

HERMETICA

THE ANCIENT GREEK AND LATIN
WRITINGS WHICH CONTAIN RELIGIOUS
OR PHILOSOPHIC TEACHINGS ASCRIBED TO
HERMES TRISMEGISTUS

EDITED

WITH ENGLISH TRANSLATION AND NOTES

BY

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VOLUME III

Notes on the Latin Asclepius
and the Hermetic Excerpts of
Stobaeus

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PREFACE

THE manuscript of this volume was revised, and some of the proofs read, by Mr. Scott before he died. I have endeavoured to carry out his intentions. Some additional notes have been inserted, though sparingly ; these are distinguished by square brackets.

Mr. F. Ll. Griffith allowed me to draw freely upon his knowledge of Egyptian antiquities. The officials of the Clarendon Press met, or anticipated, my needs. The task of picking up the threads in so large a work was lightened by one of the readers of the Press, Mr. S. Dixon, who has given me invaluable help. I wish to thank them and others who have advised me.

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ARMSTRONG COLLEGE,
NEWCASTLE-ON-TYNE,
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HERMETICA



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THE LATIN ASCLEPIUS

Title. The *incipit* and *explicit* of the MSS. of the Latin *Asclepius* show that the title which the translator found at the head of his Greek text was Ἑρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου βίβλος ἱερὰ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιὸν προσφωνηθεῖσα. But the Greek document was known to Lactantius and Lydus by the title Ἑρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου λόγος τέλειος.¹ Lactantius quotes under this title both from *Ascl.* I and from *Ascl.* III; and one of his quotations is taken from the Epilogue (i. e. the narrative passage appended at the end of *Ascl.* III), which is connected with and presupposes the Prologue prefixed to *Ascl.* I. It appears therefore that the λόγος τέλειος as known to Lactantius included all that is contained in our Latin *Asclepius*; and the title λόγος τέλειος may have been given to the document by the redactor who joined together *Ascl.* I, *Ascl.* II, and *Ascl.* III.

Stobaeus, 4. 52. 47, quotes the Greek of *Ascl.* III. 27 e (vol. i, p. 364) under the heading Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Ἀσκληπιόν. It is possible therefore that the Greek original of *Ascl.* III, as a separate document, was included in the *Hermes to Asclepius* collection, and that Stobaeus knew it in that form, and not as a part of the larger whole to which the title λόγος τέλειος was applied. Cyril (c. *Julian.* 4. 130 E) quotes from Hermes Trismegistus ἐν ἑαυτῷ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιόν a passage which appears to be a lengthened form of *Ascl.* III. 29 b *init.*; it is possible that the original of *Ascl.* III was known to him also as a separate document.

The full title of the composite document was probably Ἑρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου βίβλος ἱερὰ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιὸν προσφωνηθεῖσα, ἢ ἐπικαλουμένη Λόγος τέλειος.² The title Λόγος τέλειος means 'a discourse in which the teaching is brought to completion',³ i. e. one which follows on

¹ Lact. *Div. inst.* 4. 6. 4 (*Ascl.* I. 8). *Ib.* 7. 18. 3 (*Ascl.* III. 26 a). *Ib.* 6. 25. 11 (*Ascl.* III. 41 a). Lydus *De mensibus* 4. 7 (*Ascl.* III. 19 b and 39). *Ib.* 4. 3² (summary of a lost passage of the *Asclepius*; see *Ascl.* III. 33 b, vol. i, p. 368). *Ib.* 4. 148 (a sentence from the same lost passage).

² Compare the heading of the *Kore Kósmu* (*Éxc.* XXIII) in Stobaeus: Ἑρμοῦ τρισμεγίστου ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς βίβλου (τῆς) ἐπικαλουμένης Κόρης κόσμου. Title of a book of magic, Dieterich *Adraxas*, p. 169: βίβλος ἱερὰ ἐπικαλουμένη Μονὰς ἢ Ὁγδὴ Μουσεῖος, περὶ τοῦ ὀνόματος τοῦ ἁγίου. *Ib.* p. 170: Ἑρμῆς . . . ἱερὰ Βύβλω ἐπικαλουμένη Πτέρυγι.

³ Reitzenstein (*Hellenist. Mysterienrel.* pp. 96 and 166) assumes that the word τέλειος is intended to suggest τελετή; and he takes the title to mean 'a discourse

and completes the instruction given in earlier discourses. It may be translated 'the crowning discourse'. It implies that this document is to be regarded as containing the most advanced teaching of Hermes, and as representing the final stage of the pupil's religious education. The discourse reported in it is 'omnium antea a nobis factorum divinior', says Hermes, ch. 1 a; and he who has grasped its meaning will be 'omnium bonorum tota mente plenissimus'. In other words, he will have attained to complete *gnosis*; he will 'see God', or be united with God.

Below the Greek title stands the short title *Asclepius*; and this is followed in the MSS. by the words 'Asclepius iste pro sole mihi est',—a note written by some admiring reader. The man who wrote it meant 'This dialogue is a source of light and life to me'.

Prologue

1 a, 1 b. *Deus, deus . . . orsus dicere*. The narrative passage 1 b, *Tu vero . . . orsus dicere*, has almost certainly been added by a redactor, and probably by the person who joined the three documents together. The similar narrative passage 41 a, at the end of *Ascl.*, refers back to 1 b, and was presumably written by the same hand. In most of the extant *Hermetica*, the text consists wholly of speeches in *oratio recta*, and contains no narrative; and in nearly all of them, Hermes speaks to a single hearer alone.¹ In *Ascl.* 1 b,

concerned with initiation'. But I do not think that this interpretation can be accepted. The *Asclepius* has nothing to do with initiation; it contains no trace of theurgy or sacramentalism (except so far as the defence of the established temple-cults in *Ascl.* III may be taken to imply approval of the use of such methods in the worship of the *dei terreni*). The relation of Hermes to Asclepius in this dialogue is not that of a hierophant to the *mystes* whom he initiates, but that of a teacher to the pupil whom he instructs. It is true that in *Ascl.* III. 19 a Hermes says 'divina (tibi) nudo mysteria'; but this merely means 'I reveal holy truths to you'; and it no more implies that a sacramental operation is taking place, than do the words of Paul in 1 *Cor.* 15. 51, ἰδοὺ μυστήριον ὑμῖν λέγω πάντες οὐ κοιμηθήσόμεθα, πάντες δὲ ἀλλαγῆσόμεθα κ.τ.λ. Moreover, the proper word for 'concerned with initiation' is not τέλειος, but τελεστικός. The adjective τέλειος is indeed sometimes used with reference to initiations; e. g. Plato (*Sympos.* 210 A) describes the 'greater mysteries' of Eros as τὰ τέλεια καὶ ἐποπτικά; and Hippolytus (*Ref. haer. prooem.*, Duncker and Schn., p. 4), speaking of the mysteries of heretical sects, says μούσι, τὸ τέλειον τῶν κακῶν παραδιδόντες. . . . ὁ γὰρ ὑπομείνας . . . παραλαβεῖν τὰ τέλεια αὐτῶν μυστήρια κ.τ.λ. But such instances do not suffice to prove that the word could be used in this sense as an epithet of λόγος, 'a discourse'; and it is difficult to believe that the title can have been understood by Greek readers to imply that the discourse is, or has to do with, a τελετή.

Eusebius (*Hist. eccl.* 10. 1. 3) calls the tenth and last book of his history (i. e. the book in which he celebrates the final triumph of the Christian Church over its Pagan opponents) τὸν τέλειον . . . καὶ πανηγυρικὸν τῆς τῶν ἐκκλησιῶν ἀνανέωσης λόγον.

¹ The plural 'you' occurs however in Hermes *ap.* Cyril. c. *Julian.* i. 556; and

two other pupils besides Asclepius are introduced ; and in *Ascl.* 41 a, the presence of one of these two is mentioned, and that of the other is to be presumed. But in the greater part of the dialogue, Hermes addresses Asclepius alone, and shows no sign of consciousness that others are present. Hence it may be inferred that *Ascl.* I, *Ascl.* II, and *Ascl.* III, in their original form, mentioned no pupil except Asclepius, and that the passages in which the presence of other listeners is mentioned or implied have been added or altered by the person who put the separate documents together to make a larger whole. The redactor intended the composite document to be regarded as a *Λόγος τελειος*,—the consummation of Hermes' teaching ; and he may have thought it fitting that the privilege of receiving the crowning revelation of the inspired teacher should not be restricted to a single disciple, but should be shared by the three men who were known by tradition as pupils of Hermes.

The passages in which the presence of other hearers besides Asclepius is implied are the following. Prologue, 1 b. *Ascl.* I. 6 c: 'vobis exponam.'—'vobis expediam.'—7 a: 'vobis praestabo rationem.' *Ascl.* II. 16 a: 'Ne ergo dix(er)i(tis), o Asclepi et Hammon.'—'vestri tamen causa.' *Ascl.* III. 24 b: 'istud vos ignorare fas non est.' 25: 'mihi credite.' 32 b: 'et vos, o Tat et Asclepi et Hammon, . . . mysteria silentio tegite.' 34 b: 'o Asclepi et vos qui adestis, scitote.' Epilogue, 40 d: 'Dictum est vobis de singulis.' 41 a. In the case of some of these passages, there are grounds for suspecting interpolation, apart from the question of the number of listeners.

In the following passages, Asclepius appears to be the only hearer:—*Ascl.* I. 2 a: 'O Asclepi' (*bis*).—'Curato meminisse.' 2 b: 'meministi.' 3 b: 'Nunc mihi adesto totus,' &c. 6 a: 'O Asclepi.' 7 a: 'O Asclepi.' 8 *init.*: 'Audi ergo, Asclepi.' 9 *init.*: 'O Asclepi, animadverto ut . . . festines audire. . . Audi itaque, O Asclepi.' 10 *init.*: 'Rationem . . . o Asclepi . . . cupio te . . . percipere.' 11 b: 'Talem quo munere credis esse munerandum?' 12 b: 'Tibi quasi praedivins dixerō.' 13 *init.*: 'O Asclepi.'—*Ascl.* III. 19 a: 'Magna tibi pando . . . mysteria.'—'tu, si intendas, poteris pervidere.' 20 a *init.*: 'o Asclepi.' 20 b: 'Haec ergo ratio, o Asclepi, tibi sit reddita.' 21: 'Asclepi.'—'recte poteris nuncupare.' 22 b: 'Audi itaque.' 23 b: 'o Asclepi, . . . cognosce.'

in the introductory sentence of *Corp.* X it is assumed that Asclepius is present as well as Tat, to whom the discourse of Hermes is addressed.

—‘Miraris, o Asclepi, an . . . et tu diffidis?’ 24 a: ‘o Asclepi. Videsne quatenus tu ipse diffidas?’ 24 b: ‘An ignoras, o Asclepi?’ 25: ‘Quid fles, o Asclepi?’ 26 a: ‘o Asclepi.’ 26 b: ‘o Asclepi.’ 27 a: ‘o Asclepi, ut ego te docebo.’ 28: ‘Audi ergo, o Asclepi.’ —‘cavendumque esse cognosce.’—‘Asclepi.’ 29 c: ‘crede, o Asclepi.’ 32 b: ‘Vides ergo, o Asclepi.’ 33 c: ‘Asclepi, inane nihil dixeris.’ 34 c: ‘Quae si intellexeris, o Asclepi, gratias acturus es deo.’ 35: ‘o Asclepi.’ 36: ‘Vides ergo, o Asclepi, tibi’ &c. —‘hoc vis dicere.’ 37: ‘Avus enim tuus, Asclepi.’—‘o Asclepi.’ 38 a: ‘o Asclepi.’ 38 b: ‘ne putassis . . . o Asclepi.’ 39: ‘o Asclepi.’ Some of these passages prove little; but there are some of them which could hardly have been written by one who assumed that other pupils besides Asclepius were present. E. g. Hermes could hardly have said ‘I reveal great mysteries to *thee*’ (19 a), if he was revealing them to two other persons at the same time. It seems more likely that in the original documents Asclepius alone was addressed, and that the redactor changed a singular into a plural here and there, but did not think it worth while to alter the words of address throughout.

It is more difficult to decide whether the words of Hermes (1 a, ‘Deus . . . cognosces’) which precede the narrative of 1 b were also added by the redactor, or whether they formed the beginning of the original *Ascl. I*. But I am inclined to think it more probable that the whole of ch. 1 is the redactor’s work, and that the original *Ascl. I* began with the words ‘O Asclepi, omnis . . . anima’ in ch. 2 a; for these words open a fresh topic, and are not in any way connected with 1 a. Besides, the inflated language in which the superiority of this discourse to all earlier *Hermetica* is asserted in 1 a seems to me to be hardly in keeping with the sober sincerity of the writer of *Ascl. I*; whereas it agrees better with the attitude of the redactor, who appears to have thought that, by stitching together different documents, he could produce a complete and final exposition of Hermetic doctrine, a *Λόγος τέλειος*, in a single treatise.

1 a. divino sermoni. The discourse of Hermes is ‘divine’ (*θεῖος*), in the sense that the speaker is possessed or inspired by God; it is the voice of God that speaks through the lips of the human teacher. Hermes adds that the discourse he is about to utter will be ‘more divine’ than any that he has uttered before; that is, he

feels himself to be more completely or more intensely possessed by the deity. (This is the writer's way of saying that the *Asclepius* is superior to all Hermetic treatises that have been written before it. Cf. *Corp.* XVI. 1 a: μέγαν σοι (τούτον) τὸν λόγον . . . διεπεμφάμην, πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ὡσπερ κορυφὴν καὶ ὑπόμνημα. *Herm. ap. Stob. Exx.* VI. 1: ὁ κυριώτατος πάντων λόγος καὶ κορυφαίωτατος οὗτος ἂν εἴη). And Hermes infers from the opportuneness of his pupil's arrival that God will Asclepius to hear the impending revelation, and has therefore prompted him to come at this time. Cf. Hermes in Cyril *c. Julian.* i. 556 B: εἰ μὴ πρόνοιά τις ἦν τοῦ πάντων κυρίου ὥστε με τὸν λόγον τούτον ἀποκαλύψαι, κ.τ.λ.

omnium . . . diviniior. This is one of several instances in which the translator has rendered a Greek genitive by a Latin genitive, though Latin usage requires an ablative. For the genitive after a comparative, cf. *Ascl.* III. 22 b *fin.*, 'meliorem et diis . . . et omnium mortalium.' (The same construction occurs in Apuleius *De Platone* 1. 9 *init.*: 'Animam . . . omnium gignentium esse seniore.') Genitive absolute, *Ascl.* III. 27 e, 'numeri conpleti': 29 c, 'viventis . . . partis'. See also *Ascl.* I. 5, 'accedit . . . daemonum'.

vel nobis divino numine inspiratorum. Hermes corrects the phrase *a nobis factorum*; for his discourses are not composed by him, but by God, who speaks through him. He is ἐνθεος.

On the subject of inspiration, Egyptians, Hebrews, and Greeks thought much alike, from the earliest times to which we can trace back their thoughts; and in the time of the Roman Empire, Pagans, Jews, and Christians spoke of it in similar terms. See Philo *Quis rer. div. heres* 52. 259 *sqq.*, quoted in note on *Corp.* XVIII. 3.

The Hermetists, when they ascribe their own compositions to the inspired teacher Hermes, are employing a literary artifice; but it does not follow from this that there is no serious meaning in their assertions that the teaching comes from God. There can be little doubt that some of them at least felt themselves to be ἐνθεοι, and were sincerely convinced that both in their oral teaching, and in the writings in which they reproduced that teaching, God spoke through them. A similar belief in his own inspiration was held by Philo; e. g. *De Cher.* 9. 27, Cohn I, p. 176: ἤκουσα δέ ποτε καὶ σπουδαιοτέρου λόγου παρὰ ψυχῆς ἐμῆς, εἰωθίας τὰ πολλὰ θεοληπτέωσθαι καὶ περὶ ὧν οὐκ οἶδε μαντεύεσθαι ὄν, ἐὰν δύνωμαι, ἀπομνημονεύσας ἐρῶ. *De somn.* 2. 38. 252, Wendland III, p. 298: ἐπηχεῖ δέ μοι πάλιν τὸ εἰωθὸς

ἀφανῶς ἐνομιλεῖν πνεῦμα ἄορατον, καί φησιν κ.τ.λ. In a similar sense Christian writers spoke of themselves as inspired by the πνεῦμα θεοῦ or ἅγιον πνεῦμα.

religiosa pietate. I suppose these words to be dependent on *videatur*; it is the fervent piety of Hermes' utterance that proves it to be *divinior*. If this is the meaning, the words are awkwardly placed; but perhaps they have been shifted.

Quem (*sc. sermonem*) **si intellegens** (deum) **videris.** It seems necessary to insert an accusative, in order to provide *videris* with an object; for *sermonem videre* is hardly a possible phrase.

eris omnium bonorum tota mente plenissimus. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 4 a: ὁ (τὸν θεόν) ἐπιγνούς, πλήρης γενόμενος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν, τὰς νοήσεις θέας ἴσχει. It is assumed that the *gnosis* of God involves the actual presence of God in the soul. And God is τὸ ἀγαθόν; in him all goods are comprised.

Alterum enim alterius consentaneum esse dinoscitur. What are the two things which are inseparably joined together? Are they *deum videre* and *bonorum plenissimum esse*? Or *omnia bona* and *unum bonum*? Or *omnia* and *unum*? For *omnia* and *unum*, cf. *Corp.* XVI. 3.

[**omnia unius esse, aut unum esse omnia.**] These words may be a misplaced duplicate of *omnia unum esse et unum omnia* in ch. 2 a; or possibly the remains of a marginal note on *unum in quo sunt omnia*.

1 b. ad eius nomen multa meminimus a nobis esse conscripta. The writer of this passage knew a large body of Hermetic writings. Among those known to him were a large number of documents entitled *Hermes to Ammon*; a large number entitled *Hermes to Tat* and described as φυσικά; and a very large number entitled *Hermes to Tat* and described as διεξοδικά. The φυσικά are presumably identical with the documents elsewhere called οἱ γενικοί λόγοι. From the words 'omnium antea a nobis factorum' addressed to Asclepius in 1 a, it may be inferred that the writer also knew numerous documents entitled *Hermes to Asclepius*. Thus it appears that, at the time when the Prologue was written, the greater part of the body of religious *Hermetica* known in the fourth century A. D. and later was already in existence. We have found reason to conclude that the original of *Ascl.* III, as a separate document, was written in or about A. D. 270; and the composite λόγος τέλειος was known to Lactantius about A. D. 310. The redactor who joined the

several documents together must therefore have done his work at some time between A. D. 270 and A. D. 310; the Prologue, if written by him, must have been written between those dates; and by that time the collection of *Hermetica* must have been nearly completed.

Hermes is here made to speak of himself as the *writer* of the documents in which his conversations with his pupils are recorded ('a nobis esse conscripta.'—'Tractatum hunc autem tuo inscribam nomine'¹). Are we intended to suppose that Hermes, after discoursing to his pupils, sat down and wrote out a verbal report of the discussion? It looks as if the writer wished to take advantage of the veneration with which the ancient books supposed to have been written by Thoth were regarded in Egypt, and sought to represent the document which he was writing as one of the same class, abandoning for the moment the fiction of a spoken dialogue.

inreligiosae mentis est multorum conscientia publicare. The doctrine revealed by Hermes to his chosen disciples must be kept secret from others. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 32 b (inserted by the redactor?); 'intra secreta pectoris divina mysteria . . . celate.' *Corp.* XIII. 22 b and 13 b. *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* XI. 4, 5.

On the other hand, the writer of *Ascl.* I (12 b) speaks bitterly of the *invidia* and *malignitas* of teachers who exclude men from 'the true philosophy'. In *Corp.* I, the prophet is bidden to preach to all who will listen; and in *Corp.* VII we have a specimen of preaching addressed to the many.

adytum. What sort of place is the 'sanctuary' (*ἄδυτον*) in which Hermes instructs his disciples? It cannot be the 'Holy of Holies' of a public temple; for it does not appear that the teacher is specially concerned with the cult of any particular 'terrestrial god'. If the writer had wished to connect him with some temple-worship, he might have represented him as a priest occupied in the service of his grandfather, the god Thoth-Hermes (*Ascl.* III. 37); but he has not done so. Probably therefore we are meant to understand by the *adytum* a private cell or chamber set apart for solitary prayer and contemplation, to which the teacher now and then admitted a few select companions for religious conferences. It is possible that the Hermetists of the writer's circle made a practice of thus reserving a chamber for private adoration of the supreme God. Such a chamber would correspond to that which is described by Philo in his account

¹ This is as if, in Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates were made to say 'I will write your name, Phaedo, at the head of this dialogue as its title'.

of the Therapeutae, *De vita contempl.* 3. 23, Cohn VI, p. 52: οἴκημα ἱερόν, ὃ καλεῖται σεμνεῖον καὶ μοναστήριον, ἐν ᾧ μονούμενοι τὰ τοῦ σεμνοῦ βίον μυστήρια τελοῦνται.

sanctoque illo quattuor virorum religione et divina [dei] completo praesentia. *Divina* and *dei* are probably alternative translations of τοῦ θεοῦ. *Sanctum* might be used as a substantive, in the sense of ἱερόν, 'a holy place'; (it is thus used in the Vulgate;) but if this were the meaning, we should have to take *completo* with it, and translate 'that holy place being filled with the pious awe of the four men'. As *completo* is hardly an appropriate word in this connexion, it seems better to take *sancto* as a participle, in the sense 'having been consecrated' (ἀγιασθέντος τοῦ ἀδύτου).

⟨(ex ore Hermu)⟩ **divinus Cupido sic est orsus dicere.** The phrase *divinus Cupido* (ὁ θεῖος ἔρως) is a reminiscence of Plato's *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. 'The ἔρως of God' means man's yearning for union with God. But this desire is implanted in man by God; it is regarded as a manifestation of the deity,—a δύναμις of God, indwelling and operative in the human soul; and as such, it is here personified. (See Plotinus 3. 5: περὶ ἔρωτος, πότερα θεός τις ἢ δαίμων ἢ πάθος τι τῆς ψυχῆς, κ.τ.λ.) It is not the merely human teacher that speaks; a higher power speaks through him. Accordingly, 'Eros spoke thus through the lips of Hermes' is substituted for the more obvious phrase 'Hermes spoke thus'. But the statement would be incomplete without an express mention of Hermes; I have therefore transposed the words *ex ore Hermu* to this place.

Asclepius I

2 a. omnis humana immortalis est anima: sed non uniformiter cunctae . . . ; non enim [] omnis unius qualitatis est anima. The meaning of this obscure passage appears to be that the souls of men are immortal, and differ in that respect from the souls of the lower animals, which are mortal. (Cf. *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* IV A. 5: ἰδέαι δὲ ψυχῶν, θεία, ἀνθρωπίνη, ἄλογος.) The merely animal life or soul (the *anima* of ch. 2 b *fin.* and 3 a) is spoken of as a thing distinct from the four corporeal elements; but it is included, together with them, under the sway of φύσις ('anima et mundus a natura comprehensa agitantur'); it is conveyed into or generated in the individual organism by the entrance of the two finer elements, fire and air, into a body composed of the two grosser elements, earth and water; and at the dissolution of the material

organism, the individual animal ceases to live. Man also, as long as he is embodied on earth, possesses a quasi-material and perishable soul, of the same nature as that of the beasts (the *θηητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς* spoken of in Pl. *Timaeus*); but to this mortal soul is added, in man, the *νοῦς*, which is imperishable; (see ch. 6 b, 'quae quinta pars soli homini concessa est', and ch. 7 b, 'solum enim animal homo duplex est', &c. ;) and the human soul, in virtue of its possession of *νοῦς*, is immortal. (Cf. Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* XI. 2. (8): *ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν αἰσθη-τρικὸν θνητόν, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἀθάνατον.*) If this is the writer's view, his doctrine of the soul must have been arrived at by a blending of Platonic and Stoic theories.

The inappropriate words 'vel tempore' may have arisen out of a variant reading *χρόνῳ* for *τρόπῳ* (*more*).

In the MSS., the words 'non enim, o Trismegiste, omnis unius qualitatis est anima' are given as a question asked by Asclepius. 'Is not all soul of one quality?' 'No; for all things have been created by God.' But that is nonsense; the answer has nothing to do with the question. The reproachful reply of Hermes ('O Asclepi, ut celeriter', &c.) must have been called forth by some remark of Asclepius which has fallen out of the text. The point on which Hermes insists in his reply is that all things without exception have been created by God; Asclepius then must have suggested that there is something which has not been created by God, but exists independently of him. And as the thing of which Hermes has been speaking is *anima*, it may be conjectured that Asclepius said 'Is not *anima* uncreated (*ἀγέννητος*)?' or something to that effect. But if Asclepius asked this question, there must have been something in the preceding speech of Hermes to suggest it; and the needed suggestion might be supplied by inserting the words *creatae sunt animae* after *aliae alio more*, where there appears to be a lacuna in the text.

hoc dixi, omnia unum esse et unum omnia. In ch. 1 a, something is said about *unum* and *omnia*; but that passage contains nothing to the effect that all things have been created by God, which is the point here emphasized. The words in ch. 2 a therefore cannot very well be explained as a reference to ch. 1 a; and we must conclude that Hermes is here referring to previous dialogues in which he has taught this doctrine to Asclepius. The writer, no doubt, found it repeatedly expounded in the *Hermes to Asclepius* documents in his possession. If the Prologue was added by the redactor, he

must have had ch. 2 a before him when he wrote it, and his statements about *omnia* and *unum* in ch. 1 a may have been suggested to him by what he read in ch. 2 a.

The Hermetists who repeat the old saying that 'all things are one', or assert that 'the One (i. e. God) is all things', mean thereby that all things in the Kosmos derive their being from the one supra-cosmic God, or are manifestations of his energy. Thus the writer here makes use of the statement *omnia unum esse et unum omnia* as implying that all things have been created by God, and consequently, as excluding the hypothesis that *anima* exists independently of God. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 9: 'qui solus omnia aut pater est omnium.' *Ascl.* III. 19 c: 'ex uno etenim cuncta pendentia ex eoque defluentia, cum distantia videntur, creduntur esse quam plurima, adunata vero, unum.' *Corp.* V. 9. *Corp.* IX. 9: αὐτὸς ἅπαντά ἐστιν. *Corp.* X. 2. *Corp.* XI. ii. 14 a: αὐτὸς ὦν ὁ ποιεῖ. *Corp.* XIII. 2 sqq. (God is τὸ ἐν καὶ τὸ πᾶν; and accordingly, he who is 'born again', and thereby identified with God, becomes, like God himself, τὸ πᾶν, ἐν παντί.) *Corp.* XVI. 3 and 19.

The Hermetists, even when they use such phrases as these, do not identify God with the Kosmos in the sense in which the Stoics did; they still hold fast to the Platonic doctrine that the supreme God is incorporeal and supracosmic; and when they assert that 'God is all things', they mean by this merely to emphasize the dependence of the Kosmos on the supracosmic God. On the other hand, there are some among them who insist rather on the distinction between God and the Kosmos; see e. g. *Corp.* VI (God alone is good, and all else is devoid of good). But the strongest contrast to ἐν τὰ πάντα is to be found in *Ascl.* II, where θεός and ἕλη are spoken of as co-existent and almost co-equal ἀρχαί of the universe.

The saying 'All things are one' occurs first in Heraclitus, Diels fr. 50: οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν ἐν πάντα εἶναι. As used by him, it might be taken to mean either that all things are formed by the changes of one living material substance, viz. fire, (Heracl. fr. 10, ἐκ πάντων ἐν καὶ ἐξ ἐνὸς πάντα,) or that all changes are determined by one unchanging law (Heracl. fr. 30, κόσμον τόνδε τὸν αὐτὸν ἀπάντων). The same words were employed by Plato to summarize the Eleatic doctrine of changeless being. Pl. *Theaet.* 180 E: ὅσα Μέλισσοί τε καὶ Παρμενίδαι . . . δισχυρίζονται, ὡς ἐν τε πάντα ἐστὶ καὶ ἔστηκεν αὐτὸ ἐν αὐτῷ. *Id.* 183 E: Μέλισσον μὲν καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους οἱ ἐν ἐστὸς λέγουσι τὸ πᾶν. Pl. *Parmen.* 128 A: σὺ μὲν

γὰρ (Parmenides) ἐν τοῖς ποιήμασιν ἐν φῆς εἶναι τὸ πᾶν. The nearest approach to this in the extant fragments of Parmenides is fr. 8. 5 Diels: οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται (sc. τὸ εἶν), ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἐν, συνεχές. Cf. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 303: Μέλισσος καὶ Ζήνων τὸ ἐν καὶ πᾶν (sc. θεὸν εἶναι). Cic. *Acad.* 2. 118: 'Xenophanes . . . unum esse omnia, neque id esse mutabile, et id esse deum.'

The saying of Heraclitus and Parmenides, ἐν πάντα εἶναι, became widely current,¹ chiefly through the mediation of the Stoics; and it was adopted by the Hermetists, in a sense modified to suit their doctrine.

utpote quae in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia. Since all things which exist have been brought into being by God's will, they must have existed in his thought and purpose before they came into being in the world of sense. Similarly, it might be said that things which do not yet exist in the world of sense, but will come into being in the future, exist already in God's thought; and that the universe as a whole, before it came into being as a κόσμος αἰσθητός, already existed, as a κόσμος νοητός, in God's mind. Thus Philo, *De opif. mundi* 4. 17 ff., compares the νοητός κόσμος to the plan of a city, which exists in the architect's mind before he builds the city. Cf. *Corp.* V. 9 and *Corp.* XI. ii. 20 a.

A similar thought was expressed in mythical form in the Orphic *Theogonia* (Ptolemaic period?), where it was said that Zeus prepared himself for his task of generating the sensible universe by 'swallowing' all that pre-existed. Abel, *Orphica*, §§ 119-124.

2 b. De caelo cuncta (. . .) in terram et in aquam, et in aera ignis. Hermes begins his exposition by explaining how all living things are brought into being. The life of all organisms on earth results from movements and interactions of the four corporeal elements.

The meaning of *De caelo cuncta* . . . may perhaps be inferred

¹ See the section headed *El ἐν τὸ πᾶν* in Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 291, where it is said that this question was answered in the affirmative by the Stoics and Plato. Cf. Philo *Leg. alleg.* 1. 14. 44, Cohn I, p. 72: καὶ ἰκανὸς αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ ὁ θεός, τὰ μὲν ἄλλα, ἐπιθεᾶ καὶ ἔρημα καὶ κενὰ ὄντα, πληρῶν καὶ περιέχων, αὐτὸς δὲ ἕν' οὐδενὸς ἄλλου περιεχόμενος, ἄτε εἰς καὶ τὸ πᾶν αὐτὸς ἄν. Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 1. *Prolog.* 13: 'Quid est deus? Mens universi. Quid est deus? Quod vides (τὸ ὄρατον) totum et quod non vides (τὸ ἀόρατον) totum. Sic demum magnitudo sua illi redditur, . . . si solus est omnia, opus suum et extra et intra tenet.'

Reitzenstein (*Myst.* p. 91) compares with the Hermetic use of the phrase *Corp. Inscr. Lat.* X. 3800: 'tibi, quae una es omnia, dea Isis'; and Martial 5. 24. 15: 'Hermes, omnia solus et ter unus.' A book of magic, entitled *Ἐν [καὶ] τὸ πᾶν, is mentioned in the 'Eighth Book of Moses', Dieterich *Abrahas*, p. 203.

from the words *caelum . . . administrator est omnium corporum* in ch. 3 c. The interactions of the elements, through which living organisms are brought into being and maintained in existence, result from the movements of the heavenly bodies.

The beginning of the sentence *in terram* &c. is lost; but the writer's meaning seems to have been that fire, the vivifying element *par excellence*, enters into and vivifies air, and air vivified by fire enters into and vivifies the two grosser elements, earth and water.

This theory of the elements and their relation to life closely resembles that of the Stoics; and the Hermetist must either have derived it directly from a Stoic source, or taken it from some syncretic Platonist who had borrowed from the Stoics.

Solum quod sursum versus fertur vivificum; quod deorsum, ei deserviens. *Quod sursum versus fertur* is τὸ ἀνωφερές; and *quod deorsum (fertur)* is τὸ κατωφερές. The terms ἀνωφερής and κατωφερής, as applied to the elements, are of Stoic origin; they are not employed by Aristotle, who uses in a corresponding sense the words κουφός and βαρύς. Chrysippus (Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 42, 1053 e: Arnim *Stoic. vet.* II, p. 143) τὸ τε πῦρ, ἀβαρὲς ὄν, ἀνωφερὲς εἶναι λέγει, καὶ τούτῳ παραπλησιῶς τὸν ἀέρα. The ἀνωφερῆ¹ then are the two light elements, fire and air; the κατωφερῆ are the two heavy elements, earth and water. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 6: τὸ μὲν ἀνωφερὲς [ὡς πῦρ] καὶ κατωφερὲς [ὡς γῆ].

We are here told that fire and air alone are *vivifica*; in ch. 6 b, we are told (in a clause which I have bracketed) that 'spiritus (πνεῦμα), permixtus cunctis, cuncta vivificat'. It appears then that πνεῦμα must be identical with fire and air; it must be air into which fire has entered, or in other words, it must be a mixture of fire and air. And this is precisely the Stoic doctrine. Alexander Aphrod. *De mixtione* p. 224 Bruns: τὸ πῦρ . . . καὶ ὁ ἀήρ, . . . ἐξ ὧν μίγνυμένων τὸ πνεῦμα γίγνεται (according to the Stoics).²

¹ Arius Didymus (Diels *Doxogr.* p. 459), reporting Zeno, uses ἀνώφοιτα in the same sense: ἀβαρῆ εἶναι ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ . . . φύσει γὰρ ἀνώφοιτα ταῦτ' εἶναι διὰ τὸ μηδενὸς μετέχειν βάρους.

² Cf. Ar. *Gen. an.* 736 a 1: τὸ δὲ πνεῦμά ἐστι θερμὸς ἀήρ. With regard to the portion of πνεῦμα which is contained in an individual living body, the Stoics seem to have held that the fire in it (τὸ θερμόν) is that in which the power of self-movement (the essence of life) resides, and the air in it (τὸ ψυχρόν) is that by which τὸ θερμόν is detained within the organism, and prevented from flying up to its natural place above. (See Galen *De tremore, palpit., convuls.* 6, vol. vii, p. 616 κ, Arnim II, p. 147.) And in this way the statement of Chrysippus quoted in Plut. *De Stoic. repugn.* 43, p. 1053 F, (οὐδὲν ἄλλο τὰς ἕξεις πλὴν ἀέρας εἶναι

quicquid de alto descendit generans est; quod sursum versus emanat, nutriens. The things which 'descend from on high' are fire and air. They are ἀνωφερῆ by their own nature; but by the operation of the heavenly bodies they are sent down from their natural place above to enter bodies composed of earth and water, and generate life in them. (An obvious instance of these *generantia* may be seen in the light and heat radiated by the sun.) Earth and water are the *nutrientia*; they 'issue from below' (e. g. in the form of plants which grow up from the soil, and water-springs which rise out of the earth), and serve as food and drink to build up the bodies of men and beasts. Cf. 6 b: 'corpora ex aqua et terra, inferiori(bu)s mundi elementis, augescunt.'

The words ἀνωφερῆς and κατωφερῆς are differently applied in Herm. ap. Stob. *Exc.* XI. 2. (40): αἱ ἐνέργειαι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνωφερεῖς, ἀλλὰ κατωφερεῖς. The ἐνέργειαι there spoken of are the life-giving operations of the heavenly bodies, or of the fire and air which are sent down to earth by the action of the heavenly bodies; and κατωφερεῖς, as applied to them, corresponds, not to *quod deorsum (feriur)* in *Ascl.* I. 2 b, but to *quicquid de alto descendit*.

Terra, sola in se ipsa consistens, omnium est ((*gener(anti)-um*)) *receptrix, omniumque* [[*generum*]] *quae accepit restituitrix.* The contradiction between *quod sursum versus emanat* (as applied to earth) and *in se ipsa consistens* is merely verbal. Portions of earth are taken up into the bodies of plants, beasts, and men; but the solid mass of the earth stands fast at the centre of the universe, and receives on its surface the *generantia* (i. e. portions of air and fire, or πνεῦμα, from above,) by which these bodies are vitalized. At the dissolution of the individual organism, the *generantia* which had entered into its composition return to their natural place above; and this is what is meant by saying that the earth 'renders them back'.

Hoc ergo totum, . . . quod est omnium vel omnia, (constat ex anima et mundo). It is necessary to complete the sentence

φησιν ὑπὸ τούτων γὰρ συνέχερα: τὰ σώματα) may be reconciled with the numerous passages in which τὸ συνέχον is said to be the πνεῦμα, i. e. air and fire mixed together.

For the contrast between the pair of light elements (*vivifica*) and the pair of heavy elements (*eis deservientia*), cf. Nemesius *De nat. hom.* 5, p. 126: the Stoics say τῶν στοιχείων τὰ μὲν εἶναι δραστικά, τὰ δὲ παθητικά: δραστικά μὲν ἄερα καὶ πῦρ, παθητικά δὲ γῆν καὶ ὕδωρ. Cic. *Acad. Post.* 1. 7. 26 (from the Stoicizing Platonist Antiochus): 'aer et ignis movendi vim habent et efficiendi, reliquae partes accipiendi et quasi patiendi, aquam dico et terram.'

thus, in order to make it agree with what follows. The universe is made up of *mundus* (ἔλη, i. e. the sum of the four elements,—see ch. 3 a,—) and *anima* (ψυχή, 'life'). In the Stoic system, ψυχή is merely πνεῦμά πως ἔχον (Plotinus 4. 7. 4), i. e. a mixture of fire and air in a certain special condition; and in the Stoic authority whence the Hermetist's theory is derived, the universe must have been described as consisting of the four corporeal elements and nothing else. But the Hermetist adheres to the Platonic view that ψυχή is incorporeal, and modifies the Stoic statement accordingly. As he regards it, ψυχή is produced in the individual body, or conveyed into it, by fire and air, but is not identical with them;¹ and he consequently speaks of it here as an incorporeal substance which exists beside them. In ch. 7 b, however, he does not expressly recognize the existence of the θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς (i. e. the life which is generated in the individual by fire and air, and ceases to exist in the individual at the dissolution of the body), as a thing distinct from the corporeal elements; for he there speaks of man as consisting solely of immortal νοῦς and perishable body, including the θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς under the term 'body'.

The Greek word here rendered by *mundus* must have been ἔλη, and not κόσμος. Cf. ch. 7 b: 'quod ἑλικόν Graeci, nos mundanum dicimus.' *Ascl.* III. 17 a: 'ἔλη autem (vel mundus).'

sicut meministi: again a reference to previous dialogues.

Anima et mundus a natura comprehensa agitantur. The writer, following the usage of Aristotle and the Stoics, here employs the word φύσις to signify the force which operates in and through all *vivifica* or *generantia*, i. e. the force which brings all individual living beings into existence. 'Nature', in his view, is not a separate entity distinct from God; it is merely the sum of God's ἐνέργειαι operating in the material world; it is God's will, working through the agency of the heavenly bodies, and thereby directing the movements and interactions of the elements to the production of living organisms. But for the moment, he personifies this force, and speaks of it as though it were a living and rational agent, distinct from God, but subordinate to him,—a servant who knows her Master's will, and works with a view to his good pleasure (3 c fin. : 'natura . . . producit cuncta dei visibus placitura').

¹ Cf. Arist. *De an.* 2. 2, 414 a 19: καλῶς ὑπολαμβάνουσιν οἷς δοκεῖ μήτ' ἀνευ σώματος εἶναι μήτε σώμα τι ἢ ψυχῆ· σῶμα μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι, σώματος δέ τι. The Hermetist's conception of ψυχή (i. e. of the merely animal life, apart from νοῦς), somewhat resembles that of Aristotle.

ut infinitae qualitatum ex intervallo species [esse] nascantur. Nature so varies her operations, that no two of the individual living beings which she produces are alike. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 35: 'impossibile est formam unamquamque alteri simillimam nasci.'

Qualitas, here and elsewhere in *Ascl.*, must be a translation of ποιότης or ποιόν. Plato, *Theaet.* 182 A, says that ποιότης is a strange word (ἴσως οὖν ἡ ποιότης ἀλλόκοτον φαίνεται ὄνομα). In Aristotle, ποιόν is one of the categories; and he uses ποιότης more freely than Plato, but not very frequently. In the writings of the Stoics, ποιόν and ποιότης are terms in constant use.

Species (εἶδος), as used here and in chs. 3 c and 4, means (1) the group of qualities by which the individual is characterized, and (2) the individual, regarded as characterized by those qualities. (It must be taken in the first of these two senses in 'mundus (ἔλη) . . . praeparatus est . . . receptaculum omniformium specierum'; and in the second sense, in 'species enim pars est generis, ut homo humanitatis'.)

Plato¹ frequently uses the word εἶδος (or its equivalent ἰδέα) in the general sense of 'form'; but he also employs it in a special sense, to signify eternal and changeless types or patterns (παραδείγματα) substantively existing in separation from sensible things. In *Tim.* 52 A, he distinguishes two different kinds of εἶδος, viz. (1) the νοητὸν εἶδος, which is changeless and eternal, and (2) the αἰσθητὸν εἶδος, which is ὁμώνυμον ὁμοίων τε ἐκείνῳ (sc. τῷ νοητῷ εἶδει), but is ever in motion, γιγνόμενόν τε ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ πάλιν ἐκεῖθεν ἀπολλύμενον.² The εἶδη of *Ascl.* I correspond to the αἰσθητὸν εἶδος of *Tim.* 52 A.

Aristotle's εἶδος is not χωριστόν (i. e. has no substantive existence apart from the individual things in which it manifests itself), but in other respects resembles Plato's νοητὸν εἶδος. In Aristotle's system, the term εἶδος, as used in logical classification, means (1) the group of essential qualities common to all individuals of a class which is included in a larger class (the γένος), and (2) the class characterized by those qualities; and in his physics, the group of essential qualities to which the word εἶδος applies is regarded as the type of the kind,—a type which φύσις aims at realizing, by

¹ The usage of the words εἶδος and ἰδέα before the time of Plato is very fully discussed by Prof. A. E. Taylor, *Varia Socratica*, 1911, pp. 178-267.

² In *Tim.* 50 C, the αἰσθητὰ εἶδη are described as εἰσιόντα (εἰς τὴν ὑποδοχὴν) καὶ ἐξίόντα, τῶν ὄντων ἀεὶ (i. e. τῶν νοητῶν εἰδῶν) μμήματα, τυπωθέντα ἀπ' αὐτῶν τρόπον τινὰ δύσφραστον καὶ θαυμαστόν.

the processes of birth and growth, in each individual of the kind. The *infima species* of Aristotle is still a class, and not an individual. E. g. 'man' is an *infima species*. A man differs εἶδει from a horse; but a black man does not differ εἶδει from a white man, nor a man from a woman (*Metaph.* 9. 9, 1058a). That which constitutes the individuality of this or that man is not the εἶδος, but the ὕλη (*Metaph.* 6. 8, 1034 a 7); Callias and Socrates are identical εἶδει, but differ διὰ τὴν ὕλην, i. e. owing to the fact that the εἶδος is imposed on two different portions of ὕλη. Aristotle was of course aware that the individuals of a class or kind differ among themselves in form or quality; but he dismisses these individual differences as mere συμβεβηκότα, which cannot be made a subject of 'knowledge'; for ἐπιστήμη is concerned solely with universals.¹

Seneca, *Ep.* 58, giving an account of Platonic doctrine, distinguishes (1) the *cogitabile* (νοητόν in the sense of *general concept* of a class or kind); (2) the ἰδέα, which is 'eorum quae natura fiunt exemplar (παράδειγμα) aeternum' (i. e. the νοητόν εἶδος of Pl. *Tim.* 52 A); and (3) the εἶδος, which is 'forma ab exemplari sumpta (copied from the ἰδέα) et operi imposita' (i. e. the αἰσθητόν εἶδος of Pl. *Tim.* 52 A). *Ib.* § 16: 'quod generaliter est, tanquam homo generalis (ὁ γενικός ἄνθρωπος), sub oculos non venit; sed specialis (ὁ εἰδικὸς ἄνθρωπος, i. e. the individual man) venit, ut Cicero et Cato.'

The Platonist Albinus, in his *Epitome*² of Plato's doctrines, distinguishes τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης from the ἰδέαι. In c. 4, he says ἐπεὶ τῶν νοητῶν τὰ μὲν πρῶτα ὑπάρχει, ὡς αἱ ἰδέαι, τὰ δὲ δεύτερα, ὡς τὰ εἶδη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης, καὶ νόησις ἔσται διττή, ἢ μὲν τῶν πρῶτων,

¹ See Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. tr. vol. i, p. 369. Zeller does indeed note a few passages of Aristotle in which 'that which constitutes the difference between individuals of the same species seems to be included in the conception of their εἶδος'; and to these may be added *Περὶ μακροβ.* 1. 465 a 4: λέγω δὲ κατὰ γένος μὲν διαφέρειν ὅλον ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἵππον, . . . κατ' εἶδος δ' ἄνθρωπον πρὸς ἄνθρωπον. But Bonitz remarks on this passage 'non videtur concinere cum reliquo usu Aristotelico'; and Zeller's conclusion is that 'Aristotle's system leaves no room for individual Forms of sensible things'.

The Aristotelian commentator Asclepius (Brandis, *Scholias in Ar.*, ed. Boruss. IV. 626 a 4) speaks of the individual form, and distinguishes it from the universal form: ἡμεῖς δὲ φαμεν ὅτι πρῶτον μὲν καθὼ ἄνθρωποι οὐδὲν ἀλλήλων διαφέρουσι, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις τὸ κατατεταγμένον εἶδος τὸ κατ' ἀριθμὸν ὑπάρχον διάφορον ἔστιν· ἄλλο γὰρ εἶδος τοῦ Σωκράτους καὶ ἄλλο τοῦ Πλάτωνος. τὸ δὲ ἀκατάτακτον ὡς ἐξηρημένον ἔστι καὶ μονοειδές, καὶ διὰ τὴν γόνιμον αὐτοῦ δύναμιν καὶ μονοειδές ὑπάρχον διάφορα καὶ πολλὰ ἀπογεννᾷ. The κατατεταγμένον εἶδος and ἀκατάτακτον εἶδος of that passage correspond respectively to the εἶδος and γένος of *Ascl.* I; and the statement that the one 'generates' the other may serve to illustrate the Hermetist's statement, 'genus deorum ex se deorum facit species'.

² Printed in vol. vi of Hermann's edition of Plato, but there wrongly ascribed to 'Alcinous'.

ἡ δὲ τῶν δευτέρων. *Ib.* c. 10: πᾶν σῶμα συνδύασμά τι εἶναι ἕκ τε ὕλης καὶ τοῦ σὺν αὐτῇ εἶδους, ὅπερ ἐξομοιοῦται ταῖς ἰδέαις καὶ μετέχει αὐτῶν δύσφραστον δὴ τρόπον. The last phrase shows that he was thinking of the εἰσιόντα καὶ ἐξιόντα in *Pl. Tim.* 50 c; but since he describes the εἶδη τὰ ἐπὶ τῆς ὕλης of which he speaks as δεύτερα νοητά, they must be universals (the *cogitabilia* of Sen. *Ep.* 58), and must, as such, correspond to Aristotle's εἶδη, and not to the individual εἶδη of *Ascl.* I.

The Stoics, having freed themselves more completely than Aristotle from the influence of Plato's doctrine of the substantive existence of νοητὰ εἶδη, gave fuller recognition to the differences by which individuals of the same kind are distinguished. In opposition to the Academics, they asserted with emphasis that no two individuals are exactly alike; (see note on *Ascl.* III. 35;) and they extended the meaning of the term εἶδος so as to make it include those qualities of the individual in which it differs from others of its kind, as well as those which it possesses in common with them. 'The Stoics' in *Diog. Laert.* 7. 61: εἶδος δέ (in extension or denotation) ἐστὶ τὸ ὑπὸ τοῦ γένους περιεχόμενον, ὡς ὑπὸ τοῦ ζώου ὁ ἄνθρωπος περιέχεται. γενικώτατον δέ ἐστὶν ὁ, γένος ὄν, γένος οὐκ ἔχει (i. e. is not contained in any wider γένος), οἷον τὸ ὄν· εἰδικώτατον δέ ἐστὶν ὁ, εἶδος ὄν, εἶδος οὐκ ἔχει (i. e. contains no narrower εἶδος), ὥσπερ ὁ Σωκράτης. The εἰδικώτατον εἶδος of this passage is not the *infima species* of Aristotle, but the individual. And this use of the word εἶδος was adopted from the Stoics by men of other schools. In *Philo De aeternit. mundi* 8. 69, *Cohn VI*, p. 94, τὰ ἐν εἶδει is used in the sense of 'individuals': τῆς δὲ φύσεως, . . . ὅπερ οὐκ ἴσχυσε λαβεῖν ἡμῶν ἕκαστος, τοῦθ' ἅπαντι τῷ γένει δωρησαμένης, τὸ ἀθάνατον. μένει γὰρ εἰς αἰεὶ (τὸ γένος), φθειρομένων τῶν ἐν εἶδει. (Cf. *Ascl.* I. 4 *fin.*) *Philo De mut. nom.* 11. 78, *Wendland III*, p. 170: τὸ μὲν γὰρ εἶδος καὶ βραχὺ καὶ φθαρτόν, τὸ δὲ γένος πολὺ τε αὐτὸ καὶ ἀφθαρτόν. An exact parallel to the Hermetist's use of εἶδος occurs in *Philo Vita Mos.* 2. 11. 61, *Cohn IV*, p. 214: ἦδει γὰρ (Noah) . . . κἂν εἰ τὰ εἶδη (i. e. the individuals of each race of animals) φθείροιτο, ἀλλὰ τοὶ τὴν ἐν τοῖς γένεσιν ἀφθαρσίαν . . . διαμένουσιν. . . . μετὰ δὲ τὴν εἰσοδὸν ἀπάντων (into the ark) εἴ τις ἐθέασατο τὸ πλήρωμα, οὐκ ἂν διήμαρτεν εἰπὼν ἀντίμμορον εἶναι γῆς ἀπάσης, ἐν ἑαυτῷ φέρον τὰ ζώων γένη, ὧν καὶ ἡ σύμπασα γῆ [τὰ]¹ ἀμύθητα εἶδη (individuals)

¹ τὰ *seclusi*. The article would imply that the individuals produced after the Flood are identical with those produced before it, which is absurd.

καὶ πρότερον ἤνεγκε καὶ ἴσως ἀθις οὔσει. Contrast with this the Aristotelian use of εἶδος in *Ar. Gen. an.* 2. 1, 731 b 31: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἀδύνατος ἡ φύσις τοῦ τοιούτου γένους (*sc.* of animals) αἰδίοις εἶναι, καθ' ὃν ἐνδέχεται τρόπον, κατὰ τοῦτόν ἐστιν αἰδίοις τὸ γινόμενον. ἀριθμῶ μὲν οὖν (i. e. in the case of the individual) ἀδύνατον, . . . εἶδει δ' ἐνδέχεται. διὸ γένος αἰεὶ ἀνθρώπων καὶ ζώων ἐστὶ καὶ φυτῶν. Here Aristotle's εἶδος corresponds to the γένος of Philo and *Ascl.* I, and Aristotle's ἀριθμῶ corresponds to their εἶδος.

The writer of *Ascl.* I makes no mention of νοητὰ εἶδη in the Platonic sense, i. e. substantively existing and 'separate' παραδείγματα of things. The writer of *Ascl.* III (17 b and 35, vol. i, p. 328) differs from him in recognizing a *species incorporalis, quae divina est* (Plato's νοητὸν εἶδος), but discriminates from it the *forma visibilis* (αἰσθητὸν εἶδος, the sensible and transitory form of the individual), which corresponds to the *species* (εἶδος) of *Ascl.* I.

3 a. elementa sunt quattuor . . . : mundus unus. Here again, *mundus* stands for ὕλη. Cf. Philo *Quaest. et solut. in Exodum* 2. 88 (p. 527 Aucher): 'quamvis terra ab aqua distincta sit et aqua ab aere et aer ab igne et ignis ab istis singulis, nihilo minus tamen omnia sunt concinnata ad unam formam determinatam. Quae enim ex tot et tantis perfectum fuit materia, una convenit esse, maxime quod et elementorum mutua inter se commutatio communionem eorum evidenter arguit.' The Hermetist does not here speak of the 'elementorum mutua inter se commutatio', but perhaps assumes it to be known. The doctrine that all the four elements change into one another was taught by Aristotle and the Stoics, and by Plato in *Tim.* 49 B; but in *Tim.* 54 C, earth is excepted.

mundus unus, anima una, et deus unus. Cf. *Corp.* XI. ii. 9: μίας οὔσης τῆς ὕλης καὶ μίας τῆς ψυχῆς. All individual souls or lives are, no doubt, one in the sense that 'all things are one', as having been created by the one God, or existing only as dependent on him; but something more than this must be meant. It seems to be implied that there is one stock or reservoir of life, from which the life of every individual living being is drawn. Cf. *Corp.* X. 7: ἀπὸ μίας ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ παντός πᾶσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰσιν . . . (ὥσπερ ἀπονενεμημένοι). In the Stoic system, the μία ψυχὴ is the living fire which pervades the universe, and is identified with God. The writer of *Ascl.* I diverges from the Stoic doctrine in distinguishing ψυχὴ both from God and from the material elements; but his conception

of its relation to the elements is somewhat obscure. If life is separately generated in each individual organism by the entrance into it of portions of fire and air, what can be meant by saying that all soul is one? Perhaps he might have said that there is 'one soul' residing in (though not identical with) the whole body of fire and air, or πνεῦμα, and that the vivifica in the individual, which are temporarily separated portions of πνεῦμα, serve as vehicles for portions of that one soul or life; but the point is not clearly explained.

The words *et deus unus* somewhat awkwardly anticipate the contents of the next paragraph; and it is possible that they have been added by a later hand.

3 b. Nunc mihi adesto totus. In the preceding passage, Hermes has been speaking of ἄλη and ψυχή, i. e. of the material universe and the living beings which it contains; and his mentions of God have been merely incidental. But at this point, he passes on to speak of God, as the ultimate source of all life in the universe. Here then begins his teaching about God (*divinitatis ratio*, = θεολογία); and he introduces it with a solemn preface. Compare *Ascl.* III. 19 a, 'sublimis etenim ratio' &c.

divina sensus intentione noscenda. Man cannot apprehend God except by God's aid; it is only by virtue of the divine νοῦς implanted in him that he can attain to knowledge of God. Some degree of inspiration or divine possession in the hearer as well as in the teacher is needed to make the teaching of the *gnosis* effective.

ut intentionem nostram . . . velocitate praetereat. The teacher is the instrument through whom the divine νοῦς speaks. His human faculties may be inadequate to keep pace with the rush of inspiration; and he himself, as well as his hearers, may fail to attain to a full comprehension of the truths which the power of God impels him to utter.

3 c. Caelum ergo, sensibilis deus. The οὐρανός is called θεὸς αἰσθητός, in contrast to the supracosmic God (θεὸς νοητός or ἀόρατος). Elsewhere, the term θεὸς αἰσθητός is applied to the Kosmos; e. g. *Ascl.* I. 8 *init.*: ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε, θεὸν ὄρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητόν. The phrase is derived from Pl. *Tim. fin.*: εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ θεὸς αἰσθητὸς . . . εἰς οὐρανὸς ὄδε. In that passage, οὐρανός means 'the sphere of heaven with all that it encloses', and is equivalent to κόσμος. Cf. Ar. *De caelo* I. 9, 278 b 11: ἓνα μὲν οὖν τρόπον οὐρανὸν

λέγομεν τὴν οὐσίαν τὴν τῆς ἐσχάτης τοῦ παντός περιφορᾶς (i. e. the outermost sphere) . . . ἄλλον δ' αὖ τρόπον τὸ συνεχές σῶμα τῇ ἐσχάτῃ περιφορᾷ τοῦ παντός, ἐν ᾧ σελήνη καὶ ἥλιος καὶ ἔνια τῶν ἀστρων' . . . ἔτι δ' ἄλλως λέγομεν οὐρανὸν τὸ περιεχόμενον σῶμα ὑπὸ τῆς ἐσχάτης περιφορᾶς (i. e. the whole Kosmos)· τὸ γὰρ ὅλον καὶ τὸ πᾶν εἰώθαμεν λέγειν οὐρανόν. The Hermetist here uses the term in the first or second of Aristotle's three senses; the οὐρανός of which he speaks is either the sphere of the fixed stars, or the whole body of the heavens from the fixed stars down to the lunar sphere. He regards it as a living being,—a 'second God', who works in subordination to the supreme God, and employs Sun and Moon as his subordinates in the administration of the sublunar world.

In the growth and decay of all living organisms on earth,—i. e. in those movements and interactions of the elements by which living bodies are composed and decomposed,—the immediate agents are here said to be the Sun and the Moon. (The fixed stars and the remaining planets, which in some of the other *Hermetica* are spoken of as sharing in the administration of the lower world, are not here expressly mentioned.) In *Corp.* XI. ii. 7, the chief functions in the administration of τὰ ἐπίγεια are assigned to the Sun and the Moon. Cf. Seneca *Benef.* 4. 23: 'num dubium est quin hoc humani generis domicilium circuitus solis ac lunae vicibus suis temperet? quin alterius calore alantur corpora, . . . alterius tepore efficaci et penetrabili rigetur maturitas frugum? quin ad huius cursum fecunditas humana respondeat?' As to the Sun, cf. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 19. 49 (probably from Posidonius): 'Sol, qui astrorum tenet principatum, . . . Ita ex quattuor temporum mutationibus (i. e. the changes of season caused by the oblique movement of the sun) omnium, quae terra marique gignuntur, initia causaeque ducuntur.' Cic. *Somn. Scip.* 4. 2: '(sol) dux et princeps et moderator luminum reliquorum, mens mundi et temperatio.' In *Corp.* XVI, the Sun is (in subordination to the supracosmic God) the supreme administrator of the Kosmos. As to the function of the Moon, cf. Ar. *Gen. an.* 4. 10, 777 b 26: (ἡ σελήνη) συμβάλλεται εἰς πάσας τὰς γενέσεις καὶ τελειώσεις. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 19. 50: 'multaque ab ea (sc. luna) manant et fluunt, quibus et animantes alantur augescantque, et pubescant maturitatemque assequantur quae oriuntur e terra.' Plut. *Is. et Os.* 41, 367 D: τὴν μὲν γὰρ σελήνην, γόνιμον τὸ φῶς καὶ ὑγροποιὸν ἔχουσαν, εὐμενῆ καὶ γοναῖς ζώων καὶ φυτῶν εἶναι βλαστήσει. Plut. *Fac. in orbe lunae* 25. 18, 939 F. *Catal. Codd. Astrolog. Graec.* IV, p. 82, ex *Heliodori* (about

A. D. 500) *commentario in Paulum Alexandrinum*: (ἡ σελήνη) μάλλον τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων ἐγγυτέρω οὖσα τῆς γῆς αὖξει καὶ μειοῖ τὰ ἐν γενέσει καὶ φθορᾷ πράγματα· δι' ὃ καὶ ταύτη τὸν κλῆρον τῆς Τύχης προσωκείωσεν ὁ θεϊότατος ἐκεῖνος ἀνὴρ, λέγω δὲ τὸν τρισμέγιστον Ἑρμῆν. Heliodorus is here referring to an astrological treatise entitled 'the *Panaretos* of Hermes Trismegistus'; see Bouché-Leclercq, *L'Astrologie grecque*, p. 307.

The belief that the growth and decay of living things on earth are influenced by the moon was based in part on a fancied connexion of these processes with the waxing and waning of the moon itself. Aul. Gell. 20. 8: 'De iis quae habere *συμπάθειαν* videntur cum luna augescente et senescente.' Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 79: κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αὐξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζώων καὶ θαλασσιῶν φθίνει τε καὶ αὖξεται.¹

Caeli vero . . . per rerum naturam. A badly corrupted passage. I have tried to express what I suppose to have been the writer's meaning, by a rearrangement of the words. *Frequentatio* needs a dependent genitive; and a suitable genitive may be supplied by transposing *animae*. A genitive seems to be wanted with *effector* also; I have therefore placed with it the words *omnium generum et omnium specierum per rerum naturam*, which are unintelligible where they stand in the MSS. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 27 a: 'deus omnibus speciebus vel generibus, quae in mundo sunt, dispensator distributorque est . . . sensus, animae, et vitae.'

With (*animae*) *frequentatio fertur influens per mundum*, compare ch. 6 b, 'spiritus . . . permixtus cunctis cuncta vivificat.' πνεῦμα is the vehicle of ψυχή; and the vital element of πνεῦμα is fire. The heavenly bodies are no doubt considered to be composed of fire, as in the Stoic system; and the writer's view seems to be that they send forth vitalizing fire, which coalesces with the upper air to form πνεῦμα, and that a ceaseless stream of this πνεῦμα descends to the surface of the earth, and vitalizes the bodies into which it enters there. The εἶδη are the organic forms of these vitalized bodies, or (in the alternative use of the word) the bodies themselves, regarded as portions of matter endued with organic forms, and vitalized by πνεῦμα.

What are the *supradicta omnia*? They ought to be the heavenly bodies, if it is by the operation of the heavenly bodies that organisms

¹ Even to this day, some people in Devonshire believe that 'apples picked at wane of moon do shrivel and scrump up cruel' (Eden Phillpotts).

on earth are vitalized. But in the text of the MSS., only three such things have been recently mentioned, viz. *caelum*, *sol*, and *luna*; and the word 'all' could hardly be applied to these three alone. The meaning required may, however, be obtained by striking out *mundo* in the sentence 'Caeli vero et ipsius et omnium quae [mundo] insunt ipse gubernator est deus', and taking this to stand for τοῦ δὲ οὐρανοῦ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐνότων κ.τ.λ. The *supradicta* are πάντα τὰ ἐνότα (ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ), i. e. the heavenly bodies; and it is of them that the writer repeats what he has already said above, viz. that their operations are governed by God ('quorum idem gubernator deus omnium').

Mundus autem praeparatus est a deo receptaculum omniformium specierum. ὕλη has been made ready by God as a ἵποδοχή for all manner of εἶδη.—ὕλη ἄμορφος or ἄπειος is first clothed with the qualities of the four elements; and then the elements (which in their turn are ὕλη relatively to the εἶδη imposed upon them) are worked up into living organisms.

The word ἵποδοχή comes from Pl. *Tīm.* 49 A, where it is used to signify the substrate of forms. The word ὕλη was not used in this sense by Plato, but was introduced by Aristotle, and adopted from him by the Platonists and Stoics.

The Hermetist seems here to assert that ὕλη has been created by God. (Cf. *Corp.* III *init.*, where it is said that God is ἀρχὴ ὕλης.) *Abammonis Responsum* 8. 3. g: ὕλην δὲ παράγαγεν ὁ θεός. Iamblichus *ap. Procl. in Tīm.* 116 F-117 D, *Testim.*) In this respect, he departs from the doctrine of the *Tīmaeus* and the Platonists in general, according to which the ἵποδοχή, or ὕλη, existed independently of the Demiurgus, who reduced it to order, or imposed forms on it, but did not create it. See *Ascl.* II₁; also *Corp.* VIII. 3 and XII. ii. 22, and *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* IX. We are told however that Eudorus, a syncretic Platonist of Alexandria in the time of Augustus, held that ὕλη is derived from 'the One', i. e. from God (Zeller, *Eclectics*, Eng. tr. p. 103 n. 7).¹ In the Roman period, the doctrine that ὕλη was created by God or derived from God tended to supersede the

¹ Aristotle (*Metaph.* I, 6, 988 a 10), summarizing Plato's view, says τὰ γὰρ εἶδη τοῦ τί ἴσταν αἴτια τοῖς ἄλλοις, τοῖς δ' εἶδеси τὸ ἔν. But Alex. Aphrod. *ad loc.* (Brandis, *Scholīa in Ar.*, ed. Boruss. IV, p. 552 b) says that in some copies the words καὶ τῆ ὕλη were added after τοῖς δ' εἶδеси τὸ ἔν, and that Aspasius said that this alteration of the text had been made by Eudorus and Euarmostus. This appears to imply that Eudorus held the One to be the cause of the existence of ὕλη as well as of that of the εἶδη.

earlier Platonic doctrine of its pre-existence.¹ Seneca, *Nat. quaest. Prolog.* 16, states the question 'materiam (deus) ipse sibi formet an data utatur'; and Numenius, as reported by Chalcidius, *Comm. in Tim.* 293, Mullach *Fr. Ph. Gr.* II, p. 244 a, said that some Pythagoreans held that the 'indefinite dyad' is generated by the 'monad' (that is to say, that matter is derived from God),—an opinion which Numenius himself rejected.

natura . . . ad caelum usque producit cuncta dei visibus placitura. The words *ad caelum usque* appear to imply that every part of the sublunar world is occupied by living beings, and that each stratum of the universe has its appropriate inhabitants. Cf. ch. 4: 'supradicta autem genera inhabitant usque ad loca (deorum).' Men, beasts, and plants are produced on the earth, and fishes in the water; but what kind of living beings are produced in the air? Compare Apuleius *De deo Socr.* 8. 137: 'Nam cum quattuor sint elementa, . . . sintque propria animalia terrarum, (aquarum,) flammaram,—siquidem Aristoteles (*Hist. an.* 5. 19, 552 b) auctor est in fornacibus flagrantibus quaedam parvula animalia pennulis apta volitare,² . . . cur hoc solum quartum elementum aeris . . . desertum a cultoribus suis natura pateretur?' Apuleius dissents from those

¹ Possibly Jewish influence may have contributed to the acceptance of this new doctrine. The writer of *Genesis 1 init.*, no doubt, meant by his words, not that God created the world out of nothing, but that God fashioned the world out of a pre-existing chaos (Gunkel *ad loc.*); and Hellenizing Jews sometimes identified this chaos with the Greek ἀμορφος ὕλη. This was the view held by the writer of *Sap. Sal.* 11. 18: ἡ παντοδύναμός σου χεὶρ καὶ κτίσασα τὸν κόσμον ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης. It was also held by Philo; *De opif. mundi* 2.8, Cohn I, p. 2: τὸ μὲν εἶναι δραστήριον αἴτιον, τὸ δὲ παθητόν. . . τὸ δὲ παθητὸν ἀψυχον καὶ ἀκίνητον ἐξ αὐτοῦ, κινήθην δὲ καὶ σχηματισθὲν καὶ ψυχωθὲν ὑπὸ τοῦ νοῦ, μετέβαλεν εἰς . . . τόνδε τὸν κόσμον. *Ib.* 5. 21, Cohn I, p. 6: ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν οὐ χάριν τῆς ἀρίστης αὐτοῦ φύσεως οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν οὐσία μηδὲν ἐξ αὐτῆς ἐχούση καλόν, δυναμένη δὲ πάντα γίνεσθαι. ἦν μὲν γὰρ ἐξ αὐτῆς ἀτακτος ἀποιος ἀψυχος κ.τ.λ. Philo *De plant. Noe* 1. 3, Wendland II, p. 133: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ τὴν οὐσίαν ἀτακτον καὶ συγκεχυμένην οὖσαν ἐξ αὐτῆς, εἰς τάξιν ἐξ ἀταξίας καὶ ἐκ συγχύσεως εἰς διάκρισιν ἄγων ὁ κοσμοπλάστης μορφοῦν ἤρξατο. The Christian Justin also adhered to the Platonic view; *Apol.* i. 10. 2: πάντα τὴν ἀρχὴν, ἀγαθὸν ὄντα (Pl. *Tim.* 29 E), δημιουργῆσαι (τὸν θεὸν) ἐξ ἀμόρφου ὕλης δι' ἀνθρώπου δεδογάμεθα. *Ib.* 59. 1: Plato learnt from Moses ὕλην ἀμορφον οὖσαν στρέψαντα τὸν θεὸν κόσμον ποιῆσαι. *Ib.* 67. 8: ὁ θεὸς τὸ σκότος καὶ τὴν ὕλην τρέψας κόσμον ἐποίησε. But on the other hand, a creation *ex nihilo* is asserted in *2 Macc.* 7. 28 (οὐκ ἐξ ὕτων ἐποίησεν αὐτὰ ὁ θεός); and this view was generally adopted by the Christians. e.g. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 8. 8: Nemo quaeret ex quibus ista materiis . . . deus fecerit: omnia enim ille fecit ex nihilo.' *Ib.* 27 sqq.: 'Deus vero facit sibi ipse materiam. . . Facturus mundum deus prius materiam de qua faceret praeparavit, et praeparavit ex eo quod non erat.' (Lactantius had read the Hermetic Λόγος τέλειος, and may have borrowed from it the phrase *materiam praeparavit.*)

² On the other hand, Aristotle *Meteor.* 4. 4, 382 a 6 says that ἐν γῆ καὶ ἐν ὕδατι ζῶα μόνον ἐστίν, ἐν ἀέρι δὲ καὶ πυρὶ οὐκ ἐστίν.

who assign birds to the air;¹ and his conclusion is that the air is inhabited by daemons. Cf. Pseudo-Pl. *Epinomis*, where the *αἰθήρ* and the *ἀήρ* (i. e. the upper and lower atmosphere) are said to be occupied by different orders of daemons; and Philo *De gigant.* 2. 6 ff., Wendland II, p. 43.

Does the writer of *Ascl.* I include the daemons among the beings produced by the natural processes which he is here describing? Such a view would not be quite impossible; for according to Apuleius and other Platonists, they have bodies composed of air; and in Plut. *Defect. orac.* II. 415 c ff., they are described as mortal. But perhaps he is not thinking of daemons here; and the words *ad caelum usque* might be applied to birds.

4. *Omnia autem* (. . .) *desuper pendentia in species dividuntur hoc . . .* (modo). The *vivifica* or *generantia* are sent down into the sublunar world by the operation of the astral gods, and are in that sense 'dependent on the powers above'. Cf. 'quicquid de alto descendit generans est' in ch. 2 b. The meaning might be made clearer by reading *omnia autem* (*vivifica*), *desuper pendentia*, &c.; but it is possible to make sense of the words as they stand, if we take *omnia desuper pendentia* to represent *πάντα τὰ ἄνωθεν ἐξηρημένα*.

The *vivifica* are so distributed in the sublunar world, that each individual organism receives life only for a time, but the permanence of the race is maintained by the production of successive individuals. In contrast to the individually mortal beings of our world below, the writer speaks also of the gods, who are individually immortal. (By 'the gods' we must understand the astral gods; the anthropomorphic gods of Greek and Egyptian cults and myths are either ignored, or identified with daemons.) It must be presumed that the individual gods have been created once for all by the supreme God, and thenceforward continue to exist for ever. They cannot be said to be produced by the operations of *φύσις* which have been described in the preceding sentences ('*natura per species imaginans mundum*' &c.). Their bodies presumably consist of unmixed fire, and cannot be vitalized by *πνεῦμα*, which is a mixture of fire and air; and *γένος*, which, in its application to mortal beings, means a race maintained by reproduction, must be taken in the sense of 'class' or 'order' when applied to the astral gods, among whom there is neither birth nor death.

¹ Philo (*De plantatione* 4. 14, Wendland II, p. 136) locates in the air both birds and unembodied 'souls' of three different ranks.

Genus ergo deorum ex se deorum faci[e]t species. The writer cannot have meant that astral gods are generated by others of their kind; he must mean merely that there is a common type, or group of qualities, which manifests itself (with individual differences) in all individual gods,—or perhaps, that the individual form may be generated *in thought* from the generic form, by adding other qualities to it. He does not seem to have held that the *γένος* is an entity existing apart from the individuals (an *idea* in the Platonic sense), and that the individuals are generated by this entity; for there is no trace of such a notion elsewhere in *Ascl.* I. His position in this respect rather resembles that of Aristotle, who regards the class-form as the 'formal cause' of the individuals, though not as actually existing in separation from them.

Est et aliud animalis genus, sine anima quidem, et tamen non carens sensibus. This *genus* is the vegetable order. In ch. 6 b, animals are called *animalia* (ἔμψυχα or ζῶα), and vegetables are called *inanimalia* (ἄψυχα). But *animalis* here, (if it is not a mistake for *inanimalium*, 'another race, viz. a race of soulless things',) stands for the wider term τοῦ ζῶντος or ζῶν ἔχοντος, which includes both animals and vegetables. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 35 *init.*: 'Unumquodque enim animal (ζῶν ἔχον), . . . sive sit animans (ἔμψυχον, animal) sive sine anima (ἄψυχον, vegetable).' *Ib.* 27 c: 'animantium (ζῶων) mortaliū et fructiferarum (ἀρ)θωρων omnium.' *Ib.* 29 c: 'omnia gubernantem . . . animalia (τὰ ζῶντα), sive animantia (ἔμψυχα) sive inanimantia (ἄψυχα).'

On the question whether the life in plants is to be called *ψυχή*, opinions differed. Plato (*Tim.* 77 B)¹ and Aristotle² (*De an.* 2. 5, 413 b 7 and elsewhere) said yes; the Stoics said no. Aetius (*Diels Doxogr.* p. 438): Πλάτων . . . καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ἔμψυχα ζῶα. . . . Ἀριστοτέλης ἔμψυχα μὲν, οὐ μὴν ζῶα· τὰ γὰρ ζῶα ὀρμητικὰ εἶναι καὶ αἰσθητικὰ. . . . οἱ Στωικοὶ δὲ καὶ Ἐπικούρειοι οὐκ ἔμψυχα. . . . τὰ δὲ φυτὰ αὐτομάτως πως κινεῖσθαι, οὐ διὰ ψυχῆς.³ Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 81:

¹ Plato *ib.* says that vegetables may with perfect fitness be called ζῶα.

² Seneca *Ep.* 58. 10 follows Aristotle: 'sunt quaedam quae animam habent (ἔμψυχα) nec sunt animalia (ζῶα). Placet enim satis et arbustis animam inesse: itaque et vivere ille et mori dicimus. Ergo animantia superiorem tenebunt locum, quia et animalia in hac forma sunt et sata.' I. e. both animals and plants are included under the wider genus *animantia* (ζῶντα).

³ Cf. the so-called 'Pythagorean' document quoted from Alex. Polyhistor in Diog. Laert. 8. 28, which contains a large ingredient of Stoicism: καὶ ζῆν μὲν πάντα ὅσα μετέχει τοῦ θερμοῦ· διὸ καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ζῶα (ζῶντα?) εἶναι· ψυχὴν μὲντοι μὴ ἔχουν πάντα.

According to the Stoics, τῶν ἠνωμένων σωμάτων τὰ μὲν ὑπὸ ψιλῆς ἕξεως συνέχεται, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ φύσεως, τὰ δὲ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς· καὶ ἕξεως μὲν ὡς λίθοι καὶ ξύλα, φύσεως δὲ καθάπερ τὰ φυτὰ, ψυχῆς δὲ τὰ ζῶα. Thus in saying that plants are *sine anima* (ἄψυχα), the writer of *Ascl. I* follows the authority of the Stoics against that of Plato. Yet at the same time, he says that plants have *αἴσθησις*;¹ and in this, he agrees with Plato, and differs from the Stoics.

Sensation was attributed to plants by Anaxagoras, Empedocles, and Democritus. Pseudo-Arist. *De plantis* I, 815a 14: πότερον ἔχουσιν ἢ οὐχὶ τὰ φυτὰ ψυχὴν καὶ δύναμιν ἐπιθυμίας ὀδύνης τε καὶ ἡδονῆς καὶ διακρίσεως. Ἀναξαγόρας μὲν οὖν καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς ἐπιθυμίᾳ ταῦτα κινεῖσθαι λέγουσιν, αἰσθάνεσθαι τε καὶ λυπεῖσθαι καὶ ἡδεσθαι διαβεβαιούνται. ὣν ὁ μὲν Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ζῶα εἶναι (τὰ φυτὰ)² καὶ ἡδεσθαι καὶ λυπεῖσθαι εἶπε, τῇ τε ἀπορροῇ τῶν φύλλων καὶ τῇ αὐξήσει τοῦτο ἐκλαμβάνων. . . . ὁ δὲ Ἀναξαγόρας καὶ ὁ Δημόκριτος καὶ ὁ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς καὶ νοῦν καὶ γνῶσιν³ εἶπον ἔχειν τὰ φυτὰ. Plato expresses a similar view, *Timaeus* 77 B ff.: the plant μέτεστι . . . τοῦ τρίτου ψυχῆς εἶδους, . . . ᾧ δόξης μὲν λογισμοῦ τε καὶ νοῦ μέτεστι τὸ μηδέν, αἰσθήσεως δὲ ἡδέας καὶ ἀλγεινῆς μετὰ ἐπιθυμιῶν.⁴ On the other

¹ The writer of *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc. III. 17* attributes *αἴσθησις* to ἄψυχα, but apparently only a sort of *αἴσθησις* in which feelings of pleasure and pain are not included.

² Plut. *Quaest. Nat. I*: ζῶον γὰρ ἔγγειον τὸ φυτὸν εἶναι οἱ περὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἀναξαγόραν καὶ Δημόκριτον οἴονται.

³ The early philosophers did not clearly distinguish *νόησις* from *αἴσθησις*, and applied the same words to both processes. Cf. Sext. *Empir. Math. 8. 286*: ὁ δὲ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς . . . πάντα ἡξίου λογικὰ τυγχάνειν, καὶ οὐ ζῶα μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ φυτὰ, *ῥητῶς γράφων* " Πάντα γὰρ ἴσθι φρόνησιν ἔχειν καὶ νόματος αἴσαν" (fr. 110. 10 Diels). Sextus is wrong in taking this verse to mean that plants are 'rational'; Empedocles probably meant merely that they have some sort of consciousness of their condition, and feel pleasure and pain.

⁴ The Manichaeans believed that plants have feeling. Augustine (*contra Faust. 6, p. 205 f.*) says that the Manichaeans wept when they plucked vegetables for food, holding that in them also there was a certain portion of life, i. e. of the Deity; 'dicitis enim dolorem sentire fructum, cum de arbore carpitur, sentire dum conciditur, cum teritur, cum coquitur, cum manditur.' August. *Confess. 3. 10*: 'perductus ad eas nugas (sc. the Manichaean doctrine), ut crederem ficum plorare cum decerpitur, et matrem eius arborem, lacrimis lacteis. Quam tamen ficum si comedisset aliquis sanctus, alieno sane non suo scelere decerpitam, misceret visceribus, et anhelaret de illa angelos, imo vero particulas Dei . . . : quae particulae summi et veri Dei ligatae fuissent in illo pomo, nisi electi sancti dente ac ventre solverentur.' They abhorred agriculture, because those who practise it must wound living plants. Those who committed this sin might, however, obtain pardon for it by presenting a portion of the produce to the elect; for when the fruit was eaten by the elect, the divine life imprisoned in it was liberated, and to liberate the divine life from the gross elements with which it is intermixed is a meritorious act (August. *De haeres. 46, Confess. 4. 1*).

Cf. Tylor, *Primitive Culture I, p. 475*: 'The Buddhist books show that in the early days of their religion, it was matter of controversy whether trees had souls,

hand, Diogenes of Apollonia (Theophrast. *De sensu* 44), in the age of Pericles, said τὰ φυτὰ, διὰ τὸ μὴ εἶναι κοῖλα μηδὲ ἀναδέχασθαι τὸν ἀέρα, παντελῶς ἀφήρησθαι τὸ φρονεῖν (in which sensation is doubtless included); and Aristotle¹ and the Stoics² denied that plants have αἴσθησις.³

Ipsud caelum . . . quarum omnium rerum [in]mortales sunt species. There is little doubt about the writer's meaning here, though the exact wording is uncertain. *Specierum* appears to have been written instead of *deorum* by a copyist's blunder; and *deo* in the preceding line may have arisen out of *deo(rum)* written above *specierum* as a correction.

Supradieta genera ought to mean all *genera* other than that of the gods; viz. plants, beasts, men, and *daemons*. But did the writer intend to assert that *daemons* are mortal? Such a statement would not be unexampled (see Plut. *Defect. Orac.*); but when 'mortals' are spoken of, *daemons* are not commonly included; and it seems more likely that for the moment he ignores the *daemons*, and is thinking only of plants, beasts, and men. Similarly below, 'reliquorum genera (i. e. all except the gods) nascendi fecunditate servantur'; this cannot have been meant to apply to the *daemons*.

quam (sc. speciem) necesse est sequi qualitatem generis sui. This is verbally inconsistent with the following statement that immortality is a quality possessed by the *genus*, but not by the *species*; but the meaning is clear. 'The human race is immortal'; that is, the succession of individual men never fails. Yet 'mortality is a quality of the human race'; that is, every individual man must die.

and therefore whether they might lawfully be injured. Orthodox Buddhism decided against the tree-souls, and consequently against the scruple to harm them, declaring trees to have no mind nor sentient principle. . . . Buddhists also relate that a heterodox sect kept up the early doctrine of the actual animate' (and sentient?) 'life of trees.' There may possibly be a historical connexion between this Indian doctrine and that of Mani.

Porphyry, *De abst.* 1. 18 and 21, ascribes a similar view to 'the Egyptians': εἰ δέ, ὡς φασί, καὶ τὰ φυτὰ ψυχὴν ἔχει, ποῖος ἂν εἴη ὁ βίος, μήτε ζῶων μήτε φυτῶν ἡμῶν ἀποτερόντων; . . . καὶ τὸν τῶν Αἰγυπτίων λόγον σεσίγηκα, ὅτι καὶ τῶν φυτῶν ἀδικοῦμεν ἀπτόμενοι. Does this refer to Egyptian Manichaeans, or to indigenous Egyptian taboos by which the eating of certain plants was prohibited?

¹ Ar. *Περὶ νεστ. καὶ γήρωσ.* 467 b 23: τὰ γὰρ φυτὰ ζῆ μὲν, οὐκ ἔχει δ' αἴσθησιν, τῷ δ' αἰσθάνεσθαι τὸ ζῶον πρὸς τὸ μὴ ζῶον διορίζομεν.

² Philo, *Quod deus sit immut.* 9. 41, Wendland II, p. 65 (from a Stoic source): τὰ μὲν γὰρ φυτὰ ἀόρμητα, ἀφάνταστα, αἰσθήσεως ἀμέτοχα.

³ Wordsworth agreed with the author of *Ascl.* I: 'Tis my faith that every flower enjoys the air it breathes.'

genera, . . . quamvis per species occida(n)t, nascendi fecunditate servantur. This thought occurs in Pl. *Sympos.* 206 E: ἀειγενές ἐστι καὶ ἀθάνατον ὡς θνητῶ ἢ γέννησις. *Ib.* 208 B: ταύτη τῇ μηχανῇ . . . θνητὸν ἀθανασίας μετέχει. Aristotle speaks to the same effect, e. g. *Gen. an.* 2 *int.*, 731 b 31; and the statement frequently recurs in writings of the Roman period. To the instances given above in the note on εἶδος (ch. 2 b) may be added Ocellus Lucanus 4. 2 (Mullach *Fr. Ph. Gr.* I, p. 402); ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἀμήχανον ἦν θνητὸν φύντα θείου βίου κοινωνῆσαι, τὴν τοῦ γένους ἀθανασίαν φθειρομένην καθ' ἕκαστον ἀνεπλήρωσεν ὁ θεός, ἀκατάληκτον ποιήσας καὶ συνεχῆ ταύτην τὴν γένεσιν. Apuleius *De deo Socr.* 4: 'homines . . . singillatim mortales, cunctim tamen universo genere perpetui.' Aelius Aristides (Keil) *Or.* 43. 21: θνητὸν δὲν ἡμῶν τὸ γένος κατὰ μέρος ἀθάνατον εἶναι τῇ διαδοχῇ. Lactantius *Div. inst.* 7. 5. 15. The Stoics, however, could not assert the immortality of the race without qualification, as according to their system all individual beings are absorbed in God (= πῦρ νοερόν) at the *ecpyrosis*.

ut homo mortalis sit. Man, regarded as a living organism on earth, is mortal. He dies, in the sense that the organism is broken up, and the elements of which it was composed, including the portions of fire and air by which life was generated and maintained in the organism, are dispersed. In another sense, man is immortal (ch. 2 a, 'omnis humana immortalis est anima'); i. e. there is a part of him which is imperishable, and survives the dissolution of the body; and it is in this part that his personality resides. According to the writer of *Ascl.* I, the immortal part of man is the νοῦς, or the ψυχή as endowed with νοῦς; and this part must be distinguished from the merely natural or animal life (the θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς), which perishes with the body. But in this paragraph, man is regarded merely as a product of cosmic nature; only the body and the θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς are taken into account; and accordingly, he is spoken of as a perishable being. His imperishable νοῦς is dealt with later, in ch. 6 b ff.; and in ch. 9, we are told that man is only 'ex parte mortalis'.

5. «Sunt omnes simillimae generibus suis species;» omnibus tamen &c. The meaning of this chapter appears to be as follows. Every individual man possesses the qualities which characterize the *genus* man; but in addition to these, he possesses other qualities also, by which he is differentiated from his fellow

men. (Cf. *Ascl.* III. 35.) And these distinctive qualities of the individual are determined, in part at least, by his association or intercourse with individuals of other *genera*. Thus, by communion with gods,—i. e. by worship and contemplation,—a man may come to possess (in addition to the qualities of the *genus* man, which he possessed from the first and still retains,) the qualities of the *genus* god.

But seeing that the qualities of a *genus* are precisely those by which its individuals are distinguished from those of other *genera*, how is it possible for the qualities of two different *genera* to be present together in the same individual? How can a man become a god, or 'like a god', without ceasing to be a man? This question the writer leaves unanswered.

(*Sunt res*) *quaedam quae ante factae sunt . . . non possunt*. This passage has nothing to do with the topic discussed in the rest of the chapter, and is evidently a detached fragment. The meaning of the first sentence may be inferred from a similar passage in *Cic. Acad. Poster.* I. 7. 26 (taken from Antiochus): 'earum igitur qualitatum¹ sunt aliae principes, aliae ex his ortae. Principes sunt unius modi et simplices; ex his autem ortae variae sunt et quasi multifformes. Itaque aer . . . et ignis et aqua et terra prima sunt: ex his autem ortae animantium formae earumque rerum quae gignuntur e terra.' The *res quae ante factae sunt* of *Ascl.* I. 5 must be the *prima* or *qualitates principes* of Antiochus, i. e. the four elements; and the *quae de his fiunt* of *Ascl.* I. 5 must correspond to the *ex his ortae* of Antiochus, which are animals and vegetables. The operation of creative force is divided into two distinct stages. First, the four elements are formed, by the imposition of the primary physical qualities (heat and cold, fluidity and dryness) on *ἄποιος ὑλη*; and then, portions of the elements thus constituted are worked up into living organisms. Compare the account of the Creation which is given by Hippolytus, *Ref. haeres.* 10. 32: *διαφόρους δὲ τοῖς ἐσομένοις ἀρχὰς πρότερον ἐδημιούργει (ὁ θεός), πῦρ καὶ πνεῦμα (i. e. air), ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν, ἐξ ὧν διαφόρων τὴν ἑαυτοῦ κτίσιν ἐποίησε*. The notion may be traced back to the *Timaeus*; but the form of expression seems to be derived from Antiochus.

¹ The word *qualitas* is here used inaccurately, in the sense of *quale*, i. e. *ποιόν τι*, 'a thing possessing qualities'. Thus we are told (*ib.* § 24) that *qualitas* is equivalent to *corpus*. The *ποιόν τι* is constituted by the imposition of qualities on *ἄποιος ὑλη*. See Reid's note *ad loc.*

Corpora enim impossibile est (ad genus) conformari sine nutu divino. The function of making living organisms is assigned partly to the gods (i. e. to the heavenly bodies), and partly to the daemons, who may be regarded as personifications of the physical forces at work in the sublunar world. Similarly, in *Corp.* XVI, the operations of nature are carried on by troops of daemons, working in obedience to the several planet-gods, who are themselves commanded by the Sun-god. But how is the work divided between the gods and the daemons? The word *species* suggests that the contrasted phrase *corpora conformari* has reference to *genus*; probably therefore the meaning is that, in the formation of the individual organism, the generic form (i. e. the group of qualities common to all individuals of the *genus*) is imposed by the direct influence of the heavenly bodies, and the distinctive qualities of the individual are added by the more minute and detailed work of the daemons. An analogous division of functions occurs in *Ascl.* III. 38 b: 'caelestes dii catholicorum dominantur, terreni (god of a lower order, who correspond in some respects to the daemons of *Ascl.* I) incolunt singula.'

inanimalia institui et coli sine hominibus non possunt. The *inanimalia* are the things made by human hands, e. g. a statue, or a house. The things made by the gods and daemons, i. e. the works of nature, are living organisms; the things made by human art are lifeless.

If this fragment formed part of the original text, the most suitable place for it would be somewhere in the preceding passage which deals with the elements, e. g. at the end of ch. 3 c. But as it is at variance with that passage in assigning to the gods and daemons the function which is there assigned to 'nature', it seems more likely that it is a marginal note inserted by a later hand.

Quicumque ergo daemonum &c. As the text stands in the MSS., daemons are divided into two classes only, viz. (1) those who have attached themselves to some god, and are called *θεοειδέεις*, and (2) those who retain the qualities of their own *genus* unaltered, and are called *φιλόανθρωποι*. But it is evident from the context that the character of 'man-loving daemons' must be altered by their association with men, and consequently that they cannot be identical with those who 'in qualitate generis sui perseverant'. The writer must therefore have distinguished *three* classes of daemons, viz. (1) those who associate with gods, (2) those who keep to themselves,

and (3) those who associate with men. What special name he assigned to the daemons of the second class, we do not know. It is to be presumed that they dwell apart in the upper atmosphere, and neither descend to earth nor ascend to heaven. The daemons of the third class probably correspond to the *di terreni* of *Ascl.* III. 37-38 b, i. e. the gods of the temple-cults, who take up their abode on earth, and assist mankind by giving oracular responses, healing sickness, &c. (The writer makes no mention of *maleficent* daemons, such as are spoken of elsewhere in the *Hermetica*, e. g. *Corp.* IX. 3; see also *Ascl.* III. 25, *nocentes angeli*.) As to the first class, Platonists may perhaps have assumed the existence of 'godlike daemons', in order to reconcile with their own daemonology passages in early Greek literature, where δαίμων s used as a synonym for θεός. But we are here told that daemons of this class attach themselves to some one particular (astral) god. I do not know how this statement is to be explained; and I have met with no exact parallel elsewhere. In *Corp.* XVI, the daemons are divided into troops or regiments, each of which is under the orders of one of the planet-gods; but they are employed in the administration of the sublunar world, whereas it seems to be implied in *Ascl.* I that the 'god-like daemons' are remote from men, and dwell with the astral gods in heaven. Possibly the writer had in mind the myth in Pl. *Phaedrus* 246 E ff., where it is said that 'Zeus, driving a winged car, leads the way in heaven, and there follows him an array of gods and daemons, marshalled in eleven bands', each of which bands is led by one of the chief gods. *Ib.* 250 B, 'When we (philosophers) following in the train of Zeus, and others in the train of other gods', saw the beatific vision. In the latter sentence, 'we' and 'others' are human souls; but a reader might apply the words to daemons also.

a genere suo defluentes. The meaning of this is indicated by the clause *in qualitate generis sui perseverant*, which stands in contrast to it. These daemons separate themselves from their own kind. For ἀπορρεῖν in the sense 'to dissociate oneself from', cf. Pl. *Legg.* 776 A, κατακορῆς δὲ συνουσία . . . ἀπορρεῖν ἀλλήλων ποιεί.

et ipsa ἴα praedictae¹ desuper veniens. Cf. ch. 6 a, 'utpote qui isdem se ortum esse cognoscat.' Men are sprung from the same source as daemons; and that source is above. The meaning of this seems to be that daemons and men resemble one another,

and differ from the lower *genera*, in possessing *voûs*,¹ and that the *voûs* in them comes directly from the supracosmic God. If this is what is meant, the writer in this phrase identifies the man with the *voûs* in him, or assumes that the *voûs* is that in which his personality resides; whereas in the preceding chapters the man is identified with the living organism formed by the operations of nature,—i. e. with that part of him which is *not voûs*, and does *not* in the same sense 'come from above'. We have indeed been told that the portion of *πνεῦμα* (fire and air) by which physical life is generated in the organism 'de alto descendit', i. e. comes down to earth from the higher regions of the Kosmos; but neither this portion of *πνεῦμα* nor the physical life which it generates in the organism is a pre-existent individual soul. From what has hitherto been said, it would appear that the life of the individual man begins only when he is born on earth; and the generation of life in the individual could hardly be described by saying that the man himself 'comes from above'. Moreover, the words *desuper veniens* must be applicable to daemons as well as men; and there is no reason to suppose that the preceding description of the process by which living organisms are generated on earth is applicable to daemons. On the other hand, it *is* applicable to beasts and plants as well as men; that process therefore could not be spoken of as a thing by which daemons and men in common are distinguished from the lower *genera*.

I cannot account for the words *a praedictae* (al. *a praedicto*); perhaps they have been wrongly placed here, and belong to some other sentence.

consortio [omnium] aliarum specierum. E. g. the man in question worships a god, or a daemon; he marries a wife; he keeps a herd of cattle; he grows a crop of wheat. But he cannot be said to connect himself with *all* the individuals of the several *genera*; therefore *omnium* must be struck out.

qui se mente, qua diis iunctus est, . . . diis iunxerit. The clumsiness of *iunctus . . . iunxerit* must be ascribed to the translator. He ought to have written *qua diis cognatus est*. Cf. ch. 6 a: 'diis cognata divinitate coniunctus est.' *Ascl.* III. 22 b: 'homo diis cognatione coniunctus.'

¹ Of course the *di caelestes* also possess *voûs*, and possess it in a higher degree. It is in virtue of his *voûs* that man is 'akin' to them; cf. 'mente, qua diis iunctus est', and 'diis cognata divinitate coniunctus est'.

The religion of 'those who attach themselves to the gods' is called *divina*; perhaps the epithet is intended to distinguish it from the lower religion of 'those who attach themselves to daemons'.

On the communion or association of men with gods, cf. Iambl. *De anima*, Stob. I. 49. 42, vol. i, p. 382 W.: *περὶ τῆς κοινωνίας τῆς πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς τῶν ψυχῶν γέγονέ τις διαμφισβήτησις, τῶν μὲν λεγόντων ἀδύνατον μίγνυσθαι θεοὺς ταῖς κατεχομέναις ψυχαῖς ἐν τῷ σώματι, τῶν δὲ διατεινομένων μίαν εἶναι κοινὴν πολιτείαν τῶν καθαρῶν¹ ψυχῶν πρὸς τοὺς θεοὺς, καὶ εἰ ὅτι μάλιστα ἐν τοῖς σώμασι διατρίβουσιν· οἱ δὲ μόνοις δαίμοσιν ἢ καὶ ἥρωσιν ὑποτιθέασιν αὐτὰς εἰς κοινὴν συνουσίαν.* Corp. X. 22 b: *κοινωνία δέ ἐστι ψυχῶν· καὶ κοινωνοῦσι μὲν αἱ τῶν θεῶν ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ταῖς τῶν ἀλόγων.*

daemonum is an unintelligent translation of a Greek genitive, dependent on *ἐγγίζει* (*accedit*). See note on ch. I^a, *omnium* . . . *divinior*. The 'approximation' to gods or daemons (*prope deos accedit*) is distinguished from 'attachment' to them (*qui se diis iunxerit*), and follows upon it as a result; it must therefore mean approximation in character, or assimilation.

The daemons to whom men attach themselves must be those of the third class, called *φιλόανθρωποι*. They seem to be the 'gods' of the popular religion, i. e. the beings who are worshipped in the temple-cults and mysteries; and the men who attach themselves to them are those who devote themselves to a cult of this kind, but have no religion of a higher sort. The writer of *Ascl.* I probably considers these 'daemons friendly to man' to differ from the astral gods (whom alone he calls 'gods') in much the same way that in *Ascl.* III. 37-38 b the *di terreni* are represented as differing from the *di caelestes*. If so, the difference may be described thus. The 'gods' are *ἀπαθείς*; they operate by invariable law; they cannot be moved by prayers or offerings; their worship does not admit of sacrificial rites, but consists solely of reverent contemplation and hymns of praise;² and their worshipper, so far as he becomes like them, will attain to *ἀπάθεια*, and will live a life as steadfast and untroubled as are the movements of the heavenly spheres. On the

¹ This position is similar to that of the writer of *Ascl.* I, who implies that the pious alone 'se diis iungunt'. The Stoics did not thus limit the *κοινωνία*; they said that *all* men, as rational beings, are included in one community with the gods.

² Cf. ch. 9: 'hominum enim admirationibus, adorationibus, laudibus, obsequiis caelum caelestesque delectantur.' The word *delectantur*, if taken in its literal sense, would, no doubt, imply that they are subject to *πάθη*; but this incidental phrase must not be interpreted too strictly.



other hand, the 'daemons friendly to man', i. e. the beings worshipped in the temples, are *ἐμπαθεῖς*; their favour can be won, and their anger averted, by sacrificial rites and initiations; and their worshipper, if he becomes like them, will indeed rise above the average level of humanity, but will not be wholly freed from disturbing passions.

humani vero, qui medietate generis sui contenti sunt. This class of men corresponds to the class of daemons who 'in qualitate sui generis perseverant'. Those who do not aspire to rise above their earthly condition, or in whom the divine *νοῦς* is dormant, and the *θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς* alone is operative, are called *humani*. Such are the men who have no religion, (not even that lower religion which consists in pious worship of 'daemons',) to raise them above their natural selves. For *humanus* in this sense, cf. ch. 6 a, 'humanae naturae partem in se ipse despicit.' Ch. 11 a: 'homo hactenus esse debuit' &c.

his similes erunt, quorum se generis speciebus adiunxerint. A man who is wholly occupied with things of a lower order than himself will be degraded to the level of the things he deals with, whether his occupation with them is practical, as in agriculture (see ch. 9), or theoretical, as in physical science (11 a *fin.* and 13). But perhaps the form of 'attachment' to these things which is specially in the writer's thought is that of private ownership (ch. 11 a). He who takes these things into his own exclusive possession will be dragged down by them; e. g. the owner of cattle will grow like the beasts he owns.¹ At the present stage of his argument, however, the writer merely touches on man's lower connexions for a moment, and passes on to emphasize the higher.

6 a. magnum miraculum est homo. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 23 b: 'miraculo dignus est (homo).' *Corp.* X. 24 b: ὁ γὰρ ἄνθρωπος ζῴων ἐστὶ θεῖον, κ.τ.λ.

daemonum genus novit. 'He is acquainted with the daemons',—especially with the *φιλάνθρωποι δαίμονες*, i. e. the gods of the temple-cults. The word *novit* (*ἐγνώκε*) implies social intimacy, or friendship, as well as intellectual knowledge. Similarly, *γνώσις* (*θεοῦ*) is not merely intellectual knowledge of God, but involves union with God.

hominum quanto est natura temperata felicius. With what other beings is man here contrasted? Especially, I think, with the

¹ Cf. *Ecclesiasticus* 38. 25: 'How can he get wisdom . . . that driveth oxen, and is occupied in their labours, and whose talk is of bullocks?'

daemons. Cf. *eo amplior* in ch. 5, and *felicior loco* below. The writer is unwilling to accept the Pythagorean and Platonic view that man's embodiment on earth is a calamity, and seeks to represent it as a positive advantage to him (provided that he adapts himself rightly to his 'intermediate position'). Man's embodiment does not cut him off from connexion with the higher world; and it gives him, in addition, connexions with the things of the world below. These latter connexions are here spoken of as things to be glad of ('*cetera . . . nexu secum caritatis astringit*'; and '*ut quae infra se sunt diligat*'). On the other hand, we were told in ch. 5 *fn.* that he who 'attaches himself' to earthly things 'becomes like them', i. e. is degraded to their level. But the two passages may be reconciled, if we take the 'attachment' there spoken of to mean an exclusive devotion to these things, such as would sever him from the higher world, and foster that 'earthly part of his own being' which he ought to scorn. The man whose heart is set on that which is above may none the less find objects of interest and affection here below; for the occupations of his daily life on earth are part of his service to God (ch. 8 *ff.*), and in his case '*laborare est orare*'.

quibus se necessarium esse caelesti dispositione cognoscit.

An anticipation of the doctrine set forth in ch. 8.

Suspicit caelum. Cf. ch. 9: '*sortiti sunt caeli suspiciendi venerabilem curam.*' *Ascl.* III. 25: '*nemo suspiciet coelum*'.

Omnia illi licent. Possibly we ought to read *omnia illi* (*adire*) *lice[n]t*. At any rate, the context shows that this must be the meaning. There is no question here of moral freedom; and the resemblance to Paul's πάντα μοι ἔξεστιν (1 *Cor.* 6. 12 and 10. 23) is merely verbal.

Man is embodied on earth; yet he is not imprisoned in his earthly body, for his thought (i. e. his νοῦς, the immortal part of him,) is free to traverse the whole universe. Cf. the description of the philosopher in Pl. *Theaet.* 173 E: τὸ σῶμα μόνον ἐν τῇ πόλει κέται αὐτοῦ καὶ ἐπιδημεῖ, ἡ δὲ διάνοια . . . πανταχῇ φέρεται, κ.τ.λ. Pseudo-Aristot. *De mundo* I, 391a 8: ἐπειδὴ γὰρ οὐχ οἷόν τε ἦν τῷ σώματι εἰς τὸν οὐράνιον ἀφικέσθαι τόπον, καὶ τὴν γῆν ἐκλιπόντα τὸν οὐράνιον ἐκείνον χώρον κατοπεῦσαι, . . . ἡ γοῦν ψυχὴ διὰ φιλοσοφίας, λαβοῦσα ἡγεμόνα τὸν νοῦν, ἐπεραιώθη καὶ ἐξεδήμησεν, ἀκοπίαστόν τινα ὁδὸν εἰροῦσα, καὶ τὰ πλείστον ἀλλήλων ἀφειστώτα τοῖς τόποις τῇ διανοίᾳ συνεφρόνησε, ῥαδίως οἶμαι τὰ συγγενῆ γνωρίσασα, καὶ θείῃ ψυχῆς ὄμματι τὰ θεῖα καταλαβοῦσα. Lactant. *De orif. dei*

16. 9 f. (quoted in note on *Corp.* XI. ii. 19). Compare also the *Hermippus*, I. 6. 40: ὁ ἄνθρωπος . . . ἕλην μὲν συστάσεως τὴν αὐτὴν (τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς ζώοις) ἐσχηκώς, ἔχων δέ τι νοεράς οὐσίας ἐν αὐτῷ πλέον, καθ' ἣν γῆν τε περιπολεῖ καὶ οὐρανοῦ ἐμβατεύει καὶ θαλάττης ὑγρὰ τέμνει κέλευθα καὶ τούτων τὰ μεγέθη μετρεῖ, ἔτι τε (τὰς) τῶν ἀστέρων κατὰ μῆκος καὶ πλάτος πορείας ἐπίσταται καὶ τοὺς περιόδους αὐτῶν ἀριθμεί. See *Corp.* X. 25; XI. ii. 19.

6 b. *quae sunt animalia desuper deorsum radices pervenientes habent.* The 'roots' of animals are the streams of πνεῦμα (= fire and air intermingled) which descend from above, and maintain life in the animal bodies into which they enter. The notion that animals are 'rooted' above may have been suggested by Pl. *Tim.* 90 A, where it is said that man is φυτὸν οὐκ ἔγγειον ἀλλ' οὐράνιον.¹ But the simile is differently applied by the Hermetist. Plato, in that passage of the *Timaeus*, is speaking of 'the supreme form of soul' (τὸ κυριώτατον παρ' ἡμῶν ψυχῆς εἶδος), which corresponds to the νοῦς of *Ascl.* I, and exists on earth in man alone, and not in the lower animals. He says that this divine part of the soul resides in the human head, and 'attaches the head or root of us to heaven, whence was the birth of our souls from the beginning'; and he adds that this is the reason why man alone of all the animals stands erect. Plato's meaning then is that that which is highest and most godlike in man draws its sustenance from God. The Hermetist, on the other hand, is speaking of the animal life which exists in men and beasts alike; and his meaning is that this animal life is sustained by fire and air, which are sent down to earth from their natural place above by the operation of the heavenly bodies. Aristotle, *De an.* 2. 4, 416 a 4, says that ὡς ἡ κεφαλὴ τῶν ζώων, οὕτως αἱ ρίζαι τῶν φυτῶν but he is speaking merely with regard to the nutrition of the body. *Ib.* 2. 1, 412 b 3: αἱ δὲ ρίζαι τῷ στόματι ἀνάλογον ἄμφω γὰρ ἔλκει τὴν τροφήν. *Ag. Περὶ μακροβ.*, 467 b 2: τὸ γὰρ

¹ This saying of Plato was often quoted. *Corp.* XVIII. 11 as emended: τὰ τῶν ψυχῶν οὐράνια φυτὰ. Philo *De plantatione* 4. 16, Wendland II, p. 137: τὰ μὲν φυτὰ κατωκῆρα ἀπειργάζετο, τὰς κεφαλὰς αὐτῶν ἐν τοῖς βαθυγειοτάτοις γῆς μέρεσι πήξας, ζῶων δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων τὰς κεφαλὰς ἀνεκκύσας ἀπὸ γῆς κ.τ.λ. . . ἐξαιρέτου δὲ τῆς κατασκευῆς ἔλαχεν ἄνθρωπος: τῶν μὲν γὰρ ἄλλων τὰς ὄψεις περιήγαγε κάτω κάμψας, . . . ἀνθρώπου δὲ ἐμπαλιν ἀνῶρθωσεν, ἵνα τὸν οὐρανὸν καταθεῖται, φυτὸν οὐκ ἐπίγειον ἀλλ' οὐράνιον, ὡς ὁ παλαιὸς λόγος, ὑπάρχων. Plut. *De Pyth. orac.* 12, 400 B: ὁ μὲν γὰρ Πλάτων καὶ τὸν ἄνθρωπον οὐράνιον ἠνόμασε φυτὸν, ὥσπερ ἐκ ρίζης ἀνω τῆς κεφαλῆς ὀρθούμενον. Mas'udi (*Testim.*), who saw the clapper of a Sabian chapel at Harran inscribed with 'a Syrian saying of Plato', comments: Now Plato had said, 'Man is a plant of heaven; . . . he is like an inverted tree, the roots of which are turned towards heaven, and its top towards earth.'

ἄνω τοῦ φυτοῦ καὶ κεφαλὴ ἢ ῥίζα ἐστί. Περὶ νεοτ. καὶ γήρωσ, 468 a 1 : καθ' ὃ μὲν γὰρ εἰσέρχεται μόριον ἢ τροφή, ἄνω καλοῦμεν.

inanimalia autem de imo in superna 'viva' radice silvescunt. There is no point in the epithet *viva*; and to make this clause correspond to the preceding, we require something equivalent to *de imo in superna perveniente radice*.

Quaedam autem duplicibus aluntur alimentis, quaedam simplicibus. There are two kinds of nutriment, viz. nutriment of the σῶμα, and nutriment of the (animal) ψυχή. The first kind consists of earth and water; the second kind then must consist of the two other elements, fire and air; *ignis et aeris* must therefore be inserted after *anima*. And this is confirmed by the phrase *quinta pars* below, which implies that all the four elements have been mentioned immediately before.

A plant has no ψυχή (ch. 4); it is σῶμα and nothing more,—a living and sentient body indeed, but still a body without 'soul'; its nutriment is therefore of one kind only, viz. earth and water, which its roots absorb from below. An animal consists of body and 'soul', and therefore needs two kinds of nutriment, viz. earth and water (in the form of solid and liquid food) for its body, and fire and air for its 'soul'.

This theory must have been taken over with little alteration from some Stoic source. It is hardly consistent with the view expressed above (ch. 2 b) that ψυχή is a thing distinct from the four elements; for the statement that fire and air are the food of the soul implies that the soul consists of fire and air. From his own point of view, the writer ought rather to have said that fire and air are the vehicle of the immaterial ψυχή, and convey it into the body, or generate it in the body.

The author doubtless held that it is by the process of breathing that animals take into their bodies 'the food of the soul', viz. fire and air (= πνεῦμα); and he might have justified his statement that plants have no ψυχή by saying that they do not breathe. Cf. Ar. *De an.* I. 5, 410 b 27: τοῦτο δὲ πέπονθε καὶ ὁ ἐν τοῖς Ὀρφικοῖς ἔπεισ καλοῦμενοις λόγος· φησὶ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ὄλου εἰσιέναι ἀναπνεόντων, φερομένην ὑπὸ τῶν ἀνέμων. οὐχ οἶόν τε δὴ τοῖς φυτοῖς τοῦτο συμβαίνειν, οὐδὲ τῶν ζώων ἐνίοις, εἴπερ μὴ πάντα ἀναπνεύουσιν. The word πνεῦμα originally meant 'breath'. It came to be used to signify the 'life-breath' or 'vital spirit', i. e. the material vehicle of life in an individual living body; and it is thus used in some

passages of Aristotle. The Stoics extended its meaning, and used it to signify also the vehicle of life in the Kosmos as a whole, which they regarded as a single living organism. But the πνεῦμα ('vital spirit') of the Kosmos, as well as that portion of the cosmic πνεῦμα by which an individual organism is vivified, was still thought of as a sort of breath; and the Stoics held it to be the very substance which we breathe, viz. warmed air. Cf. Hippocr. *De flatu* 4: 'The body is sustained by three kinds of nutriment, σῖτα, ποτά, πνεύματα, of which the last is by far the most important.' Ar. *Resp.* 6 mentions the view that respiration takes place τροφῆς χάριν, . . . ὡς τρεφομένου τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ ἐντὸς πυρός, but does not himself accept it. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 54. 134 (from Posidonius?): 'cum tribus rebus animantium vita teneatur, cibo, potione, spiritu.' *Ib.* 2. 55. 136: 'In pulmonibus autem inest raritas quaedam et assimilis spongiis mollitudo, ad hauriendum spiritum aptissima, qui tum se contrahunt aspirantes, tum in respiratu dilatant, ut frequenter ducatur spiritus animalis, quo maxime aluntur animantes.' Galen, *Us. part.* 7. 9, considers that the function of respiration is firstly to keep up the vital heat, and secondly to feed τὸ ψυχικὸν πνεῦμα.

[**Spiritus, quo plena sunt omnia, permixtus cunctis cuncta vivificat.**] The statement that *all* things (in the sublunar world) are filled with πνεῦμα and vivified by it implies that vegetables as well as animals are vivified by πνεῦμα (= fire and air). But that is inconsistent with the rest of the paragraph. It seems necessary therefore to bracket *spiritus . . . vivificat*. These words were probably inserted by some one who was accustomed to the Stoic use of the term πνεῦμα to denote the vehicle of life, but mistakenly supposed that term to mean something distinct from the 'fire and air' here spoken of by the author of *Ascl.* I. The interpolator may have been the same person who inserted some irrelevant mentions of *spiritus* in *Ascl.* II.

Sensus (sensu addito ad hominis intellegentiam MSS.), quae quinta pars soli homini concessa est ex aethere. At this point Hermes begins to speak of the divine and immortal part of man. We know from *Ascl.* III. 41 b, where the Greek original is preserved, that the translator sometimes rendered νοῦς by *sensus* (see also *Ascl.* II. 16 a, *Ascl.* III. 18 b, 32 b); and it is evident from the context that the Greek word here represented by *sensus* must have been νοῦς. But a subordinate phrase (*sensu addito* MSS.)

is inadequate for the first mention of *νοῦς*; and there can be little doubt that *sensus* stood at the beginning of a fresh sentence, in correspondence to the nominatives *anima*, *corpora*, [*spiritus*,] with which the preceding sentences begin. The words *addito ad hominis intellegentiam* may be the remains of a marginal note.

νοῦς is here called *quinta pars*, 'the fifth part of man', in contrast to the four material elements. Similarly, in ch. 7 b, the *νοῦς* is called *pars simplex*, in contrast to *pars quadruplex*. The phrase *quinta pars* was probably suggested by a reminiscence of the Aristotelian 'fifth substance';¹ but if so, the suggestion must have come, not from Aristotle himself, but from some later writer, by whom the doctrine of Aristotle was presented in an altered form. The Hermetist's *νοῦς* has little in common with the circularly moving and immutable element of which, according to Aristotle's theory, heaven and the heavenly bodies consist. The *νοῦς* of *Ascl. I* is immaterial (*οὐσιώδης*, ch. 7 b); the 'fifth substance' of Aristotle is material. The *νοῦς* of *Ascl. I* is implanted in man on earth; but Aristotle's 'fifth substance' exists only in the heavens, and no portion of it ever descends into the sublunar world.

In *Gen. an.* 2. 3, 736 b (a passage which Zeller *Arist.* II, p. 8

¹ See Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. tr. I, pp. 471-477. Aristotle says (*De caelo* 270 b 20, *Meteor.* 339 b 14) that men had recognized from ancient times that heaven consists of a different substance from all things below, and that they called this substance *αἰθήρ*; but he does not himself use the word *αἰθήρ* to denote it. He calls it τὸ κύκλω φερόμενον σῶμα (as opposed to the four sublunar elements, the natural movement of which is in a straight line upward or downward)—τὸ πρῶτον τῶν σωμάτων—τὸ πρῶτον στοιχείον—τὸ τῶν ἀστρον στοιχείον' and he describes it as τὴν οὐσίαν σώματος ἄλλη παρὰ τὰς ἐνταῦθα συστάσεις, θειότερα καὶ προτέρα τούτων ἀπάντων—ἀγένητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον καὶ ἀναγέλις καὶ ἀναλλοιώτων. Later writers call it τὸ κυκλοφορικὸν (or κυκλοφορητικὸν) σῶμα,—πέμπτη οὐσία,—and sometimes *αἰθήρ*. Ps.-Aristot. *De mundo* 392 a 5: οὐρανοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀστρον οὐσίαν μὲν αἰθέρα καλοῦμεν, . . . διὰ τὸ ἀεὶ θεῖν κυκλοφορομένην, στοιχείον οὖσαν ἕτερον τῶν τεττάρων, ἀκράτων τε καὶ θεῖον. Plut. *Ei apud Delph.* 11, 389 F: The Kosmos is in a sense composed of five κόσμοι; one of these consists of earth, another of water, a third of fire, a fourth of air; τὸν δὲ πέμπτον οὐρανόν, οἱ δὲ φῶς, οἱ δ' αἰθέρα καλοῦσιν, οἱ δ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο πέμπτην οὐσίαν, ἣ τὸ κύκλω περιφέρεσθαι μόνη τῶν σωμάτων κατὰ φύσιν ἔστιν. (Plutarch *ib.* attributes the doctrine of the 'fifth substance' to Plato as well as Aristotle; in this he follows the authority of Xenocrates, who interpreted as a recognition of the 'fifth substance' the obscure sentence in Pl. *Tim.* 55 C, ἐτι δὲ οὐσης ξυστάσεως μᾶς πέμπτης (viz. the fifth regular solid, the dodecahedron), ἐπι τὸ πᾶν ὁ θεὸς αὐτῇ κατεχρήσατο ἐκεῖνο διαζωγραφῶν. See Simplicius, in *Scholía in Ar.*, ed. Berol. IV, pp. 427 a and 470 a.) Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 288: Ἀριστοτέλης . . . στοιχεῖα δὲ τέσσαρα, πέμπτον δὲ τι σῶμα τὸ αἰθέριον, ἀμετάβλητον. Diog. Laert. 5. 32: εἶναι δὲ παρὰ τὰ τέσσαρα στοιχεῖα καὶ ἄλλο πέμπτον, ἐξ οὗ τὰ αἰθέρα συνεστάναι· ἄλλοιαν δ' αὐτοῦ τὴν κίνησιν εἶναι· κυκλοφορητικὴν γάρ. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 10. 316: συμπάρελαβον γάρ (Ocellus Lucanus and Aristotle) τοῖς τέσσασι στοιχείοις τὸ πέμπτον καὶ κυκλοφορητικὸν σῶμα, ἐξ οὗ λέγουσιν εἶναι τὰ οὐράνια.

describes as 'standing rather isolated'), Aristotle says that there is a certain material substance in which the life of the organism resides; he calls this substance τὸ θερμόν ('the vital heat'), τὸ πνεῦμα ('the vital breath'), and 'the φύσις (i. e. substance) in the πνεῦμα';¹ and he says that it is distinct from and more 'divine' than the four elements, and that it is *analogous* to the element of which the heavenly bodies consist (ἀνάλογον οὐσα τῷ τῶν ἄστρον στοιχείῳ). Aristotle did not himself identify this material vehicle of life in earthly bodies with the 'circularly moving' substance of the heavens, and could not have done so without self-contradiction. But in some later accounts of Peripatetic doctrine, the ψυχή (which Aristotle had distinguished from the material vehicle of organic life) was spoken of as a material thing, and was said to consist of the same 'fifth substance' as the heavenly bodies. Iambl. *De anima* (Stob. I. 49. 32, vol. i, p. 366 W.): τινές μὲν τῶν Ἀριστοτελικῶν αἰθέριον σῶμα τὴν ψυχήν τίθενται. This view seems to have been first expressed by the Peripatetic Critolaus (about 156 B. C.), who must have been influenced in this respect by the materialistic teaching of the Stoics. Tertull. *De anima* 5: 'illos . . . qui (animam) de manifestis corporalibus effingunt, . . . ut Critolaus et Peripatetici eius ex quinta nescio qua substantia.' Macrobius *Somn. Scip.* I. 14. 19: 'Critolaus Peripateticus, constare (animam) de quinta essentia.' Cf. Aetius, *Diels Doxogr.* p. 303: Κριτόλαος καὶ Διόδωρος ὁ Τύριος (a pupil of Critolaus), νοῦν ἀπ' αἰθέρος ἀπαθοῦς (τὸν θεὸν εἶναι). In Cicero's writings, a similar view is repeatedly spoken of, and is erroneously attributed to Aristotle himself. Cic. *Acad. post.* I. 7. 26 (from Antiochus): 'quintum genus, e quo essent astra mentesque, singulare eorumque quattuor . . . dissimile Aristoteles quoddam esse rebatur.' *Acad. post.* I. 11. 39. *Tusc.* I. 10. 22: 'Aristoteles, . . . quom quattuor nota illa genera principiorum esset complexus, e quibus omnia orerentur, quintam quandam naturam censet esse, e qua sit mens.' *Tusc.* I. 17. 41. *Tusc.* I. 26. 65: 'sin autem est quinta quaedam natura, ab Aristotele inducta primum, haec et deorum est et animorum.' *De fin.* 4. 5. 12: 'num quinta quaedam natura videretur esse, ex qua ratio et intelligentia oriretur.' (In these passages of Cicero, it appears to be νοῦς rather than ψυχή that is said to consist of the *quinta natura*.) Cicero's

¹ Elsewhere, he speaks of the material vehicle of life in the organism as σύμφυτος θερμότης φυσική, — ἢ ἀρχὴ τῆς θερμότητος, — ἀρχὴ θερμοῦ φυσική, — τὸ φυσικὸν πῦρ, — τὸ θερμὸν τὸ κοινωνοῦν τῆς ζωῆς, — τὸ σύμφυτον πνεῦμα, — πνεῦμα ἐμφυτον.

authority for this version of the Peripatetic doctrine of the 'fifth substance' was probably the syncretic Platonist Antiochus; (see Madvig's note on *De fin.* 4. 5. 12, and Reid's note on *Acad.* 1. 11. 39;) and Antiochus must have got it from Critolaus. The same modification of the Aristotelian doctrine occurs in Philo, *Quis rer. div. heres* 57. 283, III, p. 64 Wendland: τὰ μὲν σωματικὰ ταῦτα (viz. earth, water, air, and fire): τὸ δὲ νοερὸν καὶ οὐράνιον τῆς ψυχῆς γένος πρὸς αἰθέρα τὸν καθαρώτατον ὡς πατέρα ἀφίξεται. πέμπτη γάρ, ὡς ὁ τῶν ἀρχαίων λόγος, ἔστω τις οὐσία κυκλοφορητική, τῶν τεττάρων κατὰ τὸ κρεῖττον διαφέρουσα, ἐξ ἧς οἱ τε ἀστέραι καὶ ὁ σύμπας οὐρανὸς ἔδοξε γεγενῆσθαι, ἧς κατ' ἀκόλουθον θετέον καὶ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν ἀπόσπασμα.¹ Compare also Philostratus *Vita Apollon.* 3. 34: Apollonius asked the Indian sages ἐκ τίνων ἐνγκείμεσθαι τὸν κόσμον ἡγούντο· οἱ δὲ ἔφασαν "ἐκ στοιχείων". "μῶν", ἔφη, "τεττάρων"; "οὐ τεττάρων", said the spokesman of the Indians, "ἀλλὰ πέντε". "καὶ τί ἄν", ἔφη, "πέμπτον γένοιτο παρὰ τὸ ὕδωρ τε καὶ τὸν ἀέρα καὶ τὴν γῆν καὶ τὸ πῦρ;" "ὁ αἰθήρ", εἶπεν, "ὄν ἡγεῖσθαι χρὴ γένεσιν θεῶν εἶναι· τὰ μὲν γὰρ τοῦ ἀέρος ἔλκοντα θνητὰ πάντα, τὰ δὲ τοῦ αἰθέρος ἀθάνατά τε καὶ θεία." The doctrine which Philostratus ascribes to his 'Indian philosopher' was probably derived from Critolaus.

The Hermetist's statement that the *νοῦς* is *quinta pars*, and has been bestowed on man *ex aethere*, doubtless comes ultimately from Critolaus; but it is probable that, as in the case of Cicero, the notion was derived from Critolaus through Antiochus, since a Hermetic writer is more likely to have borrowed from a Platonist than from a Peripatetic. But in what sense did the writer of *Ascl.* I adopt it? He could not, consistently with his own principles, admit that *νοῦς* consists of a material substance;² we

¹ Cf. Philo *Leg. alleg.* 3. 55. 161, Cohn I, p. 148: δύο ἐστὶν ἐξ ὧν συνέσταμεν, ψυχὴ τε καὶ σῶμα. τὸ μὲν οὖν σῶμα ἐκ γῆς δεδημιούργηται, ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ αἰθέρος ἐστὶν ἀπόσπασμα θεῖον (leg. θεῖον?). . . ἡ δὲ αἰθερίου φύσεως μοῖρα οὐσα ψυχὴ (τροφὰς ἔχει) αἰθερίου καὶ θείας. The *αἰθήρ* of which Philo here speaks, (and which he identifies with the *πνεῦμα ζωῆς* mentioned in *Genesis* 2. 7,) is probably the 'fifth substance' of the Peripatetics; though it would be possible to take the word in this passage as signifying the celestial fire of the Stoics.

² Cf. Philo *De plantatione* 5. 18, Wendland II, p. 137: ἀλλ' οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι, τῆς αἰθερίου φύσεως τὸν ἡμέτερον νοῦν μοῖραν εἰπόντες εἶναι, συγγένειαν ἀνθρώπῳ πρὸς αἶθερα συνήψαν· ὁ δὲ μέγας Μωσῆς οὐδεὶ τῶν γεγονότων τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος ὁμοίωσεν. The 'others' of whom Philo speaks may be Stoics, who used the word *αἰθήρ* as a name either for the fire of which the heavens consist, or for the upper atmosphere (with which Posidonius held the soul to be consubstantial); or they may be men who held the doctrine of Critolaus. Philo's Moses here speaks as a Platonist, and maintains the incorporeality of God and *νοῦς*, in opposition to the materialism of the Stoics, or of Stoicizing Peripatetics and Academics.

must therefore suppose either that he took over the phrase from his authority without noticing what it implied, or that he intended *ex aethere* to be here understood in a metaphorical sense, as signifying 'from the incorporeal and eternal'.

solī hominī concessa est. On God's gift of intellect or reason to man, see *Ascl.* III. 22 b. Compare also *Corp.* IV. 3; VIII. 5; XII. i. 2.

ad divinae rationis intellegentiam exornat. What is meant here by *divina ratio* (ὁ θεῖος λόγος)? In ch. 3 b, Hermes spoke of the *divinitatis ratio* (ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, in the sense of ἡ θεολογία, 'the teaching about God'); but ὁ θεῖος λόγος cannot mean that. Compare *Ascl.* III. 22 a: 'ex intellectu enim rationis divinae, qua constituta sunt omnia, . . . medela nascitur vitiorum.' In that passage, ὁ θεῖος λόγος apparently means the design or ordinance of God, and is nearly equivalent to 'God's will', or 'God's law'; and perhaps the phrase is to be taken in the same sense here (cf. 'quibus se necessarium esse caelesti dispositione cognoscit' in ch. 6 a). For *ratio* (λόγος) in the sense of 'purpose', see ch. 9, 'aptius . . . compositus ad certam rationem.' By the gift of νοῦς, man is enabled to recognize God's purpose with regard to him, that is, to know the place and function which God has assigned to him; and that is the very knowledge which it is the special aim of *Ascl.* I to teach. There is no trace here of a hypostatized or personified Λόγος.

Intellegentia stands for γνῶσις in *Ascl.* III 41 b; and it may very well represent the same Greek word here.

6 c, 7 a. Sed quoniam de sensu . . . tunc totam vobis praestabo rationem. This paragraph interrupts the argument. If we remove it, *Solum enim animal homo &c.* follows naturally on *Sensus* (νοῦς) . . . *humanos tantum sensus* (αἰσθήσεις) . . . *sustollit*; but as the text stands, *enim* is meaningless. There is therefore strong reason to suspect that the intervening paragraph did not exist in the original *Ascl.* I. It may have been inserted by the redactor who made up the composite Λόγος τέλειος.

The digression begins with a promise to discuss *sensus* (νοῦς) later on. This promise is not fulfilled in *Ascl.* I; but in *Ascl.* III. 32 b, ὁ θεῖος νοῦς, ὁ κοσμικὸς νοῦς, and ὁ ἀνθρώπειος νοῦς are dealt with.¹ At the end of the digression, the promise is repeated,

¹ In *Ascl.* III. 18 b also, something is said about *sensus* (νοῦς), but hardly enough to amount to a fulfilment of the promise in *Ascl.* I. 6 c, 7 a.

with the addition that the teacher means to speak of *νοῦς* 'when he speaks of *πνεῦμα* also'. Now there is nothing about *πνεῦμα* in *Ascl.* III. 32 b; and there is no continuous and systematic treatment of *πνεῦμα* in any part of the *Asclepius*,—nor indeed in any of the extant *Hermetica*. But *Ascl.* II (in its present form) begins with the words 'De spiritu autem et de his similibus hinc sumatur exordium' (14 b); it is possible therefore that *quando et de spiritu* means 'in that part of the composite dialogue which begins at ch. 14 b', and that the redactor, in putting this promise into the mouth of Hermes, meant to say 'a discussion of *νοῦς* will be found in ch. 32 b'.¹

It is to be noted that the plural *vobis*, which may be taken as a sign of the redactor's hand, occurs three times in this paragraph.

7a. *Dicebam enim [in ipso initio rerum] de coniunctione deorum.* I cannot account for the words *in ipso initio rerum*. Man's *coniunctio* with the gods was first spoken of in the latter part of ch. 5.

illum intelligentiae divinae (divinum MSS.) . . . sensum, qui sensus est divinius in solo deo et in humana intelligentia. The meaning seems to be that the *νοῦς* here spoken of is not the faculty of reason or intelligence which all men alike possess, but a 'diviner sort of *νοῦς*', which exists only in God and in the elect among men. The distinction may have been suggested to the redactor by *Ascl.* III. 32 b, where ὁ θεῖος *νοῦς* is discriminated from two lower kinds or grades of *νοῦς*. But the words are obscure. *Intelligentiae* can hardly stand for *γνώσεως* here; for it is impossible to make sense either of τὸν θεῖον *νοῦν* τῆς γνώσεως, or of τὸν νοῦν τῆς θείας γνώσεως. Perhaps the translator may have here rendered the single word *νοῦν* by *intelligentiae sensum*.

The words *in humana intelligentia* also are difficult to explain.

¹ I was at first inclined to think that this promise was meant to point forward to *Corp.* IX, the opening words of which (χθές, ᾧ Ἀσκληπιέ, τὸν τέλειον ἀπ[ο]ἰδέωκα λόγον) imply that it was written as a sequel to the *Λόγος τέλειος*. But *Corp.* IX does not deal especially with *νοῦς*. It is a short treatise *περὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ νοήσεως*; it begins by asserting that *αἰσθῆσις* and *νόησις* are, in man at least, inseparably connected, and it couples them together throughout. Besides, it contains nothing that could be called a discussion of *spiritus*, though *πνοή* (§ 7) and *πνεῦμα* (§ 9) are incidentally mentioned in it. I think therefore that the promise in *Ascl.* I. 6 c, 7 a cannot have been meant to refer to *Corp.* IX. On the other hand, the similar promise in ch. 8 *init.* ('de hoc . . . alio dicemus tempore') apparently refers to *Corp.* IX; see note *ad loc.*

The 'diviner νοῦς' might be said to exist 'in the human soul' (cf. *Ascl.* III. 18 b, 'sensus autem cum semel fuerit animae commixtus humanae'), but not 'in the human *gnosis*'. Besides, the following question of Asclepius implies that Hermes has spoken of this sort of νοῦς as present in some men only, and not in all men. Possibly the original may have been something like ἐν τῷ θεῷ μόνῳ καὶ τοῖς ἐν γνώσει οὖσι (*Corp.* IX. 4 b) τῶν ἀνθρώπων, and the latter phrase may have been corrupted into καὶ ἐν τῇ γνώσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων.

It is to be presumed that the higher sort of νοῦς is present in the astral gods, and in the daemons, as well as in God and in men; but here, that fact is ignored.

Non enim omnium hominum . . . uniformis est sensus ? Cf. *Corp.* I. 21 fin.: οὐ πάντες γὰρ ἀνθρώποι νοῦν ἔχουσιν; *Corp.* X. 23: οἶε . . . ὅτι πάντα ψυχὴ νοῦν ἔχει; *Ascl.* III. 18 b: 'Sensus (νοῦς) . . . quo dono caelesti sola felix sit humanitas; neque enim omnes, sed pauci' &c. Pl. *Tim.* 51 E: νοῦ δὲ θεοῦς (μετέχειν φατέον), ἀνθρώπων δὲ γένος βραχύ τι.

Non omnes . . . intellegentiam veram adepti sunt. *Intellegentia vera* (ἡ ἀληθὴς γνώσις?) is here equivalent to 'the diviner sort of νοῦς'. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 41 b: χαρισάμενος ἡμῖν νοῦν, λόγον, γνώσιν ('condonans nos sensu, ratione, intellegentia' Lat. transl.), νοῦν μὲν, ἵνα σε νοήσωμεν, . . . γνώσιν δέ, ἵνα σε ἐπιγνόντες . . . χαίρωμεν.—γνώσις there appears to be a higher degree of νοῦς, or a faculty superior to νοῦς.

7 b. Solum enim animal homo duplex est. Cf. *Corp.* I. 15: παρὰ πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ζῶα διπλοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ ἀνθρώπος, κ.τ.λ. *Ascl.* III. 22 b: 'hominem . . . ex utraque natura composuit, divina atque mortali.'

una pars simplex: viz. the νοῦς.

quae . . . οὐσιώδης. The word οὐσιώδης is here used in the Platonic sense. In Platonic usage, οὐσία means 'true being' or 'reality', as opposed to the unreal appearances of the sensible world; thus οὐσιώδης, 'of the nature of true being', implies 'incorporeal', and is accordingly contrasted with ὑλική. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 1 b and 5. On the other hand, in Stoic usage, οὐσία means 'corporeal substance', and material things are called οὐσιώδη, 'substantial'. Plutarch (*Comm. not.* 49. 2, 1085 D), in an account of Stoic doctrine, speaks of τὸ μόνιμον καὶ οὐσιώδες of earth and water, as compared with the two lighter elements.

quam vocamus divinae similitudinis formam. Cf. ch. 10, 'se etiam secundam esse imaginem dei'; and see *Corp.* I. 12. It is possible that this phrase was derived from a Jewish source. The words of *Gen.* 1. 26 (καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς Ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν) gave rise to much speculation. See Philo's comments on *Gen.* 1. 26 and *Gen.* 2. 7, in *De opif. mundi* 23. 69, Cohn I, p. 23; *Leg. alleg.* 1. 12. 31 ff., Cohn I, p. 69; *De plantatione* 5. 18, Wendland II, p. 137. Cf. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 10. 3 and 14, and *ib.* 7. 4. 3 (*Testim.*). The Mosaic Γένεσις κόσμου was, no doubt, known to many Pagans in Egypt under the Roman empire; and the Hermetist may have borrowed from it, or from some predecessor who had been influenced by it, the phrase *divinae similitudinis formam*. But on the other hand, the notion might have been derived from Plato, independently of Jewish influence. In Pl. *Phaedo* 95 c, for instance, the soul is called θεοειδές τι.

Celsus denied that man is 'an image of God'. Orig. *c. Cels.* 6. 63: εἰτὰ φησιν ὁ Κέλσος . . . "Οὐδ' ἄνθρωπον ἐποίησεν (ὁ θεὸς) εἰκόνα αὐτοῦ· οὐ γὰρ τοιούδε ὁ θεός, οὔτ' ἄλλω εἶδει οὐδενὶ ὅμοιος." To this Origen replies that Celsus is mistaken in supposing that it is the human *body* that is said to be made in the likeness of God; εἰ γὰρ τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ σώματι ἔστι μόνω, ἐστέρηται τὸ κρείττον, ἢ ψυχῇ, τοῦ κατ' εἰκόνα· . . . ὅπερ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν λέγει. εἰ δ' ἔστιν ἐν τῷ συναμφοτέρω τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀνάγκη σύνθετον εἶναι τὸν θεόν, καὶ οἰοεὶ συνεστώτα καὶ αὐτὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος· . . . ὅπερ οὐδεὶς ἡμῶν φησὶ. λείπεται δὴ τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ θεοῦ ἐν τῷ καθ' ἡμᾶς λεγομένῳ ἔσω ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ ἀνακαινουμένῳ, καὶ πεφυκῶτι γίγνεσθαι κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ κτίσαντος, νοεῖσθαι. Thus Origen agrees with the Hermetist in restricting the *divinae similitudinis forma* to the incorporeal part of man (the *pars οὐσιώδης*).

est autem (altera pars) quadruplex, quod ὑλικόν . . . dicimus [e quo factum est corpus]. The body is fourfold, in the sense that it is composed of the four elements. It is the fourfold part of man; but it cannot be said to be *made of* the fourfold part of man. The original may have been τὸ δὲ ἕτερον μέρος τετραπλοῦν, τὸ ὑλικόν λεγόμενον, or something of the sort; and *e quo factum est corpus* may be a clumsy explanation inserted by a later hand.

Man is here said to be composed of τὸ οὐσιώδες, i. e. the νοῦς, and τὸ ὑλικόν, i. e. the body. The mortal part of the soul, i. e. that part of it which is not νοῦς, is not expressly mentioned; we must

therefore understand it to be here included under the term *ἑλικόν*, and regarded as corporeal, and composed of the two lighter elements; though in chs. 2 b *sqq.* it was spoken of as a thing distinct from *ἔλη*.

cum cognatis suis, id est mentis purae sensibus. I suppose the *mentis purae sensus* to be the *νοήματα*. If so, the thoughts which the *νοῦς* thinks are metaphorically spoken of as a family of which the *νοῦς* is the head. A man's thoughts might be said to be 'generated' by his mind; and the mind might in that sense be called their parent. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 3, ὁ γὰρ νοῦς κύει πάντα τὰ νοήματα κ.τ.λ., where the *νοῦς* is spoken of as the mother of the thoughts it thinks.

7 c. *quae de tota summitate tractantur.* We should have expected rather *de totius summitate* (περὶ τῆς τοῦ ὄλου κορυφῆς, or περὶ τοῦ πάντων κεφαλαιοτάτου?).

8. ὁ κύριος . . . ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον.—*Dominus . . . amavit eum ut divinitatis partem suae.* This passage is for the most part derived from the *Tymaeus*. Cf. Pl. *Tym.* 92 c (the concluding sentence): θνητὰ γὰρ καὶ ἀθάνατα ζῶα λαβῶν καὶ ξυμπληρωθεὶς ὁδε ὁ κόσμος οὕτω, ζῶον ὁρατὸν τὰ ὁρατὰ περιέχον, εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ (*αἰ.* τοῦ ποιητοῦ, 'of its Maker'), θεὸς αἰσθητός, μέγιστος καὶ ἄριστος κάλλιστός τε καὶ τελεώτατος γέγονεν εἰς οὐρανὸς ὁδε, μονογενῆς ὢν. *Tym.* 29 E-31 B: ἀγαθὸς ἦν . . . : πάντα ὅ τι μάλιστα γενέσθαι ἐβουλήθη παραπλήσια ἑαυτῷ. . . . οὐτε δύο οὐτ' ἀπείρους ἐποίησεν ὁ ποιῶν κόσμους, ἀλλ' εἰς ὁδε μονογενῆς οὐρανὸς γεγονῶς ἔστι τε καὶ ἔτ' ἔσται. *Tym.* 37 C: ὡς δὲ κινήθην αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησε τῶν αἰδίων θεῶν γεγονὸς ἄγαλμα ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἠγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς κ.τ.λ.

The parenthesis, *αἰσθητὸν δέ φημι . . . καὶ εἰς ὄρασιν*, points forward to a subsequent answer to the question *πότερον ὁ κόσμος αἰσθάνεται*. This question is answered in *Corp.* IX. 6: *καὶ γὰρ ὁ κόσμος . . . αἰσθησιν ἰδίαν καὶ νόησιν ἔχει*. The opening words of *Corp.* IX inform us that it was written as a sequel to the *Λόγος τέλειος*; and there can be little doubt that the promise in the text is connected with the fulfilment of the promise in *Corp.* IX. Hence we may conclude that the parenthesis which contains this promise, together with the resuming words *ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦτον ἐποίησε*, was inserted in the *Λόγος τέλειος* after the later document, *Corp.* IX, had been written, and probably by the writer of *Corp.* IX. The parenthetical note is appended to the word *αἰσθητόν*, by which it was suggested, and

has separated the words θεὸν ὄρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν || πρῶτον καὶ μόνον καὶ ἕνα, which were originally intended to be taken together. In insisting that there is only one sensible Kosmos, the writer of *Ascl. I* is following the *Timaeus*.

The Latin, as punctuated in my text, agrees with the Greek (as given by Lactantius) in the structure of the sentence. But if the translator understood the Greek thus, why did he not put in *autem*, to correspond to δέ after αἰσθητὸν? And why did he insert the words *eum deum secundum*? I am inclined to think that he failed to see the construction of the complex Greek sentence, and broke it into two separate sentences, making the first of them end at καὶ εἰς ὄρασιν, and taking αἰσθητὸν δέ φημι as the beginning of the apodosis. If so, he must have written thus: 'Dominus . . . quoniam a se secundum fecit deum . . ., eum deum secundum sensibilem dixerim, non ideo . . ., sed eo, quoniam videntium sensus incurrit. Quoniam ergo hunc fecit' &c. 'Seeing that the Master . . . made a God second to himself, . . . I think fit to call that second God sensible' &c.

ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε.—quoniam a se secundum fec[er]it. The Kosmos was the 'First God' of the Stoics, but the 'Second God' of the Platonists, who differed from the Stoics in recognizing a supracosmic God. Cf. ch. 10, 'aeternitatis dominus deus primus est, secundus est mundus.' *Ascl. III.* 29 c, 'secundum etenim deum hunc crede.'

ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦτον ἐποίησε πρῶτον καὶ μόνον καὶ ἕνα.—quoniam ergo hunc fecit ex se primum et a se secundum. The translator must have had before him a different reading of the Greek.

καλὸς δὲ αὐτῷ ἐφάνη (ᾧν), καὶ πληρέστατος πάντων τῶν ἀγαθῶν.—visusque ei pulcher, utpote qui sit omnium bonitate plenissimus. If ἐφάνη was originally followed by ᾧν, we can account for the translator's rendering, by assuming that he divided the Greek words wrongly, and took ᾧν καὶ πληρέστατος to mean utpote qui sit plenissimus.

The thought occurs in the passages of the *Timaeus* quoted above. But here again, there is a resemblance to the Jewish account of the Creation; compare the recurring phrase καὶ ἶδεν ὁ θεὸς ὅτι καλόν (*Gen.* 1. 4, 8, 10, 12, 18); καὶ ἶδεν ὁ θεὸς ὅτι καλὰ (*ib.* 21, 25); καὶ ἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἰδοὺ καλὰ λίαν (*ib.* 31). It is not unlikely that the first chapter of *Genesis*, as well as the

Timaeus, was known to the writer of *Ascl.* I, or to some of his teachers.

ἡγάσθη τε καὶ πάνυ ἐφίλησεν ὡς ἴδιον τόκον.—*amavit eum ut divinitatis partum suae.* The word ἡγάσθη comes from Pl. *Tim.* 37 c. The translator has omitted it. It is possible that in his copy ἡγάσθη was corrupted into ἡράσθη (this corruption occurs three times in *Corp.* I. 12, 13 a), and that he wrote *amavit et valde amavit*, which a copyist might easily reduce to the single verb *amavit*.

The notion that the Kosmos is son of God is borrowed from the *Timaeus*. The thought was familiar to all Platonists. Cf. Philo *De ebrietate* 8. 30, Wendland II, p. 176: God mated with his ἐπιστήμη, and she brought forth τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν αἰσθητὸν υἱόν, τόνδε τὸν κόσμον. In Philo *Quod deus sit immut.* 6. 31, Wendland II, p. 63, the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος is called the younger son of God, the νοητὸς κόσμος being God's elder son. In *Corp.* I. 12, the phrases which Platonists were accustomed to use in describing the Kosmos as the son of God are transferred to the Archanthropos: ὁ δὲ πάντων πατήρ . . . ἀπεκύησεν ἄνθρωπον . . . οὗ ἡγάσθη ὡς ἴδιου τόκου, κ.τ.λ. Christian theologians, reading these phrases in the *Timaeus* or in the writings of later Platonists, took them to apply, not to the universe itself, but to the Λόγος by whom the universe was made, and regarded them as equivalent to the words addressed to Jesus, σὺ εἶ ὁ υἱός μου ὁ ἀγαπητός, ἐν σοὶ εὐδόκησα (Mark 1. 11, Luke 3. 22). Thus Lactantius quotes the words of Hermes in *Ascl.* I. 8 as referring to the 'Son of God' in the Christian sense. Interpreted in this way, such passages may have contributed to the formulation of Christian dogma.¹ By a similar misunderstanding, Pseudo-Augustine supposes that Λόγος τέλειος, the title of the Hermetic document, means *Verbum perfectum*, 'The perfect Word of God'.

¹ E. g. the epithet *μονογενής*, which the Christians applied to the Second Person of their Trinity, was taken over by them from the *Timaeus*, where it is applied to the Kosmos. This word meant primarily 'the only one of his kind' (*γένεος*); and in the earlier Latin versions of the Christian Creed, it was represented by *unicus*, 'unique', for which *unigenitus*, 'only-begotten', was afterwards substituted. (Rashdall, *Doctrine and development*, p. 78.)

See Philo *De vita Mosis* 2(3). 14. 134, Cohn IV, p. 231. Speaking of the Jewish High Priest, Philo there says ἀναγκαῖον γὰρ ἦν τὸν ἱεροῦμένον τῷ τοῦ κόσμου πατρὶ παρακλήτῳ χρῆσθαι τελειοτάτῳ τὴν ἀρετὴν υἱῷ (sc. τῷ κόσμῳ) πρὸς τε ἀμνηστίαν ἀμαρτημάτων καὶ χορηγίαν ἀφθονωτάτων ἀγαθῶν. A Christian theologian of the early centuries, reading those words, would almost necessarily assume that 'the Son' of whom Philo spoke was Christ.

ut 'tantus et' bonus. If the Latin words are sound, it would seem that the translator read ὡς τοσοῦτος καὶ ἀγαθός. But the Hermetist cannot have written that. Possibly the true reading was something like ὡν πρώτως αὐτός (σοφός?) καὶ ἀγαθός (cf. 'et rationis suae imitatore[m] et diligentiae' below), and -τως αὐτός was corrupted into τοσοῦτος.

qui illum . . . intueri potuisset. The translator repeatedly writes a pluperfect subjunctive where Latin usage requires an imperfect. Ch. 15: 'si locus deesset qui omnia sustinere potuisset' (for *posset*). Ch. 22 b: 'per quae vitia . . . abalienare potuissent' (for *possent*). Ch. 37: 'per quas idola . . . vires habere potuissent' (for *possent*). Ch. 9: 'harmoniae suavitas defuisset' (for *deesset*). Ch. 8: 'satis esse debuisset' (?). Cf. ch. 16 a: 'provisum est quantum rationabiliter potuisset' (for *poterat* or *potuit*).

Voluntas etenim dei ipsa est summa perfectio. A man needs time and effort to execute his purposes; but with God, 'to will is to accomplish'. The same thought is expressed in other words below; 'voluntatem (dei) comitatur effectus.' Cf. *Ascl.* III. 26 b: 'et habet omnia quae vult, <<et ea vult quae habet>>.' The 'will' of God, as here spoken of, corresponds to the 'word' or 'command' of God in the Jewish account of the Creation: εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς Γενηθήτω φῶς· καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς.¹

Cum itaque eum οὐσιώδη (fecisset). Man is first created as an incorporeal being, and afterwards embodied. This may be regarded as a rudimentary form of the doctrine of the Archanthropos, which presents itself fully developed in *Corp.* I. But we must not conclude on that account that *Corp.* I is necessarily of later date than *Ascl.* I.

talesque omnes esse praecepit. These words show that the preceding description of the making of man must be taken as referring to an individual 'first man', and not to men in general. Here then we have another point in common with the Mosaic account of the Creation. Cf. Philo *De opif. mundi* 51. 145, Cohn I, p. 51: τοὺς δ' ἀπογόνους (of Adam), τῆς ἐκείνου μετέχοντας ιδέας, ἀναγκαῖον, εἰ καὶ ἀμυδρούς, ἀλλ' οὖν ἔτι σώζειν τοὺς τύπους τῆς πρὸς τὸν προπάτορα συγγενείας. ἡ δὲ συγγένεια τίς; πᾶς ἀνθρώπος κατὰ μὲν τὴν διάνοιαν ὑκείνεται λόγῳ θεοῦ, τῆς μακαρίας φύσεως ἐκμαγεῖον

¹ The Pagan author of the *Περὶ ὕψους* (ch. 9) quotes these words, and says that in them 'the lawgiver of the Jews, having formed an adequate conception of the Supreme Being, gave it adequate expression'.

ἢ ἀπόσπασμα ἢ ἀπαύγασμα γεγονώς, κατὰ δὲ τὴν τοῦ σώματος κατασκευήν, ἅπαντι τῷ κόσμῳ· συγκέκρται γὰρ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν, γῆς καὶ ὕδατος καὶ ἀέρος καὶ πυρός.

[[*ex utraque natura in unum confundens miscensque quantum satis esse debuisset.*]] These words picture the process of incorporation differently from the preceding phrase, 'textit eum corporea domo', and can hardly have stood in the same sentence with it. I have therefore transferred them to the following sentence. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 22 b: 'hominem . . . ex utraque natura conposuit, divina atque mortali.' Lactantius *Div. inst.* 7. 13. 3 (*Testim.*).

Debuisset may have arisen out of *quantum debuisset* (ὅσον ἔδει?), written as an alternative for *quantum satis esset* (ὅσον ἤρκει?).

[*in*] *colere atque gubernare terrena.* *Incolere* either is a misreading for *colere*, or is here used in the sense of *colere*, 'to tend'.

This sentence gives the writer's answer to the question asked above, 'What need was there that man should be embodied?' In the *Timaeus*, that question is answered only by saying that 'if mortal beings be not created, the Kosmos will be incomplete' (*Tim.* 41 B), and that the soul is implanted in the body ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Some Platonists, following the tradition of Empedocles and the Pythagoreans, spoke of embodiment as a punishment which the soul has incurred by some sin committed in a previous stage of existence; and a similar doctrine is taught in the *Kore Kosmu*. Others said that the soul descends from the world above and enters the body of its own free will, or that it is drawn down to earth by morbid desire. But the writer of *Ascl.* I answers the question by saying 'God willed that man should be embodied, *in order that he might tend the things of earth*'. Cicero, following some Greek authority of later date than Plato, suggests a similar answer; *Somn. Scip.* 3. 7: 'homines enim sunt hac lege generati, qui tuerentur (φυλάττειν?) illum globum . . . quae terra dicitur.' Cic. *De sen.* 21. 77: 'Nam dum sumus inclusi in his compagibus corporis, munere quodam necessitatis et gravi opere perfungimur. Est enim animus caelestis, ex altissimo domicilio depressus et quasi demersus in terram, locum divinae naturae aeternitatisque contrarium. Sed credo deos immortales sparsisse animos in corpora humana, ut essent qui terras tuerentur, quique caelestium ordinem contemplantes imitarentur eum vitae modo atque constantia.' Cic. *Nat.*

deor. 2. 39. 99 (probably from Posidonius), in a passage describing the beauties and splendours of the earth: 'Quid iam de hominum genere dicam? qui quasi cultores terrae constituti non patiuntur eam nec immanitate beluarum efferari nec stirpium asperitate vastari, quorumque operibus agri, insulae litoraue collucent distincta tectis et urbibus. Quae si, ut animis, sic oculis¹ videre possemus, nemo cunctam intuens terram de divina ratione dubitaret.' (No one would doubt that these things are ordained by God's design.) Cf. *Sap. Sal.* 9. 1: θεός, . . . ὁ . . . τῆ σοφία σου κατασκευάσας ἄνθρωπον ἵνα δεσπόζη τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ γενομένων κτισμάτων, καὶ διέπη τὸν κόσμον ἐν δσιώτητι καὶ δικαιοσύνη. Philo *De orif. mundi* 29. 88, Cohn I, p. 31: ἡνίοχον δὴ τινα καὶ κυβερνήτην ἐφ' ἅπασιν ὁ ποιητὴς ἐδημιούργει τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ἵνα ἡνιοχῆ καὶ κυβερνᾷ τὰ περίγεια, ζῶων καὶ φυτῶν λαβῶν τὴν ἐπιμέλειαν, οἳά τις ὑπαρχος τοῦ πρώτου καὶ μεγάλου βασιλέως. The language of that passage closely resembles that of *Ascl.* I; but the thought was suggested to Philo by *Gen.* 1. 26: καὶ ἀρχέτωσαν (οἱ ἄνθρωποι) τῶν ἰχθύων τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν κτηνῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἐρπετῶν τῶν ἐρπόντων ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. Some readers of *Genesis* may have found a similar meaning in *Gen.* 2. 15: καὶ ἔλαβεν Κύριος ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὃν ἔπλασεν καὶ ἔθετο αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ, ἐργάζεσθαι αὐτὸν καὶ φυλάττειν. (For the word φυλάττειν, cf. *Ascl.* I. 8: 'quae pars terrena mundi artium disciplinarumque . . . usu servatur.' Ch. 11 a: 'mundi inferioris necessitate servandi.') Thus here again, the question of Jewish influence arises; and it is not impossible that the Hermetist, in his description of man's earthly function, derived something from the Jewish Cosmogonia, as well as from Pagan writers such as Posidonius.²

For a comprehensive discussion of the descent and embodiment of the soul, see Plotinus 4. 8. Plotinus says, *inter alia*, that the embodied soul κοσμεῖ τε καὶ διοικεῖ καὶ ἄρχει (τοῦ μετ' αὐτήν, i. e. material things); and that it τὸ καθέκαστον μετὰ περιστάσεως (with trouble) διοικεῖ, ἐφαπτομένη ἤδη καὶ θεραπεύουσα τὰ ἕξωθεν.

¹ We see with our eyes one little bit of the earth's surface only. Our mental vision may include the whole; but if we could see it all with our bodily eyes, we should be more strongly impressed.

² It is conceivable even that Posidonius himself may have read the first two chapters of *Genesis*, and may have been to some slight extent influenced by them. We know that in his time there were Jews of the *Diaspora* who were eager to communicate their sacred wisdom to their Gentile neighbours.

commodationes alternae, quae est humanitatis inter se firmissimus nexus. An incidental recognition of human society. The mention of social ties between man and man is exceptional in the *Hermetica*.

artium disciplinarumque cognitione atque usu servatur. In other words, the work of φύσις is incomplete until it is supplemented by τέχνη.

[Placitum enim dei . . . multo ante sciverit.] These two sentences are irrelevant in their present context. *Voluntatem (dei) comitatur effectus* is a repetition of *Voluntas dei ipsa est summa perfectio* above. The second sentence, *Neque enim . . . deo displiciturum esse &c.*, may be compared with *natura . . . producit cuncta dei visibus placitura* in ch. 3 c *fin.* In place of *quod placuit*, something like *quod fiat* would have been more intelligible.

9. caeli vel quae in eo sunt dilectum . . . vel cultum. The translator uses *dilectus* as a synonym for *diligentia* (θεραπεία). The Hermetist here speaks of worship of *caelum* and the *di caelestes* (sun, moon, and stars), and makes no mention of the *deus summus*; yet below, speaking of the same sort of worship, he says that 'hominum cantilenis concelebratur laudibus qui solus omnia est'. His view seems to be that hymns addressed to the *di caelestes* are, in effect, a form of worship of the *deus summus*. Music such as he describes would probably be employed in congregational worship only; and it may be that, in the gatherings of the Hermetist's community, hymns of this character were sung, not to God himself, but to his ministers, the astral gods. It was probably held that the supreme Deity could be directly approached only in private prayer and contemplation.

In the temple-cults of Egypt, there was much singing of hymns. Among other forms of music employed in Egyptian worship, we hear of a practice of intoning the vowel-sounds in series. Demetrius Περὶ ἑρμηνείας 71: ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ δὲ καὶ τοὺς θεοὺς ἑμνοῦσι διὰ τῶν ἐπὶ φωνηέντων οἱ ἱερεῖς, ἐφεξῆς ἠχοῦντες αὐτά, καὶ ἀντὶ αὐλοῦ καὶ ἀντὶ κιθάρας τῶν γραμμάτων τούτων ὁ ἦχος ἀκούεται ὑπ' εὐφωνίας. Many people (though not the writer of *Ascl. I*) attributed a theurgic efficacy to such vocal sounds; hence the groups of vowels which occur so frequently amidst the gibberish of the magic papyri. (Dieterich, *Abraxas*, p. 33.)

Hanc aliud animal non facit (fecit MSS.) nec divinatorum

nec mortalium (*animalium* MSS.). Man is the only living being that worships; the gods do not worship. This statement is contradicted elsewhere in the *Hermetica*. In *Corp.* I. 25, the disembodied soul hears 'the Powers that are above the Ogdoad' singing the praise of God; see also *Corp.* XIII. 15. In the *Kore Kosmu* (*Exc.* XXIII. 69) we are told that Osiris and Isis (deities residing for a time on earth) 'invoked the Monarchos' with a hymn; *χαίρει γὰρ ὑμῶν ὁ θεός*. In the documents of the old Egyptian religion, adoration of a god by gods is of frequent occurrence. Moreover, in *Ascl.* I, only a few lines below, there is mention of *caelestes laudes*, i. e. hymns sung in heaven, either by the *di caelestes*, or by beatified human souls, or perhaps by both. It would be possible to get rid of the inconsistency by bracketing *nec divinatorum nec mortalium*, and taking *animal* to refer to earthly beings only; but that is hardly necessary.

Musarum chorus. References to the deities of Hellenic mythology,—and indeed, to individual deities of any kind, other than the astral gods,—are rare in the *Hermetica*, with the exception of the *Kore Kosmu*. Here, the writer is using the language of Greek literary tradition; the Muses are, to him, merely a personification of music; and it is probable that he no more regarded them as real living persons, than did Pope, when he wrote 'Descend, ye Nine, descend and sing'.

ne terrenus mundus videretur incultior. Thus even the singing of hymns may, in a certain sense, be included in that part of man's function which consists in *terrae cultus*.

Aliqui . . . pura mente praediti. 'Pure mind' is *νοῦς* which is not contaminated by the body in which it is encased, i. e. by the *πάθη* which the body generates. Cf. ch. 7 b, 'mentis purae sensibus'. Xen. *Cyrop.* 8. 7. 20: ἀλλ' ὅταν ἄκρατος καὶ καθαρὸς ὁ νοῦς ἐκκριθῆ (τοῦ ἄφρονος σώματος), τότε καὶ φρονιμώτατον αὐτὸν εἰκὸς εἶναι.

In ch. 8, it was said of all men indifferently that God made them 'ex utraque natura in unum confundens miscensque' &c. But here, it appears that some few men escape the *confusio* of the two substances which takes place in the many, and preserve their *νοῦς* unmixed.

(in) *inferiorem intellegentiam mole corporis resederunt.* The inferior sort of *intelligentia* (*νόησις*?) here spoken of must be that which is employed in the arts and sciences by means of which

men 'tend the things of earth'. In this passage, men are divided into two classes,—the few, whose function is τὸ τὰ οὐράνια θεραπεύειν, and the many, whose function is τὸ τὰ ἐπίγεια θεραπεύειν. But in what precedes and follows, it seems to be implied that it is every man's business to do both.

curandis elementis hisque inferioribus. Does *inferioribus* mean 'the things of the lower world' in general, or 'the lower elements', earth and water? If the latter, perhaps *-que* ought to be struck out.

10. Rationem vero tractatus istius &c. At this point Hermes makes a fresh start (*hinc exordiar*), and calls on his pupil to listen with exceptional attention. What is the doctrine (*ratio*, λόγος,) which these prefatory words are intended to introduce? It must be something which has not yet been spoken of; and for this reason, it cannot be anything contained in ch. 10, which is little more than a recapitulation of what has gone before. It must therefore be the new doctrine taught in ch. 11 a, namely, that in order to discharge his function rightly, a man must renounce private property. The truths stated in ch. 10 are set forth for the purpose of leading up to this conclusion. The doctrine spoken of is *plurimis incredibilis*; i. e. it is rejected by the many, but accepted and acted upon by the saintly few who renounce all earthly possessions.

Aeternitatis dominus deus primus est, secundus est mundus, homo est tertius. Cf. Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* XI. 2. (6): πρῶτον ὁ θεός, δεύτερον ὁ κόσμος, τρίτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. *Corp.* X. 14 b: τρία τοίνυν ταῦτα, ὁ θεὸς . . . καὶ ὁ κόσμος καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος. For *aeternitatis dominus*, see *Ascl.* III. 29 c-32 a.

ut sit ipse et mundus uterque ornamento sibi. Man's function is τὸ τὸν κόσμον κοσμεῖν; and the man who fulfils this function κοσμεῖται, or becomes κόσμος. The word *κόσμησις* might mean either 'setting in order' or 'beautifying'; the translator took it in the latter sense, and rendered it by *ornamentum*. Perhaps he was right; cf. ch. 11 b: '(mundi) pulchritudinem qui diligentia servat atque auget.'

Conpositio perhaps stands for *συγκόσμησις*; if so, there is here a second play on the word *κόσμος*.

Is novit se. He fulfils the precept γνῶθι σεαυτόν. *Novit et mundum*; he understands the Kosmos, and stands in a friendly relation to it; cf. ch. 6 a: 'daemonum genus novit.'

cuius sunt imagines duae mundus et homo. The Kosmos is *εἰκὼν τοῦ θεοῦ*. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 27 a, 'eius imago mundus'; *Corp.* VIII. 2; XII. ii. 15 b; V. 2; XI. ii. 15 a. In the *Timaeus*, the sensible Kosmos is described as the son of God, but as an 'image', or visible copy, of the *νοητὸς κόσμος*. Later Platonists regarded the *νοητὸς κόσμος* as constituted by God's thought, and included in his being, and accordingly called the sensible Kosmos an 'image of God'.

Man also is an image of God. See note on *divinae similitudinis formam*, ch. 7 b. But in that passage, it was the immortal part of man alone that was said to be made in the likeness of God. Here, on the other hand, the writer is speaking of man as a composite being (*conpago*), and the notion that he is an image of God seems to be based on the conception of man as a microcosm.¹ If man is an image of the Kosmos, and the Kosmos is an image of God, man must be 'a second image of God'.

The thought that man is *imago mundi* is elaborated by Firmicus Maternus the astrologer (about A. D. 340), *Math.* 3 *prooem.*: 'scire itaque nos . . . oportet . . . quod ad imaginem speciemque mundi formam hominis ac staturam totamque substantiam deus ille fabricator hominis natura monstrante perfecit; nam corpus hominis, ut mundi, ex quattuor elementorum commixtione composuit, ignis scilicet et aquae, aeris et terrae, ut omnium istorum coniunctio temperata animal ad formam divinae imitationis ornaret; et ita hominem artificio divinae fabricationis composuit, ut in parvo corpore omnem elementorum vim atque substantiam natura cogente conferret, ut divino illi spiritui, qui ad sustentationem mortalis corporis ex caelesti mente descendit, licet fragile, sed tamen simile mundo pararet hospitium. Hac ex causa hominem quasi minorem quandam mundum stellae quinque, sol etiam et luna, ignita ac sempiterna agitatione sustentant, ut animal quod ad imitationem mundi factum est simili divinitatis substantia gubernetur'. The philosophic doctrines of Firmicus are for the most part derived from Stoic sources.

¹ The statement that man is a *μικρὸς κόσμος* is attributed to Democritus (Diels *Vorsokr.* p. 398). The view that man *ought* to be a microcosm is expressed in Philo *Vita Mosis* 2 (3). 14. 135, Cohn IV, p. 231: *προδιδάσκει τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ θεραπευτήν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦ κοσμοποιοῦ δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε κόσμου διηρηκῶς ἄξιον εἶναι πειρᾶσθαι, οὗ τὸ μίμημα ἐνδύμενος ὀφείλει, τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράδειγμα εὐθὺς ἀγαλλομαφορῶν, αὐτὸς τρόπον τινὰ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου μεθηρμῶσθαι, καί, εἰ θέμις εἴπειν, . . . βραχὺς κόσμος εἶναι.*

«**Nam ut homo . . . esse formatum**»). This sentence is manifestly out of place in ch. 11 a, where it stands in the MSS.; and it supplies precisely what is needed here to lead on to what follows. In order to establish an analogy between the *pars divina hominis* and the *pars mortalis*, the writer splits up the former into four constituent parts, which he calls *animus* (διάνοια?), *sensus* (νοῦς), *spiritus* (πνεῦμα), and *ratio* (λόγος). It would be useless to ask what precise meaning he attached to each of the four terms, and how he distinguished them from one another; it was enough to serve his purpose that four substantives could be found which were applicable to the higher part of man.

The division of the *divina pars hominis* into four parts is in direct contradiction to the preceding statement in ch. 7 b, 'eius una pars simplex'; and for this reason, it seems probable that the passage containing this futile conceit of four quasi-elements of which the mind is composed has been inserted by a later hand, and that the transposition of *nam ut . . . esse formatum* to ch. 11 a was subsequent to the interpolation of the passage in ch. 10. The original text may perhaps have run thus: 'se etiam secundam esse imaginem dei. Unde efficitur ut parte divina inscendere posse videatur in caelum, parte vero mundana mortalis resistat in terra' &c. In confirmation of this hypothesis, it is to be noted that a new and different meaning is here given to the word *spiritus*. The 'spirit' spoken of, since it belongs to the *pars divina*, must be πνεῦμα in the Jewish and Christian sense, i. e. something nearly equivalent to the Platonic and Hermetic νοῦς, and entirely different from the material πνεῦμα of the Stoics, composed of the two elements fire and air, which was mentioned in ch. 6 b, and is spoken of in *Ascl.* III *init.*

11 a. Est autem mensura eius utriusque . . . religio. *Mensura* (μέτρον) must here be understood in the sense of *συμμετρία* or *ἁρμονία*, i. e. the due proportion or right adjustment of the two parts to one another. In the pious man, and in him alone, the *pars mundana* is rightly subordinated to the *pars divina*.

ab omnibus cognationis divinae partibus aliena. What are the 'parts' of the divine kinship? The phrase is obscure, and probably corrupt. Perhaps the original reading may have been *cognitionis divinae* (τῆς θείας γνώσεως).

quaecunq̄ue terrena . . . possidentur. See ch. 12 a, 'qui capitur de possessionibus fructus'. He who would live the higher

life must 'scorn earthly possessions'; i. e. he must renounce private property. A man who acted on this principle might maintain life either as a labourer employed by others and earning his keep by daily work, or as a mendicant living on the gifts of others, or as a member of a society which held property in common. It seems most likely that the mode of life which the writer recommends is that of a communistic brotherhood, and that he himself was a member of such a brotherhood. In Egypt, religious societies of this character existed in pre-Christian times; and the Christian monasticism which arose there in the fourth century was a continuation of habits of life which had long been established in that country. The Therapeutae described by Philo are a communistic brotherhood of Jews living near Alexandria. Philostratus (*Vita Apollon.* 6. 6 ff.) describes a community of *Gymni* (Pagan theosophists) living near the southern border of Egypt. His narrative of the visit of Apollonius to the *Gymni*, though professedly based on the written record of an eye-witness, cannot be accepted as historical; but it is good evidence for the existence of such societies in the time of Philostratus, soon after A. D. 200. A member of the community of *Gymni* says (*ib.* 6. 16) *μειράκιον γενόμενος τὰ μὲν πατρῶα τοῖς βουλομένοις ἀφήκα, γυμνὸς δὲ Γυμνοῖς ἐπεφοίτησα τούτοις, . . . ἐμὲ δὲ νέον ἔτι . . . ὄντα κατέλεξαν ἐς τὸ αὐτῶν κοινόν.* Plutarch (*Defect. orac.* 21, 421 f.) describes a Pagan hermit, who lived in solitude on the shore of the Red Sea, and held Pythagorean or Platonic doctrines. But as the writer of *Ascl.* I, while disapproving of private property, at the same time speaks with approval of social ties, and of agriculture and other forms of wealth-producing labour, it may be inferred that he favoured a communistic rather than a solitary life; and the manner of living which he advocates would seem to be something like that of the Essenes of Palestine, who held no property as individuals, but laboured with their hands, and put the proceeds into a common stock. (See Schürer, *Gesch. des jüd. Volkes*, ed. 4, vol. ii, p. 651 ff.)

Ut enim meum animum rationis ducit intentio. Note the emphasis on *meum*. The words are hardly appropriate in the mouth of the inspired and infallible teacher Hermes; the writer is here speaking in his own person, and expressing an opinion held by him, but not shared by some of those with whom he has to do.

homo hactenus esse debuit. *Homo* here signifies *mediatate*

generis sui contentus. The men who thus acquiesce in their earthly condition are called *humani* in ch. 5. Cf. Ar. *Eth. Nic.* 10. 7: εἰ δὴ θεῖον ὁ νοῦς πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπον, καὶ ὁ κατὰ τοῦτον βίος θεῖος πρὸς τὸν ἀνθρώπινον βίον· οὐ χρὴ δὲ κατὰ τοὺς παραινούντας ἀνθρώπινα φρονεῖν ἀνθρώπον ὄντα, οὐδὲ θνητὰ τὸν θνητόν, ἀλλ' ἐφ' ὅσον ἐνδέχεται ἀθανατίζειν. Aristotle is here in close agreement with Plato; see Pl. *Tim.* 90 B f., καθ' ὅσον μετασχεῖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ φύσει ἀθανασίας ἐνδέχεται, κ.τ.λ.

contemplatione divinitatis. The meaning would be clearer if some participle such as *confisus* (πεποιθώς) were added. Cf. ch. 6 a, 'humanae naturae partem in se ipse despicit, alterius partis divinitate confisus.'

[**Nam ut homo . . . atque suspiciat.**] This passage has nothing to do with the context. The first part of it ('nam ut homo . . . esse formatum') seems to have been placed here by mistake. The second part ('manibus . . . suspiciat') cannot have been written by the same person who wrote 'parte ((divina)), quae ex animo et sensu, spiritu atque ratione est' in ch. 10. It is a second, and still more inappropriate, attempt to find an analogy between the *pars divina hominis* and the *pars mundana*. Of the four parts into which the *pars divina* is here divided, two, viz. *ratio* and *sensus* (if my correction is right), are the same as in ch. 10, but the two others are different (*memoria* and *providentia* in place of *animus* and *spiritus*); and instead of enumerating the four *elements* of which the *pars mundana* is composed, the writer enumerates the four *members* with which it is equipped for its work, viz. two hands and two feet. The passage may be conjecturally accounted for in this way. The words 'nam ut homo . . . esse formatum' were accidentally shifted from ch. 10 to ch. 11 a, and thus separated from the explanation which originally followed them; and a redactor, reading them here, and rightly thinking that an enumeration of four parts of mind and body respectively was needed to complete the statement, tried to supply what was lacking by his own invention.

[**Unde efficitur ut . . . non possit.**] The contents of this sentence are cognate with those of ch. 13 *init.*, 'in varias . . . et geometriam'. It may have been written by the author of *Ascl.* I, but transposed from its proper place by some accident.

II b. tali ministerio obsequioque praepositum. The *ministerium* is ἡ τῶν ἐπιγείων θεραπεία; the *obsequium* is ἡ τῶν οὐρανίων θεραπεία.

parentes nostri. Who are the 'parents' of Hermes and Asclepius? In *Ascl.* III. 37, we are told that Hermes the teacher is a grandson of the god Thoth-Hermes, and Asclepius the pupil is a grandson of the god Imhotep-Asclepius. But we cannot be sure that the writer of *Ascl.* I would have given precisely the same account of the matter. Possibly he considered the teacher and pupil to be *sons* of the gods whose names they bore. At any rate, it is assumed that the parents lived on earth as men before they 'returned to heaven', or became gods. The teacher and pupil are descended from an indefinite series of human ancestors; they are now men such as their parents once were; and if they earn a like reward, they will, after death, be gods, or beatified souls, such as their parents now are. In *Corp.* X. 5, the teacher Hermes speaks of Uranos and Kronos (i.e. the Egyptian gods Shu and Seb) as his ancestors. See Lactant. *Div. inst.* I. 11. 61 (*Testim.*).

divinae pietati. For *pietas* in the sense of 'mercy' or 'loving-kindness', cf. *Ascl.* III. 22 b *fin.*: 'diique etiam pio affectu humana omnia respiciunt.' Augustine *Civ. dei* 10. 1: 'pietas quoque proprie dei cultus intellegi solet, quam Graeci εὐσέβειαν vocant. . . . More autem vulgi hoc nomen etiam in operibus misericordiae frequentatur: . . . ex qua loquendi consuetudine factum est ut et Deus ipse dicatur pius; quem sane Graeci nullo suo sermonis usu εὐσεβῆν vocant, quamvis εὐσέβειαν pro misericordia illorum etiam vulgus usurpet'.

exutos mundana custodia. Does *mundana custodia* mean 'our guardianship of the material world', or 'our imprisonment in the material world'? (For the latter, cf. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 8. 68: 'corpore quasi custodia saeptum tenetur'.) The notion of 'guardianship' agrees better with the prevailing thought of the treatise; and the writer has previously described the body as a shelter (*domus*) for the *voûs*, and not as a prison. But on the other hand, the following word *nexibus* comes nearer to the notion of imprisonment.

naturae (dative) superioris partis . . . restituat. We should have expected rather 'in naturalem sedem superioris partis' (i. e. to heaven, the native home of the *voûs*), in contrast to 'reditus denegatur in caelum' below. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 37, 'reliquus (homo) . . . remeavit in caelum'. If the text is sound, the meaning must be 'restore us to the natural condition of our higher part'. For the dative after *restituat*, in place of the more usual *in* with acc., cf. Plin. *N. H.* 20. 6, 23. 51, 'ulcera sanitati restituens'. Thomas adopts Kroll's emendation, *naturae* (gen.) *superioris parti*, which might be rendered

'to the region of the higher substance'. For *pars* in this sense, cf. ch. 7 c, 'in ea parte, qua deus est, (hominem) in summa beatitudine degere'. The writer of *Ascl.* I, no doubt, held that God is not in space; but even those who were convinced of this could not avoid using traditional phrases in which God was spoken of as dwelling in or above the highest heaven.

12 a. in corpora alia, indigna (neut. plur.) **animo sancto, [et] foeda** (fem. sing.) **migratio**. The wicked are punished after death by reincarnation in bestial bodies. Beasts have no *voûs*; and those who have not rightly used the *voûs* bestowed on them as men, are condemned to a life devoid of *voûs*. The writer has taken over this doctrine from some Platonic authority, and has failed to notice its inconsistency with the position maintained by him in the rest of *Ascl.* I. Down to this point, we have been given to understand that the *voûs* is the only part of man which is immortal, and that not only the body, but the lower part of the soul also, perishes at death; yet here it appears that there is in man something other than *voûs* which survives death. The soul which is reincarnated in the body of a beast must be wholly deprived of *voûs*; yet in that condition it continues to exist, and retains its personality.

In *Ascl.* III. 28, where punishment after death is discussed, there is no mention of reincarnation. In *Kore Kosmu*, Stob. *Exc.* XXIII. 39, it is said that sinners will be punished by reincarnation in bestial bodies. The same doctrine is asserted in *Corp.* X. 8 a, but denied *ib.* 19 b-22 a. It is derived from Plato, who adopted from the Pythagoreans the theory of the transmigration of human souls into the bodies of beasts. According to Herodotus (2. 123), 'the Egyptians were the first to teach the doctrine that the human soul is immortal, and that when the body perishes, the soul enters some other animal that is born at the time, and having passed through the whole circle of animals of land and sea and air, again enters a human body at birth. It traverses this cycle of births, they say, in three thousand years'. Herodotus adds 'there are certain Greeks, some of earlier and some of later date, who adopted this doctrine, and announced it as their own; I know their names, but I will not mention them'. The Greeks of whom Herodotus is thinking, or at any rate the most prominent among them, must be Pythagoras and Empedocles. But it is not clear from his words whether he had himself met with Egyptians who taught this doctrine, or whether he was only repeating a tradition that Pythagoras had learnt his doctrine

of transmigration from Egyptians. There is nothing intrinsically improbable in the hypothesis that in Herodotus' time there were some Egyptians who held something resembling the Pythagorean doctrine of transmigration; but as far as I know, there is no positive evidence that it was so. By the time when the *Hermetica* were written, Greek writings in which this doctrine was taught had been known for centuries in Egypt, and it was unquestionably from Greek teachers that the Hermetists learnt it.¹ See Pl. *Phaedo* 81 E ff.: *Phaedrus* 249 B: *Rep.* 10. 620: *Tim.* 42 C and 91 D ff. In the *Phaedo*, it is said that the impure soul is drawn into an earthly body by its craving for bodily things, and thus co-operates in its own imprisonment; and in the *Republic* and the *Phaedrus*, we are told that the soul is permitted to choose freely the form of its next embodiment on earth. Plutarch, in the earlier part of the *Vision of Thespisius* (*De sera numinis vindicta* 565 E), agrees with Pl. *Phaedo* in speaking of reincarnation in an animal body as resulting from the soul's own cravings. In this part of the *Vision*, Plutarch has probably been influenced by Posidonius. But later on in the same vision (567 E ff.), where he is following a different authority, Plutarch speaks of wicked souls as condemned to reincarnation in animal bodies by a higher Power, and forged into new shapes by daemons to fit them for this compulsory embodiment.

futurae aeternitatis spe. *Aeternitas* cannot here mean existence through endless time; for it must be something which is granted to the pious alone. We have just been told that the wicked as well as the pious survive death; and if the soul does not perish at the death of the body, it may be presumed that it continues to exist for ever.² If that is so, wicked souls, as well as pious souls, are everlasting; and the 'eternity' which is in prospect for the pious alone must mean a life freed from the limitations of existence in time. *Aeternitas* is the mode of God's existence, and in this connexion the word is equivalent to *divinitas*. The pious man will be a god, or will live the life of a god. See *Ascl.* III. 29 c-32 a.

aliis incredibile, aliis fabulosum, aliis forsitan videatur esse deridendum. How are these three classes of men to be distin-

¹ Cf. Plut. *Is. et Os.* 31, ψυχὰς ἀνοσίαν ἀνθρώπων . . . εἰς ἕτερα μεταμορφουμένων σώματα. Plutarch there seems to attribute the doctrine to Egyptian priests; but his evidence on such a matter is not of much weight.

² It is true that this does not necessarily follow; and according to some of the Stoics, individual souls may survive death, but their individual existence will necessarily cease at the *ecpyrosis*, if not before. But no such doctrine as that was taught by Platonists.

guished? Perhaps the first sort are those who cannot convince themselves that the doctrine is true; the second, those who hold it to be manifestly false; the third, those who make light of it, because the promise of *aeternitas* has no attraction for them. These last do not want to live as gods; they prefer the life of beasts.

animam obtorto . . . detinet collo. Cf. *Corp.* X. 24 a: (ὁ νοῦς) καταλείπει τὴν [ἐν] τῷ σώματι προσσηρημένην καὶ ὑπ' αὐτοῦ ἀγχομένην κάτω (ψυχὴν).

ut in parte sui qua mortalis est inhaereat (*sc. anima*). 'The part of the soul in respect of which it is mortal' must be the παθητικὸν μέρος (which is the θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς of Pl. *Tim.*). But if this part is mortal, the wicked soul must be wholly mortal, and could not survive to be reincarnated in the body of a beast. Moreover, it is awkward to say that the soul 'sticks in a part of itself'. The meaning intended might have been better expressed by writing 'in parte *hominis* qua mortalis est (*homo*)', i.e. the body and the bodily affections.

12 b. partem divinitatis agnoscere. *Pars divinitatis* is 'that part of man which consists in *divinitas*', i.e. the divine part, namely, the νοῦς. The aim of philosophic teaching in the true sense is to make men aware of the existence in them of this divine part, and to lead them to recognize its claim to supremacy in their thoughts and lives. But the perverted philosophy of which the Hermetist here proceeds to speak, so far from helping men to attain to the higher life, shuts them off from it. In his indignation against the false philosophers, the writer charges them with deliberately aiming at the evil which he holds to result from their way of teaching; 'they grudge men access to the divine life' (*invidens immortalitatis malignitas*). *Immortalitas* here means the same as *aeternitas* above, viz. the life of a god. The meaning might be more clearly expressed by writing (*quorundam*) *malignitas*. The MSS. give *immortalitati*; but the dative hardly yields the sense required, and it seems better to read either *immortalitate* or *-tatem* or *-tatis*.

quasi praedivinus dixero. The philosophic teaching which the writer is criticizing is that of his own time; and he introduces a reference to his own time into the dialogue by putting a prediction into the mouth of the prehistoric teacher, as in the Prophecy, *Ascl.* III. 24 b-26 a. In a prediction, the verbs must be in the future tense; we must therefore read *efficient*, *confundent*, in place of the presents given in the MSS.

13. in varias disciplinas . . . eam (*sc.* philosophiam) . . . miscentes, ἀριθμητικὴν et musicen et geometriam. Cf. Porphyr. *De abst.* 1. 29: οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ εὐδαιμονικὴ ἡμῖν θεωρία λόγων ἄθροισις καὶ μαθημάτων πλήθος, . . . οὐδ' ἐν τῷ ποσῷ τῶν λόγων λαμβάνει τὴν ἐπίδοσιν· οὕτω γὰρ οὐδὲν ἂν ἐκόλυεν τοὺς πᾶν μάθημα συναγόντας εἶναι εὐδαίμονας. νῦν δ' οὐχ ὅπως πᾶν μάθημα συμπληροῖ τὴν θεωρίαν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τὰ περὶ τῶν ὄντων ὄντων, ἐὰν μὴ προσῆ καὶ ἡ κατ' αὐτὰ φυσίωσις καὶ ζωή. . . ἡμῖν τὸ τυχεῖν τῆς τοῦ ὄντος θεωρίας τὸ τέλος, τῆς τεύξεως τελούσης τὴν . . . σύμφυσιν τῷ θεωροῦντι καὶ θεωρουμένῳ. Euseb. *Præf. ev.* 14. 10. 10: the Pagan philosophers περιφέρουσιν ἄνω καὶ κάτω θρυλοῦντες τὰ μαθήματα, δεῖν ἐξ ἅπαντος φάσκοντες τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐν πείρᾳ τῆς τοῦ ἀληθοῦς καταλήψεως γίνεσθαι μετελθεῖν ἀστρονομίαν, ἀριθμητικὴν, γεωμετρίαν, μουσικὴν' . . . τούτων γὰρ ἄνευ μὴ δύνασθαι λόγιον ἄνδρα καὶ φιλόσοφον ἀποτελεσθῆναι, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῆς τῶν ὄντων ἀληθείας ψαῦσαι, μὴ τούτων ἐν ψυχῇ τῆς γνώσεως προτυπωθείσης· εἴτ' ἐπανατεινόμενοι τῇ μαθήσει τῶν εἰρημένων ἐπ' αὐτοῦ μονονουχί τοῦ αἰθέρος βαίνειν μετέωροι ἀρθέντες οἴονται, ὡς δὴ τὸν θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐν τοῖς ἀριθμοῖς περιφέροντες· ἡμᾶς τε, ὅτι μὴ τὰ ὅμοια ζηλοῦμεν, βοσκομαμάτων κατ' οὐδὲν διαφέρειν ἡγούνται, ταύτη δέ φασι μηδὲ θεὸν μηδέ τι τῶν σεμνῶν ἡμᾶς δύνασθαι εἰδέναί. . . (ὁ δ' ἀληθὴς λόγος) τοὺς μὲν σὺν τοῖς εἰρημένοις μαθήμασι οὕτε θεὸν οὕτε σώφρονα βίον οὐθ' ὅλως τι τῶν βελτίστων καὶ συμφερόντων ἐπιγνόντας ἀποδείξει, τοὺς δὲ τῶν μαθημάτων ἐκτὸς πάντων εὖσεβεστάτους καὶ φιλοσοφωτάτους γεγενῆσθαι. In support of his contention, Eusebius quotes the opinion of Socrates reported in Xen. *Mem.* 4. 7. 3 ff.: τὸ δὲ μέχρι τῶν δυσξενέτων διαγραμμάτων γεωμετρίαν μαθάνειν ἀπεδοκίμαζεν κ.τ.λ. The attitude of Augustine towards the physical sciences was similar; e. g. *Confess.* 5. 4: 'infelix enim homo qui scit illa omnia (*sc.* astronomy), te autem nescit; beatus autem qui te scit, etiam illa nesciat. Qui vero et te et illa novit, non propter illa beator, sed propter te solum beatus est.'

The Hermetist's polemic seems to be directed chiefly against the publicly recognized teachers of Platonism in Alexandria, whom he blames for their adherence to the traditional maxim of the Platonic school, μηδὲις ἀγεωμέτρητος εἰσίτω. Compare the saying ascribed to Plato, ὁ θεὸς ἀεὶ γεωμετερεῖ, discussed in Plut. *Quæst. conviv.* 8. 2. 1, 718 c, where Plato's view of the value of geometry as a preparation for philosophy is thus summarized: ὅπερ αὐτὸς (ὁ Πλάτων) εἶρηκε καὶ γέγραφε πολλάκις, ὑμνῶν γεωμετρίαν, ὡς ἀποσπῶσαν προσισχομένους τῇ αἰσθήσει, καὶ ἀποστρέφουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν νοητὴν καὶ αἰδιον φύσιν, ἧς θεὰ τέλος ἐστὶ φιλοσοφίας, κ.τ.λ. Diog. Laert. 4. 2. 10 says of Xenocrates,

πρὸς δὲ τὸν μίῃτε μουσικὴν μίῃτε γεωμετρίαν μίῃτε ἀστρονομίαν μεμαθηκότα, βουλόμενον δὲ παρ' αὐτὸν φοιτᾶν· Πορεύου, ἔφη· λαβὰς γὰρ οὐκ ἔχεις φιλοσοφίας. Theon of Smyrna, a Platonist of the time of Hadrian, wrote a work *Περὶ τῶν κατὰ μαθηματικὴν χρῆσιν εἰς τὴν τοῦ Πλάτωνος ἀνάγνωσιν*. The Platonist Taurus, who taught at Athens early in the second century A. D., spoke with approval of the strict gradation of studies which was said to have been insisted on by the early Pythagoreans, and added (Aul. Gell. i. 9), 'nunc autem isti, qui repente pedibus inlotis ad philosophos devertunt, non est hoc satis, quod sunt omnino ἀθεώρητοι, ἄμουσοι, ἀγεωμέτρητοι, sed legem etiam dant, qua philosophari discant. Alius ait "hoc me primum doce"; item alius "hoc volo" inquit "discere, illud nolo." The attitude of Taurus is precisely that which the writer of *Ascl. I* condemns. Justin, *Dial. c. Tryph. 2*, says that a Pythagorean teacher, to whom he applied for instruction (about A. D. 125), refused to take him as a pupil, because he had not learnt music, astronomy, and geometry. Cf. Numenius *ap. Euseb. Pr. ev. 11. 22. 2*, quoted in prefatory note on *Corp. II*.

In speaking of the *callida commentatio* of this class of teachers, the Hermetist may have had in mind, *inter alia*, the aberrations of those Pythagorizing Platonists who attached an occult significance to the properties of numbers and geometrical figures. Plato's Socrates, when his Muses revealed the secret of the mystic number, was well aware that they were only joking (ὡς πρὸς παῖδας ἡμᾶς παιζούσας καὶ ἔρευχελούσας, *Pl. Rep. 8. 545 E*); but the less enlightened followers of Plato were apt to mistake such recondite jests for solemn truths; and even leading thinkers wasted many pages in expounding the holy mysteries of the number ten, and similar matters. The authors of the religious *Hermetica*, as far as appears from their extant writings, kept themselves free from the influence of this quaint superstition. The writer of *Ascl. I* must have known it to be widely prevalent in the Neo-Pythagorean and Platonic schools of his time; and his hostility to 'arithmetic' may have been increased by his repugnance to this misapplication of it.

Musice here means the scientific theory of music, and has nothing in common with the music employed in hymn-singing, which was spoken of in ch. 9 as a gift from heaven.

ut apocatastasis astrorum . . . numeris constare miretur. This is the right use of arithmetic. As to the word *apocatastasis*, see *Corp. VIII. 4* and *XI. i. 2*. ἀποκατάστασις is a technical term

of astronomy. It signified, firstly, the return of a particular planet to a position which it had previously occupied relatively to the fixed stars or to some other planet (*ἀποκατάστασις ἀστέρος τινός*). It occurs in this sense in Pseudo-Pl. *Axiochus* 370 c, and in Plut. *Fac. in orbe lunae* 24. 5, 937 F. Cf. Cleomedes *De motu circ. corp. cael.* 2. 7: 'Ἀφροδίτη δὲ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἀποκαθίσταται αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ ἡλίῳ) δι' ἡμερῶν φπδ' 'the planet Venus returns to the same position relatively to the sun at intervals of 584 days'. Philo *De opif. mundi* 34. 101, Cohn I, p. 35: the number twenty-eight *ἀποκαταστατικός ἐστὶ σελήνης* i. e. it is the number of days from one new moon to another. Secondly, the term was used to signify the return of *all the planets together* to the same relative positions as before (*ἀποκατάστασις πάντων τῶν ἀστέρων*, or *ἀ. τοῦ παντός*). The period at the end of which an *apocatastasis* in this sense took place was called a 'great year'. See Pl. *Tim.* 39 D; Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 20. 51; Cic. *Rep.* 6. 22; Cic. *Hort.* fr. 26; Aetius, *Diels Doxogr.* p. 363. The duration of a 'great year' was variously reckoned at 9,977 years (Sext. Emp. *Astrol.* 5. 105), 12,954 years (Cicero), 300,000 years (Firmicus Maternus), &c. Some Stoic borrowed from the astronomers the conception of an *apocatastasis* of all the planets together, and combined it with the Stoic doctrine of a periodical *ecpyrosis* and renewal of the universe; and thus in the usage of the later Stoics *ἀποκατάστασις* came to be equivalent to *παλιγγενεσία* (τοῦ κόσμου). See note on *mundi regentura* in *Ascl.* III. 26 a. 'The Stoics' in Arius Didymus, *Diels Doxogr.* p. 469; Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 3. 29. 1; Nemesius *De nat. hom.* c. 38, p. 277 (Arnim *Sto. Vet.* II, p. 190). The phrase ἄχρι χρόνων ἀποκαταστάσεως πάντων, which occurs in the speech attributed to Peter in *Acts* 3. 21, must have been derived from a Stoic source.

The Hermetist is here speaking of the *ἀποκαταστάσεις* of the planets severally, which occur at short intervals, and can be observed within one man's lifetime, and not of the *ἀποκατάστασις τοῦ παντός*. The observer finds that the movements of the heavenly bodies agree with his calculations (*numeris constare*), and are thus proved to be determined by invariable laws. The heavenly bodies are the administrators by whose agency God governs the lower world; and to recognize the regularity of their movements is to recognize the immutability of the divine laws by which all corporeal things are governed.

stationes praefinitas cursu(m)que commutationes. These

words refer to the variations in the apparent movements of the planets. Cf. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 20. 51 (from Posidonius): 'maxime vero sunt admirabiles motus earum quinque stellarum quae falso vocantur errantes. Nihil enim errat, quod in omni aeternitate conservat progressus et regressus reliquosque motus constantes et ratos. Quod eo est admirabilius in his stellis quas dicimus, quia tum occultantur, tum rursus aperiuntur, tum adeunt, tum recedunt, tum antecedunt, tum autem subsequuntur, tum celerius moventur, tum tardius, tum omnino ne moventur quidem, sed ad quoddam tempus insistent.' Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 7. 25: 'quae (sint) stationes (of the planets), quando in rectum ferantur, quare agantur retro, modo coepimus scire.' The *statio* (στάσις) of a planet is the point at which it remains for a time apparently stationary.

terrae vero dimensiones, [[*qualitates, quantitates,*]] maris profunda, (aeris . . .), ignis vim. Air must have been mentioned together with the three other elements. *Quantitates*, in this position, is a superfluous repetition of *dimensiones*; and there is no reason why *qualitates* should be mentioned in the case of earth alone, and not in the case of water, air, and fire. I have therefore transposed *qualitates, quantitates* to the following clause. *Horum omnium* means, I think, not 'all these four elements', but 'all things around us'. Investigation of the *qualitates, quantitates*, and *effectus* of material things may be taken to mean study of natural science in general.

The writer of *Ascl. I* is not wholly hostile to natural science. He recognizes the value of science in its practical applications ('artium disciplinarumque cognitio', ch. 8), as a means whereby man is enabled to fulfil his function of 'tending the earth'; and he does not wholly reject the study of theoretic science. He considers it mischievous in so far as it turns men's thoughts away from God to lower things, and blocks the way to the true *gnosis*; but on the other hand, he holds that such studies, when pursued in the right spirit, may serve a good purpose, by evoking and heightening religious fervour ('ut . . . cognoscens miretur, adoret atque conlaudat artem mentemque divinam'). This use of natural science is suggested in Pl. *Tim.* 69 A; and a similar thought was expressed in a paragraph of Aristotle's dialogue *De philosophia*, reproduced in Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 37. 95, and summarized in Sext. Emp. *Math.* 3. 20-22. Cf. Philo *Leg. alleg.* 3. 32. 97, Cohn I, p. 134: ἐζήτησαν οἱ πρῶτοι, πῶς ἐνοήσαμεν τὸ θεῖον. εἶθ' οἱ

δοκούντες ἄριστα φιλοσοφεῖν ἔφασαν, ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τῶν μερῶν αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν ἐνπαρχουσῶν τούτοις δυνάμεων ἀντιληψίῃ ἐποησάμεθα τοῦ αἰτίου. ὥσπερ γάρ, εἴ τις ἴδοι δεδημιουργημένην οἰκίαν ἐπιμελῶς . . ., ἔννοιαν λήψεται τοῦ τεχνίτου, . . . οὕτως δὴ καὶ εἰσελθὼν τις ὥσπερ εἰς μεγίστην οἰκίαν ἢ πόλιν τόνδε τὸν κόσμον, καὶ θεασάμενος οὐρανὸν μὲν ἐν κύκλῳ περιπολοῦντα καὶ πάντα ἐντὸς συνειληφότα, πλανήτας δὲ καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως κινουμένους ἐμμελῶς τε καὶ ἑναρμονίως καὶ τῷ παντὶ ὠφελίμως, γῆν δὲ τὸν μέσον χῶρον λαχοῦσαν, ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος χύσεις ἐν μεθορίῳ τεταγμένας, ἔτι δὲ ζῶα θνητὰ τε αἶψα καὶ ἀθάνατα, καὶ φυτῶν καὶ καρπῶν διαφοράς, λογιέται δῆπου, ὅτι ταῦτα οὐκ ἄνευ τέχνης παντελοῦς δεδημιούργηται, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἦν καὶ ἔστιν ὁ τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς δημιουργὸς ὁ θεός. οἱ δὴ οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμενοι διὰ σκιᾶς τὸν θεὸν καταλαμβάνουσι, διὰ τῶν ἔργων τὸν τεχνίτην κατανοοῦντες. Similarly, Paul, *Ep. Rom.* i. 19, says of the Pagans, τὸ γνωστὸν τοῦ θεοῦ φανερόν ἐστιν ἐν αὐτοῖς, ὁ θεὸς γὰρ αὐτοῖς ἐφάνέρωσεν. τὰ γὰρ ἀόρατα αὐτοῦ ἀπὸ κτίσεως κόσμου τοῖς ποιήμασιν νοούμενα καθοράται, ἢ τε αἰδῖος αὐτοῦ δύναμις καὶ θειότης.

With this Hermetist's attitude towards the natural sciences may be compared that of Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 6. 79-83.

Musicen vero nosse nihil aliud est nisi cunectarum [omnium] rerum ordinem scire &c. Cf. Pl. *Tim.* 80 B, concerning the consonance of a higher and a lower note in music; the two tones μίαν ἐξ ὀξείας καὶ βαρείας ξυνεκεράσαντο πάθην ὄθεν ἡδονὴν μὲν τοῖς ἄφροσιν, εὐφροσύνην δὲ τοῖς ἔμφροσι διὰ τὴν τῆς θείας ἁρμονίας μίμησιν ἐν θνηταῖς γενομένην φοραῖς παρέσχον. (Plato is there thinking of harmony in the human soul,—cf. *Tim.* 47 B-E,—rather than of harmony in the universe; but he is conscious of the analogy between the one and the other.) Philo *De opif. mundi* 25. 78, Cohn I, p. 26: God prepared the Kosmos for man's enjoyment by filling it with all manner of θεάματα, ἃ καταπληκτικωτάτας μὲν ἔχει τὰς οὐσίας, καταπληκτικωτάτας δὲ τὰς ποιότητας, θαυμασιωτάτας δὲ τὰς κινήσεις καὶ χορείας ἐν τάξεσιν ἡρμοσμέναις καὶ ἀριθμῶν ἀναλογίαις καὶ περιόδων συμφωνίαις ἐν αἷς ἀπάσαις τὴν ἀρχέτυπον καὶ ἀληθῆ καὶ παραδειγματικὴν μουσικὴν οὐκ ἂν ἀμαρτάνοι τις εἶναι λέγων, ἀφ' ἧς οἱ μετὰ ταῦτα ἄνθρωποι γραψάμενοι (ἐν) ταῖς ἑαυτῶν ψυχαῖς τὰς εἰκόνας ἀναγκαιοτάτην καὶ ὠφελιμωτάτην τέχνην τῷ βίῳ παρέδοσαν. *Corp.* XVIII. 1: ὁ γὰρ τοι κατὰ φύσιν μουσικὸς θεός κ.τ.λ.

Asclepius II

That part of the *Asclepius* which I have named *Ascl. II* (viz. chs. 14 b-16 a) was written by a thoroughgoing dualist. The writer's object is to account for the existence of evil without detracting from God's goodness; and he does so by putting matter side by side with God, as a co-ordinate source or cause of things, and attributing the evil in the world to the operation of matter. Metaphorically, matter is the Mother of the universe, as God is the Father; ('*ἕλη* et conceptus et partus in se possidet vim', and 'his omnibus ad concipiendum fecundissimos sinus praestat'); and that which is evil in the offspring comes from the Mother.

This doctrine is based on that of the *Timaeus*; but the writer differs from Plato in ascribing to matter a generative energy, whereas in the *Timaeus* the *ἀνάγκη* which resides in the *ὑποδοχή* operates as a cause of evil merely by way of passive resistance to the beneficent action of the Demiurgus, or hindrance to the perfect realization of God's good purpose. Seneca, *Nat. quaest., Prolog.* 16, states the problem thus: 'quanti aestimas ista cognoscere, . . . quantum deus possit; materiam ipse sibi formet an data utatur; . . . deus quicquid vult efficiat, an multis rebus illum tractanda destituant, et a magno artifice prave multa formentur, non quia cessat ars, sed quia id in quo exercetur saepe inobsequens arti est?' Seneca's second alternative agrees with the *Timaeus*.

One of the various ways in which this topic was dealt with by the Platonists of the Roman empire may be seen in Plutarch *Is. et Os.* 45-79 (c. A. D. 100). Plutarch's view is there set forth in the form of a commentary on the Egyptian myth of Isis and Osiris, which he regards as a symbolical presentation of certain fundamental truths. Disentangled from the myth with which he has interwoven it, the substance of his doctrine may be stated as follows.

45. If all things were caused by God (as the Stoics say),¹ nothing evil could come to be; and if nothing were caused by God (as Democritus and Epicurus say), nothing good could come to be. But inasmuch as nature, here below, produces good and evil intermingled, we must conclude that there are two opposed first causes,—two conflicting

¹ Plutarch says that the Stoics assert *ἀποίου δημιουργὸν ἕλης ἕνα λόγον καὶ μίαν πρόνοιαν . . . περιγινόμενῃ πάντων καὶ κρατοῦσαν* i. e. they maintain that *ἕλη*, being *ἀποίος*, is wholly subject to God's will, and cannot thwart his design.

Powers. Since nothing can come into being without a cause, and the Good cannot cause evil, it follows that, beside the first cause of good, there is a separate and distinct first cause of evil. . . .¹ 48. Plato, in some of his dialogues, hints at this obscurely; but in the *Laws*, which he wrote in his old age, he says clearly (Pl. *Legg.* 10. 896 E) that the Universe is moved, not by one soul, but by two at least, one that works good,² and one that works evil.³

But there is also a third and intermediate entity (viz. Matter).⁴ And this third thing is not, as some suppose, devoid of soul and reason and self-movement; it is dependent on both the others, but ever seeks and desires and follows after the better of them.

49. The two opposing Powers of which this Kosmos is the mingled product are not of equal strength. The Power of good has the upper hand; yet the Power of evil cannot be utterly destroyed, for it is largely rooted in the body and soul of the All, and ever maintains a losing fight against the good.

53. There is in nature a feminine principle (viz. Matter), receptive of all generation,—a 'nurse' and 'recipient', as Plato calls it,—which, being wrought on by the divine Reason, takes on itself all manner of forms. This feminine principle has an innate love of the sovereign Good; it yearns for and seeks after the good; it shuns and flees from the evil. It is the place, and the primal matter, of both good and evil; but of itself it ever inclines to the better, and yields itself to God, that he may beget in it effluences and images of himself; and it delights in being thereby made fruitful. For that which is generated is a copy, wrought in matter, of that which ever is. 54. God, or the principle of Good, is eternal and imperishable, but the shapes or images of good,—the stamps impressed by God on matter in the visible world,—are perishable; and in this lower region, they are from time to time destroyed by the Power of disorder and confusion. That maleficent Power is excluded from the world above, but assails this sensible Kosmos, which is generated in the likeness of the Eternal by Matter wedded to the Good.

There was a time when Matter, not yet wrought upon by the divine Reason, produced her first birth of herself alone; and that which then came into being was a thing incomplete,⁵—not a Kosmos,

¹ Here follows an account of the dualistic doctrine of Zoroaster concerning the good God Horomazes and the bad daemon Areimanios.

² Symbolized by Osiris.

³ Symbolized by Typhon.

⁴ Symbolized by Isis.

⁵ This first offspring of Matter corresponds to the primeval chaos described in

but a mere shadow of the Kosmos which was to be. 55. But in the Kosmos as it now is, the Power of evil is not indeed wholly destroyed, but its strength and vigour are impaired; for the divine Reason has harmonized the universe, bringing its discordant elements into concord, and has enfeebled, though not annihilated, the destructive Power of evil. Here below then, the destructive Power still works, though but weakly and ineffectually; for it mingles with and cleaves to the material elements, which are subject to change and disturbance. And hence arise earthquakes, and droughts, and storms, and pestilences, and the obscurations of the moon; for the working of the Power of Evil extends upwards as far as the human sphere.

56. Under the head of *good* must be reckoned, firstly, the eternal pattern or ideal (τὸ νοητόν, i. e. that which is of God); secondly, Matter (ἕλη, —not ἄποιος, but seeking the good); and thirdly, the issue of these two (viz. the Kosmos, so far as the good prevails in it).

57. God, or the Good, is that which is perfect, and lacks nothing,—that which is the object of desire and aspiration. Matter, in herself, is lacking of the good; but she is ever being filled by the good,—ever yearning after the good, and receiving of it. And the Kosmos, produced by the union of God (or the Good) with Matter, is not indeed eternal,¹—not free from change and corruption,—but is ever coming into being;² and by means of the cyclic recurrence of changes, it is enabled to continue ever young, and will never perish.

58. Matter then is not a body lifeless and devoid of qualities,—not a thing inert and inactive. Matter is ever partaking of the supreme God; she ever consorts with Him, loving the good and beauty that are about Him. She is not opposed to Him; but as a good wife may be said to yearn for her husband even when she has him beside her, so Matter yearns for God, even while she is with Him and is filled with the Divine.

59. Yet here below she needs must mourn; for in this lower world the Power of Evil makes his assaults, and there is slaying and tearing asunder. But she receives into herself all things that perish, and puts forth from herself again all things that come to birth. For

the *Timæus*; it is ἕλη subject to ἀνάγκη only, and not yet ordered by νοῦς aiming at the good.

¹ ἀίδιος. This means, not that the Kosmos as a whole will ever cease to exist, but only that the individual things in the Kosmos (or rather in the lower part of it) are subject to dissolution.

² αἰετηνής.

the starry heavens, ruled wholly by the potencies of God, abide for ever; but the creatures of land and sea, in which life has been implanted in this lower world, decay and perish and are buried, but spring to life again and again in fresh generations.¹ For in the lowest regions of matter, the Power of Destruction works most strongly; and here, the seeds of life sown by the Power which brings things to birth and maintains them in being (i. e. by God, or the Good) are faint and feeble, so that they would be wholly destroyed by the Power of Evil, but that Matter receives into herself that which is destroyed, and preserves and rears and builds it up again. 60. In short, the generative and preservative force in nature (i. e. the soul of Matter) moves towards God, and tends towards being; while the destructive force (i. e. the soul of Evil) moves away from God, and tends towards not-being.

79. God is far removed from earth; He is pure, and undefiled by anything that admits of decay and death. And human souls, here below, while they are entangled in the body and the bodily affections, have no communion with God, beyond that dim and dreamlike apprehension of Him to which philosophy enables them to attain. But when they are freed from the body, and depart to the region of the unseen, the untroubled, and the holy, then the Soul of Good is their leader and their king; and clinging to Him, they gaze on that unspeakable beauty with insatiate yearning. And it is by desiring without cease and seeking after and consorting with that supra-mundane beauty, that the soul of Matter fills this lower world with all things fair and good that come to birth.

Plutarch's *ἕλη* then differs from the 'recipient' described in the *Timaeus*, in that it is not *ἀποιος*, but is qualified by the presence in it of a living force which strives towards the good; and the Kosmos is produced and maintained in being, not by the action of God alone on a passive and partially intractable Matter, but by the combined operation of God from above and of Matter from below. The living force in matter which strives towards the good (and which Plutarch finds symbolized in the goddess Isis) is equivalent to Aristotle's *φύσις*; and Plutarch's view of the function of God in relation to it might be expressed by Aristotle's statement that the Good *κινεῖ ὡς ἐρώμενον* (Ar. *Metaph.* II. 7. 1072 b 3).

But if the operation of Matter, as well as that of God, tends

¹ The Greek of this sentence is corrupt; but the meaning of the original was probably something like what I have written.

towards good, how is the existence of evil to be accounted for? Plutarch's altered conception of Matter makes it impossible for him to accept the explanation put forward in the *Timaeus*, viz. that evil is the result of the ἀνάγκη which is inherent in 'the recipient',— or in other words, that evil arises from the intractability of Matter. And accordingly, Plutarch prefers to adopt the suggestion thrown out in Plato's *Laws*; he asserts the existence of a Soul of Evil, distinct from and independent of God,—a living Power, which, in the sublunar region, works against and partially thwarts the tendency of Matter towards the Good.

The evil of which Plutarch is speaking in this treatise is not *moral* evil; he regards *good* as equivalent to *life* or *existence*, and *evil* as equivalent to *death* or *non-existence*. Thus the joint operation of God and Matter results in the production and preservation of living things; the operation of the Soul of Evil results in the destruction of living things. The sublunar region, where alone the Soul of Evil has power, is the region of mortality; but Matter, ever striving towards God (i. e. towards Good, or Life), counteracts the work of destruction by continual reproduction.

In the concluding paragraph (ch. 79), Plutarch suggests that what he has said concerning the aspiration of Matter towards the Good in the universe at large may be applied also to the aspiration of the human soul; but he has not worked out this thought with equal fullness.

Whether Plutarch's Platonic interpretation of the myth of Isis and Osiris is wholly of his own invention, or whether he had heard of some more or less similar explanation of it that had already been devised by some Egyptian influenced by Hellenic thought, we do not know. But at least it may be said that, in his identification of Isis with the productive power of nature, Plutarch is giving articulate expression to the dim thoughts and feelings which lay at the root of that ancient and widespread worship of the Mother (originally Mother Earth) which in Egypt took the form of the Isis-cult.

A view more nearly resembling that of *Ascl. II* is to be found in the doctrine of Numenius (A. D. 150–200), as reported by Chalcidius, *Comm. in Tim.* 294, Mullach *Fr. Ph. Gr.* II, p. 244: 'Deum quippe esse . . . initium et causam bonorum; silvam (ἔλην) malorum.'¹

¹ Numenius seems to have held that ἔλην is productive of evil *only*, and not of any good at all. But the author of *Ascl. II* does not say that; his view is that ἔλην produces both good and evil.

(295) . . . (Pythagoras) ait (rightly, according to Numenius), existente providentia, mala quoque necessario substituisse, propterea quod silva sit, et eadem sit malitia praedita. Quodsi mundus ex silva, certe factus est de existente olim natura maligna. . . . Platonemque idem Numenius laudat, quod duas mundi animas autumet, unam beneficentissimam, malignam alteram, scilicet silvam.¹ Quae (*sc.* silva) licet modice fluctuet,² tamen, quia intimo proprioque motu movetur, vivat et anima convegetetur necesse est, lege eorum omnium quae genuino motu moventur.³ Quae quidem etiam patibilis animae partis (i. e. the παθητικὸν μέρος of the human soul), in qua est aliquid corpulentum mortaleque et corporis simile, auctrix est et patrona,⁴ sicut rationabilis animae pars auctore utitur ratione ac Deo. Porro ex Deo et silva factus est iste mundus. Igitur iuxta Platonem mundo bona sua Dei, tanquam patris, liberalitate collata sunt; mala vero matris silvae vitio cohaeserunt.⁵

The problem discussed in *Ascl.* II was similarly dealt with by the heretical Christian Hermogenes, who wrote before A. D. 200. Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 8. 17: Ἐρμογένης δέ τις, καὶ αὐτὸς νομίσας τι καινὸν φρονεῖν, ἔφη τὸν θεὸν ἐξ ὕλης συγχρόνου⁶ καὶ ἀγεννήτου πάντα πεποιηκέναι· ἀδυνάτως γὰρ ἔχει τὸν θεὸν μὴ οὐκ ἐξ ὄντων τὰ γινόμενα ποιεῖν. εἶναι δὲ τὸν θεὸν αἰεὶ κύριον καὶ αἰεὶ ποιητὴν, τὴν δὲ ὕλην αἰεὶ δούλην καὶ γινόμενην,⁷ οὐ πάσαν δέ. αἰεὶ γὰρ⁸ ἀγρίως καὶ ἀτάκτως φερομένην ἐκόσμησε ταύτῃ τῷ λόγῳ· δίκην χυτρίου ὑποκαιομένου βράζουσαν ἰδὼν ἐχώρισε κατὰ μέρος, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ παντὸς λαβὼν ἡμέρωσε, τὸ δὲ εἴασεν ἀτάκτως φέρεσθαι. καὶ τὸ ἡμερωθῆν τοῦτο εἶναι κόσμον λέγει, τὸ δὲ ἀγριον μένειν καὶ⁹ ὕλην καλεῖσθαι ἄκοσμον. ταύτην οὐσίαν εἶναι τῶν ἀπάντων λέγει, ὡς καινὸν φέρων δόγμα τοῖς αὐτοῦ μαθηταῖς (though in reality, says Hippolytus, this doctrine was not new, but had been

¹ Numenius here differs from Plutarch in his interpretation of Pl. *Legg.* 10. 896 E. Plutarch's *maligna anima* is not ὕλη (Isis), but Typhon, a Power hostile to ὕλη.

² What is the meaning of *licet modice fluctuet*? Ought we to read *immodice*?

³ If a thing 'moves itself', it must have a ψυχή which moves it,—or in other words, it must be alive.

⁴ Cf. Iambli. *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, Stob. I. 49. 37, vol. i, p. 375 W.: τῶν δ' αὖ . . . ἀπὸ τῶν ἐξωθεν προσφουμένων προστιθέντων ὁπωσοῦν τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ κακόν, ἀπὸ μὲν τῆς ὕλης Νομμηνίου καὶ Κρονίου πολλάκις. Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* VII. 3: ἀνθρώπων γὰρ γένος (ἀμαρτητικόν), ἅτε θνητὸν ἐν καὶ ἐκ κακῆς ὕλης συνεστώσ.

⁵ ὕλη is συγχρονος ('coeval') with God; i. e. it is without beginning in time, as God is without beginning in time.

⁶ γινόμενην here means, not 'coming into being', but 'being made into σώματα'. It can be said that ὕλη αἰεὶ γίνεται in this sense, though it is ἀγέννητος. See Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* IX.

⁷ Perhaps καὶ γὰρ.

⁸ Perhaps τὸ δὲ ἀγριον μένον [καὶ], in contrast to τὸ ἡμερωθῆν.

taught by Plato). Tertullian *Adv. Hermogenem*¹ (Kroymann, *Corp. Script. Eccl. Lat.* vol. 47) c. 1: 'Hermogenis autem doctrina tam novella est, . . . Totum quod est deus aufert (Hermogenes), nolens illum ex nihilo universa facere. A Christianis enim ad philosophos conversus, de ecclesia in Academiam et Porticum,² inde sumpsit [a Stoicis] materiam cum deo ponere, quae et ipsa semper fuerit, neque nata neque facta, nec initium habens omnino nec finem, ex qua deus omnia postea fecerit.' *Ib.* 2: 'ex nihilo non potuisse eum facere sic contendit (Hermogenes), bonum et optimum definiens deum, qui bona atque optima tam velit facere quam sit: immo nihil non bonum atque optimum et velle eum et facere. Igitur omnia ab eo bona et optima oportuisse fieri secundum condicionem ipsius. Inveniri autem et mala ab eo facta, utique non ex arbitrio nec ex voluntate; quia si ex arbitrio et voluntate, [nihil] incongruens et indignum³ sibi faceret. Quod ergo non arbitrio suo fecerit, intellegi oportere ex vitio alicuius rei factum, ex materiae sine dubio.' *Ib.* 6: '(Hermogenes) dicit salvum deo esse ut et solus sit et primus et omnium auctor et omnium dominus et nemini comparandus'; but he has no right to say this (says Tertullian), because, if his statements about matter were true, matter would be on a par with God. *Ib.* 8: 'Sola eam (*sc.* materiam non natam, coaequalem deo,) Hermogenes cognovit et haereticorum patriarchae, philosophi; prophetas enim et apostolos usque adhuc latuit.' *Ib.* 10: 'Ergo, inquit (Hermogenes), ex nihilo faceret (omnia deus), ut mala quoque arbitrio eius imputarentur? Magna (says Tertullian) caecitas haereticorum pro huiusmodi argumentatione, cum ideo aut alium deum bonum et optimum volunt credi, quia mali auctorem existiment creatorem,⁴ aut (as Hermogenes did) materiam cum creatore proponunt, ut malum a materia, non a creatore deducant. . . . Audiatur igitur et Hermogenes . . . se nihil egisse hac sua iniectione.⁵ Ecce enim, etsi non auctor, sed adentator mali invenitur deus, qui malum materiae tanto sustinuit aeone ante mundi constitutionem, quam ut bonus et mali aemulus emendasse debuerat. Aut enim

¹ Harnack puts the date of Tertull. *Adv. Hermog.* at A. D. 198-203.

² Tertullian is hardly right in adding *et Porticum*. The doctrine spoken of is Platonic, not Stoic; and if Hermogenes adopted some Stoic notions, it must have been in subordinate details only.

³ *et indignum* secludendum?

⁴ This refers to those Gnostics (e. g. Valentinus) who distinguished the δημιουργός (*creator*) from the supreme God, and made him a being of lower order and character.

⁵ I. e. by his theory of ἕλη ἀγέννητος.

potuit emendare, sed noluit, aut voluit quidem, verum non potuit. (Si non potuit),¹ infirmus deus: si potuit et noluit, malus et ipse, quia malo favit. Et sic iam habetur (auctor) eius quod licet non instituerit, quia tamen, si noluisset illud esse, non esset, ipse iam fecit esse, quod² non noluit esse. . . . Malum pro bono sustinendo et non potius eradicando adsertor eius inventus est (deus); male, si per voluntatem, turpiter, si per necessitatem.' *Ib.* c. 13, Tertullian says 'si dabimus illi (*sc.* materiae) aliquid etiam boni germinis, iam non erit uniformis naturae, id est malae in totum et tantum, sed duplex, id est malae et bonae naturae. . . . Si potuit . . . duplex natura fuisse materiae, amborum ferax fructuum, iam nec bona ipsa deo deputabuntur, ut nec mala illi imputentur, sed utraque species, de materiae proprietate sumpta, ad materiam pertinebit.'³ *Ib.* 15: 'ceterum si ideo malum (as Hermogenes says) non ex nihilo, ne dei fiat, de cuius arbitrio videbitur factum, sed ex materia, ut ipsius sit, de cuius substantia erit factum, et hic, ut dixi, auctor mali habebitur deus, qui, cum eadem virtute et voluntate debuisset omnia bona ex materia protulisse aut tantum bona, non omnia tamen bona protulit, sed etiam mala, utique aut volens esse mala, si poterat efficere ne essent, aut non valens efficere omnia bona, si voluit et non fecit.' *Ib.* 15 *fn.*: 'Hermogenes expugnat quorundam argumentationes dicentium mala necessaria fuisse ad inluminacionem bonorum ex contrariis intellegendorum.' *Ib.* 35: Hermogenes says that ὕλη is 'neque corporalis (*σωματικῆ*) neque incorporealis (*ἀσώματος*)'. But he also says (c. 36) that it is 'ex parte corporalis', and 'ex parte incorporealis'. 'Corporale enim materiae vult esse, de quo corpora edantur, incorporale vero inconditum motum eius. "Si enim" ait "corpus tantummodo esset, nihil ei incorporale appareret, id est motus; si vero in totum incorporalis fuisset, nullum corpus ex ea fieret."' *Ib.* 37: Hermogenes says that 'materia' is 'nec bona nec mala.' "Si enim" inquis "esset bona, quae semper hoc fuerat non desideraret compositionem dei: si esset natura mala, non accepisset translationem in melius, nec quicquam compositionis suae applicuisset illi deus, tali natura; in vacuum enim laborasset."' *Ib.* 41: Hermogenes says that 'inconditus et confusus et turbulentus

¹ I have added *Si non potuit*. Kroymann proposes *Infirmus deus (si voluit nec potuit)*.

² Perhaps (*eo*) *quod*.

³ Cf. *Ascl.* II. 15 *fn.* as emended: 'Sicuti enim natura materiae bonitatis fecunda est, sic et malignitatis eadem est aequae fecunda.'

fruit materiae motus', like the movement of water boiling in a pot.¹ But elsewhere, 'cum enim vis materiam nec bonam nec malam inducere, "igitur" inquis "subiacens materia, aequalis momenti habens motum, neque ad bonum neque ad malum plurimum vertit."' *Ib.* 42: 'Non vis videri deum aequare materiae, et subicis habere illam cum deo communionem: "impossibile enim" inquis "non habentem illam commune aliquid cum deo ornari eam ab ipso." . . . Commune autem inter illos facis, quod a semetipsis moveantur, et semper moveantur. . . . Sed deus composite, materia incondite movetur.' *Ib.* 44: in explaining *how* God worked on matter, 'plane a philosophis² recedis (says Tertullian to Hermogenes) . . . Stoici enim volunt deum sic per materiam decucurrisse, quomodo mel per favos. At tu "non" inquis "pertransiens illam facit mundum, sed solummodo apparens et adpropinquans ei, sicut facit (ali)quid decor³ solummodo apparens, et magnes lapis solummodo adpropinquans".'

It appears from what Tertullian and Hippolytus say about Hermogenes ('doctrina tam novella', *καιόν*, &c.) that he was, as far as their knowledge went, the earliest Christian writer who adopted the Platonic doctrine of *ἕλη*, and made use of it, in the Platonic way, to account for the existence of evil.⁴ He must have transcribed his statement of it, with little alteration, from some treatise written by a Pagan Platonist; and the Pagan author of *Ascl.* II, who teaches the same doctrine, must have got it from a closely connected source, if not from the very same treatise.

A doctrine resembling that of Hermogenes, and perhaps derived directly or indirectly from him, is set forth and criticized in the

¹ *δικην χυτρίου ὑποκαιομένου βράζουσαν*, *Hermog. ap. Hippol.*

² Not from the Platonists; but Tertullian here ignores them, and speaks only of the Stoics.

³ *decor* MSS.: *acor* conl. Kroymann. But a comparison of God to 'a sour taste' would not seem happy. Why should not *decor* be right? *Decor* means *κάλλος*; cf. *Ascl.* III. 34 c, 'quod totum (*sc. τὸ πᾶν*) est bonum (et) decens (*ἀγαθὸν καὶ καλόν*)'. What Hermogenes meant was that God is *τὸ καλόν*, and, in virtue of his beauty, *κινεῖ ὡς ἐράμενος*. In c. 42, Tertullian reports Hermogenes as saying '(materiam) desiderare componi a deo' (see c. 37 quoted above). Compare Plutarch *Is. et Os.* 53 and 58.

Tertullian, in his comment on these words of Hermogenes, speaks of *decor* (*acor* conl. Kroymann) *vulnerans animum*. The word *vulnerans* might there be taken in the same sense as in Ovid's 'amor mea vulnerat arcu pectora'.

The comparison of God to a magnet is to the same effect; cf. *Corp.* IV *fin.*

⁴ Hermogenes was not quite the earliest; for *κακὴ ἕλη*, in the Platonic sense, had already been spoken of by Marcion, c. A. D. 139-144. (See Harnack, *Marcion*, 1921, pp. 100, 140, 198.) But Marcion does not seem to have made any large use of this conception; he was comparatively little influenced by Pagan philosophy.

dialogue Περὶ τοῦ ἀτρεξουσίου ('Concerning God, matter, and free will', as it is entitled in the Slavonic translation), written c. A. D. 300 by the Christian Methodius (ed. Bonwetsch, 1891). In that dialogue, an orthodox Christian states and maintains his opinion as to the origin of moral evil, in opposition to a 'Valentinian' Gnostic¹ and a 'companion' who agrees with the Valentinian in the main, but differs from him in holding that the primal ὕλη was not ἀποιος. The Valentinian says (cc. 2-4): 'When I observed the good order of the natural world, I thought μηδὲν αἰεὶ συνεῖναι τῷ θεῷ ἕτερον [τι] παρ' αὐτόν, ἀλλ' ἐξ αὐτοῦ (μόνου) τὰ ὄντα γεγονέναι. But when I saw cruel and wicked deeds done by men, πόθεν ταῦτα ἀναζητεῖν ἤρχομαι, τίς δὲ καὶ ἡ τῆς κινήσεως αὐτῶν ἀρχή. . . . καὶ τὸν μὲν θεὸν τούτων ποιητὴν λέγειν τολμᾶν οὐχ οἶός τε ἦν' . . . ὃς μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ἀγαθός, καὶ τῶν κρειττόνων ποιητής, τῶν δὲ φαύλων αὐτῷ πρόσσεται οὐδέν. . . . ὅθεν ἄλογον ἔδοξεν εἶναι μοι ταῦτα προσάπτειν αὐτῷ. . . . διόπερ ἔδοξέν μοι συνυπάρχειν τι αὐτῷ, ᾧ τοῦνομα ὕλη, ἐξ ἧς τὰ ὄντα ἐδημιούργησεν . . . ἐξ ἧς καὶ τὰ κακὰ εἶναι δοκεῖ. ἀποιού τε γὰρ καὶ ἀσχηματίστου οὔσης αὐτῆς, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις καὶ ἀτάκτως φερομένης, δεομένης τε τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ τέχνης, οὐκ ἐφθόνησεν οὗτος, οὐδὲ² διὰ παντὸς καταλιπεῖν (<ἤθελεν>)³ αὐτὴν οὕτως φέρεσθαι, ἀλλὰ δημιουργεῖν ἤρχετο, καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν χειρίστων αὐτῆς τὰ κάλλιστα⁴ διακρίνας⁵ [[ἤθελεν]], [καὶ]⁶ οὕτως [[γοῦν]] ἐδημιούργησεν ὅσα <γοῦν> [ἐξ]⁷ αὐτῆς ἤρμοζεν θεῷ δημιουργεῖν.⁸ τὰ

¹ In the editions, this speaker is named Valentinus. But it is strange that Methodius should give a personal name to one of the three disputants only, while the other two are not named, but are denoted merely by the descriptive words ὀρθόδοξος and ἑταῖρος; and the evidence for the name Valentinus is not such as to exclude doubt. That name nowhere occurs in the text of the dialogue; and in a speech addressed to this man (8. 4), the author writes ὦ οὗτος, and not (as we should have expected from his practice in other dialogues) ὦ Οὐαλεντίνε. It may be added that the well-known myth of Valentinus concerning the origin of matter (προέβαλεν ἡ Σοφία . . . οὐσίαν ἀμορφον καὶ ἀκατασκευάστον, Hippol. Ref. haer. 6. 30 fin.; matter is τὸ γεγεννημένον ὑπὸ (Σοφίας) ἑκτραυμα, ib. c. 31) can hardly have been unknown to Methodius; and if he knew of it, he would not be likely to put into the mouth of Valentinus himself the statement that ὕλη is ἀγέννητος. It seems probable therefore that Methodius did not give this speaker a name, but merely called him 'a Valentinian', and that the abbreviation ΟΥΑΑ, prefixed to his speeches was mistakenly supposed to mean Valentinus. The term 'Valentinian' may have been loosely used by Methodius to denote a platonizing heretic, such as was Hermogenes; it would not necessarily mean that the man to whom it was applied agreed with Valentinus in all respects.

² οὐδὲ or οὔτε or οὐ MSS.: ὥστε conl. Bonwetsch: 'neidete er nicht, noch liess er sie immer so schweben' Slav. transl.

³ ἤθελεν huc transposui.

⁴ There is an inconsistency here. If some parts of ὕλη were better and others worse, it cannot have been wholly ἀποιος.

⁵ διακρίνας scripsi: διακρίνειν MSS.

⁶ καὶ seclusi.

⁷ γοῦν huc transposui: ἐξ seclusi.

⁸ Cf. Methodius Περὶ τῶν γεννητῶν 6 (Bonwetsch p. 343): ἀπὸ τῶν στοιχείων ἡ

δ' ὅσα αὐτῆς, ὡς ἐποίει,¹ τρυγώδη ἐτύγγαυεν, ταῦτα <<ὡς εἶχεν κατέλιπεν,>> (ὡς)² ἀνάρμοστα ὄντα πρὸς δημιουργίαν [[ὡς εἶχεν κατέλιπεν]] καὶ³ οὐδὲν αὐτῷ προσήκοντα· ἐξ ὧν δοκεῖ μοι νῦν παρὰ ἀνθρώποις ἐπιρρεῖν τὰ κακά.' In reply to this, the *orthodoxus* first maintains (cc. 5, 6) that ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον ἀγένητα δύο ἄμα;⁴ and then (7. 1-8. 2), taking as his starting-point the Valentinian's assertion that ἄπειος ὕλη συνυπάρχει τῷ θεῷ, and making use of the distinction between οὐσίαι and ποιότητες, refutes him by an argument which concludes thus: οὐκοῦν εἰ τὰ κακὰ ποιότητες ὑπάρχουσιν οὐσιῶν, ἢ δὲ ὕλη ἄπειος ἦν, τῶν δὲ ποιότητων ποιητὴν εἶπας τὸν θεὸν εἶναι, ἔσται καὶ τῶν κακῶν δημιουργὸς ὁ θεός. ὅτε τοίνυν οὐδ' οὕτως ἀνάτιον τῶν κακῶν δυνατὸν εἰπεῖν τὸν θεόν, ὕλην αὐτῷ προσάπτειν περιττὸν εἶναι μοι δοκεῖ. Thereupon the Valentinian (8. 3 and 4) withdraws his previous statement that κακὰ are ποιότητες, and substitutes for it the statement that κακὰ are οὐσίαι;⁵ but the *orthodoxus* again refutes him (8. 5-14). Then the 'companion' interposes, and says (9. 1-11. 2) 'your argument holds good against the Valentinian, but not against me; for it is based on his assertion that ὕλη was ἄπειος, and I deny that. ἐμοὶ γὰρ ἢ ὕλη ποιότητος ἀνάρχως ἔχειν δοκεῖ· οὕτως γὰρ καὶ τὰ κακὰ ἐκ τῆς ἀπορροίας αὐτῆς εἶναι λέγω, ἵνα τῶν κακῶν ὁ μὲν θεὸς ἀνάτιος ἦ, τούτων δὲ ἀπάντων ἢ ὕλη αἰτία. Matter had certain qualities ἀγενήτως, some of which were bad; and God changed them for the better.' The *orthodoxus* answers (11. 3-8), πῶς τοίνυν αὐτὸν (sc. τὸν θεόν) τὰς τῶν φαύλων ποιότητος ὡς εἶχον καταλελοιπέναι λέγεις; πότερον δυνάμενον μὲν κἀκεῖνας ἀνελεῖν, μὴ βουληθέντα δέ, ἢ τὸ δύνασθαι μὴ ἔχοντα; εἰ μὲν γὰρ δυνάμενον λέξεις οὐ βουληθέντα δέ, αὐτὸν αἴτιον

ὕλης ἢ 'στηριγμάτων', ἢ ὅπως αὐτοὶ ταῦτα βούλεσθε ὀνομάζειν (οὐδὲν γὰρ διαφέρει), τούτων ἀγενήτως προϋφαστηκῶτων καὶ πλημμελῶς φερομένων, ὁ θεὸς διακρίνας ἐτεχνάσατο τὰ πάντα. *Ib.*: τὸν θεὸν ἤρχθαι τοῦ διοικεῖν . . . καὶ κατακοσμεῖν τὴν πρότερον ἄμορφον οὐσαν ὕλην.

¹ *Al.* ὡς ἐπος εἰπεῖν, which Bonwetsch accepts.

² ὡς εἶχεν κατέλιπεν *hic transposui*: ὡς ἀδίδι.

³ καὶ *scripsi*: κατ' MSS.

⁴ The text of c. 5 *init.* is corrupt. It might be emended thus: ὅτι μὲν ὑπάρχειν ἀδύνατον ἀγένητα δύο ἄμα, οὐδὲ σὲ ἀγροεῖν νομίζω, εἰ καὶ τὰ μάλιστα δοκεῖς τοῦτο προσθεικέναι τῷ λόγῳ. [τὸ] πάντως (γὰρ) ἐξ ἀνάγκης τὸ ἔτερον δεῖ[ν] λέγειν, ἢ ὅτι κ.τ.λ., ἢ αὐ πάλιν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.

⁵ Bonwetsch gives the text of 8. 4 thus: ΟΡΘΟΔ. παραστήσαι (*al.* παραστήναι) μοι δοκεῖς (*al.* δοκεῖ) καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας ὑπάρχειν τινάς· οὐ γὰρ ἐκτὸς οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ ὄντα βλέπω. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν, ᾧ οὗτος, καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας εἶναι λέγεις, ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ. But that is unintelligible. The sense required may be got by writing §§ 3 and 4 thus: ΟΥΑΛ. τὴν μὲν προαίρειν . . . ἀγνοῶ σαφῶς. περιστήναι (i. e. to change my position) (οὖν) μοι δοκεῖ (εἰς τὸ) καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας ὑπάρχειν τινάς· οὐ γὰρ ἐκτὸς οὐσιῶν αὐτὰ ὄντα βλέπω. ΟΡΘΟΔ. ἐπεὶ τοίνυν, ᾧ οὗτος, καὶ τὰ κακὰ οὐσίας εἶναι λέγεις, ἀνάγκη κ.τ.λ.

τούτων εἰπεῖν ἀνάγκη, ὅτι δυνάμενος ποιῆσαι μὴ εἶναι κακὰ συνεχώρησεν αὐτὰ μένειν ὡς ἦν. . . . εἰ δ' ἐκ τοῦ μὴ δύνασθαι τὸν θεὸν ἀνελεῖν τὰ κακὰ τὸ μὴ πεπαῦσθαι λέγεις, ἀδύνατον τὸν θεὸν φήσεις ὑπάρχειν. τὸ δὲ ἀδύνατον ἦτοι τῷ φύσει ἀσθενῆ ὑπάρχειν αὐτὸν ἔσται, ἢ τῷ νικᾶσθαι τῷ φόβῳ δεδουλωμένον πρὸς τινος κρείττονος. εἰ μὲν οὖν τὸν θεὸν φύσει ἀσθενῆ ὄντα τολμήσεις εἰπεῖν, περὶ τῆς σωτηρίας αὐτῆς κινδυνεύει μοι δοκεῖς· εἰ δὲ τῷ νικᾶσθαι φόβῳ πρὸς τοῦ μείζονος, μείζονα λέξεις τοῦ θεοῦ τὰ κακὰ, νικῶντα τῆς προαιρέσεως αὐτοῦ τὴν ὁρμήν· ὅπερ ἄτοπον εἶναι μοι λέγειν περὶ θεοῦ δοκεῖ. διὰ τί γὰρ οὐχὶ μᾶλλον ταῦτ' ἔσονται θεοί, νικᾶν κατὰ τὸν λόγον τὸν σὸν δυνάμενα τὸν θεόν, εἴπερ θεὸν ἐκεῖνό φαμεν, ὃ τὴν ἀπάντων ἐξουσίαν ἔχει;

After some further discussion, the *orthodoxus* (cc. 16-21) states his own opinion (i. e. that of Methodius himself) concerning the origin of moral evil. Man, he says, is *αὐτεξούσιος*, having been so made by God. It was for man's good that God endowed him with free will; for man is thereby enabled to win merit by obedience to God. Evil means disobedience to God; and man, having been made *αὐτεξούσιος*, had power to disobey. Man disobeyed; and his first act of disobedience was the beginning of evil. (Evil then is not *ἀγένητον*, but came into being at a definite time.)

But how was man induced to disobey? It was the Devil that persuaded him; and the Devil did so because he was envious of man. The first *ἀρχὴ τοῦ κακοῦ* then was the Devil's envy. The Devil's part in the matter does not, however, relieve man from responsibility; for man was free either to accept the Devil's advice or to reject it.

But was not the Devil made by God? And if so, was it not God's fault that the Devil was envious? No; for the Devil, as made by God, was not evil; but (God made him *αὐτεξούσιον*, and) it was of his own free choice that he disobeyed God, i. e. became evil.

But did not God, when he made the Devil, know that the Devil would rebel against him? And if so, is not God responsible for the evil that resulted? God knew; and knowing what would follow, he made the Devil, in order that he might more fully manifest his goodness by the remission of man's sin. Good could not be known except by contrast with evil;¹ and man would be deprived of the boon of free will if the choice between good and evil were not set before him.

¹ Cf. Tertull. *Adv. Hermog.* 15 *fin.*, quoted above.

But when the Devil had induced the first man to disobey, why did not God at once destroy the Devil, and so prevent further mischief? Because, if he had done so, God's goodness would not have been manifested in his dealings with men of all later generations, and men would not have learnt the meaning of good by seeing it in contrast with evil. As it is, 'a man of God'¹ can and does overcome the Devil, being taught by God himself to struggle against him. God is like a trainer of athletes; he sends us into the *palaestra* to wrestle with the Devil, and the man who obeys his Trainer's instructions wins the crown of victory. The man who neglects them, and does not struggle hard, is overcome; but that is his own fault. Thus, (if we do what God bids us do,) 'the Devil is trodden down beneath our feet, and lies dead'.²

After this, the *orthodoxus* brings the dialogue to a close by speaking of ἕλη once more (c. 22). If matter, he says, was not co-existent with God from the first, how is it that it now exists? (It was made by God, at the time when he began to make the world.) And why did God make the world? We cannot fully know God's motives; but I think (says the *orthodoxus*) that he made it in order to put his skill (τὴν τῆς τέχνης ἐπιστήμην) in action,³ and to manifest his goodness, and in order to bring into existence beings (viz. men) who might recognize his skill, and whom he might benefit by his goodness. τὸ μὲν οὖν λοιπὸν τοῦ κόσμου σύστημα διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον γεγενέαι φημί, πρὸς ὑπερησίαν τῶν ἀναγκαίων αὐτῷ, (τὸν δὲ ἄνθρωπον δι' αὐτὸν τὸν θεόν,) ὅπως δοξάζῃ τὸν δεσπότην, (καὶ) ὅπως τὸ ἀγαθὸν (nom.) εἰς τινας ἐνεργήσῃ τοῦ θεοῦ. Moreover, even before God made the world, he was not idle; for he was occupied in designing it and rejoicing beforehand in its beauty.

μηδὲν τοιγαροῦν, ἄνθρωπε, αὐτοσύστατον⁴ εἶναι λέγε (πρὸς)⁵ τῷ θεῷ.

¹ 'Ein Mensch Gottes', *Slav. transl.* (this passage is not extant in the Greek); i. e. any and every good man. There is not, I think, any reference to Christ here, nor indeed anywhere in the dialogue.

² What Methodius says about the Devil is a repetition, on another plane, of what he has already said about man. God is not responsible for the Devil's misdeeds, just as he is not responsible for man's misdeeds; because, in making the Devil, God endowed him with free will, just as he did in the case of man. (Methodius asks 'Quis deceptit hominem', and answers 'Diabolus'; he might, with equal reason, have gone on to ask 'Quis deceptit ipsum Diabolum?') But he says that the evil produced by the Devil's and man's misuse of free will has resulted in greater good.

³ See note on *Corp.* III. 1 a, σοφίας εἰς δείξιν.

⁴ The word *σύστασις*, as used by Methodius, means 'constitution' or 'existence', without any implication that the constituted or existent thing is composite; and *αὐτοσύστατον* is equivalent to *αὐτοποίητον* or *αὐτογέννητον*.

⁵ πρὸς *addidi*: 'mit Gott zusammen' *Slav. transl.*

. . . πᾶσιν τὸ εἶναι αὐτὸς παρέσχεν, οὐκ οὔσιν πρότερον, οὐδὲ τὴν σύστασιν ἀνάρχως ἔχουσιν. τί τεχνίτην μόνον θέλεις εἶναι τὸν θεόν; τί τὴν δωρεὰν αὐτοῦ παραιτῆ, ὡς τέχνην [καί]¹ μόνην τῇ ἕλλῃ χαρισάμενον, οὐχὶ δὲ καὶ τὴν τοῦ εἶναι σύστασιν; οὐκ ἦν σύγχρονόν τι τῷ θεῷ· οὐδὲ ποθὲν ταῦτα λαβὼν ἐδημιούργησεν αὐτός. . . . οὐ σχημάτων μόνον γέγονεν ποιητής, οὐδὲ τὴν οὔσαν αὐτῷ εἰς οὐσίαν συνεκέρασεν^{1, 2} αὐτὸς (γάρ) ἐστι καὶ τῶν οὐσιῶν δημιουργός.

As to what Plotinus says on this subject, see B. A. G. Fuller, *The problem of evil in Plotinus*, 1912; and Inge, *The philosophy of Plotinus*, vol. i, pp. 22-24, 90, 131-137, and vol. ii, p. 171 sq.

Ascl. II. 14 b. [Et de his . . . hinc sumatur exordium.] This must have been written by the compiler to serve as a connecting-link between *Ascl. I* and that which he joined on to it. But how are we to account for the words *de spiritu et de his* (or *huic*?) *similibus* (περὶ πνεύματος καὶ τῶν τούτῳ ὁμοίων)? We should have expected a phrase indicating the subject-matter of *Ascl. II*. But *Ascl. II* is not *de spiritu*; it ought rather to be described as *περὶ ἀρχῆς κακοῦ*, or *περὶ ἕλλης*; and in its original form it probably contained no mention of *πνεῦμα*. The word *spiritus* occurs four times in the traditional text of it; but these mentions of *spiritus* are irrelevant to their context.

It is possible that the words *de spiritu vero et de his similibus hinc sumatur exordium* were followed, in the composite *Λόγος τέλειος*, by a passage concerning *πνεῦμα*,³ which preceded *Ascl. II*, but has been completely lost. But it is also possible that those words were written by way of introduction, not to *Ascl. II*, but to *Ascl. III*. The first paragraph of *Ascl. III* treats of certain *principalia mundanorum*, one of which is *spiritus*. That paragraph then might be described as 'concerning spirit and the like'; and we may suppose that the words *et de his . . . hinc sumatur exordium* were intended to stand at the beginning of *Ascl. III*, but were separated from it by the subsequent insertion of *Ascl. II*. The irrelevant mentions of *spiritus* in *Ascl. II* may have been added

¹ καὶ *seclusi*.

² 'Nicht blos der Formen Schöpfer seiend, sondern auch die bei ihm seiende Substanz, wie es passend war' (= οὐ σχημάτων μόνον ὄν ποιητής, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν συνοῦσαν αὐτῷ οὐσίαν προσηκόντως?) *Slav. transl.* Perhaps, οὐδὲ συνοῦσαν αὐτῷ οὐσίαν (sc. ἕλλην ἀγένητον) (ποιότησι) συνεκέρασεν.

³ It appears from *Fragm. 24* (Didymus and Cyril) that there was a discussion of *πνεῦμα* in 'the third of the Discourses of Hermes to Asclepius'.

afterwards, by some one who thought that the introductory words made it necessary that something should be said on that subject.

Fuit deus et ὕλη. *Fuit* = (ἐν ἀρχῇ) ἦν. Cf. Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* IX. 1: καὶ γέγονεν . . . ἣ ὕλη καὶ (ἀεὶ?) ἦν.

「**quem Graece credimus mundum**」. A clause inserted by the translator, and corrupted by the copyists. The sense required is *quam Graeci ὕλην, nos mundum dicimus*. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 7 b: 'quod ἑλικόν Graeci, nos mundanum dicimus.' *Ascl.* III. 17 a: 'ὕλη autem (vel mundus).'

[**Et mundo . . . nec deo** (. . .)]. The meaning of these words would seem to be that πνεῦμα 'was with or in' matter in one sense, and 'was with or in' God in another sense. But the past tense of *comitabatur* and *inerat* is difficult to explain; for πνεῦμα, if the word is to be understood in the sense in which it was used by the Stoics, cannot be one of the 'first things'; it is warm air, i. e. matter endowed with certain qualities, and must therefore be γεννητόν. But this sentence is an interpolation, and there is no knowing what meaning the interpolator may have attached to the word πνεῦμα. It is possible that he was thinking of *Gen.* 1. 2, πνεῦμα θεοῦ ἐπέφερετο ἐπάνω τοῦ ὕδατος.

Haec, de quibus mundus, idcirco non erant, qu(i)a n(a)ta non erant. *Mundus*, since it is said to issue from or to be made of other things, must here mean κόσμος, and not ὕλη, which 'was in the beginning'. The 'things out of which the universe has come into being' are, I suppose, the four elements, which have been formed by the imposition of qualities on ἄποιος ὕλη. The writer is speaking of a time when the elements had not yet been formed, and nothing but God and ἄποιος ὕλη was in actual existence.

in eo iam tunc erant unde nasci habuerunt. They existed potentially in God and matter, whence they were thereafter to be generated. Compare, and contrast, *Ascl.* I. 2 a: 'utpote quae in creatore fuerint omnia, antequam creasset omnia'; i. e. all created things pre-existed potentially in God. Matter, as a second creative or generative entity distinct from God, is not admitted in *Ascl.* I. The view of the writer of *Ascl.* II would be better expressed if *in iis* (*sc.* God and matter) were written instead of *in eo*.

For *nasci habuerunt* ('were to be produced') cf. Tertull. *Hab. mul.* 1: 'etiam filius Dei mori habuit'; Lactant. *Div. inst.* 4. 12. 15: 'ut ostenderet quod carne indui haberet.'

[**Non enim ea sola non nata dicuntur quae necdum nata**

sunt, sed ea (etiam quae . . .) &c.]. The MSS. give the sentence thus: 'non enim ea sola non nata dicuntur quae necdum nata sunt, sed ea quae carent fecunditate generandi, ita ut ex his nihil nasci possit.' We want *sed ea (etiam)*, to answer to *non ea sola*; but even with that correction, the words would not yield a satisfactory meaning. The writer is apparently distinguishing different senses of the word ἀγέννητος. Now that word could be used in three senses, viz. (1) 'existing without having been generated' (i. e. 'without beginning', the most frequent sense in philosophic writings); (2) 'not yet generated' (i. e. not yet existing, but destined to come into being at some future time; Soph. *O. C.* 973, ὅς οὔτε βλάστας πο γενεθλίους . . . εἶχον, ἀλλ' ἀγέννητος τότε ἦ); (3) incapable of generating (Theophr. *C. P.* 6. 10. 1). God and matter (and, according to *Ascl.* II. 15 *init.*, space also) are ἀγέννητα in the first of these three senses; the material universe and its contents were, before the creation, ἀγέννητα in the second sense; and space (c. 15 *init.*) is ἀγέννητον in the third sense (as well as in the first sense). The statement given in the MSS. amounts to saying 'the word ἀγέννητος can be used not only in the second sense, but (also) in the third sense', and leaves unmentioned the first sense, i. e. the sense in which it is applicable to God and matter, and with which therefore the writer of *Ascl.* II is especially concerned. This difficulty may be got over by assuming a lacuna after *sed ea*; we may suppose that the sentence ran thus: 'not only those things are called ἀγέννητα which have not yet been produced' (second sense), 'but those things (also which are without beginning)' (first sense). That statement would be intelligible in itself, but is not to the point here; it may perhaps be a marginal note wrongly inserted in the text.

The following words ((. . .) *quae carent fecunditate generandi, ita ut ex his nihil nasci possit*) have nothing to do with anything that has hitherto been mentioned. The only thing spoken of in *Ascl.* II that *caret fecunditate generandi* is space (*locus*); and that is spoken of only in c. 15. It is possible therefore that these words occurred in the passage concerning space in c. 15, or in a note appended to that passage, and have been accidentally shifted thence.

Quaecunq̄ue ergo . . . cuncta nascuntur. The writer is here laying down general propositions concerning ἀγέννητα (or αὐτογέννητα), with the intention of afterwards applying these propositions to God and matter.

de quibus nasci potest (aliquid), tametsi ea ex se nata sunt. The word *tametsi* implies that one would at first sight be apt to think that *αὐτογέννητα* cannot be *γεννητικά*, i. e. cannot generate anything. And in what follows, the same thing is repeatedly implied concerning *ἀγέννητα*. ('ἔλη, . . . quamvis nata non videatur, a principio tamen in se nascendi procreandique vim possidet.'—'mundus (i. e. ἔλη), quamvis natus non sit, in se tamen omnium naturas habet' &c.—'materiae, quae creabilis est, tametsi creata non est.')

But why should any one be inclined to think that *αὐτογέννητα* or *ἀγέννητα* cannot be *γεννητικά*?

Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 2. 8. 42, arguing against the doctrine of uncreated matter, says 'Materia igitur si facta non est, nec fieri ex quicquam potest'. But that is not a true parallel; for Lactantius's *fieri ex ea* has a different meaning from the Hermetist's *nasci ex ea*. The reason which Lactantius gives for his statement is that matter, when something else is made of it, thereby changes into the thing made, and ceases to exist as matter, whereas that which is uncreated must be imperishable. That cannot be the reasoning implied by our Hermetist; for he clearly holds that both God and matter continue to exist after other things have been generated from them. It is possible however that the view hinted at by his 'although' is that *αὐτογέννητα* or *ἀγέννητα* must be unchangeable, and that consequently they cannot generate, because the act of generating involves a change in the generator. In that case, the argument implied would resemble that of Origen as reported by Methodius *περὶ τῶν γενητῶν* (Bonwetsch, p. 341), viz. that τὸ πᾶν must be ἀναρχον καὶ συναΐδιον τῷ θεῷ, because if not, ἀλλοιοῦσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλειν τὸν ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀαλλοίωτον συμβήσεται θεόν· εἰ γὰρ ὕστερον πεποίηκε τὸ πᾶν, δῆλον ὅτι ἀπὸ τοῦ μὴ ποιεῖν εἰς τὸ ποιεῖν μετέβαλε. Cf. Tertull. *Adv. Hermog.* 12: '(Hermogenes) deum negat ex semetipso facere (= γενᾶν) potuisse, quia non demutetur quod sit aeternum (= ἀγέννητον).' On the same principle, says Tertullian, it could be proved that God cannot have made the world out of ἀγέννητος ἔλη; for if he did, 'demutationem admisit materia, et, si ita est, statum aeternitatis amisit'.

Ex se nata = *αὐτογέννητα*. The word *αὐτογέννητος*, 'generated by or from himself', was often applied to God, as an equivalent for *ἀγέννητος* in the sense 'without beginning', or 'pre-existent from all eternity'. Cf. *Corp.* VIII. 2 as emended: ὁ μὲν γὰρ πατήρ ἰπὸ ἐτέρου οὐκ ἐγένετο· εἰ δὲ καὶ ἐγένετο, ἕφ' ἑαυτοῦ· μᾶλλον δὲ οὔποτε

ἐγένετο, ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἔστιν. . . ὁ δὲ πατὴρ αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ αἴτιος. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 1. 7. 13: 'quia fieri non potest quin id quod sit aliquando esse coeperit, consequens est ut, quoniam nihil ante illum (*sc.* deum) fuit, ipse ante omnia ex se ipso sit procreatus; ideoque ab Apolline¹ αὐτοφυῆς, a Sibylla αὐτογενῆς et ἀγένητος² et ἀποίητος nominatur. Quod Seneca, vir acutus, in Exhortationibus vidit. "Nos" inquit "aliunde pendemus: itaque ad aliquem respicimus, cui quod est optimum in nobis debeamus. Alius nos edidit, alius instruxit: deus ipse se fecit.'" Lactant. *ib.* 2. 8. 44: 'Solus igitur deus est qui factus non est. . . Permanebit semper in eo quod fuit, quia non est aliunde generatus, nec ortus ac nativitas eius ex aliqua re altera pendet, quae illum mutata dissolvat. Ex se ipso est.' Aelius Aristides 43. 7 ff. Keil: Ζεὺς τὰ πάντα ἐποίησεν' . . . ἐποίησεν δὲ πρῶτος³ (*legendum* πρῶτον) αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. . . ὁδε ἐστὶ πρῶτός τε καὶ πρεσβύτατος καὶ ἀρχηγέτης τῶν πάντων, αὐτὸς ἐξ αὐτοῦ γενόμενος. ὁπότε δὲ ἐγένετο οὐκ ἔστιν εἰπεῖν, ἀλλ' ἦν τε ἄρα ἐξ ἀρχῆς καὶ ἔσται εἰσαεὶ, αὐτοπάτωρ τε καὶ μείζων ἢ ἐξ ἄλλου γεγονέναι. Compare the three following passages, quoted from Pagan oracles by Didymus *De trinitate*, Migne *Patr. Gr.* tom. XXXII. 788 a: ἀθάνατος δὲ θεός, παναγήραος, ἀστυφέλικτος, | ἄρρητος, ἱερῶν ὑποδήσεις⁴ αὐτογένεθλος | τίκτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν, αἰεὶ νεός, ἱερῶν ποιητός⁵, | αὐτὸς ἀληθείης γενέτης, ἱερῶν⁶ αὐτὸς ἀληθής. *Ib.* 790 c: αὐτὸς πάντα φέρει θεὸς ἄμβροτος· αὐτὸς ἑαυτοῦ | καὶ γενέτης καὶ ῥίζα πέλει, καὶ τέρμα καὶ υἱός. *Ib.* 792 a: οὐ γὰρ ἀπ' ὠδίνος θεὸς ἄμβροτος, οὐδ' ἀπὸ κόλπων | νηδύος ἐκ λοχίης φάος ἔδρακεν· ἀλλὰ νόοιο | ἀρρήτῳ ἱεροφάντῳ⁶ κυκλοῦμενος, αὐτολόχευτος | γίνεται ἐξ ἑθελῶν αὐτός, ἐὼν γενέτης τε καὶ υἱός. Oracle of Apollo, quoted in *Excerpta e Theosophia* (Buresch, *Klaros*) § 42: αὐτὸς ἀναξ πάντων, αὐτοσπορος, αὐτογένεθλος, | . . . εἰς φάος ἦγεν ἅπαντα (i. e. created the universe). Oracle quoted in Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 9. 10 = Ps.-Justin *Cohort.* ad Graecos 11: μόνου Χαλδαίου σοφίην λάχον, ἧδ' ἄρ' Ἑβραίου, | αὐτογένεθλον ἀνακτα σεβαζόμενοι θεὸν ἀγνῶς.

The notion that God is 'self-generated' was current in Egypt from early times. Cf. *Book of the Dead*, Turin copy, ch. xv (Wiedemann, *Rel. of anc. Egypt*, p. 45): 'Hail to thee, Râ

¹ I. e. in a certain oracle ascribed to Apollo.

² *Orac. Sibyll.* Fragm. 1. 17 Geffcken: αὐτογενῆς, ἀγένητος.

³ Perhaps κρυφίῳι λοχεύμασι.

⁴ Perhaps οὐ τι ποιητός.

⁵ Perhaps μόνος.

⁶ *στροφάλιγγι conz.* Mingarelli.

Harmakhis, Khepera who art self-begotten.' (*Ib.* p. 47) 'Thou bringest forth thyself without birth'. A document of the XXth Dynasty, c. 1233-1133 B.C. (*ib.* p. 54) speaks of Râ as 'the divine god who created himself, maker of heaven and earth, and of the breath of life'. Inscription of El Khargeh, time of Darius (Navelle, *Old Eg. faith*, Eng. tr. 1909, p. 146 f.): 'He is Ra who exists by himself; . . . he is the good god who rests in his own body and gives birth to himself without coming forth from a mother's womb.' The same notion is implied in the phrase 'the husband of his mother', which is often applied to Egyptian gods (*Wiedemann ib.* pp. 104, 111); and the use of the beetle (*kheper*) as a symbol of Râ is explained (Navelle *ib.* p. 131 f.) as signifying 'that he reproduces himself by himself,—that he is his own son. To call him Kheper, therefore, is to affirm that he will have no end, since he can be born again unceasingly from his own substance'. The primary meaning of these Egyptian phrases seems to have been that the Sun-god daily renews himself, and is thus enabled to rise in fresh splendour every morning, rather than that he has had no beginning in the past. Did the Greeks borrow from the Egyptians the notion expressed by *αὐτογέννητος* as a predicate of the supreme God, or did they invent it independently?

Our Hermetist holds that *ἕλη* also is *αὐτογέννητος*, in the same sense that God is.

Deus ergo sempiternus, deus aeternus. The writer of *Ascl.* III would have said rather that God is *aeternus* (*αἰώνιος*), and the Kosmos *sempiternus* (*αἰδῖος*); see ch. 29 c *sqq.*

ἕλη autem . . . [et spiritus], quamvis nata non videat[ur]. It cannot rightly be said of *πνεῦμα* (in the sense in which that word is used in *Ascl.* III *init.*, and in the *Hermetica* in general,) that 'it does not appear to have been generated'; for *πνεῦμα* in that sense is a corporeal substance, and as such, must have been generated, whether by God alone or (as the writer of *Ascl.* II would say) by God and *ἕλη* together. Hence it may be inferred that *et spiritus* has been added by an interpolator (presumably the same person who inserted *et mundo comitabatur spiritus* &c. above), and that the verbs *videantur* and *possident* have been accordingly altered from singular to plural. This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that in the two following sentences *ἕλη* alone is spoken of, and *spiritus* is ignored.

nascendi procreandique vim . . . atque naturam. The sense

required would be better expressed by omitting *nascendi*, *-que*, and *atque naturam*, and writing *procreandi vim* alone. But *nascendi procreandique* may be a faulty translation of γεννήσεως; and *vim atque naturam*, both here and in the following sentence, may be the translator's rendering of the single word δύναμιν.

Fecunditatis etenim initium in qualitate materiae (naturae MSS.) est, quae et conceptus et partus in se possidet vim atque naturam (materiam MSS.). The writer attributes to ἄλη (that ἄλη which 'was in the beginning') the quality of fecundity. He differs in that respect from those Platonists who said that the primal ἄλη is wholly ἄπειρος.

The meaning would have been clearer if *fecunditas* had been written in place of *fecunditatis initium*. Perhaps *fecunditatis initium* (ἀρχή) means 'original fecundity', as opposed to fecundity resulting from the action on matter of some cause or agent other than itself.

sine alieno conceptu est sola generabilis. *Sine alieno conceptu*, in order to suit the context, ought to mean 'without being made capable of conceiving (i. e. of giving birth to things) by anything else', in contrast to *quae vim solam concipiendi habent ex alterius commixtione naturae* in c. 15 *init.* But it is difficult to see how that sense can be got out of the words. It is possible that the Greek was ἀνευ συλλήψεως ἀλλοτριίας, 'without the assistance of anything else', and that the translator mistakenly supposed σύλληψις to be here used in the sense of 'conception'. (In the preceding phrase *conceptus et partus*, the Greek word translated by *conceptus* may have been κύησις).

This clause, if taken alone, might seem to imply that Matter is capable of generating even without the co-operation of God. But that cannot be the writer's meaning. He holds that in the generation of things God and Matter co-operate,—God as Father, and Matter as Mother; and what he here means to assert is that (the operation of God as Father being presupposed) Matter is capable of discharging the function of Mother without aid from any other entity. In other words, Matter is not a merely passive 'recipient', but possesses a generative power co-ordinate with that of God. And in this respect, (as the writer proceeds to point out,) Matter differs from Space; for Space is barren in itself, and is capable of 'conceiving',—i. e. of being filled with γεννητά,—only when something else (viz. Matter) is interfused with it. In Pl.

Tim. 52 A, the ὑποδοχή (i. e. matter) is identified with χώρα. Possibly the writer of *Ascl.* II had that passage in mind, and spoke of space here with the intention of expressing his dissent from the *Timaeus*. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 17 b as emended: ὕλη 'multis loci instar qualitatemque habere creditur'.

in se vim totius naturae (γεννήσεως?) habet. In the traditional text, the subject of this clause is Space. But the purpose of the whole paragraph appears to be to deny this proposition with respect to Space, and affirm it with respect to Matter. I have therefore transposed the words.

15. At vero ea . . . discernenda sunt. This statement is first made in general terms, and is afterwards applied to Space in particular.

ut (. . .). The clause introduced by *ut* has disappeared; and *videatur* has probably been substituted for *videtur* by way of an attempt to patch up the mutilated passage.

The meaning appears to be, that on the one hand ὕλη is both ἀγέννητος and γεννητική, and on the other hand τόπος is ἀγέννητος but not γεννητικός.

locus mundi cum his quae in se sunt. *In se* must be taken to mean *in mundo*, not *in loco*. The translator ought to have written, not *in se*, but *in eo*. The words *locus mundi* &c. signify the space in which the whole universe is contained, as opposed to the space in which this or that particular thing is contained. Cf. *Ar. Phys.* 4. 209 a 32: καὶ τόπος ὁ μὲν κοινός, ἐν ᾧ ἅπαντα τὰ σώματα ἐστίν, ὁ δ' ἴδιος, ἐν ᾧ πρῶτον (ἕκαστον τῶν σωμάτων). But as the sense in which *locus* is here spoken of is sufficiently explained by the following sentence ('locum autem dico in quo sint omnia'), the words *mundi cum his quae in se sunt* are superfluous; and the passage would read better if they were omitted.

Neque enim . . . sustinere potuisset. Space must be ἀγέννητον, because it must have been already in existence before any (corporeal) thing came into being. Cf. *Pl. Tim.* 52 B: καὶ φαμεν ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι πού τὸ ὄν ἅπαν ἐν τινι τόπῳ καὶ κατέχον χώραν τινά, τὸ δὲ μήτ' ἐν γῆ μήτε πού κατ' οὐρανὸν οὐδὲν εἶναι. *Ar. Phys.* 4. 208 b 29 ff.: δόξειε δ' ἂν καὶ Ἡσίοδος ὀρθῶς λέγειν ποιήσας πρῶτον τὸ χάος, . . . ὡς δέον πρῶτον ὑπάρξαι χώραν τοῖς οἴσι, διὰ τὸ νομίζειν, ὥσπερ οἱ πολλοί, πάντα εἶναι πού καὶ ἐν τόπῳ. εἰ δ' ἐστὶ τοιοῦτο, θαυμαστή τις ἂν εἴη ἢ τοῦ τόπου δύναμις, καὶ προτέρα πάντων' οὐ γὰρ ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων οὐδὲν ἐστίν, ἐκεῖνο δ' ἄνευ τῶν ἄλλων, ἀνάγκη πρῶτον εἶναι.

The translator has written *potuisset* in place of *posset*; see note on *Ascl.* I. 8, 'qui illum . . . intueri potuisset'.

nec qualitates . . . dinosci potuissent. *dinosci* is hardly the right word; for it is the existence of things, and not men's knowledge of them, that is in question. The Greek must have been to the effect that things could not *have* distinct qualities &c. if they were not in space.

With this paragraph concerning space should be compared *Ascl.* III 34 a, where a different view is maintained, and the independent or substantive existence of space is denied. The two passages cannot have been written by the same person.

Sic ergo et mundus (i. e. ὅλη) *quamvis natus non sit.* If there is no lacuna between this and the preceding paragraph, *sic* must be taken as qualifying *natus non sit*, and not *omnium naturas habet*; that is, the meaning must be 'Matter then, though it is likewise (i. e. as Space is) ungenerated' &c.; for it is in being ἀγέννητα that ὅλη and τόπος are alike. The Latin does not lend itself readily to this interpretation; but the translator may have misunderstood the Greek.

in se tamen omnium naturas (γεννήσεις?) *habet.* Matter contains in itself the power of generating all things.

Hoc est ergo totum qualitatis (diversae, prout natura est) *materiae.* The All includes both good things and bad things; and this diversity in the quality of the things produced results from the varying operation of the productive force of matter. It seems certain that this was the writer's meaning, though the exact wording is doubtful. Cf. *Corp.* XIV. 7: μή διὰ τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν γινομένων φυλάξῃ κ.τ.λ.

16 a. *Ne ergo dix(er)i(tis), o Asclepi et (Tat et) Hammon.* It may be presumed that in the original *Ascl.* II as an independent dialogue Hermes addressed his discourse to a single pupil, and consequently, that the earliest form of the Greek would be reproduced by writing *ne ergo dixeris* here, and *tua tamen causa* for *vestri tamen causa* below, and retaining only one of the three names. The plural address was probably substituted by the compiler of the *Δόγος τέλειος*; and as he can have had no reason for omitting Tat while naming the two other disciples, *Tat et* must have dropped out by accident.

[[*Non poterat deus . . . avertere a rerum natura malitiam.*]]
The traditional text is meaningless. By interchanging this sentence

with *dicunt enim . . . a malitia liberare* below, we obtain the sense which the context requires. It is the teacher himself who holds that 'it was impossible for God to exclude evil from the universe'; and the impiety which he condemns consists in finding fault with God for not doing what it was not possible for God to do. Perhaps the two sentences may have been intentionally interchanged by a transcriber who shrank from applying the words *non poterat* to God.

Cf. Pl. *Theaet.* 176 A: ἀλλ' οὐτ' ἀπολέσθαι τὰ κακὰ δυνατόν, . . . τὴν δὲ θνητὴν φύσιν καὶ τόνδε τὸν τρόπον περιπολεῖ ἐξ ἀνάγκης. Plut. *Is. et Os.* 49: μεμιγμένη γὰρ ἡ τοῦδε τοῦ κόσμου γένεσις καὶ σύστασις ἐξ ἐναντιῶν οὐ μὴν ἰσοσθενῶν δυνάμεων, ἀλλὰ τῆς βελτίονος τὸ κράτος ἐστίν· ἀπολέσθαι δὲ τὴν φαύλην παντάπασιν ἀδύνατον, πολλὴν μὲν ἐμπεφυκυῖαν τῷ σώματι πολλὴν δὲ τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παντός, καὶ πρὸς τὴν βελτίονα αἰὲ δυσμαχοῦσαν.

A different view is expressed in *Corp.* XIV. 7-9, where we are told that it is impious to say that God οὐ δύναται. The writer of that *libellus* admits, however, that evil follows on γένεσις 'as rust forms on metal'; and that amounts to the admission of an ἀνάγκη which God cannot overcome.

Quibus respondendum nihil omnino est. This phrase implies contempt, such as is more fully expressed by Celsus in *Orig. c. Cels.* 8. 49: ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦτο πειθομένοις οὐκ . . . ἄξιον [τοῦτο] διαλέγεσθαι· οὗτοι γάρ εἰσιν οἱ καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ἄγροικοὶ καὶ ἀκάθαρτοι κ.τ.λ.

quantum rationabiliter potuisset. *Potuit* or *poterat* would have been more correct. Cf. *sustinere potuisset* above.

sensu, disciplina, intellegentia mentes hominum est munere dignatus. God's purpose in bestowing intelligence on men is to give them a protection against evil. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 22 b, where the same thought recurs. The topic is there introduced by these words: 'dignum est hunc persequi tractatum, atque expedire quare solis hominibus intellegentiam et disciplinam divinitas suam sit impertire dignata.' The author of that passage could not possibly have written thus, if he had already dealt with the same question, and given the same answer to it, a few pages before. Here then we have a clear proof that *Ascl.* II and *Ascl.* III were originally unconnected.

In ch. 22 b, God's gift to men is called *intellegentia et disciplina*, and *ratio disciplinaque*. In ch. 41 b, *condonans nos sensu, ratione, intellegentia* is the translator's rendering of χαρισάμενος ἡμῖν νοῦν, λόγον, γνῶσιν. Probably therefore in ch. 16 a also *sensus* is νοῦς (as

frequently elsewhere in the *Asclepius*), and *intellegentia* is γνῶσις; and *disciplina* certainly stands for ἐπιστήμη. The three terms may be distinguished thus: νοῦς is the faculty or 'part of the soul', by which man knows; ἐπιστήμη is knowledge in its subordinate branches; and γνῶσις is the supreme knowledge, i.e. the knowledge of God, which involves also love of God, and, in its highest degree, union with God. Cf. *Corp.* X. 10 a: γνῶσις δέ ἐστιν ἐπιστήμης τὸ τέλος, ἐπιστήμη δὲ . . . ἀσώματος, ὀργάνῳ χρωμένη αὐτῷ τῷ νοῖ.—νοῦς is the mental eye, and ἐπιστήμη and γνῶσις are a lower and a higher grade of mental vision.

est divina intellegentia prudentiaque munitus. If a man shuns evil, the intellectual powers by means of which he does so have been bestowed on him by God; and thus it is 'God's wisdom and providence' that has protected him. It would be possible also to translate the words thus, 'he is protected by God-given intuition and wisdom', taking *intellegentia prudentiaque* to be properties of man (equivalent to *sensu, disciplina, intellegentia* above), instead of properties of God. But this would be less suitable to the context; for the thing to be proved is that *God* has done all that could be done to counteract evil.

fundamentum est enim disciplinae in summa bonitate consistens. Here *disciplina* (ἐπιστήμη) alone corresponds to *sensu, disciplina, intellegentia* above. *Summa bonitas* must mean the goodness of God; knowledge is a gift bestowed on man by God's bounty. If he had been speaking of human goodness, the writer would rather have said that goodness is founded on knowledge (of God).

[*Spiritu autem . . . subiectus est*]]. This sentence has nothing to do with the subject-matter of *Ascl.* II. It is probably a displaced marginal appendage to the paragraph concerning *spiritus* which follows at the beginning of *Ascl.* III. The words *spiritu autem ministrantur omnia et vegetantur in mundo* are a doublet of *Ascl.* III. 17 a *iniii.*, *spiritu vero agitantur sive gubernantur omnes in mundo species.*

[*Itaque (haec) hactenus a nobis intellegantur.*] These words mark the end of *Ascl.* II. They were probably added by the compiler of the *Λόγος τέλειος*, as were the corresponding words (*Et de his . . . hinc sumatur exordium*) at the beginning of *Ascl.* II.

Asclepius III

16 b. *Mente sola intellegibilis* &c. The interest of the writer of *Ascl.* III seems to be centred in the question 'How ought we to worship the gods?' With a view to answering that question, he sets forth a system of theology (*ratio divinatorum*, 19 a). The topic of theology is introduced in ch. 18 b,¹ by the mention of νοῦς and θεοὶ νοητοί; and accordingly, it is at that point (19 a) that Hermes warns his disciple of the sublimity of the truths which he is about to reveal. The words which he there uses (*divina nudo mysteria* &c.) must be taken as applying to the whole of the discourse which follows. But by way of leading up to the main topic, the writer, before entering on the *ratio divinatorum*, begins by giving a short account of the constitution of the sensible or corporeal universe,—a *ratio mundanorum*, or cosmology,—which is contained in chs. 16 b, 17 a, 17 c (with chs. 33 a–34 a added as an appendage). The discourse of Hermes begins abruptly with the words *Mente sola intellegibilis* &c., and it is possible that, in *Ascl.* III as an independent dialogue, these words were preceded by some introductory sentences, which were omitted by the compiler of the Λόγος τέλειος; but there is no reason to think that anything of importance to the exposition of the doctrine has been lost here.

The contents of this preliminary 'cosmology' are summed up in 17 c, where we are told that it deals with *principalia omnium (mundanorum)*; and these *principalia* appear to be ὕλη, μορφαί, and πνεῦμα.

Compare the very similar arrangement of the first part of *Ascl.* I. In that *libellus* also, there is a preliminary paragraph on the constituents of the Kosmos (chs. 2 b, 3 a), ending with the sentence 'Totus itaque quibus formatus est mundus' &c., on which follows a solemn introduction of the topic of theology (*divinitatis ratio*, 3 b). This parallelism of arrangement is in itself enough to prove that *Ascl.* I and *Ascl.* III were originally two distinct and unconnected documents; the repetition would be impossible in a single treatise composed as a whole by one author.

In chs. 33 a–34 a, we have a passage treating of Void and Space. That passage, where it stands in the MSS., interrupts the continuity

¹ It is true that the supreme God has already been spoken of in 16 b and 17 a; but what is said about him there is brought in merely because it is needed for the explanation of the Kosmos.

of the discourse, and is manifestly out of place. There is, in fact, no place in *Ascl.* III where it would be in keeping with the context, except immediately after ch. 17 c; and at that point, it fits on perfectly. After speaking of the true *principalia mundanorum* (viz. ἴλη, μορφαί, and πνεῦμα), the writer might very well go on to speak of two things (viz. κενόν and τόπος) which are erroneously supposed to be *principalia mundanorum*, and to show that the common opinion about them is mistaken. I conclude then that, if the passage on Void and Space was intended to form part of *Ascl.* III at all, it must have been meant to stand next after ch. 17 c; and I have transposed it accordingly.

But how did it come to be placed in its traditional position? As it is complete in itself, and shows no sign of fracture at the beginning or end, its transference can hardly have been caused by the accidental shifting of a leaf. Possibly its writer (whether the original author of *Ascl.* III or another) may have written it as a supplement to chs. 16 b–17 c after the bulk of the treatise was finished; he may have left it lying loose (perhaps appending a note, which was subsequently overlooked, to indicate the position for which he intended it); and a transcriber may have written it in at the point where chance had placed it.

summus qui dicitur. ὕψιστος, as a designation of God, was in common use among the Jews; it frequently occurs e.g. in the Jewish *Oracula Sibyllina*. But its use is not to be taken as a proof of Jewish influence; for any Greek who had occasion to speak of the supreme God might easily hit on the word independently. Zeus was called ὕψιστος by Greeks, from the time of Pindar and Aeschylus downward.

sensibilis dei: i. e. mundi. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 3 c: 'caelum ergo, sensibilis deus.' *Ib.* 8: θεὸν ὄρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητὸν. The term αἰσθητὸς θεός, as applied to the Kosmos, is ultimately derived from the concluding words of Pl. *Tim.*

in se circumplectitur [omnem locum]. The writer, who in ch. 34 a refuses to admit the substantive existence of *locus*, would hardly mention it in enumerating the contents of the Kosmos. Moreover, space, if mentioned at all, should be said to contain the Kosmos rather than to be contained in it. Probably therefore the words *omnem locum* have been inserted by another hand.

omnem rerum substantiam totamque [[gignentium crean-

tiumque]] *materiam*. Cf. 17 b as emended: 'sunt visibiles formae . . . uniuscuiusque . . . tota substantia.' The οὐσία of a thing (in the sense in which the term is here used) is the sum of the μορφαί with which its ἕλη is endued; so that οὐσία and ἕλη together make up the whole contents of the Kosmos. The words *gignentium creantiumque*, as a qualification of *materiam*, yield no satisfactory sense; and on the other hand, *quantumcumque est* demands a genitive; I have therefore transposed the words. *Quantumcumque est gignentium creantiumque* may be taken to mean the whole number of living things which possess reproductive power; and in that sense, the phrase describes a part of the contents of the Kosmos, which have already been summed up by the terms οὐσία and ἕλη. The reproductive energy of every single animal and plant is included in, and is a constituent part of, the vital energy of the Kosmos as a whole, the αἰσθητὸς θεός; and that vital energy is diffused through the Kosmos by God, working with πνεῦμα as his instrument.

It is possible, however, that the Greek has been inaccurately translated, and that *quantumcumque est gignentium creantiumque* stands for something like πάντα τὰ γεννητά, or πᾶσα γένεσις, in the sense of 'all things that come into being'.

17 a. *quasi organum vel machina*. Cf. *Corp.* X. 18: ὄργανον τῷ πυρὶ . . . χρήται. The function here assigned to πνεῦμα (i. e. warm air, the vehicle of life) is there assigned to fire. In 19 b, we are told that 'aer . . . organum est vel machina omnium, per quam omnia fiunt.' See note *ad loc.*

The writer's conception of πνεῦμα and its function in the Kosmos is derived from the Stoics. But he shows some confusion of thought in putting πνεῦμα on a par with ἕλη and μορφαί, as one of the three *principalia mundanorum*; for πνεῦμα in the Stoic sense is itself ἕλη endued with certain μορφαί or ποιότητες. It seems as if he here limited the term ἕλη to the matter of which *gross* and *ponderable* bodies are made, and assumed πνεῦμα to be differently constituted from such bodies. See 18 b *init.*

Spiritu . . . gubernantur omnes in mundo species. The word *species* cannot here signify either the *formae visibiles* (αἰσθητὰ εἶδη) imposed on matter, or the eternal ἰδέαι (*species divinae* and *incorporales*, ch. 35), of which the αἰσθητὰ εἶδη are copies; for of neither of these could it be said that 'God has distributed to each one of them its special φύσις'. We must therefore take *species* (εἶδη) to mean in this sentence either 'kinds or classes of beings',

or (as in *Ascl.* I. 4 f.) 'individuals'. *Secundum naturam suam* corresponds to *ut cuiusque naturae qualitas est inallata* below; and *cuiusque* there means 'of each individual thing'.

omnium est (formarum) receptaculum. *Formarum* is required here to complete the sense, and must be understood again with the following *omniumque*.

omniumque agitatio atque frequentatio (spiritu efficitur (?)). *κίνησις* (*agitatio*) is here used in the sense of *μεταβολή*, i. e. substitution of one form for another; and *πύκνωσις* (*frequentatio*) signifies the unbroken succession of the different forms which a thing assumes in the course of its life and growth. *πνεῦμα* is the instrument by which life and growth are effected; and this may be expressed in other words by saying that *πνεῦμα* is that by means of which the matter of which the thing consists is endued with a constant succession of different forms. In this way the writer combines the Platonic doctrine of matter and form with the Stoic doctrine of *πνεῦμα*.

spiritu vero inplet omnia, ut cuiusque naturae qualitas est inallata. The writer of *Ascl.* III agrees with the Stoics in saying that *πνεῦμα* is present throughout the universe, and is the vehicle of life in all things. But he differs from them in recognizing a supracosmic God by whose ordinance the vitalizing *πνεῦμα* is distributed to all things in the Kosmos; whereas the supreme God of the Stoics is himself a part of the Kosmos, being the *πῦρ νοερόν* inherent in the *πνεῦμα* by which the Kosmos is permeated.

The Stoic doctrine of *πνεῦμα* is that which is stated by Virgil,¹ *Georg.* 4. 221 *sqq.*: '(quidam dixere) deum . . . ire per omnes | terrasque tractusque maris caelumque profundum; | hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum | quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.' Virg. *Aen.* 6. 724 *sqq.*: 'caelum ac terras camposque liquentes | . . . spiritus intus alit, totamque infusa per artus | mens agitat molem, et magno se corpore miscet. Inde hominum pecudumque genus, vitaeque volantum,' &c.

According to the Stoics, the operations of the *πνεῦμα* are of three different grades, viz. *ξέσις* (cohesive force), *φύσις* (vegetable life), and *ψυχή* (animal and human life). See note on *Ascl.* I. 4. Diog. Laert. 7. 138 *sq.*: τὸν κόσμον (δι)οικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι Χρύσιππος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ προνοίας, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν (τῷ τρίτῳ) Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ 'νοῦ' (*lege*

¹ Virgil probably got his statement of it from Posidonius.

πνεύματος),¹ καθάπερ ἐφ' ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ' ἦδη δι' ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι' ὧν δὲ ἦττον. δι' ὧν μὲν γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὄστων καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι' ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. Nemesius *Nat. hom.* 2 : ζῆν μὲν λέγουσι καὶ τὰ πάντα ἄψυχα ἐκτικὴν ζωὴν, καθ' ὃ συνέχεται ὑπὸ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ εἶναι μόνον καὶ μὴ διαλύεσθαι. (All force is a kind of life; and where there is life, there is πνεῦμα. Thus even a lump of inorganic matter contains so much of life—and accordingly, of πνεῦμα—as is needed to hold it together.) See Arnim *Sto. Vet.* II, pp. 144–151.

17 c. sunt in his aut per haec aut de his (<<mundana, ut ita dixerim,>> omnia. In his refers, I suppose, to ὕλη; per haec, to πνεῦμα; and de his, to the μορφαί, of which the οὐσία of all material things consists. This seems to be the best place that can be found for the words *mundana ut ita dixerim*, which occur as a detached fragment in 18 a. It is probably the translator who, in the words *ut ita dixerim*, apologizes for here using the term *mundana*, which, as employed by him, has the two different meanings κοσμικά and ὑλικά.

In the MSS., and in previous editions, *omnia* has been detached from this sentence, and taken as the first word of the following sentence, which is assigned to Asclepius.

33 a. inane nec esse aliquid nec esse potuisse. The Pythagoreans (Ar. *Phys.* 4. 6, 213 b 22 : Archytas, as reported by Eudemus, Mullach *Fr. ph. Gr.* II. 117 b), Democritus, and Epicurus asserted the existence of void; Plato (*Tim.* 79 b) and Aristotle (*Phys.* 4) denied it. The Stoics denied the existence of void within the Kosmos, but asserted the existence of infinite void outside the Kosmos. The doctrine of Chrysippus on τόπος and κενόν is reported by Arius Didymus, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 460. For the Stoic view concerning void, see also Aetius, Diels *ib.* p. 316; Diog. Laert. 7. 140; Cleomedes 1. 2–8 (from Posidonius).² The Hermetist, when

¹ νοῦ cannot be right; if we retain it, we get the statement that νοῦς permeates some things as νοῦς, and other things, as something else than νοῦς. For πνεῦματος, cf. Alex. Aphrod. *De mixtionē* p. 223 Bruns: (the Stoics say) τὸ πᾶν ἠνώσθαι τε καὶ συνέχεσθαι, πνεύματος τινος διὰ παντὸς διήκοντος αὐτοῦ.

² Zeller, *Eclectics*, Eng. tr. 1883, p. 60, says that 'Posidonius, deviating from his predecessors (of the Stoic school), would only allow so much space external to the world, as would be necessary for the world's ἐκπύρωσις'. Schmekel, *Phil. der mittleren Stoa*, p. 240, expresses the same opinion; according to Posidonius, he says, 'der Raum . . . ist nicht unendlich, sondern nur so gross als die Raumerfüllung es mit sich bringt; doch ist seine Ausdehnung fast unendlich'. (What is meant by 'almost infinite'?) 'Während der Zeit der Weltbildung ist ein Teil desselben ausserhalb der Welt vollkommen leer.' This view of Posidonius's doctrine is based on Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 338 : οἱ Στωικοὶ εἶναι κενόν, εἰς ὃ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν ἀναλύεται ὁ κόσμος, ἀπειρος ἄν' (ἀπειρον ὄν Heeren). —Ποσειδώνιος ἐφῆσε τὸ ἐκτὸς

he wrote this chapter, probably had in view the Stoic doctrine of void as expounded by Posidonius. He agrees with the Stoics in denying the existence of void within the Kosmos; and it is the Stoic assertion of the existence of infinite void outside the Kosmos that suggests to him the question which he answers in his own way below, 'nec istud enim quod dicitur extra mundum' &c.

Cf. *Corp.* II. 10: οὐδὲ ἐν τῶν ὄντων ἐστὶ κενόν, κ.τ.λ. The argument which follows in that document closely resembles that of *Ascl.* III. 33 a and 33 c.

Omnia enim mundi sunt membra plenissima . . . corporibus. The *mundi membra* (τὰ τοῦ κόσμου μόρια) are the four elements, earth, water, air, and fire, which are thought of as disposed in four distinct strata. Each of these four strata is wholly filled with bodies; and so the Kosmos as a whole is full. Cf. *Corp.* II. 2: στιβαρὸς (ὁ

τοῦ κόσμου οὐκ ἄπειρον, ἀλλ' ὅσον αὐτάρκες εἰς διάλυσιν. But this statement is surely a blunder of Aetius (or of some one by whom his text has been transmitted), caused by a misunderstanding of the passage of Posidonius which is reproduced in Cleomedes I. 2-8 (ed. Ziegler, 1891). Cleomedes, at the point where he speaks of the *ecpyrosis*, is occupied in proving that κενόν exists, and not in ascertaining its extent. He says that those who accept the *ecpyrosis* (as Posidonius did) must admit that κενόν exists outside our present Kosmos, because at the *ecpyrosis* the Kosmos will be vaporized, and will consequently expand 'to more than ten thousand times its present extent', and there must be room for its expansion; but he then goes on to say that even if you deny the *ecpyrosis* (as Boethus and Panaetius did), you must still admit the existence of κενόν outside the Kosmos for another reason, which he proceeds to give. And he afterwards asserts emphatically and repeatedly that this κενόν is ἀπειρον. E. g. ὅτι 'δὲ' (lege δὴ) ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου κενόν εἶναι ἀναγκαῖον, γινώσκον διὰ τῶν προαποδειχθέντων' ὅτι δὲ τοῦτο ἀπὸ παντὸς μέρους αὐτοῦ εἰς ἄπειρον διήκειν ἀναγκαϊότατόν ἐστι, διὰ τούτων ἂν καταμάθοιμεν. . . ἀφ' ὧν γινώσκον ὡς οὐκ ἐνδέχεται πού περατοῦσθαι τὸ ἔξω κενόν· ἀπειρον ἄρα ἐστίν. . . ἀναγκαῖον τοίνυν ὁμολογεῖν ἡμᾶς, ἀπειρον εἶναι τὸ ἔξω τοῦ κόσμου κενόν.

We are told in the note at the end of Cleomedes' treatise that its contents 'are not the opinions of the writer himself, but have been collected from various writings, old and recent; most of what is said in it is taken from Posidonius'. Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 21, speaks of Posidonius, 'unde Cleomedis libellus . . . paene totus excerptus est'; and Schmekel (p. 189) says that 'Cleomedes dies (viz. the passage about the *ecpyrosis*) aus Posidonius abschreibt'. But if Cleomedes is here reproducing Posidonius, then Posidonius held precisely the doctrine which Aetius, in the words quoted above, attributes to the Stoics in general, viz. 'that there is a void (outside the Kosmos), into which the Kosmos expands at the *ecpyrosis*, and that this void is infinite'.

Schmekel himself, *ib.* p. 188 n. 2, admits this by implication; for he there says 'Mit der periodischen Auflösung der Welt in Feuer hängt bei den Stoikern die Annahme eines unendlichen leeren Raumes ausserhalb des Kosmos notwendig zusammen'. Hirzel, *Unters. zu Cic.* I. 225 ff. (referred to by Zeller and Diels) considers Aetius's statement (that the κενόν of Posidonius was οὐκ ἄπειρον) to be an error. I have not read Hirzel's argument; but I have little doubt that he is right in his conclusion.

Cleomedes I. 4 *fin.*, where he is proving that κενόν does not exist *within* the Kosmos, says οὔτε, μὴ ὑφ' ἐνὸς τόπου συνεχόμενου (τοῦ κόσμου), καὶ τοῦ πνεύματος μὴ δι' ἔλου ὄντος συμφυοῦς, οἶόν τ' ἂν ἦν ἡμῖν ὄραν ἢ ἀκοεῖν. (For τόπου read τόνου.)

κόσμος)· πεπλήρωται γὰρ ἄλλων σωμάτων μεγάλων πολλῶν, μᾶλλον δὲ πάντων ὅσα ἔστι σωμάτων.

validitate et tenuitate diversa. Air, for instance, is *tenuis* in comparison with water, and water in comparison with earth. To an atomist, *validitas* and *tenuitas* ('density' and 'rarity') would signify the presence of smaller and larger intervals of void between the particles of which the body is composed. But the writer, since he denies the existence of void, must understand *tenuitas* in a sense compatible with continuity of substance; and he probably means by it 'readiness to yield to pressure'.

[**Sicuti enim**] is followed by no apodosis, and seems to have been inserted through some misunderstanding.

istud . . . quod dicitur extra mundum, si tamen est aliquid. The writer cannot resist the tendency to speak to τὰ νοητά in terms of spatial relation; he talks of them (as does Plato in the myth of the *Phaedrus* and elsewhere) as if they were located in the region beyond the outermost sphere of the visible and corporeal Kosmos. But he is aware, or half aware, that this is not true in the literal sense of the words; and he consequently puts in the saving clause 'si tamen est aliquid'. Cf. ch. 27 b: 'deus, supra verticem summi caeli consistens' &c. The 'fullness' of which he is thinking is the πλήρωμα of the δυνάμεις of God; and he doubtless knows that God is not situated in a particular portion of space (see 34 b); yet he cannot help imagining that it is so. We have not yet left off using the word 'heaven' with a similar implication. Even Plotinus, strongly as he insists that the νοητά are not ἐν τόπῳ, cannot avoid the use of spatial terms (ἄνω, ἐκεῖ, &c.) with reference to them; cf. Plot. 4. 3. 17, εἰ γὰρ οὐρανὸς ἐν τῷ αἰσθητῷ τόπῳ ἀμείνων, εἷη ἂν προσεχῆς τῶν νοητῶν τοῖς ἐσχάτοις. For *si tamen est aliquid*, compare *Corp.* XI. ii. 19: τὰ ἐκτός, εἰ γέ τι ἐκτός τοῦ κόσμου. *Corp.* IV. 5: τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ, καὶ εἰ τί ἐστιν ὑπὲρ οὐρανόν. The topic may have been suggested to the writer by the physical question discussed by Posidonius; but the point of view of the Hermetist, who believes that τὰ νοητά are ἀσώματα, though he may fail at times to realize all that is implied in his belief, is different from that of the Stoics, who held that all things real, God not excepted, are corporeal.

divinitati suae: contrasted with *naturae suae et qualitati* below. The θεότης of the abode of God is opposed to the ὑλότης of the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος. *Naturae suae et qualitati convenientium* is equivalent to αἰσθητῶν, as *divinitati suae similitum* is equivalent to νοητῶν.

corporum et animalium. The mention of ζῶα, as a class of things distinct from σώματα, seems to be out of place here. Possibly, however, the Greek was σωμάτων πλήρης ἐστὶ . . . καὶ τούτων ζῶῶν ἐχόντων, or something of the sort; 'bodies,—yes, and living bodies.' In the view of the writer, all things in the universe are alive, in higher or lower degree; 'spiritu inplet omnia.'

[**aut quod acie sumus obtunsi**]. Distance makes a thing look small, by the law of perspective; but why should the dimness of our sight make a thing look small? It may prevent us from seeing the thing at all; but it cannot alter the apparent size of the thing, as long as the thing is visible to us. These words then are out of place; their writer must have intended them to stand after *propter nimiam brevitatem aut tenuitatem*, and to be followed by *non videmus*. But if placed in that position, they impair the concinnity of the passage; it therefore seems probable that they were added by a later hand.

propter nimiam brevitatem (aut tenuitatem non videmus). A mention of *tenuitas* is clearly needed here; cf. above, *minora vero aut tenuiora aut vix videri aut omnino non possunt*. The instance of air, of which the writer speaks below, is an instance of *tenuitas*, and not of *brevitas*.

The things with which the Kosmos are filled are all visible ἀπλῶς, i. e. corporeal; but some of them are invisible ἡμίην. Things which are invisible in the latter sense only must be distinguished from those which are truly or absolutely ἀόρατα, viz. on the one hand τὰ νοητά, and on the other hand ἕλη ἄμορφος (see ch. 17 b).

33 b. [**Dico nunc daemonas . . . commotio.**] This sentence is irrelevant to the discussion of void, and must be excised. Assuming that the writer held, as most Platonists did, that daemons are not bodiless, but have bodies composed of air or πνεῦμα, he might possibly have mentioned them as an instance of things corporeal and yet invisible to us; but if this had been his meaning, he would not have introduced his instance with the words *dico nunc*, which imply that certain kinds of daemonic beings are the sole or chief subject of discussion. See chs. 28, 29 a, with which I take this passage to be connected.

33 c. ut inane ab igni, ab aqua. Cf. Cic. *De fato* II. 24 (from Carneades): 'quum vas inane dicimus, non ita loquimur ut physici, quibus inane esse nihil placet: sed ita ut, verbi causa, sine aqua, sine vino, sine oleo vas esse dicamus.'

⟨⟨spiritu tamen et aere,⟩⟩ . . . **vacuum esse non possit.** Accord-

ing to the Stoics, πνεῦμα permeates all things, and is continuous throughout the Kosmos. Cf. *Corp.* II. 11: ταῦτα οὖν, ἃ σὺ φησὶ εἶναι κενά, κ.τ.λ. *Timaeus Locr.* 5: πῦρ μὲν ὦν διὰ τὰν λεπτομερίαν διὰ πάντων ἦκεν, ἀήρ δὲ διὰ τῶν ἄλλων ἕξω πυρός, ὕδωρ δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς. ἅπαντα δ' ὦν πλήρη ἐντί, οὐδὲν κενὸν ἀπολείποντα.

quamvis sit breve [vel magnum]. The words *vel magnum* must have been added by some one who misunderstood the meaning. There is some point in saying that not even the smallest portion of space can be empty; but there is no point in saying that no portion of space, however small *or large*, can be empty.

34 a. *Similiter vero de loco dicendum est.* Cf. *Ascl.* II. 15, where a different and inconsistent account of space is given. According to Cleomedes I. 4, κενόν is τὸ οἶόν τε δέξασθαι σῶμα, and τόπος is κενὸν ὑπὸ σώματος κατεχόμενον καὶ πληρούμενον.

18 b. (. . .) *Mundus itaque nutrit corpora, animas spiritus.* In this paragraph the writer passes on from the *principalia mundanorum* to νοῦς. Compare *Ascl.* I. 6 b as emended, where a like transition is made in very similar language: 'Alimenta autem sunt bina animae et corporis. . . Anima ignis et aeris . . . agitatione nutritur: corpora ex aqua et terra . . . aucescunt. [Spiritus . . . cuncta vivificat.] Sensus (νοῦς) . . . de animalibus cunctis humanos tantum sensus ad divinae rationis intellegentiam . . . sustollit.'

A connecting passage has probably been lost before *mundus itaque* &c.; but one or two sentences would be enough to fill the gap.

What is here meant by *mundus*? According to the parallel passage in *Ascl.* I, it ought to mean *aqua et terra*, the two *inferiora mundi elementa* (in contrast to fire and air, or to πνεῦμα, which is a mixture of fire and air). We must suppose either that the author of the Greek wrote ἕλη, and meant by it 'gross matter', i. e. earth and water (a thing different from the ἄποιος ἕλη spoken of in 17 a and 17 b); or else, that *mundus* has been wrongly substituted for some other term denoting earth and water.

In the Stoic system, from which the term πνεῦμα is borrowed, the statement *animas nutrit spiritus* (πνεῦμα ψυχᾶς τρέφει) would be strictly correct; for the ψυχή of the Stoics is corporeal, and is merely a special modification of the corporeal πνεῦμα. The Hermetist has taken over the statement unaltered, though according to his view the ψυχή, being incorporeal, cannot be literally 'fed' by the corporeal πνεῦμα. His meaning would be more exactly expressed

by the phrase used elsewhere (e. g. *Corp.* X. 13), ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι (ἰσχυρίζεται). The corporeal πνεῦμα brings the incorporeal ψυχὴ with it into the organism into which it enters; and during the life of the organism the supply of πνεῦμα is maintained by breathing.

But it is only the lower and earthly part of the soul,—i. e. such 'soul' or life as men and beasts possess in common,—that is thus connected with πνεῦμα. The νοῦς, of which Hermes here proceeds to speak, has no corporeal vehicle, but comes direct from God. In the following sentence, where νοῦς is called a *donum caeleste*, οὐράνιον must be understood in a metaphorical sense, as a synonym for θεῖον. The νοῦς is not, like *pneuma*, a gaseous substance which streams down from the higher levels of the Kosmos; nor is it conveyed from God to man by any such material substance; it is wholly incorporeal.

Sensus = νοῦς: see *Ascl.* I. 6 b, *Ascl.* III. 32 b, and *Ascl.* 41 b.

neque enim omnes, sed pauci. Here νοῦς signifies a divine illumination which is not granted to all men, but to the elect alone. Cf. *Corp.* I. 22 and *Corp.* IV. 3; Pl. *Tim.* 51 E. In ch. 32 b, the writer speaks of three different grades of νοῦς; and that which he here calls νοῦς without qualification is there distinguished from the two lower grades, and called ὁ θεῖος νοῦς. See *Ascl.* I. 7 a, 'non omnes . . . intellegentiam veram adepti sunt', where it is implied that all men have νοῦς of some sort, but that there is a *sensus* (νοῦς) *divinior* to which only a few among men attain. Similarly, in *Corp.* IX. 5, we are told that all men have νόησις, οὐ πᾶς δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀπολαύει τῆς νοήσεως' and that man's νοῦς gives birth to bad thoughts as well as good thoughts. Philo habitually uses the word νοῦς in the wider sense; e. g. *Leg. alleg.* I. 12. 32: ὁ δὲ νοῦς οὗτος γεώδης ἐστὶ τῷ ὄντι καὶ φθαρτός, εἰ μὴ ὁ θεὸς ἐμπνεύσειεν αὐτῷ δύναμιν ἀληθινῆς ζωῆς. *Ib.* 2. 16. 64, there is a νοῦς ἄλογος. *Ib.* 3. 9. 29: the good man flees from his ἴδιος νοῦς to God, who is ὁ τῶν ὄλων νοῦς' and the ἴδιος νοῦς is γενητὸς καὶ θνητός.

terrae interiectu . . . eius privatur lumine. The words *et lunae*, which follow *terrae* in most of the MSS., must have been inserted by some one who overlooked the significance of *interveniente nocte*, and supposed that the writer was speaking of eclipses. But eclipses of the sun do not take place at night. Cf. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 49: 'ipsa enim umbra terrae soli officiens (officientis *conj.* Gesner) noctem efficit.'

natura, 'a thing'. The MSS. give *materia*; but the writer

would not apply the word *ἄλη*, even in a metaphorical sense, to an incorporeal thing. Another instance of confusion between the words *natura* and *materia* occurs in *Ascl.* II. 14 b.

caliginum erroribus might possibly mean 'through wanderings caused by darkness'; but it is more probably an inaccurate translation of a Greek phrase meaning 'by the darkness of error'.

sensum (sensus MSS.) deorum animam dixerunt. Here again *sensus* stands for *νοῦς*. Cf. *Corp.* XII. i. 8: *νοῦν, ἄρχοντα πάντων, καὶ ψυχὴν ὄντα τοῦ θεοῦ*; and *ib.* 9: *ὁ νοῦς, ἡ τοῦ θεοῦ ψυχὴ*. (So the MSS.; but *ψυχὴ θεῶν* is different from *ψυχὴ τοῦ θεοῦ*, and that passage is probably corrupt.) Philo *De opif. mundi* 24. 73: *τὰ δ' αὖ μόνης κεκοινωνηκεν ἀρετῆς, ἀμέτοχα πάσης ὄντα κακίας, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστéρες· οὗτοι γὰρ ζῶα τε εἶναι λέγονται καὶ ζῶα νοερά, μᾶλλον δὲ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἕκαστος, ὅλος δὲ ὅλων σπουδαῖος, καὶ παντὸς ἀνεπίδεκτος κακοῦ.* (The *νοῦς* of which Philo here speaks is the *sensus diviniior*, and not the lower sort of *νοῦς* which is common to all mankind.) Sen. *Nat. quaest.* I, *prolog.* 14: 'Quid ergo interest inter naturam dei et nostram? Nostri melior pars animus est, in illo nulla pars extra animum est; totus est ratio.'

The souls of beasts and unilluminated men are devoid of (*ὁ θεῖος*) *νοῦς*; the soul of the illuminated man is a mixture of that lower soul with *νοῦς*; the souls of the *νοητοὶ θεοί* consist wholly of *νοῦς*, unmixed with anything lower. In *Corp.* X. 19 a, we are told that the soul of the pious or illuminated man, when released from the body, rides itself of its lower part, and becomes pure *νοῦς*. In *Ascl.* I (except in the passage on transmigration into the bodies of beasts, 12 a), it seems to be implied that the *νοῦς* is the only part of man which is immortal; whence it might be inferred (though the writer does not himself draw this inference) that every human soul which survives the death of the body 'becomes pure *νοῦς*'.

nec eorum dico omnium. The *di terreni*, of whom the writer speaks in ch. 37 f., are not exempt from *πάθη* ('*terrenis etenim diis . . . facile est irasci*' &c.); consequently, their souls cannot consist of *νοῦς* alone.

But what of the *di caelestes*? It might be inferred from what is said about them elsewhere in *Ascl.* III that their souls, though incorporated in visible bodies, consist of *νοῦς* and nothing else; yet in this passage it seems to be implied that this can be said of *νοητοὶ θεοί* only; for the *magni et principales di* here spoken of must be the *νοητοὶ θεοί*.

19 a. [vel rerum capita vel initia primordiorum]. These words are out of place here; they are perhaps an alternative for *principalia et antiquiora et quasi capita vel initia omnium* in ch. 17 c.

Magna tibi pando, et divina nudo mysteria. Hermes here enters on the main subject of his discourse. The solemn introduction marks the transition to a more exalted theme. Hitherto he has been speaking of *mundana*, and his mentions of God in chs. 16 b and 17 a were merely incidental; he is now about to speak of *divina*,—that is, to expound the nature of the gods, and explain how they ought to be worshipped.

The word *mysteria*, as here used, contains no suggestion that a theurgic or sacramental operation is about to take place; it merely signifies a doctrine which is holy, and has hitherto been known to few. The word in itself does not necessarily imply that the hearer is under any obligation to keep the doctrine secret from others; for it was often used (as by Paul, for instance,) when there was no intention of secrecy, or desire for secrecy. But in some of the *Hermetica* (e. g. *Corp.* XIII) the disciple is expressly forbidden to reveal to others what he has heard; it is therefore *possible* that the writer of *Ascl.* III here intended the word *mysteria* to suggest such a prohibition. See note on *Ascl.* 1 b: 'tractatum (hunc) . . . inreligiosae mentis est multorum conscientia publicare.'

Note the word *tibi*; Hermes is revealing these 'mysteries' to a single hearer only. I have accordingly altered *scitote* into *scito* below.

The first part of the *ratio divinatorum*,—i. e. that which (assuming my conjectural rearrangement of the text to be right) is contained in chs. 18 b, 19 a, <<34 b>>, 19 b, <<27 c, b>>, 19 c, <<34 c>>, <<17 b>>, <<35 and 36>>,—consists of, or includes, an exposition of the Platonic doctrine of *νοητά*, and their relation to *αἰσθητά*. The writer warns us, through the mouth of Hermes, that his teaching on this subject will not be found easy to understand; and for the modern reader, difficulties of a different order have been added. We have to deal with a text which has been cut to pieces, and shuffled like a pack of cards. I have tried to place the scattered passages in such an order that they will yield a more or less continuous sense; but I can hardly hope that I have been lucky enough to hit on the right place for every fragment. However, some points at least in the rearrangement seem certain; for instance, no one, I think, to whom it has once been suggested, will doubt that 27 c belongs to the list of *οὐράρχαι*, and ought to stand immediately after 19 b.

Deorum . . . pars intellegibilis, alia vero sensibilis. The *αἰσθητοὶ θεοί* are primarily the Kosmos and the heavenly bodies. But it would be possible to apply the term also to the 'man-made gods' spoken of in ch. 37 ff., i. e. the gods embodied in statues and worshipped in the temples.

magis enim ipsos sentimus quam eos quos visibles nuncupamus. Does *sentimus* here stand for *αἰσθανόμεθα*, or for *θεωροῦμεν*? Strictly speaking, the *νοητοὶ θεοί* are *νόῳ* or *λόγῳ θεωρητοί*; but it is possible that the writer here said, by way of an intentional paradox, that they are in reality even more fully *αἰσθητοί* than are the gods commonly called *αἰσθητοί* or *ὄρατοί*.

It may be doubted whether the meaning is that we see these gods with our bodily eyes, as manifested in their visible works, or that we see them with the 'eye of the mind', by intellectual intuition. For the former thought, cf. *Corp.* V. 2 and 5, and *Corp.* XI. ii. 22 a. 'Onatas the Pythagorean' (date unknown; perhaps 50 B. C.—A. D. 50?) in Stob. I. I. 39, p. 48 W.: *ὁ μὲν ὦν θεὸς αὐτὸς οὔτε ὄρατος οὔτε αἰσθητός, ἀλλὰ λόγῳ μόνον καὶ νόῳ θεωρατός· τὰ δ' ἔργα αὐτῶ καὶ τὰ πράξεις* (καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν σύμπαντα κόσμον ἐπιστροφάσιες) *ἐναργέες τε καὶ αἰσθηταί ἐντι πάντεσσιν ἀνθρώποις.* The two thoughts occur together in Philo *Leg. alleg.* 3. 32. 99 f., Cohn I, p. 135: *οἱ δὲ οὕτως ἐπιλογιζόμενοι διὰ σκιᾶς τὸν θεὸν καταλαμβάνουσι, διὰ τῶν ἔργων τὸν τεχνίτην κατανοοῦντες. ἔστι δέ τις τελεώτερος καὶ μᾶλλον κεκαθαρμένος νοῦς, τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια μνηθεῖς, ὅστις οὐκ ἀπὸ τῶν γεγονότων τὸ αἴτιον γνωρίζει, ὡς ἂν ἀπὸ σκιᾶς τὸ μένον, ἀλλ' ὑπερκύψας τὸ γενητόν, ἐμφασιν ἐναργῆ τοῦ ἀγενήτου λαμβάνει.* Of which of these two ways of 'seeing' the gods is the writer of *Ascl.* III here thinking? As he says that we can see them *more* clearly than we see sensible things, he probably means the second and higher of Philo's two ways of apprehending God.

ratio divinatorum (ratio eoque diviniore MSS.). Cf. *Ascl.* I. 3 b: 'divinitatis etenim ratio, divina sensus intentione noscenda' &c. **suique se fontis liquoribus miscabit.** The 'source' of the teaching is God, or the divine *νοῦς*, by whom or which the teacher is possessed or inspired.

«**Haec ergo ipsa (divinatorum), ut dicis, (ratio) quae est, o Trismegiste?**» This misplaced fragment, one of the three which have been put together in ch. 18 a, is evidently a question addressed to Hermes; and such a question is appropriate here. The insertion of *ratio* is suggested by comparison with the subsequent question in ch. 20 a: 'Alia haec iterum ratio quae est, o Trismegiste?' If I have

placed the fragment rightly, the *ratio* mentioned in it must be the *ratio divinatorum* of which Hermes has just spoken; and if we insert *divinatorum*, the words *ut dicis* become intelligible.

34 b. [**His ergo sic se habentibus**]. I assume these words to have been added by a reviser, in order to give a superficial appearance of connexion with ch. 34 a, after the passage had been shifted from its original position.

scito[te] intellegibilem mundum . . . esse incorporalem &c. Hermes begins his 'revelation of divine mysteries' by speaking of the *νοητοὶ θεοί* (ch. 19 a); and we find him speaking of them in ch. 19 b also, in which he explains how the world is administered by a hierarchy of *νοητοὶ θεοί*, to whom the several orders of *αἰσθητοὶ θεοί* are subject. But the connexion between 19 a and 19 b is obscured by the loss of an intermediate passage.

The writer's exposition of the doctrine of *νοητοὶ θεοί* would naturally be preceded by some preliminary explanation of *νοητά* in general, or of the *νοητὸς κόσμος*, in which all *νοητά* are included, and of which the *νοητοὶ θεοί* are parts. Now in ch. 34 b, the *νοητὸς κόσμος* is spoken of, and spoken of in such a manner as to make it evident that, if the passage was in any way connected with a longer and fuller discussion of *νοητά*, it must have stood at the *beginning* of that discussion. An introductory paragraph such as ch. 34 b, in which no previous knowledge of the subject is assumed, is appropriate at the point where *νοητά* are first spoken of, but would be out of place later on in the dialogue, after Hermes has long been talking about them. I have therefore transposed ch. 34 b, and placed it in the gap between 19 a and 19 b. If it stood there, it must have immediately followed the question asked by Asclepius at the end of 19 a; but there still remains a lacuna between the end of 34 b and the beginning of 19 b.

The 'mystery', of which Hermes has just said that an intense effort of thought is needed to understand it, is in fact the doctrine of *νοητά*,—that is, the Platonic 'theory of ideas' (*νοητὰ εἶδη*). The reality and priority of the incorporeal is a fundamental principle of Platonism, and is maintained by the Hermetists in general, at least to the extent of holding God and *νοῦς* to be incorporeal; (concerning *ψυχή* as distinguished from *νοῦς*,—the lower *ψυχή*,—there is some wavering;) but the author of *Ascl.* III differs from some of the other Hermetic writers in teaching that principle in the special form of the Platonic theory of ideas; and he expounds this theory in

the first part of his *ratio divinatorum*. The writer of *Ascl. I*, on the other hand, says nothing about 'ideas' in the Platonic sense;¹ and he would probably have regarded the study of so abstruse a subject as an instance of that *importuna curiositas* by which philosophy is too often sullied (*Ascl. I. 14 a*).

The Platonist Atticus (c. A. D. 160-180: Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 15. 13. 2 ff.: Mullach *Fr. ph. Gr.* III, p. 202) speaks of the theory of ideas in a tone resembling that of our Hermetist: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄκρον τε καὶ ἔσχατον τῶν Πλάτωνος φιλοσοφημάτων ἐστὶ τὸ περὶ τὴν νοητὴν ταύτην καὶ ἀίδιον οὐσίαν, τὴν τῶν ἰδεῶν. ἔνθα δὲ πόνος τε καὶ ἀγὼν ἔσχατος τῇ ψυχῇ προκίεται. ὁ μὲν γὰρ μετασχὼν καὶ ἐφικόμενος αὐτῆς πάντως εὐδαίμων· ὁ δὲ ἀπολειφθεὶς καὶ ἀδυνατήσας θεωρὸς γενέσθαι πάντως ἄμοιρος εὐδαιμονίας καταλείπεται. . . ταῦτα γὰρ ἐστὶν οἷς μάλιστα (ὁ Πλάτων) τῶν ἄλλων ὑπερέχει. νοήσας γὰρ² (τὸν) θεὸν προ(ε)στῶτα τῶν ἀπάντων (ὡς) πατέρα³ καὶ δημιουργὸν [καὶ δεσπότην καὶ κηδεμόνα],⁴ καὶ γνωρίζων ἐκ τῶν ἔργων τὸν τεχνίτην πρότερον νοῆσαι τοῦτο ὃ μέλλει δημιουργήσει, εἴθ' οὕτω [[τῷ νοηθέντι]] κατόπι ἐπὶ τῶν πραγμάτων προσάγειν τὴν («τῷ νοηθέντι») ὁμοιότητα, (συνελογίσαστο)⁵ τ(ὸν) αὐτὸν δὴ (τρόπον)⁷ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ νοήματα πρεσβύτερα (εἶναι)⁸ τῶν πραγμάτων. (καὶ ταῦτά φησιν εἶναι)⁹ τὰ τῶν γινομένων¹⁰ παραδείγματα, ἀσώματα (ὄντα)¹¹ καὶ νοητά, κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ ὡσαύτως ἔχοντα αἰεὶ, μάλιστα μὲν καὶ πρώτως αὐτὰ ὄντα, παρὰ τὰ δὲ καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις τοῦ εἶναι τοιαῦτα ἕκαστα οἶά περ ἐστὶ κατὰ τὴν πρὸς αὐτὰ ὁμοιότητα. (ταῦτα δὲ)¹² συνιδῶν ὁ Πλάτων ὄντα οὐ ῥᾶστα ὀφθῆναι, οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ λόγῳ σαφῶς δηλωθῆναι δυνάμενα,¹³ αὐτὸς

¹ In *Ascl. I. 3 c-4*, 'generic forms' are spoken of, but not νοητὰ εἶδη in the distinctively Platonic meaning of that term.

² Dindorf and Mullach give the whole passage from νοήσας γὰρ to βιοτῆ παραγίνεται as one long sentence, so clumsily constructed that it cannot possibly be what Atticus wrote. I have divided it into three sentences, and made such alterations as are needed to get a satisfactory meaning.

³ τὸν θεὸν προσετώτα τῶν ἀπάντων ὡς πατέρα *scripsi*: θεὸν πρὸς αὐτὰ τῶν ἀπάντων πατέρα Dindorf: θεὸν αὐτός, ὡς τῶν ἀπάντων πατέρα Mullach.

⁴ καὶ δεσπότην καὶ κηδεμόνα *seclusi*. It is on the word δημιουργὸν that the argument is based; the divine 'craftsman' works in the same way as a human τεχνίτης, first planning or designing in thought the thing which he is about to make, and then making the thing in accordance with the plan which is already present in his mind. The word πατέρα is irrelevant; but Atticus may have taken it over from the *Timaeus* along with δημιουργόν.

⁵ τῷ νοηθέντι *huc transposui*.

⁶ συνελογίσαστο *addidi*.

⁷ τὸν αὐτὸν δὴ τρόπον *scripsi*: ταῦτον δὲ MSS.: ταῦτον δὲ τὸν τρόπον Mullach.

⁸ εἶναι *addidi*.

⁹ καὶ ταῦτά φησιν εἶναι *addidi*.

¹⁰ γινομένων *scripsi*: γενομένων *edd*.

¹¹ ὄντα *addidi*.

¹² ταῦτα δὲ *addidi*.

¹³ A reminiscence of Pl. *Tim.* 28 c: τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν. Cf. Herm. *ap. Stob. Exc. I.*

ὡς οἶόν τε ἦν ὑπὲρ αὐτῶν εἰπεῖν καὶ φρονήσαι καὶ παρασκευάσαι τοὺς μέλλοντας ἐπακολουθήσειν πραγματευσάμενος [ταῦτα],¹ καὶ τὴν σύμψασαν αὐτοῦ φιλοσοφίαν εἰς τοῦτο συνταξάμενος, περὶ ταῦτα φησι καὶ τὴν τούτων νόησιν τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι, καὶ τὴν ἐπιστήμην δι' ἧς τὸ ἀνθρώπινον τέλος καὶ ἡ μακαριστὴ βιωτὴ παραγίνεται. Atticus then considered that the theory of ideas is indispensable for attainment to happiness, but is difficult to understand; and the writer of *Ascl.* III seems to be of the same opinion.

Compare the opening words of Porphyry's Ἐπιτομή πρὸς τὰ νοητά: — Πᾶν μὲν σῶμα ἐν τόπῳ, οὐδὲν δὲ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσώματων ἢ τι τοιοῦτον ἐν τόπῳ. τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσώματα, αὐτῷ ᾧ κρείττονα παντός ἐστι σώματος καὶ τόπου, πανταχῇ ἐστίν, οὐ διαστατῶς, ἀλλ' ἀμερῶς.

As to the νοητὸς κόσμος, cf. *Timaeus Locr.* (about A. D. 150?), Mullach *Fr. ph. Gr.* II, p. 39: τέλειος δ' αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αἰσθητὰ ἐστίν (ὁ αἰσθητὸς κόσμος), ὅτι καὶ τὸ παράδειγμα τῆνῳ αὐτῷ, περιέχον πάντα τὰ νοατὰ ζῶα ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδὲν ἐκτὸς ἀπέλιπεν ἄλλο, ὅρος ὢν νοατῶν παντελής, ὡς οὐδὲ ὁ κόσμος αἰσθητῶν. Among these νοητὰ ζῶα must be included the νοητοὶ θεοὶ of whom the Hermetist speaks. According to the view which prevailed among the later Platonists, all *ιδέαι* exist in God's thought, and are constituted by God's thinking; (see e. g. Philo *Opif. Mundi* 4. 19; and in Atticus, quoted above, the *ιδέαι* are called τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ νοήματα;) and it is to be presumed that the νοητοὶ θεοὶ are thus constituted. But they are none the less to be regarded as distinct and substantively existent persons; for existence in God's thought is equivalent to reality or substantiality.

⟨⟨nisi ei aut longitudinis . . . addideris . . . signa⟩⟩. These words have nothing to do with the paragraph about τόπος (34 a), to which they are attached in the MSS.; and it seems probable that they belonged to the discussion of τὸ ἀσώματον in which I have placed them. But *nisi* does not give a satisfactory connexion; perhaps some intervening words have been lost.

19 b, 27 c. *Sunt ergo omnium* &c. A list of οὐσιάρχα. As this passage deals with the higher gods by whom the material universe is governed, the most suitable position for it might seem to be between the account of the *deus summus* (26 b–32 b) and the account of *di terreni* (37–38 b); and I was at first inclined to put it there. But against this must be set the fact that in ch. ⟨⟨35⟩⟩, which there is reason to place in the earlier part of the *libellus*, we find the phrase *ille Omniformis quem diximus deus*, which appears to be

¹ ταῦτα seclusi.

a reference to 19 b,¹ and therefore to imply that 19 b has preceded; and I have accordingly left 19 b in its traditional position, and placed 27 c next after it. The occurrence of such a passage at this point can be justified; for after stating in general terms the relation between the *νοητὸς κόσμος* and the *αἰσθητὸς κόσμος*, the writer may very well have gone on to describe more precisely the system of administration by which the government of the latter is carried on by *νοητοὶ θεοί*, i. e. by members of the former; and if we retain it here, 19 c follows on appropriately.

In this passage (19 b and 27 c) the government of the material universe is described as follows. Each region or stratum of the material world is presided over by a *νοητὸς θεός*, to whom the term *οὐσιάρχης* is applied. Each *οὐσιάρχης* governs the *αἰσθητοὶ θεοί* who occupy the region over which he presides; and the *αἰσθητοὶ θεοί*, under the direction of their respective *οὐσιάρχαι*, carry on all the processes of the material universe, working 'one through another'. This phrase seems to mean that the *αἰσθητοὶ θεοί* of each stratum operate immediately on those of the stratum next below them, and thus ultimately on all that lies below; the planets, for instance, radiate light into the air, and the air transmits it to the earth.

The scheme may be tabulated thus:—

<i>Region.</i>	<i>αἰσθητοὶ θεοί.</i>	<i>οὐσιάρχης (νοητὸς θεός).</i>
1. Outermost sphere	Οὐρανός	Zeus (Hypatos?)
2. Sphere of the fixed stars	The 36 Decani	Pantomorphos
3. The 7 planetary spheres	(The 7 planets)	Heimarmene
4. The atmosphere	?	Zeus (Neatos?)
5. Earth and sea	?	Zeus Chthonios

The *αἰσθητοὶ θεοί* are not expressly named, except in the case of the first and second regions; and it may be doubted what names the writer would have assigned to those of regions 4 and 5. Mother Earth at least was recognized as a 'visible deity' by most of the nations known to the Hermetist;² is it to be inferred that Air and Sea also are *αἰσθητοὶ θεοί*? Or are the 'visible gods' of

¹ The reference back to 19 b might however be got rid of by altering *diximus* into *dicimus*; that passage therefore does not prove with absolute certainty that 19 b stood earlier in the *libellus* than <<35>.

² Cf. Plut. *Fac. in orbe lunae* 21. 14, 935 B: τὸ δὲ γῆς ὄνομα παντί που φίλον Ἑλληνι καὶ τίμονι, καὶ πατρῶον ἡμῖν ὡσπερ ἄλλον τινὰ θεὸν σέβεισθαι.

the grosser elements rather the gods of the temple-cults, embodied in statues,—the *di terreni* of ch. 38 b? The atmosphere was usually assigned to the daemons as their special abode; but daemons are not *αἰσθητοί* under normal conditions.

The functions of the several 'Departmental Rulers' (*οὐσιάρχαι*) are described as follows.

(1) The Ruler of the outermost sphere 'bestows life on all things', employing the visible *οὐρανός* as his agent or instrument. Using the terms of the theory of forms, as explained in ch. <<35>>, we may say that the function of this god is to transmit to the material world copies of the ideal forms of the several kinds or races of living beings, these copies (the 'generic forms') being as yet unmodified by the differences which distinguish one individual from another of the same race. If so, he must transmit them, not directly to the world below, but to the *οὐσιάρχης* next beneath him, to be modified by individual differences, before they can be imposed on the matter of which individual bodies consist; for the generic form never finds material embodiment until it has been thus differentiated. On the other hand, in terms of the Stoic doctrine of *πνεῦμα*, it might be said that the function of the first *οὐσιάρχης* consists in the constant emission of vitalizing fire from the material substance of the highest heaven, and that this vitalizing element passes down through the lower spheres of heaven, and entering the air, combines with it to form *πνεῦμα*, by which life is conveyed into the bodies of men and beasts on earth. The writer of *Ascl.* III has found some difficulty in harmonizing the conceptions which he has borrowed from different schools; and perhaps in this passage, as elsewhere, the details of his composite system may not have been thought out with perfect clearness or consistency.

(2) The Ruler of the sphere of the fixed stars, working through the Decani as his agents, 'gives to the individuals of each kind their diverse forms'; that is, he modifies the generic form or race-type by adding to it individual differences. In ch. <<35>>, it is explained how these individual modifications of the race-type are effected by the revolution of the sphere over which this god presides. No two individuals are precisely alike, because no two are born under precisely the same aspect of the stars. It is held then that the form which the individual assumes at birth is determined by the influence of the fixed stars,—or rather, of those thirty-six fixed stars or star-groups which are called Decani.

(3) The Ruler of the planets (including sun and moon) is Heimarmene, 'who changes all things according to the law of φύσις'; and by φύσις we must here understand growth (and decay). The birth-form of the individual has been determined by the operation of the fixed stars; the continual succession of changes which this form undergoes in the process of life and growth is determined by the operation of the planets. (As an obvious instance of this, we may take the influence of the sun,—and, according to ancient belief, of the moon also,—in determining the growth of plants.) And since growth proceeds in accordance with fixed laws, and is unalterable by the human will (no man 'by taking thought can add a cubit to his stature'), the power which presides over the process is named Heimarmene, that is, Fate or Destiny. Regarded as the power which determines for good or ill the series of changes in the life-history of the individual, sending εὐτυχία or δυστυχία as the case may be, this deity is also named Τύχη, 'Fortune'.

(4) The region between the lunar sphere (the lowest of the planetary spheres) above, and the earth below, is filled with air; and so the air acts as the medium or 'instrument' by which the vitalizing influences of the heavenly bodies (of which their visible light is an instance) are conveyed to the earth, and to the men and beasts and plants upon the surface of the earth. Accordingly, the function of the Ruler of the air is to transmit and distribute these influences; he is 'the subordinate distributor of life'.

(5) The grosser elements, earth and water, of which the lowest stratum or central mass of the universe consists, are the material of which the bodies of all living beings here below are composed. (Cf. *Ascl.* I. 6 b as emended: 'corpora ex aqua et terra, inferioribus mundi elementis, aucescunt.') Thus the function of the Ruler of earth and sea is that of 'supplying nutriment to (the bodies of) all mortal beings', men, beasts, and plants.

Whence was this scheme derived? The writer must have obtained it either directly or indirectly from a Stoic source; for it is among the Stoics that the nearest analogies are to be found. In particular, the use of the name Zeus to denote the god by whom the Kosmos is administered is characteristic of Stoicism. Cf. 'The Stoics' in *Diog. Laert.* 7. 88: ὁ νόμος ὁ κοινός, ὅσπερ ἐστὶν ὁ ὀρθὸς λόγος διὰ πάντων ἐρχόμενος, ὁ αὐτὸς ὢν τῷ Διί. The name Zeus does not, I think, occur elsewhere in the *Hermetica*.¹ It is used occasionally

¹ Except as the name of the planet Jupiter (*Kore Kosmu* 28).

in mythical passages of Plato, as in the myth of the *Phaedrus*; but the Platonists in general employed other terms in speaking of their supreme God; and most of the earlier Platonists did not, as the Stoics did, take pains to find a place in their system for Zeus and the other deities of the popular cults and myths.

It is true that some traces of a system similar to that of *Ascl.* III. 19 b occur in the teaching of the Platonist Xenocrates (about 330 B. C.). Plut. *Plat. quaest.* 9. 2: Ξενοκράτης Δία τὸν ἐν μὲν (read τὸν μὲν ἐν) τοῖς κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ ὡσαύτως ἔχουσιν ὑπατον καλεῖ, νέατον δέ, τὸν ὑπὸ σελήνην. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5. 117: Ξενοκράτης δέ . . . τὸν μὲν ὑπατον Δία, τὸν δὲ νέατον καλῶν, ἔμφασιν πατρὸς ἀπολείπει καὶ νιῶ. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 304, of Xenocrates: ἀρέσκει δὲ καὶ αὐτῷ (θείας εἶναι δυνάμεις Zeller) καὶ ἐνδιήκειν τοῖς ὑλικοῖς στοιχείοις. τούτων δὲ τὴν μὲν (δι' ἀέρος ἐνεργούσαν δύναμιν Ἦραν Meineke) ἴαειδῆ (Ἰαίδην Diels) προσαγορεύει, τὴν δὲ διὰ τοῦ ὑγροῦ Ποσειδῶνα, τὴν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆς φυτοσπόρον Δήμητρα. ταῦτα δὲ χορηγήσας τοῖς Στωικοῖς κ.τ.λ. Thus we find two distinct schemes of this kind attributed to Xenocrates; and in one of the two, Zeus, with distinctive epithets, acts as departmental ruler in different regions of the universe. (This notion may have been suggested to Xenocrates by Orphic verses such as those in Stob. 1. 1. 23, vol. i, p. 29 W.: Ζεὺς πρῶτος γένητο, Ζεὺς ὑστατος ἀργκέρανος, | Ζεὺς κεφαλῆ, Ζεὺς μέσσα, Διὸς δ' ἐκ πάντα τέτυκται. Cf. Aesch. fr. 295: Ζεὺς ἐστὶν αἰθέρ, Ζεὺς δὲ γῆ, Ζεὺς δ' οὐρανός· | Ζεὺς τοὶ τὰ πάντα ᾠτὶ τῶνδ' ὑπέριτερον.) But the Platonists in general, until after the time of Plotinus, were not interested in this method of dealing with the popular theology. On the other hand, the Stoics took the notion over from Xenocrates ((Ξ.) ταῦτα χορηγήσας τοῖς Στωικοῖς, Aetius *l. c.*), and developed it further. Chrysippus, in Philodemus *De pietate* (Diels *Doxogr.* p. 545 f.): Χρῦσιππος . . . Δία φη(σὶν εἶναι τὸν) ἅπαντ(α διοικῶν)τα λόγον, κ(αὶ τὴν) τοῦ ὄλου ψυχῆ(ν, καὶ) τῆ τούτου μ(ετοχῆ) πάντα (ζῆν). . . Δία δὲ τὸν αἰθέρα· τοὺς δὲ τὸν Ἀπόλλω· κα(ὶ) τὴν Δήμητρα γ(ῆ)ν, ἣ τὸ ἐν αὐτῇ πνεῦμα. . . (κ)αὶ Δία μ(ε)ν εἰ(ν)α(ι τὸν) περὶ τὴν (γῆ)ν ἀέρα, (τ)ὸ(ν) Diels δὲ σκο(τε)ινόν (sc. ἀέρα) Ἰαίδ(ην), τὸν δὲ διὰ τῆς γῆ(ς κ)αὶ θαλάτ(τ)ης Ποσειδῶ(ν). καὶ το(ῦς) ἄλλου(ς) δὲ θεοὺς ἀψύχοις ὡς καὶ τούτους συνοικεῖοι. (Cf. *Ascl.* III. 27 c: 'aliorum vero vires et effectus per omnia quae sunt distribuuntur.') Diogenes Babylonius (Stoic, about 155 B. C.) in Philodemus *ib.* (Diels, p. 548 f.): τ(ὸ)ν κ(όσ)μον γράφει τῷ Δ(ι) τ(ὸ)ν αὐτὸν ὑπάρ(χει)ν, ἣ περιέχ(ει τὸ)ν Δία, κ(αθ)άπε(ρ) ἀνθρωπ(ον) ψ(υχ)ῆ(ν) . . . (εἰ)ν(αί)τε τοῦ Διὸς τὸ μὲν εἰς τὴν θάλατταν διατατα(κ)ὸς Ποσειδῶνα,

τὸ δ' εἰς τὴν γῆν Δῆμητρα, τὸ δ' εἰς (τ)ὸν αἴρα Ἴραν, . . . τὸ δ' εἰς τὸ(ν) αἰ(θ)έρα Ἀθηνᾶν. According to Diogenes then, Poseidon, Demeter, &c., are merely different parts or aspects of the one world-soul, Zeus; each of them is Zeus operating in some one particular department of the Kosmos. Pseudo-Galen in Diels *Doxogr.* p. 618 (cf. Aetius, *id.*, p. 306): the Stoics τὸν θεὸν πῦρ ἔντεχνον ἢ πνεῦμα νομίζουσιν, ὁδῶ βαδίζον ἐπὶ κόσμους γένεσιν, . . . καὶ διήκειν δι' ὅλου τοῦ κόσμου, τὰς προσηγορίας μεταλαμβάνον [τε] κατὰ τὰς τῆς ὕλης δι' ἧς κεχώρηκε παραλλάξεις. It would seem that these προσηγορίαὶ might be either the names Poseidon, Demeter, &c., or the name Zeus with different epithets. See also Diog. Laert. 7. 147.

The Hermetist then must have derived his scheme, either directly or indirectly, from a Stoic source. The borrowing from Stoicism must have taken place during the period of eclecticism or syncretism; and that period began in the first century B. C. Now the most prominent and influential exponent of Stoicism in the period of syncretism was Posidonius (100-50 B. C.); it was from him especially that the later Platonists, and among them the Hermetists, took over as much of the Stoic physics as they had a use for; and it is very likely that the scheme of οὐσιάρχει in *Ascl.* III is derived, with more or less alteration, from the Περὶ θεῶν or the Περὶ κόσμου of Posidonius.¹ But we need not suppose that the writer of *Ascl.* III borrowed directly from Posidonius; it is more probable that he got the contents of this passage from some later writer, by whom the scheme of Posidonius had been adopted with some modifications.

That the scheme, if originally Stoic, has been modified, either by the Hermetist himself, or by some intermediary through whom it was transmitted to him, is indisputable. The Stoics recognized no incorporeal beings; the departmental gods of a Stoic must therefore have been corporeal; they must have been specialized forms of the all-pervading πνεῦμα or πῦρ νοερόν. Our Hermetist, on the other hand, regards his οὐσιάρχει as νοητοὶ θεοί, and thus makes them differ in kind from the αἰσθητοὶ θεοί over whom they severally preside. Moreover, the Stoics recognized no supracosmic or transcendent deity; in their system, the sphere of heaven is the

¹ There is evidence that in one detail at least the scheme in *Ascl.* III agrees with that of Posidonius. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 324: Ποσειδώνιος (τὴν εἰμαρμένην εἶναι) τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον (δευτέραν Diels) δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτην δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην. Now in the scheme in *Ascl.* III, Zeus (Hypatos) stands first, and Heimarmene third. The second is 'Pantomorphos'; and this name may have been substituted for the word φύσις used by Posidonius.

ἡγεμονικόν of the living Kosmos, and the πῦρ νοερόν of which that sphere consists is itself the supreme God. It must have been this deity that, in the Stoic archetype of the scheme before us, was named Zeus Hypatos, and described as ruling in the outermost sphere. The Hermetist has a place in his system for the cosmic God of the Stoics; but he cannot accept him as supreme, for he knows of another God above him. The Hermetic writer then was bound to supplement the Stoic scheme by a mention of the supracosmic God; and the misplaced fragment 27 b gives precisely the supplement required.

What is the origin of the word οὐσιάρχης? If we could answer that question, we might thereby get a clue to the source or sources of the passage. I have not met with this word elsewhere; but phrases which closely resemble it, and may be considered to imply its existence, occur in *Abammonis Responsum* 8. 2 (*Testim.*). In that chapter the author of the *Responsum* gives a summary of a system of theology which he believes to be set forth in the sacred books of the Egyptians, but which he must have got from some recent writer who interpreted the 'Books of Thoth' in a Neoplatonic sense. He tells us (if I read the passage rightly) that the first God of that system (who corresponds to the εἷν of Plotinus) is called νοητάρχης, because he is ἀρχή (source or cause) of τὰ νοητά; and that the second God (who corresponds to the νοῦς of Plotinus) is called αὐτάρχης, 'cause of himself', because he 'produced himself by shining forth', and is also called οὐσιοπάτωρ, because he is ἀρχὴ τῆς οὐσίας, 'cause of corporeal substance' (or in other words, Demiurgus of the material universe). The terms νοητάρχης and οὐσιοπάτωρ are in that passage used in contrast, and mean respectively 'source or cause of νοητά' and 'source or cause of οὐσία'; and the author might just as well have written οὐσιάρχης in place of οὐσιοπάτωρ. (Compare *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 1 b, πολλῶν οὐσιῶν ὑπαρχουσῶν, καὶ τούτων διαφερουσῶν παμπληθές, πολλαὶ παρεδόθησαν αὐτῶν καὶ ἀρχαί, διαφόρους ἔχουσαι τάξεις. Ib. 8. 5 b, εἰσὶ γὰρ ἀρχαὶ παρ' αὐτοῖς (sc. τοῖς Αἰγυπτίοις) πλείονες καὶ περὶ πλείονων οὐσιῶν, which is equivalent to saying 'there are πλείονες οὐσιάρχαι'). There can be little doubt that νοητάρχης, αὐτάρχης, and οὐσιοπάτωρ are translations of Egyptian words used in the old writings and in worship as titles or epithets of certain gods; and if so, οὐσιοπάτωρ and οὐσιάρχης are probably alternative translations of one and the same Egyptian word.

The system summarized by Abammon in *Resp.* 8. 2 differs, however, in some important respects from that given in *Ascl.* III. 19 b. Firstly, the author of *Ascl.* III knows nothing of a God who is ἐπέκεινα νοῦ; i. e. he ignores Abammon's first God, and his supreme God corresponds to Abammon's second God. (It follows from this that he has no use for the word νοητάρχης, which is used to denote the first God in Abammon's system.) Secondly, instead of speaking, as Abammon does in *Resp.* 8. 2, of a single οὔσιοπάτωρ, who has to do with all οὐσία, he speaks of a number of οὐσιάρχαι, each of whom has to do with one particular department of οὐσία.¹ And thirdly, he seems to use the word οὐσιάρχης in the sense ἄρχων οὐσίας, 'ruler over (a department of) οὐσία', whereas in *Abammonis Resp.* οὔσιοπάτωρ is used in the sense ἀρχὴ οὐσίας, 'source or cause of οὐσία'. These differences make it unlikely that either of the two systems was derived directly from the other; it seems more probable that both were based on or developed out of some earlier system in which the term οὐσιάρχης was employed.

In the list of οὐσιάρχαι in *Ascl.* III, both the use of the name Zeus and the meaning given to the word οὐσία suggest a Stoic source, and may be taken to point to Posidonius. But on the other hand, that list shows traces of Egyptian influence also. Besides the word οὐσιάρχης itself, there is mention of Decani and Horoscopi, and of the god Pantomorphos; and Posidonius would not be likely to make use of those exotic terms. There is therefore reason to assume an Egyptian intermediary between Posidonius and the Hermetist; and the most probable intermediary is Chaeremon, the Egyptian priest and Stoic philosopher, who wrote his book on Egyptian religion about A. D. 50. (See note on *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 4 b.)

Thus a hypothesis which would agree well with the facts before us may be stated as follows. Posidonius, in the first century B. C., gave a list of departmental gods, such as was commonly given by the Stoics. The Egyptian Stoic Chaeremon, about A. D. 50, reproduced that list, with some alterations, among which was the mention of the Egyptian star-gods called Decani,² and the use of the

¹ In *Resp.* 8. 1 b and 8. 5 b, however, Abammon also implies that there are πλείονες οὐσιάρχαι.

² In Porphyry's letter to Anebo (Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 3. 4) and *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 4 b, the Decani and Horoscopi are mentioned in connexion with Chaeremon. Owing to corruptions in the texts, there is some doubt whether it was explicitly said there

Egyptian term *οὐσιάρχης*. The author of *Ascl.* III, about A. D. 270, adopted Chaeremon's list, with such changes as were needed to make it agree with his own Platonic tenets. An Egyptian Neoplatonist, perhaps about A. D. 280, also made some use of Chaeremon's book in constructing his system of theology; and the author of *Abammonis Resp.*, about A. D. 300, summarized that Neoplatonic system. Hence the points of resemblance between *Abammonis Resp.* and the list of *οὐσιάρχαι* in *Ascl.* III. There is no proof that it was so; but it seems probable that something like this took place.

In the usage of the Stoics in general, and of Posidonius in particular, *οὐσία* is equivalent to *ἕλη*; the two words denote the same thing, and if there is any difference of meaning the difference is merely in the point of view from which the thing is regarded.¹ The Stoic *οὐσία* is 'material substance'. The term might be used to signify *ἄποιος ἕλη*;² but *ἄποιος ἕλη* is a mere abstraction, and never occurs in concrete reality. *οὐσία* as actually existing is always invested with the qualities of one or other of the four elements. At the *ecpyrosis*, all *οὐσία* takes the form of fire; in the *diacosmesis*, portions of the total *οὐσία* change into air, water, and earth, while the rest retains the form of fire. Thus the term covers the four elements collectively. Accordingly, in a Stoic document, *οὐσιάρχης* should mean 'one who presides over (some kind of) material substance'; and that appears to be the sense in which the word is used in *Ascl.* III. 19 b. The first three *οὐσιάρχαι* preside over different spheres of heaven, i. e. different strata of fire; the fourth presides over air; the fifth presides over earth and water.

19 b. Sunt ergo omnium 'specierum' principes dii (intellegibiles), ((quorum est [princeps] (appellatio) οὐσιάρχαι.)) It may be inferred from the following mention of *dii sensibiles* in

that the Decani and Horoscoli were spoken of by Chaeremon himself; but at any rate it seems to be implied that they were.

¹ Cf. Arius Didymus, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 457: Ζήνωνος, οὐσίαν δὲ εἶναι τὴν τῶν ὄντων πάντων πρώτην ἕλην, ταύτην δὲ πᾶσαν αἰδίον, καὶ οὔτε πλείω γινομένην οὔτε ἐλάττω· τὰ δὲ μέρη ταύτης οὐκ αἰεὶ ταῦτ' ἀδιαμέμνεν, ἀλλὰ διαίρεσθαι καὶ συγχεῖσθαι. . . . ἔφησε δὲ ὁ Ποσειδώνιος τὴν τῶν ὕλων οὐσίαν καὶ ἕλην ἄποιον καὶ ἄμορφον εἶναι, καθ' ὅσον οὐδὲν ἀποτεταγμένον ἴδιον ἔχει σχῆμα οὐδὲ ποιότητα καθ' αὐτὴν· αἰεὶ δ' ἐν τινι σχήματι καὶ ποιότητι εἶναι. διαφέρει δὲ τὴν οὐσίαν τῆς ἕλης, τὴν (αὐτὴν add. Hirzel) οὐσίαν κατὰ τὴν ὑπόστασιν, ἐπινοία μόνον.

² An instance of the use of the term *ἕλη* by Stoics is given in Plut. *Sto. repugn.* 43. 4: the Stoics say τὴν ἕλην ἀργὸν, ἐξ ἑαυτῆς καὶ ἀκίνητον ὑποκείσθαι ταῖς ποιότησιν· τὰς δὲ ποιότητας, πνεύματα οὐσας καὶ τόνους ἀερωδεῖς (i. e. strains or pressures of a gaseous substance), οἷς ἂν ἐγγίνωνται μέρει τῆς ἕλης εἰδοποιεῖν ἕκαστα καὶ σχηματίζειν.

contrast, that the gods here spoken of are νοητοί; I have therefore added *intelligibiles*.

The list of οὐσιάρχαι must have been preceded by some explanation of the term οὐσιάρχης; and it is to be presumed that the explanation needed was given in this sentence. The word οὐσία given in the MSS. is almost certainly a remnant of οὐσιάρχαι; for if the translator had read οὐσία in the Greek text, he would have translated it into Latin, and written *substantia*. If we assume that *princeps* has come by duplication from *principes* above, and has ousted some such word as *appellatio* (προσηγορία), we get the clause *quorum est appellatio οὐσιάρχαι*. (Cf. *quorum est vocabulum Horoscopi* below.) But it is evident from the contents of the list that the gods called οὐσιάρχαι are νοητοί, not αισθητοί; (τύχη and εἰμαρμένη, for instance, are not αισθητά;) the antecedent of *quorum* must therefore be *dii intelligibiles*, and we must transpose the relative clause accordingly.

But how is *specierum* to be dealt with? To suit the context, either *substantiarum* (οὐσιῶν) or something like *mundi membrorum* (τῶν τοῦ κόσμου μορίων) seems to be required. We must assume either that *specierum* has been substituted by error for some other word (*substantiarum*?), or that something which would have made *specierum* intelligible has been lost. Possibly the Hermetist may have written πάντων τῶν (τῆς οὐσίας) εἰδῶν ἄρχοντες, 'rulers over all the several kinds of material substance'. That would, I think, be a correct description of the sense in which he uses the word οὐσιάρχαι.

utriusque originis consimiles suae. A νοητὸς θεός is soul without body, and that soul is pure νοῦς, which comes direct from God; a deity of that class has therefore only one *origo*. On the other hand, an αισθητὸς θεός, e. g. the Sun or Moon, consists, like a man, of soul and body (though, in the case of the god, both soul and body are of a more exalted nature); he has therefore two *origines*. His soul, if it is wholly νοῦς,—or that part of it which is νοῦς, if it is not wholly νοῦς,—comes straight from God; his body, being composed of one or more of the cosmic elements, comes from matter,—i. e. also from God, in so far as matter is endued with forms by God, but not directly or immediately.

Is the statement that the αισθητὸς θεός 'resembles both his sources' meant to imply that his soul is affected by its combination with a body, and includes something other and lower than νοῦς?

This certainly holds good in the case of the *dii terreni*, but hardly in the case of the *dii caelestes*.

opus suum inluminans. The radiation of light is a typical instance of the influences of the *dii caelestes* on the world below. But φῶς is probably here meant to imply ζωή; cf. ζωή καὶ φῶς in *Corp.* I. 9 &c.

Caeli, vel quidquid est quod eo nomine comprehenditur. These words imply that οὐρανός here signifies something more than the mere material sphere of heaven. This οὐρανός is in fact the ἡγεμονικόν or primary seat of consciousness of the living Kosmos. According to the Stoic cosmology in its most usual form (see, for instance, Chrysippus *ap.* Arium Didymum, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 466), the sphere of the fixed stars is the outermost sphere of the universe. But the οὐρανός here spoken of is distinguished from the region in which the Decani (i. e. certain fixed stars) are situated, and is assigned to a different οὐσιάρχης; i. e. the writer assumes the existence of an outermost sphere distinct from and beyond the sphere of the fixed stars,—if indeed he located all the fixed stars, as Chrysippus and most other people did, in the surface of a single sphere. But possibly his conception of the structure of the heavens may have more or less resembled that of the author of *Herm. ap.* Stob. *Exc.* VI, who places the circle of the Zodiac below (i. e. nearer to the earth than) the outermost sphere (τὸ περιεκτικὸν τῶν ἀπάντων σῶμα), and makes the Decani float in the space between the outermost sphere and the circle of the Zodiac.

Iuppiter (ὑπατος). In the MSS., two of the five οὐσιάρχαι are named *Iuppiter* simply, and a third is named *Iuppiter Plutoniums*. It is evident that distinctive epithets must have been given to the first Zeus and the second, as well as to the third. Perhaps the translator retained the first two epithets in their Greek form, and a copyist omitted them because he could not make out the Greek letters. I have inserted ὑπατος and νέατος, the epithets applied to Zeus in a similar connexion by Xenocrates (*Plut. Plat. quaest.* 9. 2, quoted on p. 111), and I have assumed *Plutoniums* to be the translator's rendering of χθόνιος; that epithet would agree well with the function of making the earth (χθών) produce trees and crops, which is assigned to this third Zeus. As to νέατος, it may be objected that the second Zeus cannot be 'lowest' if there is another below him; but perhaps that objection is lessened by the fact that Zeus Chthonios was commonly regarded as a different person from the Zeus of the

upper world. There must have been three epithets, but we cannot be sure what the epithets were.

It may be suspected that in the earliest form of the Stoic list all the departmental gods alike were named Zeus, with distinctive epithets. Τύχη and Είμαρμένη may have been substituted for the third by a Greek Stoic (Posidonius?), and Παντόμορφος for the second by an Egyptian (Chaeremon?).

[*Solis οὐσιάρχης lumen est; bonum enim luminis per orbem nobis solis infunditur.*] This sentence is irreconcilable with the context. We are told in it that the οὐσιάρχης of the sun is the thing conferred on us by the sun, viz. light. But this implies a meaning of οὐσιάρχης entirely different from the sense in which it is used before and after. In order to make the preceding statement correspond with this, we should have to rewrite it thus, 'The οὐσιάρχης of heaven is life; for life is given to all through heaven'; and so on throughout the list. On the other hand, in order to make the statement about the sun correspond with the rest, we should have to substitute some god-name, e. g. Apollo, for *lumen*, and alter the sentence into this: *Solis οὐσιάρχης Apollo est; bonum enim luminis (ab Apolline) per orbem nobis solis infunditur.* But even if the text were thus altered, further difficulties would remain. The insertion of the sun at this point, between the outermost sphere on the one hand and the fixed stars called Decani on the other, makes confusion in the otherwise orderly arrangement of the system. Besides, the sun is brought in again below, where it is in its proper place; for one of the seven (planetary) spheres, which have Heimarmene for their οὐσιάρχης, must be the sphere of the sun. It is therefore evident that the sentence *Solis . . . infunditur* has been inserted by another hand; and we must class it with the other 'solar interpolations' which occur in the *Hermetica*. See *Ascl.* III. 29 b *fin.* and 29 c; *Corp.* X. 2; *Corp.* XI. ii. 15 a; *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* II A. 14.

(*Decanorum*) [[]], *id est, eodem loco semper defixorum siderum* ((*XXXVI quorum vocabulum est Horoscopi*)), *horum οὐσιάρχης &c.* We need at the beginning of the sentence a substantive to correspond to *caeli*, [*solis*], *septem sphaerae, aer, terrae* in the corresponding sentences; and there is no doubt that the 'thirty-six fixed stars' spoken of are the Decani. Concerning the Decani, see *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* VI.

The number XXXVI, and the relative clause which follows it,

are clearly out of place in the MSS. The traditional text implies that the 'the thirty-six' are identical with the whole number of fixed stars, which is absurd. The phrase *eodem loco semper defixorum siderum* therefore needs qualification; and the words *XXXVI quorum vocabulum est Horoscopi*, when placed after it, supply precisely the qualification needed. Moreover, *horum*, which is otiose when read immediately after *siderum*, serves a purpose when the relative clause is interposed.

quorum vocabulum est Horoscopi. The word *ὠροσκόπος* was used in several different senses. (a) It is probable that the word originally stood for *ὠροσκόπος ἀστήρ*, and signified a star which was rising at a given hour, and which consequently 'watched over' that hour, and exerted a dominant influence over any event (e.g. the birth of a child) which took place at the hour in question. (b) In astrology, *ὠροσκόπος* was used to signify, not a star, but the point of the zodiacal circle which was rising at the moment of a person's birth,—or in other words, the point of the zodiacal circle which was at that moment intersected by the eastern horizon,—whether that point was occupied by a star or not. In constructing the 'theme of geniture' (*τὸ θέμα τῆς γενέσεως*), i. e. the diagram drawn by an astrologer to indicate the positions of the stars and planets at the moment of a man's birth, with a view to predicting his destiny, the *ὠροσκόπος* in this sense was the first point determined, and the whole diagram was dependent on its determination. (c) It seems that the word *ὠροσκόπος* was sometimes used as a synonym for *δεκανός*. Thus, in an astrological papyrus,¹ the probable date of which is A. D. 95–155, οἱ λαμπροὶ λς' ὠροσκόποι are mentioned. The names of several of these 'thirty-six bright Horoscopi' are given, and appear to be identical with names which occur in the lists of the Egyptian Decani.² Similarly, the writer of *Ascl.* III. 19 b uses

¹ *Brit. Mus. Cat.* XCVIII, pp. 126–130; Bouché-Leclercq, *L'astrol. gr.* 222. 4 and 230. 3; Wessely, *Denkschr. der k. Akad. der Wissensch., phil.-hist. Cl.* XXXVI, Wien 1888, *Abth.* 2, p. 150.

² Yet the writer of that document also speaks of *δεκανοί*, and apparently distinguishes the *δεκανοί* from the thirty-six *λαμπροὶ ὠροσκόποι*. Bouché-Leclercq says that in this respect the document 'pose une énigme dont l'auteur a gardé le clef'. Possibly the same thirty-six stars or star-groups were denoted by both terms, but were used in two different ways for drawing astrological inferences, and were called *δεκανοί* when used in one way, and *λαμπροὶ ὠροσκόποι* when used in another.

In Porphyry's *Epistle to Anabo* (Euseb. *Praep. ev.* 3. 4), and *Adammonis Resp.* 8. 4, *δεκανοί* and *ὠροσκόποι* are spoken of together, in connexion with Chaeremon.

Galen *Περὶ ἀπλῶν φαρμ.* 6. *prooem.*, vol. ix, p. 798 K. (Reitzenstein *Poimandr.* p. 3): a certain Pamphilus of the Ptolemaic period, *βοτάνης μέμηται . . . περὶ ἧς*

ἠροσκόποι as a synonym for δεκανοί. This use of the word appears to be derived from sense (a). In the view of those who regarded the influence of the Decani as predominant, the ἠροσκόπος (ἀστήρ) who presided over a given person's birth would be one of the Decani, viz. that Decanus who was nearest to the eastern horizon at the moment when the child was born. Each Decanus in turn would be ἠροσκόπος in this sense during a space of forty minutes, and all the thirty-six Decani would successively become ἠροσκόποι in the course of twenty-four hours. And since the most important function of the Decanus was that of operating as ἠροσκόπος in his turn, the word ἠροσκόπος came to be used as a synonym for δεκανός.¹

quem Παντόμορφον (vel Omniformem) vocant. The translator added *vel Omniformem*. See ch. (35), where the god called Pantomorphos is spoken of again. It seems clear that ὁ παντόμορφος (sc. κύκλος) properly meant the Zodiac; and the Zodiac was probably called παντόμορφος by reason of the various forms of the ζῳδία contained in it, which were thought to determine the forms and shape the destinies of the men born under their influence. In the Stoic-Egyptian source (Chaeremon?), the Pantomorphos must have been the visible Zodiac itself, regarded as a god who presides over births, and operates through the agency of the Decani, i. e. the star-gods resident in the thirty-six subdivisions of the Zodiac; but the Hermetist has made him a νοητὸς θεός who rules over the Decani. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 12 as emended: the human body ἐκ τοῦ ζωοφόρου κύκλου (i. e. the Zodiac) συνέστη, γεννῶντος φύσεως μιᾶς παντομόρφου ιδέας, κ.τ.λ. *Corp.* XVI. 12 as emended: ὁ νοητὸς κόσμος, τὸν αἰσθητὸν κόσμον περιέχων, πληροῦ τὸν ὄγκον ποικίλαις καὶ παντομόρφοις ιδέαις. *Kore Kosmi* (Stob. *Exc.* XXIII) 20 as emended: God τὸν ζωδιακὸν . . . διέταξε, καὶ τούτῳ παντουργὸς χαρισάμενος δυνάμεις (i. e. powers of producing all manner of forms), γεννητικὸν ἐκέλευσεν εἶναι τῶν εἰς αἰὲ μελλόντων ἔσσεσθαι πάντων ζῳών. Porphyr. *De abst.* 4. 16: ὃ τε τὰ λεοντικὰ παραλαμβάνων (in the Mithraic mysteries) περιτίθεται παντοδαπὰς ζῳών μορφάς· ὧν τὴν αἰτίαν ἀποδιδοῦς Πάλλας ἐν τοῖς περὶ τοῦ Μίθρα τὴν κοινὴν φησι φορὰν (i. e. the general opinion)

ὁμολογεῖ . . . ἐν τινι τῶν εἰς Ἑρμῆν τὸν Αἰγύπτιον ἀναφερομένων βιβλίων ἐγγεγράφθαι, περιέχοντι τὰς 35 τῶν ἠροσκόπων ἱεράς βοτάνας. The ἠροσκόποι to whom the thirty-six plants are assigned must be the thirty-six Decani.

¹ In Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 6. 4. 35, ἠροσκόπος is used in yet another sense, as the title of an Egyptian priest (elsewhere called ἠρολόγος) whose special function is to study the four Egyptian 'Books of Hermes (Thoth)' which treat of astronomy. The word there means a man who 'observes the hours', i. e. notes the positions of the heavenly bodies at certain times.

οἶσθαι [ὡς] πρὸς τὴν τοῦ ζφδιακοῦ κύκλου (ἐνέργειαν?) ἀποτείνειν τὴν δὲ ἀληθινὴν ὑπόληψιν κ.τ.λ.

The word παντόμορφος occurs as a title of a divine person in one of the Coptic-Gnostic documents, C. Schmidt I, p. 344.

In *Corp.* XI. ii. 16 a, the word παντόμορφος is used in a different connexion, being applied to the Kosmos; and it there means 'taking all (corporeal) forms'. (Similarly, in Plut. *Ei apud Delph.* 9. 388 E, the Kosmos is described as παντοδαπὸς ἐν τε μορφαῖς καὶ ἐν πάθεσι καὶ δυνάμεσι διαφόροις γιγνόμενος.) But in *Ascl.* III, the word means 'imposing all manner of forms on men and other living creatures (at their birth)'.

The function of this god is more fully explained in ch. <<35>>, and in order to make the following words in 19b agree with that explanation, I have substituted *singulis* for *diversis*. The Pantomorphos *speciebus singulis diversas formas facit*; e. g. at the birth of each individual of the human kind he assigns to that individual a form distinct from those of all other human beings. And he discharges this function through his agents the Decani; or more precisely, he operates in each case by the agency of the particular Decanus who is ὠροσκόπος (i. e. is on the eastern horizon) at the time when the child is born.

αἱ καλούμεναι ἐπὶ σφαῖραι ἔχουσιν (οὔσι)ἀρχὴν τὴν καλουμένην τύχην ἢ εἰμαρμένην.—*Septem sphaerae quae vocantur habent οὔσιἀρχὴν (οὔσιἀρχας MSS.), id est sui principem (principes MSS.), quam Fortunam dicunt aut εἰμαρμένην.* In Lydus's quotation, ἀρχήν is evidently an error for οὔσιἀρχην. The omission of οὔσι- was caused by the preceding ἔχουσιν. On the other hand, Lydus is undoubtedly right in giving (οὔσι)ἀρχην and ἦτις . . . ἄλλοιοῖ in the singular; and the plurals οὔσιἀρχας, *principes, quibus* in *Ascl.* III must have been substituted by some one who misunderstood the passage. Heimarmene presides over the seven planetary spheres collectively, as the Pantomorphos presides over the thirty-six Decani; there is not a separate οὔσιἀρχης for each planet. As to the connexion of the planets, or the stars in general, with Heimarmene, cf. *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* XII. 2 and *Exc.* XIV. 2. See also *Ascl.* III. 39 f.

In the Greek of Lydus, the words καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν αὐτῶν οὐκ ἔα μένειν must be a later addition, because the next words in the Latin, *lege naturae* &c., which follow appropriately on *inmutantur omnia = πάντα ἄλλοιοῖ*, would not be a suitable continuation of οὐκ ἔα μένειν.

In Lydus, the words ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη . . . οὐδὲν ἀτακτον, extracted from the Greek original of *Ascl.* III. 39, follow immediately on ἐξ μένειν here, being written as if they belonged to the same passage. That is, Lydus extracted from the Λόγος τέλειος two different passages concerning εἰμαρμένη, and wrote them down consecutively; but either he omitted to mark where one ended and the other began, or the mark of division has been omitted by a transcriber.

stabilitate firmissima sempiterna agitatione variata. *Stabilitate firmissima variata* is ablative absolute (genitive in the Greek); *sempiterna agitatione* is ablative of manner (dative in the Greek), qualifying *variata*. The meaning is, that all things in the Kosmos change, but the law by which they change is changeless. Cf. chs. 31, 32 a, and 40 b. Philo, *Vita Mosis* 2. (3). 12. 125, Cohn IV, p. 229: λόγῳ γὰρ αἱ τροπαὶ καὶ ἐτήσιοι ὄραι τεταγμένῳ καὶ παγίῳ συνίστανται, τὸ παραδοξότατον, διὰ τῆς καιρίου μεταβολῆς ἐπιδεικνύμεναι τὴν διαωνιζούσαν αὐτῶν μονήν.

19 b, 27 c. secundus (vitae) || dispensator. It is evident that ch. 27 c is a displaced piece of the list of οὐσιάρχαι, and should follow here. We have been told that Zeus (Hypatos), the first of the οὐσιάρχαι, 'per caelum omnibus praebet vitam'; he then is the *primus vitae dispensator*. We have also been told that the air is the instrument by means of which the influences of Zeus Hypatos and his subordinatcs in the heavens are brought to bear upon the world below; hence it follows that the οὐσιάρχης who presides over the air is *secundus vitae dispensator*.

The doctrine that air is the source or vehicle of life was asserted in the age of Pericles by Diogenes of Apollonia. (See Gomperz, *Greek thinkers*, Eng. tr. I, p. 371 ff.)¹ The function assigned to air in the system of Diogenes was similar to that which was afterwards assigned to πνεῦμα (i. e. warm air) in the system of the Stoics; and the Stoic doctrine of πνεῦμα must have been derived in part from the air-theory of Diogenes. The Stoics held that the vitalizing element in πνεῦμα is πῦρ, or heat; but the ambiguity of the word πνεῦμα, which, in one of its uses, meant wind (i. e. air in motion), and was sometimes used as a synonym for ἀήρ, would tend to conceal the difference between the two doctrines. The Hermetist may therefore have been unconscious of any inconsistency between what he here says about air and what he said about πνεῦμα in ch. 17 a.

¹ Another point of agreement between *Ascl.* III. 19 b and the doctrine of Diogenes may be noted. Diogenes said that Zeus is air and nothing but air (Gomperz *ib.* p. 375); and in *Ascl.* III, the οὐσιάρχης of the air is a Zeus.

27 c. animantium mortalium. The beings which are both *ἔμψυχα* and *θνητά* are men and beasts. The term does not include vegetables, which are here mentioned separately. See *Ascl.* I. 4, where vegetables are said to be *sine anima*, i. e. *ἄψυχα*.

27 b. Deus, supra verticem summi caeli consistens. Cf. ch. 33 a, 'quod dicitur extra mundum, si tamen est aliquid.' Ch. 30 *init.*: 'in ipsa vitali aeternitate locus est mundi.' The Hermetist imagines the boundless space outside the cosmic sphere,—that space which the Stoics called *κενόν*,—to be filled with the presence of God, who thence watches over the Kosmos from every side ('ubique est, omniaque circum inspicit').

19 c. (Hoc modo coniuncta sunt in) mortalibus . . . adunata vero, unum. The text of this passage is badly damaged; but the writer's meaning was probably not far from that expressed by my attempt at restoration.

(in) *mortalibus mortalia*. A few lines below, the MSS. give *de mortalibus mortalia*, which is presumably a misplaced doublet. The phrase *et his similia*, which follows *mortalia* here, may be a corruption of *sensibilia*, which follows *mortalia* below.

[*vel potius duo . . . nutu efficiuntur*]. These words are out of keeping with the context, and cannot have been written by the same man who wrote *aut potius unum* a few lines above. They express a dualistic doctrine of the same kind as that which is set forth in *Ascl.* II, though not quite identical with it. Both the author of *Ascl.* III and the author of *Ascl.* I would have regarded the words *vel potius duo* as blasphemy.

id est, de materia qua fiunt &c. The meaning intended would be more clearly expressed by writing 'vel potius duo sunt, (viz.) id unde fiunt omnia, et is a quo fiunt; id est, materia de qua fiunt, et eius voluntas cuius nutu efficiuntur'. The two *ἀρχαί* of all things are *matter* and *God's will*.

34 c. quae omnia sine deo vegetari non possunt. *Vegetare* means 'to quicken' or 'call into life'; and this applies to all corporeal things; for all bodies without exception are alive, in higher or lower degree. God's creative activity may be described either by saying that he infuses life into matter, or that he imposes forms on matter; for all matter, in so far as it is formed, is vitalized. The *νοητὰ εἶδη*, from which the forms imposed on matter are copied, are the archetypes of living beings, and are themselves living beings of a higher order (*νοητὰ ζῶα*, Pl. *Tim.*).

ipsi (sc. deo) soli sensibile atque intellegibile. Why *sensibile*? We must understand *totum* as including both the *αἰσθητὸς κόσμος* and the *νοητὸς κόσμος*. To men, the former is only in part *αἰσθητός*, as the latter is only in part *νοητός*; for each one of us, sense and thought alike are limited to a few objects. To the consciousness of God alone both worlds are present in all their fullness. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 9: ὁ δὲ θεὸς οὐχ . . . ἀναίσθητός ἐστι καὶ ἀνόητος (i. e. God *αἰσθάνεται καὶ νοεῖ*).

quantitates . . . omnes mensuras excedentes magnitudinis. The writer says that *great* and *immeasurable* magnitudes are from God, and not (as we might rather have expected) *all* magnitudes, large and small alike, because his object is to exalt the majesty of God. Even the greatest of corporeal things, the outermost sphere of heaven, is 'from God and in God'.

mundum ipsum sensibilem et quae in eo sunt omnia a superiore illo mundo quasi vestimentum esse contexta (quasi ex vestimento esse contexta MSS.). The *superior mundus* is the *νοητὸς κόσμος*. If we retain the reading of the MSS. (striking out *ex*), this must be taken as meaning that the *ἄλη* which is the substratum of the *αἰσθητὸς κόσμος* is 'clothed' with visible forms which are copies of the *νοητὰ εἶδη*. But a more satisfactory sense may be got by reading *quasi vestimentum esse contexta*; the *αἰσθητὸς κόσμος* is 'woven out of' the visible forms which are copies of the *νοητὰ εἶδη*, i. e. is wholly made up of those forms. This agrees better with what is said in 17 b as emended, *sunt visibiles formae . . . uniuscuiusque, sicuti est, tota substantia*. The visible world thus constituted is the 'garment' in which God is clothed. For the simile of a garment, cf. Philo *De fuga et inventione* 20. 110, Wendland III, p. 133: ἐνδύεται δ' ὁ μὲν πρεσβύτατος τοῦ ὄντος λόγος ὡς ἐσθῆτα τὸν κόσμον· γῆν γὰρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀέρα καὶ πῦρ καὶ τὰ ἐκ τούτων ἐπαμπίσχηται. Philo *De somniis* 1. 35. 203, Wendland III, p. 249: τὸ παμπούκιλον ὕφασμα, τουτονὶ τὸν κόσμον.

17 b. Est enim (ἄλη) . . . tota substantia. I have placed this passage here, because the last sentence of 34 c (*Sin totum . . . quasi vestimentum esse contexta*) serves as a suitable introduction to it. That which I conjecture to have been the original meaning of the paragraph has been hidden by deliberate interpolation. Some person through whose hands the text has passed (possibly the translator himself) completely failed to understand the Hermetist's doctrine of matter and forms; and finding it stated that *ἄλη* (which he regarded as equivalent to *mundus*, the material world,) 'is invisible

in itself', he took this to mean that *you cannot see into the depths of the earth, because it is a solid globe*, and inserted several clauses with the intention of explaining and developing that meaning. When the words which I have marked as interpolations are struck out, that which remains yields a satisfactory sense.

[*cava mundi rotunditas in modum sphaerae*]. I assume that these words have been substituted by the interpolator for the one word $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ (translated *mundus*). It is, however, not quite impossible that the Hermetist described the primary matter as shaped into a sphere, and in that one respect not absolutely formless, though devoid of all visible qualities; see *Corp.* VIII. 3.

($\epsilon\lambda\eta$) *multis loci[s] instar qualitatemque habere creditur*. Cf. Plotinus 2. 4. 11: *ὅθεν τινὲς ταῦτόν τῷ κενῷ τὴν ἕλην εἰρήκασι*. Plato, *Tim.* 52 A, identifies the *ὑποδοχή* with *χώρα*.

Per formas enim solas specierum, quarum imaginibus videtur (*quasi*) *insculpta, [] visibilis creditur*. The meaning must be, 'we (mistakenly) suppose that $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ itself is visible, because the forms imposed on it are visible'. But it is not clear how this meaning is to be got out of the words. Perhaps *formas specierum* may be taken to mean 'corporeal forms (*αἰσθητὰ εἶδη*) derived from the *νοητὰ εἶδη*'. The Greek may possibly have been *διὰ γὰρ τὰς μορφὰς* (the visible forms) *μόνον τὰς (ἐκ) τῶν εἰδῶν* (the invisible and eternal 'ideas') κ.τ.λ. The *αἰσθητὰ εἶδη* which are imposed on matter are *imagines* (*εἰκόνας*) of the *νοητὰ εἶδη*. We see the *αἰσθητὰ εἶδη*, but we do not see the $\epsilon\lambda\eta$ on which they are imposed.

In the words *quasi insculpta* we have a different simile from that employed above, *quasi vestimentum esse contexta*. The notion conveyed by *insculpta* more nearly resembles, but does not quite coincide with, that implied by Plato's word *ἐκμαγεῖον*, which suggests that the shapes imposed on matter are like the impressions of a seal on wax.

Plato (*Tim.* 50 c) says that these visible and transitory copies of the invisible and eternal *εἶδη* are stamped on matter 'in a fashion hard to declare' (*δύσφραστον*). The Hermetist has tried to explain the process by introducing a hierarchy of astral and cosmic gods by whom the demiurgic or form-imposing energy of the supreme God is transmitted to the lower world, and by combining with the Platonic doctrine of forms the Stoic doctrine of *πνεῦμα*. This *πνεῦμα*, as he conceives it, is a life-conveying material substance, the movements of which are determined by the influences of the heavenly bodies, and which the Powers above employ as their

instrument¹ in the process of clothing matter with forms (or in other words, in working matter up into living organisms), and maintaining that constant succession of changing forms (*formarum agitatio atque frequentatio*) in which the life of all earthly organisms consists. But it must be admitted that his explanations leave much unexplained, and that the mode of operation by which copies of the νοητὰ εἶδη are impressed on or 'carved in' formless matter still remains δύσφραστον. By way of an attempt to express what seems to be implied in his theory, perhaps it might be said that πνεῦμα, operating (like Aristotle's φύσις) as a vital force within the organism during the process of growth, develops it, by a continuous succession of changes, into something more and more nearly resembling the ideal type (e. g. develops the human embryo, and the human child, into the likeness of the αὐτοάνθρωπος). The εἶδος remains νοητόν,—an unrealized ideal, not a thing visible in the world of sense; but it is the 'final cause' of the process. The efficient cause is God; and the νοητόν εἶδος (the 'pattern' which is 'copied', or in other words, the end or aim towards which the process is directed) has its existence in the mind of God. With this end or aim in view, God works through the heavenly bodies (or rather through subordinate incorporeal deities,—οὐσιάρχειαι,—by whom the heavenly bodies are controlled); and the heavenly bodies act on the material elements of which each individual organism is composed, and infuse into it the πνεῦμα by which it is vitalized. (Compare *Ascl.* I. 2 b-4.)

If this, or something like it, is the writer's meaning, he has not succeeded in expressing it very clearly,² or in harmonizing perfectly the Platonic and Stoic conceptions which he has brought into juxtaposition. But in one respect at least he is clear and consistent, namely, in the expression of his conviction that it is the will of God that works all. In the view of the writer of *Ascl.* III, as in that of the Hermetists in general, φύσις is a 'part' of God (*Corp.* XII. ii. 21), and all operations of nature are ἐνέργειαι of God.

¹ In 19 b, air, in place of πνεῦμα, is said to be the *organum*. In some of the *Hermetica* (e. g. *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* IX), the force which operates in the imposition of forms on matter is called simply ἐνέργεια θεοῦ, and no material *organum* is mentioned. Other Hermetists (e. g. the writer of *Corp.* XVI), instead of speaking of a material *organum*, assign to personal agents (the 'daemons') the function of executing the will of God in the lower world. As the daemons reside in the air, and have bodies composed of air, this latter notion is not wholly unconnected with the view that air is the *organum*.

² His exposition might, however, appear less inadequate if we had his text before us in its original and unmutilated form.

eius imum, . . . si locus est (imus) in sphaera. The interpolator is speaking of the place in which Hades was commonly located, i. e. the interior or central part of the earth, and describes this, with some hesitation, as the 'bottom' of the globe. As he twice compares Greek with Latin, the interpolation must have taken place either at the time of or subsequently to the translation of the Greek text into Latin.

quod sunt visibiles formae . . . tota substantia. The interpolator wrote *quod sint*, because he made this clause depend on the preceding *dicuntur*. But the sense of the uninterpolated original would have been more correctly expressed by *quod sunt*, dependent on *est invisibilis*. The words *specierum omnium quae insunt uniuscuiusque sicuti est tota substantia* occur in the MSS. a few lines below (in 18 a), where they are meaningless. Transposed to this place, they give (with the correction *quae omnibus insunt* for *specierum omnium quae insunt*)¹ precisely the sense which the preceding context requires. The visible forms (αἰσθητὰ εἶδη), which are copies of the νοητὰ εἶδη, constitute the whole substance or reality of the individual things in the material universe; if you abstract them, there will be nothing left except unformed (and therefore invisible) ὕλη, which has a merely potential existence.

«Species enim, quae divina est . . . incorporalia sint.» This piece, where it stands in the MSS. (in ch. 35), interrupts the train of thought, and must be a misplaced fragment. I have transposed it to this place, because it seems to be connected with the subject dealt with in ch. 17 b as conjecturally emended. The *species quae divina est* is the νοητὸν εἶδος, the ideal παράδειγμα.

35, 36. Unumquodque enim . . . splendore reddentium. These two chapters continue the exposition of the doctrine of forms; I have therefore placed them here. If my rearrangement is right, chs. 33-36 consist wholly of passages which have been accidentally shifted from their right places.

35. Unumquodque enim . . . sui dissimilia. With this chapter should be compared and contrasted *Ascl. I. 3 c-4*, where the word *species* (εἶδη) means 'individuals'.

The *species* spoken of in *Ascl. III. 35* are the forms or types of the several kinds (*genera*) of living beings. Types of natural *genera*

¹ The words *specierum omnium* might be retained, if they could be taken in the sense of 'all kinds of things', or 'all individual things'; but in that case it would still be necessary to insert *omnibus* or some such word before *insunt*.

(and perhaps of the cosmic *στοιχεῖα* spoken of in ch. 36) are the only sort of 'Platonic ideas' that the author recognizes.¹ For instance, there is a single *species incorporalis* (*νοητὸν εἶδος*, ideal type) of the human race; and the Pantomorphos (the god of the Zodiac), operating by the agency of the Decanus Horoscopus (i. e. the god of that subdivision of the Zodiac which is on the eastern horizon at the decisive moment), stamps a visible 'copy' of this ideal type upon each child at birth. But each of these visible copies differs from every other; for the positions of the heavenly bodies, by the influence of which the corporeal form of each individual is determined at birth, change from moment to moment. Hence no two men are quite alike.

It might be objected that the same Decanus is Horoscopus for forty minutes in every successive space of twenty-four hours; many men therefore must be born under the influence of the same Decanus; and all men born under the influence of the same Decanus ought to be alike. But this difficulty may be avoided, if we assume that the Decanus Horoscopus collects and brings to bear upon the individual at the moment of birth the influences of all the heavenly bodies together. When the Decanus who is now Horoscopus becomes Horoscopus again to-morrow, each of the planets will have changed its position relatively to the fixed stars; and even within the same forty minutes, the aspect of the heavens is not quite the same at any two moments.

sive sit animans sive sine anima sit. See note on *Ascl.* I. 4, *genus sine anima.*

quamvis unumquodque animal[is genus] omnem generis sui possideat formam. It appears from these words that the *forma generis* is the 'universal', i. e. the group of qualities which all individuals of the *genus* possess in common. Below, the writer seems to use the word *species* as equivalent to *forma generis*. (*Species ergo permanet . . . Sic generum formae sunt permanentes.*) Does this imply that he regarded the *forma generis* (the 'universal' of a natural class) as identical with the *species quae divina est*, i. e.

¹ His theory of ideas resembles that of the Platonist Albinus, who says in his *Epitome* (ch. 9): ἡ ἰδέα, ὡς μὲν πρὸς τὸν θεόν, νόησις αὐτοῦ. . . ὀρίζονται δὲ τὴν ἰδέαν παράδειγμα τῶν κατὰ φύσιν αἰώνιων. οὔτε γὰρ τοῖς πλείστοις τῶν ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος ἀρέσκει τῶν τεχνικῶν εἶναι ἰδέας, οἷον ἀσπίδος ἢ λύρας, οὔτε μὴν τῶν παρὰ φύσιν, οἷον πυρετοῦ καὶ χολέρας, οὔτε τῶν κατὰ μέρος, οἷον Σωκράτους καὶ Πλάτωνος, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ τῶν εὐτελῶν τινός, οἷον ῥύπου καὶ κάρφους, οὔτε τῶν πρὸς τι, οἷον μείζους καὶ ὑπερέχοντος· εἶναι γὰρ τὰς ἰδέας νύησις θεοῦ αἰώνιους καὶ αὐτοτελεῖς.

with the Platonic παράδειγμα (the 'ideal type')? If so, he must have failed to think the matter out clearly. The 'universal' cannot rightly be identified with the 'ideal'; the *forma generis*, which 'is possessed by every individual of the *genus*', cannot be the same as the ideal type, which is never fully or adequately reproduced in any individual in the world of sense.¹ A new-born child, or a man physically and morally deformed, possesses the *forma generis*, i. e. the group of qualities included under the general concept 'man', but is far from possessing the qualities of the ideal man, the αὐτοάνθρωπος. The Platonist Albinus (quoted in note on *Ascl.* I. 2 b) saw the necessity of making this distinction, and accordingly discriminated the πρῶτα νοητά (ideal types) from the δεύτερα νοητά (universals).

In the parallel passage *Ascl.* I. 4, the word *genus* (which corresponds to *forma generis* in *Ascl.* III. 35) clearly means 'universal', and not 'ideal type', or παράδειγμα in the Platonic sense.

impossibile est formam unamquamque alteri simillimam nasci. The Stoics insisted strongly on this point, in opposition to the Academics. Cic. *Acad.* 2. 26. 85: 'Stoicum est quidem ('nec admodum credibile' in the opinion of the Academics,) nullum esse pilum omnibus rebus talem qualis sit pilus alius, nullum granum.' Sen. *Ep.* 113. 15: 'Nullum animal alteri par est. Circumspice omnium corpora: nulli non et color proprius est et figura sua et magnitudo. Inter cetera propter quae mirabile divini artificis ingenium est, hoc quoque existimo, quod in tanta copia rerum nunquam in idem incidit: etiam quae similia videntur, cum contuleris, diversa sunt. Tot fecit genera foliorum: nullum non sua proprietate signatum. Tot animalia: nullius imago tota cum altero convenit, utique aliquid interest. Exegit a se ut quae alia erant et dissimilia essent et imparia. (Seneca attributes the differences to the ingenuity of the divine Artist; the Hermetist gives an astral explanation of them.) Plut. *Comm. not.* 36: ἀκοῦσαι τοίνυν ἐστὶν αὐτῶν (sc. the Stoics). . . πρὸς τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς διαφερομένων, καὶ βούωντων ὡς (the Academics) πάντα πράγματα συγγέουσι ταῖς ἀπαραλλάξιαις (i. e. by their denial of differences between individuals), ἐπὶ δυοῖν

¹ Aristotle uses the word εἶδος in the sense of 'universal' in his logic; but he uses it in a sense more nearly approaching that of the Platonic παράδειγμα ('ideal type') in his physics, when he says that 'nature' aims at reproducing the εἶδος in the individual, but succeeds in reproducing it only by a gradual process, if at all. In an imperfectly developed individual, the εἶδος in the latter sense may be said to be present potentially, but is not present actually.

οὐσίῳν ἓνα ποιὸν (sc. λόγον?) εἶναι βιαζόμενοι'. καίτοι τοῦτο μὲν οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις ἀνθρώπων οὐ διανοεῖται, καὶ τούναντίον οἶεται θαυμαστὸν εἶναι καὶ παράδοξον, εἰ μήτε φάττα φάττη, μήτε μελίττη μέλιττα, μήτε πυρῶ πυρός, ἢ σύκω (τὸ τοῦ λόγου) σῦκον, ἐν τῷ παντὶ χρόνῳ γέγονεν ἀπαράλλακτον. According to Plutarch, then, the Stoics went against common sense in denying that any two individuals of a kind could be alike, and the Academics agreed with common sense in maintaining the opposite view.

horarum et climatatum distantibus punctis. A difference in the place of birth (κλίμα), as well as a difference in the time, implies a difference in the aspect of the heavens, and consequently a difference in the resulting form.

inmutantur totiens, quot hora momenta habet circuli circumcurrentis. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 6, 7: «φερόμενος δὲ (ὁ κόσμος) πάντα ζωοποιεῖ.» . . . τὸ δὲ τάχος αὐτοῦ τῆς φορᾶς τὴν ποικιλίαν τῶν [ποιῶν] γενέσεων ἐργάζεται. πνοή γάρ, οὔσα πυκνοτάτη, προτείνει τὰ ποιὰ τοῖς σώμασι. The 'qualities' (ποιά) there spoken of are the Stoic equivalent of the *formae visibiles* (αἰσθητὰ εἶδη) of *Ascl.* III. They are produced in bodies by the operation of πνοή (= πνεῦμα); and the operation of the πνοή varies with, and is determined by, the constantly changing positions of the heavenly bodies. *Corp.* XVI. 15: γενόμενον γὰρ ἡμῶν ἕκαστον . . . παραλαμβάνουσι δαίμονες οἱ κατ' ἐκείνην τὴν (σ)τι(γ)μὴν τῆς γενέσεως ὑπηρεταὶ κ.τ.λ.

If it is assumed that small differences in time produce appreciable effects, not even twins will be alike. Augustine (*Civ. dei* 5. 1-6), arguing against the astral doctrine of Posidonius, discusses the case of twins at some length. *Ib.* 5. 3: 'frustra itaque adfertur nobile illud commentum de figuli rota, quod respondisse ferunt Nigidium hac quaestione turbatum, unde et Figulus appellatus est. Dum enim rotam figuli vi quanta potuit intorsisset, currente illa bis numero de atramento tamquam uno eius loco summa celeritate percussit; deinde inventa sunt signa quae fixerat, desistente motu, non parvo intervallo in rotae illius extremitate distantia. Sic, inquit, in tanta rapacitate caeli, etiamsi alter post alterum tanta celeritate nascatur, quanta rotam bis ipse percussi, in caeli spatio plurimum est: hinc sunt, inquit, quaecumque dissimillima perhibentur in moribus casibusque geminorum.'

The 'circulus circumcurrens in quo est ille Omiformis deus' is the Zodiac in which are situated the Decani, over whom the Pantomorphos presides.

36. **Et mundus speciem mutat, o Trismegiste?** The word *species* cannot here signify the *species aeterna et incorporealis* (νοητὸν εἶδος), i. e. the ideal type; for the ideal type is eternal and unchanging. When the writer speaks of the *species* of the Kosmos or its component parts as changing, *species* must signify *forma visibilis* (αἰσθητὸν εἶδος); and we must take *speciem mutat* to mean 'exchanges one *forma visibilis* for another'.

The case of the cosmic στοιχεῖα differs from that of the *genera* previously discussed in this respect, that each of them is the only one of its kind. In dealing with the human race, the writer says that the *forma visibilis* of each individual differs from that of every other individual, while the *forma generis* (or *species incorporealis*) is common to all individuals of the *genus*. But it is impossible to speak thus of the forms when he is dealing with the *caelum*; for there is only one *caelum*. Accordingly, he says that there is a *species* (*incorporealis*) of the *caelum*, which persists unchanged, but that varying *species* (i. e. *formae visibiles*,—variously modified copies of the unchanging *species incorporealis*,—) are assumed by the one *caelum* at different times: 'in una caeli specie hae sunt quae saepe alternantur species.'

[[atque stationes aut cursus]]. It is absurd to say that earth 'stands or runs'; there must therefore be some error in the text. Since the writer speaks of the changes of *caelum* (i. e. air), earth, and fire, he probably spoke of the changes of water also; and the most obvious difference in water is that between standing and running water. I have therefore altered *atque* to *aqua*, and added *mutat*.

Solis etenim et lunae. The sun and moon are made of fire; and since they are gods, it is rightly said that the fire of which they are made assumes *divinas species*.

sunt enim quasi speculorum nostrorum similes. I suppose the meaning of this simile to be that the sun and moon 'reflect', i. e. reproduce in visible copy, the *species incorporealis* or ideal type of fire or light. Cf. *Corp.* XVII: ἀνανακλάσεις εἰσι τῶν ἀσωμάτων πρὸς τὰ σώματα. Philo *De opif. mundi* 7. 29-8. 31: πρῶτον οὖν ὁ ποιῶν ἐποίησεν οὐρανὸν ἀσώματον καὶ γῆν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀέρος ἰδέαν (i. e. the *species incorporeales* of heaven, earth, and air) . . . εἰθ' ὕδατος ἀσώματον οὐσίαν, . . . καὶ ἐπὶ πάσιν . . . φωτός, ὃ πάλιν ἀσώματον ἦν καὶ νοητὸν ἡλίου παράδειγμα καὶ πάντων ὅσα φωσφόρα ἄστρα κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν ἐμελλε συνίστασθαι. . . τοσοῦτ' ἂν γὰρ τὸ νοητὸν (φῶς)

τοῦ ὄρατοῦ λαμπρότερόν τε καὶ αἰγοειδέστερον, ὅσῳ περ ἥλιος, οἶμαι, σκότους. . . . τὸ δὲ ἀόρατον καὶ νοητὸν φῶς ἐκείνο θείου λόγου γέγονεν εἰκόν'. . . . καὶ ἔστιν ὑπερούρανιος ἀστήρ, πηγὴ τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἀστέρων, ἣν οὐκ ἂν ἀπὸ σκοποῦ καλέσειεν ἂν τις παναύγειαν, ἀφ' ἧς ἥλιος καὶ σελήνη καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πλάνητές τε καὶ ἀπλανεῖς ἀρύτονται, καθ' ὅσον ἐκάστῳ δύναμις, τὰ πρέποντα φέγγη, τῆς ἀμιγῶς καὶ καθαρᾶς αὐγῆς ἐκείνης ἀμαυρουμένης, ὅταν ἄρξῃται τρέπεσθαι κατὰ τὴν ἐκ νοητοῦ πρὸς αἰσθητὸν μεταβολήν· εἰλικρινὲς γὰρ οὐδὲν τῶν ἐν αἰσθήσει. Plotinus 3. 6. 7: ὅθεν καὶ τὰ (ἐν τῇ ὕλῃ) ἐγγίγνεσθαι δοκοῦντα (i. e. the *formae visibiles*) παύγνια (ἔστιν), εἶδωλα ἐν εἰδώλῳ ἀτεχνῶς, ὡς ἐν κατοπτρῷ τὸ ἀλλαχοῦ ἰδρυμένον, ἀλλαχοῦ φανταζόμενον.

aemulo splendore. The sun and moon vie with one another in brightness. As Philo puts it, each of them draws from the νοητὸν φῶς as much of visible light as it is capable of receiving. And the apparent brightness of each of them varies from hour to hour; this must be what is meant by *omniformes imagines sunt*.

20 a-32 b. In these chapters (with the exception of the group of misplaced passages 27 b-29 b), the text runs on without a break. The writer deals with several distinct topics, viz. (1) the name of God (20 a); (2) sexual procreation (20 b-21); (3) the divine element in man (22 a-23 a); (4) god-making (23 b-24 a); (5) the Prophecy of Hermes (24 b-26 a); (6) the relation between the eternity of God and the time-process of the Kosmos (26 b-27 a and 29 c-32 b). The passages in which the several topics are treated are linked together by superficial transitions, but have little real connexion. The writer's thoughts do not seem to be guided by any preconceived plan; he passes at haphazard from one subject to another.

20 a. Alia haec iterum ratio quae est, o Trismegiste? In the lost passage which preceded these words, Trismegistus must have announced that he was about to set forth 'a second doctrine'. Compare 19 a *fin.*: 'Haec ergo ipsa (divinorum), ut dicis, (ratio) quae est, o Trismegiste?' The doctrine of νοητά, expounded in 19 a ff., was announced as *divinorum ratio*; and here follows *alia divinorum ratio*. This 'second doctrine' seems to be especially that which is contained in chs. 20 b and 21. (Cf. 20 b *fin.*: 'haec ergo ratio . . . tibi sit reddita, quare et quomodo fiant omnia (utriusque sexus).') In this passage, the creative energy of God is regarded in a different aspect. In the first *ratio*, God was spoken of as imposing forms on matter; in the second *ratio*, God is spoken of as generating

the Kosmos and all things in it by a process of which human procreation is an 'image'. The second *ratio* is quite distinct from and unconnected with the first, and is, no doubt, derived from a different source. It is introduced by a paragraph concerning the name of God (20 a).

quocumque [alio] nomine [[]] nuncupatur [quod] inter nos intellectus nostri causa. If we are to speak to one another about 'the One who is all', we must apply some name to him; we therefore call him *θεός* or *πατήρ* or *κύριος* or the like; but all such names are inadequate. Cf. ch. 41 b: ἄφραστον ὄνομα (< . . .), τετιμημένον (δὲ) τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ, . . . καὶ εὐλογοῦμενον τῇ τοῦ πατρὸς.

«(ab hominibus sanctius religiosiusque) debet esse sacram tantum tantum [[]] numinis contemplatione. The grammatical subject of *debet* is *nomen*, understood from *quocumque nomine*. There is nothing holy in the name itself; the man who speaks or hears the name must make it holy,¹ by infusing into it his own religious emotion.

vox hoc est, ex aere spiritu percusso sonus. A Stoic definition. Cf. the Stoic Diogenes Babyl., in Diog. Laert. 7. 55: ἔστι δὲ φωνὴ ἀήρ πεπληγμένος. . . ζῴου μὲν ἐστὶ φωνὴ ἀήρ ὑπὸ ὀρμῆς πεπληγμένος ἀνθρώπου δέ, [ἔστιν] ἑναρθρος καὶ ἀπὸ διανοίας ἐκπεμπομένη. 'The Stoics' in Diog. Laert. 7. 158: ἀκοῦεν δὲ (ἡμᾶς), τοῦ μεταξὺ τοῦ τε φωνοῦντος καὶ τοῦ ἀκούοντος ἀέρος πληττομένου, σφαιροειδῶς εἶτα κυματομένου, καὶ ταῖς ἀκοαῖς προσπίπτοντος, ὡς κυματοῦται τὸ ἐν τῇ δεξαμένῃ ὕδωρ κατὰ κύκλους ὑπὸ τοῦ ἐμβληθέντος λίθου. Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 2. 6. 3: 'Quid enim est vox nisi intentio aeris, linguae formata percussu?' Cf. Pl. *Tim.* 67 B, and Ae. 4. 19. 11.

In the writer's time, the statement that a name 'is nothing but a sound' &c. was by no means a truism. In Egypt, perhaps not one man in a hundred would have admitted it; for in that country especially, the belief in the magic or theurgic potency of sacred names was prevalent among Pagans, Jews, and Christians alike.

Spiritus (πνεῦμα or πνοή) here means 'breath', and has nothing to do with the cosmic πνεῦμα spoken of in ch. 17 a.

ut esset in homine necessarium vocis auriumque commercium. Each word must be limited to a few syllables; for if words of unlimited length were admitted, speech would become impossible.

simul . . . et sensus et spiritus et aeris (nomina) et omnia in his aut per haec aut de his nomen est totum dei.

¹ Cf. ἀγιασθήτω τὸ ὄνομά σου in the Lord's Prayer.

It is necessary to read *omnia* (sc. *nomina*) in place of *omnium*. The writer might have said that the true name of God is made up of *omnium nomina*, 'the names of all things'; but if that had been his meaning, he could not have added *in his aut per haec aut de his*. The word *his* refers to *sensus et spiritus et aeris*; and it is not all *things*, but (as we have just been told) all *names*, that are connected with thought, breath, and air. Names are *in sensu* (dependent on?) the thought which they express): they are *per spiritum* (produced by means of the breath); and they are *de* (or *ex*) *aere* (made of air).

innomine(m) vel potius omninomine(m). Cf. *Corp.* V. 10 a: *ὀνόματα ἔχει ἅπαντα . . . καὶ . . . ὄνομα οὐκ ἔχει.* Lactant. *Div. inst.* 1. 6. 4: (*Trismegistus deum*) *ἀνόνημον esse dixit* &c. Compare Justin *Apol.* 1. 10. 1: *θεῶ . . . τῷ μηδενὶ ὀνόματι θεῶ καλουμένῳ.* *Ib.* 2. 5 (6). 1: the daemons worshipped by the Pagans have individual person-names; *ὄνομα δὲ τῷ πάντων πατρὶ θεόν, ἀγεννήτῳ ὄντι, οὐκ ἔστιν ᾧ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὄνομά τι προσαγορεύηται, πρεσβύτερον ἔχει τὸν θέμενον τὸ ὄνομα, τὸ δὲ πατήρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ κτίστης καὶ κύριος καὶ δεσπότης οὐκ ὀνόματά ἐστιν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῶν εὐποιοῦν καὶ τῶν ἔργων προσρήσεις.* Minucius Felix (Baehrens, 1886) 18. 9: 'Magnitudinem dei qui se putat nosse, minuit; qui non vult minuere, non ἴnovit'. Nec nomen deo quaeras: 'deus nomen est'. Illic vocabulis opus est, cum per singulos propriis appellationum insignibus multitudo dirimenda est: deo, qui (*legendum* quia?) solus est, 'dei vocabulum totum est'. Quem si patrem dixerō, carnalem opineris; si regem, terrenum suspiceris; si dominum, intellegas utique mortalem. Aufer additamenta nominum, et perspicies eius claritatem.' Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 5. 12. 82: The One is *ἀνόνημαστον*· *κἂν ὀνομάζωμεν αὐτό ποτε οὐ κυρίως καλοῦντες ἦτοι ἐν ἡ τὰγαθὸν ἢ νοῦν ἢ αὐτὸ τὸ ὄν ἢ πατέρα ἢ θεὸν ἢ δημιουργὸν ἢ κύριον, οὐχ ὡς ὄνομα αὐτοῦ προφερόμενοι λέγομεν, ὑπὸ δὲ ἀπορίας ὀνόμασι καλοῖς προσχρώμεθα, ἵν' ἔχη ἡ διάνοια, μὴ περὶ ἄλλα πλανωμένη, ἐπερείδουσαι τούτοις, οὐ γὰρ τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον μνηστικὸν τοῦ θεοῦ, ἀλλὰ ἀθρώως ἅπαντα ἐνδεικτικὰ τῆς τοῦ παντοκράτορος δυνάμεως.* The Christian writers and the Hermetists must have derived the thought from a common Pagan source; and perhaps the ultimate source may have been Egyptian. Brugsch (*Rel. und Myth. der alten Aegypter*, p. 97) quotes from Egyptian documents: 'No man knows how to name him.'—'His name remains hidden.'—'His name is a secret for his children.'—'His names are numberless.'—'Many are his names, no one knows their number.' Isis ὑπὸ τῶν πολλῶν

μυριώνυμος κέκληται (Plut. *Is. et Os.* 53); and a dedication *Isidī Myrionimae* occurs in *C. I. L.* III. 882 (from Dacia).

20 b. solus omni utriusque (solus ut omnia utraque MSS.) sexus fecunditate plenissimus.—21. Utriusque sexus ergo deum dicis? God is ἀρσενόθηλος. Cf. *Corp.* I. 9: ὁ δὲ νοῦς . . . ἀρρενόθηλος ὦν. *Id.* 15: ἀρρενόθηλος δὲ ὦν (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) ἐξ ἀρρενοθήλεος ὄντος τοῦ πατρός. (The 'bisexual father' of the Archanthropos is ὁ πάντων πατήρ, the supreme God.)

This notion, as well as that of the 'deus innominis vel potius omninominis' in the preceding paragraph, may have been derived from Egyptian sources.¹ In ancient Egyptian documents, the progenitor of the universe is described as bisexual. Thus in the cosmogony of Heliopolis (Breasted, *Hist. Eg.* p. 56) it was told of Tum, the Demiurgus who emerged from the primordial waters, that *from himself* he begat four children, namely, Shu (the atmosphere) and Tefnut (the twin-sister and consort of Shu), Qeb or Seb (the earth), and Nut (the sky). Wiedemann (*Rel. of Anc. Eg.*, Eng. tr., p. 32, n. 3, where references are given) says that 'this account is most completely preserved in the copy of a papyrus dating 306-305 B. C.; but its main point is alluded to in texts of the Old Kingdom, and of the beginning of the New Kingdom'. Brugsch, *Rel. und Myth.* p. 423, gives a translation of a text of the sixth Dynasty, about 2500 B. C. (Maspero, *Pyr. Unas* 465 f.), in which the act of bisexual procreation by which the children of Tum were produced is explicitly described; and a similar description of it occurs in the hieratic papyrus (Brit. Mus. 10188, Budge *Pr.* 1886, p. 22) quoted by Brugsch *ib.* pp. 740 and 756.² Ikhnaton, 1375-1358 B. C. (Breasted, *Hist. Eg.* p. 376) called his sun-god

¹ The notion of a bisexual deity occurs in the religions of Asia Minor also. See the myth of the bisexual Agdistis, reported by Pausanias (7. 17. 5) in connexion with the Phrygian cult of Cybele and Attis. The notion of an Aphroditos (i. e. a male aspect or counterpart of Aphrodite), whence the 'Hermaphroditos' of Greek plastic art was derived, seems to have been indigenous in Cyprus and Asia Minor (Preller, *Gr. Mythologie*, p. 509). But the sources of a Hermetic document are more likely to have been Egyptian than Anatolian.

² According to this document, Tum thus generated Shu and Tefnut, and by Shu and Tefnut were generated Qeb and Nut (earth and sky).

Did this primitive myth arise out of a cult-rite, or magical practice, in which an act resembling that which the documents attribute to the god was done (or simulated) by the priest? The god is said to have done the deed 'in the city of On (Heliopolis)'; the meaning of this, as of the many similar localizations of a divine act, must surely be that the god's worshippers were in the habit of doing at his temple in that city something which was explained as a symbolical repetition or commemoration of a deed originally done by the god himself.

Aton 'the father and the mother of all that he has made'. Brugsch *ib.* p. 197 quotes from ancient Egyptian documents: 'God is father and mother.'—'God begets and is not begotten; he bears offspring, and is not born.'—'He begets himself (as father) and bears himself (as mother).' *ib.* p. 314, an inscription in the temple at Esne-Latopolis in Upper Egypt: 'Neith, the ancient, the Mother of God, the mistress of Esne, the father of the fathers, the mother of the mothers, . . . that which exists in the beginning.' In a text from Philae (Brugsch *ib.* p. 113), Khnum, the god recognized as Demiurgus¹ in Upper Egypt, is described as 'the mighty spirit (*baï*) who has made that which exists, who has fashioned that which reveals itself, the beginning of existing things, the father of the fathers, the mother of the mothers'. Amélineau, *Gnost. ég.* p. 291 f., quotes or refers to other Egyptian texts to the same effect, and remarks of some of them that 'si du dieu père on dit qu'il enfante, en joignant pour déterminatif à l'idée d'enfanter une femme en travail, on dit aussi de la déesse mère qu'elle engendre, et l'idée de la génération est déterminée par le phallus. Il y a donc identification complète des deux puissances'.

Among the Greeks, the notion of a bisexual progenitor of the Kosmos makes its appearance in the Orphic Theogonia, in which Phanes-Erikepaïos² (the Orphic equivalent of the Heliopolitan Tum), the Protogonos who issued from the primordial Egg, was described as *ἀρσενόθηλυς*. Apion, in Clem. *Homil.* 6. 4, p. 672 (Abel *Orphica* 38): *ἐνδοθεν γὰρ τῆς περιφερείας (of the egg) ζῶν τι ἀρσενόθηλυ εἰδοποιεῖται προνοία τοῦ ἐνότος ἐν αὐτῷ θείου πνεύματος, ὃν Φάνητα Ὀρφεὺς καλεῖ. Ib.: τὸ ἐκ τῆς ἀπείρου ὕλης κατ' ἐπιτυχίαν κράσεως ἀποκνηθὲν ἔμψυχον ῥόν, οὗ βαγέντος κατὰ τινὰς ἀρσενόθηλυ ἐξέθορον Φάνης. Clem. *Recogn.* 10. 30: '(Orpheus dicit) ipsum Chaos . . ., quasi ad ovi immanis modum per immensa tempora effectum, peperisse ac protulisse ex se duplicem quandam speciem, quam illi masculofeminam vocant; . . . et hoc esse principium omnium.' *Ib.* 10. 7. 316: 'aiunt . . . quasi intra ovi testam fotum vivifactumque esse animal quoddam, disruptoque post haec immani illo globo processisse speciem quandam hominis duplicis formae,*

¹ Khnum is described as 'He who in the beginning fashioned this world with his hands', Brugsch *ib.*

² The name *Ἐρικεπαῖος* occurs, as far as I know, only in late documents. It is probably of Egyptian origin; and the Orphici may have borrowed it from Egyptians in the Ptolemaic or Roman period. There is evidence that the name Phanes was used by Orphici as early as the third century B.C. (Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 408 f.).

quam illi masculofeminam vocant. Hunc etiam Phaneta nominarunt.' Proclus *In Tim.* 2. 130 F (Abel *Orph.* 62): καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ πρώτῳ τὸ θῆλυ καὶ τὸ ἄρρεν, ὡς ζῶψ πρώτῳ. "Θῆλυς καὶ γενέτωρ κρατερὸς θεὸς Ἡρκεπαῖος," φησὶν ὁ θεολόγος (i. e. Orpheus). Proclus *ib.* 2. 137 B (Abel 73 and 94). The same deity is named διφυῆς (i. e. ἀρσενόθηλυς) "Ἐρως in Orph. *Argonaut.* 14. The Orphic Zeus, who swallowed Phanes, and generated or created all that now exists, was also described as bisexual. Pseudo-Aristot. *De mundo* 7. 401 b 2 = Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 3. 9 (Abel 46 and 123): Ζεὺς ἄρσην γένετο, Ζεὺς ἄμβροτος ἐπλετο νύμφῃ. Lactantius (*Div. inst.* 4. 8. 3 ff.) speaks of the agreement of 'Orpheus' and 'Hermes' as to the bisexuality of God. There can, I think, be little doubt that the Orphic notion of a bisexual progenitor of the universe was derived from Egypt; did the Hermetists take over the conception from the Orphici, or did it pass to them from the Egyptian priests by a more direct route?

Another instance occurs in Philostratus *Vita Apollon.* 3. 34: (Apollonius:) Ζῶψ ἡγγῶμαι τὸν κόσμον; (Indian sage:) Ἦν γε ὑγιῶς γινώσκῃς· αὐτὸς γὰρ ζωογονεῖ πάντα. (Apoll.): Θῆλυν αὐτὸν καλῶμεν, ἢ τῆς ἄρσενός τε καὶ ἀντικειμένης φύσεως; (Ind.): Ἀμφὸν αὐτὸς γὰρ αὐτῷ ἐγγυγνόμενος τὰ μητρός τε καὶ πατρὸς ἐς τὴν ζωογονίαν πράττει, ἔρωτά τε ἑαυτοῦ ἴσχει θερμότερον ἢ ἕτερόν τι ἑτέρου, ὃς ἀρμόττει αὐτὸν καὶ ξυνίστησιν. The doctrine which Philostratus attributes to his Indian philosopher is probably Graeco-Egyptian. But it is the Kosmos (the God of the Stoics), and not the supracosmic God of the Platonists and Hermetists, that is there described as bisexual. Something of the sort may very well have been said, for instance, by the Egyptian Stoic Chaereon.

Philo, *De ebrietate* 8. 30, Wendl. II, p. 176, describes the Creation as an act of sexual generation, and comes near to calling the Creator bisexual: τὸν γοῦν τόδε τὸ πᾶν ἐργασάμενον δημιουργὸν ὁμοῦ καὶ πατέρα εἶναι τοῦ γεγονότος . . . φήσομεν, μητέρα δὲ τὴν τοῦ πεποιηκότος ἐπιστήμην, ἣ συνὼν ὁ θεός, οὐχ ὡς ἄνθρωπος, ἔσπειρε γένεσιν· ἢ δέ, παραδεξαμένη τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ σπέρματα, τελεσφόρους ὠδίσι τὸν μόνον καὶ ἀγαπητὸν αἰσθητὸν υἱὸν ἀπεκύησε, τότε τὸν κόσμον.

The notion that God is bisexual was adopted by some of the Gnostic sects. Simon Magus, in Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 6. 18: οὗτος ἐστὶν ὁ ἐστῶς, στάς, στησόμενος, ὢν ἀρσενόθηλυς δύναμις . . . ὡς οὖν αὐτὸς ἑαυτὸν ὑπὸ ἑαυτοῦ προαγαγὼν ἐφανέρωσεν ἑαυτῷ τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπίνοιαν, οὕτως καὶ ἡ φανείσα ἐπίνοια . . ., ἰδοῦσα αὐτόν, ἐνέκρυψε τὸν πατέρα ἐν ἑαυτῇ, . . . καὶ ἔστιν ἀρσενόθηλυς δύναμις καὶ (ἢ)

ἐπίνοια.¹ Monoimus, Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 8. 12 : αὐτῆ (sc. the primal Monas) μήτηρ, αὐτῆ πατήρ, τὰ δύο ἀθάνατα ὀνόματα. And instances of it occur in the writings of orthodox Christians also; e. g. Clem. Alex. *Quis dīves salvetur* 37 : θεῶ τὰ τῆς ἀγαπῆς μυστήρια, καὶ τότε ἐποπτεύσεις τὸν κόλπον τοῦ πατρός, ὃν ὁ μονογενῆς θεὸς μόνος ἐξηγήσατο (*Ev. Joh.* I. 18). . . . καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄρρητον αὐτοῦ πατήρ, τὸ δὲ εἰς ἡμᾶς συμπαθὲς γέγονε μήτηρ. ἀγαπήσας ὁ πατήρ ἐθελύθη· καὶ τούτου μέγα σημεῖον, ὃν αὐτὸς ἐγέννησεν ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

The writer of *Ascl.* III seems to have two distinct reasons for asserting the bisexuality of God. In the first place, this passage is a polemic against dualistic doctrines such as that which is set forth in *Ascl.* II. In that document, the male and female principles are separate and distinct; God is the Father, and ὕλη is the Mother; the Kosmos issues from the combined productivity of God and ὕλη; and the evil in it is produced by ὕλη. On the other hand, in *Ascl.* III. 20 f., God includes in himself the male and female principles together, so that no productive function is left for ὕλη.

In the second place, the writer seeks to justify and sanctify by the divine example the usage of human marriage and procreation, in opposition to the ascetic exaltation of celibacy, which was held to be the higher state by many people of his time, especially in Egypt. The disposition to regard sexual intercourse as impure and degrading found support in the dualistic doctrine; for if matter is evil, or the cause of evil, the aim of man must be to sever himself from everything that is connected with the body, and polluted by the taint of matter. The Hermetist then is contending both against a dualistic cosmology, and against the ascetic ideal to which that doctrine gave support.

There is little evidence that abstinence from sexual intercourse was favoured by the official religion of Egypt. Chaeremon (Porphyry. *De abst.* 4. 6) says that the Egyptian priests abstained from it during the 'purification' required of them before and during the course of their turn of temple-service, but not at other times. But he describes the life of the priests as in other respects a life of extreme austerity. That is certainly not true of the Egyptian priests in general; but Chaeremon's statement may perhaps be

¹ A simpler and clearer statement of a similar doctrine occurs in an extract from a heretical document, Clem. *Strom.* 3. 4. 29 : ἐν ἧν τὰ πάντα· ἐπεὶ δὲ ἔδοξεν αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνόητι μὴ εἶναι μόνη, ἐξῆλθεν ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐπί[π]νοια· καὶ ἐκοινωνήσεν αὐτῇ, καὶ ἐποίησεν τὸν ἀγαπητόν.

accepted as evidence that there were among them in his time (c. A. D. 50) certain groups in which there prevailed an ascetic ideal which would naturally tend to the rejection of marriage. Philo's description of the Therapeutae shows that there were in Egypt communities of Jews who practised extreme asceticism, including abstinence from sexual intercourse. Philo himself regards their mode of life with admiration; and he says that Egypt is the special home of those who live 'the contemplative life', i. e. a life resembling that of his Therapeutae.¹

Among the Greeks, the Orphici and the Pythagoreans, from the latter part of the sixth century B. C. onwards, held views of which the rejection of marriage was a logical outcome. (In Euripides, *Hippol.* 952, Hippolytus, the scorner of Aphrodite, is described by his father as an Orphicus.) Plato adopted and formulated much of the doctrine which underlay the ascetic practices of these sects. Plato himself, however, was far from condemning sexual intercourse. In his writings we find, side by side with the *σῶμα-σῆμα* doctrine of the Orphici and Pythagoreans, such a passage as *Sympos.* 206 c: 'This procreation is the union of man and woman, and is a divine thing; for conception and generation are an immortal principle in the mortal creature.' Cf. *Pl. Laws* 6. 773 E and 776 B concerning marriage. But some of the later Platonists and Pythagoreans developed the ascetic tendency of Plato's depreciation of τὰ αἰσθητά into a *contemptus mundi* which went far beyond Plato's own position. Plotinus contended against the extreme views of those who maintained that the material Kosmos is evil; yet he himself 'seemed to be ashamed that he was in a body' (*Porphy. Vita Plotini init.*)²

¹ Philo *De vita contempl.* 3, 21, Cohn VI, p. 51: πολλαχοῦ μὲν οὖν τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐστὶ ἐτὸ γένος (sc. τῶν θεραπευτῶν),—ἔδει γὰρ ἀγαθοῦ τελείου μετασχεῖν καὶ τὴν Ἑλλάδα καὶ τὴν Βάρβαρον,—πλεονάζει δὲ ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ καθ' ἕκαστον τῶν ἐπικαλουμένων νομῶν, καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τὴν Ἀλεξάνδρειαν. Philo cannot have meant to say that communities of men whose way of life was in all details similar to that which he goes on to describe were to be found in every nome of Egypt, and in Greece and many other countries. He must be here using the term *θεραπευταί* in a more general sense; and his meaning must be that groups of ascetic mystics (such as the Orphic fraternities, for instance,) were to be found in many lands, but nowhere in such abundance as in Egypt.

² A Pagan exaltation of virginity, similar in tone to many Christian utterances on the subject, occurs in a poem on marriage addressed to a young lady by an unknown writer named Naumachius (*Stob.* 4, 22, 32, vol. iv, p. 514 Hense): καλὸν μὲν δέμας. ἀγρὸν ἔχειν ἀμῆτὰ τε μῦναι | παρθενικὴν, καθαροῖσιν τ' αἰεὶ μελεδήμασι χαίρειν, | μήτε Ἰβαρυτῶν (βαρύτλητον Rohde) λαγόνων περὶ φόρτον ἄγουσαν, | μήτε πόνον τρομέουσαν ἀγάστονον Εἰλειθυίης, | ἀλλ' ἦσθαι βασιλείαν ἀφανῶν θηλυτε-

The Stoics, who had no feud with matter, and no aspiration to escape from the world we live in, steadily advocated marriage; see e.g. the extracts from Antipater, Musonius, and Hierocles in Stobaeus 4, cap. 22, *Περὶ γάμου*, Hense IV, pp. 497-512. But their attitude towards it differed from that of the author of *Ascl. III*. They regarded marriage as a matter of social obligation,—a duty which a man owes to his family, to his country, and to 'the city of the universe'.¹ The Stoic view is expressed in Ocellus Lucanus (first century B. C.?) 4. 3, Mullach *Fr. Rh. Gr.* I, p. 402: μέρος ὑπάρχων (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) οἴκου τε καὶ πόλεως καί, τὸ μέγιστον, κόσμον, συμπληροῦν ὀφείλει τὸ ἀπογινόμενον τούτων ἕκαστον, ἐὰν μέλλῃ μήτε συγγενικῆς ἐστίας λειποτάκτης γίνεσθαι, μήτε πολιτικῆς, μήτε μὴν τῆς θείας. οἱ γὰρ καθάπαξ μὴ διὰ παιδοποιίαν συναπτόμενοι ἀδικήσουσι τὰ τιμώτατα τῆς κοινωνίας συστήματα. The writer of *Ascl. III*, on the other hand, is, like most of the other Hermetists, little interested in social relations; he speaks of sexual intercourse as a 'sacrament', and treats it as a thing which, like all else, derives its significance from the relation between man and God.

Among the Christians, from the second century onwards, if not earlier,² there was a strong and increasing tendency to depreciate marriage, and to assert the higher sanctity of a celibate life. Clement of Alexandria discusses marriage in *Strom.* 2. 23. 137—3. 18. 110. Clement himself holds marriage in high esteem (provided that it is used rightly, and with due regard for σωφροσύνη or ἐγκράτεια),³ and puts married life and celibacy on a par.⁴ But in the greater

ράων, | ψυχῆς ὄμμα φαεινὸν ὑπὲρ βίβιοιο χέουσαν, | ἔνθα γάμοι κεδνοὶ καὶ ἀληθές, ἔνθα μγείσα | θεσπέσιος ἐπέεσι νοήματα φάεα τίκτει. The writer goes on to speak of marriage as a δεύτερος πλοῦς.

¹ Hierocles, however, speaks in a tone more nearly resembling that of *Ascl. III*, when he says (Stob. IV, p. 505 Hense) that that which makes a house truly beautiful is ζεύγος ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς συγκαθειμαρμένων ἀλλήλοις καὶ καθιερωμένων θεοῖς γαμηλίους γενεθλίους ἐφεστίους, συμφωνούντων μὲν ἀλλήλοις καὶ πάντα κοινὰ πεποιημένων μέχρι καὶ τῶν σαμάτων, μᾶλλον δὲ καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν ψυχῶν, κ.τ.λ.

² There were already Christians who forbade marriage at the time when the 1st Epistle to Timothy was written. 1 *Τιμ.* 4. 1-3: ἐν ὑστέροις καιροῖς ἀποστήσονται τινες τῆς πίστεως, . . . ἐν ὑποκρίσει ψευδολόγων, . . . κωλύοντων γαμεῖν κ.τ.λ. (This, though expressed in the form of a prediction, implies that the doctrine spoken of was taught by some at the time of writing.)

³ E. g. 3. 6. 46: τῶν ἀγιασθέντων ἁγίων οἶμαι καὶ τὸ σπέρμα. 3. 9. 66: ὁ γάμος συνεργάζεται τι τῇ κτίσει. 3. 12. 84: ἅγιος ὁ γάμος. 3. 17. 103: ἀγία ἡ γένεσις, δι' ἣν ὁ κόσμος συνίστηκεν, κ.τ.λ. (with reference to human procreation).

⁴ 3. 9. 67: κύριος ἕκαστος ἡμῶν τυγχάνει τῆς περὶ τέκνων γονῆς αἰρέσεως (i. e. each of us is free to marry and beget children or not, as he thinks best). 3. 12. 79: ἔχει γὰρ, ὡς περ ἡ εὐνουχία (celibacy), οὕτω καὶ ὁ γάμος ἰδίας λειτουργίας καὶ διακονίας τῷ κυρίῳ διαφερούσας. 3. 12. 86: Clement says that St. Paul's epistles οὐδαμῶ γάμον ἠθέτησαν τὸν σώφρονα, ἀλλὰ . . . ἀποδέχονται ἐκάτερον, τὸν τε εὐχαρίστως τῷ θεῷ

part of this discussion, Clement is occupied in contending against the opposite aberrations of two different classes of heretics,—on the one hand, those who permitted extreme sexual licence,¹ and on the other hand, those who regarded all procreation as evil, and called marriage *πορνεία*. Among the latter, he speaks especially of Marcion and Tatianus.² Clem. *Strom.* 3. 3. 12: οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ Μαρκίωνος (τὴν?) φύσιν³ (ὑπειλίφασιν) κακὴν, ἔκ τε ὕλης κακῆς καὶ ἐκ δικαίου⁴ γενομένην δημιουργοῦ· ᾧ δὴ λόγῳ, μὴ βουλόμενοι τὸν κόσμον τὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ γερόμενον συμπληροῦν, ἀπέχεσθαι γάμου βούλονται, ἀντιτασσόμενοι τῷ ποιητῇ τῷ σφῶν, καὶ σπεύδοντες πρὸς τὸν κεκληκότα ἀγαθόν.⁵ 3. 3. 21: δεδείχθαι ἡμῖν νομίζω τὰς ἀφορμὰς τῶν ξένων δογμάτων τὸν Μαρκίωνα παρὰ Πλάτωνος ἀχαρίστως τε καὶ ἀμαθῶς εἰληφέναι.⁶ 3. 6. 45: τοῖς δὲ εὐφήμεως δι' ἐγκρατείας ἀσεβοῦσιν εἰς τε τὴν κτίσιν καὶ τὸν ἄγιον δημιουργόν, τὸν παντοκράτορα μόνον θεόν, καὶ διδάσκουσι μὴ δεῖν παραδέχεσθαι γάμον καὶ παιδοποιίαν, μηδὲ ἀντεισάγειν τῷ κόσμῳ δυστυχήσοντας ἐτέρους, μηδὲ ἐπιχορηγεῖν τῷ θανάτῳ τροφήν. 3. 6. 46: μαρὰν δὲ εἶναι τὴν συνουσίαν λέγοντες. 3. 6. 49: εἰσὶν ἅ οἱ πορνείαν ἀντικρυς τὸν γάμον λέγουσι, καὶ ὑπὸ τοῦ διαβόλου ταύτην παραδιδόσθαι δογματίζουσι.⁷ Some of these opponents of marriage quoted in support of their view certain sayings

γάμῳ κεχρημένον σωφρόνως, τὸν τε εὐνουχία ὡς ὁ κύριος βούλεται συμβιοῦντα. 3. 12. 88: ἄμφω γὰρ ἅγιοι ἐν κυρίῳ, ἡ μὲν ὡς γυνή, ἡ δὲ ὡς παρθένος.

¹ We know little of the teaching of these sects except what is said about them by their orthodox opponents. It is probable that, if we had their own writings before us, we should find that some of them agreed with the author of *Ascl.* III in regarding sexual intercourse as a 'sacrament',—a view which is not necessarily inconsistent with *σωφροσύνη*; and statements in which they are accused of profligate excesses should be received with caution.

² Cf. Irenaeus *Adv. haer.* 1. 28. 1 (Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 4. 29): τὸν γάμον τε φθορὰν καὶ πορνείαν παραπλησίως Μαρκίῳ καὶ Σατορνίνῳ ἀναγορεύσας (Τατιανός). Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 7. 28: Satomilus τὸ γαμεῖν καὶ γεννᾶν ἀπὸ τοῦ Σατανᾶ φησὶν εἶναι.

³ I. e. the material world, and the human body as a part of it.

⁴ Marcion's Demiurgus (the God of the Jews) was 'just', but not 'good'.

⁵ I. e. to the supreme God, who is 'good'.

⁶ That is, Clement regards the teaching of Marcion on this subject (just as Plotinus 2. 9 regards that of the Gnostic 'enemies of the Kosmos' against whom he argues) as a perverted development of Platonism.

⁷ An extreme repugnance to procreation was taught by Mani, whose doctrine on this subject was probably derived, in part at least, from followers of Marcion and Tatianus, or from Gnostic sects of like character. Augustine *Adv. Faust.* 15, p. 278, addressing a Manichaean, says 'didicisti inimicos deputare parentes tuos, quod te per concubitum in carne ligaverint, et hoc modo utique deo tuo immundas compedes imposuerint'. *Ib.* 19, p. 331: 'Opinantur diabolum fecisse atque iunxisse masculum et feminam.' Augustine *Adv. Secundum* 21: 'Displicet "crescite et multiplicamini"; ne Dei vestri multiplicentur ergastula.' Alexander Lycopol. 4: the Manichaeans bade men ἀπέχεσθαι γάμων καὶ ἀφροδισίων καὶ τεκνοποιίας, ἵνα μὴ ἡ δύναμις (the divine life-force) ἐνοικήσῃ τῇ ὕλῃ κατὰ τὴν τοῦ γένους διαδοχὴν.

of Jesus reported in the 'Gospel according to the Egyptians' (*Strom.* 3, §§ 45, 63, 66, 92); whence it would seem that the group of Egyptian Christians among whom that Gospel originated regarded marriage with disapproval.

Tertullian (*Exhort. cast.*) said that God tolerates matrimony, but prefers virginity; and the general opinion of orthodox Christians in the third century seems to have been that expressed by Cyprian (*De hab. virg.* 21), who held that virginity cannot be made incumbent on all believers, but is a counsel of perfection. But there were some among the orthodox,¹ and many in the heretical sects, who went to greater lengths in their rejection of sexual intercourse. Probably then the assertion of the sanctity of procreation in *Ascl.* III is directed especially against the Christians, whom in the subsequent Prophecy (ch. 25) the writer describes as 'scorning the Kosmos', and 'preferring death to life'.

Compare *Corp.* II. 17 a (on παιδοποιία), and *Corp.* XI. ii. 14 a.

semper [voluntatis] (bonitatis) **praegnans** suae. *Bonitas* (ἀγαθότης) might have been translated 'bounty'. The 'goodness' of which the writer is thinking is that which is manifested in the production of living creatures.

Voluntas eius (eadem) **est bonitas omnis**. Cf. ch. 26 b: 'Dei enim natura consilium est bonita(tis), . . . vult autem omnia bona.'

et futuris omnibus dehinc (sicuti sunt et fuerunt) **natura[m] ex se nascendi sufficiat**. The reading is doubtful; but it seems clear that the words *sicuti sunt et fuerunt* must be closely connected with *futuris dehinc*. I suppose *natura ex se nascendi* to mean the power of reproduction which all mortal things possess, and by which the race is maintained in existence, though the individuals perish. It is in virtue of this power that *omnia* (sc. *genera*, not individuals,) *futura sunt dehinc sicuti sunt et fuerunt*. The process by which this reproduction is effected, i. e. the process of sexual procreation, is an 'image', or temporal and cosmic manifestation, of the eternal productivity of God. Compare *Gen.* 1. 27 f.,² ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ ἐποίησεν αὐτούς, κ.τ.λ. A Jew who had adopted the Egyptian notion of a bisexual God might argue from this text that if the human race is ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ, and is (in that

¹ Hippolytus, *Ref. haer.* 8. 20, speaks of men who 'call themselves Ἐγκραῖται', and says that they 'agree with the Church concerning God and Christ', but profess to live a holier life than other Christians, ἐαυτοὺς διὰ βρωμάτων δοξάζειν νομίζοντες, ἀπεχόμενοι ἐμψύχων, ὑδροποτοῦντες, καὶ γαμῖν κωλύοντες.

² See note on *Corp.* I. 12.

respect) made κατ' εικόνα θεοῦ, God must be ἄρρεν καὶ θήλυ. Had the writer of *Ascl.* III met with an argument of Jewish origin to this effect?

Cyprian *De habitu virgin.* says that virginity is 'Dei imago, respondens ad sanctimoniam Domini'. That is exactly the opposite of the Hermetist's doctrine.

21. **omnia animalia et inanimalia.** *Inanimalia* (ἄψυχα) must mean vegetables; see *Ascl.* I. 4. The existence of the two sexes, or something corresponding to them, in plants was recognized by some ancient writers, though the mode of reproduction of plants was not clearly understood. Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. tr. vol. ii, p. 34, refers to several passages in *De gen. an.* and *Hist. an.*, and sums up the view of Aristotle thus: 'The sexes have not attained to separate existence (in plants); . . . they remain in the condition of perpetual union of the sexes.' The question εἰ εὐρίσκεται ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς γένος θήλυ καὶ γένος ἄρρεν is discussed in Ps.-Aristot. *Περὶ φυτῶν* I. 2. Theophrastus spoke of male and female plants.

et 'in naturam et sensum et naturam.' From the following words *et mundum* &c., it may be inferred that the lost clause which stood here began with *et deum* or *et in deo*, and contained some mention of the creative energy of God.

et mundum dico in se continere naturam. *Natura* must here mean procreative power; i. e. it must be equivalent to *natura ex se nascendi* above. Perhaps some word or phrase by which this sense was more clearly indicated has dropped out.

eius utriusque conexio aut, quod est verius, unitas. In God, the two procreative functions are eternally united. In mortal races, they are divided, each individual being either male or female; but in the act of procreation, the separation ceases, and male and female become one, as God is one. Cf. the speech of Aristophanes in *Pl. Sympos.* 189 C-193 D: e. g. ἔστι δὴ οὖν . . . ὁ ἔρως ἔμφυτος ἀλλήλων τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, . . . ἐπιχειρῶν ποιῆσαι ἐν ἐκ δυοῖν. *Gen.* 2. 24: ἔσονται οἱ δύο εἰς σάρκα μίαν. Philo *De opif. mundi* 53. 152: ἔρως δ' ἐπιγενόμενος καθάπερ ἐνὸς ζῶον διττὰ τμήματα διεσθηκῶτα συναγαγὼν εἰς ταῦτόν ἀρμόττεται, πόθον ἐνιδρυσάμενος ἐκατέρῳ τῆς πρὸς θάτερον κοινωνίας εἰς τὴν τοῦ ὁμοίου γένεσιν. But in what follows, Philo asserts that ascetic doctrine against which the polemic of *Ascl.* III is directed; for he adds ὁ δὲ πόθος οὗτος καὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων ἡδονὴν ἐγέννησεν, ἥτις ἐστὶν ἀδικημάτων καὶ παρανομημάτων ἀρχή, δι' ἣν ὑπαλλάττονται τὸν θνητὸν καὶ κακοδαίμονα βίον ἀντ' ἀθανάτου καὶ εὐδαίμονος. Elsewhere, Philo, like the writer of *Ascl.* III, speaks of human

procreation as an imitation of the creative energy of God; e.g. *De decalogo* 12. 51, Cohn IV, p. 280, speaking of the first five Commandments, he says: εἶναι τῆς μίας γραφῆς τὴν μὲν ἀρχὴν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα καὶ ποιητὴν τοῦ παντός, τὸ δὲ τέλος γονεῖς, οἱ μιμούμενοι τὴν ἐκείνου φύσιν γενῶσι τοὺς ἐπὶ μέρους. *Ib.* 22. 107: τῶν γονέων ἡ φύσις ἀθανάτου καὶ θνητῆς οὐσίας ἔοικεν εἶναι μεθόριος, θνητῆς μὲν . . . , ἀθανάτου δὲ διὰ τὴν τοῦ γεννᾶν πρὸς θεὸν τὸν γεννητὴν τῶν ὄλων ἐξομοίωσιν. *Ib.* 23. 111, Philo speaks of human parents as τοὺς ἐκ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος εἰς τὸ εἶναι παραγαγόντας, καὶ κατὰ τοῦτο μιμησαμένους θεόν. *Ib.* 23. 120: τῶν δ' εὐτολμοτέρων ἀποσεμνύνοντες τὸ γονέων ὄνομά φασί τινες, ὡς ἄρα πατὴρ καὶ μήτηρ ἐμφανεῖς εἰσι θεοί, μιμούμενοι τὸν ἀγέννητον ἐν τῷ ἔξοπλαστῆν.

Plutarch speaks of love and marriage in a tone not unlike that of *Ascl.* III; but he dwells on the *κοινωνία βίου* as well as the act of procreation, whereas the Hermetist here confines his attention chiefly to the latter, and hints at the former only in a passing phrase (*summa caritas* &c.) *Plut. Amatorius* 5. 9: τὸν γαμήλιον ἐκείνον (ἔρωτα) καὶ σύνεργον ἀθανασίας τῷ θνητῷ γένει, σβεννυμένην ἡμῶν τὴν φύσιν εὐθὺς ἐξανάπτοντα διὰ τῶν γενέσεων. *Ib.* 16. 3 ff.: ἔρωσ is a kind of ἐνθουσιασμός. *Ib.* 17. 21: Love is an initiation; ἐγὼ δὲ ὄρω τοῖς ἔρωτος ὄργασταῖς καὶ μύσταῖς ἐν Ἄιδου βελτίονα μοῖραν οὖσαν. *Ib.* 23. 6: ἀλλὰ γυναιξί γε γαμεταῖς ἀρχαὶ ταῦτα φιλίας, ὡσπερ ἱερῶν μεγάλων κοινωνήματα. καὶ τὸ τῆς ἡδονῆς μικρόν' ἢ δὲ ἀπὸ ταύτης ἀναβλαστάνουσα καθ' ἡμέραν τιμὴ καὶ χάρις καὶ ἀγάπησις ἀλλήλων καὶ πίστις κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* 24. 3: αὕτη γὰρ ἔστιν ὡς ἀληθῶς ἢ δι' ὄλων λεγομένη κρᾶσις,¹ ἢ τῶν ἐρώντων' (ἢ δὲ τῶν) ἄλλως συμβιούντων ταῖς κατ' Ἐπίκουρον ἀφαῖς καὶ περιπλοκαῖς ἔοικε, συγκρούσεις λαμβάνουσα καὶ ἀποπηδήσεις, ἐνότητα δὲ οὐ ποιοῦσα τοιαύτην, οἷαν ἔρωσ ποιεῖ, γαμικῆς κοινωνίας ἐπιλαβόμενος. *Ib.* 24. 5: οὕτω γὰρ ἐρᾶν μὲν ὄμβρου γαῖαν οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, καὶ γῆς οὐρανόν, ἐρᾶν δὲ ἡλίου σελήνης οἱ φυσικοί, καὶ συγγίνεσθαι καὶ κνεῖσθαι. καὶ γῆν δέ, ἀνθρώπων μητέρα καὶ ζῴων, καὶ φυτῶν ἀπάντων γένεσιν, οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον ἀπολέσθαι ποτὲ καὶ σβεσθῆναι παντάπασιν, ὅταν ὁ δεῖνός ἔρωσ ἢ ἡμερος τοῦ θεοῦ τὴν ὕλην ἀπολίπη, καὶ παύσῃται ποθοῦσα καὶ διώκουσα τὴν ἐκείθεν ἀρχὴν καὶ κίνησιν; (Plutarch here agrees with the writer of *Ascl.* III in regarding the operation

¹ A technical term of Stoic physics. It was applied to marriage by the Stoic Antipater, about 150 B.C. (*Stob.* IV, p. 508 Hense): αἱ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλαι φιλίαι ἢ φιλοστοργίαι εἰκόασι ταῖς τῶν ὀσπρίων ἢ τινῶν ἄλλων παραπλησίον κατὰ τὰς παραθέσεις μίξεσιν, αἱ δ' ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικὸς ταῖς δι' ὄλων κρᾶσεσιν, ὡς οἶνος (*legendum* οἴνου!) ὕδατι. . . οὐ γὰρ μόνον τῆς οὐσίας (i. e. property) καὶ τῶν φιλιτάτων πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις τέκνον καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν σωματῶν οὗτοι μόνου κοινωνοῦσι.

of productive force throughout the universe as analogous to human procreation; but he works out the analogy differently. Instead of speaking of God as bisexual, he makes God the male principle, and ἴλη the female principle; and it is the aspiration of matter towards union with the creative energy of God that he compares with human love. He expresses the same thought at greater length in *Is. et Os.*) Plut. *Coniug. praecepta* 20 (cf. *Amatorius* 21. 9): καὶ ἡ φύσις μίγνυσι διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἡμᾶς, ἵν' ἐξ ἑκατέρων μέρος λαβοῦσα καὶ συγχέασα, κοινὸν ἀμφοτέροις ἀποδῶ τὸ γινόμενον, ὥστε μηδέτερον διορίσαι μηδὲ διακρίναι τὸ ἴδιον ἢ τὸ ἀλλότριον.

hoc . . . in aeternum procreandi . . . mysterium. Procreation is the means by which a race of mortal beings attains to 'a secondary eternity', i. e. an everlasting existence in time. The word *μυστήριον* here means a ritual act by which man is brought near to God. For the notion that sexual union is a 'mystery' or sacrament in this sense, cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 3, 27: εἰσὶν δ' οἱ τὴν πάνδημον Ἀφροδίτην κοινωνίαν μυστικὴν ἀναγορεύουσιν. . . . οἱ γὰρ τρισάθλιοι τὴν τε σαρκίνην (. . .) «κατὰ¹ (leg. καὶ?) τὴν συνουσιαστικὴν κοινωνίαν ἱεροφαντοῦσι, καὶ ταύτην οἴονται εἰς τὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ ἀνάγειν τοῦ θεοῦ. The Valentinians, as reported by Irenaeus *Adv. haer.* 1. 6. 4, said that they *ιδιόκτητον ἄνωθεν ἀπὸ τῆς ἀρρήτου καὶ ἀνωνομάστου συζυγίας συγκατεληλυθυῖαν ἔχειν τὴν χάριν* . . . διὸ καὶ ἐκ παντὸς τρόπου δεῖν αὐτοῦς αἰεὶ τὸ τῆς συζυγίας μελετᾶν μυστήριον. This notion of the Valentinians may have been derived from the *ἱεροὶ γάμοι* of Pagan mystery-cults.

huius tam blandi necessariumque mysterii. If the act is both *blandum* and *necessarium*, i. e. both desirable and unavoidable, why should it be concealed? The writer answers, because men in general are incapable of recognizing its true sanctity.

ne . . . utriusque naturae divinitas ex commixtione sexus cogatur erubescere. Male and female are made one with each other, and thereby are made one with God; hence, if they are put to shame, God himself is put to shame in them. I suppose that *ex commixtione sexus* is to be connected with *utriusque naturae divinitas* rather than with *cogatur*.

22 a-23 a. God's gift of reason to man. Compare the similar treatment of the same topic by a different writer in *Ascl.* II. 16 a. See also *Ascl.* I. 6 c-7 a.

The mention of *inreligiosi* in ch. 21 *fin.* enables the writer to pass on to what is really a new subject without breach of literary continuity.

22 a. [[unde contingit in multis remanere malitiam.]] The persistence of vice in the many is not caused by the paucity of religious men, but by *defectus prudentiae* in the many; and the words must be transposed accordingly.

ex intellectu . . . rationis divinae, qua constituta sunt omnia. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 6 b: '(νοῦς) humanos . . . sensus ad divinae rationis intellegentiam exornat.'

contemptus ((mundi totius)). Here *contemptus mundi* is good, and *mundus* must therefore be evil. Cf. *vitia mundi* in 22 b. Yet in 27 a, and elsewhere in *Ascl.* III, the *mundus* is good. In ch. 25, the error of the Christians is described by the words 'non admirandus videbitur mundus' &c. *Mundus* in 22 a must mean that which in 22 b is called *pars corruptior mundi*, as opposed to *pars divina*. If the Hermetist used the word κόσμος here as well as in ch. 25, he must have used it in a different sense. But perhaps the Greek for *mundi totius* may have been πάντων τῶν ἰλικῶν, or something of the sort. Even monistic Platonists found themselves compelled to admit that ὕλη is in some sense a source of evil.

perseverante autem inperitia atque inscientia, vitia omnia convalescunt. Cf. *Corp.* X. 8 b: κακία δὲ ψυχῆς ἀγνωσία κ.τ.λ.

disciplina et intellectus. The gift of God by which man is enabled to escape from moral evil is in this passage also called *prudentia scientiaque rerum omnium quae sunt*;—*intellectus rationis divinae qua constituta sunt omnia*;—*intellegentia et disciplina*;—*ratio disciplinaque*;—*prudentia et disciplina*. In ch. 41 b, God confers on man νοῦς (rendered by *sensus*), λόγος (rendered by *ratio*), and γνῶσις (rendered by *intellegentia* and *cognitio*). The corresponding terms in *Ascl.* II. 16 a are *sensus, disciplina, intellegentia*, which probably stand for νοῦς, ἐπιστήμη, γνῶσις.

Cf. Philo, *Quod deus sit immutabilis*, 9. 44 f., Wendland II, p. 66: ἴδωμεν δὲ τίνι τῶν ἄλλων ζῶων ὑπερβέβληκεν ἄνθρωπος. ἐξαίρετον οὗτος τοίνυν γέρας ἔλαχε διάνοιαν, ἢ τὰς ἀπάντων φύσεις σωμάτων τε ὁμοῦ καὶ πραγμάτων εἴωθε καταλαμβάνειν. καθάπερ γὰρ ἐν μὲν τῷ σώματι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ὄψις ἐστίν, . . . τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν τὸ κρατιστεύον ὁ νοῦς· ψυχῆς γὰρ ὄψις οὗτος. . . . τοῦτο τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ εἶδος οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων, ἐξ ὧν τὰ ἄλλα ἀπετελείτο, διεπλάσθη, καθαρωτέρας δὲ καὶ ἀμείνονος ἔλαχε τῆς οὐσίας, ἐξ ἧς αἱ θεῖαι φύσεις ἐδημιουργοῦντο. παρὸ καὶ μόνον τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν εἰκότως ἀφθαρτον ἔδοξεν εἶναι διάνοια. There the words διάνοια and νοῦς correspond to *disciplina et intellectus* &c. in *Ascl.* III. 22 a.

22 b. *cum post deos homines efficeret.* Compare Pl. *Tim.*

41 D-43 A. The making of men is described in the *Kore Kosmu.*

ex parte corruptiore mundi et ex divina pari lance conponderans. Cf. Lactantius *Div. inst.* 7. 13-16: '(Deus) hominem finxit ex ipsa terra, . . . id est spiritum suum terreno corpore induit et involvit, ut compactus ex rebus diversis ac repugnantibus bonum ac malum caperet. . . Nam quia homo ex duabus rebus constat, corpore atque anima, quorum alterum terrenum est, alterum caeleste, duae vitae homini adtributae sunt, una temporalis, quae corpori adsignatur, altera sempiterna, quae animae subiacet.'

We are told that men are made of a mixture of the *corruptior pars mundi* and the *divina (pars mundi)*; or, as it is afterwards expressed, that God made man *ex utraque natura* (of either substance), *divina atque mortali.* On the other hand, the gods are made wholly of the *divina pars mundi*, which is also called *mundissima pars mundi*, and *immortalis natura.* And it is in virtue of the *divina pars mundi* in his composition that man possesses *disciplina et intellectus*, and is capable of attaining to immortality, or in other words, of becoming a god. The *divina pars mundi* then must be the stuff of which the rational and immortal part of the soul is made. Is this stuff corporeal or incorporeal? According to the Hermetists in general (see for instance *Ascl.* I. 7 b), the rational and immortal soul is incorporeal. But in this passage, the writer uses words which seem to imply that the higher part of man, as well as the lower, is corporeal; for *mundus* (which probably here stands for $\psi\lambda\eta$) cannot be incorporeal. It seems then that, according to this chapter, there are two kinds of matter, the one finer, and the other coarser; the gods (i. e. the astral gods, the *di caelestes*) and the rational soul of man are composed of the finer kind of matter; the human body is composed of the coarser kind; and it is the coarser kind alone that gives rise to evil passions. In expressing himself thus, the writer has probably been influenced by the language of some Stoic authority (very likely Posidonius); for the Stoics denied the existence of incorporeal soul, and taught that gods are composed of $\pi\upsilon\rho$ $\nu\omicron\epsilon\rho\acute{o}\nu$, and human souls, of a mixture of fire and air. (Or, his *divina pars mundi* may be rather the 'fifth element' of the Peripatetics; see note on *Ascl.* I. 6 b, '($\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$) quae quinta pars soli homini concessa est ex aethere'.) It does not, however, necessarily follow that the writer of *Ascl.* III consciously rejected the Platonic and Hermetic doctrine of incorporeality; the truth seems rather to be that he has

here adopted phrases which were current in another school, without making the alterations which would be needed to bring them into agreement with his own principles. Perhaps, when he speaks of the rational soul as composed of a kind of 'matter' or 'stuff', he means the phrase to be understood metaphorically. Compare the language of Philo in *Q. d. s. i. 9. 44*, quoted above (οὐκ ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων . . . διεπλάσθη, καθαρωτέρας δὲ . . . ἔλαχε τῆς οὐσίας, ἐξ ἧς αἱ θεῖαι φύσεις ἐδημιουργοῦντο), which, taken literally, would imply that the νοῦς or διάνοια is made of a material substance. In *Kore Kosmu* (Stob. *Exc.* XXIII. 14), the making of souls is described in terms of matter (πνεῦμα γὰρ . . . λαβὼν, καὶ νοερῶ τοῦτο πυρὶ μίξας, ἀγνώστοις τισὶν ἐτέραις ὕλαις ἐκέρασε, κ.τ.λ.); but it need not be inferred from these words that the author of the *Kore Kosmu* held the soul to be really composed of material elements.

vitia contigit mundi, corporibus commixta, remanere, et alia propter cibos (intrare). Evil passions are caused by the matter in which the soul is entangled during its life in the body. They arise partly from the matter of which the body was originally composed, and partly from the additional matter which is absorbed into the body when we take food. It is apparently only the grosser elements, earth and water, that give rise to evil passions; hence the *di caelestes*, whose bodies are composed of fire alone, are free from them.

Cf. *Pistis Sophia* cap. 111, C. Schmidt, p. 182: 'the child eats of the τροφαί¹ of the κόσμος of the ἄρχοντες, and . . . the ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα² draws to itself the μέρος of κακία which is in the τροφαί. (And as the child grows,) the ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα seeks after all κακία and ἐπιθυμίας, and all sins; . . . and it seduces the soul, and compels it to do all its ἀνομίαι' &c. *Ib.* cap. 130, p. 213: 'Suppose that a man has neglected to pray the prayer which takes away the κακία of the τροφαί which he eats and drinks, and that through the κακία of the τροφαί he is bound to the axle of the εἰμαρμένη of the ἄρχοντες, and through the ἀνάγκη of the στοιχεῖα he has sinned . . .'

Diis . . . nullis indigentibus rationis disciplinaeque administrandis. The writer is here speaking of the αἰσθητοὶ θεοί, i. e. the *di caelestes* (astral gods), and not of the νοητοὶ θεοί. The *di caelestes*, not being affected by the causes which produce evil passions in

¹ Schmidt's text gives τροφαί; but the right reading is evidently τροφαί.

² The ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα is an appendage which is attached to the soul at the time of its incarnation.

men, have no need of *ratio disciplinae* (λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη) as a preventive against such passions. God has therefore bestowed λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη on men alone. The *di caelestes* have not received this gift, but are secured against evil in a different and more effectual way. In the first place, they have immortality and perpetual vigour, i. e. they are not liable to physical evil, and have no need of λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη to enable them to guard against that; and in the second place, their actions, (i. e. their movements in the heavens, by means of which they operate on the world below,) are determined by invariable law, so that they do not need λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη to enable them to guard against moral evil. It seems surprising to be told that the gods do not possess 'reason and knowledge'; but the statement may be accepted, if we assume that λογισμός (or διάνοια) and ἐπιστήμη are here distinguished from and contrasted with νοῦς, and that the souls of the gods are pure νοῦς. Cf. ch. 18 b *fin.*: *sumum* (i. e. νοῦν) *deorum animam dixerunt*¹ We must take the words λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη to mean faculties adapted to the state of man on earth. The gods possess the power of directly and intuitively apprehending the true and good; this power man does not now possess; he will acquire it only when he realizes his 'hope of immortality', i. e. when he himself becomes a god. By λογισμός and ἐπιστήμη we must understand knowledge of good and evil, which carries with it the power to choose between good and evil. (Cf. Philo, *Quod deus sit immutabilis*, 9. 47, Wendland II, p. 66, where διάνοια, the faculty by the possession of which man is distinguished from the beasts, is identified with τὸ ἐκούσιον.) Now the gods are secured against the possibility of evil. In place of the human knowledge of good and evil, they have knowledge of absolute and unmixed good; and they are not called upon to choose between good and evil, for they necessarily and inevitably do that which is good. Cf. Philo *De opif. mundi* 24. 73, Cohn I, p. 24: τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν οὐτ' ἀρετῆς οὐτε κακίας μετέχει, ὥσπερ φυτὰ καὶ ζῶα ἄλογα, τὰ μὲν ὅτι ἄψυχά τε ἐστὶ καὶ ἀφαντάστῳ φύσει διοικεῖται, τὰ δ' ὅτι νοῦν καὶ λόγον ἐκτέμνηται· κακίας δὲ καὶ ἀρετῆς ὡς ἂν οἴκος νοῦς καὶ λόγος (the *ratio disciplinae* of *Ascl.* III), ᾧ πεφύκασιν ἐνδαιψασθαι. τὰ δ' αὖ μόνῃς κεκοινώνηκεν ἀρετῆς, ἀμέτοχα πάσης ὄντα κακίας, ὥσπερ οἱ ἀστέρες· οὗτοι γὰρ ζῶα τε εἶναι λέγονται καὶ ζῶα νοερά, μᾶλλον δὲ νοῦς αὐτὸς ἕκαστος, ὅλος δι' ὅλων σπουδαῖος, καὶ παντὸς

¹ See Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* XI. 2. (15). The MSS. there give δ νοῦς ἐν τῷ θεῷ· ὁ λογισμός ἐν τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. But the reading of that aphorism is doubtful.

ἀνεπίδεκτος κακοῦ· τὰ δὲ τῆς μικτῆς ἐστὶ φύσεως, ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος, ὃς ἐπιδέχεται τὰναντία, φρόνησιν καὶ ἀφροσύνην, . . . καὶ συνελόντι φράσαι ἀγαθὰ καὶ κακά, καλὰ καὶ αἰσχροῖα, ἀρετὴν καὶ κακίαν. Sen. *Ep.* 95. 36 : 'di immortales nullam didicere virtutem, cum omni editi, et pars naturae eorum est, bonos esse.' *Id.* 49 : 'errat si quis illos (sc. deos) putat nocere nolle : non possunt.'

quamvis immortalitas . . . intentionemque protendens. I have rewritten this corrupt passage so as to make it express what I suppose to have been the writer's meaning ; but his exact words can hardly be restored.

ordinem necessitatis lege conscriptum aeterna[]constituit. Cf. Ps.-Pl. *Epinomis* 982 A ff. : there are two kinds of ζῶα, τὸ μὲν ἐκ πυρός, . . . τὸ δ' ἐκ γῆς, καὶ τὸ μὲν γήμων ἐν ἀταξία, τὸ δ' ἐκ πυρός ἐν τάξει πάσῃ κινούμενον. τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐν ἀταξία κινούμενον ἀφρον χρῆ νομίζειν, ὅπερ ὡς τὸ πολὺ δρᾶ τὸ περὶ ἡμᾶς ζῶον, τὸ δὲ ἐν τάξει τε καὶ οὐρανῷ πόρον ἔχον μέγα τεκμήριον χρῆ ποιείσθαι τοῦ φρόνιμον εἶναι· κατὰ ταῦτὰ γὰρ ἂν καὶ ὡσαύτως πορευόμενον αἰεὶ καὶ ποιοῦν καὶ πάσῃον τεκμήριον ἱκανὸν τοῦ φρονίμως ζῆν εἶναι παρεχόμενον. ἡ ψυχῆς δὲ ἀνάγκη νοῦν κεκτημένης ἀπασῶν ἀναγκῶν πολὺ μείσστη γίγνεται ἂν· ἀρχουσα γὰρ ἀλλ' οὐκ ἀρχομένη νομοθετεῖ. τὸ δὲ ἀμετάστροφον, ὅταν ψυχῆ τὸ ἀριστον κατὰ τὸν ἀριστον βουλευέσθαι νοῦν, τὸ τέλειον ἐκβαίνει τῷ ὄντι κατὰ νοῦν, καὶ οὐδὲ ἀδάμας ἂν αὐτοῦ κρείττον οὐδὲ ἀμεταστροφώτερον ἂν ποτε γένοιτο. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 43 f. : 'sensus autem astrorum atque intellegentiam maxime declarat ordo eorum atque constantia' &c. See Mayor's note *ad loc.*

The writer of *Ascl.* III ascribes to the *deus summus*, and not to the *di caelestes* themselves, the νοῦς by which the movement or action of the heavenly bodies is determined. But he certainly does not mean that they are mere passive matter, moved by compulsion from without ; we must assume that they are νοεροί, and that their νοῦς works in perfect and unvarying accord with that of the *deus summus*. It could not do otherwise ; for it is his νοῦς that is in them ; all νοῦς is one.

potuissent stands for *possent*. See note on *Ascl.* I. 8, *intuerei potuisset*.

et 'bonum' hominem et qui posset immortalis esse ex utraque natura composuit, divina atque mortali. The *mortalis natura* is contrasted with the *divina natura* ; and in place of *bonum*, we need some adjective which may stand in corresponding contrast to *immortalis*. Some such word as *terrenum* would serve the purpose.

Compare Herm. *ap. Lactant. Div. inst.* 7. 13. 3: «καὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ἐξ ἐκατέρων φύσεων, τῆς τε ἀθανάτου καὶ τῆς θνητῆς, μίαν ἐποίει φύσιν τὴν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, κ.τ.λ. *Ascl.* I. 7 b: 'homo duplex est' &c. *Corp.* I. 15: διπλοῦς ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος κ.τ.λ.

((*hominem*)) . . . esse meliorem et diis. Cf. *Corp.* X. 24 b: καὶ ὑπὲρ ἐκείνου (sc. τοὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοὺς) ἐστὶν ὁ ὄντως ἄνθρωπος, ἢ πάντως γε ἰσοδυναμοῦσιν ἀλλήλοις. The reason given in that document is that man's range is wider than that of the *di caelestes*; for he is at home both in the higher world and in the lower, while the *di caelestes* are limited to the higher. (A similar thought is expressed in *Ascl.* I. 6 a, 'feliciore loco medietatis' &c. See also *Ascl.* I. 9 *fin.*, 'mortalitate auctus'.) Perhaps the writer of *Ascl.* III might have added that man has freedom of choice between good and evil, and if he chooses rightly, is on that ground 'better' than the gods, whose action is determined by necessity. He who might do wrong deserves more credit if he does right.

Compare *Pistis Sophia* cap. 100, C. Schmidt, p. 162: 'when you have departed from the body, and ascended to the region of the Archontes, all the Archontes (= the *di caelestes*) will feel shame before you (sc. the "saved" or "purified" men), because you are the dregs of the ἔλγῃ of which they are made, and yet have become purer light than all of them.'

omnium mortalium represents the Greek genitive after a comparative. Cf. *Ascl. Prologue, init.*, 'omnium . . . divinior'.

diis cognatione coniunctus. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 5: 'mente, qua diis iunctus est.' *Ib.* 6 a: 'diis cognata divinitate coniunctus est.'

homo . . . ipsos . . . veneratur, diique . . . humana . . . custodiunt. Cf. Aelius Aristides 43. 22, Keil II, p. 345: Zeus, the Demiurgus, ἐποίει θεοὺς μὲν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιμελητάς, ἀνθρώπους δὲ θεῶν θεραπευτάς τε καὶ ὑπηρέτας.

23 b, 24 a. Man is able to make gods. This topic is resumed in ch. 37. Here, the mention of it leads on to the Prophecy, chs. 24 b-26 a. The 'man-made gods' are the gods worshipped in the temple-cults of Egypt, which the Christians were seeking to suppress at the time when *Ascl.* III was written. Jews and Christians had long been accustomed to make it a reproach against the Pagans that they worshipped 'gods made by men's hands'; the writer defiantly admits the fact, and glories in it.

The notion that a god or daemon could, by certain ritual words and acts, be incorporated in an image or other material object, no

doubt lay at the root of most of the Pagan cults. But the belief that a statue was a god, or was animated by an indwelling god, had been discarded by all educated Greeks; and in the higher Greek literature, from Homer down to the Christian era, few traces of it are to be found. Heraclitus, fr. 5 Diels, speaks with scorn of the ignorant people who address their prayers to statues, 'as if one were to talk to house-walls'. Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 12 explains and defends the practice of making statues of the gods from the point of view of an enlightened Greek, which is very different from that of the Egyptian writer of *Ascl.* III: 'Mind and wisdom (*νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν*) in their very being, no sculptor or painter can depict. . . . But knowing that the human body is a receptacle of wisdom and reason, we ascribe this form to the gods; and having no model to copy, we seek to represent the inimitable and invisible by that which is imitable and visible, using the human form as a symbol. . . . It cannot be maintained that it would be better to have no statues or images of the gods set up among men, and that we ought to look to the heavenly bodies alone. All men of sense revere the heavenly bodies as blessed gods; but them we see only from afar; and our conception of the divine produces in all mankind a strong desire to worship the deity close at hand, drawing near to the gods and laying hold of them with entreaties, sacrificing to them, and decking them with wreaths. For just as young children, when they are parted from their father or mother, often in dreams stretch out their hands with strong desire and yearning towards the loved one who is far away, even so do men yearn toward the gods, loving them, as is but right, by reason of their goodness to us, and the kinship between god and man, and eager to meet them and hold converse with them in any way.'

Maximus Tyrius, *Or.* 2 Hobein, discusses the question *εἰ θεοῖς ἀγάλματα ἰδρυτέον*; and his answer is to the same effect as that of Dio. 'Those men', he says, 'in whom the memory (of the higher world from which the soul has come) is strong, and who are capable of uplifting their souls straight to heaven, and meeting the Divine there,—such men, perhaps, have no need of images. But men of that kind are rare; and you will never find a whole community that retains the memory of things divine, and does not need such help as images give. . . . And so the lawgivers, I think, dealt with their peoples as with a troop of children, and invented these images for mankind, as signs to direct them to the worship

of the Divine, and as means of guidance on the road to the recollection of things above. . . . There is no race, Barbarian or Greek, . . . which can do without setting up some visible symbols of their reverence for the gods. . . . God himself, the Father and Maker of all that is,—who was before the sun, and before the heavens, who is mightier than time¹ and all the world of change,—him no lawgiver can name, no tongue can tell of him, no eye behold him; and inasmuch as it is beyond our power to apprehend him in his true being, we seek help in sounds and names, in living creatures, in shapes wrought in gold and ivory and silver, in trees and plants, in rivers and mountain-tops and water-springs, longing indeed to know God,² but compelled by our weakness to give to things of beauty in this world the name which should denote his being. . . . And if the memory of God is awakened in Greeks by the sculpture of a Pheidias, and in Egyptians by their worship of beasts, in some men by a river, and in others by a fire, I find no fault with their disagreement; only let them recognize the Divine, and yearn for it, and call to mind the God their souls once knew.³

Julian, *Fragmentum epistolae* 293 A, Bidez and Cumont 89 b, p. 133 (Hertlein I, p. 376 sq.): ἕκαστος ἡμῶν . . . τὰ τῆς εὐσεβείας ἔργα πληροῦται, . . . τὰ ἱερὰ τῶν θεῶν καὶ τὰ ἀγάλματα . . . σεβόμενος ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ παρόντας ἑώρα τοὺς θεοὺς. ἀγάλματα γὰρ καὶ βωμοὺς καὶ πυρὸς ἀσβέστου φυλακὴν καὶ πάντα ἀπλῶς τὰ τοιαῦτα σύμβολα οἱ πατέρες ἔθεντο τῆς παρουσίας τῶν θεῶν, οὐκ ἵνα ἐκεῖνα θεοὺς νομίσωμεν, ἀλλ' ἵνα δι' αὐτῶν τοὺς θεοὺς θεραπεύσωμεν. ἐπειδὴ γὰρ ἡμᾶς, ὄντας ἐν σώματι, σωματικῶς ἔδει ποιῆσθαι τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ τὰς λατρείας, ἀσώματοι δὲ εἰσιν αὐτοί· πρῶτα μὲν ἔδειξαν ἡμῖν ἀγάλματα τὸ δεύτερον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου τῶν θεῶν γένος περὶ πάντα τὸν οὐρανὸν κύκλῳ περιφερόμενον. δυναμένης δὲ οὐδὲ τούτοις ἀποδίδοσθαι τῆς θεραπείας σωματικῶς· ἀπροσδεῖ γὰρ ἔστι φύσει· τρίτον ἐπὶ γῆς ἐξευρέθη γένος ἀγαλμάτων, εἰς ὃ τὰς θεραπείας ἐπιτελοῦντες, ἑαυτοῖς εὐμενεῖς τοὺς θεοὺς καταστήσομεν. ὥσπερ γὰρ οἱ τῶν βασιλείων θεραπεύοντες εἰκόνας, οὐθὲν δεομένων, ὅμως ἐφέλκονται τὴν εὐνοίαν εἰς ἑαυτούς, οὕτως καὶ οἱ θεῶν θεραπεύοντες τὰ ἀγάλματα, δεομένων οὐθὲν τῶν θεῶν, ὅμως πείθουσιν αὐτοὺς ἐπαμύνειν σφίσι καὶ κήδεσθαι· δείγμα γὰρ ἔστιν (τῆς) ὡς ἀληθῶς ὀσιότητος ἢ περὶ τὰ δυνατὰ προθυμία, κ.τ.λ.³

¹ κρείττων δὲ χρόνον [καὶ αἰῶνος] καὶ πάσης βεούσης φύσεως.

² ἐπιθυμοῦντες μὲν αὐτοῦ τῆς νοήσεως.

³ A Christian reader of this passage expresses his scorn in an inserted note: ἀλλ' οὐκ ἐχρῆν, ἢ πασῶν δαιμόνων πληθὺν ἀναστηλώσας (ἐν!) τῇ σῇ ψυχῇ, τοὺς κατὰ σέ

In *Corp.* XVII we have a fragment from the end of a dialogue in which the same subject was discussed. The view of its writer seems to have resembled that of Dio Chrysost., Maximus Tyrius, and Julian, rather than that expressed in *Ascl.* III. See also Plotinus 4. 3. 11.

Plutarch (*Is. et Os.* 71) expresses his contempt for Greeks who are so foolish as to suppose that a statue is a god: ὡςπερ Ἑλλήνων οἱ τὰ χαλκᾶ καὶ τὰ γραπτὰ καὶ λίθινα μὴ μαθόντες μῆδ' ἐθισθέντες ἀγάλματα καὶ τιμὰς θεῶν ἀλλὰ θεοὺς καλεῖν, εἶτα τολμῶντες λέγειν ὅτι τὴν Ἀθηναίαν Λαχάρης ἐξέδυσε, τὸν δ' Ἀπόλλωνα χρυσοῦς βοστρύχου ἔχοντα Διόνυσος ἀπέκειρεν, . . . λανθάνουσιν ἐφελκόμενοι καὶ παραδεχόμενοι δόξας πονηρὰς ἐπομένας τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. But in Egypt, the belief in the real presence of the god in the statue survived in all its primitive force.

The story of *The Possessed Princess of Bekhten* (Budge, *Egyptian Reading Book*, p. xxviii ff.) is a good illustration of the popular Egyptian notion of a statue which is a god. The King of Egypt sent 'Khonsu-who-performeth-mighty-things' in a boat, with an escort, from Thebes to the distant land of Bekhten; the Prince of Bekhten came forth to meet the god; and the god went (i. e. was carried) to the place where the Princess was, and drove out the demon of sickness which possessed her. The Prince then said 'The god Khonsu shall be made to abide in this country, and I will not allow him to depart into Egypt'; and the god tarried there three years and more. But the Prince was then warned by a dream, in which he saw the god come out of his shrine, in the form of a golden hawk, and fly away to Egypt; and when he woke up, he said 'The god has departed from us, and has made his way back into Egypt; we must now send his vehicle back to Egypt'. Throughout this story, the god is the statue, and the statue is the god, except in the inference which the Prince draws from his dream; the words there used imply that the divine soul hitherto embodied in the statue has quitted it, and flown off to Egypt, leaving the statue lifeless in its shrine.

Strabo (17. 28, p. 805) says that the Egyptian temples contained ξόανον οὐδέν, ἢ οὐκ ἀνθρωπόμορφον, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀλόγων ζῴων τινός. But this must be a mistake, caused by the fact that the god himself was never exposed to public view. On the Egyptian cult-images,

ἀνειδέους καὶ ἀσχηματίστους σωματοπλαστεῖσθαι. πῶς δὲ οὐ ξύλα καὶ λίθους νομίσωμεν ἃ χεῖρες ἀνθρώπων ἐμόρφωσαν; ὧ καὶ τῶν λίθων αὐτῶν ἀφρονέστερε, κ.τ.λ.

see Erman, *Life in Ancient Egypt*, Eng. tr. 1894, p. 275. 'In the Holy of Holies was a shrine, . . . inside which was a richly adorned little bark, . . . containing the figure of the god. The statue could therefore have been only about two feet high; it probably resembled the little bronze figures of which we possess such a number. We know no more, for this sacred image of the god was so strictly guarded from profane eyes that as far as is known it is never once represented in the temple reliefs' (with one possible exception of late date). 'Even the pictures of the Holy of Holies show only the divine bark; in the centre is the deck cabin, like a little temple', (in which the statue was hidden). 'This bark was carried round in procession on great festivals, and to the outside world it was itself the image of the god.' The cult-images were doubtless deliberately destroyed by the Christians, and no specimen of them has been preserved. If they resembled the portraits of the gods which appear on the monuments, many of them must have taken the form of a human body with an animal head; but the writer of *Ascl. III* expressly says that they were in human shape (23 b *fin.*, 'humanitas deos suos ex sui vultus similitudine figuraret'), and there is no conclusive evidence to the contrary. The statue of Serapis in the temple of that god at Alexandria was of foreign origin, and did not conform to the native Egyptian type.

Wiedemann, *Rel. of the Anc. Eg.*, Eng. tr. 1897, p. 180 f, says it is a mistake to suppose that 'the Egyptian temple centred round a statue'; . . . 'generally speaking (in the case of those temples in which the godhead was supposed to dwell) it was not to statues that the temple prayers and offerings were made, but . . . to the sacred animal of the place'. The author of *Ascl. III*, however, differs from Wiedemann in this. It appears to be implied in ch. 37, that the deity who resided in a temple was in some cases embodied in a statue, and in other cases, in a sacred animal. The passage of Celsus (Orig. *c. Cels.* 3, 17) quoted by Wiedemann *l.c.* applies only to those temples in which the god was incarnated in an animal, and does not exclude the existence of other temples in which the god was incorporated in a statue. Wiedemann speaks of 'the numerous statues set up in a temple . . . for the adornment of the building and the future welfare of the bestower'; but these must be distinguished from the cult-image in which the god was embodied. The latter was concealed in its shrine, and only

certain priests (οἱ εἰς τὸ ἄδυντον εἰσπορευόμενοι πρὸς τὸν στολισμὸν τῶν θεῶν, *Decree of Canopus*, 238 B. C.) had access to it.

23 b. nobis inducitur sermo. The true reading must surely be *inducitur*, though *indicitur*, which is given by the MSS., was already read by Augustine.

inluminat (-nant MSS.). Here, as often, φῶς is closely connected with ζωή. By means of certain rites, man confers conscious life and intelligence on the statues which he makes.

Nec inmerito miraculo dignus est. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 6 a *imit.*: 'magnum miraculum est homo' &c.

It may be doubted whether the text of this sentence is sound; we should rather have expected 'nec inmerito (gratulatione?) dignus est, qui est omnium (miraculorum) maximum'.

de mundissima parte materiae (naturae MSS.) esse prognatum. The bodies of the *di caelestes* are made of fire (or of the 'fifth element' of the Peripatetics). The words which follow (*ex utraque natura* &c.) seem to imply that the souls of the cult-images are corporeal, and are made of the same material substance as the bodies of the *di caelestes* (and that those bodies are souls?). If this is the meaning, the writer has here again adopted the language of Stoicism.

signaque eorum sola quasi capita pro omnibus esse. *Signa* (σημεῖα) more commonly means 'constellations'; but it here denotes the heavenly bodies individually.

The astral gods have no trunk or limbs; the bodily form of each of them is that of a human head without appendages. The human head is (approximately) spherical, and is the seat of reason; and the sun, moon, and stars resemble it in both respects. The notion is derived from Plato *Tim.* 44 Df. Cf. *Corp.* X. 11: ὁ κόσμος σφαῖρά ἐστι, τουτέστι κεφαλῆ, κ.τ.λ.

ex utraque natura conformatae sunt. A temple-god, like a man, consists of body and soul. His body is a statue carved by human hands; his soul is a daemon, or beatified human soul, incorporated in the statue by means of a prescribed ritual.

ex ea quae infra homines est. We must read *infra* in place of *intra*. The wood or metal of which the statue is made is not 'within' man; but it may be said to be 'beneath' man, in the sense that it stands lower in the scale of existence, and is subject to his power.

memor naturae et originis suae. *Natura* (γένεσις?) here means 'birth'. Man remembers that God is the author and

source of his being, and he therefore imitates God. We have already been told that man imitates God by procreation; we are now told that he imitates God also by making gods in his own image. The thought is far-fetched and fanciful; but a writer who has set himself to maintain the paradox that 'man makes gods' can hardly be expected to keep within the limits of sober reason.

24 a. *futurorum praescias, . . . inbecillitates hominibus facientes easque curantes*. The chief functions which the writer ascribes to the temple-gods of Egypt are firstly, the prediction of future events; and secondly, the causing and healing of disease. He distinguishes three methods of prediction, viz. (1) *sorte*, 'by lot', (2) *vate*, by the utterance of a person possessed by the deity, and (3) *somniis*, by dreams.

We hear of oracles worked by the temple-priests under the native dynasties; and in the times when the priesthood was most powerful, e. g. at the end of the XXth dynasty (1090 B. C.), the oracle of Amon at Thebes 'became part of the ordinary machinery of government' (Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*, p. 523). The kingdom of Aethiopia, which had been founded by colonists from Egypt, was long dominated by priests, who used the oracle of Amon at Meroe as their instrument. See Hdt. 2. 29. Diodorus 3. 5 describes the method by which the Aethiopian king was appointed; the god was carried round, and chose (ἐλαβε) one of a group of selected candidates. This must mean that the priests who carried the statue in its portable shrine, and whose movements were supposed to be controlled by the god, stopped before the man who was to be appointed. This is the same procedure by which the priests of Amon at Thebes made Thutmôsis III king of Egypt in 1501 B. C. (Breasted, *ib.* p. 268). According to Lucian, *Dea Syria* 38, a similar method of working the oracle was employed in the temple at Bambyce; and when a question was asked, the god answered 'yes' by making the priests who carried him move forward, or 'no' by making them move backward. But such a method as this could hardly be described by the word *sorte*; and when the Hermetist speaks of consulting the oracle 'by lot', he probably means drawing one of a number of tablets on which sentences are written.

Diodorus *ib.* adds that the Aethiopian priests were able to compel a king to kill himself at the command of the oracle, until King Ergamenes, about 280-250 B. C., defied and massacred them. In Egypt, under the Ptolemies and the Romans, the temple-oracles

had ceased to be of political importance, but were still consulted by many persons who sought a god's advice about their private concerns; though the demand for oracular responses must have been diminished by the increasing competition of the astrologers.

We hear of oracular dreams (*somnía*) obtained by incubation at the temples of Serapis. Strabo 17. 17, p. 801: Κάνωβος . . . ἔχουσα τὸ τοῦ Σαράπιδος ἱερόν πολλῇ ἀγιστεία τιμώμενον καὶ θεραπείας ἐκφέρων, ὥστε καὶ τοὺς ἔλλογιμωτάτους ἀνδρας πιστεύειν καὶ ἐγκοιμᾶσθαι αὐτοὺς ὑπὲρ ἑαυτῶν ἢ ἑτέροισ. συγγράφοισι δέ τινες καὶ τὰς θεραπείας, ἄλλοι δὲ ἄρετὰς τῶν ἐνταῦθα λογίω¹ (ἀρεταλογίας Wilcken). The last words refer to the ἀρεταλόγοι, i. e. professional story-tellers attached to a sanctuary, whose business was to edify the public with tales of wonders worked by the god. Otto *Priester und Tempel* I. 118, II. 226.¹ There were professional interpreters of dreams (ἐνπνιοκρίται) and interpreters of oracles who carried on their business in the Serapeum at Memphis (Otto *ib.* I. 118). The god Imhotep-Asclepius likewise prescribed for his patients through dreams. For early instances of oracular dreams, see the story of Merneptah, 1225-1215 B. C. (Breasted, *Hist. Eg.* p. 468), and that of the priest-king in the time of Sennacherib (Hdt. 2. 141); the god who speaks in the dream is in both these cases Ptah.

An oracle is delivered *vate* when the god speaks through the mouth of a priest who is possessed by him; as when the priest of the Libyan Ammon 'told Alexander *by word of mouth* that he was a son of Zeus' (Strabo 17. 43, p. 814). At that temple, we are told, this method was exceptional; as a rule, the priest who 'personated the god' (τὸν Δία ὑπεκρίνατο), and gave the response to the inquirer, did not speak, but merely signified his meaning by gestures. Firmicus Maternus, *De err. prof. relig.* 13. 4, quotes Porphyry as saying 'Serapis vocatus et intra corpus hominis conlatus, talia respondit'. In such cases, the priest becomes for the time 'a living statue' of the god (see ch. 37 below).

The Hermetist says that the temple-gods not only heal diseases, but also cause them. Cf. ch. 37: 'Isin . . . quantis obesse scimus iratam!' No doubt the sick were sometimes told by an oracle that

¹ The story of 'The possessed Princess of Bekhten' is an ἀρεταλογία of pre-Hellenic date. Abt, *Ein Bruchstück einer Sarapis-Aretalogie*, *Archiv für Religionswiss.* XVIII (1915), 257 *sqq.*, gives the text of a papyrus-fragment in which is told a story of a response obtained from Sarapis by incubation, and of the healing &c. which followed. This papyrus was written 'not later than the third century A.D.'

the disease was due to the anger of this or that temple-god, and were directed to appease the offended deity by offerings.

24 b-26 a. The Prophecy.¹ See Introduction, vol. i, pp. 61-76, where I have given reasons for holding that this prediction must have been written at the time of the Palmyrene occupation of Egypt in A. D. 268-273.

Elsewhere in the *Hermetica* we find passing references to the time of the writer, or times recent to him, in the form of predictions spoken by Trismegistus; e. g. *Ascl.* I. 12 b: men will corrupt philosophy by mingling it with profane science. *Corp.* XVI. 1 b: Greeks will translate the books of Hermes into their own language. *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* VI. 14: men will give names to stars which are now nameless. *Ascl.* III. 27 d: the city of Alexandria will be founded. But the extant Hermetic literature contains no other prophecy of the same type as that in *Ascl.* III. In the form of a prediction uttered by a prehistoric teacher, the writer expresses his horror and dismay at the situation of his country. He is deeply moved by the calamities under which Egypt is suffering; but in his view, these calamities are merely a symptom or accompaniment of a yet more terrible evil; and that which distresses him most is the decay of religion. He sees Christianity gaining ground among his countrymen; they are accepting the new doctrine and way of life, and abandoning the old cults; and this, to him, means that religion itself is dying out, since religion, as he understands it, is inseparable from the established forms of worship. If men cease to worship the gods, all kinds of misery and disaster must inevitably follow; not only human society, but the universe itself must fall into confusion. Yet he does not utterly despair; sooner or later God will intervene to save his disordered world from ruin; and so the gloomy prophecy ends in a tone of faith and hope; the writer looks forward to a *παλιγγενεσία*, when all things shall be made new.

Apocalyptic prophecies were known to the Egyptians from an early period. A document dating from the Middle Kingdom, about 2000 B. C. (Leyden Papyrus I. 344; Lange, *Sitzungsber. der Berliner Akad.* XXVII. 601-610; Breasted, *Hist. Eg.* p. 204) contains the utterance of a prophet named Ipuwer, who foretells the coming of a time when 'the social and political organization shall be overthrown, the poor shall become rich and the rich shall suffer need,

¹ This passage is discussed by Bernays, *Gesammelte Abhandlungen*, 1885, vol. i, pp. 327-346.

foreign enemies shall enter, and the established order of things shall be completely overturned'. After predicting frightful calamities, the prophet announces a saviour who shall restore prosperity to the land. A Greek papyrus published by Wessely (*Denkschr. d. Wien. Akad.* XLII, 1893, p. 3ff.; Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. des Lagides* III, p. 25) contains fragments of an Egyptian document, in which it is told how a man of the time of Amenophis predicted the expulsion of foreign enemies and the restoration of the national king; the original was probably written in the time of the Persian rule. Manetho mentions a prophecy which was said to have been uttered by a lamb in the reign of Bocchoris (Bekneranef, 712 B.C.); and the prophecy to which he refers is extant in a demotic papyrus of the time of Augustus (Krall, *Festgaben für Büdinger*, Innsbruck 1898; Breasted, *Hist. Eg.* p. 547). The lamb foretells the invasion and conquest of Egypt by the Assyrians. Egyptian documents of this type may have been known to the Hermetist.

He may also have been influenced by Jewish apocalyptic writings current in his time (see Bousset, *Religion des Judenthums in Neutest. Zeitalter*, Kap. XIII), e. g. the *Oracula Sibyllina*, the greater part of which originated in Egypt. *Orac. Sib.* V (about the time of Trajan?) contains several announcements of woe to Egypt, and predicts—but, unlike *Ascl.* III, with exultation—the overthrow of Egyptian idolatry (ll. 484–500). Predictions of civil war in Egypt occur in *Sib.* VII. 18–20 and XIII. 74–78; the latter passage is connected with an account of the reign of Philippus, A. D. 244–249. The concluding paragraph of the Hermetic prophecy, in which the writer describes the impending *senectus mundi* and the subsequent *regentura*, is also in some respects analogous to the eschatology of the Jewish and Christian apocalypses.¹ See, for instance, the short summary of Jewish eschatology in *Sib.* II. 6–14 and 21–33. The Sibyllists agree with the Hermetist in foretelling a time of misery and confusion, which will culminate in the destruction of the impious, and will be followed by a 'restoration of all things' in the interest of the pious. But the denotation of the words 'pious' and 'impious' is reversed; for the Sibyllists are bitter opponents of the old cults to which the Hermetist clings. Moreover, the political aspirations of the Jewish Sibyllists of the first and second

¹ The prevalent belief that the end of the *saeculum* is at hand is expressed e. g. by Tertullian *Apol.* 32 (A. D. 197): the Christians pray for the Roman emperor, because they know 'vim maximam universo orbi imminentem, ipsamque clausulam saeculi, acerbitates horrendas comminantem, Romani imperii commeatu retardari'.

centuries A. D.—their thirst for vengeance on their enemies, their confident predictions of the destruction of the tyrant power of Rome, and their assurance that the overthrow of Rome will be followed by the reign of God's chosen people,—find no analogy in the prophecy of the Hermetist. He deplores the invasion of Egypt by foreigners, partly because it involves the slaughter of Egyptians, and partly because it hastens the decay of the national religion; but he shows no trace of a vindictive temper; bloodshed is revolting to him, and the more revolting when the shedders of blood are his own countrymen; and his patriotism does not take the form of a desire for the political dominance of his own race.

In the concluding paragraph of the Prophecy, the Hermetist seems to be following some authority which spoke of a *cyclically recurring* renovation of the universe. If that is the case, the source from which he is there drawing cannot be Jewish or Christian; for the Jews and Christians rejected the notion of a recurring cycle, and looked forward to a single and final renovation. (See Orig. *c. Cels.* 4. 67.) It therefore seems that the writer must have been influenced rather by the Stoic theory of a periodically recurring *ecpyrosis* and *diacosmesis*; and the analogies presented by Seneca (see below) make it probable that his description is derived in part from Posidonius. The Hermetist himself, however, lays no stress on the cyclic recurrence of the process; his attention is fixed on the one *senectus mundi* which he sees to be already in progress, and the one *regentura* which will follow it.

The text of the Prophecy has been confused by some interpolations, and probably by some transpositions.

Interpolations:—(a) Ch. 24 b: 'sed, quod est durius, quasi de legibus a religione, pietate, cultuque divino statuatur praescripta poena prohibitio.' These 'so-called laws' are evidently laws enacted shortly before the words were written. But Pagan worship was not prohibited by law until the middle of the fourth century A. D. See Gibbon, ch. 21 *fin.*; Boissier, *Fin de Paganisme*, I, p. 75 ff. and 94 ff., II, p. 339 ff.; Otto, *Priester und Tempel*, I, p. 404. Constantine forbade divination, confiscated the property of many temples, and suppressed certain particular cults* for special reasons; (he is said, for instance, to have taken measures against certain priests of the Nile-god, whose practices were considered morally offensive; see Euseb. *Vita Constant.* 4. 25;) but it is generally agreed that he enacted no

penal laws against Pagan worship as such. An edict ascribed to Constans, A. D. 341 (?), *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 2, forbids sacrifices in general, and appears to assert (though this is explained away by commentators) that Constantine had forbidden them before him: 'Cesset superstitio, sacrificiorum aboleatur insania. Nam quicumque contra legem divi principis parentis nostri et hanc nostrae mansuetudinis iussionem ausus fuerit sacrificia celebrare, competens in eum vindicta et praesens sententia exseratur.' But Constans did not rule in Egypt. Firmicus Maternus, *De err. prof. relig.*, A. D. 347, urges the emperors Constantius and Constans to enact penal laws against Pagan worship; e. g. c. 16: 'amputanda sunt haec, sacratissimi imperatores, penitus atque delenda, et severissimis edictorum vestrorum legibus corrigenda, ne diutius Romanorum orbem praesumptionis istius error funestus immaculet.' The language of Firmicus implies that no such laws were in force at the time when he wrote. It seems that the earliest law to which the words of the Hermetic text could be applied was the edict issued by Constantius, probably in A. D. 353, *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 4: 'Placuit omnibus locis atque urbibus universis claudi protinus templa, et accessu vetitis omnibus licentiam delinquendi perditis abnegari. Volumus etiam cunctos sacrificiis abstinere. Quod si quis aliquid forte huius modi perpetraverit, gladio ultore sternatur: facultates etiam perempti fisco decernimus vindicari: et similiter affligi rectores provinciarum, si facinora vindicare neglexerint.' This was followed by another edict, issued at Milan by Constantius in A. D. 356, *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 6: 'Poena capitis subiugari praecipimus eos quos operam sacrificiis dare vel colere simulacra constiterit.' These laws would account for the complaint of the Hermetist. They were, however, very imperfectly enforced. For some time longer, Pagan cults were still practised without concealment; and under the rule of Julian, A. D. 361-363, the old religions were once more supported by the favour of the government. It was not until the reign of Theodosius, A. D. 379-395, that a serious and systematic effort was made to stamp out Pagan worship throughout the eastern empire. An edict of A. D. 391, *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 11, addressed to the *Comes Aegypti* and another official, runs as follows: 'Nulli sacrificandi tribuatur potestas, nemo templa circumeat, nemo delubra suspiciat. Interclusos sibi nostrae legis obstaculo profanos aditus recognoscant adeo, ut si qui vel de diis aliquid contra vetitum sacrisque molietur, nullis exuendum se indulgentiis recognoscat.' And this was followed

by a still more emphatic and comprehensive edict of Theodosius in A. D. 392 (*Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 12). The actual suppression of the open practice of Pagan worship in Alexandria may be dated from the destruction of the Serapeum in A. D. 390.

The sentence in *Ascl.* III which speaks of penal laws against Paganism cannot then have been written before the middle of the fourth century, and therefore cannot have stood in the *Λόγος τέλειος* in the time of Lactantius, who wrote the *Div. inst.* about A. D. 310. But on the other hand, the *Λόγος τέλειος*, as known to Lactantius, must have contained the bulk of the Prophecy; for he quotes part of the Greek text of ch. 26 a, and says that the passage which he quotes follows 'post enumerationem malorum'. Hence we must conclude that the reference to penal laws against Pagan worship did not form part of the original text, but was inserted by another hand, at a time not earlier than A. D. 353.

The insertion of this clause seems to have caused some words of the original text to be omitted; this may account for the lacuna after *neglectum religionum*.

(*b*) Ch. 25: 'Sed mihi credite, et capitale periculum constituetur in eum qui se mentis religioni dederit. Nova constituentur iura, lex nova.' For the same reason, this passage also cannot have been written before A. D. 353, and must be an interpolation. The words *capitale periculum* resemble those of Constantius's edict of A. D. 356, *Poenā capitis subiugari praecipimus* &c. The inserted passage interrupts the continuity of the text; for 'nihil sanctum . . . mente credetur', which follows it, is closely connected in sense with 'anima enim . . . putabitur vanitas', which precedes it.

The two references to penal laws may have been inserted at different times, and suggested by different enactments. The first speaks of a penalty, but does not tell us what the penalty is; the second expressly mentions capital punishment. One of the two may very likely have been inserted by the translator. One of them at least was included in the Latin text of the *Asclepius* as known to Augustine; *De civ. dei* 8. 24 (A. D. 413-426): 'Dolet (Hermes) venturum esse tempus, quo haec omnia . . . etiam legibus iubeantur auferri.'

(*c*) Ch. 24 b: 'Divinitas enim repetet caelum, deserti homines toti morientur, atque ita Aegyptus deo et homine viduata deseretur.' This sentence makes nonsense of all the predictions which follow. We are told that, after the Egyptians have perished to a man-

'those of them who survive'¹ will be known as Egyptians by their tongue alone; the land of Egypt (i. e. the Egyptians) 'will suffer yet worse things',—worse, that is, than total destruction,—'and will be infected with worse plagues'; these same non-existent Egyptians will furnish an example of cruelty; they will cease to admire the universe, they will prefer death to life, and so on. It is true that in some of these sentences the writer speaks of *homines*, and does not mention Egyptians by name; but Egyptians are expressly mentioned in 24 b *fin.* and 25 *init.*; and it is evident that the Hermetist intends the prophecy throughout to apply primarily to his own country and his own countrymen. If he had once foretold the total destruction of the people of Egypt, nothing more would have been left for him to say. We must therefore conclude that the words 'divinitas enim . . . viduata deseretur' were subsequently inserted by some one who sought to pile up the horrors higher, and disregarded the destructive effect of his interpolation on the prophecy as a whole. Perhaps the translator is responsible for the addition of these words.

Transpositions:—When these interpolations have been struck out, there remains a prophecy in which three distinct things are predicted:—

- (a) Egypt will be invaded and occupied by foreigners;
- (b) many Egyptians will be slaughtered;
- (c) the Egyptians who survive will cease to worship the gods.

But in the traditional text, these three things are intermixed, and the several sentences are wanting in connexion and rational sequence. The contents of the successive clauses, as they stand in the MSS., may be indicated thus:—

Alienigenis . . . complentibus, non solum neglectum religionum—:

(a) and (c).

Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima: (b).

O Aegypte . . . facta narrantibus: (c).

Et inhabitabit . . . barbaria: (a).

Te vero . . . totae corrumpentur: (b).

Et vivis . . . videbitur alienus: (b) and (c).

Quid fles . . . crudelitatis exemplum: (c) and (b).

Et tunc taedio hominum &c.: (c).

The confusion has probably been produced, or at any rate

¹ The only parallel that occurs to me is the nursery rhyme about the children sliding on the ice: 'It so fell out, they all fell in; The rest, they ran away.'

increased, by transpositions such as we meet with in so many instances throughout the text of the *Asclepius*; and we have to consider whether it is possible to restore the true order. A clue may be found in the words *ipsa Aegyptus*, 25 *init.* It is clear that in this phrase the Egyptians are contrasted with the foreign invaders, and consequently that it must have followed closely on some reference to the foreigners; and as it is stated in this sentence that the Egyptians will do cruel deeds, the preceding sentence should be one which describes cruel deeds done by the foreigners. Now if we remove 24 *fin.*, 'Et vivis . . . videbitur alienus', we get, as the preceding sentence, 'Te vero . . . totae corrumpentur', i. e. a description of the Nile swollen with blood. If we assume that this blood is shed by the foreigners, a satisfactory connexion is thus obtained. And the displaced words 'Et vivis . . . videbitur alienus' may be appropriately placed after 'crudelitatis exemplum'; in that position, they will supply a desirable amplification of the *crudelitas* spoken of, and at the same time lead on to the following description of the decay of religion.

If the words addressed to the Nile refer to cruel deeds done by the foreigners, they should follow something else on the same topic. Now in the sentence 'Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima', we are told that the *land* will be polluted by slaughter; and this would be suitably followed by the description of a corresponding pollution of the *water*. It is probable then that 'Te vero appello, sanctissimum flumen' &c. should follow immediately on 'Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima', and that the three intervening sentences should be removed. One of these three sentences, 'Divinitas enim . . . viduata deseretur', has already been excised as an interpolation; but we have still to dispose of the other two, viz. 'et inhabitabit . . . barbaria', and 'O Aegypte . . . facta narrantibus'. Of these, the former, 'et inhabitabit' &c., should come earlier, since the writer would naturally tell us who the foreigners are before he tells us of the cruel things they do; and I have accordingly placed it before 'Tunc terra ista'. On the other hand, the sentence 'O Aegypte' &c., which speaks of the dying out of religion, should come later, after the writer has said all that he has to say about the slaughter; I have therefore placed it immediately before 'Et tunc taedio hominum' &c. in ch. 25.

Thus rearranged, the prophecy may be analysed as follows:—

(a) 'Alienigenis . . . neglectum religionum . . . barbaria'. (Invasion by impious foreigners.)

(b 1) 'Tunc terra . . . mortuorumque plenissima. Te vero . . . corrumpentur'. (Cruel deeds done by the foreigners.)

(b 2) 'Quid fles . . . crudelitatis exemplum. Et vivis . . . sepulcrorum'. (Cruel deeds done by Egyptians.)

(c) 'superstes vero . . . videbitur alienus. O Aegypte . . . pia facta narrantibus. Et tunc taedio hominum' &c. (The Egyptians abandon their religion.)

It may be doubted whether this rearrangement is in all respects correct; but I think it is indisputable that the traditional text is incoherent, and that by means of the three transpositions which I have proposed we obtain a satisfactory sense and connexion throughout. My conclusions as to the date of the document, however, are in no way dependent on the admittedly uncertain order of the sentences. If the author wrote the passage as it appears in the MSS., he must have been an extraordinarily clumsy writer; but even on that assumption, the things predicted would remain the same, and the same inferences might still be drawn from them.

24 b. quod Aegyptus imago sit caeli. As an individual deity is embodied in a cult-statue, so the *di caelestes* collectively are embodied in the land of Egypt. Philo, *Vita Mosis* 2 (3). 24. 192, Cohn IV, p. 245, speaks of the veneration of the Egyptians for their land: *μόνοι γὰρ σχεδὸν πάντων ἔθνῶν Αἰγύπτιοι γῆν ἐπετείχισαν οὐρανῶ, τὴν μὲν ἰσοθέων τιμῶν ἀξιώσαντες, τῷ δ' οὐδὲν γέρας ἐξείρετον ἀπονείματες. . . . θεοπλαστοῦσι τῷ λόγῳ τὸν Νεῖλον Αἰγύπτιοι ὡς ἀντίμῃμον οὐρανοῦ γεγονότα, καὶ περὶ τῆς χώρας σεμνηγοροῦσιν.*

translatio aut descensio omnium quae gubernantur atque exercentur in caelo. Cf. *Kore Kosmu, Exc. XXIII. 65*, as emended: Osiris and Isis πρὸς κάθετον (ὁμολογούσας) τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῶ μυστηρίοις ἱεροποιίας ἀνέστησαν ἐν γῆ. *Abammonis Resp. 7. 1*: the Egyptians, τὴν φύσιν τοῦ παντὸς καὶ τὴν δημιουργίαν μιμουμένοι, καὶ αὐτοὶ τῶν μυστικῶν καὶ ἀποκεκρυμμένων καὶ ἀφανῶν νοήσεων εἰκόνας τινὰς διὰ συμβόλων ἐκφαίνουσι. The rites performed in the Egyptian temples are εἰκόνας of the operations of the *Caelestes*, through whom the demiurgic energy of the supracosmic God is brought to bear upon the world below. Moreover, the Hermetist holds that the processes of nature which are worked by the *Caelestes* ('omnia quae gubernantur atque exercentur in caelo') are dependent on the due performance of these rites; if certain ritual acts are omitted,

the Nile will not rise, and the crops will not grow; and when the national cults are abandoned, the universe itself will fall into disorder. Thus it may be said that the seat of operation of the cosmic powers has been transferred from heaven to the temples of Egypt.

In the mystic language of the Egyptian priests, the word *pet* ('heaven') was used as a substitute for 'temple'. E. g. in an inscription of the Persian period, it is stated that the high priest of Khnum at Heracleopolis Magna 'has entered *heaven* (i. e. the temple) to see him who dwells there, namely the god Khnum' (Brugsch *Rel. und Myth.* p. 65 f. See also Brugsch *ib.* p. 201 f.) It is often stated in Egyptian documents that this or that cosmic event took place at a certain temple; e. g. the terrace of the temple at Hermopolis is described as 'the place at which Ra, the god of light, first shone forth, rising from the lotus-flower' (Brugsch *ib.* p. 123); and Tum engendered the universe 'in the city of On'. Such phrases presumably mean that some rite which was regarded as an 'image' of the cosmic operation of the god was periodically performed at the place spoken of. Compare the account given by Brugsch (*ib.* p. 155) of the contents of a papyrus dealing with the deities of the Fayum (*Papyrus ég. de Boulaq*, 1870, I-V): 'Alles, was sich der philosophirende Gedanke über den Ursprung der Welt zurecht gelegt hatte, von dem Chaos an bis zur Entstehung des Lichtes hin, wurde in fassbarer Gestalt auf den durch Menschenhand entstandenen "See" übertragen, und "das Seeland", das heutige Fajum, gleichsam in einen Schauplatz der Schöpfungsgeschichte verwandelt.'

terra nostra mundi totius est templum. The Kosmos is *αἰσθητὸς θεός*; and in this one deity all particular *αἰσθητοὶ θεοὶ* are comprehended. He is made up of all the gods by whom the several departments of the material world are administered; Egypt, the land in which all these gods 'have come down to dwell on earth', may therefore be called the 'temple', i. e. the consecrated habitation, of the Kosmos; and the cults of the several gods may be collectively described as the cult of the Kosmos. Cf. *mundus adorandus* in 25 and 26 a. The notion of a god whose parts or 'members' are also gods was current in Egypt from the earliest times. The primal God 'creates his own members, and they are the gods' (*Book of the Dead*).¹ In Pl. *Timaeus* also, the

¹ Cf. *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 3 and 10. 5 sq. (*Testim.*), on the Demiurgus and his several *δυνάμεις*.

Kosmos is a god whose parts, e.g. the heavenly bodies, are likewise gods.

futurum tempus est, cum adpareat Aegyptios &c. See Augustine's comments on this passage, *De civ. dei* 8. 23 sqq. (*Testim.*). Augustine understands the prophecy in *Ascl.* III as referring to the abolition of idolatry by the Christians; and in that respect he is undoubtedly right.

Aegyptios . . . pia mente divinitatem sedula religione servasse. This is hardly consistent with the previous statement (ch. 22 a) that the pious are few and far between. Here, the writer assumes that the Egyptians in general have hitherto been pious worshippers of the gods. We are not told why the gods forsake Egypt; but it seems to be implied that they depart from the land because it is desecrated by the invasion of impious foreigners. The Palmyrenes and their allies, the Saraceni and the Blemmyes, were not likely to treat the gods of Egypt with much respect; they may have plundered temples, and confiscated religious endowments; at any rate, the temple-cults must have suffered neglect during the troubles caused by the invasion; and Egypt occupied and dominated by profane barbarians was no longer a fitting abode for the gods.

in iritum casura (est, vel) frustrabitur: probably two alternative translations of a single Greek word or phrase.

regionem istam terramque. What is the distinction between *regio* and *terra*?

quasi de legibus: 'by so-called laws.' *Quasi* = *δηθεν* (Bernays). The enactments against the old cults are not true laws, because they are contrary to right.

Compare the complaint of the Pagan writer of *Lithica* 61-81 (Abel, *Orphica*, p. 111): *ὁ δ' ἀργαλέος καὶ ἀπεχθῆς ἀπὲρ πᾶσιν, | ᾧ κεν ἐπωνυμίην λαοὶ τεύξωσι μάγοιο. | καὶ ῥ' ὁ μὲν ἐν κοινήσιν ἵπ' ἄορι κρατὸς ἀμερθεῖς | λευγαλέω θανάτῳ δίος φῶς ἐκτεάνυσται. | οἱ δ' ἱκελοὶ θήρεσσιν, αἰδρίες ἢ δ' ἀδίδακτοι, | χήτεϊ δαιμονίῳ νοήματος κ.τ.λ.* These verses refer to the execution of penal laws against magic; but the Christians were apt to regard all Pagan cults as forms of magic.

terra ista sanctissima. 'The holy land' (*ta-sert*) was a recognized name of Egypt under the native dynasties. In the hieroglyphic text of the *Decree of Canopus*, 238 B. C., *ta-netert*, 'the divine land', occurs as an equivalent for *τὴν Αἴγυπτον* in the Greek. Cf. Herm. ap. Stob. *Exc.* XXIV. 11: *τῆς ἱερωτάτης ἡμῶν χώρας.*

sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima. *Sepulcrorum* does not give the right meaning. Egypt was 'full of graves' at all times, and we need some phrase which implies an exceptional number of *recent* deaths. *Sepulcrorum* may be a mistranslation of ταφῶν (ταφή = *funus*); Egypt will be πλήρης ταφῶν καὶ νεκρῶν, i. e. full of corpses on their way to burial, and corpses lying unburied. The word ταφῶν would imply that cries of mourning for the dead are heard on every hand. Cf. the letter of Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, written a few years before *Ascl.* III (Euseb. *Hist. eccl.* 7. 22. 3): ὡς γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν πρωτοτόκων τῶν Αἰγυπτίων γέγραπται, οὕτως καὶ νῦν "ἐγενήθη κραυγὴ μεγάλη" οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν οἰκία, ἐν ἧ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐν αὐτῇ τεθνηκώς" (*Exod.* 12. 30).

Augustine (*Civ. dei* 8. 26) mistakenly supposes that the words 'sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima' refer to Christian worship of martyrs. (See note *ad loc.* in *Testim.*)

Te vero appello, sanctissimum flumen. The Nile (Ἥρασι) was one of the national gods of Egypt; festivals were celebrated in his honour; and he had temples at Nilopolis, at Heliopolis, and elsewhere (Wiedemann, *Rel. of Anc. Eg.* pp. 145-147). Theologians of the Graeco-Roman period identified Osiris with the Nile, or called the river Ὀσίριδος ἀπορροή (Plut. *Is. et Os.* 32, 33. 38).

25. vivis multo maior numerus erit sepulcrorum. Here again, as above, *sepulcrorum* must be a mistranslation. The other reading, *sepultorum*, which occurs only in one or two of the worse MSS., is equally unsatisfactory in meaning. The sense required is that the number of corpses *awaiting* burial (not the number of those which *have been* buried in all past time) will be greater than that of the survivors; i. e. that more than half the population of Egypt will perish in the slaughter of which Hermes has just spoken.

superstes vero qui fuerit, . . . actibus . . . videbitur alienus. Down to this point, the Hermetist has been describing, under the form of prediction, events which have taken place before his eyes. Here, he begins to look forward into the future, and foresees the completion of a process, the earlier stages of which he has witnessed; the national religion will soon be extinct. The Egyptians have hitherto been pious; but those who survive the slaughter will be impious,—that is to say, they will turn Christians.

non admirandus videbitur mundus nec adorandus. It is not necessarily implied that a cult of the Kosmos *eo nomine* existed in Egypt. Men worshipped the Kosmos, firstly, by worshipping the primal God, the Father or Demiurgus (called by different names in different temples) who had generated or fashioned the Kosmos; and secondly, by worshipping the constituent parts of the Kosmos, e.g. the astral gods, the Nile, and Mother Earth in the form of Isis. The writer foresees that, when the Christians get the upper hand, all these cults will be suppressed, and the sentiment which finds expression in them will be extinguished. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 4 b: ἐνοιό ποτε ἐροῦσι βλασφημοῦντες that the Kosmos is χωρίον τῆς κακίας.

Some Christian Gnostics maintained that the material universe had been created by an evil power; and many Christians held that it is governed, or partly governed, by the Devil. Cf. *Er. Ephes.* 6. 12: (ἔστιν ἡμῖν ἡ πάλη) πρὸς τοὺς κοσμοκράτορας τοῦ σκότους τούτου, πρὸς τὰ πνευματικὰ τῆς πονηρίας ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις. The cosmic powers which the Pagans worshipped were those against which the Christians wrestled. Valentinus, in Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 6. 33: διάβολος, ὁ ἄρχων τοῦ κόσμου τούτου. Carpocrates, Hippol. *ib.* 7. 32: καταφρονῆσαι τῶν κοσμοποιῶν ἀρχόντων is the way to gain supernatural power; εἰ δέ τις (τοῦ Ἰησοῦ) πλέον καταφρονῆσειεν τῶν ἐνταῦθα, δύνασθαι διαφορώτερον αὐτοῦ ὑπάρχειν. *Pistis Sophia* (A. D. 250-300?) c. 102, C. Schmidt, p. 164: 'Renounce (ἀποτάσσεσθαι) the whole κόσμος, and all the ἔλη in it, and all its cares and all its sins. . . . Renounce the love of the κόσμος' &c. *ib.* c. 100, p. 161: 'Preach to the human race, saying, Renounce the whole κόσμος and all the ἔλη in it. For he who in the κόσμος buys and sells, and he who eats and drinks of its ἔλη, and who lives in all its cares and its δμιλίαι, he gathers to himself fresh ἔλαι in addition to his other ἔλη; for all this κόσμος, and all things in it, and all its δμιλίαι, are hylie dregs.' (The *Pistis Sophia* teaches that man must seek to be purged from his ἔλη, and become pure Light; for thus only can he rise to the Realm of Light above; otherwise, he will have to endure μεταγυρισμός in successive bodies, with intervals of torture, and ultimately, will suffer extinction (?) in outer darkness.) See Bousset, *Hauptprobleme der Gnosis*, p. 110 ff. These Gnostics changed the 'Second God' of the Platonists and Hermetists into a devil; and many orthodox Christians went a long way in the same direction.

Hoc totum bonum. Does this mean 'the Kosmos', or 'the worship of the gods'? Probably the latter; for it could hardly be said here that the Kosmos 'periclitabitur'. It is true that, later on in the chapter, the writer describes the Kosmos as falling into confusion, and appearing to be in danger of utter destruction; but that topic has not yet been introduced.

machina voluntatis dei. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 6: the Kosmos is ὄργανον τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ βουλήσεως κ.τ.λ.

in suo opere absque invidia (homini) suffragantis. A dative dependent on *suffragantis* is required. One MS. gives *suo operi*,—'fortasse recte', says Thomas,—in place of *in suo opere*; but the *opus dei*, i. e. the Kosmos, is here described as the *instrument* of God's beneficent action, and cannot in the same clause be spoken of as the *object* of his beneficence. The heavenly bodies especially are the instruments by which God's providence works.

In *absque invidia*, we have a reminiscence of Pl. *Tim.* 29 E: ἀγαθὸς ἦν, ἀγαθῶ δὲ οὐδεὶς περὶ οὐδενὸς οὐδέποτε ἐγγίγνεται φθόνος. The same phrase of Plato is adopted and enlarged upon by Philo, *De opif. mundi* 5. 21 ff., Cohn I, p. 6 f.

tenebrae praeponentur lumini, et mors vita utilior iudicabitur. With this description of Christianity may be compared the verses in which Rutilius Namatianus (1. 440 ff.), about A. D. 416, expresses his disgust at the Christian monks of Capraria: 'Squalet lucifugis insula plena viris. | Ipsi se monachos Graeco cognomine dicunt, | quod soli nullo vivere teste volunt. | Munera fortunae metuunt, dum damna verentur: | quisquam sponte miser, ne miser esse queat. | Quaenam perversi rabies tam stulta cerebri, | dum mala formides, nec bona posse pati? | Sive suas repetunt ex fato ergastula poenas, | tristia seu nigro viscera felle tument.' *Ib.* 1. 517, on a Christian hermit living in an island off the Italian coast: 'Perditus hic vivo funere civis erat. | Noster enim nuper, iuvenis maioribus amplis, | nec censu inferior coniugiove minor, | impulsu furiis homines divosque reliquit, | et turpem latebram credulus exul agit. | Infelix putat illuvie caelestia pasci, | seque premit laesis saevior ipse deus. | Num, rogo, deterior Circaeis secta venenis? | Tunc mutabantur corpora, nunc animi.' In the view of Namatianus, as in that of the Hermetist, the Christian ascetics are *lucifugi*, and their life is a *vivum funus*; they are *impulsi furiis*, and their state of mind is *perversi rabies cerebri* (cf. 'furius fortis . . . habebitur' in *Ascl.* III.

The writer of *Ascl.* I (see especially ch. 11 a) approximates in some respects to the Christian exaltation of asceticism which the writer of *Ascl.* III rejects with horror; but his tendency in that direction is counteracted by his doctrine that the *cultus terrenorum* is included in man's function.

The view that *mors vita utilior est* may be illustrated from Lactantius *passim*; e.g. *Div. inst.* 7. 11. 3: 'in ea condicione res posita est, ut qui beati sunt in hac vita corporali atque terrena, semper miseri sint futuri: . . . deinde qui iustitiam sequentes in hac vita miseri fuerint . . . semper beati sint futuri.' In this life, Lactantius thinks, the good man is necessarily miserable.

nemo suspiciet caelum. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 6 a: '(homo) suspiciet caelum.' *Ib.* 9: 'sortiti sunt caeli suspiciendi venerabilem curam.' As an instance of the feeling with which pious Pagans 'looked up to the sky', cf. Julian *Or.* 4 (εις ἥλιον) *init.*: 'From my childhood I was possessed by an impetuous love of the rays of the divine sun. In early youth, I uplifted my soul towards the ethereal light; and I not only desired to fix my eyes on it during the day, but even at night, when the sky was clear, I left all else to admire the beauties of heaven. Absorbed in that contemplation, I failed to hear those who spoke to me, and ceased to be conscious of myself.'

religiosus pro insano . . . putabitur. Cf. the edict of Constans (?), *Cod. Theodos.* 16. 10. 2: 'sacrificiorum aboleatur insania.'

furiosus fortis . . . habebitur. The Christians praised the fortitude of those who endured torture and death in their resistance to the government. To the Hermetist, the behaviour of the Christians during the persecutions of A.D. 250-260 must have seemed madness. Epictetus, *Diss.* 4. 7. 6, thought that the fearlessness of death shown by the 'Galilaeans' was due to 'habituation' (ὑπὸ ἔθους); Marcus Aurelius, 11. 3, attributed it to obstinacy (κατὰ ψιλὴν παράταξιν). Julian *Ep.* 89 b (Bidez and Cumont, 288 a) said the Christians were driven by evil daemons, who induced them to seek death: ἐπὶ δὲ τοὺς οὐ προσιώντας τοῖς θεοῖς ἐστι τὸ τῶν πονηρῶν δαιμόνων τεταγμένον φύλον, ὑφ' ὧν οἱ πολλοὶ παροιστρούμενοι τῶν ἀθέων ἀναπείθονται θανατῶν, ὡς ἀναπτησόμενοι πρὸς τὸν οὐρανὸν ὅταν ἀπορρήξωσι τὴν ψυχὴν βιαίως.

Perhaps some Christians claimed credit also for their courage in defying the Pagan gods, whom many of them believed to be powerful daemons. Cf. Celsus, in Orig. *c. Cels.* 8. 38: the Christians say

Ἰδού, παραστὰς τῷ ἀγάλματι τοῦ Διός, ἢ Ἀπόλλωνος, ἢ ὅτου δὴ ποτε θεοῦ, βλασφημῶ, καὶ ῥαπίζω, καὶ οὐδέν με ἀμύνεται.

Anima enim . . . putabitur vanitas. This sentence is awkwardly constructed; perhaps the Greek has been inaccurately translated. It is not the soul itself, but the Hermetic doctrine about the nature, origin, and destiny of the soul, and its relation to God, that 'will be thought to be false'. Some will treat the subject with contempt (*risui*), and refuse to listen; others will consider and reject the true teaching (*putabitur vanitas*). Compare *Ascl. I. 12 a*: 'alii incredibile, aliis fabulosum, aliis forsitan videatur esse deridendum.'

The Hermetist does not recognize in the teaching of the Christians any adequate substitute for his 'doctrine of the soul'. He probably knew little of the positive side of their doctrines, and thought of them chiefly as men who scorned and rejected the rites and beliefs which he held sacred; but if the Christian dogma of the resurrection of the body was known to him, he would see in that no promise of *ἀθανασία*. To him, the resurrection of the body would mean rather the perpetual confinement of the soul in its earthly prison, from which he aspired to be released. Compare the contemptuous language of Celsus, *Orig. c. Cels. 5. 14*: ἡλίθιον δ' αὐτῶν καὶ τὸ νομίζειν, ἐπειδὴν ὁ θεὸς ὡσπερ μάγειρος ἐπενέγκη τὸ πῦρ, τὸ μὲν ἄλλο πᾶν ἐξοπτηθῆσθαι γένος, αὐτοὺς δὲ μόνους διαμενεῖν, οὐ μόνον τοὺς ζῶντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοὺς πάλαι ποτε ἀποθανόντας, αὐταῖς σαρκῖν ἐκείναις ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς ἀναδύντας. ἀτεχνῶς σκωλήκων ἢ ἐλπίς. ποῖα γὰρ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ ποθήσειεν ἔτι σῶμα σεσηπός; . . . καὶ ψυχῆς μὲν αἰώνιον βιοτὴν δύναιτ' ἂν (ὁ θεὸς) παρασχεῖν νέκνες δέ, φησὶν Ἡράκλειτος, κοπρίων ἐκβλητότεροι. σάρκα δὲ, μεστήν ὣν οὐδὲ εἰπεῖν καλόν, αἰώνιον ἀποφῆναι παρὰ λόγον οὔτε βουλήσεται ὁ θεὸς οὔτε δυνήσεται. Celsus, *ib. 7. 36*, calls the Christians *φιλοσώματων γένος*, and says that they expect to see God with their bodily eyes. *Ib. 8. 49*: πῶς οὐκ ἄτοπα ὑμῶν ταῦτα, τὸ μὲν σῶμα ποθεῖν, καὶ ἐλπίζειν ὅτι αὐτὸ τοῦτο ἀναστήσεται, ὡς οὐδὲν ἡμῶν τούτου κρεῖττον οὐδὲ τιμιώτερον . . . ; ἀλλὰ τοῖς τοῦτο πειθομένοις, καὶ τῷ σώματι συντετηκόσιν, οὐκ ἄξιον [τοῦτο] διαλέγεσθαι. . . . τοῖς μὲν γε τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ τὸν νοῦν, . . . εἴθ' ὅ τι καὶ [ὁ τι] χαίρουσιν ὀνομάζοντες, τοῖς τοῦτο ἐλπίζουσιν ἕξειν αἰώνιον σὺν θεῷ, τούτοις διαλέξομαι. It might seem indeed that the charge of 'loving the body' and that of 'hating the Kosmos' could hardly be applicable to the same persons; but there were Christians of many kinds, and the Hermetist may have confused the views of different sects. Some of the Christian Gnostics, who held beliefs about the soul which were derived from

Platonism, and resembled those of the Hermetist, went to extremes in their hatred of the material Kosmos; other Christians regarded the present Kosmos as evil and doomed to destruction, but at the same time clung to the non-Hellenic doctrine of bodily resurrection, looked forward to 'a new heaven and a new earth' no less material than the present universe, and expected to enjoy therein an everlasting life in the body.

aut immortalitatem se consecuturam esse praesumit. Cf. ch. 22 b: 'immortalitatis spem intentionemque pretendens.' The word *ἀθανασία* has two distinct senses. It may mean 'imperishability'; and in that sense, all human souls, good and bad alike, are immortal; cf. ch. 28, 'quod (anima) sit immortalis sensu aeterno supplicio subiugata'; and *Ascl.* I. 2 a *initt.*, 'omnis humana immortalis est anima.' On the other hand, *ἀθανασία* may mean 'the life of the gods', i. e. a life freed from the limitations to which the soul is subjected during its embodiment on earth,—or in other words, 'union with God'. In the latter sense, the soul, while in the body, is not yet *ἀθάνατος*; but it has before it the prospect of attaining to *ἀθανασία* when released from the body by death, provided that it has received and rightly used God's gift of *νοῦς* during its earthly life. For the second sense, cf. *Corp.* X. 7: *αἱ δὲ ἀνθρώπειαι (ψυχαί), ἀρχὴν ἀθανασίας σχοῦσαι, κ.τ.λ.*

The word *ἀθάνατος* might also bear a third sense, viz. 'not liable to the separation of soul from body'. In this sense, men are mortal, and the heavenly bodies are immortal. But this third sense has no application in the passage before us.

qui se mentis religioni dederit. The term *mentis religio* is here used by the interpolator to denote the religion of the Pagans as understood and accepted by him, i. e. the Platonic religion of the Hermetists.

Fit deorum, &c. The transition is abrupt; and it seems probable that some connecting words have been lost before *fit deorum*.

At this point a fresh start is made. Both the *secessio deorum* and the wars and crimes of men have been dealt with before ('e terris enim est ad caelum recursura divinitas', ch. 24 b: 'crudelitatis exemplum' &c., ch. 25); but the writer here returns to these topics. This may be accounted for by assuming that from this point onward he is more or less closely following some earlier authority, in which the *senectus* and *regeneritura mundi* were described as periodically recurring processes. He sees in the calamities of his time the

beginnings of such a senile decay of the universe as his predecessor had spoken of; and he adapts to his purpose the language of his source. The verbs *fit*, *remanent*, *compellunt* seem to have been in the present tense in the archetype, though they have been altered into futures in B; and there is good authority for the presents *mutescit* and *languescit* in the following clauses. As we find the aorist used in the Greek quoted by Lactantius, it may be inferred that the Latin presents stand for Greek aorists; and the aorist might be used to describe a recurring process.

soli nocentes angeli remanent. Cf. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 15. 8: 'uterque vero (*sc.* Hermes, in the Λόγος τέλειος (?), and Asclepius, in *Corp.* XVI) daemones esse adfirmat inimicos et vexatores hominum, quos ideo Trismegistus ἀγγέλους πονηρούς appellat.' Lactantius is probably referring to this passage; and if so, the Hermetist here used ἀγγελοι as a synonym for δαίμονες. *Angeli* are mentioned again in the Latin *Ascl.* III. 37, 'evocantes animas daemonum vel angelorum'; but the words *vel angelorum* may there have been added by the translator. The term ἀγγελοι occurs in Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* XXIV. 5, where it is said that kingly souls, when they descend into earthly bodies, are accompanied by an escort of ἀγγελοι καὶ δαίμονες; but the word is hardly to be found elsewhere in the extant *Hermetica*. It was frequently used by Pagan writers from the time of Porphyry onwards, and often occurs in the Magic Papyri. ἀγγελοι καταχθόνιοι are mentioned in magic tablets found in Attica (Dieterich *Mithras-liturgie*, p. 49). In *Abammonis Resp.* 2. 6 f., ἀρχάγγελοι and ἀγγελοι are spoken of as classes of superhuman beings distinct from daemons. Cf. Tertull. *Apol.* 22 (A. D. 197): 'Angelos quoque etiam Plato non negavit: utriusque nominis (*sc.* daemonum et angelorum) testes et magi adsunt.' (Plato does not use the word ἀγγελοι in this sense; but in *Sympos.* 202 E he describes the daemons as intermediaries or messengers between gods and men.) This Pagan use of the word was doubtless derived chiefly from Jewish sources; but ἀγγελος may also have been sometimes employed, independently of Jewish influence, as a rendering of a term used by Persians or Chaldaeans.

Evil daemons are repeatedly mentioned in the *Hermetica*: e. g. *Corp.* IX. 3: μοιχείας, φόνους, . . . καὶ ἄλλα πάντα ὅσα δαιμόνων ἔργα. Cf. Hermes *ap.* Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 15. 6 (*Ascl.* III. 29 b): δαίμων κακός. Plut. *Def. orac.* 17, p. 419: φαύλους . . . δαίμονας οὐκ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς μόνον . . . ἀπέλιπεν, ἀλλὰ καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρῆσιππος. Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 51, p. 277: οἱ περὶ Χρῆσιππον οἴονται φιλόσοφοι

φαῦλα δαιμόνια περινοστεῖν, οἷς οἱ θεοὶ δημίους χρωῖνται κολασταῖς ἐπὶ τοὺς ἀνοσίους καὶ ἀδίκους ἀνθρώπους. The notion was old in Egypt, but was, no doubt, reinforced there by the importation of Persian and Babylonian beliefs from the time of the Persian dominion onward.

Tunc nec terra constabit &c. When men cease to worship the gods, the beneficent action of the gods, which was dependent on the due performance of the rites of worship, inevitably ceases; the material universe is left ungoverned, and falls into disorder.

Tertullian, *Apol.* 40, speaks of those 'qui adversus sanguinem innocentium conclamant, praetextentes . . . quod existiment omnis publicae cladis, omnis popularis incommodi Christianos esse in caussa. Si Tiberis ascendit in moenia, si Nilus non ascendit in arva, si caelum stetit, si terra movit, si fames, si lues, statim "Christianos ad leonem"'. The Hermetist shares the belief that such calamities must necessarily result from the impiety of the Christians. He does not join in the cry for their blood; but he believes that sooner or later God himself will purge his universe by the destruction of the impious, and all will then be well again.

Augustine speaks of the Pagans who maintained that the calamities of the time resulted from the abandonment of the old cults. Aug. *Retractat.* 2. 43: the first five books of the *De civ. dei* 'eos refellunt, qui res humanas ita prosperari volunt, ut ad hoc multorum deorum cultum, quos pagani colere consueverunt, necessarium esse arbitrentur, et quia prohibetur, mala ista exoriri atque abundare contendunt.' Cf. *Civ. dei* 2. 3: 'vulgare proverbium: "Pluvia deficit: causa Christiani sunt."' Many of the Pagan rites were in their origin devices for influencing the course of nature, and especially for promoting fertility; and a sense of their primitive significance still survived.

The Christians in turn, when they got the upper hand, attributed bad weather to the impiety of the Pagans. *Novell. Theodosii II, Tit.* 3, A. D. 438: 'Decrevimus ut quicumque pollutis contaminatisque mentibus in sacrificio quolibet in loco fuerit comprehensus, in fortunas eius, in sanguinem ira nostra consurgat. . . . An diutius preferemus mutari temporum vices irata caeli temperie? quae paganorum exacerbata perfidia nescit naturae libramenta servare. Unde enim ver solitam gratiam abiuravit? Unde aestas messe ieiuna laboriosum agricolam in spe destituit aristarum?

Unde hiemis intemperata ferocitas ubertatem terrarum penetrabili frigore sterilitatis laesione damnavit? nisi quod ad impietatis vindictam transit legis suae natura decretum ("nature transgresses the decree of her own law"). Quod ne posthac sustinere cogamur, pacifica ultione, ut diximus, pianda est superni numinis veneranda maiestas.'

The Hermetist's description of cosmic disorder resembles predictions which occur in many Jewish and Christian apocalypses: e. g. *Ethiop. Enoch* 80. 2-7, and *Orac. Sib. passim*.

nec caelum astrorum cursibus (subsistet?), nec siderum cursus constabit in caelo. Compare the vision (apparently of Pagan origin) at the end of *Orac. Sib.* V, ll. 512-531: ἄστρο μάχην ὤδινε· θεὸς δ' ἐπέτρεψε μάχεσθαι. Then follows a *Theomachia*, in which the Signs of the Zodiac are the combatants; and at the end, ὦπτο μὲν Οὐρανὸς αὐτός, ἕως ἐτίναξε μαχητάς· | θυμωθεὶς δ' ἔρριψε καταπληνείς ἐπὶ γαίαν. | ῥίμφα μὲν οὖν πληγέντες ἐπ' Ὀκεανοῖο λοετρά | ἦψαν γαίαν ἅπασαν· ἔμεινε δ' ἀνάστερος αἰθήρ. But the disturbance of the order of nature which the Hermetist anticipates must be less violent than this, since a remnant of the human race will survive it ('hominibus qui tunc erunt' below).

omnis vox divina . . . mutescet. The oracles will be dumb; and the voice of God will be heard no longer in the human heart. The present discourse of Trismegistus is itself a *vox divina*; cf. *Ascl.* 1 b: '«(ex ore Hermu)» divinus Cupido sic est orsus dicere'. All such inspiration or possession of men by God will cease.

aer ipse maesto torpore languescet. Cf. Philo *De provid.* (Aucher) 1. 18: In proof that the air is not immortal, '(animadverto aërem) varias passiones experiri . . . : unde etiam medicorum iudicio per commutationes eius oriri morbos statuitur, quoniam languescere per hunc dixere corpora in mundo existentia naturali eius participatione. Qui ergo obnoxius est morbo, tempestati ac corruptioni, quidni ipsa quoque vita non demum privetur?'

26 a. Haec et talis senectus veniet mundi. This *senectus mundi* is the end of a period of the cosmic process, to be followed by the beginning of another period (*reginitura* below). The notion of a cyclical recurrence of disorder in the universe occurs in Pl. *Politicus* 269 c-274 d.

In the *Timaeus*, 22 b ff., Plato puts into the mouth of an Egyptian priest a description of periodical destructions of the greater part

of mankind by fire and water alternately; but according to that authority, Egypt, owing to special causes, is exempt from the fires and floods by which all other lands are periodically devastated.

On this passage of the *Timaeus* is based Philo *De aetern. mundi* 27. 146, Cohn VI, p. 117: φθοραὶ τῶν κατὰ γῆν, οὐκ ἀθρώων ἀπάντων, ἀλλὰ τῶν πλείστων, δυσὶ ταῖς μεγίσταις αἰτίαις ἀνατίθενται, πυρὸς καὶ ὕδατος ἀλέκτοις φοραῖς. κατασκήπτειν δ' ἑκατέραν ἐν μέρει φασὶν ἐν πάνν μακραῖς ἐνιαυτῶν περιόδοις. ὅταν μὲν οὖν ἔμπρησις καταλαμβάνη, ῥεῦμα αἰθερίου πυρὸς ἄνωθεν ἐκχεόμενον πολλαχῆ σκεδάννυσθαι, μεγάλα κλίματα τῆς οἰκουμένης ἐπιτρέχον' ὅταν δὲ κατακλυσμός, κ.τ.λ. The same theory occurs again in Philo *Vita Mosis* 2. 10, Cohn IV, p. 212 f.: God punishes the wicked τῶν τοῦ παντὸς δραστηκωτάτων στοιχείων ἐπιθεμένων, ὕδατος καὶ πυρὸς, ὡς καιρῶν περιόδοις τοὺς μὲν κατακλυσμοῖς φθαρῆναι, τοὺς δὲ καταφλεχθέντας ἀπολέσθαι κ.τ.λ. (Here, Noah's flood, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, serve as instances.) Cf. Cic. *Somn. Scip.* 7: 'eluviones exustionesque terrarum, quas accidere tempore certo necesse est.' Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 333: 'Philolaus' (Neo-Pythagorean) διττὴν εἶναι τὴν φθορὰν (τοῦ κόσμου), τὸ μὲν ἐξ οὐρανοῦ πυρὸς ῥίντος, τὸ δὲ ἐξ ὕδατος σεληνιακοῦ.

The Stoic *ecpyrosis* was a cyclically recurring process. But the earlier Stoics described the *ecpyrosis* as an absorption of all things into God (whom they identified with the cosmic fire), rather than as a calamitous destruction. Plut. *Sto. repugn.* 39. 2, p. 1052 C: Chrysippus said τὸν Δία αἰξεσθαι μέχρις ἂν εἰς αὐτὸν ἅπαντα καταλώσῃ. Diog. Laert. 7. 137: (ὁ θεὸς) κατὰ χρόνων ποιάς περιόδους ἀναλίσκων εἰς ἑαυτὸν τὴν ἅπασαν οὐσίαν, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ἑαυτοῦ γεννῶν. Plut. *Comm. not.* 17. 3, p. 1067 A: ὅταν ἐκπυρώσωσι τὸν κόσμον οὗτοι, κακὸν μὲν οὐδ' ὀτιοῦν ἀπολείπεται, τὸ δ' ὅλον φρόνιμόν ἐστι τηρικαῦτα καὶ σοφόν. Some of the later Stoics however modified this doctrine into something more nearly resembling the Jewish predictions of universal ruin. Cic. *Acad.* 2. 37. 119: the Stoic says 'fore tamen aliquando ut omnis hic mundus ardore deflagret'. Philo *De aetern. mundi* 3. 9, Cohn VI, p. 75: the Stoics say κόσμον μὲν ἓνα (εἶναι), γενέσεως δ' αὐτοῦ θεὸν αἴτιον, φθορᾶς δὲ μηκέτι θεόν, ἀλλὰ τὴν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν τοῖς οὐσι πυρὸς ἀκαμάτου δύναμιν χρόνον μακραῖς περιόδοις ἀναλύουσαν τὰ πάντα εἰς ἑαυτήν. Seneca, *Consol. ad Polyb.* 1. 2: 'Mundo quidam minantur interitum, et hoc universum, quod omnia divina humanae complectitur, . . . dies aliquis dissipabit et in confusionem veterem tenebrasque demerget.' Sen. *Consol. ad*

Marc. 26. 6: 'Nihil quo stat loco stabit, omnia sternet abducatque vetustas: ¹ nec hominibus solum, . . . sed locis, sed regionibus, sed mundi partibus ludet. . . . Maria sorbebit, flumina avertet, et commercio gentium rupto societatem generis humani coetumque dissolvat. ² Alibi hiatibus vastis subducat urbes, tremoribus quatiet, ³ et ex infimo pestilentes halitus mittet, ⁴ et inundationibus quicquid habitatur obducat, necabitque omne animal orbe submerso, ⁵ et ignibus vastis torrebit incendetque mortalia. ⁶ Et cum tempus advenerit quo se mundus renovaturus exstinguat, ⁷ viribus ista se suis caedent, et sidera sideribus incurrent, ⁸ et omni flagrante materia, uno igne quicquid nunc ex disposito lucet ardebit.' So far, the writer of *Ascl.* III is in close agreement with Seneca; and both may have borrowed from Posidonius, who wrote *περὶ τῆς γενέσεως καὶ τῆς φθορᾶς τοῦ κόσμου* in his *Περὶ κόσμου α'* (Diog. Laert. 7. 142). But the Hermetist could not accept the Stoic doctrine with which Seneca *l. c.* concludes: 'Nos quoque, felices animae et aeterna sortitae (i. e. disembodied and beatified souls), cum deo visum erit iterum ista moliri, labentibus cunctis et ipsae parva ruinae ingentis accessio in antiqua elementa vertemur.'

Some of the later Stoics spoke of periodical destructions of the universe by water and fire alternately. ⁹ This doctrine occurs in the Stoic Heraclitus (time of Augustus?), *Alleg. Hom.* c. 25; and it was adopted by Seneca, who gives a graphic description of the impending destruction of our world by a universal deluge (*Nat. quaest.* 3. 27-30). Seneca *ib.* attributes these periodical crises to the operation of the stars, and ascribes this doctrine to the Chaldaean Berosus (about 300 B. C.). Sen. *Nat. Quaest.* 3. 28. 7 f.:

¹ Cf. *Ascl.* III, 'senectus mundi'.

² *Ascl.* III, 'nec navigabitur mare'.

³ *Ascl.* III, 'nec terra constabit'.

⁴ *Ascl.* III, 'aer . . . languescet'.

⁵ *Ascl.* III, πῆ μὲν ὕδατι πολλῶ κατακλύσας.

⁶ *Ascl.* III, πῆ δὲ περὶ δξυτάτῳ διακαύσας.

⁷ *Ascl.* III, 'senectus mundi' and 'regentura'.

⁸ *Ascl.* III, 'nec siderum cursus constabit in caelo'.

⁹ Yet the author of the *De aeternitate mundi* (i. e. Philo in his youth?) appears to have known of no Stoic who asserted an *exhydatis* corresponding to the *expyrosis*. He says (21. 107) there are four elements; why then do the Stoics single out one of the four, and say that the Kosmos will be resolved into fire alone? δέον γάρ, εἶποι τις ἄν, . . . εἰς ἀέρα ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ γῆν . . . ἀλλ' οὐδεὶς ἐξαερούσθαι ἢ ἐξηυατούσθαι ἢ ἀπογοῖσθαι τὸν κόσμον εἶπεν.

The early Stoics spoke of a transmutation of all (except a hidden remnant of fire) from fire to water as the first stage of the *diacosmesis* (see note on *Corp.* III. 2 a), but not of a periodical *exhydatis* corresponding to the *expyrosis* as winter to summer.

'Utrumque (*sc.* diluvium et conflagratio) fit, cum deo visum ordiri meliora, vetera finiri. Aqua et ignis terrenis dominantur: ex his ortus et ex his interitus est. Ergo quandoque placuere res novae mundo, sic in nos mare emittitur desuper, ut fervor ignisque, cum aliud genus exitii placuit. . . . Berosus . . . ait ista cursu siderum fieri. Adeo quidem adfirmat, ut conflagrationi et diluvio tempus adsignet: arsura enim terrena contendit, quando omnia sidera, quae nunc diversos agunt cursus, (i.e. the seven planets) in Cancrum convenerint sic sub eodem posita vestigio, ut recta linea exire per orbis omnium possit: inundationem futuram, cum eadem siderum turba in Capricornum convenerit. Illic solstitium, hic bruma conficitur.' Cf. Censorinus, *Di. nat.* 18. 11 (about A. D. 238): 'anni (magni) hiems summa est cataclysmus, . . . aestas autem ecpyrosis.' In the allegory of the *quadriga* reported by Dio Chrysost., *Or.* 36 *fin.*, there is mention of a periodical predominance of fire and water alternately. Dio says that the doctrine of his allegory was taught by 'Zoroaster and his disciples the Magi'; but the greater part of it is manifestly borrowed from Stoicism.

Some Stoics held that the *ecpyrosis* would not extend to the whole Kosmos, and that there would be merely partial conflagrations, by which the world would be 'purified'; Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 1. 21: the Stoics προσδέχονται ἐκπύρωσιν ἔσεσθαι καὶ κάθαρσιν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου οἱ μὲν παντός, οἱ δὲ μέρους,¹ καὶ κατὰ μέρος δὲ αὐτὸν καθαιρεσθαι λέγουσιν' καὶ σχεδὸν τὴν φθορὰν καὶ τὴν ἐτέρου ἐξ αὐτῆς γένεσιν κάθαρσιν ὀνομάζουσι. This view approaches closely to that which the Hermetist expresses in the words τὴν κακίαν ἐκκαθάρας, πῆ μὲν ὕδατι πολλῷ κατακλύσας, πῆ δὲ πυρὶ ὀξυτάτῳ διακαύσας. Those who adopted the astral explanation of the *ecpyrosis* (and *exhydrosis*) must have assumed that the destruction would extend to the lower world only, and that the stars would remain unaffected by it; whereas the earlier doctrine, taught by Chrysippus, was that the star-gods, like all else, will be absorbed in 'Zeus' at the *ecpyrosis*. Thus Nemesius, *De nat. hom.* 38, says that the gods (among whom the stars must be included) are exempt from the general destruction: οἱ δὲ Στωικοί φασι ἀποκαθισταμένους τοὺς πλάνητας εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ σημεῖον κατὰ τε μῆκος καὶ πλάτος, ἔνθα τὴν

¹ We are told that the Stoics Boethius and Panaetius abandoned the doctrine of *ecpyrosis* (Philo *Aetern. mundi* 10. 76); but they probably admitted partial and purifying conflagrations.

ἀρχὴν ἕκαστος ἦν ὅτε τὸ πρῶτον ὁ κόσμος συνέστη, ἐν ῥηταῖς χρόνων περιόδοις ἐκπύρωσιν καὶ φθορὰν τῶν ὄντων ἀπεργάζεσθαι, καὶ πάλιν ἐξ ὑπαρχῆς εἰς τὸ αὐτὸ τὸν κόσμον ἀποκαθίστασθαι (καὶ) τῶν ἀστέρων ὁμοίως πάλιν φερομένων, ἕκαστον ἐν τῇ προτέρᾳ περιόδῳ γινόμενον ἀπαραλλάκτως ἀποτελεῖσθαι. ἔσεσθαι γὰρ πάλιν Σωκράτη καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ ἕκαστον τῶν ἀνθρώπων κ.τ.λ. . . . γίνεσθαι δὲ τὴν ἀποκατάστασιν τοῦ παντὸς οὐχ ἅπαξ, ἀλλὰ πολλάκις· μᾶλλον δὲ εἰς ἄπειρον καὶ ἀτελεύτητον τὰ αὐτὰ ἀποκαθίστασθαι. τοὺς δὲ θεούς, [τοὺς] μὴ ὑποκειμένους τῇ φθορᾷ ταύτῃ, παρακολουθήσαντας μὲν περιόδῳ, γινώσκειν ἐκ ταύτης πάντα τὰ μέλλοντα ἔσεσθαι ἐν ταῖς ἐξῆς περιόδοις.

We may conclude then that in his description of the *senectus mundi* and *reginitura* the Hermetist has been influenced by some Stoic writer.

The notion that our world is already in its old age, and shows signs of approaching dissolution, occurs in Lucretius 2. 1150-1174. It is to be found in the apocalyptic literature, e.g. 4 *Esdras* 14. 16: see Charles, *Eschatology*, p. 209. In the troubled times of the third century A. D., no doubt it was widely accepted. Cyprian *ad Demetrianum* 3 (about A. D. 251): '*scire debes senuisse iam mundum*: the world has no longer the strength it once possessed. Like the sun at evening, it is tending to its decline; the earth is growing miserly; all things languish.' But this notion does not occur elsewhere in the *Hermetica*. The Hermetists in general assume that the course of nature is invariable; e.g. *Corp.* XII. ii. 18: ὦν γὰρ ὁμοῦ σύμπας ὁ κόσμος ἀμετάβλητος. And the view here expressed by the writer of *Ascl.* III is difficult to reconcile with language used elsewhere in the same document; e.g. ch. 22 b: '*quamvis immortalitas et unius semper aetatis vigor ipse sit eis*' &c. (*sc. diis caelestibus*). Ch. 30 *init.*: '(mundus) nec stabit aliquando nec conrumpetur.' (In *Pl. Tim.* 33 A, a *senectus mundi* is expressly denied; the Kosmos is there said to be ἀγήρωσ καὶ ἄνοσος.) The ordering of the cosmic process by a *lex aeterna* is not however necessarily inconsistent with recurring variations; for these variations may be ordained by an unvarying law.

Lactantius, in constructing his eschatology, used the Greek original of *Ascl.* III. 24 b-26 a as one of his sources, combining its *data* with those supplied by the *Oracula Sibyllina* and other apocalypses; see especially *Div. inst.* 7. 14. 16; *ib.* 7. 15. 10; and *Epit.* 66. 3 *sqq.*

inordinatio, inrationabilitas, bonorum omnium (defectio).

The universe will go back to chaos; the order established by the Demiurgus will be abolished, and nothing but ἕλη ἄτακτος καὶ ἄλογος will remain. Cf. Pl. *Tim.* 53 A: καὶ τὸ μὲν δὴ πρὸ τούτου, πάντα ταῦτ' ἔχειν ἀλόγως καὶ ἀμέτρως· ὅτε δ' ἐπεχειρεῖτο κοσμεῖσθαι τὸ πᾶν κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* 69 B: ταῦτα ἀτάκτως ἔχοντα ὁ θεὸς . . . συμμετρίας ἐνεποιήσεν. The words *bonorum omnium* cannot depend on *inordinatio* and *inrationabilitas*; good things cannot be ἄτακτα καὶ ἄλογα. Some word signifying 'cessation' is therefore needed to complete the sense; and perhaps *defectio*, used by Lactant. (*Epit.* 66), may be his rendering of the missing word. λόγος signifies the design of the Demiurgus, by which all things have been ordered to good ends; ἀλογία therefore necessarily involves *bonorum omnium defectio*.

ὁ κύριος καὶ πατήρ καὶ θεὸς καὶ ἴ τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἐνὸς θεοῦ¹ δημιουργός.—*ille dominus et pater, deus primipotens ἴ et unius gubernator dei*¹. Both the Greek and the Latin are here corrupt. Some phrase equivalent to τοῦ κόσμου δημιουργός is required; and the Kosmos, being ὁ δεύτερος θεός, cannot be called ὁ πρῶτος καὶ εἰς θεός, or *unus deus*. The Latin has *deus primipotens* in the nominative, in place of the genitive τοῦ πρώτου; hence it is probable that τοῦ πρώτου is a corruption of [some such word as πρωτάρχης. In place of ἐνός, some epithet applicable to the Kosmos is needed; and Davis's conjecture, τοῦ πρωτογένους, gives the right sense.¹ The Kosmos is not the first god absolutely; but it is the first god that has come into being, or the first in the sphere of *genesis*. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 8: ὁ κύριος . . . ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε, θεὸν ὄρατὸν καὶ αἰσθητόν, . . . ἐπεὶ οὖν τοῦτον ἐποίησε πρῶτον καὶ μόνον καὶ ἕνα ('*ex se primum et a se secundum*'). Lactantius, in both passages alike, has made the mistake of supposing that the δεύτερος θεός of whom Trismegistus speaks is the Son of God in the Christian sense. He seems to have taken the words τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἐνὸς θεοῦ δημιουργός to mean 'He whom the first and one God employed as Demiurgus', i. e. the Word by whom the Father made the world; and so he assumes that in Trismegistus' account of the renovation of the world the Son, and not the Father, is the agent ('*missuiri a patre tunc filium dei, . . . quod Hermes tamen non dissimulavit*'). But this is a mistake. In *Ascl.* III, the Demiurgus is the supreme God, the 'Master and Father', and not a second god subordinate to him.

¹ Or τοῦ πρώτου καὶ ἐνὸς (αἰσθητοῦ) θεοῦ? See Lact. *Div. inst.* 4. 6. 4.

It is to be noted that the translator here renders *δημιουργός* by *gubernator* (the equivalent of *κυβερνήτης* or *ἡγεμών*), and not by *fabricator*.

ἐπιβλέψας τοῖς γενομένοις.—*intuens in mores factaque [voluntaria]*. *In facta* corresponds to τοῖς γενομένοις. The translator has added *in mores*; he may have read something equivalent in his Greek text. *Voluntaria* must be a duplication of the following *voluntate*.

τῇ ἀταξίᾳ.—*vitiis . . . et corruptelae omnium*. Perhaps the translator read τῇ κακίᾳ (an error caused by τὴν κακίαν in the following line) καὶ τῇ πάντων διαφθορᾷ.

ἀνακαλεσάμενος τὴν πλάνην.—*errorem revocans*. Does τὴν πλάνην mean the aberrations of men, who have ceased to worship, or those of the cosmic gods, who have ceased to discharge their functions regularly? Probably the former, since the following clauses speak of God's dealings with men. It is the impiety of men that has caused confusion in the Kosmos; and when men are recalled to their duty towards the gods, all will again go right. The word πλάνη was habitually used by Christian writers to denote the error of idolatry; here it is used in a corresponding sense by the Pagan writer to denote the error of the Christians.

καὶ τὴν κακίαν ἐκκαθάρας.—*malignitatem omnem*. The translator has omitted ἐκκαθάρας; perhaps he read πᾶσαν (*omnem*) in place of it.

πῆ μὲν ὕδατι πολλῶ κατακλύσας, πῆ δὲ πυρὶ ὀξυτάτῳ διακαύσας.—*vel inlunione diluens, vel igne consumens*. Cf. Orig. *c. Cels.* 4. 69: ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὡς ἄνθρωπος τεκτηνόμενος τι ἐνδεῶς καὶ ἀτεχνότερον δημιουργήσας ὁ θεὸς προσάγει διόρθωσιν τῷ κόσμῳ, καθαίρων αὐτὸν κατακλυσμῷ ἢ ἐκπυρώσει, ἀλλὰ τὴν χύσιν τῆς κακίας κωλύων ἐπὶ πλείον νέμεσθαι. . . θέλει οὖν διὰ καινοτέρας διορθώσεως αἰεὶ ὁ θεὸς τὰ σφάλματα ἀναλαμβάνειν. εἰ γὰρ καὶ τέτακται αὐτῷ πάντα κάλλιστα καὶ ἀσφαλέστατα κατὰ τὴν τῶν ὄλων δημιουργίαν, ἀλλ' οὐδὲν ἦττον ἰατρικῆς τινος αὐτῷ ἐδέησεν ἐπὶ τοῖς τὴν κακίαν νοσοῦσι, καὶ παντὶ τῷ κόσμῳ ὑπ' αὐτῆς ὡσπερὶ μολυνομένῳ. The Hermetist is here in close agreement with Origen.

πολέμοις καὶ λοιμοῖς ἐκπαίσας.—*morbis pestilentibus iisque per diversa loca dispersis finiens*. The translator seems to have read πολυσπέρεσι or some similar adjective in place of πολέμοις καί, and ἐκπαύσας in place of ἐκπαίσας.

ἤγαγεν ἐπὶ τὸ ἀρχαῖον καὶ ἀποκατέστησεν τὸν ἑαυτοῦ κόσμον.—*ad*

antiquam faciem mundum revocabit. The word ἀποκατέστησεν in this connexion is characteristic of the later Stoicism. See note on ἀποκατάστασις in *Ascl.* I. 13. 'The Stoics' in Arius Didymus, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 469: ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον δὲ προελθὼν ὁ κοινὸς λόγος καὶ (ἢ) κοινὴ φύσις (i. e. the πῦρ νοερόν), μείζων καὶ πλείων γενομένη, τέλος ἀναξήρανασα πάντα καὶ εἰς αὐτὴν ἀναλαβοῦσα, ἐν τῇ πάσῃ οὐσίᾳ γίνεται, ἐπανελθοῦσα εἰς τὸν πρῶτον ῥηθέντα λόγον, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀνάστασιν ἐκείνην τὴν ποιούσαν ἐναντὶν τὸν μέγιστον, καθ' ὃν ἀπ' αὐτῆς μόνῃς εἰς αὐτὴν πάλιν γίνεται ἡ ἀποκατάστασις.

Haec enim mundi (re)genitura. The Greek must have been either παλιγγενεσία or ἀναγέννησις. The writer assumes the term ἢ τοῦ κόσμου παλιγγενεσία to be already familiar to his readers, (cf. 'haec et talis senectus veniet mundi' above), and applies it to the restoration which is to follow on the ruin caused by the impiety of the Christians. The word παλιγγενεσία was used by the Stoics with reference to the periodical renovation of the universe; e. g. Philo *De aetern. mundi* 3. 9, Cohn VI, p. 75: δύναται δὲ κατὰ τούτους (sc. the Stoics) ὁ μὲν τις κόσμος αἰδίου, ὁ δὲ τις φθαρτὸς λέγεσθαι, φθαρτὸς μὲν ὁ κατὰ τὴν διακόσμησιν, αἰδίου δὲ ὁ κατὰ τὴν ἐκπύρωσιν παλιγγενεσίαις καὶ περιόδοις ἀθανατιζόμενος οὐδέποτε ληγούσας. (*Ib.* ἀναγέννησις κόσμου is used as an equivalent term.) *Ib.* 21. 107: τοὺς τὰς ἐκπυρώσεις καὶ παλιγγενεσίας θρυλοῦντας. Marc. Aurel. 11. 1: τὴν περιοδικὴν παλιγγενεσίαν τῶν ὄλων.

On the Jewish notion of a 'Welterneuerung' (a single and final renovation, not a periodically recurring process), see Bousset, *Religion des Judenthums*, pp. 321-324. The word παλιγγενεσία occurs in *Ev. Matth.* 19. 28: ἐν τῇ παλιγγενεσίᾳ, ὅταν καθίσῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ θρόνου δόξης αὐτοῦ.

The usual Latin equivalent for παλιγγενεσία is *regeneratio*. We must read either (re)genitura (I have not found this word elsewhere, but *regigni* occurs in Lucr. 5. 244), or (nova)genitura.

per[co]acta temporis cursu (dei voluntate), quae est [[]] sempiterna. *Sempiterna* is here used in the sense of *aeterna*, and perhaps stands for αἰώνιος rather than αἰδίου. Time appertains to the Kosmos, eternity to God. The writer's object is to explain that the intervention of God at a particular time to bring about the *regenitura mundi* does not conflict with the truth that his will is invariable. He wills the good unchangeably; but in the time-process of the Kosmos, his will takes effect in different ways at different times.

26 b-32 a (and 40 b). In this passage the writer treats of the relation between *time* and *eternity*. He describes God as exempt from the conditions of the time-process to which the Kosmos is subject; and the timeless and changeless existence of God he denotes by the term *aeternitas* (αἰών).

The earliest Greek writer by whom the conception of timeless and changeless existence was clearly formulated is Plato. Among Plato's predecessors, those who came nearest to it were Parmenides (c. 500-450 B. C.) and his followers. See Parmen., Diels *Vorsokr.* p. 118: ὡς ἀγένητον ἐὼν καὶ ἀνώλεθρόν ἐστιν | ὄλον μονογενές τε καὶ ἀτρεμές ἢ δ' ἀτέλεστον. | οὐδέ ποτ' ἦν οὐδ' ἔσται, ἐπεὶ νῦν ἔστιν ὁμοῦ πάν, | ἔν, συνεχές. . . . πῶς δ' ἂν ἔπειτα πέλοι τὸ ἐόν; πῶς δ' ἂν κε γένοιτο; | εἰ γὰρ ἔγεντ', οὐκ ἔστ(ι), οὐδ' εἴ ποτε μέλλει ἔσεσθαι.¹ Melissus (fl. about 444-441 B. C.), Diels *ib.* p. 143 ff.: (τὸ ὄν) αἰεὶ ἦν ὅ τι ἦν καὶ αἰεὶ ἔσται. . . . ἔστι τε καὶ αἰεὶ ἦν καὶ αἰεὶ ἔσται. . . . αἰδιόν ἐστι καὶ ἄπειρον καὶ ἔν καὶ ὅμοιον πάν. καὶ οὐτ' ἂν ἀπόλοιτο οὔτε μείζον γίνοιτο οὔτε μετακοσμέοιτο οὔτε ἀλγεῖ οὔτε ἀνιάται. . . . οὐδὲ κινεῖται. Gomperz, *Greek Thinkers*, Eng. tr. I, p. 206, thus sums up the results attained by the school of Parmenides: 'Nothing was left save the bare conception of Substance, the complexus, that is to say, of the attributes of *eternal persistence* and *eternal immutability*.' But in Parmenides, this conception was still obscure and confused; for it is only to that which is incorporeal that these attributes can be intelligibly assigned; and in the time of Parmenides Greek thinkers had not attained to a clear distinction between the corporeal and the incorporeal.² He spoke of the eternally existent; but he imagined it as a globular mass of solid matter. Plato was, as far as we know, the first Greek who clearly distinguished things incorporeal from things corporeal, and said that incorporeal things exist; and accordingly, it is only when we come to Plato that we find the conception of timeless and changeless existence fully developed. Expressed by the term τὸ ὄν in contrast

¹ Thus translated by Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy* 1892, p. 185: 'What is, is uncreated and indestructible, alone, complete (reading μῦνόν τ' οὐλομελές τε), immovable and without end. Nor was it ever, nor will it be; for now *it is*, all at once, a continuous one. . . . How, then, can what *is* be going to be in the future? Or how could it come into being? If it came into being, it is not; nor is it if it is going to be in the future.'

² Burnet, *ib.*, p. 27, says 'When an early Greek philosopher speaks of τὸ ὄν, he does not mean Being, but Body'. Perhaps it should rather be said that the early Greek philosopher means *both at once*; for he has not discriminated the one from the other. The 'Body' of which he is thinking is not mere dead matter; it is alive; it is at once 'Body' and 'God'.

to τὰ γιγνόμενα, this conception runs through a large part of Plato's writings; but it is in the *Tímaeus* alone that he uses the word αἰών to express it. It is therefore evident that the doctrine of eternity in *Ascl.* III. 26 b-32 a is derived, directly or indirectly, from the *Tímaeus*. See Pl. *Tím.* 37 D sqq.¹

Philo uses the term αἰών as it is used in the *Tímaeus*. Philo *Quod deus sit immutabilis*, 6. 31, Wendland II, p. 63: δημιουργός δὲ καὶ χρόνου θεός· καὶ γὰρ τοῦ πατρὸς αὐτοῦ πατήρ—πατήρ δὲ χρόνου κόσμος—τὴν κίνησιν αὐτοῦ γένεσιν ἀποφήνας ἐκείνου· ὥστε νῦνον τὴν τάξιν ἔχειν πρὸς θεὸν τὸν χρόνον. ὁ μὲν γὰρ κόσμος οὗτος νεώτερος υἱὸς θεοῦ, ἅτε αἰσθητὸς ὢν· τὸν γὰρ πρεσβύτερον—νοητὸς δ' ἐκείνος—πρεσβείων ἀξιώσας παρ' ἑαυτῷ καταμένειν διανοήθη. οὗτος οὖν ὁ νεώτερος υἱὸς ὁ αἰσθητὸς κινήσει τὴν χρόνου φύσιν ἀναλάμψαι καὶ ἀνασχεῖν ἐποίησεν· ὥστε οὐδὲν παρὰ θεῷ μέλλον, τῷ καὶ τὰ τῶν χρόνων ὑπηγμένῳ πέρατα. καὶ γὰρ οὐ χρόνος, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἀρχέτυπον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ παράδειγμα αἰὼν ὁ βίος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ· ἐν αἰῶνι δὲ οὔτε παρελήλυθεν οὐδὲν οὔτε μέλλει, ἀλλὰ μόνον ὑφέστηκεν. Philo *De mutatione nominum* 47. 267, Wendland III, p. 202 (on *Gen.* 17. 21): “ἐνιαυτὸν ἕτερον” οὐ (τὸ) τοῦ χρόνου μηνῶν διάστημα, ὃ ταῖς σεληνιακαῖς ἢ ἡλιακαῖς ἀναμετρεῖται περιόδοις, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἔκτοπον καὶ ξένον καὶ καινὸν ὄντως, ἕτερον τῶν ὁρωμένων καὶ αἰσθητῶν, ἐν ἀσωμάτοις καὶ νοητοῖς ἐξεταζόμενον, ὅπερ τὸ χρόνου παράδειγμα καὶ ἀρχέτυπον εἴληχεν, αἰῶνα. αἰὼν δὲ ἀναγράφεται τοῦ νοητοῦ βίος κόσμος, ὡς αἰσθητοῦ χρόνος. Philo *Quis rer. div. heres* 34. 165, Wendland III, p. 38: αἶ γε μὴν πρὸ ἡλίου τρεῖς ἡμέραι (i. e. the first three days of creation in *Gen.* ch. 1) ταῖς μεθ' ἡλίου ἰσάριθμοι γεγόνασιν, ἐξάδος τμηθείσης ἰσότητι πρὸς αἰῶνος καὶ χρόνου δήλωσιν· αἰῶνι μὲν γὰρ τὰς πρὸ ἡλίου τρεῖς ἀνατέθεικε, χρόνῳ δὲ τὰς μεθ' ἡλίου, ὅς ἐστι μῆμα αἰῶνος. (I. e. the first three ‘days’ are assigned to the creation of the νοητὸς κόσμος, and the creation of the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος begins only with the fourth ‘day’.) Clem. Alex. *Strom.* I. 13. 57: ὁ γοῦν αἰὼν τοῦ χρόνου τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ ἐνεστώσ, αὐτὰρ δὴ καὶ τὸ παρωχηκός, ἀκαριαίως συνίστησι. See also Clem. *ib.* I. 6. 28.

¹ It is to be noted that in that passage Plato, while drawing a clear distinction between αἰών and χρόνος, does not make a corresponding distinction between the adjectives αἰώνιος (‘eternal’) and αἰδιος (‘everlasting’). In the phrase τὴν αἰδιον οὐσίαν, the adjective αἰδιος corresponds to the substantive αἰών, and means ‘eternal’; and on the other hand, when he calls time αἰώνιον εἰκόνα αἰῶνος, the word αἰώνιον does not mean ‘eternal’, but ‘everlasting’. *Ib.* 38 B, the adjective διαίωσιος is used in the sense of ‘eternal’.

There seems to be no evidence that the conception of eternity, as distinguished from endless time, existed in Egypt before the time of Plato. Among the large number of Egyptian texts quoted or discussed by Brugsch in his *Rel. und Myth. der alten Aegypter*, I have found no trace of any such notion.¹ It is true that an *argumentum ex silentio* is never quite conclusive; and there may have been schools of thought in Egypt of which we know nothing. But the extant religious documents are full of references to the cyclic recurrence of the cosmic processes,—the alternations of sunset and sunrise, winter and summer, the fall and rise of the Nile; and if the priests by whom these documents were written had recognized the existence of a supracosmic ἀκίνητον in contrast to the cosmic κίνησις with which their thoughts were so much occupied, it is hardly conceivable that no mention of it should have survived. Whether Egyptians expressly asserted the *endlessness* of the time-process, seems doubtful. There are two words of frequent occurrence in Egyptian texts, *heh* and *'et*, which are commonly rendered by 'everlasting' or 'for ever'; but it appears to be uncertain whether these words signified *infinite time*, or merely *a very long time*. At any rate, there seems to be no evidence that the notion of eternity, as distinguished from endless time, was known to Egyptian thinkers until it was taken over by them from the Greeks; and on the other hand, the growth of this notion on Greek soil can be traced through its successive stages, from the search of the early Ionian physicists for 'what was lasting and abiding in the flux of things' (Burnet, *E. G. P.* 1892, p. 13), down to the paragraph on αἰών and χρόνος in the *Timaeus* of Plato. It may therefore be asserted with confidence that the conception of eternity in *Ascl.* III. 26 b-32 a is derived wholly from Plato, and not from native Egyptian sources.

The word αἰών, to which Plato was the first to assign the special

¹ The nearest approach to it is the following (Brugsch, p. 226). In an inscription of the Casis-temple of Hibis, it is said of the Theban Amon that 'he is the Permanent in all things (*men em xet nib*), the Living One, in whom one lives for ever'; and on a stele of the XVIIIth Dynasty, Amon is called 'the Permanent of all things' (*men xet nib*). Brugsch concludes that *men xet*, 'the permanent of things', was an old name of Amon, and originally referred to 'the immortal quality of the several parts of the whole Kosmos'; but that shortly before the Ptolemaic period the term came to be specially used as a name for the earth. But if so, it cannot have signified timeless and changeless existence; for the earth and the other parts of the Kosmos possess only *secunda aeternitas*, i. e. the property of endless self-renewal by recurrent changes in time. See also Brugsch, *ib.* pp. 681, 690.

ib. p. 510, in a Theban hymn to Ptah: 'men watch (or awake) and rest, but thou dost watch in resting' (*m hotp*). But this is too vague to prove the existence of a conception of eternity.

sense 'eternity' which it bears in *Ascl.* III, is a word of many meanings. In the common usage of the Greeks, it meant (1) the lifetime of a man, (2) a long space of time, and (3) endless time. Aristotle, *De caelo* 1. 9, 279 a 27, says that αἰὼν ἀπὸ τοῦ αἰεὶ εἶναι ἐλήφθε τὴν ἐπωνυμίαν; and it seems probable that many of those who used the word assumed, like Aristotle, that it was derived from αἰεὶ ὄν. This would help to account both for its use in the sense of endless time (χρόνος αἰεὶ ὄν), and for its application to a god, or a δύναμις of God.

As a rendering of the Hebrew 'olam, αἰὼν acquired the associations of that Semitic word (as for instance in the contrasted phrases ὁ αἰὼν οὗτος and ὁ μέλλον αἰὼν, 'this world' and 'the world to come'; cf. *Εβ. ad Εβρ.* 2. 2 : τὸν αἰῶνα τοῦ κόσμου τούτου, opposed to ἐν τοῖς αἰῶσι τοῖς ἐπερχομένοις); and in writings affected by Semitic influence, it might signify either a period of time, a region of space, or a mode of existence.

The word was sometimes used to mean Time personified. An early instance of this occurs in Heraclitus fr. 52 Diels: αἰὼν παῖς ἐστὶ παῖζων, πεττεύων παιδὸς ἢ βασιλήϊη. αἰὼν there means Time; and the personification is similar to that of χρόνος in Critias, fifth century B. C., Diels *Vorsokr.* p. 618: ἀκάμας τε χρόνος . . . φοιτᾷ τίκτων αὐτὸς ἑαυτόν. *Ib.* p. 621: τό τ' ἀστερωπὸν οὐρανοῦ δέμας, χρόνον καλὸν ποίκιλμα, τέκνονος σοφοῦ.

Among the deities worshipped by the Mithraists of the Roman empire, a prominent place was assigned to a being, sometimes named Κρόνος (understood as meaning Χρόνος), and sometimes Αἰὼν, whose statue took the shape of a lion-headed human figure with a snake coiled round the body. This is probably the Persian god Zerwan, 'Time'.¹

From this use of the word as the proper name of a certain god, must be distinguished its use as an epithet or predicate applicable to various gods. When employed in the latter way, αἰὼν appears to differ little in meaning from θεός; and those who so used it probably meant by it 'an everlasting or ever-living being' (αἰεὶ ὄν). There are numerous instances of this in the Magic Papyri; e. g. *Pap. mag. Par.* i. 3168: πλουτοδότα αἰὼν, ἱερὲ Ἀγαθὲ Δαίμον. Wunsch, *Sethianische Verfluchungstafeln* 101 (Reitzenstein, *Poim.* p. 270):

¹ In the 'Sanchuniathon' of Philo Byblius there was mention of a 'man' (i. e. a euhemerized god) named Αἰὼν; Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 1. 10. 7: εἰτά φησι γεγενῆσθαι . . . Αἰῶνα καὶ Πρωτόγονον . . . εὐρεῖν δὲ τὸν Αἰῶνα τὴν ἀπὸ δένδρον τροφήν.

αἰὼν ἔρπετά, κύριε Σάραπι. In *Par. mag. Lond.* 46. 467, the deity invoked is called ὁ ἀπλόγητος αἰὼν. In *Par. mag. Leid.* W, Dieterich, *Abrahas*, p. 176, ll. 1-13, the supreme God is thus addressed: ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε . . . οὐ οὐδεὶς θεῶν δύναται ἰδεῖν τὴν ἀληθινὴν μορφήν, ὁ μεταμορφούμενος εἰς πάντας ἐν ταῖς ὁράσεσιν ἀόρατος αἰὼν αἰῶνος.¹ *Par. mag. Berl.* i. 200: (σ) ἐπικαλοῦμαι, προπάτωρ, καὶ δέομαι σου, αἰῶναίε αἰὼν, ἀκνοκράτωρ, αἰωνοπολοκράτωρ. *Par. mag. Par.* i, Dieterich, *Mithrasliturgie*, p. 4, l. 18: μέλλω κατοπτεῖν σήμερον . . . τὸν ἀθάνατον αἰῶνα καὶ δεσπότην τῶν πυρίνων διαδημάτων. Eriphanius, *Haer.* 51. 22, describes a rite annually celebrated at the Koreion² in Alexandria, and adds, 'If they are asked the meaning of this mystery, they answer, "To-day at this hour Kore gave birth to τὸν αἰῶνα"''.³ Thus it appears that in Roman Egypt the word αἰὼν was habitually applied to a god.

This use of the word was adopted by some⁴ of the Christian Gnostics, who employed the term to denote the hypostatized δυνάμεις of God. In the system of Valentinus, for instance, the twenty-eight or thirty personal beings produced from the primal deity by successive emissions are called αἰῶνες. Cf. the Naassene Attis-document, Hippol. *Ref. haer.* 5. 8: αὕτη γάρ ἐστιν ἡ παρθένος ἡ . . . τίκτουσα υἱόν, οὐ ψυχικόν, οὐ σωματικόν, ἀλλὰ μακάριον αἰῶνα αἰῶνος.

In *Ascl.* III, however, there is no trace of this use of the word. In chs. 26 b-32 a αἰὼν is not personified, but retains unaltered the special sense assigned to it by Plato.

On the subject of eternity and time, see Plotinus 4. 4. 15 and 6. 5. 11. Porphyry, Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά 44: οὐδὲ ἀφιστάμενος οὖν τοῦδε ἐπὶ τῷδε μεταβαίνει (ὁ νοῦς, i. e. the divine mind) . . . εἰ δὲ μὴ

¹ Probably αἰὼν αἰῶνων, equivalent to θεὸς θεῶν (in a sense analogous to that of βασιλεὺς βασιλέων), 'God supreme over all gods'.

² The goddess worshipped in this rite was probably the Κόρη who was associated with Sarapis. Cf. Julian *Ep.* 111 (Bidez and Cumont), 432 D: ὑπάρχοντος ἡμῖν (Alexandrians) πολιούχου θεοῦ τοῦ βασιλέως Σαράπιδος ἅμα τῇ παρέδρῳ κόρη. The founders of this Alexandrian cult may have followed, in this part of it, the example of the 'lesser mysteries' of the Eleusinia, in which the birth of the son of Kore was celebrated. Sarapis corresponded to Zeus Chthonios or Pluto, the father of Kore's child.

³ Here, τὸν αἰῶνα is used to denote the son of Kore (Iacchus or Dionysus); and τὸν θεόν might equally well have been written in place of τὸν αἰῶνα.

⁴ By some of them, but not by all. In the Coptic-Gnostic documents (*Pistis Sophia* &c.), αἰὼν frequently signifies, not a person, but a place. The twelve divisions of the Zodiac are there called αἰῶνες; 'the twelve aeons' means the region of the Zodiac, and 'the thirteenth aeon' appears to be a sphere situated above that region. In a Naassene hymn quoted by Hippolytus, *Ref. haer.* 5. 10, Jesus says καταβήσομαι, αἰῶνας ὅλους διοδεύσω ('all the worlds'; i. e. 'I will go down to earth traversing, on my way down, all the celestial spheres'.)

τόδε μετὰ τόδε ἐπ' αὐτοῦ γίνεται, ἅμα πάντα νοεῖ. ἐπεὶ οὖν πάντα ἅμα, καὶ οὐ τὸ μὲν νῦν τὸ δ' αἰθίς, πάντα ἅμα νῦν καὶ αἰεῖ. εἰ οὖν ἐπ' αὐτοῦ τὸ νῦν, ἀγῆρηται δὲ τὸ παρεληλυθὸς καὶ τὸ μέλλον, ἐν ἀδιαστάτῳ τὸ νῦν καὶ ἀχρόνῳ παραστήματι. ὥστε τὸ ὁμοῦ κατὰ τε τὸ πλῆθος κατὰ τε τὸ χρονικὸν διάστημα ἐπ' αὐτοῦ. διὸ καθ' ἓν πάντα, καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ καὶ ἀδιαστάτῳ καὶ ἀχρόνῳ. εἰ δὲ τοῦτο, οὐδὲ τὸ ποθέν ποι τῷ νῶ, οὐδὲ κίνησις ἄρα, ἀλλὰ ἐνεργεία καθ' ἓν, ἐν ἐνί, αὔξης τε ἀφηρημένη καὶ μεταβολῆς καὶ διεξόδου πάσης.—εἰ δὲ τὸ πλῆθος καθ' ἓν, καὶ ἅμα ἢ ἐνέργεια, καὶ ἀχρονος, ἀνάγκη παρυσποστῆναι τῇ τοιαύτῃ οὐσίᾳ τὸ αἰεῖ ἐν ἐνὶ ὄν. τοῦτο δὲ ἐστὶν αἰών. παρυσπότη ἄρα νῶ ὁ αἰών. τῷ δὲ μὴ καθ' ἓν ἐν ἐνὶ νοοῦντι, ἀλλὰ μεταβατικῶς, καὶ ἐν κινήσει, καὶ ἐν τῷ τὸ μὲν καταλείπειν τὸ δὲ ἐπιλαμβάνειν, καὶ μερίζειν, καὶ διεξοδεύειν, παρυσπότη χρόνος τῇ γὰρ τοιαύτῃ κινήσει παρυσπίσται τὸ μέλλειν καὶ παρεληλυθέναι.

The Platonic notion of eternity is well stated by Boethius, *Philosoph. consol.* 5. 6: 'That God is eternal, is agreed by all who possess reason. What then is eternity? . . . Eternity is the complete and simultaneous possession of endless life in a single whole. The meaning of this will be clearer if we compare the eternal with the temporal. Everything that lives in time moves onward through the present from the past to the future; and no being that is situated in time can grasp all the extent of its life together. Such a being has not yet reached to-morrow; it has already lost yesterday; and even in your life to-day, you live only in one fleeting and transitory moment at a time. Thus that which is subject to the conditions of existence in time, even though it has never begun to be and never ceases to be (as Aristotle held that the universe is without beginning or end), yet is not on that account a thing that can be rightly deemed to be eternal. For though its life is endless, it does not grasp and embrace the whole extent of its life together; it does not yet possess the future, and it has ceased to possess the past. That which grasps and possesses together, in a single whole, all the contents of endless life,—that from which nothing of the future is absent, and nothing of the past has fled away,—that is rightly called eternal. Such a being must hold itself in its own grasp, must be ever present to itself, and must possess the endless course of fleeting time as a thing present to it. There are some who, when they are told that Plato held that this universe has had no beginning in time, and will never have an end, suppose that it follows from this that the created universe is co-eternal with its Creator. But they are mistaken. It is one thing to traverse the course of an endless

life (and this is the mode of existence that Plato ascribed to the universe); it is another thing to hold the whole extent of endless life grasped together in one present; and to do this is clearly a peculiar property of the mind of God. It must not be supposed that God's priority to things created is a matter of length of time; he is prior to them rather in virtue of the peculiar quality of his indivisible nature. The unending movement of things temporal is an imitation of the unchanging present of the life that moves not. The temporal world, since it cannot adequately reproduce the model, falls away from immobility into movement, and declines from an indivisible present to an endless extent of time future and time past. It is unable to hold all the contents of its life in its possession together; but by never coming to an end, it seems to make some attempt at rivalling that which it cannot fully realize in its own being. It binds itself to such a present as the fleeting moment supplies; and that present, since it is a sort of copy of the abiding present, bestows on all beings which possess it an *appearance* of existence. But since that momentary present could not abide, it hurried forward along the endless path of time; and so it came to pass that it made continuous by its movement a life the whole contents of which it had not power to grasp together by abiding. If then we seek to call things by their right names, we shall use the words of Plato, and say that God is *eternal*, but the universe is *everlasting*.

'Now¹ inasmuch as the way in which the judgement apprehends its objects must always be determined by its own nature, and God lives ever in an eternal present, his knowledge transcends all movement of time, and abides in the indivisibility of his present; he grasps the past and the future in all their infinite extent, and with his indivisible cognition he contemplates all events as if they were even now taking place.'

26 b. *Voluntas enim* &c. The writer here passes on to a fresh topic by a superficial transition. (Compare the transition at ch. 22 a *nit.*) The mention of God's changeless will introduces the distinction between the changeless and the changing, i. e. between eternity and time, with which the following chapters deal.

***Dei enim natura consilium est* [[*voluntatis*]] *bonita*(ti)s.** In *Corp.* II. 14 and elsewhere, it is asserted that God, and God

¹ This paragraph of Boethius should be compared with the paragraph on the *θεῖος νοῦς* in *Ascl.* III. 32 b.

alone, is good. The writer of *Ascl.* III expresses a similar thought by saying that God's nature is βουλή ἀγαθοῦ. The use of the word βουλή to signify God's purpose or design is as old as Homer (*Il.* I. 5, Διὸς δ' ἐτελείετο βουλή). In *Corr.* I. 8 b, the creative βουλή θεοῦ is momentarily personified.

⟨⟨**Voluntatis**⟩⟩ **summa consilium, o Trismegiste?** Having used the terms βούλησις and βουλή, the writer pauses to explain the relation between them. βουλή is the design, i. e. the determination of the end to be aimed at; (in the case of God's βουλή, that end is necessarily ἀγαθόν;) βούλησις is the direction of the will towards the accomplishment of the design; τὸ βούλεσθαι is the act of willing. Compare the distinction between βούλησις, βούλευσις, and προαίρεσις in Ar. *Eth. Nic.* 3. 2-5. The Hermetist's τὸ βούλεσθαι seems to correspond to Aristotle's προαίρεσις; but he differs from Aristotle in making βούλησις issue from βουλή. According to Aristotle's use of the words, it would be more correct to say that βούλευσις issues from βούλησις; for ἡ μὲν βούλησις τοῦ τέλους ἐστὶ, . . . βουλευόμεθα δὲ . . . περὶ τῶν πρὸς τὰ τέλη, i. e. we first wish for something, and then deliberate what action we must take to bring about the thing we wish for.

Neque enim 'in**ipense**' **aliquid vult.** According to common usage, *inipense velle* should mean 'to wish eagerly' or 'earnestly'. This cannot be the meaning intended here; *inipense* must therefore be either a mistranslation of the Greek, or a false reading of the Latin. Possibly the Greek word may have been ἀκρατῶς, in the sense 'without power to accomplish that which he wills', and the translator may have taken it to mean *impotenter*, i. e. 'immoderately' or 'violently'.

est omnium plenissimus. God is οὐδενὸς ἐνδεής.

vult autem omnia bona. Cf. 20 b: 'voluntas eius ⟨⟨eadem⟩⟩ est bonitas omnis.'

habet omnia quae vult. The good, which God wills, is present to him in complete realization. Man, whose life is a time-process, wills that to which he has not yet attained; but God lives in an eternal present, in which the distinction between aspiration and attainment disappears. Strictly speaking, the words 'will' and 'purpose' are inapplicable to God; for they imply a process in time. But they may serve to describe that which takes place in the cosmic time-process as issuing from and dependent on God's eternal being. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 8: *Voluntas etenim dei*

ipsa est summa perfectio.' *Ib. fin.*: 'voluntatem (dei) comitatur effectus.'

eius imago mundus. See note on *Ascl.* I. 10: 'dei, cuius sunt imagines duae mundus et homo.' In Pl. *Timaetus* 30 c, the pattern, in the likeness of which the Kosmos is made, is not the Demiurgus himself, but the ἀνρόζωον (= the νοητὸς κόσμος); and the writer of *Ascl.* III, in ch. 31 *init.*, probably adopted this alternative; for it seems best to strike out *dei* there, and read 'huius (*sc.* mundi insensibilis) imago hic effectus est mundus'. In the concluding sentence of the *Timaetus*, according to the reading generally accepted, the Kosmos is called εἰκὼν τοῦ νοητοῦ (ζῴου). But there is a variant, εἰκὼν τοῦ ποιητοῦ, 'the image of its maker'; and it is possible that the latter reading was accepted by some of the Egyptian Platonists. Time (which is the mode of existence of the Kosmos) is in the *Timaetus* called an εἰκὼν of eternity (which is the mode of existence of God); and it is merely another way of expressing the same thought to say that the Kosmos, being ἀθάνατον ζῴον, or ever-living in time, is an 'image' of God, who lives in eternity. Most of the later Platonists regarded the *ιδέαι* or παραδείγματα, of which the νοητὸς κόσμος consists, as thoughts or designs existing in the mind of God (see for instance Philo *De opif. mundi* 3. 17 ff.); and from saying that the Kosmos is made in the likeness of God's thoughts, it is not a long step to saying that it is made in the likeness of God.

27 a. Bonus, o Asclepi. God gives that which is *really* good, viz. life itself, which is incorporeal and imperishable. The Kosmos gives those things which men *think* to be good, viz. the corporeal means of our transitory life on earth. But are men mistaken in thinking these things to be good? If so, it would follow that it is a mistake to think the Kosmos good. The writer's meaning seems to be rather that the Kosmos and its corporeal gifts to men are good indeed, but in a lower degree,—good relatively, but not absolutely. But he emphasizes the affirmative proposition, 'the Kosmos is (relatively) good'; and in this he differs from the writer of *Corp.* VI, who lays stress on the negative, 'the Kosmos is not (absolutely) good'. See *Corp.* VI. 2 a, 4 a, and *Corp.* X. 10 b, 12. In *Corp.* VI. 6, the writer of that *libellus* speaks with contempt of τὰ ἀνθρώπεια ἀγαθὰ, which are the same as the 'omnia quae mortalibus videntur bona' of *Ascl.* III. 27, i. e. the material means of our earthly life.

In the Prophecy, *Ascl.* III. 25 ('bonum multiformi imaginum varietate conpositum' &c.), where the writer is contending against the Christians who regard the Kosmos as wholly bad, he asserts its goodness without any hint of the reservation suggested in ch. 27 a.

deus . . . dispensator distributorque est . . . sensus, animae, et vitae. Cf. *Corp.* X. 2; and XI. ii. 11 *sqq.*, where it is said that God is life, and that in giving life, he gives himself.

29 c. Secundum etenim deum hunc crede. In the traditional text, these words follow a passage concerning the sun, and *hunc* consequently appears to mean *solem*. But there can be no doubt that in the original it was the Kosmos that was called δεύτερος θεός. When the misplaced passages 27 b–29 b have been removed, a satisfactory connexion is obtained; 29 c fits on to 27 a without any breach of continuity, and *hunc* refers to *mundus*. As to *secundum deum*, cf. *Ascl.* I. 8, ἐπεὶ τὸν δεύτερον ἐποίησε κ.τ.λ. *Ascl.* I. 10, 'secundus est mundus'. *Corp.* VIII. 1 b, 2: εἰ γὰρ δεύτερος θεὸς ὁ κόσμος κ.τ.λ. The notion that the Kosmos is the second God is derived from the *Timaeus*, where the Kosmos is called θεὸς αἰσθητός, and is described as the son of the Demiurgus. Numenius (quoted in prefatory note on *Corp.* II) distinguished a first, a second, and a third God.¹ His πρώτος θεός is ἑστώς, i. e. eternal, and is περὶ τὰ νοητά; his δεύτερος θεός, the Demiurgus, is κινούμενος, and is περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητά; his τρίτος θεός (who is presumably περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά alone) is the Kosmos, and thus corresponds to the second God of some of the Hermetists, and to the supreme God of the Stoics. Philo, in *Quod deus sit immutabilis* 6. 31 (quoted on p. 186), sets forth a system not unlike that of Numenius: he there says that God has an elder son, who is νοητός, (viz. the intelligible Kosmos, or the Logos,) and a younger son, who is αἰσθητός, (viz. the sensible Kosmos). The theology of *Ascl.* III is in this respect less elaborate than that of Philo and Numenius. In *Corp.* XI. i, the hypostatized αἰών interposed between God and the Kosmos occupies a position analogous to that of Philo's 'elder son of God', and the 'second God' of Numenius.

[**omniaque mundana inlustrantem**]. These words were probably inserted after the text had been dislocated; the person who inserted them must have assumed that *hunc* meant *solem*. An

¹ A suggestion of a system of three Gods occurs in Pl. *Ep.* 2, 312 E: περὶ τὸν πάντων βασιλεία πάντ' ἑστί, κ.τ.λ.

adherent of a solar cult might say that 'sol omnia mundana inlustrat animalia', both literally and metaphorically, i.e. that the sun gives light and life. But it would hardly be said that 'mundus omnia mundana inlustrat animalia'.

animalia sive animantia sive inanimantia: animals and vegetables. See *Ascl.* I. 4, 'est et aliud animalis genus, sine anima quidem, et tamen non carens sensibus' (viz. vegetables).

Si enim animal mundus vivensque semper et fuit et est et erit. (*Vivens semper* = ἀείζωος, a term applied to the Kosmos in *Corp.* VIII. 2.) This sentence, taken by itself, would seem to imply that the Kosmos has always been in existence, i.e. that it has had no beginning. But did the writer of *Ascl.* III hold that view? His language on this point appears to vary. On the one hand, in 40 b we find the words 'nec coepit esse nec desinet'. These words have probably been shifted from their right place; but there can be little doubt that their original subject was *mundus*, or the movement or time-process of the *mundus*; and if so, we have in them an express statement that the Kosmos has had no beginning. But on the other hand, the writer repeatedly says that God is the maker of the Kosmos; (e.g. ch. 25: 'hic mundus, dei opus'; ch. 26 a: 'tanti operis effector . . . deus'; ch. 29 c *fin.*: 'semel dispensata vita'; cf. ch. 31 *init.*, where it is clearly implied that the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος is γεννητός;) whence it would seem to follow (unless the inference is expressly denied) that the Kosmos has had a beginning.

It would be possible to reconcile the words 'si enim animal mundus vivensque semper et fuit et est et erit' with the view that the universe has had a beginning, by assuming their meaning to be merely that the Kosmos, *since it first came into existence*, has ever been, and will ever continue to be, a living being; or in other words, that its life, *from the time when it first began*, has been uninterrupted, and will continue without interruption. On this assumption, the statement is a virtual denial of a periodical φθορά of the Kosmos. (The *senectus mundi* spoken of in the Prophecy, ch. 26 a, will be stayed before it ends in death.)

In the *Timaeus*, Plato (or more exactly, the speaker in Plato's dialogue) puts the question whether the Kosmos has had a beginning, and answers 'yes'. (*Tim.* 28 B: γέγονεν.) Ever since the time of the first readers of the *Timaeus*, it has been disputed whether Plato meant what he wrote in that passage, or whether,

when he wrote 'yes', he meant 'no'. (See e. g. the opinion of Xenocrates and Crantor on this point, as reported in Plut. *De an. procr. in Timaeo* 3, p. 1013; Arist. *De caelo* 1. 10, 279 b 30; Philo *De aetern. mundi* 4. 13-16, Cohn VI, p. 76 sq.) Aristotle said that the Kosmos has always been in existence; of later Greek thinkers, some agreed with Aristotle in this,¹ and others differed from him. Philo *De aetern. mundi* 3. 7: τριτταὶ δὲ περὶ τοῦ ζήτουμένου γεγόνασι δόξαι, τῶν μὲν αἰδιον τὸν κόσμον φαμένων, ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἀνώλεθρον, τῶν δὲ ἐξ ἐναντίας γενητόν τε καὶ φθαρτόν· εἰσὶ δ' οἱ . . . μικτὴν δόξαν ἀπέλιπον, γενητόν καὶ ἀφθαρτόν οἰηθέντες αὐτὸν εἶναι. The third opinion,—that the Kosmos has had a beginning, but will never have an end,—is that which (whether Plato held it or not) stands written in the *Timaeus*; and it seems to be the view accepted by some of the Hermetic writers who touch on the question; e. g. by the writer of *Ascl.* I, who repeatedly says that the Kosmos has been made by God. See *Ascl.* I. 3 c: 'mundus (= ἔλλα) praeparatus est a deo' &c. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 9: ὁ δὲ κόσμος, ἀπαξ λαβὼν (αἰσθησῶν καὶ νόησῶν) ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι. The contrary opinion however is asserted in *Corp.* XI. i. 3: ἔργον δὲ τοῦ αἰῶνος ὁ κόσμος, γενόμενος οὐποτε, καὶ αἰεὶ γινόμενος ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος. (This instance shows that a writer might call the Kosmos *opus dei* and yet hold it to be without beginning.) And those Hermetists who said that God 'is ever at his work' (*Corp.* XI. ii. 14 a), and that God's very being consists in his making things (*Corp.* XIV. 5), must have held that the world has always been in existence.²

¹ The Aristotelian view was held by some at least of the Neo-Pythagoreans; e. g. Pseudo-Philolaus, Stob. I. 20. 2, vol. i, p. 172 W.: ἦς ὅδε ὁ κόσμος ἐξ αἰῶνος. Ocellus Lucanus, Stob. I. 20. 3, p. 174 W.: ἀγένητος ὁ κόσμος. But in some of the fragments ascribed to Philolaus it is said that the Kosmos has had a beginning; Diels *Vorsokr.* p. 246: Φιλολάου Βάκχαι. ὁ κόσμος εἰς ἔστιν, ἤρξατο δὲ γίγνεσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ μέσου. *Ib.* p. 242: τὸ πρῶτον ἀρμυσθέν, τὸ ἔν, ἐν τῷ μέσῳ τῆς σφαίρας ἐστία καλεῖται. Aetius in Diels *Doxogr.* p. 332: (Φιλόλαος) τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἐν τῷ μεσαυτάτῳ πυρὶ, ὅπερ τρώπως δικην προῦπεβάλετο τῇ τοῦ παντὸς (σφαίρα) ὁ δημιουργὸς θεός. (It is doubtful whether any of these fragments were written by Philolaus himself;—on this question, see Burnet, *Early Greek Philosophy*;—but the views expressed in them must have been held by some Pythagoreans.) Aristotle (*De caelo* 1. 10, 279 b) expressly says that none of his predecessors had held the *οὐρανός* to be without beginning. In this statement Philolaus must be included, if any writing of Philolaus was known to Aristotle; and in any case, it must include 'the Pythagoreans' who were known to him.

² In the last sentence of *Corp.* XVI, the MSS. give οὐδὲ ἡ ποιήσις αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἔχει. This would imply that the Kosmos is without beginning. In the printed text, I have bracketed ἀρχὴν ἢ, because there is no mention of ἀρχή in the parallel clause which precedes; but it would be possible to write the sentence thus: ὡσπερ ὁ θεὸς οἷ(τε ἀρχὴν οὔτε) τέλος ἔχει, οὕτως οὐδὲ ἡ ποιήσις αὐτοῦ ἀρχὴν ἢ τέλος ἔχει.

nihil in mundo mortale est. Cf. *Corp.* VIII *passim*. *Corp.* XI. i. 3: οὐδὲ ἀπολείται τι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. *Corp.* XII. ii. 15 b: νεκρὸν γὰρ οὐδὲ ἐν οὔτε γέγονεν οὔτε ἐστὶν οὔτε ἔσται ἐν (τῷ) κόσμῳ κ.τ.λ. Philo *Leg. allegor.* I. 3. 7, Cohn I, p. 63: γένεσις τε αὐ φθειρομένων ἐτέρων καὶ φθορὰ γεννωμένων ἄλλων ἀποτελείται, κ.τ.λ. The same doctrine had already been taught by Empedocles, *fr.* 8 Diels: φύσις (birth) οὐδενός ἐστιν ἀπάντων | θνητῶν, οὐδέ τις οὐλομένου θανάτιο τελευτή, | ἀλλὰ μόνον μίξις τε διάλλαξις τε μιγέντων | ἐστί. Cf. Anaxagoras, *fr.* 17 Diels.

Viventis etenim semper uniuscuiusque partis: a Greek genitive absolute. See ch. 27 e, *numeri completi*.

The *partes mundi* (μέρη or μόρια τοῦ κόσμου) are the στοιχεῖα; and this term may include the heavenly bodies as well as the four elements. The heavenly bodies are of course both living and imperishable; they are *di caelestes*. The four elements also are here, as well as in *Corp.* VIII, regarded as living and imperishable. In making them living beings, the writer is in accord with the 'hylozoist' tradition of the early Ionian physicists, which was a survival of the primitive man's instinctive assumption that everything he sees is alive like himself. Empedocles, the first Greek who taught that the universe is composed of four 'roots' or elements, gave to these elements the names of gods, and described them as moved by love and hate. The Stoics, following Heraclitus, spoke of πῦρ νοερόν; they called it Zeus, and identified earth, air, and water with other deities worshipped by the Greeks.

The Persians, in the fifth century B. C., worshipped (in addition to Heaven, Sun, and Moon) 'Earth, Fire, Water, and the Winds' (Hdt. I. 131); and these deities can still be recognized in the Mithraism of the Roman empire. 'Le mithraïsme divinisaient les quatre corps simples qui, suivant la physique des anciens, composent l'univers' (Cumont, *Mystères de Mithra* 1902, p. 97). The '*Mithrasliturgie*' edited by Dieterich (*Pap. mag. Par.* i. 475 sqq.) begins with an invocation of πνεῦμα (i. e. air), πῦρ, ὕδωρ, and οὐσία γεώδης, regarded as deities. The influence of Mithraism may have been felt in Roman Egypt, and may have helped to maintain or revive there the habit of regarding the four elements as living and personal beings.

Attempts have been made to find in the deities of the ancient Egyptian cosmogony personifications of fire, air, earth, and water; and it has been inferred thence that the doctrine of the four elements

was known in Egypt long before the time of Empedocles. (See Brugsch, *Rel. und Myth. der alten Aeg.* p. 190.) That inference can hardly be justified. But to the Egyptians, quite as much as to the early Greeks, it was natural to imagine life and personality in all things; the notion of living parts or members of the living universe was familiar to them from of old; and when they had learnt from Greek teachers that there are four 'parts of the Kosmos', they would be ready enough to identify each of the four with one or other of their native gods. Diodorus (I. 11 f.) has recorded a Graeco-Egyptian theory of this sort:—'The Kosmos is composed of five elements, just as the human body is composed of members; and each of these elements is a deity. The life-giving πνεῦμα (the "fifth element" of the Peripatetics) is Zeus (i. e. Amon); fire is Hephaistos (Ptah); earth is the Μήτηρ (Isis?); water is Ὠκεάνη (a Nile-goddess); and air is Athena (Neith).' There were doubtless various systems of this kind. An Egyptian instance of the recognition of the elements as deities occurs in the *Rhind Papyrus*, demotic text, col. 5. 2 (Reitzenstein, *Die hellenistischen Mysterienrel.* p. 84), where the dead man is addressed thus: 'Thou honourest (dost worship?) the morning sun, and the moon, and the air and the water and the fire.' (In the corresponding hieratic text, 'renewer of life' is substituted for 'water', and 'eye of Horus' for 'fire'.)

In the *Kore Kosmu*, fire, air, water, and earth are persons, and make speeches. This is perhaps no more than a literary artifice; but it is an artifice which the mental habit of the time made it easy to employ.

The writer of *Ascl.* III says that the several elements are 'ever-living' or immortal; but it does not necessarily follow from this that in his opinion they are not transmutable,—that water, for instance, always remains water, and air never ceases to be air. The common opinion of his time, at least among the Platonists, was that transmutations of portions of one element into portions of another are continually taking place, but that these transmutations are compensated by other transmutations in the reverse direction, so that each element, *regarded as a whole*, persists unaltered. According to the Stoics, fire alone of the four elements could be properly said to be ἀείζωος; for the other three will be wholly transmuted into fire at the *ecpyrosis*.¹

¹ Cumont, *Mystères de Mithra*, p. 98, says that the Mithraists also held that the four elements changed into one another. He refers to the 'Zoroastrian' allegory

est sicuti est: i. e. it is *ἀείζωος*.

vitae aeternitatisque debet esse plenissimus. I suppose the meaning to be that, in order that the Kosmos may live everlastingly in time, it must be 'filled with life', or vivified throughout, by God, whose life is eternal (i. e. timeless and changeless). Compare the phrases in ch. 30, 'in ipsa aeternitatis vivacitate mundus agitur', and '(mundus) extrinsecus vivificatur ab aeternitate'. Similarly, in *Corp.* VIII. 2, it is said that the Kosmos is made *ἀείζωος, ὡς ἀθανατιζόμενος* by God, who is *ἀίδιος*. But if this is the sense intended, it is obscurely expressed; and perhaps there is some corruption in *aeternitatisque*.

[*Sol ergo . . . dispensator est.*] This must be one of the 'solar interpolations'. (See *Ascl.* III. 19 b, 'Solis οὐσάρχης lumen est' &c.) The sentence interrupts the context. The writer is speaking of the relation between God and the Kosmos as a whole, and has no reason to digress into a description of the special function of the sun. Moreover, the function here assigned to the sun (*gubernator vitalium* and *eorum . . . dispensator*) is the same as that which, in the following sentences, is assigned, in one sense, to the supreme God (*vitalium . . . sempiternus gubernator*, and *vitae dispensator aeternus*), and in another sense, to the Kosmos (*vitae dispensator his omnibus*); and there is no place for a third *dispensator*.

Deus ergo viventium vel vitalium, in mundo quae sunt, sempiternus gubernator est. We should rather have expected *aeternus gubernator*, in accordance with *dispensator aeternus* in the next line; for *sempiternus*, 'everlasting', is properly an epithet of the Kosmos as opposed to the eternal God. But perhaps the Hermetist here used *ἀίδιος* as an equivalent for *αἰώνιος*; compare *τὴν ἀίδιον οὐσίαν* in *Pl. Tim.* 37 E, and *τὸ ἀίδιον* in *Corp.* VIII. 2. Similarly below, in ch. 30 *init.*, *sempiternitate vivendi* seems to stand for *aeternitate vivendi*.

The *viventia vel vitalia* (ζωικά, in the sense of ζωογόνα?) in

of the *quadriga* in Dio Chrysost. *Or.* 36. 39 f. But that allegory is merely Stoic cosmology in a Persian disguise. The supreme God drives a four-horse car; the horses are the elements. There is a series of cyclic changes, in the course of which fire and water alternately predominate. At the end of a long period, fire absorbs into itself the other three elements, and coalesces with the supreme deity; then follows a fresh *diacosmesis*. The image of the *quadriga*, and the picturing of the four elements as horses, may have been derived from a Persian source; but most of the details (which, as Dio himself admits, suit very ill with the allegorical setting) are evidently taken from Greek Stoicism.

mundō quae sunt are, I suppose, the intracosmic sources of life, i. e. the heavenly bodies (and the four elements, regarded as concentric spherical strata?), which receive life from God, and distribute it to all individual things in the world below. If so, they are the same material 'parts of the Kosmos' which, in ch. 19 b, were said to be governed by the incorporeal deity Zeus (Hypatos), the οὐσιάρχης of the οὐρανός, and by the other οὐσιάρχαι in subordination to him. (We were there told that 'per caelum Iuppiter omnibus praebet vitam'.) It would have been possible to bring the two passages into connexion, by explaining in ch. 29 c that the supreme God employs Zeus (Hypatos) as his agent in transmitting life to the *vitalia*; but the writer has not done so. In this instance, as in some others, the author of *Ascl.* III has made no attempt to work up into a single and consistent system the fragments of doctrine which he has taken from different sources.

Semel . . . dispensata (dispensavit MS.) vita : *sc.* at the time when the Kosmos was made. These words seem to imply that the Kosmos has had a beginning. It may be difficult to reconcile this with the maintenance of the Kosmos by a *lex aeterna*; but the same difficulty presents itself in the *Timaeus* also.

Cf. *Corp.* IX. 9 : πάντων οὖν τῶν ζῶων ἡ αἴσθησις καὶ νόησις (i. e. their conscious life) ἔξωθεν ἐπεισέρχεται, εἰσπνέουσα ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος (i. e. from the Kosmos around them)· ὁ δὲ κόσμος, ἅπαξ λαβὼν ἅμα τῷ γενέσθαι, ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβὼν ἔχει.

30. mundus agitur. The contrast between *στάσις* and *κίνησις* corresponds to the contrast between *αἰών* and *χρόνος*. God is *ἑστώς* or *ἀκίνητός*; the Kosmos is *κινούμενος*. The word *κίνησις* means (1) *movement* in space (*φέρεσθαι*); (2) *change* of form, quality, or condition (*ἀλλοιοῦσθαι*). Pl. *Parmen.* 138 B: κινούμενόν γε (τὸ ἐν) ἢ φέροιο ἢ ἀλλοιοῖτο ἄν· αὐταὶ γὰρ μόναι κινήσεις. Arist. *De caelo* 4. 3, 310 a: τρεῖς αἱ κινήσεις, ἡ μὲν κατὰ μέγεθος, ἡ δὲ κατ' εἶδος, (these two might be included under *ἀλλοιώσεις*), ἡ δὲ κατὰ τόπον. The Hermetist, throughout this passage on time and eternity, probably has both meanings in his mind together. But *κίνησις* in either sense is a process in time; if we say that a thing *κινεῖται*, we imply that it is (or that parts of it are) in one place or state at one time, and in another place or state at another time. The vital energy of God is timeless, and accordingly, is motionless and changeless. But the derived vitality of the Kosmos

is extended in time, and accordingly manifests itself in movement and change; the Kosmos 'differt numeris et temporibus cuncta'. Cf. *Corp.* XI. i. 2: τοῦ δὲ αἰῶνος, (οὐσία ἐστὶν) ἢ ταυτότης' . . . τοῦ δὲ χρόνου, ἢ μεταβολή. *Corp.* X. 11: ἡ δὲ νοητὴ στάσις κυεῖ τὴν ἕλικὴν κίνησιν.

in ipsa vitali aeternitate locus est mundi. 'Eternity' or 'the eternal' is here figuratively pictured as occupying the outer space by which the spherical Kosmos is enclosed. Cf. ch. 27 b, 'Deus, supra verticem summi caeli consistens' &c.; and ch. 33 a, 'quod dicitur extra mundum' &c. The same notion is more fully developed in *Corp.* II, where τόπος (i. e. the motionless space by which the moving Kosmos is surrounded) is substituted for αἰών. Compare also *Corp.* XI. i. 2: ὁ οὖν αἰὼν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, ὁ δὲ κόσμος ἐν τῷ αἰῶνι. i. e. Aeon and Kosmos are, as it were, concentric spheres; and Aeon, the larger sphere, is itself contained by God, who fills the boundless space without. *Ib.* 3: τοῦ κόσμου ὑπὸ τοῦ αἰῶνος ἐμπεριεχομένου.

Ipsae mundus vitae dispensator est his omnibus quae in se sunt. The Kosmos includes or consists of the *vitalia* spoken of above, i. e. the heavenly bodies (and the elements?); it might therefore be said with equal truth that life is received from God and dispensed to individuals by the Kosmos collectively, or by the *vitalia* severally. But it would destroy the consistency of the passage to single out one of the *vitalia*, viz. the sun, and say that life is dispensed by that alone, as is said in the 'solar interpolation' above.

Cf. *Corp.* IX. 6: the Kosmos ὁμοῦ τόπος ἐστὶ καὶ δημιουργὸς ζωῆς. See note on *Ascl.* III. 25, 'machina voluntatis dei'.

et locus est omnium quae sub sole gubernantur. Perhaps this may be another 'solar interpolation'. But it is also possible that the original writer used the phrase 'beneath the sun' to signify the lower or earthly region of the Kosmos, the place of γένεσις and φθορά. This region is more commonly called 'sub-lunar'; but the moon, being subject to apparent growth and diminution, was sometimes regarded as belonging rather to the lower world.

vivificatur ab aeternitate. If *ab* stands for ὑπό, we may see in these words a slight tendency towards that hypostatization of αἰών which is fully carried out in *Corp.* XI. i. For the moment, the writer speaks of αἰών as if it were a person, and capable of

independent action ; but he does not really so regard it. (Or, does *ab* stand for *ἀπό*,—‘the Kosmos draws its life from the eternal’?)

terrenum [[]] **tempus . . . caeleste vero . . .** We mark off days and years, and thus measure the lapse of time, by noting either the periodic changes which take place on earth below (e. g. the daily alternation of light and darkness, regarded as *qualitates aeris*, and the yearly alternation of summer heat and winter cold), or the periodic movements of the heavenly bodies (e. g. the diurnal and annual revolutions of the sun).

mundus est receptaculum temporis. Cf. *Corp.* XI. i. 2 : ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. To us, it would seem more natural to say that the Kosmos is in time, than that time is in the Kosmos. But the Greeks, from Plato downwards, were in the habit of saying that time is not merely measured, but constituted or brought into being by the cyclic movement of the heavenly bodies ; and this movement is a process which takes place within the Kosmos.

ordo et tempus innovationem omnium rerum . . . per alternationem faciunt. The writer, by a figure of speech which is common in all periods, speaks of time as an agent ; but his meaning is rather that the *ἀνανέωσις* of all cosmic things is effected by a series of changes which take place in regular temporal succession. This ‘renovation’ takes one form in heaven above, and another form on earth below. The heavenly bodies are imperishable, but are in ceaseless motion ; and they are ‘renewed’ in the sense that each of them, after a fixed interval of time, comes back to the same place at which it was before. On the other hand, in the lower world, the process of renovation takes the form of *γένεσις* and *φθορά* ; that is to say, all composite bodies are decomposed into their elements, and out of these same elements other like bodies are composed ; or in other words, the elements are temporarily combined in composite bodies, and are ‘renewed’ by the dissolution of these bodies. Thus, in the one way or the other, ‘all things in the Kosmos’,—both things in heaven and things on earth,—‘are renewed by alternation’. Cf. *Corp.* VIII. 4 : ἡ δὲ ἀποκατάστασις τῶν ἐπιγείων σωμάτων (διαλυθείσης γίνεται τῆς) συστάσεως, κ.τ.λ. *Corp.* III. 4 as emended : τὰ δὲ ἐλαττούμενα ἀνανεώθησεται θεῶν ἐγκυκλίῳ ἐναριθμίῳ δρομήματι. *Plut. Is. et Os.* 57 : ὁ δὲ . . . κόσμος, . . . οὐκ αἰδιος οὐδ’ ἀπαθής οὐδ’ ἄφθαρτος ἀλλ’ ἀειγενὴς ὢν, μηχανᾶται ταῖς τῶν παθῶν μεταβολαῖς καὶ περιόδοις αἰετός καὶ μηδέποτε φθαρησόμενος διαμένειν.

nihil immobile [nec] nascentium, nec caelestium nec terrenorum. The heavenly bodies may be included among *nascentia* (= τὰ γιγνόμενα), because they have come into being in the past, though, having once come into being, they are imperishable. Moreover, according to some Greek systems, their substance is perpetually renewed by evaporations from the world below.

(deus) **a se est.** Cf. *Ascl.* II. 14 b: 'haec ergo est, quae ex se tota est, natura dei', and notes *ad loc.*

circum se totus est (αὐτὸς περὶ αὐτὸν ὅλος ἐστί). Cf. Numenius, Euseb. *Pr. ev.* II. 18. 20 (quoted, p. 80 of Vol. II): ὁ μὲν οὖν πρῶτος (θεὸς) περὶ τὰ νοητά. If the νοητά are regarded as God's thoughts, περὶ τὰ νοητά differs little from περὶ αὐτόν.

Inasmuch as God 'is in all things', and 'all things are in God',—or, as we are elsewhere told, 'God is all things' (e.g. ch. 20 a, 'siquidem is sit unus [et] omnia'),—there is nothing beside him, to which he could be related. Yet, in another aspect, he is distinguished from the Kosmos, and stands in a certain relation to it; indeed, the very purpose of this passage is to explain that relation.

nisi aliquis audeat dicere ipsius commotionem in aeternitate esse. Eternity is to God as time is to the Kosmos. The word *κίνησις*, since it implies a process in time, is not properly applicable to God, who is not in time; but we may think fit to use it, for want of a better, to describe that function of God in eternity which corresponds to and produces the movement of the Kosmos in time. The so-called 'movement' of God is that timeless energy of God, the effect of which is seen in the 'movement' of the Kosmos, i. e. in the temporal and changing life of the Kosmos and all things in it; it is that function of God which, in ch. 20 b above, was described as everlasting procreation. God is ἀκίνητος; but when this is asserted, there is need to guard against the mistaken inference that God is inactive or inert. Similarly below, in ch. 31, 'sic et deum agitari credibile est in se ipsum eadem immobilitate'. Cf. Numenius, Euseb. *Pr. ev.* II. 18. 21: ἀντὶ γὰρ τῆς προσούσης τῷ δευτέρῳ (θεῷ) κινήσεως, τὴν προσοῦσαν τῷ πρώτῳ στάσει φησὶ εἶναι κίνησιν σύμφυτον, κ.τ.λ.

aeternitas, in quam omnium temporum agitatio remeat, et ex qua omnium temporum agitatio sumit exordium. The process of mundane things in time may be said to issue from 'eternity', i. e. from the life or energy of the eternal God. But what is meant by saying that all temporal processes 'return into' eternity? Possibly *reheat in* stands for ἀναφέρεται εἰς, i. e. 'is relative

to', or 'dependent on'. Cf. 'temporis . . . in aeternitatem semper revocatur agitatio' in ch. 31 below.

31. mundum non natum, quem recte (in)sensibilem dicimus, intra se habens. Here αἰών is brought into connexion with the νοητὸς κόσμος. The νοητὸς κόσμος 'is in' eternity, in the same sense that the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος is in time (though, from another point of view, we were told above that time is in the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος). See ch. 34 b: 'scito[te] intellegibilem mundum . . . esse incorporalem' &c.

Seeing that the translator frequently renders νοῦς by *sensus*, he may possibly have rendered νοητόν by *sensibilem* here; but it seems more likely that *in-* has been accidentally omitted.

The νοητὸς κόσμος is described as *non natus* (ἀγέννητος), in contrast to the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος; and this implies that the latter is γεννητός.

The writer doubtless regards the νοητὸς κόσμος (i. e. the aggregate of the νοητὰ εἶδη or παραδείγματα) as existing in and constituted by God's thought, rather than as a self-subsistent entity distinct from God; it is thus comprehended in the being of his πρῶτος θεός, and accordingly, the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος is, in his view, δεύτερος θεός, not τρίτος.

Huius [dei] imago hic effectus est mundus. *Dei* must be cut out. The writer would hardly speak of the supreme God as *huius dei*; and the preceding mention of the νοητὸς κόσμος would be pointless if nothing further were said about it. *Huius* then must be taken as referring to the *mundum insensibilem* (τὸν νοητὸν κόσμον); and *hic mundus* is the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος.

ea ipsa in se revertendi necessitate. We are accustomed to picture the time-process as a rectilinear movement; we speak of the 'progress' of time. But the Greeks, connecting their conception of time more closely with the revolutions of the sun and moon, frequently pictured its movement as circular. The sun retraces the same path again and again; and so they thought of the time-process as coming back to the same point, or 'returning into itself', at the termination of each year or other fixed period. We still retain the Greek usage when we speak of the 'recurrence' or 'return' of summer or winter.

The 'stability' of time (i. e. its ἀκινήσια, here understood in the sense of 'changelessness',) consists in this, that its circular movement persists unchanged, being determined by *necessitas* (ἀνάγκη), i. e. by changeless law. The same thought is expressed below, in the words 'efficitur ut . . . temporis mobilitas stabilis fiat fixa lege currendi'.

temporis . . . in aeternitatem semper revocatur agitatio.
 ἡ τοῦ χρόνου κίνησις εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα ἀεὶ ἀναφέρεται (?). I suppose this to mean that the movement of time is dependent on eternity; i.e. that the movements of the heavenly bodies are worked by the will or energy of the eternal God. Though God himself is not in time, yet the cosmic processes in which his timeless energy takes effect are processes in time; and when we think of him as acting on the Kosmos, we cannot avoid speaking of him in words which seem to imply that his existence is extended in time. If God made the sun rise yesterday, and makes it rise again to-day, his action is extended over a space of time,—or at any rate, appears to us to be so; and thus 'eternity (the mode of God's existence), though motionless in itself, appears to be in motion, on account of its relation to time; for eternity enters into time (lit. "is in time", which I take to mean "operates in time"), and it is in time that all movement takes place'.

It must have been for the purpose of evading this difficulty that Numenius introduced his 'second God', who is *περὶ τὰ νοητὰ καὶ τὰ αἰσθητὰ* (i.e. is concerned with, or in relation to, the eternal on the one hand, and the temporal on the other,) and thereby enabled himself to say that his 'first God' is *περὶ τὰ νοητὰ* (i.e. is concerned with or related to the eternal alone).

The statement that eternity 'is in' time seems to correspond to the statements which occur elsewhere, that 'God is in all things' or 'is all things'. God is in the Kosmos, in the sense that he operates in the Kosmos; all life, all action in the Kosmos is, or is derived from, God's life and action. Yet in another sense, God is above and distinct from the Kosmos.

[[**eaque mobilitas ratione temporis vertitur**]]. I can make no sense of these words as they stand; and the sentence appears to be complete without them. I have found a suitable place for them at the end of ch. 40 b.

Sic et deum agitari credibile est in se ipsum eadem immobilitate. Since eternity is God's life or mode of being, that which has just been said of eternity, (viz. that it is stable, and yet seems to be mobile,) may with equal truth be said of God. *Agitari in se* (abl.) *ipsum* probably stands for *αὐτὸν ἐν ἑαυτῷ κινεῖσθαι*. The Kosmos moves 'within God' (i.e. enclosed in and surrounded by God, so to speak), or 'within eternity'; but God, since there is nothing above or beyond him, must move 'within himself', if he moves at all.

Stabilita[s] etenim ipsius [in] magnitudine est immobilis agitatio; ipsius enim magnitudinis immobili(ta)s lex est. This is obscure. *Ipsius in magnitudine* seems to be analogous to *in se* in the preceding sentence. The principle assumed as the basis of the argument appears to be 'that which is great is necessarily motionless'; but it is not clear on what grounds the writer considered himself justified in making that assumption. Perhaps the thought is similar to that expressed in ch. 30 above, 'nec alicuius impulsu [nec] loco moveri potest, cum in eo sunt omnia et in omnibus ipse est solus'; that which is all-comprehensive cannot be moved from without.

'The μέγεθος of God' is a term in frequent use in the theology of the period. Cf. *Corp.* XI. ii. 20 b: συναύξησον σεαυτὸν τῷ ἀμετρήτῳ μεγέθει.

sive deus, sive aeternitas, sive uterque. The writer here shows clearly that his αἰών is not, like that of *Corp.* XI. i. 2, an entity distinct from God. θεός and αἰών alike are merely words by means of which we attempt to describe the supreme Being; and all words applied to the supreme Being must necessarily be inadequate. Cf. ch. 20 a.

The words 'sive deus . . . utroque sunt' are evidently misplaced in the traditional text; and they are appropriate in the sentence to which I have transferred them. The only doubt is whether it is better to place them before or after 'quod est tale quod non subicitur sensibus'.

sive alter in altero. In one sense, it may be said that eternity is in God; for eternal existence is an attribute or property of God. Moreover, it was said above that time is in the Kosmos ('mundus est receptaculum temporis'); and eternity is to God as time is to the Kosmos. *Corp.* XI. i. 2: ὁ οὖν αἰὼν ἐν τῷ θεῷ, . . . ὁ δὲ χρόνος ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. But in another sense, it may be said that God is in eternity, as the Kosmos is in time.

tempus . . . per ambitionem reditus aeternum est. Time is endless or everlasting; and endless time is, in common usage, called 'eternal' (αἰώνιος or εἰς αἰῶνα).

The writer seems to regard the endlessness of time as resulting from or conditioned by the circularity of its movement. This may be accounted for as follows. He pictures the process of time as the movement of a body along a line; but he is not accustomed to the notion of a line of infinite length, and consequently assumes that

a movement cannot be endless unless the line of movement re-enters itself. Given this condition, but not otherwise, the moving body may continue to move for ever; for it may retrace the same finite path unceasingly. Compare 'ea ipsa in se revertendi necessitate' above; and ch. 40 b, 'sic est enim rotundita(t)is volubilis ratio' &c. See Aristotle on circular motion, *Phys.* 8. 7 ff.; e. g. 261 b 27, ὅτι δ' ἐνδέχεται εἶναι τινα ἄπειρον (φοράν), μίαν οὖσαν καὶ συνεχῆ, καὶ αὕτη ἐστὶν ἡ κύκλω, λέγωμεν νῦν. *Ib.* 265 a 17: ἄπειρον μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν εὐθείαν φέρεσθαι τὸ γὰρ οὕτως ἄπειρον οὐκ ἔστιν.

32 a. Mundus . . . non habet principatum. The Hermetist rejects the Stoic doctrine that the Kosmos (or a part of the Kosmos) is the supreme God. This is the fundamental difference between the theology of the Platonists and that of the Stoics.

stabilitatem suam in lege agitationis sempiternae. Cf. 40 b: 'fixa inmutabili(s) lege currendi.' 19 b: 'Είμαρμένην, (a) qua inmutantur omnia lege naturae, stabilitate firmissima sempiterna agitatione variata.'

⟨⟨aeternitas quae secunda est⟩⟩. This misplaced scrap, when inserted here, suits well with what has preceded, and at the same time supplies a satisfactory explanation of 'Haec . . . aeternitas' at the beginning of 40 b, which I have placed next after it.

40 b. Haec ergo est aeternitas ⟨⟨in omnibus (quibus) mundus iste perfectus est⟩⟩; [[]] **qui, fixa inmutabili(s) lege currendi, sempiterna commotione versatur.** I have tried to reconstruct this badly damaged passage in accordance with the sense required by the context. It is evident that the subject of *sempiterna commotione versatur* cannot be *aeternitas*, and must be *mundus*; it is therefore necessary to alter *quae* into *qui*, and to insert, before *qui*, some phrase containing *mundus*. Now there occurs in ch. 39 the phrase *in omnibus mundus iste perfectus est*, which is evidently out of place where it has been put, and which contains the word *mundus* needed here as an antecedent for *qui*; and if we transpose the phrase to 40 b, and insert *quibus*, a satisfactory meaning can be obtained. 'This sort of eternity' (i. e. the *secunda aeternitas*, which consists in the regular and endless process of things in time) is to be found in all the component parts of the universe; that is to say, they are all (as we were told before) imperishable, and all in constant movement determined by unchanging law.

⟨⟨quae nec coepit esse nec desinet.⟩⟩ The clause is certainly

m.splaced in the MSS. It is doubtful where it ought to stand; but it seems to be appropriate where I have placed it. Whether the subject of the words *nec coepit esse nec desinet* was *commotio mundi*, or *lex currendi*, they seem to imply that the writer holds the view that the Kosmos has had no beginning; see note on 29 c, 'vivensque semper et fuit et est et erit'.

oriturque et occidit alternis [[*saepe*]] **per membra.** The writer seems to be here thinking especially of the sublunar part of the Kosmos, the region of *γένεσις* and *φθορά*; and the terms 'rising' and 'setting', which in their literal sense refer to the movements of the heavenly bodies, are metaphorically applied to the changes which take place in this lower region. The movement (or temporal life) of the Kosmos 'rises and sets' in its several 'members' (the elements); that is to say, portions of the elements are combined to form individual bodies, and are restored to their former state by the dissolution of those bodies. Both processes are continually going on; but with regard to any given portion of earth or water, the two processes alternate. Individual bodies 'rise' and 'set', i. e. are composed and dissolved; or, to put it the other way, certain portions of earth and water 'set' or disappear when an animal body is formed by their combination, and 'rise' or reappear when the body is broken up.

[[*saepe*]] **isdem quibus occiderat membris oriatur.** The same portion of earth or water enters into the composition of many different bodies in succession.

Sic est enim rotundita(tis) volubilis ratio &c. The process of *γένεσις* and *φθορά*, (or rather, of *μεταβολή*, since the writer would deny the existence of *φθορά* in the strict sense of the word,) is cyclic or recurrent, and is in that respect analogous to the movement of the heavenly bodies, which literally travel in a circle. There is, so to speak, a *κύκλος γενέσεως*, in a different sense from the 'circle of births' spoken of by Orphici and Pythagoreans; for the process by which things change into one another may be described as a circular movement; A, by a series of changes, passes into B, and B, by a further series of changes, passes into A. The Hermetist goes on to explain, much as Aristotle had done before him, that a circular movement differs from other movements in this respect, that it is (or at any rate may be) without beginning or end. If a body is moving in a circle (or in any curve which re-enters itself), you cannot say that the

movement begins at any one point in its path (*ut initium quod sit volubilitatis ignores*). 'All points in the orbit both precede and follow one another'; that is to say, the moving body arrives at the point A both before and after it arrives at the point B. Cf. *Corp.* I. 11 a: ἄρχεται γὰρ οὐ λήγει ἢ [δὲ] τούτων περιφορά.

«(Eaque mobilitati)s ratione tempus vertitur.» The movement of time is circular, and accordingly, is without beginning or end. Cf. ch. 31, 'tempus . . . per ambitionem reditus aeternum est'.

32 b. Omnis ergo . . . luminasti lumine. Having spoken of time and eternity, the writer here proceeds to speak of the faculties by which things temporal and things eternal are apprehended. In correspondence with the series *deus, mundus, homo* he distinguishes three kinds or grades of νοῦς, viz. *sensus*¹ *divinus* (ὁ θεῖος νοῦς); *sensus mundanus* (ὁ κοσμικὸς νοῦς); and *sensus humanus* (ὁ ἀνθρώπειος νοῦς). Things eternal are apprehended by the divine νοῦς; things temporal, by the two other kinds of νοῦς.

What is the meaning of the adjective θεῖος in this connexion? Does ὁ θεῖος νοῦς correspond to ὁ θεὸς νοεῖ, and mean (1) God's faculty of thought? Or does it correspond to (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) τὸν θεὸν νοεῖ, and mean (2) man's faculty of apprehending God? Or does it correspond to (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φωτισθεὶς νοεῖ, and mean (3) a faculty in man which comes from God? I think the primary meaning of the term in this passage is the third of these. 'The divine, the cosmic, and the human νοῦς' are three grades of νοῦς as it exists in man. All men have in them 'the (merely) human νοῦς'; some men have in them 'the cosmic νοῦς'; a few men have in them 'the divine νοῦς'. The divine νοῦς is a faculty possessed by the elect among men; and it is divine, in the sense that it comes from God. But though this seems to be the primary meaning, the other two meanings are not excluded, and may have been combined with it in the writer's thought. The God-given νοῦς is employed, by those men who possess it, in contemplating God and the things of God; thus it is divine in sense (2), as well as in sense (3). Moreover, it is 'consubstantial with God' (*consistens, ut ita dicam, cum deo*); i. e. it is the very mind of God himself, or an ἀπόρροια of God's mind, implanted in or communicated to man. Not man as a mere thing

¹ It is evident that *sensus* here stands for νοῦς, as in *Ascl.* I. 6 c, 7 a, II. 16 a, and III. 18 b, 41 b.

of earth, but God in man, 'sees God'. And thus 'the divine νοῦς' is divine in sense (1) also.

The 'cosmic νοῦς' should be related to the 'second God' as the divine νοῦς is related to the supreme God; and if so, what has been said about the divine νοῦς may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the cosmic νοῦς. It seems to follow then that the cosmic νοῦς is primarily a faculty in man, which he derives from the Kosmos; that it is employed, by the man who possesses it, in investigating the Kosmos; and that it is 'consubstantial' with the mind of the Kosmos. The writer, since he calls the Kosmos ζῶον and θεός, must necessarily regard it as a νοερόν ζῶον, i. e. as possessing νοῦς; and though in this passage the 'cosmic νοῦς' is spoken of chiefly as a faculty implanted in man, the conception of 'the mind of the Kosmos', i. e. the faculty of thought which the Kosmos possesses, and from which the faculty in man is derived, is probably not wholly absent from the writer's thought.

With reference to 'the mind of the Kosmos' and 'the mind of God' (if and so far as these conceptions are present in the passage before us), we may compare *Corp.* IX, which contains a discussion of the αἴσθησις καὶ νόησις (i. e. the conscious life) of the Kosmos, and the αἴσθησις καὶ νόησις of God. But the point of view is different; the writer of *Corp.* IX is speaking of will and action, whereas the writer of *Ascl.* III is speaking of thought and knowledge. See also *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 4 d (*Testim.*): 'The Egyptians' καθαρὸν τε νοῦν ὑπὲρ τὸν κόσμον προτιθέασι, καὶ ἕνα ἀμέριστον ἐν ὅλῳ τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ διηρημένον ἐπὶ πάσας τὰς σφαίρας ἕτερον. The first and second of these three kinds or grades of νοῦς correspond to the θεῖος νοῦς and the κοσμικὸς νοῦς as existing in God and the Kosmos respectively, but not as faculties implanted in man. (The third, ὁ νοῦς ὁ διηρημένος ἐπὶ πάσας τὰς σφαίρας, is comparable to the οὐσιάρχαι of *Ascl.* III. 19 b.)

How does the 'cosmic' νοῦς, regarded as a faculty in man, differ from the 'human' νοῦς? Both alike have to do with things corporeal and temporal, and are in that respect contrasted with the 'divine' νοῦς, which has to do with things incorporeal and eternal. But the knowledge correlative to the 'cosmic' νοῦς is larger than the knowledge correlative to the 'human' νοῦς; and the distinction appears to consist in this, that the knowledge to which the 'human' νοῦς attains is that partial and limited knowledge of the sensible world which the individual man con-

structs out of the memory of his own past sense-impressions; while the knowledge to which the 'cosmic' *νοῦς* attains is a knowledge which goes beyond the individual man's experience, and embraces (or would, at its utmost extent, embrace) all the phenomena of the sensible world. We might perhaps construct in more modern terms a scheme analogous to that of the Hermetist by distinguishing a faculty or organ of merely empirical cognition (the human *νοῦς*), a faculty or organ of science (the cosmic *νοῦς*), and a faculty or organ of religion (the divine *νοῦς*).¹ But it would be more in accordance with the Hermetic writer's mode of thought to state the matter as follows. The man who possesses only the 'human' *νοῦς* is incapable of passing beyond the narrow limits of his earthly self; he is wholly sunk in the body, and differs from other animals only by the fact that he retains a memory of his past. The man who possesses the 'cosmic' *νοῦς* is capable of attaining to a *γνώσις τοῦ δευτέρου θεοῦ*; i. e., he may come to 'know' or 'see', and thereby be united with, the cosmic and temporal God. He is in some degree raised above his limited and separate self; he has a religion, but it is still only a lower sort of religion. (Compare the distinction made in *Ascl. I. 5 fin.* between 'communion with the daemons' and 'communion with the gods'.) The man who possesses the 'divine' *νοῦς*, and that man alone, is capable of attaining to a *γνώσις τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ*, i. e. to knowledge of and union with the supracosmic and eternal God.

The Hermetist's triple division of *νοῦς* may be compared with the triple division employed by some of the Gnostics, who distinguished between the *ὕλικός* or *χοϊκός ἄνθρωπος*, the *ψυχικός ἄνθρωπος*, and the *πνευματικός ἄνθρωπος*.² The distinction between the *ψυχικός* and the *πνευματικός* was already known to Paul; and his use of the terms may serve to illustrate the Hermetist's distinction between the 'human' and the 'cosmic' *νοῦς* together on the one hand, and the 'divine' *νοῦς* on the other. See

¹ The process by which a man rises from the level of the cosmic *νοῦς* to the higher level of the divine *νοῦς* may be illustrated by what is said about the right use of the sciences in *Ascl. I. 13*; see *Philo Leg. alleg. 3. 32. 97*, quoted in the note on that passage.

² The Naassenes, according to Hippolytus *Ref. haer. 5. 6*, said that *ἔστι τούτου sc. τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) . . . τὸ μὲν νοερόν, τὸ δὲ ψυχικόν, τὸ δὲ χοϊκόν*. In that statement, *νοερόν* takes the place of *πνευματικόν*. Compare the tripartition of man into *σῶμα*, *ψυχή*, and *νοῦς*, in the doctrine set forth in the speech of Sulla in *Plut. Fac. in orbe lunae 28*, where the word *ψυχή* denotes a 'cosmic' and perishable part of man, as opposed to the *νοῦς*, which is divine and immortal.

1 *Cor.* 2. 14: ψυχικός δὲ ἄνθρωπος οὐ δέχεται τὰ τοῦ πνεύματος τοῦ θεοῦ. . . τίς γὰρ ἔγνω νοῦν Κυρίου; . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ (sc. οἱ πνευματικοί) νοῦν Χριστοῦ ἔχομεν. The θεῖος νοῦς of the Hermetist corresponds to τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ in the language of Paul.¹

The Hermetist's notion of the stage attainable by the man who possesses the cosmic νοῦς may be illustrated by Philo *Vita Mosis* 2 (3). 14. 135, Cohn IV, p. 231: προδιδάσκει τὸν τοῦ θεοῦ θεραπευτήν, εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦ κοσμοποιοῦ δυνατόν, ἀλλὰ τοῦ γε κόσμου διηλεκτῶς ἄξιον εἶναι πειρᾶσθαι, οὗ τὸ μίμημα ἐνδύομενος, ὀφείλει, τῇ διανοίᾳ τὸ παράδειγμα (i. e. τὸν κόσμον) εὐθὺς ἀγαματοφορῶν, αὐτὸς τρόπον τινὰ πρὸς τὴν τοῦ κόσμου φύσιν ἐξ ἀνθρώπου μετηρμύσθαι, καὶ . . . βραχὺς κόσμος εἶναι. Philo is here employing the language of Stoicism, and speaks for the moment as if he held that man may be content with assimilation to the Kosmos (the aim of the religion of the 'cosmic νοῦς' in the Hermetist's system); but in the words εἰ καὶ μὴ τοῦ κοσμοποιοῦ (ἄξιον εἶναι) δυνατόν, he hints at the higher religion of the 'divine νοῦς'.

In *Ascl.* III. 18 b &c., as well as in other *Hermetica*, (see e. g. *Corp.* IV. 3 ff.), the word νοῦς without qualification is used in the sense assigned to ὁ θεῖος νοῦς in *Ascl.* III. 32.

in *ipsa veritate consistens*. ἀλήθεια means either 'truth' or 'reality'. Here, it is 'reality'; τὸ ἀληθές = τὸ ὄντως ὄν in the Platonic sense. The eternal alone is real.

plenissimus omnium (in)sensibilium. It is necessary to write *insensibilium*; for we require a word which may stand in contrast to *sensibilium* below. The verbal inconsistency involved in speaking of a *sensus* which is full of *insensibilia* is due to the translator, who has rendered νοῦς by *sensus*.

Sensus vero mundanus receptaculum est sensibilium omnium specierum et disciplinarum. The cosmic νοῦς is περὶ τὰ αἰσθητά or σωματικά, in contrast to the divine νοῦς, which is περὶ

¹ The difference in the expression of a similar conception results from the different descent of the two doctrines. Paul's 'spirit' is the Semitic *ruach*, rendered by the Greek word πνεῦμα which Hellenizing Jews had adopted from the Stoics; the Hermetist's νοῦς, on the other hand, has been taken over from Plato.

Paul speaks of τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου and τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου (in contrast to τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ); these may be compared with the 'human' νοῦς and the 'cosmic' νοῦς of the Hermetist; but Paul does not seem to have made a clear and definite distinction between the two. 1 *Cor.* 2. 11: τίς γὰρ οἶδεν ἀνθρώπων τὰ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ ἐν αὐτῷ; οὕτως καὶ τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ οὐδεὶς ἔγνωκεν εἰ μὴ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ θεοῦ. ἡμεῖς δὲ οὐ τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ἐλάβομεν, ἀλλὰ τὸ πνεῦμα τὸ ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἵνα εἰδῶμεν τὰ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ χαρισθέντα ἡμῖν.

Paul's use of the term πνευματικός is discussed by Reitzenstein, *Die hellen. Mysticienrel.*, 1910, p. 43 ff. and 160 ff.

τὰ ἀναίσθητα (= νοητά in the Platonic sense) or ἀσώματα. In this respect the 'cosmic νοῦς' differs from the ψυχὴ τοῦ κόσμου in Pl. *Tim.* 37 B, which is both περὶ τὸ αἰσθητόν and περὶ τὸ λογιστικόν.

On *sensibiles species*, see ch. 34 c.

Sensibilium must be understood again with *disciplinarum* (ἐπιστημῶν); for a qualifying word is needed to distinguish these *disciplinae* from the *disciplina* of the *sensus divinus*. The *sensibiles disciplinae* (or *sensibilium disciplinae*?) are the several branches of the scientific knowledge of αἰσθητά.

The word *omnium* is to be noted; compare 'ex omnibus quae in mundo sensibilia sunt' below. It seems to be a distinguishing mark of the 'cosmic νοῦς', as opposed to the 'human νοῦς', that it embraces, or is capable of embracing, *all* αἰσθητά as its objects.

Humanus vero (sensus . . .). There is certainly a lacuna after *vero*; and it seems probable that the lost words contained an explanation of the distinction between the *sensus humanus* and the *sensus mundanus*.

ex memoriae tenacitate, quod memor sit omnium quas gesserit rerum. Compare what is said below: 'the knowledge which corresponds to the nature of the human νοῦς *tota in memoria est praeeteritorum*.' The man who possesses only the lowest of the three grades of νοῦς is capable of acquiring such knowledge only as can be constructed out of his recollection of his own experiences in the past. The acquisition of this sort of knowledge may qualify him for dealing with the practical concerns of earthly life; ('per eam memoriae tenacitatem et gubernator effectus est terrae'; e.g. he has learnt by experience how to grow a crop;) but he cannot even attain to a comprehensive knowledge of the things of the sensible world; much less can he rise above the world of sense, and attain to the vision of the divine. On the other hand, the 'divine νοῦς' sees all things *sub specie aeternitatis*. In the divine life there is neither past nor future; consequently, in the divine consciousness there can be no place for memory. The man in whom the divine νοῦς is implanted is capable of thus seeing things, at least by glimpses (*per caliginem*); though, as long as he is imprisoned in an earthly body, he is compelled to employ the 'human νοῦς' and the 'cosmic νοῦς' also in dealing with the earthly things around him.

The *memoria* spoken of in this passage has, of course, nothing to do with the Platonic doctrine of ἀνάμνησις; it means the man's memory of his past sense-impressions in his earthly life.

sensûs divinitas is equivalent to *sensus divinus*.

divinum sensum cunctis confundi noluit, ne erubesceret aliorum commixtione animantium. Cf. *Ascl. I. 12 a*: 'in corpora alia, indigna animo sancto, [et] foeda migratio.'

Intellegentia enim sensus humani, qualis aut quanta sit, tota in memoria est praeteritorum. We have here a series of parallel phrases:—

(1) *intellegentia sensus humani, qualis aut quanta sit.*

(2) *intellectus naturae et qualitatis sensus mundi.*

(3) *intellectus qualitatis sensus summi dei.*

It is impossible to make sense of this form of words as it stands in the Latin; and its recurrence excludes the hypothesis of corruption of the Latin text. It must therefore be a case of mistranslation; and the question is, whether we can guess the Greek which the translator has misrepresented.

A clue to the meaning may perhaps be found in the similar passage below (ll. 17-20):—

'intellectus noster ad (2') *qualitatem sensus mundi intellegendam et dinoscendam* mentis pervenit intentione,

intellectus autem mundi pervenit ad (3') *aeternitatem et deos noscendos qui supra se sunt.*'

In (2'), we have again the same unmeaning form of words which occurs in (1), (2), and (3). In (3'), however, we arrive at something which has a meaning; the writer speaks of attaining to 'knowledge of eternity and of the supracosmic deities'. But (2') and (3') are clearly parallel; hence it may be inferred that (2') ought to be equivalent to 'knowledge of temporal and mundane things'.

Let us assume that the Greek original of (2') was something like (*φθάνει μέχρι*) *τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ νοῦ*: 'such knowledge as corresponds to the character of the cosmic *νοῦς*'; or in other words, 'such knowledge as the cosmic *νοῦς* is qualified to acquire'. That sort of knowledge is precisely a knowledge of temporal and mundane things; and thus the sense we wanted is obtained. The translator, we may suppose, mistook the meaning of *κατά*; he thought that *ἡ γνώσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιόν* was equivalent to *ἡ γνώσις τοῦ ποιού*, and so he rendered it by *qualitatem intellegendam*. (The Greek word for 'knowledge' here was probably *γνώσις*; in ch. 41 b *γνώσις* is rendered by *intellegentia*. For the use of *κατά*, cf. *Corp. I. 32*: *αἰτουμένῃ τὸ μὴ σφαλῆναι τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατ' οὐσίαν ἡμῶν*.)

Now (2') closely resembles (1), (2), and (3) above; let us assume

then that the translator has made the same mistake in (1), (2), and (3) also. On that assumption, the Greek may have been somewhat as follows:—

(1) ἡ γνῶσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπέου νοῦ ποιδὸν καὶ ποσόν:

‘the knowledge which corresponds to the character and extent of the human *noûs*’;

mistranslated by

‘*intellegentia sensus humani, qualis aut quanta sit*’.

(The translator, besides misunderstanding *κατά*, presumably thought that τὸ τοῦ ἀνθρωπέου νοῦ was much the same as τὸν ἀνθρώπειον νοῦν, and took ποιδόν and ποσόν to be dependent questions.)

(2) ἡ γνῶσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιδὸν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ νοῦ:

‘the knowledge which corresponds to the character of the cosmic *noûs*’;

mistranslated by

‘*intellectus naturae et qualitatis sensus mundi*’.

(For *naturae et qualitatis*, cf. ch. 33 a, where it is said that the *sensibilis mundus* is ‘*plenissimus corporum . . . naturae suae et qualitati convenientium*’. Perhaps *natura* is φύσις; but it is also possible that *natura* and *qualitas* together stand for ποιδόν.)

(3) ἡ γνῶσις ἡ κατὰ τὸ ποιδὸν τοῦ νοῦ τοῦ ὑψίστου θεοῦ (or possibly, τοῦ ὑψίστου without θεοῦ):

‘the knowledge which corresponds to the character of the *noûs* of God supreme’;

mistranslated by

‘*intellectus qualitatis sensus summi dei*’.

On this hypothesis, a satisfactory sense may be got out of this paragraph, which is meaningless in the Latin. (It cannot, however, be considered certain that the sense thus obtained is that which the writer intended.)

[[*aeternitas quae secunda est*]]. These words are certainly out of place here. It is probable, though not certain, that their original place was that to which I have transposed them.

[*ex sensibili mundo sensus (mundi) natura qualitasque dinoscitur.*] This is probably an alternative for the preceding sentence, ‘*Intellectus . . . poterit provideri*’. The translator seems to have made a second attempt to render the Greek sentence which puzzled him. The *sensus datus qualitasque* of the MSS. may be a corruption of *sensus (mundi) natura qualitasque*; and this may have been meant to represent τὸ ποιδὸν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ νοῦ.

Ubi . . . quid temporum dimensione dinoscitur, . . . ubi geniturae : i. e. in the region of χρόνος and γένεσις. The things in this region are the objects of the 'human νοῦς' and the 'cosmic νοῦς', which are accordingly incapable of apprehending the real, or attaining to absolute truth. See the discussion of ἀλήθεια in Herm. ap. Stob. *Exc.* II A.

[[**Vides ergo . . . taciturnitate celate**]]. This must have been intended to be the conclusion of the paragraph. In the MSS., the passage 'hoc autem differt . . . conscientiae', which continues the discussion of the different kinds of νοῦς, is placed after this conclusion ; but it must have been so placed by an error.

Hoc autem differt intellectus a sensu. What are the Greek words which are here rendered by *intellectus* and *sensus*? We have found reason to think that in the preceding sentences *intellectus* stands for γνώσις, and *sensus* for νοῦς. It is not to be assumed that a Latin word in the translation always represents the same Greek term ; but as the phrase *qualitatem sensus mundi intellegendam* corresponds closely with the form of words which was three times used above, we can hardly be wrong in deciding that in this place, as before, *sensus mundi* stands for ὁ κοσμικὸς νοῦς, and *intellegendam et dinoscendam* represents γνῶναι or γνώσις. But what is *intellectus noster*? If we take *intellectus* to stand for γνώσις in this phrase, we get the statement that 'Our γνώσις attains to a γνώσις which corresponds to the nature of the cosmic νοῦς'. But that is not satisfactory ; it must be something other than γνώσις that attains to a certain kind of γνώσις. Nor again can *intellectus noster* be 'our νοῦς' ; for it is here said that our *intellectus* can attain to a kind of knowledge to which it was previously said that the human νοῦς can *not* attain (viz. the kind of knowledge which is correlative to the cosmic νοῦς). *Intellectus* then must here stand for some Greek word other than γνώσις, and other than νοῦς ; and the most likely word seems to be δiάνοια.

On the assumption that *intellectus* here stands for δiάνοια (or at any rate, for some Greek word other than νοῦς or γνώσις), the words 'Hoc autem differt intellectus a sensu' admit of a satisfactory explanation. 'δiάνοια differs from νοῦς in the following way ; our δiάνοια is capable of attaining, by mental effort, to that kind of γνώσις which is correlative to the cosmic νοῦς.' And that kind of γνώσις, as we were told above, is a comprehensive knowledge of αἰσθητά,—i. e. a kind or extent of knowledge which is beyond the reach of 'the human νοῦς'.

Some such statement as this was needed to complete the treatment of the subject, and prevent misunderstanding. If the writer, having described the narrow limitations of what he calls 'the human νοῦς', had left the matter there, it might have seemed that he held it impossible for man to rise above those limitations. But he here makes it clear that the term ὁ ἀνθρώπειος νοῦς signifies only the lowest grade of human intellect, and is not co-extensive with all thought of which man is capable. The wider term, which includes higher grades of human thought, is 'our διάνοια'.

But there is something wrong in *intellectus autem mundi*. As the words stand, it looks as if *intellectus mundi* were parallel to *intellectus noster*, and must consequently mean 'the διάνοια of the Kosmos' (i. e. the thought which the Kosmos thinks), as opposed to 'our διάνοια' (i. e. the thought which man thinks). The sentence would then amount to this,—that our (human) thought can attain to a comprehensive knowledge of αἰσθητά, and 'the thought of the Kosmos' can attain to a knowledge of eternity. But this cannot have been the writer's meaning; for it is evident from what follows ('sic contingit . . . ut . . . quae in caelo sunt videamus' &c.) that he meant to say that *we* can attain to a knowledge of eternity; and the question whether the Kosmos can do so or not is beside the point.¹ We are thus forced to the conclusion that *intellectus noster* was intended to be the subject of the second clause (*pervenit ad aeternitatem* &c.) as well as of the first clause. (Probably *mentis intentione* also was meant to apply to the second clause as well as to the first; see *haec autem intentio* below.) Consequently, *intellectus autem mundi* must be a misreading or a mistranslation. The Hermetist may have written something to this effect: ἡ δὲ διάνοια τοῦ νοῦ διαφέρει· ἐπιταθεῖσα γὰρ ἡ διάνοια ἡμῶν φθάνει μέχρι τῆς γνώσεως τῆς κατὰ τὸ ποιὸν τοῦ κοσμικοῦ νοῦ, τὰ δὲ τοῦ κόσμου ἤδη γνωῖσα, φθάνει μέχρι τοῦ τὸν αἰῶνα γνῶναι. Starting from the low level of 'the human νοῦς' (i. e. from the narrow range of personal sense-experience), man's thought may rise to the higher level of 'the cosmic νοῦς' (i. e. to a comprehensive knowledge of the sensible world), and again, from this fresh starting-point, may rise to the vision of the eternal.

¹ If the traditional text is retained, I can see no way of escaping from this difficulty except to assume that the writer identifies the man at this stage with the νοῦς of the Kosmos which has entered into him, and intends us to understand that what the Kosmos thinks, the man thinks also. But on this interpretation, the meaning would be far-fetched and obscurely expressed.

Something like the sense required might be obtained by altering *intellectus autem mundi* into *intellecto autem mundo* (τὸν δὲ κόσμον γνοῦσα); but the exact words of the original can hardly be recovered.

deos . . . qui supra se sunt. The 'supracosmic gods' are the incorporeal and eternal Powers, the hypostatized *δυνάμεις* of God. In speaking here of *θεοὺς* in the plural, and not *θεόν* in the singular, the writer of *Ascl.* III suggests, by an incidental phrase, the possibility of a more elaborate theology than he has himself cared to formulate,—such a theology as is implied, for instance in *Corp.* I. 26 a, where we are told that the disembodied and purified soul hears the *δυνάμεις* 'singing their hymn to God'. He is conscious of the futility of all attempts to describe the Absolute (see 'sive deus, sive aeternitas, sive uterque' &c. in ch. 31, and cf. ch. 20 a); and whether the Supreme, 'qui unus est omnia', is imagined by men as a Trinity, or (as in some Gnostic systems) as an Ogdoad, or a Triacontad, would be to him a matter of indifference.

The *di intellegibiles* of ch. 19 a may be compared; but I do not think that the *οὐσιάρχαι* of ch. 19 b are here in the writer's thought.

ut quasi per caliginem quae in caelo sunt videamus.

In caelo here means 'in the region of the incorporeal and eternal', not 'in the corporeal sky'. It is possible that the original Greek was τὰ ὑπερουράνια.

The phrase 'per caliginem . . . videamus' recalls the words of Paul, 1 *Cor.* 13. 12: βλέπομεν γὰρ ἄρτι δι' ἐσόπτρου ἐν αἰνίγματι, κ.τ.λ. But there is not the slightest reason to think that the Hermetist has been either directly or indirectly influenced by Paul. Platonic parallels are to be found in abundance.

quantum possibile est per condicionem sensus humani.

Even in the 'illuminated' man, the 'human νοῦς' is still at work, and thwarts and hampers the divine νοῦς which has been superimposed upon it. The writer is here regarding man as a soul encumbered by an earthly body, and does not consider the case of a disembodied soul. But as the 'human νοῦς' evidently appertains to man as an earthly being, it is to be presumed, though it is not here expressly said, that the disembodied soul may rid itself of this hindrance, and become wholly θεῖος νοῦς. Cf. *Corp.* X. 19 a: καὶ ἡ τοιαύτη (sc. εὐσεβής) ψυχὴ . . . ὅλη νοῦς γίνεται. (The νοῦς of that passage corresponds to the θεῖος νοῦς of *Ascl.* III. 32 b.)

Haec autem intentio . . . angustissima est nobis. Cf. *Ascl.* I. 3 b: 'divinitatis . . . ratio, divina sensus intentione noscenda.' 'This *intentio*' must be the *mentis intentio* spoken of above, by which our *διάνοια* attains to higher levels. But the phrase 'this effort is narrow' is hardly intelligible; and there is probably some error of reading or translation.

[**Et vos, o Tat et Asclepi et Hammon, . . . taciturnitate celate.**] There is reason to think that in the earliest form of the document Asclepius was the only pupil present, and that all passages in which Tat and Ammon are mentioned have been inserted or altered by the compiler by whom the Prologue was added. (See note on Prologue.) Here, the address to the three pupils together follows awkwardly after *o Asclepi* a few lines above.

On the injunction of secrecy, see *Ascl.* 1 b and *Corp.* XIII *fin.*

divina mysteria. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 19 a, 'divina nudo mysteria'. 'Mystery' here means 'secret doctrine'. There is no suggestion that rites of initiation were employed in the writer's circle; and I have found no trace of anything of that nature in the *Hermetica*. In *Ascl.* III. 21, sexual union is described as a *mysterium*, i. e. a 'sacrament'. In ch. 37, the rites by which daemonic souls are incorporated in cult-statues are called *mysteria*.

37-38 b. The Hermetist here speaks of the *di terreni* (οἱ ἐπίγειοι θεοί), that is, the gods worshipped in the Egyptian temples. The *di terreni* are 'made by men'. The writer has already touched on the topic of the making of gods by men, in chs. 23 b-24 a; and he here refers back to that passage ('iterum ad hominem . . . redeamus').

The form of words with which the paragraph is introduced ('sed iam de talibus sint satis dicta talia') tells us nothing as to the contents of the passage which it followed in the original text. When the misplaced chapters 33-36 have been removed, ch. 37 is left standing next after the passage on eternity and time, and the faculties by which things eternal and things temporal are apprehended (26 b-32 b). But there is no connexion of thought between the contents of 37-38 b and those of 26 b-32 b; and it is possible that something which has been lost or misplaced originally stood between these two passages. If so, the interval between the section which treats of the eternal being of the supreme God (26 b-32 b) and that which deals with the terrestrial

gods (37-38 b) would seem to be a suitable place for the list of *οὐσιάρχαι* (19 b), i. e. for a description of the hierarchy of *νοητοὶ θεοί* by which the material universe is governed. But the author or compiler of *Ascl.* III pays little attention to systematic arrangement; and we should hardly be justified in transposing 19 b to this position merely on the ground that a more orderly sequence would be obtained by so doing.

37. rationemque . . . ex quo divino dono. The mention of god-making in ch. 23 b followed on the mention of God's gift of *ratio disciplinae* to men in ch. 22 b.

Minus enim miranda . . . quae de homine dicta sunt (cetera). It is necessary to insert *cetera*; for without it, the words would imply that god-making has not been previously spoken of.

Quoniam ergo proavi nostri multum errabant, . . . invenerunt artem qua efficerent deos. *Quoniam* is a mistranslation of *ἐπει*; 'after our ancestors had for some time been godless, they invented an art of making gods.' Augustine misunderstood this passage, being misled by the word *quoniam*; see Aug. *De civ. dei* 8. 23 *ad fin.*-24 (*Testim.*).

In the writer's view, Hermes Trismegistus the teacher is a mortal man, and is descended from mortal ancestors. It is true that he is a grandson of the god Thoth-Hermes (see below); but that personage also was once a man on earth, and became a god only after his death. Similarly, the god Asclepius (Imhotep), the goddess Isis, and apparently all the 'terrestrial gods' (i. e. the gods worshipped in the Egyptian temples) were mortals living on earth before they became deities.

This doctrine was no novelty in Egypt. In the *Decree of Memphis* (Rosetta Stone), 196 B. C., it is said that Ptolemy V has subdued the rebels in the Busirite Nome 'as Hermes, and Horus the son of Isis and Osiris, subdued those who revolted in the same place before'; that is, Horus is there spoken of as an early king of Egypt, who, with the help of his counsellor Thoth, waged war against the rebel Set. And not only in the time of the Ptolemies, but long before the Hellenistic period, one of the various methods of interpretation by which Egyptians explained their myths had been to treat them as records of historical events on earth, and to regard the gods who figured in them as ancient

rulers of the land. Re or Ptah was the first king of Egypt, and was succeeded by his descendants, down to Horus the son of Osiris; and the dates and deeds of this dynasty of god-kings were recorded in the annals (Brugsch, *Rel. und Myth. der alten Aeg.*, pp. 30-32). In a country where the kings, both living and recently deceased, were worshipped as gods, it was natural to assume that the gods had once been kings.¹ The theory of Euhemerus, which came into vogue among the Greeks soon after the time of Alexander, must have been derived, in part at least, from these Egyptian traditions; and perhaps his book was written with the object of giving support to the newly instituted cult of the Ptolemies, or preparing the way for it (Otto, *Priester und Tempel*, II, p. 274, n. 3).

The temple-gods then, according to the writer of *Ascl.* III, are deified men; or more exactly, the souls of the temple-gods are deified souls of men. But a disembodied soul is not yet a temple-god. The *deus terrenus* or temple-god is a deified human soul embodied in a statue, and operating on earth; and it is by the action of men that this combination of soul and body is brought into existence. When the man Imhotep died, his soul 'went back to heaven', and had no dealings with earth. But men in some Egyptian town made a statue of Imhotep, placed it in a sanctuary, and by means of appropriate rites induced the soul of Imhotep to migrate from heaven to earth, and enter into the statue they had made; and this animated statue is a *deus terrenus*. This is the meaning of the paradox that 'man makes gods'.

Is Imhotep then henceforth deprived of the bliss of heaven, which is elsewhere promised to the souls of the pious after death? Must he renounce his 'union with God', in order to work as a medical practitioner in an Egyptian town? If embodiment in matter is a descent to a lower grade of being, as we are elsewhere told, how can the beatified soul be induced to submit to it? The writer of *Ascl.* III, in his eagerness to defend the established cults, seems to have overlooked this difficulty; but if the question had been put to him, he might perhaps have answered that the soul of Imhotep is still 'in heaven', though at the same

¹ There may have been some truth in that belief. It is known that Imhotep was a deified man; and it is possible that some at least of the chief gods of Egypt—e. g. Osiris—were deified rulers of pre-dynastic date. See Budge, *Osiris and the Egyptian resurrection*, 1911.

time it animates a statue upon earth; for an incorporeal being may very well be in two or more places at once. At any rate, this principle must necessarily be applied in cases where two or more statues of the same deity are worshipped in different temples.

It is here assumed that the first age of mankind was an age of ignorance and savagery, and that religion, with all other civilizing influences, was subsequently introduced. In the *Kore Kosmu* (Stob. *Exc.* XXIII *fin.*), a similar view is expressed, and the civilizing of mankind, including the introduction of religious worship, is ascribed to Isis and Osiris, who 'came down from heaven to earth' (i. e. were incarnated as human beings) for this beneficent purpose.

⟨⟨**de mundi natura conveniente**[m]⟩⟩. It is clear that these words were intended to go with *efficerent deos*, and not with *adiunxerunt virtutem*. The writer speaks first of the material body which men make (viz. the statue), and then of the *virtus* (ἀρετή in the sense of 'supernatural efficacy') which they add to it by introducing an *anima* into the statue. The statue is *de mundi natura* (i. e. is made of wood or stone or metal); the added *virtus* is not *de mundi natura*. Compare Augustine's paraphrase, 'spiritus invisibiles . . . visibilibus rebus corporalis materiae copulare' (*Ib.* 8. 23 *init.*). The words *de mundi natura* are equivalent to *corporalis materiae*.

⟨⟨**per quam (quas MSS.) idola et bene faciendi et male vires habere potuissent**⟩⟩. Some qualification of *virtutem* is needed; and this clause, when transposed, precisely meets the need. On the other hand, where it stands in the MSS., it is an awkward appendage to a sentence which would end better at *mysteriis*. *Potuissent* is used by the translator in the sense of *possent*. See note on *intueri potuisset*, *Ascl.* I. 8.

evocantes animas daemonum vel angelorum. *Evocantes* probably stands for ἐκκαλοῦντες. Cf. Plut. *Quaest. Rom.* 61, 278 F: Why is it forbidden to utter the name of the tutelar deity of Rome? πότερον . . . ἐκκλήσεις εἰςὶ καὶ γοητεῖαι θεῶν; αἷς νομίζοντες καὶ αὐτοὶ (sc. the Romans) θεοῦς τινὰς ἐκκεκλήσθαι παρὰ τῶν πολεμίων καὶ μετῴκηκέναι πρὸς αὐτούς, ἐφοβοῦντο τὸ αὐτὸ παθεῖν ὑφ' ἑτέρων. Thus the process by which Juno of Veii, for instance, was induced to migrate to Rome would be called an ἐκκλήσις; (the word *evocare* is used in the same sense by Livy, 1. 55. 4 and 5. 21. 5;) and the same term

is here applied to the process by which a deified soul is induced to migrate from heaven to earth, and take up its abode in an Egyptian temple.

The disembodied and beatified souls of men are here called *δαίμωνων ψυχαι*. The beings formed by the embodiment of these souls in cult-statues are called *ἐπίγειοι θεοί*.

The words *vel angelorum* have probably been added by the translator. See ch. 25, *nocentes angeli*.

Avus enim tuus, Asclepi, medicinae primus inventor. The grandfather of Hermes' pupil Asclepius is the god Imhotep (*Ἰμούθης*), whom the Greeks identified with their god Asklepios. See Herm. ap. Stob. *Exc.* XXIII. 6 and *Exc.* XXVI. 9. The Hermetist seems to have been right in believing this god to be a deified man. Imhotep was an ancient Egyptian proverb-maker, physician, and architect; he is said to have lived under king Zoser, of the IIIrd dynasty (fourth millennium B. C.); and he is mentioned as a well-known sage in 'The Song of the Harper'. The cult of Imhotep as a god was probably first established in the time of the Saïte dynasty (633-525 B. C.), and was further developed under the Ptolemies. See Sethe, *Untersuchungen II (Imhotep, der Asklepios der Aegypten)*; Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 120; Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*, 112 f., 206, and 575; Otto, *Priester und Tempel im hellenistischen Aegypten*, II, p. 214. The god Imhotep was regarded as a son of Ptah. The chief seat of his worship was Memphis, where he had a temple near the Serapeum; and in the fourth century A. D., he had almost eclipsed his father Ptah, and become the chief deity of Memphis (Ammian. Marcell. 22. 14. 7: 'Memphim, urbem frequentem praesentiaque numinis Asclepii claram'). Like his Greek namesake (on whom see Aelius Aristides *passim*), the Egyptian god Imhotep-Asclepius prescribed for his patients through dreams obtained by incubation. The grandson, Hermes' pupil, must have been evolved from the god by duplication, just as Hermes the teacher is a duplicate of the god Thoth-Hermes, whom the writer of *Ascl.* III calls the teacher's grandfather.

in monte Libyae circa litus crocodillorum. The 'Libyan mountain' is the desert table-land which bounds the Nile valley on the West. The only inhabited district of Egypt (apart from oases) which is situated 'in the Libyan mountain',¹ and the only place in the Libyan mountain where a 'shore' and crocodiles could be found, is the

¹ 'In the great plateau of the *Libyan Desert*, which rises 300-400 feet above the sea-level, is situated the province of the Fayûm' (Baedeker's *Egypt*).

Fayum. Consequently, the place indicated must necessarily be in the Fayum, and is probably at or near the chief city of that district, viz. Crocodilopolis, also called Arsinoe. The writer says that in this place the body of the man Asclepius (the elder) was buried, and that a temple stands there, in which the god Asclepius is worshipped. We should rather have expected him to name Memphis, which, according to other authorities, was the chief place of worship of this god, and presumably the place where his cult was first established; but Memphis is not 'in the Libyan mountain'. There were temples of Asclepius at Thebes and at Philae as well as at Memphis (Otto, *Priester und Tempel*, Index III, s. v. Imhotep-Asklepios); but the description cannot be made to apply to either of these places. There seems to be no record, except in the passage before us, of a temple of Asclepius in the Fayum; for no such temple is mentioned either by Otto, or by Bouché-Leclercq, who, in his *Histoire des Lagides*, III, p. 214, gives a list of deities worshipped in the Arsinoïte Nome. But on this point the evidence of the writer of *Ascl.* III is sufficient; and we may take it on his authority that in the third century A. D. Asclepius (i. e. Imhotep) was worshipped in a temple at or near Arsinoe, and that those who frequented the temple supposed him to have been buried there; though the people of Memphis may have been equally convinced that his burial-place was in their city. It is possible that one of the old pyramids of the XIIth dynasty near Arsinoe, the original occupant of which had been forgotten, had by this time come to be regarded by the inhabitants of the district as the tomb of Imhotep-Asclepius.

Sobk (Σοῦχος), one of the chief deities of the Fayum, was embodied in a crocodile, and Arsinoe-Crocodilopolis was the most famous place of crocodile-worship in Egypt. See Hdt. 2. 69; Diodorus 1. 89. Strabo 17. 38 f., p. 811 f.: πόλις ἐστὶν Ἀρσινόη κροκοδείλων δὲ πόλις ἐκαλεῖτο πρότερον· σφόδρα γὰρ ἐν τῷ νομῷ τούτῳ τιμῶσι τὸν κροκοδείλον, καὶ ἔστιν ἱερός παρ' αὐτοῖς ἐν λίμνῃ καθ' αὐτὸν τρεφόμενος, χειροθήης τοῖς ἱερέυσιν· καλεῖται δὲ Σοῦχος. . . . The people of Arsinoe τοὺς κροκοδείλους τιμῶσι, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἢ τε διώρυξ αὐτῶν ἐστὶ μεστὴ τῶν κροκοδείλων καὶ ἢ τοῦ Μοίριδος λίμνη. It is true that crocodiles were held sacred at several place in Upper Egypt also, viz. Diospolis Parva, Chenoboscia, Coptus, a Crocodilopolis south of Thebes, and Ombos (Parthey on Plut. *Is. et Os.* p. 267), as well as at Thebes (which was almost depopulated in Roman times); but none of these places answer to the description in the text; and the words 'in monte Libyae circa

litus crocodillorum' would certainly be understood by readers in the third century A. D. as referring to Arsinoe beside Lake Moeris.

reliquus enim, vel potius totus, . . . remeavit in caelum. The disembodied soul, if it has lived a pious life on earth, returns to heaven, whence it originally came. See *Ascl.* I. 11 b. Sometimes this was asserted especially of the souls of great men and beneficent rulers; e. g. Cic. *Somm. Scip.* 3: 'sic habeto, omnibus qui patriam conservaverint, adiuverint, auxerint, certum esse in caelo definitum locum, ubi beati aevo sempiterno fruuntur: . . . (civitatum) rectores et conservatores hinc profecti huc revertuntur.' With *vel potius totus* may be compared Sen. *Consol. ad Marc.* 24. 5 ff.: 'Imago dumtaxat filii tui periit et effigies non simillima; ipse quidem aeternus meliorisque nunc status est, despoliatus oneribus alienis et sibi relictus. . . . Proinde non est quod ad sepulcrum filii tui curras: pessima eius et ipsi molestissima istic iacent, ossa cineresque, non magis illius partes quam vestes aliaque tegumenta corporum. Integer ille, nihilque in terris relinquens sui, fugit et totus excessit.' The Hermetist has learnt from Greek philosophy to disregard the corpse, which the ancient Egyptians took so much pains to preserve. He thinks that the body of Imhotep lies buried at the place of which he speaks; but he holds that the god is present there, not because the corpse is there, but because his countrymen have set up a statue at that place, and called down the soul of Imhotep from heaven to animate the statue. He must have been aware that there were cult-statues of the same god in other places also; but of that he says nothing.

The notion that the soul, on its departure from the body, 'goes to heaven', was current in Egypt (side by side with other and inconsistent notions) from early times. See Erman, *Life in ancient Egypt*, Eng. tr. 1894, p. 343 f., where the general sense of a very ancient passage in the *Book of the Dead* is given as follows: 'The deceased stands at the gate of heaven, he feels that he has become a god, and boasts of his divine nature. He esteems himself the equal of each of the ancient gods . . . He has forsaken his earthly house in order to enter the heavenly one; he has cleansed himself from all impurities, and now enters the gate of heaven, and the glorified spirits reach out to him their hands, and conduct him to his father the Sun-god.' Perhaps originally kings alone were thought to 'go to heaven'; but the doctrine was afterwards extended to men in general, or at any rate to pious or righteous men. In the *stèle* of Mendes (Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. des Lagides* I, p. 180,) the death of

Arsinoe the wife of Ptolemy II is thus described: 'This goddess departed to heaven; she rejoined the members of (Ra or Harmachis).' Maspero (Bouché-Leclercq *ib.*) says: 'This is the formula employed from the earliest times to indicate by a euphemism the death of a king. The deceased Arsinoe is treated in the same way as Amenemhât I or Thoutmôsis III, or all the other Pharaohs of whom it was said that they have departed or flown up to heaven, and have united themselves with the Sun-god, the father of their race.' The soul which 'went to heaven', or became a celestial god, was described sometimes as admitted to the company of the Sun-god, and sailing with him in his boat; or sometimes (at least in Ptolemaic and Roman Egypt), as attached to a star, or visible in the form of a star. Plut. *Is. et Os.* 21: οὐ μόνον δὲ τούτου (sc. of Osiris) οἱ ἱερεῖς λέγουσιν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν ὅσοι μὴ ἀγέννητοι μηδ' ἄφθαρτοι (i. e. of the gods who once were mortal men), τὰ μὲν σώματα παρ' αὐτοῖς κείσθαι καμόντα καὶ θεραπεύεσθαι, τὰς δὲ ψυχὰς ἐν οὐρανῷ λάμπειν ἄστρα, καὶ καλεῖσθαι κύνα μὲν (the dog-star) τὴν Ἰσιδος κ.τ.λ. Compare the Egyptian funeral prayer translated in Porphyry. *De abst.* 4. 10: ὦ δέσποτα ἦλιε καὶ θεοὶ πάντες οἱ τὴν ζωὴν τοῖς ἀνθρώποις δόντες, προσδέξασθέ με καὶ παράδοτε τοῖς αἰδίους θεοῖς σύννοικον.

The early Egyptians said that the soul of the deceased king *goes* to heaven; but they did not say that it *returns* to heaven. If any such notion existed among them, it existed in the form of a belief that the king, who is a son of the Sun-god, is in some sense one with his divine father. The doctrine that the individual soul pre-existed in heaven before its sojourn on earth first makes its appearance in Egypt in the Hellenistic period, and must have been derived from Platonism. It was acclimatized in that country in the time of the Ptolemies; and when Horace (*Od.* 1. 2. 45) says to Augustus 'Serus in caelum redeas', he speaks of the Roman *princeps* as Egyptians were already in the habit of speaking of their rulers. Similarly, Velleius (2. 123), speaking of the death of Augustus, says 'animam caelestem caelo reddidit'; and the writer of the *Vita Marc. Aurel.* (about A. D. 300), c. 18, says that 'tantus illius amor . . . claruit, ut nemo illum plangendum censuerit, certis omnibus quod ab diis commodatus ad deos rediisset.' A divine soul comes down from heaven to earth, and is incarnated in a human body; when its work on earth is done, it quits the body, and returns to the place whence it came. Cf. Plutarch *Vita Romuli* 28, where the disembodied Romulus says θεοῖς ἔδοξεν . . . τοσοῦτον ἡμᾶς γενέσθαι μετ' ἀνθρώπων χρόνον, καὶ πόλιν

ἐπ' ἀρχῇ καὶ δόξῃ μεγίστη κτίσαντας αἰθῆρας οὐρανόν, ἐκεῖθεν ὄντας. . . ἐγὼ δὲ ὑμῖν εὐμενῆς ἔσομαι δαίμων Κυρῖνος. The Roman Romulus-Quirinus, like the Egyptian Imhotep-Asclepius, 'has returned to heaven', but none the less continues to render services to men on earth.

What does the Hermetist here mean by *caelum*? If he is true to his principles, he ought to hold that the ultimate destiny of the pious soul is union with the supracosmic and eternal God; and the word 'heaven' might be used metaphorically or symbolically to signify that consummation. But it is possible that he recognized intermediate stages on the way to the final union with God; and he may have thought of the disembodied soul as resident for a time at least, if not permanently, among the *di caelestes* in the corporeal sky,—or even as detained for a time at a lower level, among the daemons of the upper air; this might account for his calling the souls in question *animas daemonum*.

adiumenta praestat infirmis. The 'terrestrial god' Asclepius (i. e. the dead man's soul, embodied in the cult-statue at Arsinoe,) still carries on the medical practice with which the living man was occupied. Harpocraton of Alexandria (second century A. D. at latest) tells a story of a medical revelation given by Asclepius at Diospolis (Magna, i. e. Thebes?): Cumont in *Klio*, Bd. IX, Heft 3, 1909. Naville, *The old Egyptian faith*, Eng. tr. p. 204, summarizes as follows a story which is told on a funerary *stèle* of the Ptolemaic period. The wife of the high priest of Ptah bore no son. 'Then the pair addressed their petition to the god Imhotep, son of Ptah, who hears prayers and grants sons to those who have none. The god appeared to the priest in a dream, and ordered him to do certain pieces of work in the god's sanctuary, in return for which he (the god) would give him a son. . . . The work was accomplished, and . . . the priestess gave birth to a son, who was called Imhotep.'

As an instance of corresponding beliefs among the Greeks, compare Maximus Tyrius (A. D. 180–200) 9. 6 f. Hobein: When the soul has departed from the body, and has become a 'daemon', ἐποπτεύει μὲν αὐτὴ τὰ οἰκεία θεάματα, . . . αὐτὸ κάλλος αὐτοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄρωσα καὶ γανυμένη, οἰκτείρουσα μὲν αὐτὴν τοῦ πρόσθεν βίου, μακαρίζουσα δὲ τοῦ παρόντος, οἰκτείρουσα δὲ καὶ τὰς συγγενεῖς ψυχὰς αἱ περὶ γῆν στρέφονται ἔτι, καὶ ὑπὸ φιλανθρωπίας ἐθέλουσα αὐταῖς συναγελάζεσθαι, καὶ ἐπανορθοῦν σφαλόμενας· προστέακται δὲ αὐτῇ ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπιφοιτᾶν τὴν γῆν, καὶ ἀναμίγνυ-

σθαι πάση μὲν ἀνδρῶν φύσει, πάση δὲ ἀνθρώπων τύχῃ καὶ γνώμῃ καὶ τέχνῃ, καὶ τοῖς μὲν χρηστοῖς συνεπιλαμβάνειν, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικουμένοις τιμωρεῖν, τοῖς δὲ ἀδικούσιν προστιθέσθαι τὴν δίκην. ἀλλ' οὐχὶ δαιμόνων πᾶς πάντα δρᾷ, ἀλλ' αὐτοῖς διακέκριται κάκει τὰ ἔργα, ἄλλο ἄλλω. . . ὡς γὰρ εἶχον φύσεως ὅτε περὶ γῆν ἦσαν, οὐκ ἐθέλουσιν ταύτης παντάπασιν ἀπαλλάττεσθαι· ἀλλὰ καὶ Ἀσκληπιῶς (the Greek Asklepios, not the Egyptian Imhotep,) ἰᾶται νῦν, καὶ ὁ Ἡρακλῆς ἰσχυρίζεται, καὶ Διόνυσος βακχεύει, καὶ Ἀμφίλοχος μαντεύεται, καὶ οἱ Διόσκουροι ναντίλλονται κ.τ.λ. He adds, 'I myself have seen the Dioskuroi, in the form of bright stars, settle on a ship and steer it in a storm; I have seen Asklepios, and not in dream; I have seen Herakles with my waking eyes.' Maximus' notions about the disembodied human souls which have become 'daemons' differ little from early Christian beliefs about the 'saints'.¹ He does not, like the Hermetist, suppose them to be embodied in statues or living animals;² he assumes that they move about freely among men; but his view of their functions agrees closely with the Hermetist's view of the functions of the 'terrestrial gods'.

Hermes . . . in sibi cognomine patria consistens. The *patria* (i. e. native city) of the god Thoth-Hermes is presumably *Hermupolis Magna*, an important town about half-way between Memphis and Thebes. But there was also a *Hermupolis* in the Delta, capital of the Hermopolite Nome, which was of great religious importance and might well be counted the *patria* of Hermes equally with *Hermupolis Magna*.

It is implied, though not expressly said, that the deities Hermes and Isis, as well as Asclepius, once lived on earth as mortals.

quantis obesse . . . iratam. The punishment of evil-doers, by disease or otherwise, may be regarded as a good to human society (cf. *Kore Kosmu sub fin.*), and may thus be included among the benefits obtained by god-making.

Terrenis etenim diis . . . facile est irasci. The *diī caelestes* are ἀπαθεῖς, and incapable of anger; cf. 40 a, 'nec ira etenim commoventur nec flectuntur gratia'. And the same might be said of disembodied and beatified human souls. But the *deus terrenus*,

¹ Compare, for instance, the stories of miracles of healing worked at the tombs or sanctuaries of the martyrs, which are told by Augustine, *Civ. dei* 22. 8.

² The Christians who believed that a dead saint worked miracles by means of his own bones or other relics must have thought that the disembodied soul was in some sense present in the material things to which they ascribed a supernatural power; and in this respect, they approximated more closely than Maximus to the Egyptian doctrine of *Asc.* III.

like man on earth, is made *ex utraque natura*, i. e. not of incorporeal substance alone, but of incorporeal and corporeal substance together. (Cf. *Ascl.* III. 22 b: 'hominem . . . ex utraque natura composuit, divina atque mortali'.) He has a body, viz. the statue; and in virtue of this body, he is liable to *πάθη*. It is true that the sun, moon, and stars, which are *di caelestes*, have bodies; but their bodies are made of pure fire, the noblest sort of matter. It seems to be implied that it is only bodies composed of base and earthy matter that give rise to *πάθη*.

Apuleius (*De deo Socr.* 12 f.) makes a corresponding distinction between *daemones*, who are subject to *πάθη*, and *di caelestes*, who are *ἀπαθείς*. 'Ex hoc ferme daemonum numero poetae solent haudquaquam procul a veritate osores et amatores quorundam hominum deos fingere: . . . igitur et misereri et indignari et angere et laetari omnemque humani animi faciem pati: . . . quae omnes turbulae tempestatesque procul a deorum caelestium tranquillitate exulant. Cuncti enim caelites semper eodem statu mentis aeterna aequabilitate potiuntur, qui numquam illis nec ad dolorem versus nec ad voluptatem finibus suis pellitur. . . . Quapropter debet deus nullam perpeti vel odii vel amoris temporalem perfunctionem, et idcirco nec indignatione nec misericordia contingi, . . . sed ab omnibus animi passionibus liber nec dolere umquam nec aliquando laetari nec aliquid repentinum velle vel nolle. Sed et haec cuncta et id genus caetera daemonum mediocritati rite congruunt. Sunt enim inter nos et deos ut loco regionis ita ingenio mentis intersiti, habentes communem cum superis immortalitatem, cum inferis passionem. Nam proinde ut nos pati possunt omnia animorum placamenta vel incitamenta, ut et ira incitentur et misericordia flectantur et donis invitentur et precibus leniantur . . . aliisque omnibus ad similem nobis modum variant.' It is these daemons, he says, that are propitiated by the rites of worship in the temples. But the *daemones* of Apuleius differ from the *di terreni* of *Ascl.* III in two respects: they have bodies composed of air, whereas the body of the Hermetist's *deus terrenus* is either a statue or a living animal; and they are not beatified human souls, but beings of a different order from mankind.

Plut. *Is. et Os.* 25: βέλτιον οὖν οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ Ὅσιριν καὶ Ἰσιν ἱστορούμενα μῆτε θεῶν παθήματα μῆτ' ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ δαιμόνων μεγάλων εἶναι νομίζοντες, οὓς καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας

καὶ Ξενοκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος, ἐπόμενοι τοῖς πάλαι θεολόγοις, ἐρρωμενεστέροις μὲν ἀνθρώπων γεγονέναι λέγουσι, καὶ πολλῇ τῇ δυνάμει τὴν φύσιν ὑπερφέροντας ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῖον οὐκ ἀμιγῆς οὐδ' ἄκρατον ἔχοντας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματος αἰσθήσει [συνειληγῶς] (συντετηκὸς?) ἥδονην δεχομένη καὶ πόνον, καὶ ὅσα ταύταις ἐγγενόμενα ταῖς μεταβολαῖς πάθη τοὺς μὲν μᾶλλον τοὺς δὲ ἦττον ἐπιταράττει· γίνονται γάρ, ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν ἀρετῆς διαφοραὶ καὶ κακίας. See also Plut. *Def. orac.* 12 f. The daemons of whom Plutarch here speaks, like those of Apuleius, are not human souls, but superhuman beings of a lower order than the *di caelestes*.

Maximus Tyrius 8. 8: θεὸς μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς κατὰ χώραν ἰδρύνεος οἰκονομεῖ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ τάξιν· εἰσὶ δ' αὐτῷ φύσεις ἀθάνατοι [δεύτεροι] (*lege -ραι*), οἱ καλούμενοι [δεύτεροι] (*lege δαίμονες*), ἐν μεθορίᾳ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ τεταγμένοι, θεοῦ μὲν ἀσθενέστεροι, ἀνθρώπων δ' ἰσχυρότεροι, θεῶν μὲν ὑπέρηται, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐπιστάται. . . . τοῦτο γὰρ (*sc.* τὸ δαιμόνων γένος) ἐστὶν τὸ ἀνθρώποις προσφθεγγόμενον, καὶ φανταζόμενον, καὶ εἰλούμενον ἐν μέσῃ τῇ θνητῇ φύσει, καὶ [ἀπωφελούην] (*ἐπ-* Reiske) ὅσα ἀνάγκη δεῖσθαι θεῶν τὸ θνητὸν γένος. . . . οἱ μὲν ἰατροὶ νοσημάτων, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀπόρων σύμβουλοι, οἱ δὲ τῶν ἀφανῶν ἄγγελοι, οἱ δὲ τέχνης συνεργάται, οἱ δὲ ὁδοῦ συνέμποροι. *Ib.* 9. 2: τίθεσο θεὸν μὲν κατὰ τὸ ἀπαθές καὶ ἀθάνατον, δαίμονα δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἐμπαθές, ἄνθρωπον δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἐμπαθές καὶ θνητόν. *Ib.* 9. 4: λείπεται δὴ τὴν δαιμόνων φύσιν ἐμπαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατον, ἵνα τοῦ μὲν ἀθανάτου κοινωνῇ τῷ θεῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἐμπαθοῦς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. Maximus says that daemons are souls which have put off the body, —i. e. the earthly and corruptible body (9. 5: εἴπερ ἐστὶν τὸ δαιμόνιον αὐτὸ ψυχῆ ἀποδυσσαμένη τὸ σῶμα); but as he also says that a soul which has become a daemon is θρέμμα αἰθέριον (9. 6), he seems to have thought that a soul in this condition is not immaterial, but is composed of αἰθήρ, i. e. of pure bright air. If that is his meaning, he is probably following Posidonius in this part of his theory.

haec sancta animalia. In some Egyptian temples, the thing worshipped was a statue; in others, it was a living animal. These animals the writer of *Ascl.* III holds to be 'terrestrial gods'; a beatified human soul has entered into or 'possessed' the beast, and is embodied in it, just as in the other case a beatified human soul is embodied in the statue. Thus the people who worship the beast are really worshipping the soul of one of their townsmen who

died long ago. This is the Hermetist's explanation and defence of the Egyptian practice of beast-worship.

In Philostr. *Vita Apollonii* 6. 19, the head of the society of Γυμνοί at the border of Upper Egypt gives a different explanation of the practice: σοφὸν γάρ, ἔπερ τι Αἰγυπτίων, καὶ τὸ μὴ θρασύνεσθαι ἐς τὰ τῶν θεῶν εἶδη, ξυμβολικὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ποιῆσθαι καὶ ὑπονοούμενα· καὶ γὰρ ἂν καὶ σεμνότερα οὕτω φαίνοιτο. I. e. the practice of the Egyptians, who employ an animal as a *symbol* of the god, is more reverential than that of the Greeks, who presume to represent the divine being by a statue intended to *resemble* him. But this is philosophic reflection. In the popular consciousness of the Egyptians, the god was not merely symbolized by the beast, but was incorporated in it.

Plutarch, *Is. et Os.* 71 ff., says that the majority of the Egyptians 'worship the beasts themselves, and treat them as gods'; but this he regards as a contemptible and mischievous superstition. He mentions certain 'mythical' and 'historical' explanations which have been put forward to account for the usage; and he speaks of a theory (which he holds to be 'equally incredible'), that 'those human souls which continue to exist after death can be born again only by becoming incarnate in the sacred animals'.¹ Plutarch mentions also the explanation based on 'usefulness' (i. e. the theory that cows, for instance, are held sacred because they are serviceable to men). But he himself (like the naked philosopher in Philostratus) prefers to regard the sacred animals as *symbols* of deity; and living things, he says, are better symbols of deity than things without life. ἀγαπητέον οὖν οὐ ταῦτα τιμώντας, ἀλλὰ διὰ τούτων τὸ θεῖον, ὡς ἐναργεστέρων ἐσόπτρων² καὶ φύσει γεγονότων (c. 76). Plutarch's view is that of an enlightened Greek. He thinks it absurd to suppose that a beast is a god; but at the same time he is unwilling to condemn an established religious usage, and seeks to show that a man may reasonably continue to practise the rites, provided that he rejects their ostensible meaning, and interprets them in his own way. The position of the Hermetist is nearer to that of the

¹ τὸ ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν θανόντων, ὅσαι διαμένουσιν, εἰς ταῦτα μόνα γίνεσθαι τὴν παλιγγενεσίαν. This theory agrees in part with that of the writer of *Ascl.* III, who holds that certain human souls have been reincarnated in the beasts which are worshipped in the temples. Similarly, Diodorus 1. 85. 4 says of the Apis-bull, τῆς δὲ τοῦ βοῦς τούτου τιμῆς αἰτίαν ἐνίοι φέρουσι λέγοντες ὅτι τελευτήσαντος Ὀσίριδος (Osiris is here regarded as a mortal man) εἰς τοῦτον ἡ ψυχὴ μετέστη.

² Cf. *Corp.* XVII.

mass of the Egyptian worshippers of a bull or a crocodile; in his view, the beast, as well as the statue, is an actual god, though a god of lower grade than the *di caelestes*.

Diodorus i. 84 mentions some of the beasts worshipped in Egypt in his time; among them are the bull Apis at Memphis, the bull Mnevis at Heliopolis, a he-goat at Mendes, a crocodile at Lake Moeris (Arsinoe), a lion at Leontopolis, *καὶ πολλὰ τοιαῦθ' ἕτερα*. See also Philo *De decalogo* 16. 76 ff., Cohn IV, p. 286, Orig. *c. Cels.* 3. 17. Parthey, in his edition of Plut. *Is. et Os.* p. 261 ff., gives a detailed list of sacred animals.

The early Egyptians no doubt regarded certain kinds of animals as 'holy', and abstained from certain kinds of animal food as 'unclean';¹ and they associated certain species of animals with certain gods; but the actual worship of individual beasts as gods, if not wholly unknown,² at any rate occupied a comparatively small place among the cults of Egypt until near the end of the national independence. The worship of beasts, in the sense in which the practice implies a belief that the god is incarnated in the body of a particular living animal, first became prominent in the Saïte period (663-525 B. C.), and was carried to great lengths in Ptolemaic and Roman times. In these late times, the sanctity of the individual animal in which the deity was believed to be incorporated was extended, in greater or less degree, to other animals of the same species; and if some sort of veneration for the species had existed before, it was now intensified. Any one who killed an animal of a species held sacred in an Egyptian town was liable to severe legal penalties, and was likely to be lynched by the mob. Cf. Diodor. i. 83: ἀποκτείναντος Ῥωμαίων τινὸς αἰλουρον, καὶ τοῦ πλήθους συνδραμόντος ἐπὶ τὴν οἰκίαν τοῦ πράξαντος, οὗθ' οἱ πεμφθέντες ὑπὸ τοῦ βασιλέως ἄρχοντες ἐπὶ τὴν παραίτησιν οὗθ' ὁ κοινὸς ἀπὸ τῆς Ῥώμης φόβος ἴσχυσε ἐξελεῖσθαι τῆς τιμωρίας τὸν ἄνθρωπον, καίπερ ἀκουσίως τοῦτο πεπραχότα. καὶ τοῦτ' οὐκ ἐξ ἀκοῆς ἡμεῖς ἰστοροῦμεν, ἀλλ' αὐτοὶ κατὰ τὴν γεγενημένην ἡμῖν ἐπιδημίαν κατ' Αἴγυπτον ἑορακότες.

¹ At an early stage of culture, the conceptions 'holy' and 'unclean' are hardly distinguishable; the common notion underlying both is that the thing in question is charged with a potent force, and that precautions must therefore be taken in dealing with it.

² Breasted, *Hist. of Egypt*, p. 60, says that 'the animal-worship, . . . as a cult, is a late product, brought forward in the decline of the nation at the close of its history', and that until then 'it was unknown'. (He refers to Erman, *Handbuch*, p. 25.)

eorum animas, quorum sunt consecrata (*sc. haec animalia*) **(quasi imagines) viventes.** In the text of the MSS., *viventes* is meaningless. By inserting *quasi imagines*, we get a meaning which exactly suits the context. The beast is a 'living image' of the deified man, in the same sense that the statue is a lifeless image of him; and the 'terrestrial god' is in this case constituted by the combination of a disembodied human soul with the living body of an animal, as, in the other case, by the combination of a disembodied human soul with a lifeless statue. Cf. Plut. *Is. et Os.* 43: τὸν δὲ Ἄπιν εἰκόνα μὲν Ὀσίριδος ἐμψυχὸν εἶναι. Hyginus *Astronom.* 2. 28 says that Egyptian priests tell a story about gods who changed themselves into beasts; 'quibus de causis Aegyptios ea genera violari non sinere demonstrant, quod *deorum imagines* dicantur.' Porphyry. *De abst.* 4. 9: κἀνθαρον δὲ . . . Αἰγύπτιοι . . . ἐσέφθησαν ὡς εἰκόνα ἡλίου ἐμψυχον. (The context shows that Porphyry here understands εἰκὼν in the sense of 'a symbol'; but the phrase is taken from common usage, and the popular notion would rather be that the Sun-god, or a divine soul which is an ἀπόρρου of the Sun-god, is embodied in the beetle.)

A man, as well as a beast, might become in this sense a 'living image' of a god. In the *Decree of Memphis*, 196 B. C. (Mahaffy, *Egypt under the Ptoles.*, p. 316), Ptolemy V is called εἰκὼν ζωσα τοῦ Διὸς (i. e. of Amon). The votary in Apuleius *Metamorph.* 11. 24, at the end of his initiation in the mysteries of Isis at Corinth, has become an embodiment of the Sun-god Horus, the son of Isis, and is accordingly exhibited to the worshippers as an 'image' of that deity ('in vicem simulacri'). Porphyry (*De abst.* 4. 9) mentions a place in Egypt where the object of worship (i. e. the thing in which the god-soul was embodied) was not a statue or a beast, but a living man; ἐπεὶ καὶ ἄνθρωπον σέβονται κατὰ Ἄναβιν κόμηην, ἐν ἣ καὶ τοῦτω θύεται καὶ ἐπὶ βωμῶν τὰ ἱερεῖα κάεται. ὁ δὲ μετ' ὀλίγον φάγοι ἂν τὰ ἴδια αὐτῷ ὡς ἀνθρώπῳ παρεσκευασμένα.

ita ut et eorum legibus incolantur (*sc. civitates*). It is assumed that the man whose soul is incarnated in the beast worshipped in the town (e. g. Thoth-Hermes, embodied in an ibis at Hermopolis,) had governed the town during his human life, and was the founder of its local ordinances,—especially, perhaps, of its religious usages, and such laws as that which made it a penal offence in that town to kill an animal which was freely killed and eaten in other places.

et eorum nominibus nuncupentur. In some cases the town was named after the local god (e. g. Hermopolis); in other cases it was named after the beast in which the local god was embodied (e. g. Crocodilopolis).

propterea bellis se lacesere Aegyptiorum solent civitates.

This does not necessarily imply that in the writer's own lifetime Egyptian towns were in the habit of waging war against one another on behalf of their sacred animals. The speaker is the prehistoric Trismegistus; and traditions of such fighting would suffice to account for the statement which is put into his mouth. There may have been legends of actual wars waged on this ground in the past; and the mimic fighting which formed part of the ritual at some Egyptian festivals (see e. g. Hdt. 2. 63) might easily give rise to such legends. But there is evidence that even under Roman rule a riot or faction-fight was sometimes provoked or aggravated by insulting treatment of a sacred animal by men of a neighbouring town; just as in India the slaughter of a cow by Mohammedans is now and then the cause of a riot, or an incident in a riot. An instance of war between neighbouring towns in the Ptolemaic period occurs in certain Greek papyri (Grenfell and Hunt, *Archiv für Papyrusforschung*, Bd. I, 1901, p. 57 ff.) describing a bitter quarrel which broke out in 123 B. C. between the priests of Hermonthis and those of Pathyris and the adjacent Crocodilopolis (a little way above Thebes) concerning the possession of an island; the dispute lasted for some years, and led to fierce fighting between the people of these towns. One of the fights described took place at the sacred island of the crocodile-god Sobk; and during this engagement, 'a number of priests (?) who were assisting the Crocodilopolites, and were probably inhabitants of the island, were routed and fled to the river, where many of them were drowned'. There is no express mention of sacred animals here; but when the assailants attacked the island of the crocodile-god, they probably did not spare the crocodile or crocodiles maintained there. Diodorus 1. 89. 5: some say that one of the early kings, acting on the principle 'Divide et impera', introduced the practice of animal-worship, ὅπως ἐκάστων τὸ μὲν παρ' αὐτοῖς τιμώμενον σεβομένων, τῶν δὲ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀφιερωμένων καταφρονούντων, μηδέποτε ὁμονοῆσαι δύνωνται πάντες οἱ κατ' Αἴγυπτον.¹ καὶ τοῦτο ἐκ τῶν ἀποτελεσμάτων φανερὸν εἶναι' πάντας γὰρ τοὺς πλησιοχώρους πρὸς ἀλλήλους διαφέρεσθαι, προσκόπτοντας ταῖς εἰς τὰ προειρη-

¹ The same story is told in different words in Plut. *Is. et Os.* 72.

μένα παρανομίαις. Plut. *Is. et Os.* 72: οἱ δὲ Ὀξύρυγχίται καθ' ἡμᾶς (about A. D. 100), τῶν Κυνοπολιτῶν τὸν Ὀξύρυγχον ἰχθὺν ἐσθιόντων, κίνας συλλαβόντες καὶ θύσαντες ὡς ἱερεῖον κατέφαγον' ἐκ δὲ τούτου καταστάτες εἰς πόλεμον ἀλλήλους τε διέθηκαν κακῶς, καὶ ὕστερον ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίων κολαζόμενοι διετέθησαν. Juvenal (*Sat.* 15) describes a similar fight between two Egyptian towns; 'Inde furor vulgo, quod numina vicinorum | odit uterque locus, cum solos credat habendos | esse deos quos ipse colit.' The people of one of these towns, he says, began the quarrel by jeering at those of the other, who were holding a religious festival (i. e. worshipping their special beast-god). Juvenal's details are not to be trusted; he names the towns Ombos and Tentyra, but these places are so far apart that a fight between them would not be possible¹; and his story of cannibalism is hardly credible. Some such incident as he speaks of must however have occurred shortly before he wrote. Dio Cass. 42. 34 (about A. D. 220): 'The Egyptians make war on one another on behalf of the objects of their worship; for with regard to some of these cults, they are not agreed among themselves, but are strongly opposed to one another, as well as to other races.'

27 d. *consecrabuntur* (distribuentur MSS.) *vero . . . in monte Libyco.* This is one of the detached fragments which have been thrown together in ch. 27. There can be little doubt that it originally followed and continued the account of the *dī terreni* in ch. 37. After speaking of gods whom he holds to have been prehistoric chiefs and sages, the writer proceeds to speak of another class of gods worshipped in Egypt, viz. the present and recent rulers of the land. It is possible that some intervening words or sentences have been lost; but the gap, if there is one, is probably not large.

The verb with which the fragment began must have been mutilated; and its place was supplied by repeating (with a change of tense) *distribuantur*, the last word of the preceding fragment in ch. 27. The sense required may be obtained by writing *consecrabuntur*.

Celsus (Orig. *c. Cels.* 8. 63) similarly speaks of the cult of the rulers in conjunction with that of other 'terrestrial gods': τί τὸ δεινὸν τοὺς τῆδε ἄρχοντας εὐμενίζεσθαι, τοὺς τε ἄλλους (*sc.* the 'dae-

¹ There was an Ombos near Tentyra; but Juvenal probably had in mind the famous centre of crocodile-worship farther south.

mons' worshipped in the temples) καὶ τοὺς ἐν ἀνθρώποις δυνάστας καὶ βασιλέας, ὡς οὐδὲ τούτους ἀνευ δαιμονίας ἰσχύος τῶν τῆδε ἡξιωμένους;

conlocabuntur in civitate in summo initio Aegypti. The deified rulers of Egypt, unlike the local town-gods previously spoken of, must have been recognized as gods throughout the land; but their worship was centred in a single city; and this city the writer indicates by a description, as he indicated Arsinoe before. It is a city which, in the time of Trismegistus, had not yet been founded; it is situated at the western extremity of Egypt; and since men of all races flock to it 'by land *and sea*', it must be a maritime city, and a great commercial port. The only city which answers to this description is Alexandria; and there cannot be the slightest doubt that Alexandria is meant.

Alexandria was the seat of the worship of its founder Alexander; it was also the chief (though not the only) seat of worship, first of the Ptolemies, and afterwards of the Roman emperors. See Otto, *Priester und Tempel*, Index I, s. v. *Herrscherkult*; and Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire des Lagides*, III. 1-68.

The body of Alexander was conveyed from Babylon to Memphis in 322-321 B. C. Ptolemy II transferred it from Memphis to Alexandria, and deposited it in a magnificent tomb-temple, called the Σῆμα, which had been built there to receive it. The transference was certainly subsequent to the death of Ptolemy I in 283 B. C.; its exact date is not recorded, but Otto (I. 144-153) gives reasons for thinking that it probably took place in 274 B. C. At the time when the body was placed in the *Sema*, an official cult of Alexander was instituted there.¹

A cult of Ptolemy I was established, after his death in 283 B. C., by his son and successor, who deified him under the name of θεὸς Σωτήρ. Ptolemy I was buried beside Alexander in the *Sema* (as were all the other Ptolemies after him), and must, from the time of his death, have been honoured there by rites of worship; but the special seat of his cult was at first not Alexandria, but Ptolemais, a Greek city which he had founded in Upper Egypt, and of which he became the town-god after his death.

So far, divine honours had been rendered by the Greeks in Egypt

¹ The πολιοῦχος θεός of Alexandria was Sarapis (Julian *Ep.* 111, Bidez and Cumont, 432 d): but Alexander was worshipped there as the deified founder of the city. Cf. Julian *Ep.* 60 B and C, 378 C (to the Alexandrians): εἰ μὴ τὸν Ἀλέξανδρον τὸν οἰκιστὴν ὑμῶν καὶ πρό γε τούτου τὸν θεὸν τὸν μέγαν τὸν ἀγνῶτατον Σάραπιν αἰδεῖσθε.

to dead rulers only, and not to the living. But Ptolemy II, on the death of his sister and wife Arsinoe in 270 B. C., took a further step. He deified not only her, but himself beside her (Otto II. 273); and the dead queen and the living king, under the name *θεοὶ Ἀδελφοί* (afterwards *Φιλαδελφοί*) were associated with Alexander at the *Sema* as *σύνναοι θεοί*, and were worshipped there in conjunction with him. The successors of Ptolemy II followed his example, and went beyond it in making the living queen a deity as well as the living king. The dynastic cult was systematized in 215-210 B. C. by Ptolemy IV, who completed the series of royal couples by inserting Ptolemy I and his wife, the *θεοὶ Σωτήρες*, between Alexander and the *θεοὶ Ἀδελφοί*; and from that time onward, each succeeding royal couple in turn was added to the list of deities worshipped at the Alexandrian *Sema*. Thus in the *Rosetta Stone* (196 B. C.) the chief priest of the Alexandrian cult of the rulers bears the title *ἱερεὺς Ἀλεξάνδρου καὶ θεῶν Σωτήρων καὶ θεῶν Ἀδελφῶν καὶ θεῶν Εὐεργετῶν καὶ θεῶν Φιλοπατόρων καὶ θεοῦ Ἐπιφανοῦς Εὐχαρίστου* (the last-named being the reigning king, Ptolemy V, who was not yet married). At Ptolemais, the worship of the succeeding Ptolemies was similarly added to that of the founder and town-god, Ptolemy I.

The cults so far mentioned, though strongly influenced by the religious atmosphere of Egypt, were Greek in form; the rites were performed by Greek priests, who were unconnected with the corporation of the Egyptian priesthood; and it was chiefly the Greek subjects of the Ptolemies, massed together in Alexandria, that took part in the worship, and thereby expressed their loyalty to the reigning dynasty, probably for the most part without any serious belief in the divinity of their very human kings and queens. The attitude of the native Egyptians towards their rulers was different. From the earliest times, the kings of Egypt had been regarded as divine; they were sons of the Sun-god, and incarnations of Horus; and at least since the time of the New Kingdom, 1500 B. C. (Otto II, p. 270), the living king was worshipped as a god. When he had died and 'departed to heaven', he was of course still a god. The people in general might be less directly concerned with a deity who had ceased to dwell among them in the flesh; but a temple or mortuary chapel was usually built in connexion with his tomb; the duty of performing the customary rites there was committed to a body of priests endowed for the purpose; and the cult of a dead king sometimes lasted for many centuries. Even in Ptolemaic times,

some of the kings of the earliest dynasties still had priests assigned to them. (For details as to the worship of dead kings, see Petrie *Hist. of Egypt, passim.*) The Ptolemies succeeded to the position of the native kings, and were regarded in the same way by their Egyptian subjects. In their eyes, the ruler was necessarily an incarnate god; and the ceremony of coronation by the Egyptian priests (which is called ἀνακλητήρια, i. e. 'proclamation-ceremony', by Polybius,) did not change the man into a god, but was a formal recognition of the fact that he was a god already (ὑπάρχων θεὸς ἐκ θεοῦ καὶ θεῶς, *Rosetta Stone*), and a declaration that he was henceforth to be worshipped. The *Rosetta Stone* (Mahaffy, *Empire of the Ptolemies*, p. 316 ff.) is a decree enacted by the synod of the Egyptian priests on the occasion of the coronation of Ptolemy V at Memphis; and the operative clauses of the decree are those by which the worship of him is instituted or augmented. It is resolved (1) that in every Egyptian temple shall be set up a piece of sculpture representing 'the god Epiphanes Eucharistos' (i. e. the god-king Ptolemy V) and the chief god of the temple side by side, and that the priests shall do reverence (θεραπεύειν) to these portraits (εἰκόνας) thrice a day; (2) that in every Egyptian temple shall be placed a cult-image (ξόανον) of the god-king, enclosed in a portable shrine (ναός); that this shrine shall be set up as an object of worship (καθιδρῦσαι) in the most holy place of the temple, together with the shrines of the other gods; and that at the great festivals, when the shrines of the gods are carried in procession, that of the god-king shall be carried with the rest; (3) that at every Egyptian temple certain monthly and yearly festivals shall be celebrated in honour of the god-king, who shall on these days be worshipped with 'sacrifices and libations and all other customary rites'; and (4) that the priests of the other gods shall add to their titles the fresh title 'priest of the god Epiphanes Eucharistos'.

The ξόανον there spoken of corresponds to the 'man-made god' of *Ascl. III*; and the rites prescribed imply a belief, or at least the simulation of a belief, that one and the same divine soul is embodied in all the numerous ξόανα, as well as in the human body of the living king.

The contrast between the attitude of the Greeks in Egypt towards their rulers and that of the native Egyptians tended to diminish as time went on; and the Ptolemies deliberately sought to assimilate the different usages by which the two races expressed their reverence

for their kings. It was no doubt chiefly with this object that the practice of worshipping the living king, long established in the Egyptian cult, was adopted in the Greek cult. On the other hand the Egyptian priests, who were accustomed to worship the living king as a *σύναος θεός* in all their temples, took over from the Greek cult the practice of associating the queen with the king, and also that of including the deceased royal couples among the deities worshipped in every temple. And besides the kings and queens, some other members of the royal family were added to the number of the gods worshipped by the Egyptians. The Decree of Canopus (Mahaffy, *Empire of the Ptolemies*, p. 229 ff.) is a resolution passed by the synod of Egyptian priests in 238 B. C. A young daughter of the reigning king, Ptolemy III, has recently died (*μετῆλθεν εἰς τὸν ἀέραν κόσμον, — εἰς θεοὺς μετῆλθεν*); and the priests announce that they hereby resolve 'to pay her everlasting honours in all the temples of the land'. She is to be worshipped by the celebration of a yearly festival at every Egyptian sanctuary; a cult-image of her (*ἱερὸν ἄγαλμα, — a 'man-made deity'*), is to be placed in each of the chief temples; and in all religious processions, this image is to be carried in the arms of a priest, 'in order that it may be seen and honoured and worshipped by all men'. The little princess was not a deity in her lifetime. She has become a deity at death; but this, according to Egyptian notions, might be said of every beatified soul, whether of royal race or not. She is already a deity; but by the setting up of the cult-images in the temples, and by the rites of worship instituted, she is made a 'terrestrial' deity.

Some of the Ptolemies not only received divine honours in their own names, but identified themselves with some recognized Greek or Egyptian deity, and received worship in that capacity. Thus at Ptolemais there was a priestess of 'Cleopatra (I), the mother of Amon, the resplendent Isis' (Otto I. 159, n. 2). There is mention of a priest of *Ἴσις μεγάλη μήτηρ θεῶν*; and this goddess is probably Cleopatra III (*ib.* p. 158). Ptolemy XIII was officially styled *νέος Διώνυσος*. The belief, real or feigned, which underlies this practice is that the deity in question is incarnated in the living man or woman. Similarly Horace (*Od.* I. 2. 41) hints that Augustus is perhaps an incarnation of the god Hermes.

After the annexation of Egypt by Augustus, Alexander was still worshipped with Greek rites at the *Sema* as before; and under Roman rule, the festival of the deified founder of the city long continued to

be celebrated in Alexandria. Julius Valerius 3. 35 (about A. D. 300): 'obitus eius (*sc.* Alexandri) diem etiam nunc Alexandriae sacratissimam habent.' This cult of Alexander was probably maintained until the abolition of Paganism (Otto I, p. 154). But the cult of the Ptolemies, both in its Greek form at Alexandria, and in its Egyptian form in all the temples of the national religion, was abandoned on the downfall of the dynasty; and in its place was instituted the cult of the Roman rulers.

On the deification of the *principes* at Rome and in the provinces, see Marquardt, *Staatsverwaltung* III. 463 ff., and Boissier, *Religion romaine* I. 109-186. In instituting the worship of deceased rulers, the Roman government gave official expression to beliefs and sentiments which had spread to Italy from the Greek kingdoms of the East, and above all from Egypt; though some foundation for the practice might also be found in native Italian usages, such as the family worship of the *Di Manes* and the *Lares*. At Rome, an official cult of the *living* ruler was never instituted; and of the earlier *principes*, only a few (e. g. Caligula and Domitian) demanded divine honours from their subjects. Aurelian (A. D. 270-275) was the first Roman emperor who styled himself *deus* on his coins (Schiller, *Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit* I. 867). Towards the end of the fourth century, Vegetius (2. 5) writes 'Imperatori, cum Augusti nomen accepit, tamquam praesenti et corporali deo fidelis est praestanda devotio'.

The first man who was worshipped after death by order of the Roman government was Julius Caesar, who had already been recognized as a god 'persuasione vulgi' (Suet. *Iulius* 88), when in 42 B. C. the Senate established a cult of *Divus Iulius*. The precedent was followed in the case of Augustus¹ and others; and thus came into existence a new class of Roman state-gods, the *Divi* and *Divae*. In A. D. 224, twenty of these deities were officially recognized; in the time of Constantine, the number had risen to about thirty-seven.

¹ The word 'deification' is apt to suggest a wrong notion. The process is correctly described in Tac. *Ann.* 1. 10: '(Augusto) templum et caelestes religiones decernuntur'; and in a calendar quoted by Marquardt (III. 467): 'eo die Augusto honores caelestes a senatu decreti.' The senators did not claim power to change a dead man into a god; but they professed belief that he had become a god, and instituted a priesthood, a temple, and an annual festival for his worship. It is true that Manilius (4. 927) says, with reference to *Divus Iulius* and the anticipated apotheosis of Augustus, 'iam facit ipse (homo) deos, mittitque ad sidera numen'; and Tacitus (*Ann.* 1. 73. 3) quotes Tiberius as writing 'decretum patri suo caelum'; but such phrases are not to be taken literally.

But in the East, the cult of the living ruler, which was indigenous in Egypt and in some parts of Asia, had, since the time of Alexander, been adopted by the Greeks, and was almost universally accepted among them¹ long before the Roman annexation of Egypt. Even under the Republic, Roman proconsuls had frequently received divine honours in these regions; Marcus Antonius was only accepting a part which was thrust upon him when he appeared in public in the character of a present god in Alexandria, Ephesus, and Athens; and when Augustus had established peace and prosperity, temples and priesthoods for his worship sprang into existence in all the eastern provinces. In this movement the Greeks in Egypt took part together with the rest of the Greek-speaking East. In the reign of Augustus, a *Kaisareion* was built in Alexandria; and it is to be presumed that it was first used for the worship of the *Divus Iulius* and the living Augustus;² that the successors of Augustus also were worshipped there during their lives; and that those of them at least who were added to the official list of the Roman *Divi* continued to be worshipped there after death.³ Later on, a *Hadrianeion* was built in Alexandria, and must have served as an additional temple for the worship of the rulers in that city. Some members of the imperial family were, like some of the Ptolemies before, identified with particular deities; e. g. Plotina, the wife of Trajan, was honoured as Ἀφροδίτη θεὰ νεωτέρα (Otto I. 159, n. 2).

The example of the Alexandrian Greeks was followed by the Greeks settled in other parts of Egypt; we hear of *Kaisareia* or *Sebasteia* at Arsinoe, Oxyrhynchus, Hermopolis, and Elephantine, a *Hadrianeion* at Memphis, and perhaps a *Hadrianeion* at Arsinoe (Otto I. 11). At the same time, the native Egyptian priests transferred to the Roman rulers the divine honours which they had previously rendered to the Ptolemies; and it appears that both the living *princeps* and the *Divi* were associated as σύνναοι θεοί with the local gods in the temples under the

¹ Plutarch (*Is. et Os.* 24) speaks with strong disapproval of the cult of living rulers: εἰ δὲ τινες ἐξαρθέντες ὑπὸ μεγαλαυχίας, . . . ἅμα νεότητι καὶ ἀγνοίᾳ φλεγόμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν, μεθ' ὕβρεως ἐδέξαντο θεῶν ἐπωνυμίας καὶ ναῶν ἰδρύσεις, βραχὺν ἤνηθησεν ἡ δόξα χρόνον. But among the Pagan Greeks of that period, such a decided condemnation of the practice is exceptional.

² There is direct evidence of a Greek cult of the living Augustus in the *Sebasteion* at Philae in 13-12 B.C.; and the cult of Augustus had probably been established earlier in Alexandria (Otto II, p. 279).

Philo, *Leg. ad Gaium* 22. 151, VI, p. 183 Cohn, describes the *Sebasteion* at Alexandria as a magnificent building. Was this *Sebasteion* identical with the *Kaisareion*, or was it a distinct and separate temple?

³ There are mentions of ἀρχιερεῖς Σεβαστῶν in Alexandria, and also in some other Egyptian towns. Otto I. 61, 136, II. 190.

control of the Egyptian priesthood throughout the land.¹ But the local rites, whether Greek or Egyptian, with which the emperors were worshipped in the other towns of Egypt must have been of small importance compared with the central Greek cult of the Roman rulers in Alexandria; and it is of the latter alone that the Hermetist speaks. In A. D. 270, the approximate date of *Ascl.* III, the dead 'rulers of the land' who were officially worshipped in Alexandria must have been Alexander and some thirty Roman *Divi*. During the Palmyrene occupation of Egypt, the living emperor Claudius, in whose name Vaballathus ruled the country, may also have been worshipped there; but in those troubled times the cult of the living ruler may perhaps have been suspended.

Modo tamen hoc in tempore ubi isti sunt? *Isti* must mean *qui terrae dominantur*, i. e. the rulers, dead or living, whom the writer supposes to have been worshipped as gods in the time of Trismegistus; and *ubi isti sunt* must mean 'what city in Egypt is the seat of their cult?' Perhaps *conlocati* (καθιδρυμένοι) may have dropped out before *sunt*.

As Trismegistus lived in the time of 'King Ammon', it would seem that the rulers here spoken of must be Amon and other gods of the same class, whom the writer assumes to have been ancient kings of Egypt. It is strange that Asclepius should need to be told where the deified kings of his own time are worshipped; but perhaps the writer has inserted this question merely because he wishes to give his own answer to it.

in maxima civitate in monte Libyco. What city is this? Apparently, Arsinoe again; for that is the only important town in Egypt which is 'in the Libyan mountain'. But if *isti* are national gods such as Amon and Osiris, how can it be said that their cult is established in one particular city or nome alone?² We should rather have expected to be told either that they are collectively worshipped in all parts of Egypt, or that the chief seat of the cult of each of them is in a different city.

¹ Otto I, II. There is evidence of worship of the living ruler in Egyptian temples, in the case of Augustus, Tiberius, Claudius, Nero, and Trajan. An Egyptian priest at Heliopolis in A. D. 210-211 bears the title ἀρχιεροφύτης τῶν κυρίων Αυτοκρατόρων Σεβαστῶν (*ib.* II, 278, n. 6). The birthdays of the Roman emperors were celebrated as festivals (and this implies that the emperors were worshipped) at the temple of Socnopaeus in the Fayum (*ib.* II, 9, n. 3). These birth-festivals were called *ἡμέραι σεβασταί* (*ib.* 10, n. 1). Similar festivals were celebrated in the temple of Jupiter Capitolinus at Arsinoe; and the cult in this temple appears to have been Egyptian, and not Greek (*ib.* I, 10).

² See vol. IV, Addenda.

Perhaps we might account for this answer to Asclepius' question by assuming that the writer is an inhabitant of the Arsinoite nome (which is also suggested by the fact that he localizes the cult of Imhotep-Asclepius there), and that he believes some famous sanctuary in his own neighbourhood to have been the chief seat of the cult of the rulers in ancient times, just as Alexandria is the chief seat of that cult in his own day. It is possible that the sanctuary of which he is thinking is the Labyrinth, which was situated at the entrance to the Fayum, about twelve miles from Arsinoe. The Labyrinth was still one of the famous sights of Egypt in the second century A. D.; Aelius Aristides, 36. 1, speaks of it as such, and mentions it next to the pyramids. Herodotus (2. 148) was told that it had been built by the twelve kings who reigned over Egypt in the time of Sennacherib, and was intended as a memorial of the twelve together (*καὶ δὴ σφι μνημόσυνα ἔδοξε ληπέσθαι κοινῇ*). Herodotus is mistaken about the date, but his story indicates the existence of a tradition that the Labyrinth was a national memorial of ancient kings, and therefore a place where ancient kings were likely to have been worshipped. Strabo, 17. 37, p. 811, says that the number of courts in the Labyrinth was the same as the ancient number of the Egyptian nomes; Pliny, *Nat. Hist.* 36. 13, also says that its divisions corresponded in number with the nomes, and adds that it contained 'temples of all the gods of Egypt'. It is therefore not unlikely that in the third century A. D. the people of the district believed the Labyrinth to have been in ancient times the centre of the national life, and the common meeting-place of all Egyptians for political and religious purposes, among which the cult of the rulers would be included. Some of the kings of the XIIth dynasty had been buried in the neighbourhood of the Labyrinth, and must have been worshipped in that district after their deaths; and a tradition of this cult may possibly have survived down to the time when *Ascl.* III was written.

38 a. Et horum . . . (evocatio) cuiusmodi est [qualitas]? The meaning of this question is determined by the answer which follows; Asclepius must have asked by what means beatified souls are induced to enter the bodies prepared for them in the Egyptian temples, viz. the cult-images. As the verb *evocare* was used above to describe this process, I have inserted *evocatio*. Perhaps *qualitas* may have arisen out of *qualis est*, an alternative for *cuiusmodi est*.

Constat . . . de herbis, de lapidibus, et de aromatibus divinitatis naturam in se habentibus. In Egyptian rites of

public worship, as well as in the private practice of magicians, much use was made of sacred plants and stones, and the burning of incense and other fragrant substances. Compare the doctrine of the Egyptian priest in *Adamtonis Resp.* 5. 23: οὐδὲ τὴν ὕλην οὖν ἀφίστησιν οὐδὲν τῆς τῶν βελτιόνων μετουσίας* ὥστε ὅση τέλεια καὶ καθαρὰ καὶ ἀγαθοειδῆς ὑπάρχει, πρὸς θεῶν ὑποδοχὴν ἐστὶν οὐκ ἀνάρμοστος, . . . ταῦτα οὖν κατιδοῦσα ἢ θεουργικὴ τέχνη, κοινῶς τε οὕτωςι (καὶ) κατ' οἰκειότητα ἐκάστῳ τῶν θεῶν τὰς προσφόρους ὑποδοχὰς ἀνευρίσκουσα, συμπλέκει πολλάκις λίθους βοτάνας ζῶα ἀρώματα ἄλλα τε τοιαῦτα ἱερὰ καὶ τέλεια καὶ θεοειδῆ, κᾶπειτα ἀπὸ πάντων τούτων ὑποδοχὴν ὀλοτελῆ καὶ καθαρὰν ἀπεργάζεται. 'There is nothing to hinder matter from participation in the divine; so that all matter which is perfect, pure, and good is not unsuited to serve as a receptacle of gods. In view of this, the theurgic art discovers the receptacles which are appropriate to the gods in general and to each god in particular, and often combines together stones, plants, animals, and spices, and other material things that are holy, perfect, and godlike, and out of all these, constructs a complete and pure receptacle (into which a god may enter).' Origen, *c. Cels.* 8. 61, describes the Pagan worshipper as τὸν περιεργαζόμενον δαιμόνων ὀνόματα καὶ δυνάμεις καὶ πράξεις καὶ ἐπώδασ, καὶ βοτάνας οἰκίας δαίμοσι, καὶ λίθους καὶ τὰς ἐν αὐτοῖς γλυφάς, καταλλήλους ταῖς παραδεδομέναις εἶτε Ἰσ. et Os. 52 and 80, speaks of certain fragrant substances (*ρήτινη, σμύρνα, and κῦφι*), the burning of which forms part of the daily Egyptian worship of the Sun-god.

In the process of 'god-making', no doubt certain sacred herbs and stones were attached to the image or placed near it, and certain fragrant substances burnt before it, in order to attract the divine soul which was to be embodied.¹ The *evocatio* must have included other rites as well, which are not here mentioned; there must at any rate have been a verbal invocation of the divine being.

Having spoken of the rites by which the beatified soul is induced to enter the image, the writer goes on to speak of the rites by which it is induced to remain there, and to dwell permanently in the temple. These are the ordinary rites of Egyptian temple-worship; they consist chiefly, he says, of sacrifices and hymns. If these rites are discontinued, the divine souls embodied in the images will quit them, and

¹ See vol. IV, Addenda.

depart from earth to heaven ; and thus, when the Christians abolish the temple-cults, 'e terris est ad caelum recursura divinitas', and '(Aegyptus) numinum praesentia destituetur' (ch. 24 b): there will no longer be 'terrestrial gods'.

The Hermetist's view of the effect produced by the temple-rites was shared by many of the Christians of the time, with the difference that they believed the beings attracted and gratified by the rites to be devils. Origen (*c. Cels.* 8. 60) quotes Celsus as saying *χρῆ γὰρ ἴσως οὐκ ἀπιστεῖν ἀνδράσι σοφοῖς, οἳ δὴ φασι διότι τῶν μὲν περιγεῖων δαιμόνων τὸ πλεῖστον, γενέσει συντετηκός, καὶ προσηλωμένον αἵματι καὶ κνίσσῃ καὶ μελωδίαις, καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ τοιοῦτοις προσδεδεμένον, κρεῖττον οὐδὲν δύναται ἂν τοῦ θεραπεύσαι σῶμα καὶ μέλλουσαν τύχην ἀνθρώπων καὶ πόλει προειπεῖν κ.τ.λ.*¹ Commenting on this, Origen (*ib.* 63) says *Κέλσος εἶπε μὲν ἐν τῷ περὶ κνίσσης καὶ αἵματος, ὧν χρῆζουσι δαίμονες, τάληθῆ. Ib.* 7. 64, Origen implies his agreement with the view that daemons τοιοῖσδε παρακαθέζονται σχήμασι καὶ χωρίοις (*sc.* altars, temples, and images), ἥτοι ὑπὸ τινων μαγγανειῶν κατακληθέντες (e.g. by the use of *herbae, lapides, and aromata*), ἣ καὶ ἄλλως δυνηθέντες προκαταλαβεῖν ἐαυτοῖς τύπους, ἐν οἷς τῆς τῶν θυομένων ἀποφορᾶς λίχνος μεταλαμβάνοντες παράνομον ἡδονὴν καὶ παρανόμως θηράσονται. Firmicus Maternus *De err. prof. rel.* 13. 4 (A. D. 350): 'Sed et in ipso simulacro (of Sarapis), sicut in ceteris, ex assiduis sacrificiis immundi daemonum spiritus colliguntur. Nihil enim operantur victimae et cruor ex assidua pecudum caede profusus, nisi ut daemonum substantia, qui diaboli procreatione generantur, ex isto sanguine nutriatur.'

Porphyry, *De abst.* 2. 38 ff., distinguishes between beneficent and maleficent daemons, and agrees with the Christians in holding that it is the maleficent daemons alone that take pleasure in animal sacrifices ; οὗτοι οἱ χαίροντες "λοιβῆ τε κνίσση τε", δι' ὧν αὐτῶν τὸ πνευματικὸν² καὶ σωματικὸν πιαίνεται. ζῆ γὰρ τοῦτο ἀτμοῖς καὶ ἀναθυμιάσει ποικίλως διὰ τῶν ποικίλων, καὶ δυναμοῦται ταῖς ἐκ τῶν αἱμάτων καὶ σαρκῶν κνίσσαις. διὸ συνετὸς ἀγὴρ καὶ σώφρων εὐλαβηθήσεται τοιαύτης χρῆσθαι θυσίαις, δι' ὧν ἐπισπάσεται πρὸς ἑαυτὸν τοιοῦτους.

in modum caelestis harmoniae. This may be a reference to the Pythagorean 'music of the spheres'. But in the old Egyptian documents, there is frequent mention of gods adoring a higher god ; and this notion also may be in the writer's mind. Cf. the hymn

¹ Celsus however added (*ib.* 8. 63) *μᾶλλον οἰητέον τοὺς δαίμονας μηδενὸς χρῆζειν, μηδὲ δεῖσθαι τινος, ἀλλὰ χαίρειν τοῖς τὸ εὐσεβὲς ἠρώσι πρὸς αὐτούς.*

² πνευματικός here means 'gaseous'

sung by the *δυνάμεις* in *Corp.* I and XIII. *Ascl.* I. 9: God sent the Muses down to earth, 'ut . . . caelestibus laudibus nec in terris harmoniae suavitas defuisset'.

39-40 a: concerning *Heimarmene*. The functions of the *di caelestes* and the *di terreni*, as described in ch. 38 b, together include the whole administration of the universe; no separate function therefore is left for *Heimarmene*. But the term *εἰμαρμένη* was too prominent in the philosophy of the time to be ignored; the writer therefore felt himself obliged to find a place for this power, and did so by identifying it with the agency of the *di caelestes* collectively, or with a certain part of that agency. Similarly, in ch. 19 b we were told that *Heimarmene* presides over the movements of the seven planetary spheres, and thereby puts in operation 'the unchanging law of change' in the sublunar world. But in ch. 19 b, *Heimarmene* was described as one of the *οὐσιάρχαι*, i. e. as a personal deity, of the same order as Zeus Hypatos; in ch. 39, the personality disappears, and the word *εἰμαρμένη* is used as an abstract term, on a par with *ἀνάγκη* and *τάξις*. It seems that in his two accounts of *Heimarmene* (19 b and 39) the writer was following two different authorities, and took no pains to harmonize them.

ἡ *εἰμαρμένη* (*sc. μοῖρα*) as a substantive occurs several times in Plato (e. g. *Gorg.* 512 E, where τὴν *εἰμαρμένην* οὐδ' ἂν εἰς ἐκφύγοι is quoted as a proverbial saying), and once in Aristotle *Poet.* 1455 a 11.¹ But the Stoics were the first to bring the word into current use as a substantive with a definite cosmologic meaning; and it is manifest that the account of *εἰμαρμένη* in *Ascl.* III. 39 f. is derived from Stoic sources. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, defined *εἰμαρμένη* as *δύναμις κινητικὴ τῆς ὕλης κατὰ ταῦτα καὶ ὡσαύτως*, and said that it might equally well be called *πρόνοια* and *φύσις* (Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 322). Chrysippus wrote a book *Περὶ εἰμαρμένης*, and spoke much of *εἰμαρμένη* throughout his writings. (See Diels *ib.*, and Arnim, *Stoic. vet. fragm.* II, pp. 264-298.) He said that *εἰμαρμένη* is *ὁ τοῦ κόσμου λόγος* (the design or plan of the universe); that it is *λόγος τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ προνοία διοικουμένων*; and that it is *λόγος καθ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται*. Elsewhere, in place of *λόγος*, he spoke of *ἡ ἀλήθεια* (meaning,

¹ The word *εἰμαρμένη* is used by Theophrastus, *Phys. opin.* 1, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 476, where Theophr. is reporting an opinion of Heraclitus; and it is said to have been used by Heraclitus himself (Aetius, Diels *Dox.* p. 322). Another instance in Theophrastus is reported by Alex. Aphrod. *De anima, fin.* (Zeller *Arist. Eng. tr.* II, p. 371) and Aetius, Diels *Dox.* p. 325.

perhaps, the predetermined truth concerning future events), ἡ αἰτία, ἡ φύσις, and ἡ ἀνάγκη as equivalent to εἰμαρμένη. He said that ἡ οὐσία τῆς εἰμαρμένης is δύναμις πνευματική (i. e. a power inherent in the material πνεῦμα which pervades the Kosmos), τάξει τοῦ παντός διοικητική also (Theodoret, supplemented by Stobaeus, Diels *ib.*) μηδὲν διαφέρειν τοῦ εἰμαρμένου τὸ κατηναγκασμένον, εἶναι δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην κίνησιν αἰδίου συνεχῆ καὶ τεταγμένην, || κατ' ἐπιπλοκὴν μερῶν συνηρτισμένην. Aul. Gell. 7 (6). 2. 3: εἰμαρμένην esse dicit (Chrysippus) φυσικὴν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὄλων, ἐξ αἰδίου τῶν ἐτέρων τοῖς ἐτέροις ἐπακολουθούτων, . . . ἀπαραβάτου οὔσης τῆς τοιαύτης ἐπιπλοκῆς. Plut. *Stoic. repugn.* 47. 4: Chrysippus said μηδὲν ἴσχεσθαι μηδὲ κινεῖσθαι μηδὲ τοῦλάχιστον ἄλλως ἢ κατὰ τὸν τοῦ Διὸς λόγον (design), ὃν τῇ εἰμαρμένη τὸν αὐτὸν εἶναι. *ib.* 47. 5: τὴν εἰμαρμένην αἰτίαν ἀνίκητον καὶ ἀκόλυτον καὶ ἄτρεπτον ἀποφαίνων.

In his cosmology, Chrysippus postulated an unalterable destiny (that is, an all-including system of invariable 'laws of nature', or sequences of cause and effect, such as is assumed by modern science); but in his ethics, he asserted the free will and responsibility of man; and he was much occupied with the problem of reconciling the one with the other. Cf. the fragment of Cic. *De fato* quoted by Aul. Gell. 7 (6). 2. 15: 'Chrysippus, aestuans laboransque quonam (pacto) explicet et fato omnia fieri et esse aliquid in nobis, intricatur hoc modo.' His somewhat obscure teaching on this subject was vigorously attacked by Carneades; and the substance of Carneades' criticism (or rather, of the report of it transmitted by Carneades' pupil Clitomachus, 129-111 B.C.) is preserved in Cic. *De fato*, and Plut. *Sto. repugn.* 47. (Schmekel, *Phil. der mittl. Stoa*, pp. 155-184.)

The later Stoics closely followed Chrysippus in their doctrine of destiny. Posidonius wrote a book on εἰμαρμένη. Cic. *De divinatione* 1. 55. 125 (based on Posidonius): 'fieri igitur omnia fato ratio cogit fateri. Fatum autem id appello, quod Graeci εἰμαρμένην, id est ordinem seriemque causarum, cum causa causae nexa rem ex se gignat. Ea est ex omni aeternitate fluens veritas sempiterna. . . . Ex quo intelligitur ut fatum sit . . . causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint, et quae instant fiant, et quae sequentur futura sint.' Seneca, who drew largely from Posidonius, speaks of *fatum* to the same effect, and insists strongly and repeatedly on the immutability of destiny, but also recognizes free will in man; *Nat. quaest.* 2. 38. 3, 'cum de ista re agetur, dicam quemadmodum manente fato aliquid sit in hominis arbitrio.'

The teaching of the Stoics in general on εἰμαρμένη is thus summarized:—Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 322: τὴν μὲν ἀνάγκην ἀνίκητόν φασιν αἰτίαν καὶ βιαστικὴν, τὴν δὲ εἰμαρμένην συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην' ἐν ἣ συμπλοκῇ καὶ τὸ παρ' ἡμᾶς, ὥστε τὰ μὲν 'εἰμάρθαι' τὰ δὲ 'ἀνειμάρθαι' ('*scribendum* εἰμαρτὰ . . . ἀνειμαρτά' Diels). *Ib.* p. 324: (τὴν εἰμαρμένην εἶναι) εἰρμὸν αἰτιῶν, τοῦτέστι τάξιν καὶ ἐπισυνδέσειν ἀπαράβατον. Diog. Laert. 7. 149: ἔστι δὲ εἰμαρμένη αἰτία τῶν ὄντων εἰρομένη, ἣ λόγος καθ' ὃν ὁ κόσμος διεξάγεται.

39. [*ante*] [[*caelestes dii . . . singula*]]. The sentence 'caelestes . . . singula' is obviously out of place between the question about εἰμαρμένη and the answer to that question. When transposed, it serves as a suitable conclusion to ch. 38 b. But the meaningless word *ante* remains to be accounted for. Is it possible that it is a corrector's note, intended to indicate that the sentence to which it is prefixed ought to be placed 'before' Asclepius' question?

semper sibi catenatis (<<*necessita*(ti)s>>) *nexibus vincta*(e). εἰμαρμένη can hardly be said to be 'bound to itself'; it is the events produced by εἰμαρμένη that are bound together in the chain of causation; .e. each necessarily results from another which precedes it. We must therefore read *vinctae* in place of *vincta*. For the notion of a chain of causes, cf. (in addition to the passages quoted above) Cic. *De fato* (discussion of the doctrine of Chrysippus) 20, 'causarum series sempiterna': 27, 'ex aeternitate causa causam serens': 31, 'omnia naturali conligatione conserte contextequae fiunt'. Seneca, *Dial.* 12. 8. 3: 'inmutabilis causarum inter se cohaerentium series.'

ἢ αὐτὸς ὁ θεός, ἢ ἡ μετ' ἐκείνων τεταγμένη (<<*ἐνέργεια*>>).—*aut deus summus, aut ab ipso deo qui secundus effectus est*. Destiny may be either identified with God, or described as that ἐνέργεια (of God) which ranks next to God himself, i. e. as the highest of God's ἐνέργεια. For the identification of destiny with God, cf. Chrysippus, in Philodemus, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 545: καὶ πρόνοιαν (?) ὀνομάζεσθαι τὸν Δία, καὶ τὴν κοινὴν πάντων φύσιν, καὶ εἰμαρμένην, καὶ ἀνάγκην. Sen. *De benef.* 4. 7. 2: 'hunc eundem (*sc. deum or Iovem*) et fatum si dixeris, non mentieris. Nam cum fatum nihil aliud sit quam series inplexa causarum, ille est prima omnium causa, ex qua ceterae pendent.' *Ib.* 4. 8. 3: naturam voca, fatum, fortunam; omnia eiusdem dei nomina sunt varie utentis sua potestate.' *Nat. quaest.* 2. 45: 'vis illum (*sc. Iovem*) fatum vocare: non errabis: hic est, ex quo suspensa sunt omnia, causa causarum.' 'The Stoics' in Arius

Didymus, Diels *Dox.* p. 465: καθ' ὅσον δὲ εἰρομένῳ λόγῳ πάντα διοικεῖ ἀπαραβάτως ἐξ αἰδίου, προσονομάζεσθαι εἰμαρμένην (*sc.* τὸν θεόν). 'The Stoics' in Diog. Laert. 7. 135: ἐν εἶναι θεὸν καὶ νοῦν καὶ εἰμαρμένην καὶ Δία.

Posidonius is reported by Aetius, Diels *Dox.* p. 324, as saying (τὴν εἰμαρμένην εἶναι) τρίτην ἀπὸ Διός· πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ εἶναι τὸν Δία, δεύτερον δὲ τὴν φύσιν, τρίτον δὲ τὴν εἰμαρμένην. The Hermetist, in *Ascl.* III. 19 b, agrees with this statement of Posidonius in making εἰμαρμένη 'third from Zeus'; but in ch. 39, he assigns to it either the first place or the second. It is possible that Posidonius in one passage distinguished εἰμαρμένη from Zeus and φύσις, and placed it below them, but in other passages identified it (as Seneca does) with either or both of them.

The words καὶ ἡ εἰμαρτή, which follow ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη ἐστὶ in Lydus, cannot be right. The rare adjective εἰμαρτός occurs in Plut. *Vit. Alex.* 30 *fin.* (εἰμαρτὸς χρόνος); but it serves no purpose here. A clause inserted by a later hand must have been corrupted into this meaningless phrase. The original form of the interpolation may perhaps be inferred from Cornutus (first century A. D.) *Theologiae Graecae compendium* (C. Lang) 13: εἰμαρμένη δὲ ἐστὶ καθ' ἣν μέμαρπται καὶ συνείληπται πάντα ἐν τάξει καὶ στοίχῳ μὴ ἔχοντι πέρασ τὰ γινόμενα. It seems probable that some one inserted this Stoic explanation of the word εἰμαρμένη in Lydus' text of the Τέλειος λόγος, and that καθ' ἣν μέμαρπται (πάντα) was subsequently altered into καὶ ἡ εἰμαρτή.

καὶ πάντων οὐρανίων τε καὶ ἐπιγείων μετὰ τῆς ἀνάγκης (κατὰ θεῖον νόμον) τάξις.—*et omnium caelestium terrenarumque rerum firmata divinis legibus disciplina.* The translator's reading of the Greek seems to have differed from that of Lydus. τάξις (which is rendered by *ordo* below) is satisfactory in sense. *Disciplina*, which stands in place of τάξις here, is used by the translator elsewhere as a rendering of ἐπιστήμη; but the Hermetist cannot have called εἰμαρμένη an ἐπιστήμη. It is possible that the original word was σύνταξις, and that the translator took this to mean a system of science.

There is nothing in Lydus' Greek to correspond to *divinis legibus*. But a mention of God's ordinance is needed; for the writer's object in this passage is to explain that εἰμαρμένη is not an independent power, but is either identical with or immediately dependent on the will of God. (Cf. ch. 40 a *init.*) I have therefore inserted κατὰ θεῖον

νόμον. The superfluous words καὶ νόμος which occur below in Lydus may have arisen out of a transposition of κατὰ θεῖον νόμον.

For the statement that εἰμαρμένη is a τάξις, cf. Chrysippus (quoted above): δύναμις . . . τάξει τοῦ παντὸς διοικητικῆ:—κίνησιν αἰδίων συνεχῆ καὶ τεταγμένην:—φυσικὴν τινα σύνταξιν τῶν ὄλων. 'The Stoics', συμπλοκὴν αἰτιῶν τεταγμένην:—τάξιν καὶ ἐπισυνδέσειν ἀπαράβατον. Iamblichus, Stob. 1. 5. 17, vol. i, p. 81 W.: μίαν οὖν τάξιν, πάσας τάξεις ὁμοῦ περιλαβοῦσαν ἐν αὐτῇ, τὴν εἰμαρμένην ἀφοριστέον.

Haec itaque εἰμαρμένη et necessitas . . . conexae sunt glutino. This clause is omitted in Lydus; but it must have been present in the original, because an explicit mention of εἰμαρμένη and ἀνάγκη together is needed to make the following ἢ μὲν . . . ἢ δέ intelligible.

ἢ μὲν αὐτὰς κύει τὰς ἀρχὰς τῶν πραγμάτων, ἢ δὲ καταναγκάζει καὶ τὰ τέλη γινέσθαι.—**quarum prior εἰμαρμένη rerum omnium initia parit, necessitas vero cogit ad effectum quae ex illius primordiis pendent.** What is the meaning of ἀρχαί and τέλη here? It might be supposed that ἀρχαί means 'causes', and τέλη (= ἀποτελέσματα) means 'effects'. But how are 'the causes' and 'the effects' to be distinguished? If we regard the succession of events as an unbroken chain of cause and effect ('rerum omnium quae geruntur semper sibi catenatis necessitatis nexibus vinctae'), every event is at once an effect of other events which have preceded, and a cause of other events which will follow; and the only ἀρχή which is not also a τέλος is the original creation of the Kosmos. It seems therefore that the writer must here be thinking, not of the cosmic process as a whole, but rather of the lives of individual men. The course of a man's life is predetermined once for all, at the moment of birth, by εἰμαρμένη, or in other words, by the operation of the heavenly bodies (in ch. 19 b, εἰμαρμένη presides over the planets). As it is expressed below, '(εἰμαρμένη) iacto velut semine futurorum omnium (in the individual man's life) sufficit prolem'. This predetermination is the ἀρχή. The τέλη are the events of the man's life, which result from the ἀρχή by necessity (ἀνάγκη), and succeed one another (τάξις) in a continuous chain of causation. Cf. Sen. *Dial.* 1. 5. 7: 'quantum cuique temporis restat, prima nascentium hora disposuit. Causa pendet ex causa.' Iamblichus, Stob. 1. 5. 18, vol. i, p. 81 W.: ἀρχαί τε αἰ τῆς φύσεως καὶ τέλη [καὶ ποιήσεις?], καὶ αἰ τούτων συνδέσεις πρὸς ἄλληλα, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τε ἄχρι τοῦ τέλους διέξοδοι, συμπληροῦσι τὴν εἰμαρμένην. (In Iamblichus, τέλη seems rather to mean the conclusion of the process, i. e. the death of the individual.

The συνδέσεις of the τέλη to the ἀρχαί correspond to the Hermetist's ἀνάγκη, and the διέξοδοι to the Hermetist's τάξις.)

ταύταις δὲ ἀκολουθεῖ τάξις [καὶ νόμος].—Has ordo consequitur. Above, we were told that εἰμαρμένη is πάντων . . . τάξις; yet here, τάξις is distinguished from it as a separate entity. The two statements are probably derived from two different sources.

In this passage, the writer distinguishes three constituent parts of destiny, which he names respectively εἰμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, and τάξις, restricting to the first member of the triad the term εἰμαρμένη, which was more commonly used (as in Iamblichus above) to include all three together.

The origin of this triad is probably to be found in the old notion of the three Μοῖραι, who are mentioned and named in Hesiod, *Theog.* 905 f.: Κλωθῶ τε Λάχεσιν τε καὶ Ἄτροπον, αἶτε διδοῦσι | θνητοῖς ἀνθρώποισιν ἔχειν ἀγαθὸν τε κακὸν τε. Plato, *Rep.* 10. 617, assigns a separate function to each of the three: τρεῖς . . . θυγατέρας τῆς Ἀνάγκης, Μοίρας, . . . ὑμῖν, . . . Λάχεσιν μὲν τὰ γεγονότα, Κλωθῶ δὲ τὰ ὄντα, Ἄτροπον δὲ τὰ μέλλοντα. The disembodied souls are brought first to Lachesis, under whose superintendence each of them chooses the life into which it is to be born at its next embodiment; when the souls have made their choice, they are led to Clotho, and 'brought within the revolution of the spindle impelled by her hand, whereby the destiny (μοῖρα) which each has chosen is ratified'; they are then brought 'to the spinning of Atropos, whereby the thread of destiny (τὰ ἐπικλωσθέντα) is made irreversible'. This passage of Plato was frequently quoted, and commented on in later discussions of fate and free will; see e. g. Porphyry *περὶ τοῦ ἐφ' ἡμῖν*, in Stob. 2. 8. 39, vol. ii, p. 163 sqq. W.

The Stoics followed Plato's example in speaking of the three Fates. Chrysippus, in Aetius, Diels *Dox.* p. 323: Μοίρας δὲ καλεῖσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ κατ' αὐτὰς διαμερισμοῦ Κλωθῶ καὶ Λάχεσιν καὶ Ἄτροπον. Λάχεσιν μὲν, ὅτι ὄν κλήρον λελόγγασιν ἕκαστοι κατὰ τὸ δίκαιον ἀπονέμεται. Ἄτροπον δέ, ὅτι ἀμετάθετος καὶ ἀμετάβλητός ἐστιν ὁ κατ' ἕκαστα διορισμὸς ἐξ αἰδίων χρόνων. Κλωθῶ δέ, ὅτι ἢ κατὰ τὴν εἰμαρμένην διανέμησις καὶ τὰ γεννώμενα τοῖς κλυθομένοις παραπλησίως διεξάγεται. The Stoic Cornutus, *Theologiae Graecae compendium* 13 (after speaking of Εἰμαρμένη and Ἀνάγκη): κατ' ἄλλον δὲ τρόπον τρεῖς Μοῖραι παρεισάγονται κατὰ τὸ τρισσὸν τῶν χρόνων. καὶ Κλωθῶ μὲν ὀνόμασται μία αὐτῶν ἀπὸ τοῦ κλώσει ἐρίων εοικέναι τὰ γινόμενα, ἄλλων ἄλλοις ἐπιπιπτόντων, . . . Λάχεσις δ' ἄλλη ἀπὸ τοῦ τῇ κατὰ τοὺς κλήρους λήξει τὰ ἀποδιδόμενα

ἐκάστῳ προσοικέται, Ἄτροπος δὲ ἡ τρίτη διὰ τὸ ἀτρέπτως ἔχει τὰ κατ' αὐτὴν διατεταγμένα. ἡ δ' αὐτὴ δύναμις οἰκείως ἂν δόξαι τῶν τριῶν προσηγοριῶν τυγχάνειν. A tripartition of destiny, corresponding to Plato's distribution of functions among the three Moirai, is implied in Chrysippus' statement that εἰμαρμένη is λόγος κατ' ὃν τὰ μὲν γεγονότα γέγονε, τὰ δὲ γινόμενα γίνεται, τὰ δὲ γενησόμενα γενήσεται, and in Cic. *De div.* 1. 55. 126 (from Posidonius), 'causa aeterna rerum, cur et ea quae praeterierunt facta sint, et quae instant fiant, et quae sequentur futura sint'. Cf. Ps.-Aristot. *De mundo* 7. 5, 401 b 14: τὰ τε περὶ τὰς μοίρας καὶ τὸν ἄτρακτον (Pl. *Rep.* 10) εἰς τοῦτό πως νέει. τρεῖς μὲν γὰρ αἱ μοῖραι κατὰ τοὺς χρόνους μεμερισμέναί, νῆμα δὲ ἀτράκτου τὸ μὲν ἐξειργασμένον, τὸ δὲ μέλλον, τὸ δὲ περιστρεφόμενον· τέτακται δὲ κατὰ μὲν τὸ γεγονός μία τῶν μοιρῶν, Ἄτροπος, ἐπεὶ τὰ παρελθόντα πάντα ἀτρεπτά ἐστιν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ μέλλον Λάχεσις, εἰς πάντα γὰρ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν μένει λήξις (the functions assigned by Plato to Lachesis and Atropos are here interchanged), κατὰ δὲ τὸ ἐνεστὸς Κλωθώ, συμπεραίνουσα τε καὶ κλώθουσα ἐκάστῳ τὰ οἰκεία. . . . ταῦτα δὲ πάντα ἐστὶν οὐκ ἄλλο τι πλὴν ὁ θεός. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 10. 19 ff.: 'omnia enim tribus temporibus contineri necesse est, praeterito praesenti futuro. Praeteriti est origo, praesentis substantia, futuri dissolutio. Quae omnia in singulis hominibus apparent; et incipimus enim cum nascimur, et sumus cum vivimus, et desinimus cum interimus. Unde etiam tres Parcas esse voluerunt, unam quae vitam hominis ordiatur, alteram quae contextat, tertiam quae rumpat ac finiat.'¹

The writer of *Ascl.* III has substituted abstract and impersonal terms for the names of the three Moirai, but has retained the distinction of their functions. His εἰμαρμένη, which 'generates the ἀρχαί', or 'sows the seed', is Lachesis, who has to do with the past, and has determined the course of the man's life before or at the moment of birth; his τάξις, which 'arranges the events in succession', and 'maintains their interconnexion', is Clotho, who has to do with the present, i. e. with the events of the man's life as they occur one after another, and spins the thread by which they are connected; his ἀνάγκη, which 'compels the τέλη to follow', is Atropos, who has to do with the future, i. e. with the results which will issue from the

¹ A different application of the names of the three Moirai occurs in Plut. *Fac. in orbe lunae* 30. 13. There, Atropos is connected with the sun, and τὴν ἀρχὴν ἐνδίδωσι τῆς γενέσεως (i. e. of the birth of the individual man) by supplying the νοῦς; Clotho is connected with the moon, and 'combines and mixes' νοῦς with ψυχὴ; Lachesis is connected with the earth, and supplies the body. In Plut. *Gen. Socr.* 591 B (Vision of Timarchus) there is a different scheme again.

ἀρχή, and whose name (= ἄτρεπτος) of itself suggests necessity. He probably did not get the notion of the three Fates directly from Plato or Chrysippus, but followed the lead of some later writer who was influenced by them.

The words καὶ νόμος have been wrongly inserted in Lydus. Each of the three members of the triad must be represented by a single word, and τάξις must therefore stand alone.

id est textus et dispositio temporis rerum perficiendarum.

This clause is omitted in Lydus; but as the terms εἰμαρμένη and ἀνάγκη have been explained, a corresponding explanation of τάξις is needed.

vel totus constat ex ordine: an allusion to the primary meaning of the word κόσμος.

iacto velut semine. The Stoics habitually spoke of σπέρμα (and σπερματικοὶ λόγοι) in a similar sense. Cf. Zeno in Arius Didymus, Diels *Dox.* p. 458: διὰ ταύτης δὲ (sc. τῆς ὕλης) διαθεῖν τὸν τοῦ παντὸς λόγον, ὃν ἔνιοι εἰμαρμένην καλοῦσιν, οἷόν περ καὶ ἐν τῇ γονῇ τὸ σπέρμα. Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 3. 29. 2: 'sive anima est mundus, sive corpus natura gubernabile ut arbores et sata, ab initio eius usque ad exitum quicquid facere, quicquid pati debeat, inclusum est. Ut in semine omnis futuri hominis ratio (= λόγος, plan or design) comprehensa est, et legem barbae canorumque nondum natus infans habet, totius enim corporis et sequentis actus in parvo occultoque lineamenta sunt; sic origo mundi (after each ecpyrosis) non minus solem et lunam et vices siderum et animalium ortus quam quibus mutarentur terrena continuit.'

40 a. dei nutu sunt effecta. Cf. Plutarch in Stob. 1. 5. 19, vol. i, p. 81 W.: τὸ γὰρ εἰμαρμένον ἄτρεπτον καὶ ἀπαράβατον, "χῶπερ μόνον δὲ φύσει νεύσῃ, | καρτερὰ τούτῳ κέκλωστ' ἀνάγκα" (*Lyr. fr. adesph.* 143^b B) καὶ πεπωμένη.

sua lege et ratione divina. *Ratio* stands for λόγος, which is here used as the Stoics habitually used it. It means the plan, purpose, or design of God. It is no more hypostatized or personified than νόμος, with which it is coupled.

In place of the νόμος καὶ λόγος of God, the writer might equally well have spoken of the πρόνοια of God; and in some other *Hermetica* (e.g. Stob. *Exc.* XII. 1) the same thought is expressed by saying that εἰμαρμένη is subject or subordinate to God's πρόνοια. Cf. Iamblichus, *Ep. ad Macedonium*, Stob. 2. 8. 45, vol. ii, p. 174 W.: τὰ δ' αἴτια τὰ δεύτερα τοῖς προηγουμένοις αἰτίοις συνήρτηται, καὶ τὸ ἐν

γενέσει πλήθος πρὸς τὴν ἀμέριστον οὐσίαν (i. e., as the writer of *Ascl.* III might have said, to God and eternity), καὶ πάντα οὕτω τὰ τῆς εἰμαρμένης συνήπται πρὸς τὴν προηγουμένην πρόνοιαν. κατ' αὐτὴν τὴν οὐσίαν ἄρα ἐπιπλέκεται ἢ εἰμαρμένη τῇ προνοίᾳ, καὶ τῷ εἶναι τὴν πρόνοιάν ἐστιν ἢ εἰμαρμένη, καὶ ἀπ' αὐτῆς καὶ περὶ αὐτὴν ὑφέστηκε.

nec ira etenim commoventur nec flectuntur gratia. εἰμαρμένη, ἀνάγκη, and τάξις are not persons; but as they are component parts or aspects of the operation of the *di caelestes*, the personal deities by whom the Kosmos is administered in subordination to the will of the supreme God, the writer here speaks of them in terms which would more properly apply to the *di caelestes* themselves. The *di terreni* may be moved to anger, and propitiated by prayer and sacrifice; but the *di caelestes* are ἀπαθεῖς. At the same time, the Hermetist's language has perhaps been influenced here by the traditional personification of the three Moirai. The thought that the Fates are inexorable was a commonplace of Greek literature; (cf. Eur. *Alc.* 962 ff.: κρείσσον οὐδὲν Ἀνάγκας ἥδρον' . . . μόνας δ' οὔτ' ἐπὶ βωμοὺς ἔστιν οὔτε βρέτας θεῶς ἐλθεῖν, οὐ σφαγίων κλύει') but it was specially emphasized by the Stoics, who expressed in these terms their conviction that the laws of nature are immutable. Cf. Sen. *Dial.* II. 4. 1: 'accusare fata possumus, mutare non possumus: stant dura et inexorabilia. Nemo illa convicio, nemo fletu, nemo causa movet. Nihil unquam ulli remittunt.' Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 2. 35: 'Fata inrevocabiliter ius suum peragunt, nec ulla commoventur prece. Non misericordia flecti, non gratia sciunt. . . si sacrificiis . . . exorari iudicas, divina non nosti.'

serviunt necessitati rationis aeternae, quae [aeternitas] inaversibilis, immobilis, insolubilis est. The writer here says that *necessitas servit necessitati*; but this is a not unnatural inadvertence.

It is not eternity, but the eternal ordinance of God, or the destiny which God ordains, that is *inaversibilis* &c. *Aeternitas* must therefore be excised. *Quae* may be taken to refer either to *necessitati* or to *rationis*; the meaning is much the same in either case.

40 b. [[*Haec ergo est aeternitas . . . et sequi.*]] It might be possible to take this passage as a digression suggested by the words *rationis aeternae* above. But its contents have no direct bearing on the subject of εἰμαρμένη, the *di caelestes*, and the *di terreni*; and on the other hand they are closely connected with the discussion of time and eternity in chs. 26 b-32 a. It seems probable therefore

that the passage is a misplaced fragment, and originally followed ch. 32 a.

40 c. *Eventus autem vel fors insunt omnibus permixta mundanis.* *Mundanis*, whether it stands for κοσμικοῖς or ἕλικοῖς, must here be taken as applying to the sublunar region of the Kosmos alone. The heavenly bodies are both κοσμικά and ἕλικά, in the wider sense of those terms; but there cannot be any admixture of *eventus vel fors* in their movements. Possibly *mundanis* may be a misreading for *humanis*.

In the traditional text, the teaching of Hermes ends with these words, and he proceeds to say (40 d) 'dictum est vobis de singulis' &c., i. e. 'I have finished'. But his discourse cannot have ended thus abruptly; the original conclusion must therefore have been lost or misplaced.

It is also apparent that the discussion of εἰμαρμένη is incomplete. The sentence 'eventus autem . . . permixta mundanis' must have been the beginning of a paragraph in which τύχη was dealt with, and its relation to εἰμαρμένη explained. The writer has been insisting on the immutability of εἰμαρμένη, i. e. of the operation of the *di caelestes*; and in order to find scope for the agency of the *di terreni*, to show that their *effectus* are not *irriti*, and to justify the temple-cults by which men seek to influence them, he must necessarily have proceeded to explain that there are after all some things which are not immutably predetermined. The single sentence on *fors* which has survived is not sufficient for the purpose; it must have been followed by a passage, now lost, which contained the explanation needed. And in dealing with this subject, he can hardly have failed to touch also on the topic of human free will (τὸ ἐφ' ἡμῶν, or τὸ αὐτεξούσιον), which was inseparably connected with εἰμαρμένη in the discussions of the Stoics. His immediate business was to find room for freedom of action on the part of the *di terreni*; but in this respect, the *di terreni* stand on the same footing as mankind. If all things without exception are determined by an immutable destiny administered by the *di caelestes*, nothing remains to be done either by *di terreni* or by men.

The existence of *fors* is denied by Iamblichus, Stob. 2. 8. 46, vol. ii, p. 175 W.: εἰ δέ τις ταῦτόματον καὶ τὴν τύχην ἐπεισάγων ἀναρῆν οἶται τὴν τάξιν, μαθέτω ὡς οὐδέν ἐστιν ἐν τῷ παντὶ ἄτακτον, οὐδ' ἐπεισοδιώδες, οὐδὲ ἄνευ αἰτίας, οὐδὲ ἀόριστον, οὐδὲ εἰκῆ οὐδ' ἀπὸ

τοῦ μηδενὸς ἐπεισιόν, οὐδὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκός. οὐκ οὐκ ἀναρῆται ἡ τάξις καὶ συνέχεια τῶν αἰτιῶν, καὶ ἡ τῶν ἀρχῶν ἔνωσις, καὶ ἡ δι' ὅλων διατεινούσα τῶν πρώτων ἐπικράτεια. βέλτιον οὖν ἀφορίζεσθαι ἢ τύχη¹ (*lege τὴν τύχην?*) (. . .). τῶν (δὲ) πλειόνων τάξεων ἢ καὶ ἄλλων δὴ τινων ἢ¹ (*lege καὶ ἄλλων ὄντων δὴ (αἰτιῶν)?*) ἐστὶν ἔφορος καὶ συναγωγὸς αἰτία, πρεσβυτέρα τῶν συνιόντων, ἣν τότε μὲν θεὸν ἐπικαλοῦμεν, [ἣν] (τότε δὲ δαίμονα Heeren) παρειλήφαμεν. ἡνίκα μὲν γὰρ ἂν τὰ κρείττονα αἰτία τῶν συνιόντων ἢ, θεὸς ἐστὶν αὐτῶν ἔφορος, ὁπόταν δὲ τὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει, δαίμων. ἀεὶ οὖν μετ' αἰτίας πάντα ἐπιτελεῖται, καὶ οὐδ' ὅτι οὐκ ἄτακτον ἐν τοῖς γιγνομένοις ἐπαισέρχεται. (Cf. *Ascl.* III. 39: οὐδὲν ἄτακτον.) That is to say, nothing takes place without a cause; events which men call 'accidental', as well as all other events, result from a process of causation which is operated by a personal agent; and that agent is either a god or a daemon. The writer of *Ascl.* III would have regarded τὰ ἐν τῇ φύσει (the operation of the laws of nature in the corporeal Kosmos) as the sphere of action of the *di caelestes*; and perhaps he would have said that the beneficent working of those laws is sometimes perverted by *fors vel eventus* (= ἡ ἄτακτος φύσις τῆς γενέσεως), and that it is the function of the *di terreni* to remedy the evils thence resulting.

27 e-29 a. This passage is described in its opening words as a discussion of 'the mortal and immortal (parts of man)'. Its central interest lies in the account which it contains of that which awaits man's immortal part after its separation from the mortal part, i.e. in the description of the lot of the soul after death.

In the MSS., this passage has been inserted into the discussion of time and eternity, 26 b-32 a, where it is obviously out of place. The subject with which it deals, viz. the life after death, is a suitable topic to conclude with; (compare the position of the myths in which the same topic is dealt with in the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic* of Plato;) and as I have failed to find any other place in the treatise where the passage could be appropriately introduced, I think that it probably stood where I have put it.¹

¹ I am here assuming that chs. 27 e-29 a formed part of the dialogue which I call *Ascl.* III, and that the only question is, in what position in that dialogue they originally stood. But it is not impossible that the compiler of the *Δόγος τέλειος* got this part of it from another document, which might be called '*Asclepius IV*'.

27 e. τοὺς γὰρ πολλοὺς ὁ θάνατος φοβεῖ ὡς κακὸν μέγιστον.—
multos enim spes timorque mortis exercuciat. The translator
 must have had before him a different reading of the Greek. The
 text of Stobaeus is to be preferred.

θάνατος γὰρ γίγνεται διαλύσει (-σις MSS.) καμόντος σώματος, καὶ
 τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πληρωθέντος ἰτῶν ἀρμῶν τοῦ σώματος· ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν
 ἡ ἀρμογή τοῦ σώματος.¹—*Mors enim efficitur dissolutione
 corporis labore defessi, et numeri completi ἰquo corporis
 membra in unam machinam ad usus vitales aptantur.* The
 genitive *numeri completi* apparently stands for the Greek genitive
 absolute, τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πληρωθέντος. Cf. ch. 29 c, *viventis . . . partis*.
 The number which 'is completed' must be a number of units
 of time. If we read *numeri completi (annorum ad) quo(s) corporis
 membra &c.*, or something to that effect, the Latin yields a satis-
 factory sense.

In the Greek of Stobaeus, τῶν ἀρμῶν κ.τ.λ. is meaningless. The
 words ἀρμῶν τοῦ σώματος may have come by duplication from
 ἀρμογή τοῦ σώματος; and ἀριθμὸς γὰρ ἐστὶν looks like a remnant
 of an explanatory note on τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πληρωθέντος. There is
 nothing in the Greek, except ἡ ἀρμογή τοῦ σώματος, to correspond
 to *corporis membra in unam machinam ad usus vitales aptantur*.

There is some awkwardness in the coupling of the gen. abs.
numeri completi (τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πληρωθέντος) with the ablative *dis-
 solutione* (διαλύσει). This might be avoided by punctuating differ-
 ently, and writing 'Mors enim efficitur dissolutione corporis labore
 defessi; et numeri completi (annorum ad) quo(s) corporis membra
 . . . aptantur, moritur [enim] corpus, quando hominis vitalia
 ferre posse destiterit'.—θάνατος γὰρ γίγνεται διαλύσει καμόντος
 σώματος· καὶ τοῦ ἀριθμοῦ πληρωθέντος τῶν [] (ἐτῶν ἐφ' ἃ διαμένει(?))
 ἡ ἀρμογή τοῦ σώματος, ἀποθνήσκει [δὲ] τὸ σῶμα, ὅταν μηκέτι
 δύνηται φέρειν τὸν ἀνθρώπ(υ)ον (βίον).

Compare the description of death in Pl. *Tim.* 81 D: τέλος δέ,
 ἐπειδὴ τῶν περὶ τὸν μυελὸν τριγῶνων οἱ ξυναρμοσθέντες μηκέτι ἀντέχωσι
 δεσμοί, τῷ πόνῳ διαστάμενοι, μεθίσσι τοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῶν δεσμούς, ἡ
 δὲ λυθεῖσα κατὰ φύσιν μεθ' ἡδονῆς ἐξέπτωτο.

moritur enim corpus: it is the *body* that dies, and not the
 soul. Cf. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 436, where opinions are collected
 on the question Ποτέρου ἐστὶν ὕπνος καὶ θάνατος, ψυχῆς ἢ σώματος:
 e.g. Ἀριστοτέλης, . . . θάνατον δὲ εἶναι μόνον σώματος, οὐ ψυχῆς.

καὶ τοῦτο ἔστι θάνατος, διάλυσις σώματος καὶ ἀφανισμὸς αἰσθήσεως

σωματικῆς.—Haec est ergo mors, corporis dissolutio et corporalis sensus interitus. In this definition, the emphasis falls on σώματος and σωματικῆς, as it falls on σῶμα in the words ἀποθνήσκει τὸ σῶμα above. Perhaps the writer is thinking of Pl. *Phaedo* 105 E: οὐκοῦν ἡ ψυχὴ οὐ δέχεται θάνατον;—οὐ. In Pl. *Gorg.* 524 B, a different definition of death occurs, the Hermetist's word διάλυσις being used, but differently applied: ὁ θάνατος τυγχάνει ὄν . . . οὐδὲν ἄλλο ἢ δυοῖν πραγμάτοιιν διάλυσις, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος, ἀπ' ἀλλήλων. Chrysippus (Nemesius *De nat. hom.* c. 2, p. 33) defined death as χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος; this agrees with the definition in Pl. *Gorg.*

σωματικὴ αἴσθησις is that kind of sensation which depends on the use of the bodily organs of sense. When the body 'is dissolved', this kind of sensation necessarily ceases. But there must be another kind of sensation, which is independent of the bodily organs, and continues after death; for the writer says in the following chapter that the soul possesses an imperishable faculty of sensation (ἀθάνατον αἴσθησιν), and is thereby rendered liable to suffer endless pain. The disembodied soul which is tortured by air-storms must be no less capable of receiving sense-impressions from material things than the embodied soul.

On the question what part of the man survives death, Plato's language varies. In *Phaedo* 66 he says that ἔρωτες, ἐπιθυμίαι, φόβοι and the like (i. e. the πάθη which accompany αἴσθησις) are caused by the union of the soul with the body, and speaks of death as a way of escape from them; but it is only he who has practised the separation of soul from body during his earthly life that is released from these πάθη by death; for (*ib.* 81) the soul which has given itself up to bodily desires and pleasures is still, after its departure from the body, tainted and clogged by an intermixture of that which is bodily, and therefore cannot rise from the earth, but flits about it, as a troubled ghost, until it enters another body. Similarly, the Hermetist appears to assume that those souls at least which merit punishment retain after death something analogous to σωματικὴ αἴσθησις.

In the *Timaeus* (69 B ff.) Plato says that man has both an immortal soul and 'another kind of soul, which is mortal' (ἄλλο εἶδος ψυχῆς, τὸ θνητόν); and in this 'mortal soul' reside pleasure and pain, confidence and fear, anger, hope, αἴσθησις ἄλογος, and reckless desire, (i. e. αἴσθησις and the πάθη which go with it).

See also *Tim.* 42 A, D, E, and 61 C (*ψυχῆς ὅσον θνητόν*). It is implied in the *Timaeus* that τὸ λογιστικόν (which corresponds to the *θείος νοῦς* of the Hermetist) alone is immortal, and τὸ ἄλογον (including both τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν) is mortal. But if the soul is in part mortal, it does not necessarily follow that its mortal part always perishes at the moment of the separation of soul from body; these passages of the *Timaeus* do not therefore necessarily exclude the possibility of a bodily taint of passion persisting in some souls after death, as is asserted in the *Phaedo*, and with it, a corresponding liability to pain. In the myths of the *Gorgias*, *Phaedo*, and *Republic*, which the Hermetist would probably accept more literally than Plato intended, the persistence of *αἴσθησις* after death is necessarily assumed.

As to the notion of a mortal part of the soul, cf. *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 6 a (*Testim.*), where it is said that the doctrine that 'man has two souls' is taught in 'Hermetic writings'.

In the story told by Sulla in Plut. *De facie in orbe lunae*, ch. 28, the term *ψυχῆ* is restricted to the lower part of the soul, and it is said that this part survives the dissolution of the body for some time, but perishes later on.

28. *summi daemonis*. The 'supreme daemon' must be the chief or ruler of the daemons who dwell in the region of the air. Paul, *Eph.* 2. 2, mentions τὸν ἄρχοντα τῆς ἐξουσίας τοῦ ἀέρος (a notion presumably derived from Pagan sources), and identifies him with the Devil. Cf. Lactant. *Div. inst.* 2. 14. 5 (*Testim.*): 'immundi spiritus, . . . quorum . . . diabolus est princeps. Unde illum Trismegistus daemniarchen vocat.' Lactantius is probably referring to the *Λόγος τέλειος*; and if so, the Greek term here translated by *summus daemon* must be *δαιμονίαρχης*.

Porphyry *De abst.* 2. 41 *fin.* mentions a 'president' of the maleficent daemons (τὸν προεστῶτα αὐτῶν). Iamblichus, as reported by Lydus (*De mens.* 4. 25, quoted in note on ch. 33 b below), said that there is μέγιστός τις δαίμων who is chief or commander of all the daemons, and that he is Πλούτων. But I have found no exact parallel elsewhere to the statement that 'the chief of the daemons' acts as judge of the dead. In Pl. *Gorg.* 524 A, souls from Asia are judged by Rhadamanthus, and souls from Europe by Aeacus, but Minos is superior to both, and acts as judge of appeal in doubtful cases. In Pl. *Rep.* 10. 614 C, the souls which have quitted the body come εἰς τόπον τινα δαιμόνιον (a reader might take this to mean

'a place belonging to the daemons'), where there are two openings hard by each other in the earth below, and two openings over against them in the sky above; and judges (unnamed) are seated 'between these', i. e. between earth and sky, or in other words, in the air. In the myth of the *Phaedo* (107 D, 113 D), the dead man is conducted by 'his own daemon' (i. e. his guardian Genius) to 'a certain place', where he 'is judged', but we are not told by whom. These passages of Plato were probably known to the Hermetist; and he may have been thinking also of Osiris, who, according to the Egyptian *Book of the Dead*, presides over the court of forty-two judges by which the dead are tried (Wiedemann, *Rel. anc. Eg.*, Eng. tr. p. 249 ff.). But he might have given to the *summus daemon* (whom he makes judge of the dead) the same name that Iamblichus did, and called him Pluto. In Propertius 4. 11, the deceased Cornelia is uncertain whether the judge by whom she is to be tried is *pater* (i. e. Dis or Pluto), or Aeacus with his brothers (Minos and Rhadamanthus) as assessors.

in sibi competentibus locis: i. e. in the higher and untroubled stratum of the atmosphere.

sin autem delictorum inlitam maculis vitiisque oblitam viderit. Cf. Pl. *Gorgo*. 524 D (Jowett's tr.): 'When a man is stripped of the body, all the natural or acquired affections of the soul are laid open to view.' And when there comes before the judge one who 'has no soundness in him, but his soul is marked with the whip, and is full of the prints and scars of perjuries and crimes with which each action has stained him, . . . him' the judge 'beholds, . . . and despatches him ignominiously to his prison, and there he undergoes the punishment which he deserves'. The notion that the stains and scars of sin are visible in the disembodied soul is adopted and amplified by Plutarch in his 'Vision of Thespesius', *De sera numinis vindicta* 22.

desuper ad ima deturbans. As the judge flings the guilty soul *downward* into the region of troubled air, the place of judgement must be in the untroubled air above. All souls alike ascend to that level to be judged; the pious are permitted to remain there; the wicked are flung down thence to the lower air.

aeris igni et aquae saepe discordanti[bus]. Storms are caused by conflicts of the air with water or fire, or with both at once. Cf. ch. 33 b below. It is assumed that the atmosphere consists of two distinct strata, an upper stratum in which the air is pure, and

consequently untroubled, and a lower stratum, in which it is intermingled with watery and fiery exhalations from the earth below, and is consequently disturbed by frequent storms. The water and fire manifest themselves in the form of rain and lightning.

An early suggestion of this notion may be seen in the myth of the *Phaedo*, where the abode of the blest is situated on the 'true surface of the earth', which rises above the air into the aether, so that the air is to them as the sea is to us, and the aether is to them as the air is to us; for we live, not on the true surface, but 'like frogs round a pond', in hollows of the earth, 'into which the water and the mist and the air have flowed together'.

If a reader of the *Phaedo* took the 'aether' of that dialogue to mean 'pure air', and assumed the 'yet fairer mansions' mentioned in 114 C to be situated in the region of celestial fire above the pure air, he would get an atmospheric system analogous to that of *Ascl.* III.

A scheme resembling that of the Hermetist somewhat more closely occurs in the *Epinomis*, written soon after Plato's death. We are there told (981 B ff.) that there are five corporeal elements, viz. $\pi\upsilon\rho$, $\alpha\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\rho$, $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$, $\upsilon\delta\omega\rho$, and $\gamma\eta$. Above the earth, the four other corporeal elements lie in successive strata, $\pi\upsilon\rho$ being the highest. 'Soul is incorporeal; and by the combination of soul with bodies in which one or other of the five elements predominates, five different orders of ζῶα are formed. Men, beasts, and plants together constitute the lowest of the five orders; they have bodies composed mainly of earth, and dwell on earth. The astral gods are the highest order; they have bodies composed mainly of $\pi\upsilon\rho$, and dwell in the stratum of $\pi\upsilon\rho$. Between these extremes are three other orders of living beings, corresponding to the three intermediate elements, viz. $\alpha\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\rho$, $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$, and $\upsilon\delta\omega\rho$. The beings who have bodies composed of $\alpha\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\rho$, and dwell in the $\alpha\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\rho$, are called δαίμονες.¹ The beings whose bodies are composed of $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$ have their abode in the $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$, but

¹ 984 D: μετὰ δὲ τούτους (sc. τοὺς ὀρατοὺς θεοὺς, the astral gods,) καὶ ὑπὸ τούτοις ἐξῆς δαίμονας. (The comma after δαίμονας in Stallbaum's edition should be altered to a full stop.) These words, as they stand in the traditional text, must necessarily be taken to mean that the 'aetherial' beings alone are called daemons. But it is probable that there is a lacuna here, and that the passage originally ran somewhat as follows: 'Next after the astral gods come the daemons. (Of these there are three orders, having bodies composed respectively of $\alpha\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\rho$, $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$, and $\upsilon\delta\omega\rho$. The $\alpha\acute{\iota}\theta\eta\rho$ γένος of daemons dwells in the second region of the universe;) the $\acute{\alpha}\eta\rho$ γένος, occupying the third and middle region' &c. In support of this, it should be noted that Chalcidius, whose daemonology (*Comment. in Timaeum* 128 ff.) is based mainly on the *Epinomis*, adopts the theory of the five cosmic strata and their occupants unaltered (except that he substitutes *humecta substantia quam Graeci ὑγρασίαν appellant* for $\upsilon\delta\omega\rho$, and says that this signifies the dense air which men

travel to and fro between the higher and lower strata; they act as 'interpreters' or messengers between those above and those below (cf. Plato's 'daemons' in *Sympos.* 202 D ff.), and we ought therefore to 'honour them with prayers'. (The writer of the *Epinomis* assigns no distinctive name to these 'aerial' beings, but describes them as τὰ μέσα τῶν ζώων.) The beings whose bodies are composed of water are called ἡμίθεοι;¹ they are sometimes visible, and differ in this respect from the 'aetherial' and aerial' beings, whose bodies are transparent and always invisible.

The scheme of the elements in the *Epinomis* agrees with that of Plato, and with the system of the Stoics, in making fire the highest element; but it differs in dividing the air into two distinct substances, named respectively αἰθήρ and ἀήρ, and thus making a list of five elements, in place of the four of which Empedocles had spoken. The αἰθήρ of the *Epinomis* has no connexion with the 'fifth substance' of Aristotle; for it is not the celestial element, but is situated below the fire in which the heavenly bodies are placed.² It corre-

breathes), but includes the occupants of the three intermediate strata, *aether*, *aer*, and *ύγρασία*, under the common name *daemones*. Perhaps Chalcidius had before him a less damaged text of the *Epinomis*.

¹ *Epinomis* 985 b: τὸ δὲ ὕδατος [πέμπτον] ὄν ἡμίθεον μὲν ἀπεικάσειεν ἂν τις ὀρθῶς ἀπεικάων [ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι], καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ὀρώμενον, ἄλλοτε δὲ ἀποκρυφθὲν ἀδηλον γινόμενον, θαύμα κατ' ἀμυδρὰν ὄψιν παρεχόμενον. The text is corrupt. The watery kind ought to be called the fourth, and not the fifth; there is nothing to answer to μὲν; and the words ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι are meaningless. The abode of the watery beings is not clearly indicated; but they are evidently phantoms which appear to men on land; and the writer seems to have regarded them, not as inhabiting the waters, but as hovering in the moist air near the ground (the *ύγρασία* of Chalcidius' paraphrase). It is the watery or misty substance of their bodies that makes them faintly visible.

The word ἡμίθεοι, in its primary use, was applied to the Homeric 'heroes', who were called 'half-gods' as being sons or near descendants of a god and a mortal woman. In Pl. *Apol.* 27 D, Socrates says that the word *δαίμονες*, if it does not mean gods, must mean θεῶν παῖδες νόθοι τινὲς ἢ ἐκ νυμφῶν ἢ ἐκ τιῶν ἄλλων (i. e. beings such as the Homeric heroes whom the word ἡμίθεοι was commonly used to describe); but that passage was not meant to be taken seriously. The writer of the *Epinomis* identifies ἡμίθεοι rather with 'heroes' in the post-Homeric sense, i. e. ghosts of dead men; and he seems to have invented a new etymology of the word, connecting it with *θία* and *θεᾶσθαι*, and assuming it to mean 'half-seen' (*ἡμιθέατοι*). Perhaps the original text of the sentence was to the following effect: τὸ δὲ [ἐξ] ὕδατος [πέμπτον] ὄν ἡμίθεον μὲν ἀπεικάσειεν ἂν τις [ὀρθῶς ἀπεικάων] [ὀνομάζεσθαι διὰ τὸ] ἐξ αὐτοῦ γεγονέναι (or possibly, δι' αὐτὸ τὸ ἐξ ὕδατος γεγονέναι), καὶ τοῦτ' εἶναι τοτὲ μὲν ὀρώμενον κ.τ.λ. 'As to the kind of beings consisting of water, we may conjecture that they are called *half-deities* (or rather *half-'seities'*) for this reason, that they are made of water, and that things of that sort are sometimes visible, but at other times are hidden and disappear; for they present a strangely faint and shadowy appearance.'

² Maximus Tyrius, A.D. 130-200, uses the word αἰθήρ in the same sense as the writer of the *Epinomis*; e.g. Max. Tyr. (Hobein) 39. 4: οὐχ ὄρας τὸν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς τοῦτον οὐρανὸν καὶ τὰ ἐν αὐτῷ ἄστρα, καὶ τὸν ὑπ' αὐτῷ αἰθέρα, καὶ ὑπὸ τούτῳ ἄερα; *Ib.* 11. 12: τοῦτο μὲν κατ' οὐρανὸν αἰ ἀστέρων φύσεις, τοῦτο δ' αὐ κατ' αἰθέρα αἰ

sponds to the upper air of the four-element scheme, as the *ἀήρ* of the *Epinomis* corresponds to the lower air of that scheme.

The writer of *Ascl.* III agrees with the *Epinomis*, firstly, in dividing the atmosphere into two distinct strata, and secondly, in recognizing three distinct orders of beings intermediate between astral gods and men. (See Lydus below.) But he must have derived his notions about the atmosphere, not from the *Epinomis* directly, but from the more elaborate physical system of Posidonius.

aeternis poenis. *Aeternus* here means 'lasting through endless time', and not, as in chs. 26 b-32, 'timeless'. Some souls are sentenced to everlasting punishment; and it is of these souls alone that the writer is here speaking. But it would be surprising if he said that all except 'the pious' will suffer everlasting punishment; and Lydus, in the passage quoted below, supplies positive evidence that he did not say so. Besides, we are told below that there are various degrees of punishment ('pro delictorum qualitatibus . . . reddentur poenae'); and it would seem to follow from this that there are some punishments which are not everlasting. The souls here described as 'marked with stains of sin and defiled with vices' must therefore be souls of extreme wickedness; they must correspond to the *ἀνίατοι*, to whom everlasting punishment is assigned in each of the three eschatological myths of Plato (*Gorgias* 525 B ff.: *Phaedo* 113 E: *Rep.* 615 C ff.), and also in Plutarch's 'Vision of Thespesius'. But if this was the writer's meaning, it is not likely that he omitted to express it here, and left the reader to infer it from what follows; it seems probable therefore that some word equivalent to *ἀνίατοι* has fallen out of the text. We might read, for instance, 'vitiisque oblitam (immedicabilibus)'.
ut in hoc animae obsit aeternitas . . . Ergo ne his implice-
mur, verendum, timendum, cavendumque esse cognosce.
 Cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 107 C: εἴπερ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀθάνατος, . . . ὁ κίνδυνος νῦν δὴ καὶ δόξειεν ἂν δεινὸς εἶναι, εἴ τις αὐτῆς ἀμελήσει. εἰ μὲν γὰρ ᾗν ὁ θάνατος

δαιμόνων οὐσίαι. *Ib.* 9: 6: the disembodied human soul becomes a daemon, *θρέμμα αἰθέριον*, and resides in the *αἰθήρ*, i. e. in the upper stratum of the atmosphere. *Ib.* 10: 3: the state of the seer, whose soul is released from the encumbrance of the body, *ἔοικεν . . . ψυχῆς πτήσει μεταρσίῳ, οὐχ ὑπὲρ ἄκρον φερομένης τῶν ὄρων ἐν ἀχλυώδει καὶ παραττομένῳ τῷ ἀέρι, ἀλλ' ὑπὲρ τοῦτον ὑψοῦ ἐν σταθερῷ αἰθέρι, γαλήνης καὶ ἡρεμίας αὐτὴν παραπεμπούσης ἀλύτως ἐπὶ τὸ ἀληθές, ἐπὶ τὴν ὄψιν.* In his doctrine of the disembodied soul, Maximus Tyrius has been influenced by Posidonius; and his *ἀήρ* and *αἰθήρ* correspond to the two atmospheric strata of which Posidonius spoke.

τοῦ παντὸς ἀπαλλαγῆ, ἔρμαιον ἂν ἦν τοῖς κακοῖς ἀποθανοῦσι τοῦ τε σώματος ἅμα ἀπηλλάχθαι καὶ τῆς αὐτῶν κακίας μετὰ τῆς ψυχῆς· νῦν δὲ κ.τ.λ.

«**Praescia etenim omnium rerum divinitate . . . reddentur poenae.**») This sentence, where it occurs in the MSS., is irrelevant, and breaks the connexion between 'poenis . . . tanto . . . severioribus' and the following question of Asclepius, 'Quare sunt digni maioribus poenis?' On the other hand, in the place to which I have transposed it, it serves as an amplification of the preceding *passione poenarum*, and, by its mention of God, leads on to the following question about punishments inflicted by man. *Praescia divinitate* implies *divina lege*, to which *sola humana lege* stands in contrast.

Praescia is probably a mistranslation. There is no occasion for speaking of *foreknowledge*; the meaning of the Greek must have been that God *knows* all things. Men's sins may be undetected by their fellow-men, but cannot be hidden from God; and since God knows all, we may be sure that the agent of God's will, the judge of the dead, will suit the penalty to the offence ('pro delictorum qualitibus, perinde ut sunt,') with absolute justice.

Primo . . . «(sunt mortalia)» terrena quae sunt omnia [[]]; **tunc ea etiam, quae &c.** There are two parts of man which are mortal. The first of these two parts is the body; the second is that part of the soul which is inseparably connected with the bodily functions, and perishes when the body perishes. This sentence then is a repetition in other words of the preceding statement *τοῦτο ἔστι θάνατος, διάλυσις σώματος καὶ ἀφανισμὸς αἰσθήσεως σωματικῆς*. The part of the soul which perishes is that in which the *σωματικὴ αἴσθησις* resides; it corresponds to the *θνητὸν εἶδος ψυχῆς* of Pl. *Tim.*

Ea omnia . . . poenis obnoxia (. . .) tanto post mortem severioribus subiciuntur. It is self-contradictory to say that the parts of man which perish at death are subjected to punishment after death; the subject of *subiciuntur* therefore cannot be *ea omnia*; and as no other subject is to be found in the text, there must be a lacuna. It is evident that the missing subject must be 'the immortal part of man'. The offences which man commits during his earthly life are punished by human law (or rather, are sometimes thus punished, though not invariably, since the offences may escape detection); and since this kind of punishment takes the form of destruction of the body and the bodily senses, or hurts inflicted on them, it may be said that 'the mortal parts' are liable to such punishment ('*ea omnia . . . poenis obnoxia*'). In contrast to these punishments, the writer

goes on to speak of another kind of punishment, to which 'the immortal part' is subjected 'after death'. But in order to bring out the contrast, he ought to say that the first kind of punishment is inflicted *in this life*. Now the words *in vita*, where they stand in the MSS., are pleonastic, the meaning being adequately expressed by *dum viverent*; but if we transfer them to the preceding sentence, they supply the contrast to *post mortem* which the sense requires.

As to the relation between the punishments inflicted in life and those inflicted after death, compare the 'Vision of Thespesius', Plut. *De sera numinis vindicta* 22, p. 564 F: 'There are three different kinds of punishment. Some men are chastised in the body and by means of the body; these are dealt with by 'Swift Penalty' (Ποινή ταχεῖα); and the chastisement which she inflicts is mild, and falls far short of that which awaits the one who need purgatorial pains (καθαρισμός). Those whose vice is more difficult to cure, their 'daemon',¹ after death, hands over to Dike. Those who are utterly incurable (οἱ πάμπαν ἀνίατοι) are rejected by Dike; and the third and fiercest of the servants of Adrasteia, she who is named Erinys, pursues them as they flee hither and thither, and makes away with them and sinks them in unspeakable and unseen depths (ἠφάνισε καὶ κατέδυσεν εἰς τὸ ἄρρητον καὶ ἄορατον) in pitiable and grievous sort. . . . The chastisements inflicted in this life, which affect the man through his possessions and his body, touch the bodily senses alone, and their grip is not so hard; moreover, they do not lay hold of vice itself, but for the most part deal only with the outward appearance of vice.² But if a man departs from earthly life unchastened and unpurged, Dike receives his soul stripped of the body, naked and exposed to view, . . . and he suffers a long course of punishment, during which every one of his evil passions is extracted from him by grievous pains. These pains exceed in intensity those suffered through the flesh, as much as the consciousness of waking life exceeds that of dreams in vividness.'

Ib. p. 567 A: 'Thespesius saw³ that the shades of those whose

¹ The δαίμων here spoken of is the 'Guardian Genius' of the individual man, as in Pl. *Rep.* 10.

² Read, perhaps, αἱ διὰ χρημάτων καὶ διὰ σωμάτων κολάσεις, ((πρὸς αἴσθησιν αὐτήν) (οὔσαι), ἀφῆν οὐκ ἔχουσι δριμύειαν· οὐδ' αὐτῆς ἐπιλαμβάνονται τῆς κακίας, ἀλλὰ πρὸς δόξαν αἱ πολλαὶ καὶ (. . .) [[πρὸς αἴσθησιν αὐτήν]] εἰσιν.

³ ἔθεάτο τῶν μὲν γνωρίμως πονηρῶν γενομένων καὶ κολασθέντων αὐτόθι τὴν σκιάν οὐκέτ' εἶναι χαλεπῶς (περιεπομένην?) οὐδ' ὁμοίως ((ἐπι)τριβομένην, ἀτελεῆ (ἐχόντων τὴν πονηρίαν?), περὶ τὸ ἄλογον καὶ παθητικόν [[ἐπί]πονον] (λεγε μόνον) οὔσαν' ὅσοι δὲ κ.τ.λ.

wickedness had been discovered on earth, and who had suffered chastisement there, were not afterwards severely dealt with, and were not so heavily afflicted; for their wickedness was incomplete, since it affected only the irrational part of the soul, in which the passions reside (τὸ ἄλογον καὶ παθητικόν); but those who had made a false pretence of virtue, and had lived their lives in secret vice, were beset by certain other daemons, who forced them to turn their souls inside out with pain and anguish; . . . and some of them the torturers flayed and cut open, showing them to be inwardly unsound and discoloured; for their wickedness was in the rational and ruling part of the soul.' I. e. he who openly and recklessly gives way to evil impulses, and in whom reason is altogether dormant, is less guilty than the cunning rogue, who misuses his faculty of reason in devising schemes for the concealment of his wickedness. The former is usually detected and punished in life. The latter may escape punishment on earth, where penalties attach only to the δόξα κακίας; but '(poenis) tanto post mortem severioribus subicitur'. The ἄλογον καὶ παθητικόν in Plutarch corresponds to 'ea quae sunt corporali ratione viventia' in *Ascl.* III.

Ib. p. 567 F, the punishment of Nero after death is lightened, ὧν μὲν γὰρ ἡδίκησε δεδωκέναι δίκας (by his downfall and untimely death on earth).

29 a. Qui(a) damnati humanis legibus vitam violenter amittunt. The judge of the dead takes into account, in mitigation of his sentence, the punishment previously inflicted by an earthly judge. The writer here confines his attention to the case of capital punishment. Death in the course of nature is no hurt (cf. ch. 27 e: 'de qua sollicitudo supervacua est'); it is merely paying a debt which all men owe. But the violent death inflicted on the criminal is a true penalty; and if he has already paid this penalty, there remains so much the less for him to pay in the other world.

Contra iusto homini (. . .). In the traditional text, the words 'Contra iusto homini' (29 a) 'in dei religione et in summa pietate praesidium est' (29 b) are read as a continuous sentence. But *iusto* does not suit what follows; we expect to be told that piety protects all who possess it, and not that it protects the just. Moreover, Lactantius, in quoting what is probably the Greek original of 29 b *init.*, begins the sentence with μία φυλακή εὐσέβεια; and Cyril agrees with him in this. I have therefore concluded that the break in the text falls between *iusto homini* and *in dei religione*. The words *Contra iusto homini*, if they belong to the

preceding passage, 29 a, may be the beginning of a sentence in which the case of a righteous man unjustly condemned by human judges (e.g. Socrates) was dealt with, as in Pl. *Gorg. fin.*

33 b. <<Dico nunc daemonas . . . commotio>>. In the Latin text, the *everlasting* punishment of the (incurably) wicked is spoken of (ch. 28, *aeternis poenis*), but there is no corresponding mention of *temporary* and *remedial* chastisements. But Lydus tells us that the *Λόγος τέλειος* contained an account of 'purgatorial' suffering inflicted by daemons; and purgatorial chastisement is necessarily limited in time. A passage on the latter topic must therefore have been lost. It is clear that the right place for it would be after ch. 29 a; and there can be little doubt that the passage to which Lydus refers, and which is missing in our text of the Latin *Asclepius*, stood in this position.

In *De mens.* 4. 32, Lydus does not quote verbally from the *Λόγος τέλειος*, but merely reports in his own words the contents of a passage in it. But in another place, *ib.* 4. 148, he quotes the actual words of the document; and the sentence there quoted evidently formed part of the passage summarized in 4. 32. In his summary, he speaks of the station of each class of daemons in close connexion with the function discharged by that class. But in the text of the *Λόγος τέλειος*, the station and the function must have been described in separate sentences; and it is the sentence describing the function of the *καθαριστικοὶ δαίμονες* that is preserved in *De mens.* 4. 148. As this sentence refers to the 'daemons of purgation' alone, and not to daemons in general, it is necessary to insert *τούτοις* before *τοῖς δαίμοσι*.

We are told by Lydus that the writer of the *Λόγος τέλειος* distinguished three orders of daemons, stationed respectively on earth, in the lower and troubled stratum of the atmosphere, and 'near the lunar region' (i. e. in the higher and untroubled stratum of the atmosphere); and that each of these three orders of daemons discharges a distinct function with respect to human souls. The very same doctrine is ascribed to Iamblichus in Lydus *De mens.* 4. 25: ὅτι τὸ ὑπὸ τὴν σελήνην δαιμόνιον φύλον τριχῆ διήρηται κατὰ τὸν Ἰάμβλιχον καὶ τὸ μὲν πρόσγειον αὐτοῦ τιμωρόν, τὸ δὲ ἀέριον καθαριστικόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ σεληνιακῇ ζώνῃ σωτήριόν ἐστιν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡρωϊκὸν¹ ἴσμεν. ἡγεῖσθαι δὲ λέγεται παντὸς τούτου μέγιστός τις δαίμων² οὗτος δ' ἂν εἴη μᾶλλον ὁ Πλούτων, ὡς φησιν ὁ αὐτὸς

¹ Cf. *heroes* in *Ascl. Lat.* 33 b.

² Cf. *summi daemonis* in *Ascl. Lat.* 28.

Ἰάμβλιχος. The verbal resemblance between that passage and Lydus' summary of the teaching of the Δόγος τέλειος in *De mens.* 4. 32 is too close to be merely accidental; but it may be sufficiently accounted for by assuming that Jamblichus and the author of the Greek *Ascl.* III, in dealing with this subject, drew from a common source.

Now the Latin fragment 33 b, which is clearly out of place where it stands in the traditional text, speaks of classes or orders of daemons in conjunction with atmospheric strata; it is therefore to be presumed that this fragment originally belonged to the passage summarized by Lydus, and I have accordingly inserted it here.

The text of 33 b is manifestly corrupt. The words 'quos inter aeris purissimam partem . . . et in terram' are meaningless. Thomas accepts Koziol's conjecture *et aethera* in place of *et in terram*; but that reading would not yield a satisfactory sense. It would imply that the beings in question inhabit a vacuum between the upper surface of the air and the lower surface of the aether; and the notion of such a vacuum is unexampled. Moreover, the following words 'ubi nec nubilis locus est' &c. clearly describe the upper stratum of the atmosphere, in contrast to the lower and stormy stratum mentioned in ch. 28 ('procellis turbibusque aeris igni et aquae saepe discordanti[bus]'). We are told that the place spoken of is above the region of clouds, and below the region in which the heavenly bodies move; it must therefore be below the lunar sphere, which is the upper limit of the atmosphere; and the only region which satisfies these conditions is that of the higher air. We must conclude then that the Hermetist wrote something which would be correctly rendered by *in aeris purissima parte*, and that the words *et in terram* have been wrongly inserted here. On the other hand, the abode of the preceding order of daemons would be more clearly described if *in terra* were placed beside *nobiscum*; and the phrase <<*in terra*>> *commorari nobiscum* would then correspond to ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ἕλῃ παρόντας (in conjunction with τὸ ἀνθρώπειον) in the paraphrase of Lydus.

The words *supra nos* also are out of place; for the writer could have no possible motive for informing his readers that a place so lofty that clouds cannot rise to it is 'above us'. But it would be strange if, while speaking of the habitations of the first and third

orders of daemons, he omitted to mention the abode of the daemons of the second order, namely, the lower air. It seems probable that he did mention it, and that *supra nos* is a remnant of the lost clause in which he spoke of it. In that context, *supra nos* might appropriately stand in contrast to *nobiscum* in the preceding clause.

The awkward *quos . . . et . . . quos* may be accounted for as a mistranslation. The translator, we may suppose, read οὓς μὲν . . . οὓς δὲ ('some . . . others'), but failed to understand the words, he wrongly rendered οὓς by *quos*, and inserted *credo* to make sense.

et *heroas quos* &c. To which of the classes of beings spoken of is the term *heroes* applied? If we adopt the reading, 'et quos . . .) <<supra nos>>, et *heroas quos*' &c., the *heroes* are inhabitants of the *upper* and *purser* air; and that is supported by the parallel statement of Iamblichus, as given by Lydus *De mens.* 4. 25: τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ σεληνιακῇ ζώνῃ σωτήριόν ἐστιν, ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡρωϊκὸν ἴσμεν. But we should rather have expected, from the use of the term *heroes* by Posidonius &c., that, if employed at all in this passage, it would be used to denote the inhabitants of the *lower* and *turbid* air; and that sense might be got by reading 'Dico nunc daemones quos credo <<in terra>> commorari nobiscum, et *heroas quos* (in aeris inferiore parte (?)) <<supra nos>>, (et quos) in aeris purissima parte' &c. There is, however, no good reason why a special name should here be given to one of the three classes; and it may be suspected that the Hermetist spoke merely of three orders of 'daemons', and that the word *heroas* has been added by a transcriber. It is possible that in Lydus' report of Iamblichus the words ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡρωϊκὸν ἴσμεν are out of place, and that we ought to read there τὸ δὲ ἀέριον (*sc.* δαιμόνων φύλον), <<ὃ δὴ καὶ ἡρωϊκὸν ἴσμεν>> καθαρτικόν, τὸ δὲ πρὸς τῇ σεληνιακῇ ζώνῃ σωτήριόν ἐστιν [[ὃ . . . ἴσμεν]].

ex *signorum aliquorum agitatione commotio*. Cf. Plut. *De sera numinis vindicta* 566 E, where Thespesius, floating at or near the upper surface of the air, hears the Sibyl chanting her prophecies in the moon; 'and he would fain have listened and heard more, but he was driven off by the eddies made by the moon as it swept along (τῇ ῥύμῃ τῆς σελήνης εἰς τοῦναντίον ὥσπερ ἐν ταῖς δύναις ἐξέώσθη), and so could hear but little.' It must be the air close to the lunar sphere that is thus disturbed; the region of

perfect calm lies somewhat lower than this, but above the region of clouds and storms.

Lydus De mens. 4. 32. In his classification of daemons, the Hermetist seems to have been more nearly in agreement with the *Epinomis*, which distinguishes *three* orders of beings intermediate between astral gods and men, than with Posidonius, who, as far as we know, distinguished only *two* such orders, named respectively 'daemons' and 'heroes'. The σωτηρικοὶ δαίμονες of *Ascl. III*, who are stationed 'near the lunar sphere', or in the upper air, correspond to the 'aetherial' beings of the *Epinomis*; the καθαρτικοὶ δαίμονες of *Ascl. III*, stationed in the lower air, correspond to the 'aerial' beings of the *Epinomis*; and the τιμωροὶ δαίμονες of *Ascl. III*, who 'dwell with us on earth', correspond, though somewhat less closely, to the 'watery' beings of the *Epinomis*, whose habitation is on or close to the surface of the earth.

The τιμωροὶ δαίμονες punish men in this life.¹ Similarly, Chalcidius *In Timaeum* 134 describes the 'watery' kind of daemons as maleficent beings, and as often employed, under God's providence, in the punishment of the wicked. These daemons, he says, are 'neque ita probabiles neque ita commodi' (*sc.* as the *aetherei* and *aerei daemones*), 'nec invisibiles semper, sed interdum contemplabiles, cum in diversas convertuntur figuras, exsanguium quoque² simulacrorum umbraticas formas induuntur, obesi corporis illuviem trahentes. Saepe etiam scelerum et impietatis ultores³ iuxta iustitiae divinae sanctionem, ultro etiam plerumque laedunt: tanguntur enim ex vicinia terrae terrena libidine, habentque nimiam cum silva communionem, quam malignam animam veteres vocabant.'

According to the summary given by Lydus, the τιμωροὶ δαίμονες are present ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ὕλῃ. But all daemons alike reside in some sort of matter. The Hermetist probably meant, and perhaps said, that these 'daemons of punishment' have their abode ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ (τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου σώματος) ὕλῃ. They are the beings whose operation is seen in physical and moral disease. They are com-

¹ They thus supplement the inadequate work of human judges.

² Read *exsanguiumque*?

³ Did Chalcidius read something corresponding to 'saepe etiam scelerum et impietatis ultores' &c. in his text of the *Epinomis*? In the extant text of that dialogue, there is a description of the mental and moral qualities of the aetherial and aerial beings, and of their attitude towards mankind, but there is no analogous account of the watery beings, though something of the sort seems to be needed to complete the scheme.

parable to the ἀκάθαρτα πνεύματα of the synoptic Gospels; and if a man were wholly mastered by them, it would be a case of 'demoniac possession.'¹ See *Corp.* XVI. 13-16, and *Corp.* IX. 3. *Corp.* XIII. 7 b: τιμωροὺς γὰρ ἐν ἐμαντῷ ἔχω, ὡ πάτερ;—οὐκ ὀλίγους ὡ τέκνον, κ.τ.λ. (The word δαίμονες is not there employed; but the hypostatized πάθη which the writer of *Corp.* XIII describes as τιμωροί correspond to the τιμωροὶ δαίμονες of *Ascl.* III.)

τοὺς δὲ καθαρτικούς, ἐν τῷ ἀέρι πεπηγότας. The word πεπηγότας cannot mean merely 'placed' or 'stationed'; the meaning must be that these daemons have bodies composed of the air in which they dwell, and formed from it by a sort of coagulation. In this respect they resemble the 'aerial' beings of the *Epinomis*. Cf. Apuleius *De deo Socr.* 11: 'daemonum corpora . . . ex illo purissimo aeris liquido et sereno elemento coalita.' But this meaning is not clearly expressed; and it is probable that some words have been lost. The original text may have been to this effect; ἐν τῷ (περιγείῳ?) ἀέρι (τεταγμένους, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ) πεπηγότας. The air of which the bodies of these daemons are composed must be the impure and misty air of the lower stratum, not the *serenum elementum* of which Apuleius speaks. They are the forces of wind and storm, imagined as personal beings.

μετὰ θάνατον is Lydus' substitute for ἐπὶ ἀπαλλαγῶσι τοῦ σώματος in the original.

ἀνατρέχειν πεπωμένους. The 'daemons of purgation' detain impure souls in the lower air, which serves the purpose of a purgatory for the curable, as it also serves the purpose of a hell for the incurably wicked (ch. 28). There is no subterranean Hades; all disembodied souls, good and bad alike, ascend from the earth into the atmosphere above, and are there disposed of according to their merits.

In the Homeric poems, and in early Greek literature in general, the prevailing view is that the abode of the dead is below the surface of the earth. There are traces of a different view, according to which the land of the departed is in some distant region on the surface of the earth, and is separated from the land of the living by a river, which the dead must cross; but this notion was reconciled with the other by transferring the river of death from the surface

¹ Porphyry, *Ad Marcellam* 11, speaks in similar terms of daemons residing in the soul (not the body): οὐδ' αὖ ἄλλος κακοδαίμων ἄνθρωπος ἢ (ὁ) πονηρῶν δαιμόνων ἐνδίαίτημα τὴν ψυχὴν κατασκευάσας.

of the earth to the subterranean 'kingdom of Hades'. Side by side with these conceptions, there persisted a popular belief that the ghosts of dead men hover in the air about their graves. This belief found expression in the cults of 'heroes'; but it met with little recognition in literature; and according to the literary tradition which maintained its supremacy down to Plato's time, the soul, when it quits the body, goes *down* to 'the House of Hades'. Plato, in his eschatological myths, still adheres in part to this tradition, though he combines with it other conceptions derived from recent cosmology. In the *Gorgias*, the righteous soul goes to 'the Isles of the Blessed' (presumably on the surface of the earth); but the unrighteous soul goes to 'the prison-house of just retribution, which men call Tartarus'; and Tartarus, since nothing is there said to the contrary, must be situated where Homer placed it, in the depths of the earth. The place of punishment is also described as ἐν Ἄιδου; and this term likewise must be taken in its Homeric sense, as signifying a place beneath the earth. In *Rep.* 10, we are told that the judges, seated between earth and sky, 'bade the righteous take the road which leads to the right hand and up through the sky; but the unrighteous they sent by the road which leads to the left hand and down' (into the interior of the earth). In the myth of the *Phaedo*, the eschatological geography is more elaborate and more original. The abodes of the blest are situated on 'the true surface of the earth', i. e. on the summits of lofty table-lands which rise above the air into the aether;¹ but the wicked are plunged into Tartarus, which is a great hole or cavern, pierced right through the spherical earth; and the Acherusian lake, 'whither come the souls of the most part of the dead', is connected with Tartarus, and is situated in a cavity of the earth. The Homeric conception has here been modified to suit the new theory of the

¹ This notion may have been suggested in part by the Homeric Olympus. But it is worth noting that the country where such a description of the earth as Plato gives in the *Phaedo* would most naturally present itself is Egypt. Residents in the Nile-valley cannot fail to be aware, by the direct evidence of their senses, that they are living in a watery hollow scooped out of a table-land of indefinite extent, which rises into the pure dry desert-air above. This table-land is uninhabited by living men; in ancient Egypt, it might well be imagined to be peopled by the dead, who were buried along its edge; and among the various incompatible notions of the Egyptians about the place of the departed, there was one according to which the kingdom of Osiris, the abode of the 'justified', lay to the west of the Nile-valley, i. e. somewhere on that 'true surface of the earth', the Libyan desert-plateau. The myth of the *Phaedo* then may be reckoned among the evidences that Plato's imagination at least, if not his philosophic doctrine, was affected by influences from Egypt.

earth's rotundity, and other advances of science; but the place of punishment is still subterranean.

After Plato's time, however, the new physics tended to prevail over the old literary tradition. The Stoics abandoned the notion of a subterranean Hades, and said that the soul, being a 'pneumatic' body (i. e. composed of fire and air), must rise when detached from the flesh.¹ This is a necessary inference from Stoic principles, and was probably asserted by Chrysippus. (See Arnim *Stoic. vet. fr.* II, p. 224, § 815.) The earlier Stoics, however, concentrated their attention on the present life of man; and though they said that some souls at least continue to exist as separate individuals until the *ecpyrosis*,² they took little interest in the state of the disembodied soul.³ But Posidonius followed the example of the Platonists in giving much attention to the life after death;⁴ and many of the statements of later writers on this topic are derived from him, or influenced by him. The writer of *Ascl. Lat.* III follows the lead of Posidonius in saying that all souls rise into the air on their departure from the body; that the air consists of two distinct strata; that impure souls are 'purged' by wind, heat, and cold, in the lower stratum of the air; and that purified souls pass upward thence into the higher and untroubled stratum of the air. But he has supplemented the doctrine of Posidonius by

¹ 'The Stoics' in Arius Didymus, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 471: (τὰς ψυχὰς) ὅσαι τε ἐν αἰθέρι εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι· διαμένειν γὰρ ἐκεῖ (i. e. in the atmosphere, and not beneath the earth) τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχὰς. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9, 71: καὶ γὰρ οὐδὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐνεστὶν ὑπονοῆσαι κάτω φερομένας· λεπτομερεῖς γὰρ οὐσαι, καὶ οὐχ ἦττον πυρώδεις ἢ πνευματώδεις, εἰς τοὺς ἀνω μᾶλλον τόπους κουφοροῦσιν.

² Diog. Laert. 7. 157: Κλεάνθης μὲν οὖν πάσας (τὰς ψυχὰς) ἐπιδιαμένειν μέχρι τῆς ἐκπυρώσεως, Χρύσιππος δὲ τὰς τῶν σοφῶν μόνων.

³ Epictetus and Marcus Aurelius adhered to the attitude of the earlier Stoics in this respect. Epictetus (3. 13. 14 f.) denies the existence of a subterranean abode of the dead (οὐδεὶς Ἄιδης οὐδ' Ἀχέρων οὐδὲ Κωνυτὸς οὐδὲ Πυριφλεγέθων), but does not substitute for it an aerial abode; he speaks of death as the dissolution of man into the elements of which he is composed, and does not contemplate the survival of the individual personality. Marcus Aurelius (4. 21) takes it for granted that disembodied souls, if and as long as they continue to exist, are situated in the air: εἰ διαμένουσιν αἱ ψυχαί, πῶς αὐτὰς ἐξ αἰθέρος χωρεῖ ὁ αἴθρ; He answers, 'In the same way that earth finds room for dead bodies; room is made for the later by the dissolution of the earlier.' οὕτως αἱ εἰς τὸν αἶρα μεθιστάμεναι ψυχαί, ἐπὶ ποσὸν συμμίναςαι, μεταβάλλουσι καὶ χέονται καὶ ἐξάπτονται (i. e. change into flame, and so cease to exist as separate individuals), εἰς τὸν τῶν ὄλων σπερματικὸν λόγον ἀναλαμβάνόμεναι, καὶ τοῦτον τὸν τρόπον χώραν ταῖς προσοικισομέναις παρέχουσι. τοῦτο δ' ἂν τις ἀποκρίνατο ἐφ' ὑποθέσει τοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς διαμένειν. There is no trace of Posidonius here; the doctrine seems to have been derived rather from Chrysippus.

⁴ According to Rohde, *Psyche*, p. 610 f., Posidonius' views on this subject were derived in part from Heraclides Ponticus (350-300 B.C.), whose 'Vision of Empedotimos', an eschatological myth after the manner of those of Plato, was influential in shaping the notions about the state of the dead which were current in later times.

combining with it a theory of daemons (beings of a different order from the disembodied or not yet embodied human souls called 'daemons' by Posidonius). Like Plutarch in the 'Vision of Thespesius', the Hermetist ascribes to the action of these personal beings the processes of retribution and purgation which Posidonius must have held to be carried on by the working of natural law. The Hermetist's daemonology must have been derived from some Platonic source; it has some resemblance to that of the *Epinomis*; but it is impossible to trace the intermediate stages by which it reached him. Thus it appears that his teaching about the life after death is derived wholly from Greek sources; and there is no trace of evidence that in this portion of his treatise he was in any way influenced by the national religion of Egypt. This is the more noteworthy, because when he is dealing with the subject of the temple-cults, his position is that of an Egyptian rather than a Greek.

As part of the passage in *Ascl.* III is lost, we do not know whether the writer adopted the doctrine of repeated incarnation. But as this doctrine was taught by the Platonists, and probably by Posidonius, and as it appears in other *Hermetica*,¹ the writer of *Ascl.* III also may perhaps have said that some souls are incarnated more than once.

ὅς οἱ ποιηταὶ . . . Πυριφλεγέθοντα ὀνομάζουσι. It is unlikely that the Hermetist was so regardless of the *mise en scène* of his dialogue as to make his prehistoric Egyptian prophet speak of the Greek poets; it may therefore be presumed that both this clause in the paraphrase, and the corresponding clause in the verbal quotation from the *Λόγος τέλειος* (*De mens.* 4. 148), are notes added by Lydus. In *De mens.* 4. 32, Lydus has added to his note in 4. 148 the words *καὶ αὐτὸς ὁ Πλάτων ἐν Φαίδωνι*. We may be sure that the Hermetist did not commit the anachronism of making Trismegistus mention Plato by name.

τοὺς δὲ σωτηρικούς . . . ἀποσώζειν τὰς ψυχὰς. Does this refer to the souls which are rising from the lower air into the upper air, or to those which are rising from the upper air into the celestial fire? Presumably the former, as the word *ἀποσώζειν* implies a rescue from a painful situation. The souls spoken of must be either innocent souls, which rise rapidly through the lower air, and, with the aid of beneficent daemons, ascend at once into the upper air, or else, more guilty souls, at the stage when their purgation in the lower air is com-

¹ Reincarnation in animal bodies, *Ascl.* I. 12 a; *Corp.* X. 8 a; *Kore Kosmu.* Stob. *Exc.* XXIII. 39. Reincarnation in human bodies only, *Corp.* X. 19 b-22 a.

pleted. In Lydus' paraphrase, the rescuers are said to be stationed 'near the lunar region'; this must be Lydus' way of describing the upper air, and the *σωτηρικοὶ δαίμονες* must be the beings spoken of in 33 b as residing 'in aeris purissima parte'. They take up into their own abode the souls which they rescue from the torments of the lower air.

Compare Plut. *Gen. Socr.* 593 F: 'When men are swimming in the sea, the people who stand upon the beach merely watch them in silence as long as they are still in deep water and floating far from land; but when some of them have nearly reached the shore, the watchers run forward, and wade in to meet them, and help them with hand and voice, and bring them safe to land.¹ And even so it is with the help which daemons² give to men. As long as we are sunk in earthly things, and enter body after body, shifting, so to speak, from one vehicle to another, they leave us to struggle and endure unaided, and to endeavour by our own virtue to escape and to reach port. But when a soul has striven well and earnestly in long contests through the course of numberless births,—when the cycle draws towards its close, and the soul, beset with danger, and eager to make its way out, is struggling upward with hard effort,—then God does not forbid the familiar daemon³ of that soul to aid it, but permits him to give help, as he is eager to do; for each daemon is eager to urge on some particular soul, and to rescue it;⁴ and the soul, being already near at hand, hears the cheering voice, and is saved. But if the soul does not obey the voice it hears, the daemon abandons it, and that soul comes to a woeful end.' Plutarch is here speaking of help given by daemons to souls which are still in the body, and are seeking to escape from the 'circle of births'; but his language may have been suggested by some authority in which souls were described as escaping, with the help of daemons, from the purgatory of the lower air to the beatitude of those who dwell in the untroubled air above.

Lydus' summary of the passage ceases here; but in the original *Λόγος τέλειος*, the account of the lot of impure souls after death was

¹ ἀνασώζουσιν.

² The 'daemons' of whom Plutarch is here speaking are αἱ ἀππλλαγμέναί γενέσεως ψυχαὶ καὶ σχολάζουσαι τὸ λοιπὸν ἀπὸ σώματος,—οἱ πεπαυμένοι τῶν περὶ τὸν βίον ἀγώνων, δι' ἀρετὴν ψυχῆς γενόμενοι δαίμονες,—i. e. the disembodied souls of good men.

³ τὸν οἰκεῖον δαίμονα. Plutarch here assumes that the special daemon who watches over the individual man,—the 'guardian Genius',—is one of the class of δαίμονες in the sense assigned to the term by Posidonius, i. e. disembodied and beatified human souls.

⁴ ἀνασώζειν.

probably followed by a corresponding account of the lot of pious souls after death, which is wholly lost. It may be presumed that, according to the writer's view, pious souls, on quitting the body, rise swiftly and painlessly through the lower air into the 'Elysium' of the higher air, and that they subsequently attain to the celestial fire; their lot would so far correspond to that of 'the few' in the system of Posidonius. If we might argue from other parts of the treatise, it would seem that the celestial fire itself must be only a stage on the way to that which is beyond it, and that the final destination of the pious must be 'the incorporeal and eternal'. But we cannot be sure that the writer applied his principles consistently.

29 b. In dei religione . . . ceteris astris antistat. This paragraph deals with the advantages enjoyed by the pious *during their life in the body*. It has nothing to do with the lot of disembodied souls, which is the subject of chs. 27 e-29 a and the lost passage summarized by Lydus; and there is no reason to think that it originally formed the conclusion of the discourse of Hermes. Its contents are similar to those of chs. 22 a-23 a, where the distinction between the pious and other men is spoken of; but it does not seem possible to insert it there, as the text of that part of the treatise appears to be continuous. It may perhaps have followed the passage on the *θεῖος νοῦς*, ch. 32 b, or that on Heimarmene, chs. 39-40 c; but there is no sufficient reason for inserting it in either of those places. It is necessary to remove it, together with chs. 27 e-29 a, from the passage on time and eternity, which it clearly interrupts; and I have left it here, merely because I did not know where else to put it.

In dei religione et in [summa] pietate praesidium est (unum). The passage quoted from 'Hermes' by Lactantius 2. 15. 6 may possibly have been taken from some other Hermetic document in which identical phrases occurred; but it seems more likely that it is an extract from the *Δόγος τέλειος* as the text stood in his copy. If so, the sentences *εὐσέβους γὰρ . . . κρατεῖ* and *τὸ γὰρ ἐν . . . εὐσέβεια* must either have been added to the original in the text quoted by Lactantius, or accidentally omitted in the Latin *Asclepius*. The latter seems probable, because the sense of the passage is more satisfactory when we read it in the form in which Lactantius gives it. An explanation of the evils to be guarded against, such as he supplies, is desirable; and the statement that 'piety is the one and only good among men' is appropriate, if not indispensable, as an introduction to the praise of piety which follows.

Cyril quotes from 'Hermes to Asclepius'; and either *Ascl.* III, or the *Λόγος τέλειος* as a whole, might be thus described. Cyril's quotation appears to be a later expansion of the text given by Lactantius; the words which he adds are superfluous, and weaken the force of the passage.

Summa, as an epithet of *pietate*, yields no satisfactory sense; and on the other hand, the Greek parallels make it probable that *praesidium* was accompanied by an epithet. *Summa* may have arisen out of *unum* misplaced.

For the thought, compare Origen *c. Cels.* 8. 27: οὐδὲ γάρ, κὰν μὴ ᾧσιν αὐτοῖς εὐμενεῖς οἱ δαίμονες, πάσχειν ἂν τι ὑπ' αὐτῶν δύναιτο, φρουρούμενοι ὑπὸ τοῦ εὐμενοῦς αὐτοῖς διὰ τὴν εὐσέβειαν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεοῦ. . . . ὁ δ' ἔχων τὸν ἐπὶ πᾶσι θεὸν διὰ τὴν εἰς αὐτὸν εὐσέβειαν εὐμενῆ . . . λέγοι ἂν θαρρῶν, ὡς οὐδὲν πεισόμενος ἀπὸ παντὸς τοῦ τῶν δαιμόνων στρατοπέδου, "Κύριος φωτισμός μου καὶ σωτήρ μου· τίνα φοβηθήσομαι;" (*Psalms* 26 (27). 1.)

εὐσεβοῦς γὰρ ἀνθρώπου οὔτε δαίμων κακὸς οὔτε εἰμαρμένη κρατεῖ. Heimarmene and the maleficent daemons have power only over the corporeal things of the sublunar world, and can dominate a man only so far as he is subject to the influence of these corporeal things. The many, whose souls are wholly immersed in the body, are necessarily slaves of 'Heimarmene and the bad daemons'; physical forces, operating through their bodily organs, trouble their souls with evil passions, and they consequently live a life of misery. But the 'pious' man,—that is, as we are told below, he who is 'illuminated' by the divine *νοῦς*, and who 'commingles himself' with it ('*toto se sensu intelligentiae divinae commiscet*'),—has escaped from the bonds of the body ('*a parte naturae quae mortalis est liberatus*'). Even while still physically present in the corporeal world, he is no longer of it; he lives in another and a higher world,¹ and is in no way concerned with what Heimarmene may do to his body. Cf. Zosimus I. 7 (*Testim.*): Hermes says that δεῖ . . . εἶαν τὴν εἰμαρμένην ὃ θέλει[ν] ποιεῖν τῷ ἑαυτῆς πηλῷ, τουτέστι τῷ σώματι.

Heimarmene is here, as often, regarded as a maleficent power, escape from which is to be desired. This notion is hardly consistent with *Ascl.* III. 39, where we are told that Heimarmene is either God himself, or the highest of God's *ἐνέργεια*. The aspiration to escape from Heimarmene is Platonic; the willing acceptance of Heimarmene

¹ Cf. Paul, *Phil.* 3. 18 ff.: πολλοὶ γὰρ περιπατοῦσιν . . . ὧν ὁ θεὸς ἡ κοιλία, . . . εἰ τὰ ἐπίγεια φρονούντες. ἡμῶν γὰρ τὸ πολίτευμα ἐν οὐρανοῖς ὑπάρχει.

as God's ordering of the world ('Ducunt volentem fata, nolentem trahunt') is Stoic.

As to the coupling of *κακὸς δαίμων* with *εἰμαρμένη*, cf. *Corp.* XVI. 13-16, where it is said that all corporeal things on earth are administered by troops of daemons who work under the orders of the planet-gods, and that this administration is called *εἰμαρμένη*. (The star-gods were commonly regarded as instruments or agents of Heimarmene.) *Corp.* XVI. 16 as emended: *ὄτω οὖν ἐν τῷ λογικῷ ἀκτῖς ἐπιλάμπει ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, τοῦτω καταργοῦνται οἱ δαίμονες, κ.τ.λ.*

non ubi sit loco, nec qualis sit qualitate. Cf. ch. 31: 'Ubi enim et quo et unde, et quomodo aut quale sit (*sc.* God, or Eternity), *incertum est*'. 'Quality' (the Stoic *ποιόν* or *ποιότης*) means *sensible* quality; the writer would not deny that it can be known that God possesses certain attributes, e. g. that of goodness. Porphyry, 'Αφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά 5: ὁ δὲ νοῦς ἀμέριστος οὐσία μόνον, τὰ δὲ σώματα μεριστὰ μόνον, αἱ δὲ ποιότητες καὶ τὰ ἔνυλα εἶδη περὶ τὰ σώματα μεριστά.

immortalitatis futurae concipit fiduciam. The 'immortality' to which the pious man looks forward means a life unrestricted by the limitations of human life on earth. He has already disengaged his affections from all that is corporeal; the body is, to him, merely an extraneous appendage; and he is assured that, when released by death from the bonds by which he is bound to it, he will live wholly in that incorporeal and eternal world on which his heart is set. Compare ch. 22 b: '[ad] immortalitatis spem intentionemque protendens.'

'**quasi oculi (oculis ed. Rom.) vera ratione perspecta et fiducia credulitatis suae**'. These corrupt words suggest a meaning something like that of *Ep. Heb.* 11. 1: *ἔστι δὲ πίστις ἐπιζομένων ὑπόστασις, πραγμάτων ἔλεγχος οὐ βλεπομένων*. It would be possible to make sense by writing 'fiducia credulitatis suae, quasi oculis, vera ratione perspecta'. This might be taken as meaning 'fiducia (*abl.*) . . . veram rationem perspicit'; but if we take it so, we must assume that *vera ratio* stand for *ἡ ἀλήθεια*, 'reality', in the sense in which that term is used in *Herm. ap. Stob. Exc.* II A.

[**Ipse enim sol . . . ceteras stellas inluminat.**] This sentence appears to be one of the 'solar interpolations'. (See *Ascl.* III. 19 b, 'Solis οὐσιάρχης lumen est'.) It weakens an impressive conclusion by introducing an irrelevant topic; and it does not agree with the preceding words. There is no sense in saying that 'the pious excel other men as much as the sun excels the stars in brilliance; for the sun does not illuminate the stars with his brilliance so much as with something else'.

The statement 'sol ceteras stellas inluminat', though inappropriate to the context, is not in itself impossible; for there were some who held that the sun gives light to the stars as well as to the moon. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 346: Μητρόδωρος (of Chios) ἅπαντας τοὺς ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρας ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου προσλάμπεσθαι, Στράτων καὶ αὐτὸς τὰ ἄστρα ὑπὸ τοῦ ἡλίου φωτίζεσθαι. Διότιμος Τύριος . . . τὴν αὐτὴν τοῦτοις εἰσηνέγκατο γνώμην. The writer of *Corp.* XVI held a similar view; see XVI. 8. It may be suspected however that *inluminat* has been substituted by error for some such word as *exsuperat*, which would agree better with *magnitudine luminis*. But if *exsuperat* were written, the sentence would be no less irrelevant.

Epilogus.

40 d. *Dictum est vobis . . . pabulis saturavimus.* Did this conclusion of the discourse of Hermes form part of the original *Ascl.* III, or was it added by the compiler of the Λόγος τέλειος? The words 'restat . . . ut benedicentes deum orantesque' &c. lead on to the following prayer, 41 b, and are needed to introduce it. The narrative passage 41 a, in which Tat is spoken of as well as Asclepius, was probably written by the same compiler by whom the Prologue was added. The plural *vobis* in 40 d *init.* implies that more than one hearer is present; but ὑμῶν may have been substituted for σοι or ἡμῶν; and apart from that, there is nothing to prevent us from supposing that both 40 d and 41 b were included in the original *Ascl.* III, in which Hermes spoke to Asclepius alone.

The narrative 41 a was present in the Λόγος τέλειος as known to Lactantius, i. e. not long after A. D. 300.

satis enim nos . . . saturavimus. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 22 b: *ικανῶς γὰρ ἕκαστος ἡμῶν (ἑαυτοῦ) ἐπεμελήθη, ἐγὼ τε [δ] λέγων σύ τε [δ] ἀκούων.*

velut animi pabulis. Cf. Philo *Leg. allegor.* 3. 55. 161, Cohn I, p. 148: εὐλόγως οὖν τὸ μὲν ἐκ γῆς διαπλασθὲν σῶμα συγγενεῖς ἔχει τροφὰς ἅς ἀναδίδωσιν ἢ γῆ, ἢ δὲ αἰθερίον φύσεως μοῖρα οὐσα ψυχὴ πάλιν αἰθερίου καὶ θείας· ἐπιστήμαις γὰρ τρέφεται, καὶ οὐ σιτίοις ἢ ποτοῖς, ὧν ἐπιδέες ἐστὶ τὸ σῶμα. Porphyr. *De abst.* 4. 20: διάφοροι τοίνυν αἱ τροφαὶ κατὰ τὸ διάφορον τῶν τρεφομένων· καὶ δεῖ πάντα μὲν τρέφειν, σπουδάξειν δὲ πιαίνειν τὰ ἐν ἡμῶν κυριώτατα. ψυχῆς οὖν λογικῆς τροφή ἢ τηροῦσα λογικῆν. νοῦς δὲ αὐτῆ· ὥστε νῶ θρεπτέον.

41a. De adyto vero egressi. The situation is the same as that described in the Prologue. We are told in the Prologue that Asclepius, Tat, and Ammon were present; here, Asclepius and Tat are mentioned, and it may be presumed that Ammon is present also.

in austrum respicientes. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 16: νότῳ ἀνέμῳ ἀποβλέπων κ.τ.λ. Why those who pray at sunset should face southward, and not westward, I do not know; but the precept is probably based on some tradition of Egyptian ritual. Possibly the westward position was avoided because the region of the sunset was associated with darkness, death, and ghosts. Cf. Porphyry. *De antro nymphḗ.* 29: κατὰ ταῦτα τοίνυν τῷ μὲν θνητῷ καὶ γενέσει ὑποπτῶτῳ φύλῃ τὰ βόρεια οἰκεῖα, τῷ δὲ θειοτέρῳ τὰ νότια, ὡς θεοῖς μὲν τὰ ἀνατολικά, δαίμοσι δὲ τὰ δυτικά.

in eum (sc. ventum) qui subsolanus dicitur. On the eastward position in prayer, cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7. 7. 43: ἐπεὶ δὲ γενεθλίου ἡμέρας εἰκὼν ἢ ἀνατολή, κακείθεν τὸ φῶς αὖξεται "ἐκ σκοτούς λάμψαν" τὸ πρῶτον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ κυλινδουμένοις ἀνέτειλεν γνώσεως ἀληθείας ἡμέρα κατὰ λόγον τοῦ ἡλίου, πρὸς τὴν ἔωθινῃ ἀνατολῇ αἰ εὐχαί. The Hermetist would perhaps have given similar reasons for his practice, though no doubt it was really derived from primitive sun-worship. Clement adds: ὅθεν καὶ τὰ παλαιάτα τῶν ἱερῶν πρὸς δύσιν ἔβλεπεν, ἵνα οἱ ἀπαντιπρόσωπον τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἰστάμενοι πρὸς ἀνατολὴν τρέπεσθαι διδάσκωνται. Clement here says that 'the most ancient temples' (Egyptian, or Greek?) faced westward. But this was not the usual arrangement in the times known to us. Cf. Hyginus *De agr. tim.* p. 153 Goes: 'antiqui architecti in occidentem templa spectare recte scripserunt: postea placuit omnem religionem eo convertere, ex qua parte caeli terra illuminatur' (i. e. in later times temples were usually built facing eastward). Porphyry (*De antro nymphḗ.* 3) says that almost all temples face eastward: ὡς ἂν σχεδὸν πάντων τῶν ἱερῶν τὰ μὲν ἀγάλματα καὶ τὰς εἰσόδους ἔχόντων πρὸς ἀνατολὴν τετραμμένας, τῶν δὲ εἰσιόντων πρὸς δύσιν ἀφορώντων, ὅταν ἀντιπρόσωποι τῶν ἀγαλμάτων ἐστῶτες τοῖς θεοῖς τὰς λιτὰς καὶ θεραπείας προσάγωσι. The front of Greek temples is commonly towards the East. The Jewish temple fronted eastward. The Egyptian temples varied in their orientation; the great temple of Amon at Karnak, for instance, opened towards the North-west, and the temple at Luxor, towards the North-east.

iam ergo dicentibus precationem. There is an awkwardness in the narrative here, which confirms the suspicion that ch. 41a was inserted by a later hand. Hermes and his three pupils begin to pray simultaneously; after they have begun, Asclepius interrupts the prayers of his companions by his proposal; and Hermes, having rebuked him, proceeds to pray aloud, speaking for all of them together. If Hermes wished to lead his disciples in prayer, why did he not do so from the first? This difficulty disappears if we omit ch. 41a, and make the audible prayer of Hermes follow on his discourse without a break.

sugeramus patri tuo, e ritu ut (patri iusserit ut MSS.) ture addito et pigmentis precem dicamus. The word *tuo* is needed; without it, *patri* would mean 'to my father'.

Pigmentum means 'a scented unguent'. Firmicus Maternus, *De err. prof. rel.* (A. D. 347) 23. 1: 'Christi unguentum immortalis compositione conficitur, et spiritalibus pigmentorum odoribus temperatur.' Firmicus Maternus *Math.* 3. 6. 3: 'odorum pigmenta.' Macrobius (c. A. D. 400) *Sat.* 1, *Praef.* 8: 'qui odora pigmenta conficiunt ante omnia curant ut nullius sint odoris propria quae condientur.' Hence *πικεντάριος*, 'an apothecary', Olympiodorus *ad Pl. Gorg.* p. 117.

On the Egyptian usage of burning fragrant substances in the worship of the sun-god (Horus?), see Plut. *Is. et Os.* 52 and 80. The substance burnt at sunset was called *κῆφι*, and was composed of sixteen ingredients.

The Hermetist admits such offerings (*sacrificiis frequentibus*, ch. 38a) in the worship of the 'terrestrial gods'; but he excludes them from the worship of the supreme God.

Melius, melius ominare . . . a mortalibus. Lactantius' translation of this passage is more trustworthy than that of *Ascl. Lat.*

tale quid de uno illo ac singulari bono in animum inducere (Lact.).—cum deum roges, tus ceteraque incendere (*Ascl. Lat.*). Perhaps some words have been lost in *Ascl. Lat.*; we might read 'cum [d]eum roges (qui solus est bonus)'. The word *incendere* in *Ascl. Lat.* might be accounted for by some confusion between *ἐνθυμείσθαι* (*in animum inducere*) and *ἐνθυμῶν* or *ἐπιθυμῶν* (*tus ceteraque incendere*); perhaps the translator read *ἐνθυμῶσθαι*.

Haec et his similia huic non conveniunt (Lact.): omitted in *Ascl. Lat.*

omnium enim quaecunque sunt plenus est (Lact.).—qui ipse est omnia, aut in eo sunt omnia (transposed in *Ascl. Lat.*). The original Greek may have been πάντων γὰρ πλήρης ἐστί. We might account for the reading of *Ascl. Lat.* by assuming that the translator had before him two alternative readings, viz. πάντα γὰρ αὐτός ἐστι, and πάντα γὰρ ἐν αὐτῷ ἐστι, and rendered both. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 26 b: '(deus) est omnium plenissimus; . . . Et habet omnia quae vult.'

et omnium minime indigens (Lact.).—Nihil enim deest ei (*Ascl. Lat.*). Cf. Porph. *De abst.* 3. 26: τὸ δὲ ἐν τῷ παντὶ κρείττον (i. e. τὸ θεῖον) . . . ἀπροσδεὲς πάντων.

huius enim sacrificium sola benedictio est (Lact.).—hae[c] sunt enim summi incensiones dei, gratiae cum aguntur a mortalibus (*Ascl. Lat.*). *Summae*, the reading of the MSS., is clearly wrong; for it would imply that other kinds of *incensiones* also are admissible, which is the very thing that the writer is denying. The only doubt is whether *summae* should be corrected into *summi* or *solae*. As the offering of incense to subordinate gods is permitted, *summi* is appropriate.

On the notion that words of praise and thanksgiving ought to take the place of material offerings in the worship of the supreme God, cf. *Corp.* I. 31, δέξαι λογικὰς θυσίας (i. e. sacrifices which consist of speech alone). Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 71: 'Cultus autem deorum est optimus idemque castissimus atque sanctissimus plenissimusque pietatis, ut eos semper pura, integra, incorrupta et munda et voce veneremur.' Some went a step further, and regarded even verbal worship as superfluous. Sen. *Ep.* 95. 47 ff.: 'Deum colit qui novit. . . . Primus est deorum cultus deos credere; deinde reddere illis maiestatem suam, reddere bonitatem. . . . Vis deos propitiare? Bonus esto. Satis illos coluit quisquis imitatus est.' Apollonius of Tyana ἐν τῷ Περὶ θυσιῶν, in Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 4. 13: οὕτως τοίνυν μάλιστα ἂν τις, οἶμαι, τὴν προσήκουσαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιοῖτο τοῦ θεῖου, τυγχάνοι τε αὐτόθεν ἰλεῶ τε καὶ εὐμένους αὐτοῦ. . . . εἰ (τῷ) θεῷ (ἐκείνῳ) μὲν, ὃν δὴ πρῶτον ἔφαμεν, ἐνὶ τε ὄντι (καὶ) κευχωρισμένῳ πάντων, μεθ' ὃν γνωρίζεσθαι τοὺς λοιποὺς ἀναγκαῖον, μὴ θύοι τι τὴν ἀρχήν, μήτε ἀνάπτοι πῦρ, μήτε καθόλου τι τῶν αἰσθητῶν ἐπονομάζοι,—δείται γὰρ οὐδενὸς οὐδὲ παρὰ τῶν κρειτόνων ἤπερ ἡμεῖς, οὐδ' ἔστιν ὃ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἀνίησι γῆ φυτὸν ἢ τρέφει ζῶον, ἢ ἀήρ, ᾧ μὴ πρόσσεστί γέ τι μίασμα,—μόνῳ δὲ χρῆτο πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀεὶ τῷ κρείττονι λόγῳ, λέγω δὲ τῷ μὴ διὰ στόματος ἰόντι, καὶ

παρὰ τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν ὄντων διὰ τοῦ καλλίστου τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν αἰτοίῃ τὰγαθά· νοῦς δέ ἐστιν οὗτος, ὄργανον μὴ δεόμενος. οὐκοῦν κατὰ ταῦτα οὐδαμῶς τῷ μεγάλῳ καὶ ἐπὶ πάντων θεῷ θυτέον. Porphyry *De abst.* 2. 34: θύσωμεν τοῖνυν καὶ ἡμεῖς· ἀλλὰ θύσωμεν, ὡς προσήκει, διαφόρους τὰς θυσίας, ὡς ἂν διαφόροις δυνάμεσι προσάγοντες· θεῷ τῷ ἐπὶ πάνσι, ὡς τις ἀνὴρ σοφὸς (meaning Apollonius of Tyana?) ἔφη, μηδὲν τῶν αἰσθητῶν μήτε θυμιῶντες μήτ' ἐπονομάζοντες· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἔστιν ἔνυλον, ὃ μὴ τῷ αὐλῷ εὐθύς ἐστιν ἀκάθαρτον. διὸ οὐδὲ λόγος τούτῳ ὃ κατὰ φωνὴν οἰκείος, οὐδ' ὃ ἔνδον, ὅταν πάθει ψυχῆς ἢ μεμολυσμένος, διὰ δὲ σιγῆς καθαρῶς καὶ τῶν περὶ αὐτοῦ καθαρῶν ἐννοιῶν θρησκευόμεν αὐτόν. δεῖ ἄρα, συναφθέντας καὶ ὁμοιωθέντας αὐτῷ, τὴν αὐτῶν ἀναγωγὴν θυσίαν ἱερὰν προσάγειν τῷ θεῷ, τὴν αὐτὴν [δὲ] καὶ ἕμνον οὖσαν καὶ ἡμῶν σωτηρίαν. ἐν ἀπαθείᾳ ἄρα τῆς ψυχῆς τοῦ δὲ θεοῦ θεωρία ἢ θυσία αὕτη τελείται. τοῖς δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐκγόνοις, νοητοῖς δὲ θεοῖς, ἤδη καὶ τὴν ἐκ τοῦ λόγου ἕμνωδιαν προσθετέον. ἀπαρχὴ γὰρ ἐκάστῳ ὧν δέδωκεν ἢ θυσία, καὶ δι' ὧν ἡμῶν τρέφει καὶ εἰς τὸ εἶναι συνέχει τὴν οὐσίαν. ὡς οἷν γεωργὸς δραγμάτων ἀπάρχεται καὶ τῶν ἀκροδρύων, οὕτως ἡμεῖς ἀπαρξώμεθα αὐτοῖς ἐννοιῶν τῶν περὶ αὐτῶν καλῶν, εὐχαριστοῦντες ὧν ἡμῖν δεδώκασιν τὴν θεωρίαν, καὶ ὅτι ἡμᾶς διὰ τῆς αὐτῶν θέας ἀληθινῶς τρέφουσι, συνόντες καὶ φαινόμενοι καὶ τῇ ἡμετέρᾳ σωτηρίᾳ ἐπιλάμποντες.

Jewish thinkers untouched by Greek influence had independently¹ arrived at the conclusion expressed by the Hermetist in the words 'huius sacrificium sola benedictio est'. *Psal.* 49 (50). 12 ff.: ἐὰν πεινάσω, οὐ μὴ σοι εἶπω· ἐμὴ γὰρ ἐστιν ἡ οἰκουμένη καὶ τὸ πλήρωμα αὐτῆς.² μὴ φάγομαι κρέα ταύρων, ἢ αἷμα τράγων πίομαι· θύσον τῷ θεῷ θυσίαν αἰνέσεως, καὶ ἀπόδος τῷ ὑψίστῳ τὰς εὐχὰς σου. *Psal.* 50 (51). 15 f.: τὸ στόμα μου ἀναγγελεῖ τὴν αἰνεσίαν σου. ὅτι εἰ ἠθέλησας θυσίαν, ἔδωκα ἂν· ὀλοκαυτώματα οὐκ εἰδοκῆσαι. θυσία τῷ θεῷ πνεῦμα συντετριμμένον. *Psal.* 140 (141). 2: κατευθυνθήτω ἡ προσευχή μου ὡς θυμίαμα ἐνώπιόν σου, ἔπαρσις τῶν χειρῶν μου θυσία ἔσπερινή.

Paul, in whom Greek and Jewish influences met, speaks in similar language; *Rom.* 12. 1: παρακαλῶ οὖν ὑμᾶς . . . παραστήσαι τὰ σώματα ὑμῶν θυσίαν ζῶσαν ἁγίαν τῷ θεῷ εὐάρεστον, τὴν λογικὴν λατρίαν ὑμῶν. Cf. *Heb.* 13. 15: δι' αὐτοῦ οὖν ἀναφέρωμεν θυσίαν αἰνέσεως διὰ παντὸς τῷ

¹ The thought cannot have been transmitted from Greeks to Jewish psalmists; but it may possibly have been transmitted to Greeks from Jews of the *diaspora*, who were debarred from offering sacrifices, and found in prayer and praise the only possible substitute.

² Cf. *Ascl.* (Lact.): 'omnium . . . plenus est, et omnium minime indigens.'

θεῷ, τοῦτ' ἔστι καρπὸν χειλέων ὁμολογούντων τῷ ὀνόματι αὐτοῦ. 1 *Ret.*
 2. 5: ἀνερέγκαι πνευματικὰς θυσίας εἰπροσδέκτους θεῷ. Clem. Alex.
Strom. 7. 6. 30 sq.: οὐδὲ ἐνδεῆς (ὁ θεός), καθάπερ τὰ γενητά, ὡς θυσίων,
 δίκην τροφῆς, διὰ λιμὸν ἐπιθυμεῖν. . . . εἰ δὲ τιμώμενον χαίρει (τὸ θεῖον),
 φύσει ἀνευδὲς ὑπάρχον, οὐκ ἀπεικότως ἡμεῖς (i. e. the Christians) δι'
 εὐχῆς τιμῶμεν τὸν θεόν, καὶ ταύτην τὴν θυσίαν ἀρίστην καὶ ἀγνωστὴν
 μετὰ δικαιοσύνης¹ ἀναπέμπομεν τῷ δικαιοτάτῳ λόγῳ (to the Word of
 God), γεραίροντες δι' οὗ (Him through whom) παραλαμβάνομεν τὴν
 γνῶσιν, διὰ τούτου (δὲ) δοξάζοντες ὃν² μεμαθήκαμεν. . . . καὶ γὰρ ἔστιν
 ἡ θυσία τῆς ἐκκλησίας λόγος (speech) ἀπὸ τῶν ἁγίων ψυχῶν ἀναθυμῶ-
 μενος, ἐκκαλυπτομένης ἅμα τῇ θυσίᾳ καὶ τῆς διανοίας ἀπάσης τῷ θεῷ.
Origen c. Cels. 8. 21: καὶ ἑορτάζει γε κατὰ ἀλήθειαν ὁ τὰ δέοντα πράττων,
 αἰεὶ εὐχόμενος, διὰ παντὸς θύων τὰς ἀναμάκτους ἐν ταῖς πρὸς τὸ θεῖον εὐχαῖς
 θυσίας. See Lactant. *Div. inst.* 6. 25. 1-12 (*Testim.*).

41 b. *Gratias tibi* &c. The Greek text of this thanksgiving (or rather, an inaccurate transcript of it) has been preserved in a damaged state, in the magic *Papyrus Mimaut*, Louvre, col. X (*Pap. mag. Par.* ii, ll. 284-302). This Papyrus was probably written about the end of the third century A. D. The sorcerers were accustomed to make up their incantations partly out of passages extracted from books of religious ritual, or other religious writings, with little regard for the meaning of these passages in their original setting;³ and the man who composed one of the charms in the *Papyrus Mimaut* made use of the concluding hymn of the Hermetic *Λόγος τέλειος* for his purpose. In the papyrus, it forms the last part of an invocation addressed to the Sun-god, to whom the operator says *ποίησον πάντα τὰ τῆς εὐχῆς μου*.—*ποίησον τὸ δεῖνα πρᾶγμα*—*ἔλθε μοι*, . . . *διδούς ἐμοὶ τῷ δεῖνα ὑγείαν, σωτηρίαν, πλοῦτον, εὐτεκνίαν, γνῶσιν, εὐωχίαν*,⁴ *εὐμένειαν, εὐβουλίαν, εὐδοξίαν, μνήμην, χάριν, μορφήν, κάλλος πρὸς πάντας ἀνθρώπους τοὺς ὄρωντάς με*.

¹ *Ps.* 4. 5: *θύσατε θυσίαν δικαιοσύνης*.

² ὃν (i. e. 'Him whom') Hort: & MS.

³ The object at which the sorcerers aimed in composing their invocations was not to transmit a correct text of any such hymn or prayer, but merely to produce something that would sound impressive to their customers, who must have been mostly ignorant and stupid people. As long as that purpose was served, it mattered little to them whether the words which they wrote down meant this or that, or had no meaning at all. They were perfectly free to alter, to omit, to add things out of their own heads, and to patch together scraps taken from different sources; and they did so without scruple. This ought to be borne in mind in dealing with such documents as the Mithraic *Apathanatismos* (Dieterich's *Mithrasliturgie*), for instance.

⁴ *εὐωχίαν Pap.* (*Eitrem*).

The Papyrus was transcribed by Wessely, and also by Reitzenstein; and it has recently been again examined and transcribed by Prof. S. Eitrem of Kristiania (Oslo). I owe it to Prof. Eitrem's kindness that I have not only been able to make use of his printed transcript of the papyrus-text (published in 1923),¹ but have also been much helped by letters which he has written to me about this difficult passage.

(χ)άρι σοι οἶδαμεν, (ᾤψιστε).

Gratias tibi (agimus), summe, exsuperantissime.

Some word denoting God, in the vocative, is wanted here; and ᾤψιστε (Reitz.) serves the purpose well. *Exsuperantissime* might be a translation of ὑπεροχώτατε; cf. ὁ πάσης ὑπεροχῆς μείζων in *Corp.* I. 31. But one such word seems better here than two; and it is possible that *summe* and *exsuperantissime* are alternative translations of a single Greek word.

ψυχῇ πάσῃ καὶ καρδίᾳ πρὸς σε ἀνατεταμένη.—(ψυχή πασα καὶ καρδιαν προς . . ανατεταμενην *Pap.*) Omitted in *Ascl. Lat.* It would be possible also to write ψυχῇ πάσῃ καὶ καρδίᾳ πρὸς σε ἀνατεταμένοι, οἱ ψυχὴν πᾶσαν καὶ καρδίαν πρὸς σε ἀνατεταμένοι. Cf. *Corp.* I. 31: δέξαι λογικὰς θυσίας [ἀγνὰς?] ἀπὸ ψυχῆς καὶ καρδίας πρὸς σε ἀνατεταμένης. Plotinus 5. 1. 6: θεὸν αὐτὸν ἐπικαλεσαμένοις, οὐ λόγῳ γεγωνῶ, ἀλλὰ τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκτείνασιν ἑαυτοὺς εἰς εὐχὴν πρὸς ἐκείνον. The word ἀνατείνειν was used in its literal sense to describe the uplifting of the hands in prayer; e.g. Ps.-Arist. *De mundo* 6, 400 a 16: πάντες οἱ ἄνθρωποι ἀνατείνομεν τὰς χεῖρας εἰς τὸν οὐρανὸν εὐχὰς ποιούμενοι. Thence it was transferred to the uplifting of the heart or soul ('sursum corda'), of which the bodily gesture was regarded as a symbol. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7. 7. 40: ταύτῃ καὶ προσανατείνομεν τὴν κεφαλὴν καὶ τὰς χεῖρας εἰς οὐρανὸν αἶρομεν τοὺς τε πόδας ἐπεγείρομεν² κατὰ τὴν τελευταίαν τῆς εὐχῆς συνεκφώνησιν, ἐπακολουθοῦντες τῇ προθυμίᾳ τοῦ πνεύματος³ εἰς τὴν νοητὴν οὐσίαν καὶ συναφιστάνειν τῷ λόγῳ⁴ τὸ σῶμα τῆς γῆς πευρώμενοι, μετάρσιον ποιησάμενοι "τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπτερωμένην" τῷ πόθῳ τῶν κρειττόνων, ἐπὶ τὰ ἅγια χωρεῖν βιαζόμεθα, τοῦ δεσμοῦ κατα-

¹ There is a gap, caused by the loss of a strip of papyrus, in the lower part of the column. Prof. Eitrem's measurement of the width of this gap, and consequently, his estimate of the number of letters missing in each line, is more exact than Reitzenstein's as given in *Poimandres*, p. 151 f., and his transcript is, in that respect at least, more trustworthy.

² 'Stand on tiptoe,' Hort and Mayor.

³ A Hermetist would have said τοῦ νοῦ οἱ τῆς διανοίας.

⁴ 'The uttered words,' H. and M.

μεγαλοφρονούντες τοῦ σαρκικοῦ. Clem. *Paed.* I. 5. 16: οὐκ ἄρ' ἔτι κλυόμεθα οἱ νήπιοι χαμαί, . . . ἀνατεινόμενοι δὲ ἄνω τῇ ἐννοίᾳ, . . . σοφίαν μεταδιόκομεν ἁγίαν.

ἄφραστον ὄνομα.—*Nomen sanctum.* It may be that, in the translator's copy of the Greek, the letters *αφρ* had been lost, and *αστον* had been altered into ἁγιον.

The term ἄφραστον ὄνομα, 'ineffable name', might, in some contexts, be used to denote God himself, the Being to whom the name belongs. But in this passage, there are two reasons against taking that to be the meaning. Firstly, the grammatical construction is not clear. Is ἄφραστον ὄνομα vocative? If so, we must put a comma before it, and connect it closely with what precedes. But the first clause (χάριν σοὶ οἶδαμεν κ.τ.λ.) is already provided with a vocative ('summe', ὕψιστε); and a second vocative, appended after the intervening clause ('tua enim gratia . . . consecuti'), seems superfluous and wrongly placed. Or are we to take ἄφραστον ὄνομα as accusative, in apposition to the σέ of the first clause (πρὸς (σέ) ἀνατεταμένη)? That also is made difficult by the intervening clause, in which the pronoun (expressed or implied) must have been σου, in the genitive. And secondly, the following words, τετιμημένον τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ κ.τ.λ., which are appropriate if applied to God himself, are inappropriate if applied to the word ὄνομα; for it could hardly be said that a name is honoured with an *appellation*. It therefore seems probable that some words, by which ἄφραστον ὄνομα was connected with the context, have been lost. This passage in the hymn was presumably suggested by what is said about the name of God in *Ascl.* III. 20 a, 'nullo ex his nominibus eum definite nuncupabimus' &c.; and the meaning must have been that God's true name cannot be told (or in other words, that God is ἀνόνημος), but men call him θεός and πατήρ.

τετιμημένον (δὲ) (τῇ) τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ.

et honorandum nomine divino (*nomen unum* MSS.).

The translator probably wrote 'honorandum nomine divino', rendering τοῦ θεοῦ by *divino*, as he rendered τοῦ πατρός by *paterna* in the corresponding phrase which follows. Cf. *Corp.* II. 16: τετιμημένοι τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ.

quod solus dominus es.—(*quo solus deus est* MSS.). Omitted in *Par.* A clause beginning with ὅτι is needed after τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ προσηγορίᾳ, to correspond to ὅτι πρὸς πάντας κ.τ.λ. after

τῆ τοῦ πατρός; and the words *quo solus deus est* in the MSS. of *Ascl.* show that the translator had some such clause before him in the Greek. I have therefore added the words ὅτι σὺ μόνος εἶ κύριος. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 21 as emended: θεέ, σὺ ὁ πατήρ κύριε, σὺ ὁ νοῦς.

Dominus (probably κύριος, though the word might stand for δεσπότης also) and *pater* are repeatedly coupled together in *Ascl.* III as names of God. Ch. 20 a: 'deus etenim vel pater vel dominus omnium.' *Ib.*: 'omniumque rerum patrem vel dominum.' Ch. 22 b: 'deus pater et dominus.' Ch. 23 b: 'dominus et pater, vel, quod est summum, deus.' *Ib.*: 'pater ac dominus.' Ch. 26 a: 'ille dominus et pater, deus primipotens': in the Greek, as given by Lactantius, ὁ κύριος καὶ πατήρ καὶ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. Ch. 29 b: 'pater enim omnium vel dominus.' In *Ascl.* I, the words *dominus* and *pater* do not occur together; but in ch. 8, God is called ὁ κύριος καὶ τῶν πάντων ποιητής, ὃν θεὸν καλεῖν γενομίκαμεν ('dominus et factor universorum, quem deum vocare existimavimus' Lact.); and in ch. 9, 'qui solus omnia aut pater est omnium'.

Philo spoke of the δύναμις βασιλική or δεσποτική of God (cf. *dominus*) on the one hand, and his δύναμις ποιητική or εὐεργετική (cf. *pater*) on the other hand, as two distinct δυνάμεις. E. g. Philo *De Cher.* 9. 27, Cohn I, p. 176: κατὰ τὸν ἓνα ὄντως ὄντα θεὸν δύο τὰς ἀνωτάτω εἶναι καὶ πρώτας δυνάμεις ἀγαθότητα καὶ ἐξουσίαν καὶ ἀγαθότητι μὲν τὸ πᾶν γεγεννηκέναι, ἐξουσία δὲ τοῦ γεννηθέντος ἄρχειν. τρίτον δέ, συναγωγὸν ἀμφοῖν, μέσον εἶναι λόγον λόγῳ γὰρ καὶ ἄρχοντα καὶ ἀγαθὸν εἶναι τὸν θεόν. *De special. legg.* 1. 8. 299, Cohn V, p. 72: What God demands of men is simple and easy, viz. ἀγαπᾶν αὐτὸν ὡς εὐεργέτην, εἰ δὲ μὴ, φοβεῖσθαι γοῦν ὡς ἄρχοντα καὶ κύριον, κ.τ.λ. Philo *Quaest. in Genesin* 1. § 57 Aucher: 'duas priores quae apud divinitatem sunt virtutes (i. e. δυνάμεις), creativam scilicet et regiam; quarum una nomen gerit dei (θεός), et altera, sive regia, domini (κύριος). Forma creativae pacata lenisque et benefica est virtus; regiae autem, legislatrix et castigatrix.' *Ib.* 2. § 16 (on the words Κύριος ὁ θεός in *Gen.* 7. 5): 'Utraque nomina (viz. κύριος and θεός) usurpavit nunc, declarativa superiorum virtutum (i. e. δυνάμεων) deperdendi ac beneficiendi, praemittens dominum, et postponens beneficium, deum. . . . Quum enim appellatio dei (θεός) benefica sit, istam frequentius usurpavit in constructione universorum (i. e. in speaking of

the Creation) . . . hoc enim (κύριος) regium est nomen et exterminativum; quoniam ubi actio generationis est, deus (θεός) praemittitur in ordine, ubi vero supplicium, dominus (κύριος) praepositur quam deus.' These two δυνάμεις of God are similarly spoken of by Philo in *Quaest. in Gen.* 2. § 51, 3. § 59, and 4. §§ 2 and 53. Thus the two names θεός and πατήρ, as used in *Ascl.* 41 b, correspond to the two names κύριος and θεός as explained by Philo. Similarly, in Christian writings, God's justice and God's mercy were contrasted; and Marcion carried the distinction so far as to make the 'just' God a different person from the 'good' God. Cf. Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 4. 3. 14: 'Unus igitur colendus est, qui potest vere pater nominari: idem etiam dominus sit necesse est, quia sicut potest indulgere, ita etiam coercere. Pater ideo appellandus est, quia nobis multa et magna largitur; dominus ideo, quia castigandi ac puniendi habet maximam potestatem.' *Ib.* 6. 25. 16: 'deo, patri ac domino.'

καὶ εὐλογοῦμενον τῇ τοῦ (πατρ)ός (sc. προσηγορία), ὅτ(ι) κ.τ.λ.

(e)t benedicendum (-dus MSS.) religione paterna, quoniam &c.

It is possible that *benedicendus* is right, and that we ought to read *honorandus* instead of *honorandum* in the preceding line, and *τετιμημένος* and *εὐλογοῦμενος* in the Greek. It is God that is 'honoured' and 'blessed'; and assuming that there is a lacuna after *ἄφραστον ὄνομα*, we do not know in what construction the participles originally stood. They may have been altered to make them agree with *ὄνομα*, after some intervening words had fallen out.

The translator apparently failed to see that *προσηγορία* was to be understood after *τῇ τοῦ πατρός*, and consequently inserted the inappropriate word *religione*.

The word *πατρός* (= *paterna*) suits well with *πατρικήν* in the following phrase; and it may be taken as certain that the Hermetist wrote *τῇ τοῦ πατρός, ὅτι*. But the sorcerer who borrowed the Hermetic hymn appears to have written something else in place of *πατρός, ὅτι*. The Papyrus, as read by Prof. Eitrem, gives *τη του . . ου οσ . πρ . .*; ¹ and Reitzenstein's reading of *Paρ.* does not differ from this in anything that matters. It may be conjectured

¹ In vol. i, p. 375, the second of the two dots after *πρ* in Prof. Eitrem's reading of *Paρ.* has been omitted by mistake.

then that the sorcerer, misled by τῆ τοῦ θεοῦ in the line above, wrote θεοῦ again here instead of writing πατρός, and perhaps that he also substituted ὄσφ for ὄτι. Assuming that he did so, the passage, as altered by him, ran thus: καὶ εὐλογούμενον τῆ τοῦ θεοῦ, ὄσφ πρὸς πάντας - - - εὐνοίαν - - - ἐνεδείξω.

πρὸς πάντας καὶ περὶ πάντα.—(πρ. s παντας και προς παντας Παρ.).

omnibus Ascl. Lat.

It may be that the Hermetist wrote simply πρὸς πάντας (= *omnibus*), and that καὶ πρὸς πάντας in Παρ. is a doublet, possibly written as an alternative for ὄσφ(?) πρὸς πάντας. But if not, πρὸς πάντας καὶ περὶ πάντα seems a more probable correction than Reitzenstein's conjecture, πρὸς πάντας καὶ πρὸς πάσας. Women are seldom spoken of in the Hermetic writings; and in none of them is it said or implied that any women (except the goddess-woman Isis) have attained to *gnosis*. Besides, if the Hermetist had thought fit to mention women here, he would have written πρὸς πάντας καὶ πάσας rather than πρὸς πάντας καὶ πρὸς πάσας.

πατρικὴν (εὐ)νοίαν καὶ στοργὴν καὶ φιλίαν, καὶ εἴ τις γλυκυτέρα (sc. τῆς πατρικῆς), ἐνεργεῖα ἐνεδείξω (καὶ ἐπιγλυκυτα(τη)ν ἐνεργ... ἐνδείξω Παρ.).

paternam pietatem et dilectionem (religionem MSS.) et amorem, et quaecumque est dulcior efficacia, praebere dignaris Ascl. Lat.

Dilectionem (= στοργήν), proposed by Eitrem, is almost certainly right. This word has been altered into *religionem*, which may have been suggested to a transcriber by *religione* in the preceding line.

The sorcerer probably wrote in the Papyrus καὶ ἐπιγλυκυτατην (or ἐπι γλυκυτατην?) ἐνεργίαν (or ἐνεργεῖα) ἐνδείξω. The Latin translation can be accounted for by assuming that the Greek which the translator had before him was καὶ εἰ τις γλυκυτέρα ἐνεργεῖα ἐνεδείξω. (Instances of the substitution of a superlative for a comparative, or *vice versa*, occur repeatedly in the Hermetic texts.) The translator apparently took ἐνεργεῖα (= *efficacia*) to be a nominative, and consequently wrote *et quaecumque est dulcior efficacia*, 'and whatever ἐνεργεῖα is sweeter'; but the Hermetist most likely wrote ἐνεργεῖα, and connected this word with the verb ἐνεδείξω. If so, his meaning must have been that God not only *feels* kindly towards men, but shows his kindness in beneficent *action*, by bestowing

on them the gifts of νοῦς, λόγος, and γνῶσις. For γλυκὺς in this connexion, cf. *Corp.* XIV. 4: ἐαυτὸν μακαρίσαι (ὡς) τὸν πατέρα γνωρίσαντα· τί γὰρ γλυκύτερον πατρὸς γνησίον;

In place of ἐνεδείξω, the translation gives *praebere dignaris*, which would be more exactly equivalent to ἐνδείξασθαι ἀξίως. As the hymn is a thanksgiving for past favours (cf. χαίρομεν ὅτι σεαυτὸν ἡμῖν ἔδειξας below), the aorist seems more suitable than the present; it is therefore probable that the Hermetist wrote either ἐνεδείξω or ἐνδείξασθαι ἡξίωσας. It is likewise doubtful whether he wrote ἀπεθέωσας or ἀποθεῶσαι ἡξίωσας (= *fuervis consecrare dignatus*) a few lines below. He may very likely have written ἡξίωσας in one of these two places, but probably not in both.

χαρισάμενος ἡμῖν (ὅμῖν *Par.*) νοῦν, (λόγ)ον, γνῶσιν.

condonans nos sensu, ratione, intellegentia.

The translator rendered νοῦς by *sensus*. For γνῶσις, he wrote *intellegentia* here, but *cognitio* further on in the same sentence.

λόγος must here mean 'speech', since it is given to men 'in order that they may call upon' God; but the translator wrongly supposed it to mean 'reason', and wrote *ratione*. For λόγος in the sense of 'speech', cf. λογικὰς θυσίας in *Corp.* I. 31, and λογικὴν θυσίαν in *Corp.* XIII. 18. Also *Corp.* IX. 1 c: ἡ δὲ νόησις . . . ἀδελφῆ οὔσα τοῦ λόγου. *Corp.* XII. i. 12: δύο ταῦτα τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ ὁ θεὸς . . . ἐχαρίσατο, τὸν τε νοῦν καὶ τὸν λόγον. (The following sentences in *Corp.* XII. i make it clear that λόγος there means 'speech'.) γνῶσις, which is God's last and greatest gift to men, follows on or results from the right use of νοῦς and λόγος, 'mind' and 'speech'.

λόγον (δέ), (ἴν)α σὲ ἐπικαλέσωμεν.

ratione, ut te suspicionibus indagemus.

The translator seems to have read something like ἴνα σε ἀναβλέψῃσιν (?) ἐξιχνεύωμεν. ἐπικαλέσωμεν might easily be corrupted into ἐζιχνεύωμεν. It is difficult to account for *suspicionibus*; but it may possibly be a corruption of (*caelum*) *suspicientes* or something of the sort, or a translation of something equivalent in the Greek, which we may suppose to have been added as an amplification of *te indagemus* (σὲ ἐξιχνεύωμεν). Such an addition would be appropriate only if λόγος were taken to mean 'reason' (*ratio*), and not 'speech'.

γνῶσιν (δέ), ἴνα (σὲ) ἐπιγνό(ν)τες καὶ τῷ φωτί σου σωθέντες χαί(ρ)ω-

μεν. χαίρομεν ὅτι κ.τ.λ.—(γνωσιν ἵνα ἐπιγνω|σωμεν¹ χα ν
 οτι *Par.*).

cognitione, ut te cognoscentes [[]] ac lumine (numine
 MSS.) salvati tuo ((gaudeamus)). Gaudemus quod &c. The
 longer clause given by *Ascl. Lat.* is preferable to the curt and
 comparatively feeble ἵνα σε ἔπιγνώσωμεν¹ of *Par.*, and leads on, by
 a suitable transition, to the χαίρομεν of the following sentence. The
 corruption in *Par.* may have been begun by the omission of χαίρομεν
 before χαίρομεν; or the sorcerer may have accidentally omitted a line
 of the Greek which he had before him. ἐπιγνώσωμεν is hardly a
 possible form; the 1 aor. ἔγνωσα, in the few instances in which it
 occurs, is causal, 'to make some one know'. Eitrem proposes
 ἐπιγνω(ρί)σωμεν; but I have found no instance of ἐπιγνωρίζειν in the
 sense here required.

ἐπιγνώσῃν differs from νοῆσαι, as γνώσις from νοῦς. (The translator
 has obliterated the distinction, rendering both verbs by *cognoscere*.)
 νοῆσαι θεόν here means to apprehend God intellectually; ἐπιγνώσῃν
 θεόν, like the corresponding substantive γνώσις (θεοῦ), means to come
 to know God as one knows a friend, and implies love as well as
 knowledge; at its highest degree, it is to be absorbed in God. The
 Hermetist then distinguishes three stages: (1) to form a conception
 of God (νοῆσαι); (2) to adore God (ἐπικαλέσαι); (3) to be united
 with God (ἐπιγνώσῃν).

γνώσις involves σωτηρία; those who 'know God' are 'saved' (from
 the evils which beset those who are subject to Heimarmene). Cf.
Ascl. III. 29 b: μία φυλακὴ εὐσέβεια κ.τ.λ. And γνώσις brings with
 it χαρά. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 8 c.

χα(ίρομε)ν ὅτι σεαυτὸν ἡμῖν ἔδ(ε)ξας (ἔδλον).

Gaudemus quod te nobis ostenderis totum.

It seems best to retain *totum* in the Latin, and add ἔδλον in the
 Greek. It is true that in ch. 32 b Hermes admitted a limitation of
 human vision which he here denies ('contingit hominibus ut quasi
 per caliginem quae in caelo sunt videamus' &c.); but in the
 enthusiasm of his adoration, all limitations are swept away. (Cf.
 ἀποθεῶσαι ἡξίωσας in the following line.) Perhaps men in the body
 may attain to the full vision of God in rare moments of exaltation,
 though it cannot be continuously present to them.

¹ Reitzenstein (*Poim.* p. 151) gives γνωσιν ἵνα σε ἐπιγνω|σωμεν as the reading of
Par.; but Prof. Eitrem, in a letter to me, says 'My copy' (of the papyrus) 'has
 clearly ἵνα ἐπιγνωσωμεν (not σε)'.

For *δλον* thus used, cf. *Abammonis Resp.* 10. 6 (*Testim.*): καὶ τότε δὴ ἐν δλω τῷ δημιουργικῷ θεῷ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐντίθησι (*sc.* ἡ θεωργία).

χαίρομεν ὅτι ἐν πλάσμασιν ἡμῶς ὄντας ἀποθεῶ(σαι ἡξίω)(σ)ας τῇ σεαυτοῦ(. . . .).

gaudemus quod nos in corporibus sitos aeternitate (aeternitati MSS.) (tua) fueris consecrare dignatus.

σεαυτοῦ ought to be followed by a feminine substantive of five or six letters, in the dative, meaning something like *aeternitate* or *aeterna vita*. I can think of no word that would exactly satisfy these conditions; but the sense required might be expressed by writing either τῷ σεαυτοῦ αἰῶνι or τῇ σεαυτοῦ αἰωνίῳ (ζωῇ).

Consecrare means 'to deify'. Cf. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 62: '(Liberum) quem nostri maiores . . . cum Cerere et Libera consecraverunt.'

In ch. 29 b it was said that the pious man 'immortalitatis futurae concipit fiduciam', i. e. is assured that he will be a god in the life to come; but here, the Hermetist goes further, and says that those who are united with God by *gnosis* are made gods even while they are still in the body; for the life in them is God's eternal life. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 10 as emended: ἐθεώθημεν (by the παλιγγενεσία). In some other *Hermetica*, the transformation from man to god is spoken of (as in *Ascl.* 29 b) as a process that is completed only when the soul has been released from the body by death. See *Corp.* XII. i. 12; *Corp.* X. 5 f.; *Corp.* I. 26 a.

Clement of Alexandria, whose conception of *gnosis* closely resembles that of the Hermetists, repeatedly says that the γνωστικός becomes a god, not only after death, but even in the present life. *Clem. Protr.* 11. 114: οὐρανίῳ διδασκαλίᾳ θεοποιῶν τὸν ἄνθρωπον. *Paed.* 3. 1. 1: ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐκεῖνος, ὃ σύννοικος ὁ λόγος, . . . ἐξομοιοῦται τῷ θεῷ . . . θεὸς δὲ ἐκεῖνος ὁ ἄνθρωπος γίνεται, ὅτι βούλεται ὁ θεός. . . . μεσίτης γὰρ ὁ λόγος, ὁ κοινὸς ἀμφοῖν. *Strom.* 4. 23. 149: τούτῳ δυνατὸν τῷ τρόπῳ τὸν γνωστικὸν ἡδὴ γενέσθαι θεόν. *Strom.* 7. 10. 56: τὴν ἐσομένην ἡμῶν κατὰ τὸν θεὸν μετὰ θεῶν δίαταν. . . . καὶ θεοὶ τὴν προσηγορίαν ἐκκληνται οἱ σύνθηρονοι τῶν ἄλλων θεῶν τῶν ὑπὸ τῷ σωτήρι πρώτων τεταγμένων γενησόμενοι. *Strom.* 7. 16. 95: ὁ δὲ . . . τὸν ἑαυτοῦ βίον ἐπιστρέψας τῇ ἀληθείᾳ οἶον ἐξ ἀνθρώπου θεὸς ἀποτελεῖται. *Strom.* 7. 16. 101: ὁ τῷ κυρίῳ πευθόμενος καὶ τῇ δοθείσῃ δι' αὐτοῦ κατακολουθήσας προφητείᾳ τελῶς ἐκτελεῖται κατ' εἰκόνα τοῦ διδασκάλου, ἐν σαρκὶ περιπολῶν θεός. For similar phrases used by other Christian writers, see Hort and Mayor's note on ἐσομένην θεῷ, *Clem. Strom.* 7. 1. 3; e. g. Hippolytus *Ref. haer.* 10. 33: εἰ δὲ θέλεις καὶ θεὸς γενέσθαι, ὑπάκουε τῷ

πεποιηκότι. *Ib.* 10. 34: γέγονας γὰρ θεός' . . . ἔθεοποιήθης, ἀθάνατος γεννηθείς.

In the pair of clauses beginning with *χαίρομεν*, we have an amplified repetition of the two thoughts expressed by the pair of participles dependent on *χαίρωμεν* in the preceding sentence. *σεαυτὸν ἡμῖν ἔδειξας* corresponds to *σὲ ἐπιγινόντες*; and *ἡμᾶς ἀποθεῶσαι ἠξίωσας* corresponds to *σωθέντες*.

χάρις ἀνθρώπου πρὸς σὲ μ(ία) τὸ (σὸν μέγεθος) γνωρίσαι.

Haec est enim humana sola gratulatio, cognitio maiestatis tuae.

A word corresponding to *sola* is needed after *πρὸς σέ*. Prof. Eitrem tells me that he saw in the papyrus, after *μ*, traces of letters which might be *ια*, and that he now recommends me to print *μια τρ* as his reading of *Ραρ*. It is therefore certain that the sorcerer wrote *μία* (not *μόνη*, which would have done equally well, as far as the meaning is concerned). For *μία* in the sense of *sola*, cf. *μία φυλακὴ εὐσέβεια* in ch. 29 b, and *θρησκεία δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ μία ἐστὶ, μὴ εἶναι κακὸν* in *Corp.* XII. ii. 23 b.

As there is no doubt about the *τ* after *μία*, we must conclude that the Hermetist wrote *τὸ* followed by something equivalent to *maiestatem tuam* (presumably either *σὸν μέγεθος* or *μέγεθός σου*),¹ and that the sorcerer omitted these two words by mistake.

For *γνωρίσαι*, cf. *Corp.* X. 15 a: *γνωρίζει (sc. τὸν ἄνθρωπον ὁ θεός), καὶ θέλει γνωρίζεσθαι*.

ἐγνωρίσαμ(έν) (σε), ὦ - - - αἰώνιος διαμονή. We have here a group of four clauses, each of which begins with *ἐγνωρίσαμεν*. The repeated *ἐγνωρίσαμεν* follows on *γνωρίσαι*, just as, in the preceding passage, the repeated *χαίρομεν* follows on *χαίρωμεν*. The four clauses fall into two pairs; in the first pair of clauses the relation between God and man is spoken of, and in the second pair, the relation between God and the Kosmos.

In *Ραρ*, the *σε* which is needed as object of *ἐγνωρίσαμεν*, and is represented by *te* in *Ascl. Lat.*, is omitted in the first, third, and fourth clauses, and was almost certainly omitted in the second clause also. If it was present in the Greek text which the sorcerer had before him, it is not likely that he would have left it out four times over through mere carelessness. It is almost indispensable in the

¹ It would also be possible to write *τὸ (σὲ) γνωρίσαι*; but an accidental omission of *σὸν μέγεθος* by the sorcerer seems more likely than an arbitrary expansion of *σέ* into *maiestatis tuae* by the translator.

first of the four clauses; but the Hermetist may possibly have written ἐγνωρίσαμεν σε there, and left the σε to be understood when ἐγνωρίσαμεν was repeated. Perhaps it is best to assume that he wrote ἐγνωρίσαμεν σε in the first of each pair of clauses, and ἐγνωρίσαμεν without σε in the second of each pair, and that the sorcerer was led by the absence of σε in the second and fourth clauses to omit it in the first and third clauses also.

ἐγν(ωρίσαμ)έν (σε), ὦ (ζωὴ ἀληθὲς) τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς·
(ἐ)γνωρίσαμεν, ὦ φῶς) (μέγιστον) ἁπάσης γνώσεως¹.

Cognovimus te, [et] (o) lumen maximum solo intellectu sensibili(um);

cognovimus (intellegimus MSS.) te, o vitae (humanae) vera vita.

One of these two clauses has to do with ζωή, and the other with φῶς. (Cf. ζωὴ καὶ φῶς in *Corp.* I. 9 &c.) In *Pap.*, the clause which deals with ζωή is placed before that which deals with φῶς; in *Ascl. Lat.*, the clause which deals with ζωή is placed after the other. Which of the two the Hermetist placed first, we have no means of finding out.

One might write either ὦ (ζωὴ ἀληθὲς) τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς (= o vita vera humanae vitae), or ὦ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ζωῆς (ζωὴ ἀληθὲς) (= o vitae humanae vita vera). The former order is perhaps to be preferred, because it makes this clause match more exactly with the other.

In the parallel clause, the sorcerer almost certainly wrote ὦ φῶς ἀπάσης γνώσεως. (ἀπάσης γνώσεως stands legibly written in *Pap.*; and ὦ φῶς (= lumen) would just fill the preceding gap, if we assume that σε was omitted here, as in the three corresponding clauses.) But this can hardly be what the Hermetist wrote; for there is no satisfactory meaning in ἀπάσης;¹ and φῶς ought to have an epithet

¹ If ἀπάσης is wrong, how is that reading to be accounted for? It has occurred to me that ἀπάσης γνώσεως might possibly be a corruption of λαμπὰς (= lumen) τῆς γνώσεως. Cf. *Corp.* X. 4 b as emended: (ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θεῶ) ἐκλάμπει ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον, ἐφ' ὅσον δύναται ὁ θεώμενος δέξασθαι τὴν ἐπεισορῆν τῆς νοητῆς λαμπηδόνος. Anything which sheds light might be called λαμπὰς. Poets applied the word λαμπὰς to the sun; and the notion that the Good, or God, is the sun of the νοητὸς κόσμος is a commonplace in philosophic writings, from Pl. *Rep.* onward. The term λαμπὰς (μεγίστη) (lumen maximum) might then be meant to signify the sun, in contrast to the lesser lights of heaven. Cf. *Ascl.* III. 18 b: 'ut enim sole mundus, ita mens humana isto clarescit lumine' (viz. the light of νοῦς, which is God's gift to such men as are worthy to receive it). But perhaps it is more likely that the missing word is φῶς, which was frequently associated with ζωή.

The false reading ἀπάσης might be accounted for in another way, by assuming that the Hermetist wrote ὦ φῶς ἀπλετον (= lumen maximum) τῆς γνώσεως, and that ἀπλε(τον τ)ης was corrupted into ἀπάσης.

equivalent to *maximum* (cf. *vera vita*, i. e. ζωῆ ἀληθές, in the parallel clause).

The reading which the translator had before him was probably ὁ φῶς μέγιστον (or ἄπλετον?) τῶν νοητῶν. (The phrase *solo intellectu sensibilium*) would be a good translation of τῶν νοητῶν.) This seems preferable to the reading of *Par.*; but the Hermetist may have written τῶν νοητῶν or τῆς γνώσεως.

In the MSS. of *Ascl. Lat.*, the second ἐγνωρίσαμεν is represented by *intellegimus*, instead of *cognovimus*. But it is difficult to believe that the translator can have intentionally made this purposeless variation. It seems more likely that he wrote *cognovimus*, and that *intellegimus* was substituted for it by a transcriber who was misled by *intelle(ctu)* in the preceding clause.

ἐγνωρίσαμεν σε, ὦ (ἐγνωρισμενων *Par.*) μήτρα (παντοφ)όρε, ἐν π(α)τρὸς φυτ(ε)ία (κυοῦσα).

⟨⟨Cognovimus te,⟩⟩ ο ⟨matrix⟩ [naturarum] ⟨rerum⟩ omnium fecunda, ⟨per patris im P⟩praegnatio⟨nem gravida facta P⟩.

This clause was evidently suggested by the passage on the bisexuality of God, *Ascl.* III. 20 b sq. God is both Father and Mother of the universe.

It seems almost certain that the Hermetist wrote ὁ μήτρα παντοφάρε. The translator may possibly have rendered παντοφάρε by *naturarum omnium fecunda*, 'productive of all kinds of things'; but it is more likely that he wrote *o matrix rerum omnium fecunda*. The words *matrix rerum* may have been corrupted into *naturarum*; or *matrix* may have been accidentally omitted in transcription, and *rerum* altered into *naturarum* (which may have been caused by *naturae* in the line below).

There is more uncertainty about the words which followed in the Greek. Reitzenstein's reading of *Par.* is εμ π. τρος φυτται (with a doubt about the π); Eitrem's reading of *Par.* is εμητρος φυτται (with a doubt about the η). We should expect the mention of the mother (μήτρα) to be followed by a mention of the father; it therefore seems most likely that the words written in *Par.* were εμ πατρος φυτται (i. e. ἐν πατρὸς φυτεία). But if this is what the Hermetist wrote, some participle is needed to provide a construction for ἐν πατρὸς φυτεία, which could hardly be made to depend on the adjective παντοφάρε; I have therefore added κυοῦσα.

Of the corresponding phrase in the Latin translation, nothing is left except the one word *praegnatio*, which probably stands for

φυτεία. It may be conjectured that the translator wrote something like *per patris impraegnationem gravida facta*.

Ὡ (τοῦ τὸ πᾶν ἐν) στά(σει κυ(κλ)ο)φοροῦντος αἰώνιος διαμονή.

⟨ο⟩ totius naturae [tuo] conceptu plenissim(a)ε [[]] aeterna perseveratio.

There is no doubt about the words αἰώνιος διαμονή (= *aeterna perseveratio*); and from that phrase, combined with -φοροῦντος, it may be inferred that this clause is a summary of the passage concerning the eternity of God and the time-process (φορά) of the Kosmos, *Ascl.* III. 29 c-32 a and 40 b. Compare the following phrases in that passage: 'Solus deus (stabilis).—'inmobilis (est) aeternitas, - - - ex qua omnium temporum agitatio sumit exordium. - - - Habet autem tempus, ((quamvis semper agitetur,)) stabilitatis suae vim atque naturam, ea ipsa in se revertendi necessitate.' (This would agree with κυκλοφοροῦντος.)—'Sic efficitur ut et aeternitatis stabilitas moveatur, et temporis mobilitas stabilis fiat fixa lege currendi.'—'Fertur enim (= -φορεῖται) in summa stabilitate (= ἐν στάσει), et in ipso (fertur) stabilitas sua.'

The Greek text cannot be restored with any confidence; but the following hypothesis may be proposed as at least a possible way of accounting for the facts before us. Let us suppose that the Hermetist wrote Ὡ τοῦ τὸ πᾶν ἐν στάσει κυκλοφοροῦντος αἰώνιος διαμονή. (στάσει is very doubtful; there is no evidence for this word in *Par.* except the three letters στα read by Eitrem, and he is uncertain about the σ; but the repeated occurrence of *stabilitas* and *stabilis* in chs. 29 c-32 a gives some support to this conjecture.) In the translator's copy of the Greek, this had been corrupted into Ὡ τοῦ παντός ἐν πᾶσι (?) κυφοροῦντος¹ αἰώνιος διαμονή; and he translated this by 'totius naturae (= τοῦ παντός) conceptu plenissimae (= ἐν πᾶσι κυφοροῦντος) aeterna perseveratio'. In our Latin text, *tuo* has been added by error; this mistake might easily arise out of 'totius naturae conceptu'. The sorcerer by whom *Par.* was written copied from a text in which στάσει was retained; but he omitted τοῦ τὸ πᾶν ἐν (or τοῦ παντός ἐν), and wrote ω στασει κυφοροῦντος αἰώνιος διαμονη.

τούτω σὲ τῷ λόγῳ (οὔτος ου *Par.*) προσκυνήσαντες (τὸν μόνον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα, παρὰ τῆς σῆς ἀγαθότητος) μ(η)δεμίαν αἰτήσωμεν (ἠησηαμεν *Par.*) (χάριν πλήν) (τόδε μόνον).

¹ κυφοροῦντος (in place of κυκλοφοροῦντος) may have been suggested to a transcriber by μήτρα παντοφόρε in the preceding clause.

In omni enim ista oratione adorantes (te solum) bonum, bonitatis tuae hoc tantum deprecamur.

I assume that the Hermetist wrote *τούτω σὲ τῷ λόγῳ* (= *in ista oratione* - - - *(te)*). The words *omni* and *enim* seem to have been added by the translator. Assuming that Eitrem has read *Pap.* rightly,¹ we must suppose that the sorcerer wrote *οὗτος οὖν λογῶ* (for *οὕτως οὖν λόγῳ*); and the reading of the text from which he copied may perhaps have been *οὕτως οὖν σὲ (τῷ?) λόγῳ*.

There is a sufficient reason for using the word *λόγος* here; Hermes has just been insisting that *λόγος*, 'speech', is the only kind of offering that can rightly be presented to the supreme God.

It seems best to retain the word *bonum*, which leads on to *bonitatis tuae*; but if we retain it, we must insert *te solum* before it, and assume that the Hermetist wrote *τὸν μόνον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα* or something equivalent. The statement that 'God alone is good' occurs repeatedly in the *Hermetica*. Cf. 'de uno illo ac singulari bono' (= *περὶ ἐκείνου τὸν ἕνα καὶ μόνον ἀγαθὸν ὄντα*) in ch. 41 a, as translated by Lactantius.

The genitive *bonitatis tuae* may be accounted for by supposing that the Hermetist wrote *παρὰ τῆς σῆς ἀγαθότητος*, and that *παρὰ* was omitted in the translator's copy of the Greek.

Pap. gives *μ(η)δεμίαν ἠτήσαμεν* (*χάριω* or *δόσιν*); but the Hermetist cannot have written that. We should have expected *οὐδεμίαν αἰτοῦμεν*; but how could *οὐ-* be corrupted into *μη-*? I conjecture *μηδεμίαν αἰτήσωμεν*, 'let us ask for nothing except this'.

The translator may perhaps have written '(nihil praeter (or nisi)) hoc tantum te precamur'.

(θ) ἔλθσον ἡμᾶς δια(τ)ηρηθῆναι ἐν τῇ σῆ γν(ώ)σ(ει καὶ φιλό)τητ(ι).

ut nos velis servari (servare MSS.) perseverantes in amore cognitionis tuae.

The word beginning with *γν*, which followed *εν τη ση* in *Pap.*, must have been *γνώσει*. But what followed that? The translator probably read *ἐν τῇ σῆς γνώσεως φιλότητι* (*amore*). I conjecture that the Hermetist wrote *ἐν τῇ σῆ γνώσει καὶ φιλότητι*, and that this was correctly copied in *Pap.* Of the word which I take to have been *φιλότητι*, Reitzenstein read in *Pap.* only the two letters *τη*; Eitrem read *τη* followed by a doubtful *ι* (which might be the lower

¹ Reitzenstein gives *οὗτος οὐ* (i.e. he was not sure about the second *υ*). Is it possible that the two letters which have been read as *ou* are really *ε τ*, and that what the sorcerer wrote was *οὐτο* (for *οὕτω*) *σε τω λογῳ*?

part of a τ), and marked a space of eight letters between γνώσει and τη. I have inserted in this space the seven letters και φιλο.

φιλότης might very well be coupled with γνώσις. Those who 'know God' are both φιλόθεοι and θεοφιλείς; they love God and are loved by God. Cf. πατρικὴν εὐνοίαν καὶ στοργὴν καὶ φιλίαν above. Pl. *Tim.* 53 D : θεὸς οἶδε, καὶ ἀνδρῶν ὃς ἂν ἐκείνῳ φίλος ᾗ. Pl. *Phileb.* 39 E : δίκαιος ἀνὴρ καὶ εὐσεβὴς καὶ ἀγαθὸς πάντως ἄρ' οὐ θεοφιλὴς ἐστὶ; Philo *Fragm.*, 662 M. δεῖ γὰρ εἶναι (τὸν ἄνθρωπον), εἴ γε ὄντως ἐστὶ λογικός, κοινωνικόν (towards men), φιλόκοσμον, φιλόθεον, ἵνα γένηται καὶ θεοφιλὴς. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7. 1. 2 : μόνον τὸν γνωστικὸν ὁσιόν τε καὶ εὐσεβῆ (εἶναι), θεοπρεπῶς τὸν τῷ ὄντι θεὸν θρησκεύοντα τῷ θεοπρεπεῖ δὲ τὸ θεοφιλεὲς ἔπεται καὶ φιλόθεον ('the worship which becometh God includes both loving God and being loved by Him', Hort and Mayor). *Ib.* 7. 1. 3 sq. : θεοφιλὴς ὁ θεοπρεπὴς ('the godly') μόνος. . . ταύτῃ ἄρα φιλόθεος τὸ πρῶτον (ὁ θεοπρεπὴς) ὡς γὰρ ὁ τιμῶν τὸν πατέρα φιλοπάτωρ, οὕτως ὁ τιμῶν τὸν θεὸν φιλόθεος. *Ib.* 7. 3. 19 : ὁ δὲ ἤδη μὴ διὰ τὰς ἐντολάς, δι' αὐτὴν δὲ τὴν γνώσιν καθαρὸς τῇ καρδίᾳ, φίλος οὗτος τοῦ θεοῦ. *Ib.* 7. 7. 42 : ἡ τοῦ γνωστικοῦ ὁσιότης (ἐστὶν) ἀντίστροφος εὐνοία τοῦ φίλου τοῦ θεοῦ ('a responsive feeling of loyalty on the part of the friend of God' H. and M.). *Ep. Jac.* 2. 23 : Abraham φίλος θεοῦ ἐκλήθη.

(καὶ) [τὸ] μή(ποτε) σφαλῆναι τοῦ τοιοῦτου (βίου).

et numquam ab hoc vitae genere separari.

How was this phrase joined on? In *Par.*, if we assume that the preceding word was φιλότητι, there remains a space of three letters before το μη; and it is most likely that the missing word is καὶ (= et in *Ascl. Lat.*). But if so, μήποτε σφαλῆναι is coupled to διατηρηθῆναι, and dependent on θέλησον; the τὸ of *Par.* must therefore have been inserted by error. μήποτε (= numquam) is preferable to μή; Hermes prays that he and his pupils may not, at any future time, fall away from the happy state of life in which they now are. We may conclude then that the Hermetist wrote καὶ μήποτε (or μηδέποτε) σφαλῆναι κ.τ.λ. For this petition, cf. *Corp.* I. 32 : αἰτουμένῳ τὸ μὴ σφαλῆναι τῆς γνώσεως. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 7. 7. 44 : ὁ γνωστικὸς δὲ ὦν μὲν κέκτῃται παραμονῆν . . . αἰτήσεται τὰ δὲ ὄντως ἀγαθὰ τὰ περὶ ψυχὴν εὐχεται εἶναι τε αὐτῷ καὶ παραμείναι. ταύτῃ οὐδὲ ὀρέγεται τινος τῶν ἀπόντων, ἀρκούμενος τοῖς παροῦσιν· οὐ γὰρ ἑλλειπῆς τῶν οἰκείων ἀγαθῶν, ἱκανὸς ὦν ἤδη ἑαντῷ ἐκ τῆς θείας χάριτός τε καὶ γνώσεως. *Ib.* 7. 7. 46 : κορυφαῖος

δὲ ἤδη (γενόμενος) ('when he has reached the summit' Hort and Mayor) ὁ γνωστικός ἠθεωρίαν¹ εὐχεται ἠαῦξεν τε καὶ¹ παραμένειν, καθάπερ ὁ κοινὸς ἄνθρωπος τὸ συνεχές² ὑγιαίνειν. ναὶ μὴν μηδὲ ἀποπσεῖν ποτε τῆς ἀρετῆς αἰτήσεται, συνεργῶν μάλιστα πρὸς τὸ ἀπτωτος διαγενέσθαι. See note on *Corp.* XIII. 14.

Separari is not a good translation of σφαλῆναι. (*Decidere* would be more nearly equivalent.) Has *separari* been substituted for some other verb in the Latin text? Or did the translator read some other verb (e.g. χωρισθῆναι, or ἀποστῆναι; compare Herm. *ap.* Stob. *Exc.* II B. 3) in his copy of the Greek?

The last words of the thanksgiving must have been τοῦ τοιοῦτου βίου or βιώτου (= *ab hoc vitae genere*). In *Pap.*, του τοιουτου stands at the beginning of a line, and is followed (in the same line) by του . . . λιον μεγα ισαγω | (Eitrem)³ and five or six more lines of detached scraps of words or phrases, out of which no meaning can be got; and at the end of this obliterated passage, we find ourselves among directions for working another charm, which appears to have nothing to do with that in which the Hermetic thanksgiving was employed. Assuming that βίου was written, there remains after it (according to Eitrem's reading) a gap of three letters, followed by του . . λιον &c. (possibly πρὸς τὸν ἥλιον or λέγε πρὸς ἥλιον?); and we must suppose that the sentence which began with these words was either a note appended by the sorcerer at the end of the preceding incantation (perhaps giving some direction as to the place or time at which it was to be recited), or else, the beginning of the separate and unconnected charm which follows.

Haec optantes (ταῦτα εὐξάμενοι?) *convertamus* (*convertimus* MSS.) *nos ad . . . cenam*. The prayer or hymn serves as a 'grace before meat'. It is possible that, in the community of which the writer was a member, discourse and prayer were habitually followed by a meal which had something of the character of a sacred rite. As the prayer or hymn was a substitute for sacrifice (α λογικὴ θυσία), so the meal which followed may have been a survival, in an altered form, of the sacrificial banquet. The initiation of the

¹ αῦξεν is certainly wrong; there can be no αὔξησης for one who is already κορυφαῖος. Has αῦξεν τε arisen out of εὐχεται, written as an alternative for εὐχεται? The future εὐξεται would perhaps be preferable to the present; cf. αἰτήσεται in the following sentence. Something like τῇ θεωρίᾳ εὐχεται (or εὐξεται) παραμένειν would give the sense required.

² τὸ συνεχές = συνεχῶς, 'continually'.

³ Reitzenstein (*Poim.*) gives the line thus:

| του τοιουτου . . . ο . . . αλιον μεταγαγω |

mystes of Isis at Corinth concluded with a *iēntaculum religiosum* (Apuleius *Metamorph.* 11. 24). Cf. Josephus *Bell. Iud.* 2. 129 ff., of the Essenes: καθάπερ εἰς ἅγιόν τι τέμενος παραγίγνεται τὸ δειπνητήριον. - - προκατεύχεται δ' ὁ ἱερεὺς τῆς τροφῆς,¹ καὶ γεύσασθαι τινα πρὶν τῆς εὐχῆς ἀθέμιτον. And when they are eating their meal, τοῖς ἐξωθεν ὡς μυστήριόν τι φρικτὸν ἢ τῶν ἔνδον σιωπῇ καταφαίνεται.

puram et sine animalibus cenam. It is implied that those who have attained to *gnosis* must abstain from eating the flesh of animals. This rule was observed by *Orphici* (Eur. *Hippol.* 952 sq.), and, with more or less strictness, by Pythagoreans of all periods. As to the reasons commonly given for it, see Porph. *De abst.*

¹ Porphyry (*De abst.* 4. 12), quoting this passage, adds ἀγνῆς οὐσίας καὶ καθαρᾶς. Cf. '*puram et sine animalibus cenam*' in *Ascl.*

STOBAEUS, EXCERPTS FROM HERMETICA

EXCERPT I

LACTANTIUS says that this passage was (*Hermae*) *ad filium scribentis exordium*. It must therefore have stood at the beginning of a *libellus*; and perhaps his words may be taken to imply that this *libellus* was the first in the collection of 'the Discourses of Hermes to Tat'. The passage seems to have been widely known; it is quoted by three early Christian writers,¹ and probably referred to by a fourth (*Fragm.* 2, Cyprian(?)); and Julian² also appears to have been acquainted with it. This would be accounted for, if we suppose that it stood at the beginning of the first *libellus* of a collection of *Hermetica*, and that the words θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπὸν κ.τ.λ. were consequently the first that met the eyes of readers of the Hermetic writings.

It seems to be assumed by Lactantius, as it frequently was by others, that Hermes himself wrote the dialogues in which he appears as a speaker; unless indeed Lactantius means that the *libellus* which began with this passage was not a dialogue, but an *epistle* of Hermes to Tat (cf. *Corp.* XIV and *Corp.* XVI).

Exc. I is the second of the three Stobaeus-excerpts which Turnebus appended to *Corp.* I-XIV, and Flussas included in his 'Caput XV'.

Wachsmuth (*Stob. Anthol.* vol. ii, p. 9) says that this excerpt 'deest apud Patricium'. But that is a mistake. The passage θεὸν νοῆσαι . . . τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ θεός, taken from Stobaeus, occurs in Patrizzi (1593), *Hermetis Trismegisti libel* XX, f. 51a. But Patrizzi joined on to the end of it without a break, as if they formed

¹ Pseudo-Justin, Lactantius, and Cyril. Lactantius again refers to *Exc.* I in *De ira dei* 11. 12 (*Testim.*); he there connects it with Pl. *Tim.* 28c. Cf. Lactant. *De opif. dei* 1. 11: 'a summo illo rerum conditore atque artifice deo, cuius divinam providentiam perfectissimamque virtutem nec sensu comprehendere nec verbo enarrare possibile est'. In this latter passage, Lactantius may have been thinking either of Pl. *Tim.* 28c, or of Herm. *Exc.* I, or possibly of both.

² Julian *Or.* 4. 131 D: ἔστι μὲν οὖν, εὖ οἶδα, χαλεπὸν καὶ τὸ ξυνεῖναι περὶ αὐτοῦ μόνον, ὅπως τις ἔστιν ὁ ἀφανῆς (sc. ἥλιος) ἐκ τοῦ φανεροῦ λογισαμένῳ, φράσαι δὲ ἴσως ἀδύνατον, εἰ καὶ τῆς ἀξίας ἔλαττον ἐθελήσειέ τις. The verbal agreement of φράσαι ἀδύνατον with Herm. *Exc.* I makes it probable that Julian had in mind that passage rather than Pl. *Tim.* 28c (ἀδύνατον λέγειν).

part of the same passage, two Hermetic fragments (12 and 11, vol. I, p. 536: ἔστιν γάρ τις . . . ὑπερ ἀνθρωπῶν ἔστιν, and αἴτιον δὲ τούτου . . . στόματι λαληθῆναι), which he got from Lactant. *Div. inst.* 4. 7. 3. He placed these two fragments in inverse order, disregarding the statement of Lactantius that ἔστι γάρ τις κ.τ.λ. occurred 'a little after' the other in the *Hermeticum* in which he found them.

§ I. θεὸν νοῆσαι μὲν χαλεπὸν, φράσαι δὲ ἀδύνατον. This is a reminiscence of Pl. *Tim.* 28 c: τὸν μὲν οὖν ποιητὴν καὶ πατέρα τοῦδε τοῦ παντὸς εὐρεῖν τε ἔργον καὶ εὐρόντα εἰς πάντας ἀδύνατον λέγειν. And the whole passage is based on the Platonic contrast between τὸ νοητὸν and τὸ αἰσθητὸν, which is dealt with in the preceding sentences of the *Timaeus* (27 D-28 B).

ᾧ καὶ νοῆσαι δυνατόν. This phrase is missing in our MSS. of Stobaeus; but as it occurs with slight variants in Pseudo-Justin, Lactantius, and Cyril, it is to be presumed that it was present in the original text, and was omitted in Stob. by an error of transcription.

τὸ γὰρ [ἀσώματον σώματι σημῆναι ἀδύνατον, καὶ τὸ] τέλειον κ.τ.λ. On the analogy of the two following clauses, τὸ γὰρ ἀσώματον . . . ἀδύνατον ought to mean 'God is ἀσώματος, man is (or, man's vocal organs are?) σώμα; therefore, man cannot describe or explain God'. But such a statement would be out of place at this stage; for in what follows, Hermes is still speaking of the difficulty of *conceiving* or *apprehending* the incorporeal (νοῆσαι χαλεπὸν); and it is not until later that he passes on from this to the other point, that it is impossible to *express* the thought of it *in words* (φράσαι ἀδύνατον, repeated in ἐξεῖπειν ἀδύνατον at the end of the passage). This objection might perhaps be got over by adopting the reading of Stob. A, συμβῆναι ('to meet with' or 'come to terms with',—cf. συγγενέσθαι below—), in place of σημῆναι. But it seems best to bracket the words. They are omitted by Lactantius.

τὸ γὰρ [] τέλειον τῷ ἀτελεῖ καταλαβέσθαι ἢ οὐ δυνατόν. God is τέλειος, man is ἀτελής; therefore, man cannot (?) apprehend God. For the use of the middle form καταλαβέσθαι in the sense 'to apprehend' (more commonly καταλαβεῖν), cf. Dion. Hal. 2. 66: ἐγὼ δὲ τὸ μὲν εἶναι τινα . . . φυλαττόμενα . . . ἐκ πολλῶν πάνυ καταλαμβάνομαι.

Even if we cut out ἀσώματον σώματι σημῆναι ἀδύνατον, we still have, in close succession, ἀδύνατον—δυνατόν—οὐ δυνατόν. We may be sure that the author was not responsible for this clumsy iteration. Besides, οὐ δυνατόν does not express his view; for he

holds that it *is* possible, though difficult, for man to apprehend God. Most likely then οὐ δυνατόν has been substituted by error for something equivalent to χαλεπὸν above and δύσκολον below.

τὸ αἰδιον τῷ ὀλιγοχρονίῳ συγγενέσθαι δύσκολον. God is everlasting, man (as an earthly organism) is short-lived; therefore, it is hard for man to enter into converse or connexion with God. This must be the meaning; but what is the grammatical construction? συγγενέσθαι requires a dative; and if the text is sound, we must understand τὸ αἰδιον (nom.) δύσκολόν (ἔστι) τῷ ὀλιγοχρονίῳ συγγενέσθαι (αὐτῷ), 'the everlasting is difficult for the short-lived in respect of associating with it'. Cf. Pl. *Rep.* I. 330 c: χαλεποὶ οὖν καὶ ξυγγενέσθαι εἰσίν. Herm. *ap. Stob. Exc.* II B. 5: σεμνὴ αὐτῆ ὁδὸς . . ., χαλεπὴ δὲ ψυχῇ ὀδεύσαι.

Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 2. 8. 68 (*Testim.*), quotes from 'Hermes' a similar passage: 'ut Hermes ait, "mortale inmortalī, temporale perpetuo, corruptibile incorrupto propinquare non potest", id est propius accedere et intellegentia subsequi.' This, in Greek, would be τὸ θνητὸν τῷ ἀθανάτῳ καὶ τὸ ὀλιγοχρόνιον τῷ αἰδίῳ καὶ τὸ φθαρτὸν τῷ ἀφθάρτῳ ἐγγίξειν οὐ δύναται. Is Lactantius there quoting *Exc.* I from memory, and very inaccurately? Or is he quoting from some *Hermeticum* now lost, in which a similar thought was expressed in different words?

τὸ δὲ ὑπὸ φαντασίας Ἰσκιάζεται¹. σκιάζεσθαι means 'to be overshadowed' or 'darkened'; but that meaning is not appropriate here. Oecolampadius (whose Latin translation of Cyril represents a better Greek text than that of Aubert) gives a satisfactory sense, by writing *adumbratur*, which might be a rendering of σκιαγραφεῖται. The writer must have meant that the world of sense is a mere illusion or unreal appearance, as opposed to τὸ νοητόν, which alone is ἀληθές. Cf. *Exc.* II A (περὶ ἀληθείας). φαντασία, as used by the Aristotelians and Stoics, means the process by which the mind presents to itself an image of something in the external world; and in Platonic writings, the word sometimes carries with it an implication that this image is illusory. See *Corp.* V. 1 b.

[ἄσον οὖν τὸ ἀσθενέστερον τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον τοῦ κρείττονος διέστηκε,] τοσοῦτον (διέστηκε) τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ θείου. This is Cyril's reading. Stobaeus gives the passage thus: τὸ δὲ ἀσθενέστερον τοῦ ἰσχυροτέρου καὶ τὸ ἕλαττον τοῦ κρείττονος διέστηκε τοσοῦτον ἄσον τὸ θνητὸν τοῦ θείου. In either form, the statement is absurd. The difference between 'that which is stronger' and 'that which

is weaker' may be great or small; it varies through all degrees; and a thing so indefinite cannot be used to measure or indicate the extent of the difference between the mortal and the divine. Possibly a marginal note containing the words τὸ ἀσθενέστερον κ.τ.λ. has been worked into the text in two different ways.

There appears to be a reminiscence of this passage in Didymus *De trin.* 3. 1. 776 A (*Testim.*): (τὸ σῶμα) κατακρατεῖν ἐπιχειρεῖ (τῆς ψυχῆς) τῆς φύσει κρείττονος, καὶ τοσοῦτῳ κρείττονος ὅσον τὸ ἀθάνατον τοῦ θνητοῦ.

For τὸ ἔλαττον and τὸ κρείττον, cf. *Corp.* X. 22 b: πάντων γὰρ οὗτος (sc. ὁ θεός) κρείττων [καὶ πάντα αὐτοῦ ἐλάττονα].

§ 2. ἡ δὲ μέση τούτων διάστασις κ.τ.λ. After τοῦ θείου (καὶ ἀθανάτου *add.* Cyril), our two authorities diverge. Stobaeus gives ἡ δὲ μέση . . . τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ θεός; Cyril gives, in place of this, an entirely different passage, εἴ τῳ οὖν ἀσώματος . . . ἐαντῷ ἀνόμοιον (*Fragm.* 25). But the continuity of the text as given by Stobaeus is guaranteed by the word διάστασις, which refers back to διέστηκε in the preceding sentence. We must therefore conclude that Cyril has here quoted two distinct and unconnected passages, and that the two have been joined together by error. Very likely a separating phrase (e.g. καὶ πάλιν or καὶ ἐτέρωθι) originally stood after θείου καὶ ἀθανάτου in the text of Cyril, and has fallen out by accident.

τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ θέαν. Compare what is said in *Corp.* X. 4 b, 5 about ἡ τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ θέα and (τὸ) θεάσασθαι τὸ κάλλος τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.

ὀφθαλμοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὰ σώματα θεατά [γλώττη δὲ τὰ ὄρατὰ λεκτά] τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον . . . ὑπὸ τῶν ἡμετέρων αἰσθήσεων καταληφθῆναι οὐ δύναται. 'With our eyes we can see bodies (only); the incorporeal cannot be apprehended by our senses.' The δέ to which μέν points forward must be that in τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον; and the words γλώττη δὲ τὰ ὄρατὰ λεκτά break the connexion of thought. The contrast on which the writer is insisting is that between the things which we can see with our eyes, and a thing which 'cannot be apprehended by our senses'; and the interposition of a statement about speech obscures this contrast. The tongue, as used in speech, is not an organ of sense-perception; the mention of the tongue is therefore irrelevant.

The emphatic ἡμετέρων seems to imply that there is another sort of αἴσθησις (viz. that of 'the eye of the mind') by which it is possible to 'behold the Beautiful'.

With this passage may be compared *Corp.* V. 2: νόσις γὰρ μόνη ὄρα τὸ ἀφανές κ.τ.λ.

Ἔννοοῦμαι, ὦ Τάτ, ἐννοοῦμαι ὁ ἐξαιρεῖν ἀδύνατον· τοῦτο ἔστιν ὁ θεός.⁷ This cannot be right. The words convey no clear meaning; and the repetition of ἐννοοῦμαι is pointless. The writer must have ended by applying to God what he had been saying about τὸ ἀσώματον in general; but the words in which he made this application cannot be restored with certainty.

EXCERPTS IIA AND IIB

Exc. IIA is the first of the three Stobaeus-excerpts which Turnebus appended to *Corp.* I-XIV, and which Flussas took over from him and printed under the heading *Trismegisti Pimandrae Caput XV*. Turnebus appears to have got his text of these three excerpts from Trincavelli's edition of the *Florilegium* of Stobaeus, which was published at Venice in 1535-6.

The text of *Exc.* IIA is arranged in three different ways in the MSS. In S and A, the sections are placed in the order 1-18; in M, they are placed in the order 4-15, 1-3, 16-18; in L and Br, they are placed in the order 1-12, 16-18, 13-15. Of these three arrangements, two at least must be wrong. For reasons given below, it appears to me certain that all three are wrong; and I have placed the sections in the order 1-5, 7, 6, 8-10, 16, 18, 11-12, 17, 13-15. That is to say, I have followed SALBr in placing §§ 1-5 at the beginning, and L Br in placing §§ 13-15 at the end; but I have shifted §§ 7, 16, and 18 without manuscript authority. There may be a good deal of doubt about § 7; but it can hardly be doubted that §§ 16 and 18 ought to stand where I have put them.

When thus rearranged, IIA is intelligible throughout; and if we had nothing else before us, we might accept it as a finished whole, complete in itself. But IIB, which has been preserved in a different part of the *Anthologium* of Stobaeus, fits on perfectly to the end of IIA, and must have been written as a continuation of it. In IIA, the writer has been occupied in establishing the doctrine that nothing here below is real (τὸ μὴ εἶ[δέ]ναι μηδὲν ἀληθὲς ἐνθάδε, § 8). The opening sentence of IIB, in the words εἰ μὴδὲν ἔστιν ἀληθὲς ἐνθάδε, refers back to the conclusion arrived at in IIA,

and makes it the starting-point of a discourse in which a fresh topic is dealt with. In II A, ἀλήθεια is discussed theoretically; in II B, the result of that discussion is brought to bear on the practical question 'How am I to live my life?' It may be considered certain then that II B was written to follow II A.

But was it written by the same person? It is conceivable that II A originally stood alone, and that it afterwards occurred to some one into whose hands the document came to write a sequel to it. But this is unlikely. The teacher's standpoint is the same in the one and the other; and there are peculiarities of diction in II A which recur in II B. ἀλήθεια, which is the subject of discussion in II A, is repeatedly spoken of in II B, and has the same significance there;¹ in both, there is the same avoidance of the word θεός; and in both alike, προπάτωρ is used to denote the supreme God.² It is probable then, if not certain, that II A and II B are the work of the same man, and were intended to be read as two parts of one whole; and we may regard them as together making up a single *libellus*, which has been preserved in its entirety. The opening words of II A suggest the title Περὶ ἀληθείας; and not II A only, but the *libellus* as a whole, might very well bear that title. In the first part (II A), we are told 'where Reality is, and what it is'; in the second part (II B), we are told what we must do in order to attain to it. The one might be described as an exposition of the writer's metaphysic, and the other, as an exposition of his ethic; but in this document, as in the *Hermetica* in general, ethic is wholly subordinated to religion.

In Stobaeus, there is joined on to the end of II B, as if it were a continuation of the same *Hermeticum*, a document which I have separated from it, and which I call Excerpt XI. That document consists of a collection of aphorisms, with some appended remarks on the obligation of secrecy. It has nothing to do with II B; and it must have had a separate heading of its own, which has been lost by accident.

The doctrine of *Exc.* II A and II B is Platonic; and not only in the leading thought ('that there is nothing real here below'), but in the details of the argument by which this thesis is supported, there

¹ Besides εἰ μηδὲν ἐστὶν ἀληθὲς ἐνθάδε in II B. 2, note II B. 3, (μαθ)ήσεται καὶ ποῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ τίς ἐστὶν ἐκείνη; ἰδ., τὴν κατάληψιν τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀληθοῦς: 5, πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὁδός. The word νοῦς occurs in neither; its correlate, ἀλήθεια, is spoken of instead.

² προπάτωρ is not thus used elsewhere in the *Hermetica*, except once in the *Kore Kosmu*.

is fairly close resemblance between *Exc.* IIA and a passage in Plutarch's dialogue *De Ei apud Delphos* (16. 17 f., 392 B), in which a Platonist speaks as follows: ὁ μὲν γὰρ θεὸς ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἐνταῦθα προσίοντα . . . προσαγορεύει τὸ "Γνωθὶ σαυτὸν" . . . ἡμεῖς δὲ πάλιν ἀμειβόμενοι τὸν θεόν, "Εἶ" φαμέν, ὡς ἀληθῆ καὶ ἀψευδῆ καὶ μόνην μόνῃ προσήκουσαν τὴν τοῦ εἶναι προσαγορεύουσαν ἀποδιδόντες. ἡμῖν μὲν γὰρ ὄντως τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστιν οὐδέν,¹ ἀλλὰ πᾶσα θνητὴ φύσις, ἐν μέσῳ γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς γενομένη, φάσμα παρέχει² καὶ δόκησιν ἀμυδρὰν καὶ ἀβέβαιον αὐτῆς· ἂν δὲ τὴν διάνοιαν ἐπερείσῃς λαβέσθαι βουλόμενος, ὥσπερ ἡ σφόδρα περιδραξίς ὕδατος τῷ πιέζειν εἰς ταῦτ' οὐδὲ συνάγειν διαρρέον ἀπόλλυσι τὸ περιλαμβανόμενον, οὕτω τῶν παθητῶν καὶ μεταβλητῶν ἐκάστου τὴν ἄγαν ἐνάργειαν ὁ λόγος διώκων ἀποσφάλλεται τῇ μὲν εἰς τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτοῦ, τῇ δ' εἰς τὸ φθειρόμενον, οὐδενὸς λαβέσθαι μένοντος οὐδὲ ὄντος ὄντως δυνάμενος. ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ, καθ' Ἡράκλειτον, οὐδὲ θνητῆς οὐσίας δις ἄψασθαι κατὰ ζῆν. ἀλλ' ὀξύτητι καὶ τάχει μεταβολῆς . . . (ἅμα) πρόσεισι καὶ ἄπεισι. ὅθεν οὐδ' εἰς τὸ εἶναι περαίνει τὸ γιγνόμενον αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς θνητῆς οὐσίας), τῷ μηδέποτε λήγειν μηδ' ἴσασθαι τὴν γένεσιν, ἀλλ' ἀπὸ σπέρματος αἰεὶ μεταβάλλουσιν ἔμβρυον ποιεῖν, εἴτα βρέφος, εἴτα παῖδα, ((εἴτα)) μαιράκιον, ἐφεξῆς νεανίσκον, [[εἴτα]] ἄνδρα, πρεσβύτην, γέροντα,³ τὰς πρώτας φθείρουσαν γενέσεις καὶ ἡλικίας⁴ ταῖς ἐπιγιγνομένας. . . φθίρεται μὲν ἀκμάζων γιγνομένου γέροντος, ἐφθάρη δ' ὁ νέος εἰς τὸν ἀκμάζοντα, καὶ ὁ παῖς εἰς τὸν νέον, εἰς δὲ τὸν παῖδα τὸ νήπιον· ὁ δὲ χθὲς εἰς τὸν σήμερον τέθνηκεν, ὁ δὲ σήμερον εἰς τὸν αὔριον ἀποθνήσκει· μένει δὲ οὐδεὶς, οὐδ' ἔστιν εἷς, ἀλλὰ γιγνόμεθα πολλοί, Ἐπεὶ ἐν φάντασμα καὶ κοινὸν ἐκμαγείον ὕλης περιελαυνόμενης καὶ ὀλισθηνοῦσης.⁵ . . . οὔτε γὰρ ἄνευ μεταβολῆς ἕτερα πάσχειν εἰκός, οὔτε μεταβάλλων ὁ αὐτὸς ἔστιν. εἰ δ' ὁ αὐτὸς οὐκ ἔστιν, οὐδ' ἔστιν·⁶ [ἀλλ' Ἐκ τούτου αὐτοῦ] μεταβάλλει γιγνόμενος ἕτερος ἐξ ἑτέρου·⁷ ψεύδεται δ' ἡ αἰσθησις, ἀγνοία τοῦ ὄντος, εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον.⁸ τί οὖν ὄντως ὄν ἐστι; τὸ αἰδιον⁹ καὶ

¹ ἡμῖν . . . τοῦ εἶναι μέτεστιν οὐδέν: cf. *Exc.* II A. 11, καθότι ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθής.

² φάσμα παρέχει: cf. II A. 3, (ἐκ) φαντασίας συνεστῶτα. *Ib.* 17: φαντασίας οὖν καλεῖν δεῖ ((τοῦς ἀνθρώπους.))

³ παῖδα . . . , νεανίσκον, ἄνδρα, . . . γέροντα: cf. II A. 17, οὔτε . . . τὸ παιδίον παιδίον (μένει), οὔτε ὁ νεανίσκος νεανίσκος, οὔτε ὁ ἀνὴρ ἀνὴρ, οὔτε ὁ γέρον γέρον.

⁴ Perhaps: τὰς προτ(έρ)ας φθείρουσαν [γενέσεις καὶ] ἡλικίας.

⁵ Perhaps: περὶ ἐν [φάντασμα] καὶ κοινὸν ἐκμαγείον ὕλης περιελαυνόμενοι καὶ ὀλισθηνοίτες. The word ἐκμαγείον, 'a plastic mass', is taken from Pl. *Tim.* 50 D.

⁶ Cf. II A. 16, τὸ δὲ μὴ (τ)αὐτὸ (ὄν) πᾶς ἂν ἀληθὲς εἴη;

⁷ The words ἀλλ' . . . ἑτέρου interrupts the argument. They may have come from an explanatory note.

⁸ Perhaps ἀγνοία τοῦ ὄντος (οἰομένη) εἶναι τὸ φαινόμενον: cf. II A. 4, τῶν μὲν δοκούντων ἀληθῆ ὄραν, τῶν δὲ ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων ψευδῶν.

⁹ τί οὖν ὄντως ὄν ἐστι; τὸ αἰδιον κ.τ.λ.: cf. II A. 15 as emended, τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι

ἀγένητον καὶ ἀφθαρτον, ᾧ χρόνος μεταβολὴν οὐδὲ εἰς ἐπάγει. . . . ἀλλ' ἔστιν ὁθεός, χρὴ φάναι, καὶ ἔστι κατ' οὐδένα χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ τὸν αἰῶνα, τὸν ἀκίνητον καὶ ἄχρονον καὶ ἀνέγκλιτον, καὶ οὐ πρότερον οὐδὲν ἔστιν οὐδ' ὕστερον, . . . ἀλλ' εἰς ὧν ἐνὶ τῷ νῦν τὸ αἰεὶ πεπλήρωκε· καὶ μόνον ἔστι τὸ κατὰ τοῦτον (sc. τὸν αἰῶνα) ὄντως ὄν, οὐ γεγονὸς οὐδ' ἐσόμενον, οὐδ' ἀρξάμενον οὐδὲ παυσόμενον.

The writer of *Corp.* XIII appears to have borrowed from *Exc.* II A; and Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 2. 12. 4, quotes from it. Apart from that, I can find no definite indication of date. But the teacher's tone and attitude are not unlike those of Porphyry in his *Ad Marcellam*, and in some passages of his *De abstinentia*; and this *libellus* may very well have been written at some date in or not long before the lifetime of Porphyry, i. e. in the third century A. D.

Contents.

Exc. II A. Reality exists only in things everlasting. The four cosmic elements, when unmixed, are real; but we men consist of those elements intermixed. Thus we are unreal, and are consequently incapable of seeing or describing the real. §§ 1, 2.

On earth, there is nothing real. Of earthly things, some few are copies of reality; the rest are wholly unreal appearances. §§ 3, 4.

It is possible for us to see and declare the truth that there is nothing real on earth; but the fact that we can see and declare a truth must not be supposed to prove that we have reality in us. §§ 5, <<7>>, 6, 8.

The real is the good; it is uncontaminated by matter, and is free from change. All earthly things are subject to change, and to destruction, which is the necessary counterpart of production; and all earthly things are therefore unreal. But the unreal things of this world are wrought by the Reality which is above. §§ 9, 10, <<16>>, <<18>>.

Man, as an earthly organism, is composite, and subject to change, and therefore is unreal. §§ 11, 12, <<17>>.

The cosmic elements are partly real, but partly unreal. Inasmuch as they are everlasting, they are real; but inasmuch as they are subject to change, they are unreal. § 13.

τις ἀληθὲς . . . ; . . . — τὸν αἰεὶ ὄντα. *Ib.* 1: ἀλήθειαν εἶναι ἐν μόνοις τοῖς αἰδίοις. *Ib.* 12 as emended, ἀληθὲς εἶναι μόνον τὸ αἰεὶ ὄν.

[]¹ He alone is absolutely real, who is incorporeal and changeless,—He that ever is. § 15.

Exc. II B. That being so, what must a man do to live his life aright? He must be religious. And that he may be religious, he must pursue philosophy. He who does so will learn that there is One by whom all things are ordered to good ends; he will be thankful to Him; and being thankful to Him, he will be religious. § 2.

And if he pursues philosophy further, he will learn where Reality is, and what it is. Having learnt this, he will be yet more religious; and being filled with passionate love of the Good and Real, thenceforward he can never fall away. If you attain to that, all will be well with you, both in this life and after death. §§ 3, 4.

(But you must begin by freeing yourself from the body.) It is hard to do this; for before it can be done, there is a fight to be fought out within you. There is one part in you that strives to mount upward; but there are two parts in you that try to drag it down; and if the one is defeated by the two, your life on earth will be a state of penal torment. You must first win victory in this contest, and then mount upward. §§ 5-8.

Exc. II A, § 1. περὶ ἀληθείας. When a *proposition* is called ἀληθής, the word means 'true'; when a *thing* is called ἀληθής, the word means 'real'. In this document, ἀληθής signifies 'real', and ἀλήθεια 'reality',—except in some phrases in §§ 5-6, where ἀληθῆ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν means 'to think *true* thoughts and make *true* statements'.

For ἀλήθεια in the sense of 'reality', cf. Pl. *Rep.* 6. 508 f., where ἀλήθεια is the correlate of νοῦς. (See *Corp.* II. 12.) Pl. *Soph.* 246 B: νοητὰ ἅττα καὶ ἀσώματα εἶδη βιαζόμενοι τὴν ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι· τὰ δ' ἐκείνων σώματα καὶ τὴν λεγομένην ὑπ' αὐτῶν ἀλήθειαν (= ἀληθινὴν οὐσίαν) . . . γένησιν ἀντ' οὐσίας φερομένην τινὰ προσαγορεύουσι. Pl. *Sympos.* 212 A: ἐνταῦθα αὐτῷ . . . γενήσεται, ὁρῶντι . . . τὸ καλόν, τίκειν οὐκ εἶδωλα ἀρετῆς, ἅτε οὐκ εἰδῶλον ἐφαπτομένῳ, ἀλλ' ἀληθῆ, ἅτε τοῦ ἀληθοῦς ἐφαπτομένῳ. *Corp.* VII. 3: ἀναβλέψας καὶ θεασάμενος τὸ κάλλος τῆς ἀληθείας. The ἀληθείας πεδῖον (Pl. *Phaedr.* 248 B) is the region of *reality*.

Περὶ ἀληθείας, ᾧ Τάτ, οὐκ ἔστι δυνατόν (κατ' ἀξίαν εἰπεῖν). As Hermes goes on to say that it is possible to speak about ἀλήθεια, (ὃ δέ ἐστι δυνατόν, τοῦτο φημί,) he cannot have begun by saying that it

¹ Interpolation: [The Sun alone is real, for he alone is changeless. The Sun resides over the Kosmos, and is subordinate only to the one supreme God.]

is *not* possible to do so ; εἰπεῖν must therefore have been qualified by something like κατ' ἀξίαν. Cf. Pl. *Phaedr.* 247 c : τὸν δὲ ὑπερουράνιον τόπον οὔτε τις ὕμνησέ πω . . . οὔτε ποθ' ὕμνησει κατ' ἀξίαν. ἔχει δὲ ὧδε· τολμητέον γὰρ οὖν τό γε ἀληθές εἰπεῖν (to say what is *true*), ἄλλως τε καὶ περὶ ἀληθείας (*reality*) λέγοντα. *Corp.* XVIII. 12 : κὰν εἰ μὴ [τὸ] πρὸς ἀξίαν ἔστιν εἰπεῖν.

ζῶον ἀτελές, ἐξ ἀτελῶν συγκείμενον μερῶν (μελῶν MSS.). This is a reminiscence of Pl. *Tim.* 32 D, where the Kosmos is described as ζῶον τέλειον ἐκ τελῶν τῶν μερῶν. In that passage, the τέλεα μέρη of the Kosmos are 'all the fire there is, and all the water, and all the air, and all the earth'. The ἀτελῆ μέρη of which a man is composed are, as the Hermetist proceeds to explain, portions of fire, air, water, and earth, corrupted by intermixture. In Herm. *Exc.* III. 12, the αἰδία σώματα are called τέλεια σώματα.

[τολμήσαντα εἰπεῖν]. τολμήσαντα is meaningless in connexion with a verb dependent on δυνατόν ; and εἰπεῖν, if meant to depend on the preceding οὐκ ἔστι δυνατόν, is too far separated from it. It may be suspected that the words δίκαιον τολμήσαντα εἰπεῖν originally went together. 'It is *possible* to say something about ἀλήθεια ; and it is *right* to make the venture.' Cf. τολμητέον in Pl. *Phaedr.* 247 c, quoted above. *Corp.* X. 24 b : εἰ χρὴ τολμήσαντας εἰπεῖν. *Ib.* 25 : τολμητέον εἰπεῖν.

ἀλήθειαν εἶναι ἐν μόνοις τοῖς αἰδίοις [σώμασιν]. The αἰδία σώματα may be 'real',—at least in some degree ; but they are certainly not the only things that are real ; for that which is real in the highest degree is incorporeal. (See §§ 13 and 15.) It is therefore necessary to bracket σώμασιν.

§ 2. τὰ (αἰδία) σώματα αὐτὰ (μὲν καθ' αὐτὰ) ἀληθῆ ἔστι. The term αἰδία σώματα is applicable both to the cosmic elements and to the heavenly bodies. But the writer here speaks of the cosmic elements alone ; and if the heavenly bodies are thought of at all, they must be thought of as included under the element fire, of which they are composed.

The elements are 'real' only so far as they are pure. As they exist in our bodies, and in all things upon earth, they are adulterated by intermixture with one another, and therefore none of them is 'real'. πῦρ αὐτόπυρ means fire by itself, free from intermixture with anything else. The wording of this sentence may have been suggested in part by Pl. *Tim.* 51 B : ἄρ' ἔστι τι πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ, καὶ πάντα περὶ ὧν αἰεὶ λέγομεν οὕτως αὐτὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ὄντα ἕκαστα ; ἢ

ταῦτα ἄπερ καὶ βλέπομεν, ὅσα τε ἄλλα διὰ τοῦ σώματος αισθανόμεθα, μόνον ἐστὶ τοιαύτην ἔχοντα ἀλήθειαν, ἄλλα δὲ οὐκ ἐστὶ παρὰ ταῦτα οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ μάτην ἐκάστοτε εἶναι τί φαμεν εἶδος ἐκάστου νοητόν; But though the Hermetist may have had the words of that passage in his mind, his meaning is different. The πῦρ αὐτὸ ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ of the *Timaeus* is the νοητόν εἶδος (Platonic 'idea') of fire. But the πῦρ αὐτόπυρ of *Exc. II A* cannot be the νοητόν εἶδος of fire; for we are told that it is a body. The νοητόν εἶδος is not a body.

The source of the writer's thought is to be found rather in Pl. *Phileb.* 29 A: τὰ περὶ τὴν τῶν σωμάτων φύσιν ἀπάντων τῶν ζώων πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ πνεῦμα (air) καθορωμένον που καὶ γῆν . . . ἐνόητα ἐν τῇ συστάσει. . . φέρε δὴ, περὶ ἐκάστου τῶν παρ' ἡμῶν λαβεῖν τὸ τοιοῦνδε, . . . ὅτι σμικρὸν τε . . . ἐνεστι καὶ φαῦλον, [καὶ] οὐδαμῆ οὐδαμῶς εἰλικρινὲς ὄν, καὶ τὴν δυνάμιν οὐκ ἀξίαν τῆς φύσεως ἔχον. . . οἷον πῦρ ἔστι μὲν που παρ' ἡμῶν, ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ παντί. . . οὐκοῦν σμικρὸν μὲν τι τὸ παρ' ἡμῶν καὶ ἀσθενὲς καὶ φαῦλον, τὸ δ' ἐν τῷ παντί πλήθει τε θαυμαστόν καὶ κάλλει καὶ πάσῃ δυνάμει τῇ περὶ τὸ πῦρ οὔσῃ. . . ταῦτα γὰρ ἔρεῖς, οἶμαι, περὶ τῆς ἐν τοῖς ζώοις γῆς τῆς ἐνθάδε καὶ τῆς ἐν τῷ παντί, κ.τ.λ.

But where and how do the elements exist in their 'purity' and 'reality'? The πῦρ αὐτόπυρ may be considered to exist in the heavens, which, according to the Stoic physics, consist of unmixed fire. But where are γῆ αὐτόγη, ὕδωρ αὐτοῦδωρ, and ἀήρ αὐτοῦαήρ to be found? Perhaps the writer might have said that they occur nowhere in the universe as we know it, but that they did occur at a certain stage in the making of the universe. The Demiurgus first made the four elements (πῦρ αὐτόπυρ &c.) out of formless ὕλη, and then made all sublunary things by mixing or combining the four elements together. See the passages on the separation of the elements in the *Cosmogonies of Corp. I* and *Corp. III*.

[μόνον καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο]. Most likely (πῦρ) μόνον καὶ οὐδὲν ἄλλο was inserted after πῦρ αὐτόπυρ, as an explanation of that unfamiliar term. If so, the explanation is correct; but it can hardly have been written by the author.

καὶ οὔτε πῦρ ἔστιν (ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀληθές) οὔτε γῆ οὔτε ὕδωρ οὔτε ἀήρ, οὔτε οὐδὲν ἀληθές. Lactantius, *Div. inst.* 2. 12. 4, referring to this passage, writes '(Trismegistus) nostra corpora . . . dixit . . . et neque ignem esse neque aërem neque aquam neque terram'. It appears therefore that he read καὶ οὔτε πῦρ ἔστιν οὔτε γῆ οὔτε ὕδωρ οὔτε ἀήρ, as in our MSS., and took the sentence to end at οὔτε ἀήρ. Perhaps we should insert ἐν αὐτοῖς or something of the sort, and also add ἀληθές.

εἰ δὲ μὴ τὴν ἀρχὴν ἢ σύστασις ἡμῶν ἔσχε τὴν ἀλήθειαν, πῶς ἂν δύναίτο ἀλήθειαν ἢ ἰδεῖν ἢ εἰπεῖν; Like is known by like. (Cf. Empedocles, fr. 109 Diels: γαίη μὲν γὰρ γαῖαν ὀπώπαμεν, ὕδατι δ' ὕδωρ, | αἰθέρι δ' αἰθέρα διον, ἀτὰρ πυρὶ πῦρ αἰδηλον.) If then nothing in us is real, we can apprehend nothing that is real.

Man is here considered merely as an earthly organism; and the divine νοῦς which is present in some men at least, and in virtue of which they are capable of seeing the Real, is left out of account.

[νοῆσαι δὲ (δυνατὸν) μόνον ἐὰν ὁ θεὸς θέλῃ]. This breaks the connexion between § 2 and § 3. Cf. οἷς ἐὰν ὁ θεὸς τὴν θεοπτικὴν δωρήσῃται δύναμιν (§ 6), which may have been inserted by the same interpolator. It should be noted that, if we cut out these two phrases, the word θεός does not occur in the document. The writer seems to have avoided the use of it deliberately. For instance, where he might have said 'from God', he prefers to say ἄνωθεν.

§ 3. πάντα . . . τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀληθῆ (ἀλήθεια MSS.) μὲν οὐκ ἔστι· τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας μιμήματα [καὶ] οὐ πάντα, ὀλίγα δέ. [ταῦτα] (τὰ δὲ) ἄλλα ψεῦδος καὶ πλάνος. Earthly things are divided into two classes, viz. (1) things which, though not real, are copies of the real, and (2) things which are not even copies of the real. The former, which are the less numerous, are presumably to be identified with the things which 'partake of the good', and the latter, with the things which are wholly bad.

It is necessary to insert τὰ δέ before ἄλλα. The reading of the MSS. may be accounted for by assuming that τὰ δέ was read as τάδε, and that this was altered into ταῦτα.

(ἐκ) φαντασίας [καθάπερ εἰκόνες] συνεστῶτα. καθάπερ εἰκόνες is a misplaced doublet of καθάπερ καὶ ἡ εἰκὼν in § 4.

φαντασία means '(unreal) appearance', as opposed to reality. Cf. Pl. *Soph.* 260 C: καὶ μὴν ἀπάτης οὔσης, εἰδώλων τε καὶ εἰκόνων ἤδη καὶ φαντασίας πάντα ἀνάγκη μεστὰ εἶναι. The word φάντασμα is similarly used by Plato; e. g. *Soph.* 236 B; *Rep.* 584 A, 598 B, 599 A.

§ 4. ὅταν δ' ἄνωθεν τὴν ἐπίρροιαν ἔχῃ ἢ φαντασία, τῆς ἀληθείας γίγνεται μίμησις. This refers to the ὀλίγα which were said above to be ἀληθείας μιμήματα. Does τὴν ἐπίρροιαν ἔχῃ mean ἐπιρρέη? Or are we to understand some genitive (e. g. τοῦ θεοῦ) after ἐπίρροιαν?

καὶ ὀφθαλμοῦς μὲν ὄραται ἔχουσα (sc. ἡ εἰκὼν ἢ ἐν τῇ γραφῇ), βλέπει δὲ οὐδέν (καὶ ὦτα,) ἀκούει δὲ οὐδέν ὅλως. This looks like a

reminiscence of *Ps.* 113. 13 (115. 5): ὀφθαλμοὺς ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐκ ὄψονται ὡτα ἔχουσιν καὶ οὐκ ἀκούσονται. (Repeated in *Ps.* 134 (135). 16, with ἐνωτισθήσονται in place of ἀκούσονται.) But the resemblance is in the words alone, and not in the thought. The Psalmist is speaking of the idols worshipped by the heathen; the Hermetist is speaking of a painted portrait of a man.

τῶν μὲν δοκούντων ἀληθῆ ὄραν, τῶν δ' ὡς ἀληθῶς ὄντων ψευδῶν. τῶν μὲν is masculine, and means those who look at the picture; τῶν δέ is neuter, and means the things seen in the picture. For the play on the word ἀληθῶς, cf. *Pl. Rep.* 2. 382 A: τό γε ὡς ἀληθῶς ψεύδος, εἰ οἶόν τε τοῦτο εἶπεν. *Theaet.* 189 C: τοῦ ἀληθῶς ψεύδους.

The writer assumes that the man who looks at the picture is deceived by it, and mistakes the painted figure for a living being. Plato (*Rep.* 598 C, *Soph.* 234 B, and *Phileb.* 38 D) speaks of a similar mistake in the case of an image or painting seen at a distance.

§§ 5, <(7)>, 6, 8. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν . . . μηδὲν ἀληθές ἐνθάδε. Hermes says that it is possible for men to think true thoughts and speak true words (ἀληθῆ) about reality (ἀλήθεια). Thereupon Tat, confusing the two meanings of the word ἀληθής, argues that if there are men on earth who think and speak ἀληθῆ, there is some ἀλήθεια (reality) on earth; but Hermes rejects this argument.

It is clear that this was the general meaning of the passage; but the text is in confusion. I have tried to make sense of it by transposing § 7 (οὕτως ἀληθές . . . Τί δαί;).

§ 6. [οἷς ἐὰν ὁ θεὸς τὴν θεοπτικὴν δωρήσῃται δύναμιν.] θεοπτικὴν is inappropriate here. If the power of thinking truly about ἀλήθεια is to be called ἡ θεοπτικὴ δύναμις, it must be assumed that ἀλήθεια is identical with God; but the writer does not bring ἀλήθεια into connexion with God until § 15, and therefore could hardly presuppose its identity with God in § 6. It is probable then that οἷς ἐὰν . . . δύναμιν is an interpolation.

For the word θεοπτικός, cf. *Ex.* VII. 3: μάλιστα ἐκείνοις συμβαίνει τὸ ὀλισθαίνειν, οἷς θεοπτικὴ δύναμις οὐ πρόσεστι. In *Adamtonis Resp.* 8. 6 a (*Testim.*), the higher of the 'two souls' of man is called ἡ θεοπτικὴ ψυχή. An instance of θεόπτῃς occurs in the traditional text of Philo *De mutatione nominum* 2. 7, vol. iii, p. 157 Wendland: Μωυσῆς οὖν ὁ τῆς ἀειδοῦς φύσεως θεατῆς καὶ θεόπτῃς. But Wendland brackets καὶ θεόπτῃς; and apart from this, the earliest instance of θεόπτῃς given in Sophocles *Lex.* is about A. D. 600. θεοπτία, as far as I know, occurs first in Eusebius.

§ 8. [τὰ ὄντα [δεῖ] νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν]. δεῖ may have been repeated from ἀλήθειαν δεῖ καλεῖν; and τὰ ὄντα νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν is probably a doublet of ἀληθῆ νοεῖν καὶ λέγειν above.

[ἔστι δὲ οὐδὲν ἀληθές ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς.] These words might be combined with [φαντασῖαι εἰσὶ καὶ δόξαι πάντα] in § 7. It would be possible to write ἔστιν οὐδὲν ἀληθές ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς, φαντασῖαι δὲ καὶ δόξαι πάντα. We may suppose this to have been a marginal note in which the teaching of the passage was summed up.

⟨(καὶ οὐκ ἀσκόπως)⟩ (εἶπον οὖτι) τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, τὸ μὴ εἶναι (εἰδέναι MSS.) μηδὲν ἀληθές ἐνθάδε. The words καὶ οὐκ ἀσκόπως are meaningless where they stand in the MSS.; and they make sense at the place to which I have transposed them. The statement τοῦτο ἀληθές ἐστι, τὸ μὴ εἶναι μηδὲν ἀληθές ἐνθάδε, is a repetition, in a slightly altered form, of the statement of Hermes as emended, ἀληθές οὐδὲν εἶναι ἐν τῇ γῇ νοῶν καὶ λέγων, ἀληθῆ νοῶ καὶ λέγω. If Hermes admitted Tat's argument to be valid, he would have to admit that he had spoken ἀσκόπως (i. e. without due consideration) when he made that statement. But he denies that he spoke ἀσκόπως; that is he maintains that his statement was correct, in spite of Tat's objection.

§ 9. ἡ γὰρ ἀλήθειά [] ἐστὶν αὐτὸ τὸ ἄκρατον ἀγαθόν . . . τὰ δὲ ἐνθάδε . . . ἄδεκτα [] τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. The writer identifies τὸ ἀληθές with τὸ ἀγαθόν. And so, when he says that there is nothing ἀληθές on earth, his position closely resembles that of the writer of *Corr.* VI, who says that there is nothing ἀγαθόν on earth. That which is 'real' is that which is really good; things which are 'unreal' are things which men mistakenly think to be good.

τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ὕλης θολούμενον μήτε ὑπὸ σώματος περιβαλλόμενον, γυμνὸν φανόν, ἄτρεπτον [σεμνόν] ἀναλλοίωτον. Cf. § 15: τὸν μὴ ἐξ ὕλης, τὸν μὴ ἐν σώματι . . . τὸν ἄτρεπτον, τὸν μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον, *Corr.* XIII. 6 as emended: τί οὖν ἀληθές ἐστὶν . . .; Τὸ μὴ θολούμενον, . . . τὸ μὴ περιοριζόμενον, . . . τὸ γυμνόν, τὸ φανόν, . . . τὸ ἄτρεπτον, τὸ ἀναλλοίωτον, τὸ ἀγαθόν. The words τὸ μὴ ὑπὸ ὕλης θολούμενον μήτε ὑπὸ σώματος περιβαλλόμενον are a description of what might be more shortly called τὸ ἀσώματον.—ἄτρεπτον and ἀναλλοίωτον ought to go together; σεμνόν, by which they are separated in the MSS., is doubtless a corrupted duplication of γυμνόν.

§ 10. ἃ οὖν μηδὲ πρὸς ἑαυτὰ ἀληθῆ ἐστι, πῶς δύναται ἀληθῆ εἶναι; A thing would be πρὸς ἑαυτὸ ἀληθές ('real in relation to itself'), if it continued through all time to be what it is at any given moment. But earthly things do not thus continue.

§ 16. πάντα δὲ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς φθορὰ κατέλαβε . . . πῶς ἂν ἀληθὲς εἶη ;
 The contents of this section are closely connected with those of § 10; and it seems clear that it ought to follow § 10, and precede § 11. In § 10, the writer has said that all things which are subject to change are unreal; in § 16, he goes on to say that all things which are subject to destruction are unreal. Having thus laid down certain tests of reality and unreality, he proceeds to apply these tests (1) to man (§§ 11, 12, <<17>>), and (2) to 'the everlasting bodies' (§ 13); and having shown that man is unreal, and that 'the everlasting bodies' are only partly real, he ends by asking and answering the question 'what then is absolutely real?' (§ 15).

[καὶ ἐμπεριέχει καὶ ἐμπεριέξει ἡ τοῦ ἀληθοῦς πρόνοια]. These words are obviously out of place here. It would be possible to put them in after τὸ ψεῦδός φημι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐνέργημα εἶναι at the end of § 18, supplying τὸ ψεῦδος as the object of ἐμπεριέχει; but they are not needed there, and it seems better to reject them altogether.

οὐδὲ γέनेσις δύναται ἵσυστῆναι]. This phrase would be admissible only if γέनेσις were taken in the sense of τὰ γινόμενα, 'the things that come into being'. But in the rest of the paragraph, γέनेσις is used only to signify 'the process of coming into being' (as in ἵνα μὴ στηῖ ἡ γέनेσις); and that process could hardly be said to 'be put together' (ἵσυστῆναι), though the things themselves might. It is probable therefore that there is some corruption here.

[πάση δὲ γενέσει φθορὰ ἐπεταί, ἵνα πάλιν γένηται (πάντα)]. The iteration of the same thought in this section is intolerable; and the only doubt is, which of the phrases it is best to cut out.

[πρῶτον τοῦτον δημιουργὸν γινώριξε]. This is a misplaced doublet of πρῶτον τοῦτον δημιουργὸν γινώριζω in § 14 *fn.*

[εἰς τὴν γέनेσιν τῶν ὄντων]. This has doubtless come by duplication from μὴ στηῖ ἡ γέनेσις τῶν ὄντων above.

ὡς ποτὲ μὲν ἄλλα ποτὲ δὲ ἄλλα γινόμενα. Plants and animals perish, and are replaced by others. The race persists; but the individuals of which it consists at one time are not the same as those of which it consists at another time.

§ 18. μεταβαλλόμενα δὲ . . . ἐνέργημα εἶναι. The first sentence of this section (μεταβαλλόμενα δὲ ψεύδεται [] τὰ ὄντα) continues the argument of § 16, and has been wrongly separated from it in the MSS. by the interposition of § 17, which evidently belongs to the discussion of the question whether man is real (§§ 11, 12).

τὸ ψεῦδός φημι τῆς ἀληθείας ἐνέργημα εἶναι. This implies that God

is the author of the *φαντασίαι* or illusions of which the sensible world consists. Cf. *Corp.* V. 1 b: *οὐκ αὐτὸς γεννόμενος ἐν φαντασίᾳ, πάντα δὲ φαντασιῶν, κ.τ.λ.* The thought is similar to that of Omar Khayyam: 'We are no other than a moving row | Of Magic Shadow-shapes that come and go | Round with the Sun-illuminated Lantern held | In Midnight by the Master of the Show.' But the writer is not yet ready to speak openly of God, and still adheres to the abstract term ἡ ἀλήθεια.

§ 11. Οὐδὲ ἄνθρωπος ἀληθῆς ἐστιν; Compare the discussion of the question whether man is *ἀγαθός*, in *Corp.* II, *Corp.* VI, and *Corp.* X.

Καθότι ἄνθρωπος, οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθῆς. In so far as he is merely a man (i. e. an earthly organism), he is not real. The words *καθότι ἄνθρωπος* serve to suggest the thought that a man may become something more than a mere man. He who has received into himself the divine *νοῦς*, or has got *gnosis*, is godlike, or a god (*Corp.* XIII &c.).

(τὸ) [καὶ] ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνου τὴν σύστασιν ἔχον. This stands in contrast to *ἐκ πολλῶν συνέστηκε*, and must therefore be taken as equivalent to *τὸ ἀσύστατον*. (Cf. *αὐτογέννητος* = *ἀγέννητος*.) Man is (1) *συστατός*, and (2) *τρεπτός καὶ μεταβλητός*; and for both these reasons, he cannot be *ἀληθῆς*.

τρέπεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλεται (εἰς) ἡλικίαν ἐξ ἡλικίας. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 5: *τὸ γὰρ θνητὸν εἶδος καθ' ἡμέραν ἀλλάσσεται χρόνῳ γὰρ τρέπεται εἰς αὐξήσιν καὶ μείωσιν, ὡς ψεῦδος (ὄν).*

[καὶ ταῦτα ἔτι ὦν ἐν τῷ σκῆνει]. This would imply that man is even more subject to *μεταβολαί* when he has quitted the body. It might no doubt be said that a soul, when disembodied, is still subject to *μεταβολαί*,—being liable, for instance, to a series of incarnations in different bodies (cf. *Corp.* X. 7, *τούτων τοίνυν τῶν ψυχῶν πολλαὶ αἱ μεταβολαί*); but the 'man' spoken of in this paragraph is man embodied upon earth, and a reference to disembodied souls would be irrelevant. It is therefore best to bracket *καὶ ταῦτα . . . σκῆνει*.

§ 17. φαντασίας οὖν καλεῖν δεῖ [] <<τοῦ ἀνθρώπου>> . . . οὔτε ὁ γέρων γέρων. This passage fits on perfectly to the end of § 12 (*φαντασία δέ τις*); and it can hardly be doubted that it originally stood here.

[[τὸν ἄνθρωπον]] [ἀνθρωπότητος φαντασίαν] τὸ [δέ] <μὲν> παιδίον παιδίου φαντασίαν, τὸν δὲ νεανίσκον κ.τ.λ. *ἄνθρωπος* is the general term under which *παιδίον*, *νεανίσκος*, *ἀνὴρ*, and *γέρων* are included; it ought not therefore to stand side by side with them as one of

the same series. Moreover, the addition of *ἄνθρωπος* to the list impairs the force of the argument; for the *ἄνθρωπος* remains an *ἄνθρωπος* all the time that he is passing through the changes from *παιδίον* to *γέρον*. It is most likely then that *τὸν ἄνθρωπον* was inserted before *τὸ μὲν παιδίον* by an accidental error, and that a transcriber tried to make sense of it by filling out the phrase on the analogy of those which follow. But he blundered in doing so; for he ought to have written *ἀνθρώπου φαντασίαν*, and not *ἀνθρωπότητος φαντασίαν*.

ἡ δὲ φαντασία ψεῦδος ἂν εἴη [ἀκρότατον]. These words fitly end the paragraph by giving a direct answer to the question with which it began. 'Is man real?' 'No; for he is a *φαντασία*, and that which is a *φαντασία* is unreal.' But *ἀκρότατον* can hardly be right; for it would imply that there are other things which are unreal in some degree, but less unreal than *φαντασῖαι*; and there would be no point in hinting at the existence of such things here.

§ 13. Οὐδὲ ταῦτα οὖν . . . τὰ αἶδια σώματα [[]] ἀληθῆ ἐστι(ν); The *αἶδια σώματα* spoken of in § 2 were the four cosmic elements; and it is to be presumed that here also the four elements are meant.

«ἐπεὶ μεταβάλλεται». The writer accepts the doctrine that all the four elements are transmutable, and are constantly changing into one another. But he holds that they are none the less *αἶδια*; for though portions of fire, for instance, are continually changing into air, water, and earth, the mass of fire in the Kosmos is maintained undiminished, by the simultaneous transmutation of portions of the other elements into fire. Cf. *Corp.* XII. ii. 14 c as emended: τὰ ἀσύνθετα σώματα (i. e. the cosmic elements), καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλα ποιούμενα, ἀεὶ τῆς ταυτότητος τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν σώζει. In *Corp.* VIII. 4, the cosmic elements are spoken of as τὰ ἀδιάλυτα σώματα, τουτέστι τὰ ἀθάνατα. See also what is said of τὰ αἶδια σώματα in *Exc.* V. 1. Cf. Macrobius *Somn.* 2. 12. 14: 'Plotinus . . . cum de corporum absumptione dissereret, et hoc dissolvi posse pronuntiaret, quicquid effluit, obicit sibi: cur ergo elementa, quorum fluxus in aperto est, non similiter aliquando solvuntur? Et breviter tantae obiectioni valideque respondit: ideo elementa, licet fluant, numquam tamen solvi, quia non foras effluunt. A ceteris enim corporibus quod effluit recedit; elementorum fluxus numquam ab ipsis recedit elementis. Ergo

in hoc mundo pars nulla mortalis secundum verae rationis adserta'.¹

In regarding air, water, and earth as 'everlasting' bodies, the Hermetist differs from the Stoics, who said that at each *ecpyrosis* these three elements are wholly transmuted into fire.

Πᾶν μὲν οὖν τὸ [γεννητὸν καὶ] μεταβλητὸν οὐκ ἀληθές. It is true that the elements are *γεννητά*, both in the sense that they were originally made by the Demiurgus, and in the sense that they are continually being produced out of one another; but there is no occasion to mention that fact here.

(ὕπὸ δὲ τοῦ προπάτορος (ἄφθαρτα) γενόμενα, τὴν ἕλην¹ δύναται ἀληθῆ ἐσχηκέναι.) This was probably suggested by Pl. *Tim.* 41 B, where the Demiurgus says to the gods whom he has made (i. e. to the parts of the Kosmos) ἐπέπερ γεγένησθε, ἀθάνατοι μὲν οὐκ ἐστὲ οὐδ' ἄλντοι τὸ πάμπαν, οὗ τι μὲν δὴ λυθήσεσθέ γε, οὐδὲ τεύξεσθε θανάτου μοίρας. The elements are not in themselves indestructible; but it is the will of God, who made them, that they shall never be destroyed. Consequently, they hold an intermediate position between 'the unreal' and 'the real'. They are unreal *qua μεταβλητά*, but real *qua αἰδία*.

ἕλην is unintelligible; it is difficult to see what could be meant by saying that the elements 'have received matter' from God, and that the matter which they have received from him is real. It seems therefore that ἕλην must have been substituted for some other word, possibly οὐσίαν or ὑπαρξίν.

προπάτωρ is here used as an appellation of the supreme God. Cf. τὸν προπάτορα (τῆς ψυχῆς) in *Exc.* II B. 3. The only other Hermetic passage in which προπάτωρ is thus employed is *Kore Kosmi*, *Exc.* XXIII. 10: ταύτην Φύσεως (δ)νόματι ἐτίμησεν ὁ θεὸς ὁ προπάτωρ. See *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 4 d (*Testim.*), where the supreme God is called προπάτωρ.

The earliest known instances of this use of the word occur in accounts of the Valentinian doctrine (second century A. D.). Irenaeus I. I. 1: the Valentinians say τινὰ εἶναι ἐν ἀοράτοις καὶ ἀκατονομάστοις ὑψώμασι τέλειον αἰῶνα προόντα· τοῦτον δὲ καὶ (Προαρχὴν καὶ) Προπάτορα καὶ Βυθὸν καλοῦσιν. *Iren.* I. 14. 2 &c. In the Valentinian system, Νοῦς, the first emanation from the Βυθός, is πατήρ, and the Βυθός itself is consequently προπάτωρ.

¹ Whence did Macrobius get this? It partly agrees in meaning with Plotinus *Enn.* 2. 1. 3; but it is not a translation of that passage.

The writers of the *Pistis Sophia* and the other 'Coptic-Gnostic' documents frequently use *προπάτωρ* as the name or title of a divine Person. (See C. Schmidt, *Koptisch-Gnostische Schriften* I, Index, s. v. *προπάτωρ*.) They employed it as a word of vaguely holy import; but they had ceased to attach any definite meaning to it, as is shown by the fact that they sometimes speak of *προπάτορες* in the plural.

It is most likely that the Valentinians adopted the use of *προπάτωρ* as a name of the supreme God from some Pagan Platonist, and that the writer of *Exc.* II, and the 'Egyptians' of *Abammonis Resp.*, got it from the same Pagan source. There is no need to suppose that the Hermetist borrowed it from the Valentinians, though the earliest extant instance of this use of the word happens to come from Valentinian writings. Perhaps he regarded the Kosmos as *πατήρ* of man, and God as *προπάτωρ*. Cf. *Corp.* X. 14 b, where it is said that man is son of the Kosmos, and 'εγγονος' of God. The word was used by later Platonists; e. g. Synesius, *Hymn.* 3. 47: *προπάτωρ, ἀπάτωρ*.

§ 14. [(Τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι τις)] ἀληθές . . . ;—Μόνον τὸν ἥλιον κ.τ.λ.] This section must be one of the numerous 'solar interpolations' which we find inserted in the *Hermetica* by devotees of the Sun-god. It is inconsistent with what precedes and follows. The statement that 'the Sun alone is real' is contradicted by § 15; and the statement that the Sun οὐ μεταβάλλεται cannot be reconciled with § 13, where we are told that the *αἶδια σώματα* (under which term the Sun, as a body composed of fire, must be included) are *μεταβλητά*. The interpolator borrowed the words which he found at the beginning of § 15 (Τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι τις κ.τ.λ.), and employed them here to introduce a passage in praise of the god of his special cult. The function which he assigns to the Sun, viz. that of a Demiurgus supreme within the Kosmos, and subject only to the supracosmic God, is similar to the function assigned to the Sun in *Corp.* XVI. See also *Exc.* V. 2.

§ 15. Τί οὖν ἂν εἴποι (τις ἀληθές) τὴν πρώτην ἀλήθειαν;—(Τί οὖν ἂν εἶναι τὴν πρώτην ἀλήθειαν; MSS.). The phrase *ἀληθές τὴν πρώτην ἀλήθειαν*, 'real with the supreme reality', i. e. 'real in the highest degree', is intended to contrast the absolute reality of God with the partial or imperfect reality of the 'everlasting bodies', which was spoken of in § 13.

Here at last the Hermetist passes from the neuter (τὸ ἀληθές)

and the abstract feminine (ἡ ἀλήθεια) to the masculine (τὸν . . . ἀεὶ ὄντα), and by doing so, declares openly what he has hitherto kept back, namely, that 'the real' of which he has been speaking is nothing else than God. Yet even here, the word θεός is still avoided.

τὸν ἀχρώματον, τὸν ἀσχημάτιστον. Cf. *Exc.* VIII. 2 : of the three kinds of ἀσώματα in man, the first (*sc.* ὁ νοῦς) is ἀχρώματον, ἀσχημάτιστον. Pl. *Phaedr.* 247 C : ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα, ψυχῆς, κ.τ.λ. Porphyry *Ad Marcellam* 8 : ἐγὼ οὐχ ὁ ἀπτός οὗτος καὶ τῇ αἰσθήσει ἵποπτωτός, ὁ δὲ ἐπὶ πλείστον ἀφεστηκὸς τοῦ σώματος, ὁ ἀχρώματος καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος, . . . διανοίᾳ δὲ μόνῃ κρατητός ;

Exc. II B, § I. ἐγὼ [ὦ τέκνον] . . . «πρῶτον τὸδε συγγράφω». As given in the traditional text, this section is utterly incomprehensible. If we retain ὦ τέκνον, it would seem that the author must have intended the words to be taken as written by Hermes, and addressed to Tat. But this *libellus* is not an epistle or written treatise sent by Hermes to his son ; it is ostensibly a written report of a spoken dialogue, in which Tat takes part (§ 2 *init.*) as well as Hermes ; and how could the author possibly make Hermes say, in a conversation with his son, 'I am composing this dialogue in writing',—i.e. 'I am at this moment writing the *libellus* in which this my conversation with you is recorded'? It is impossible to believe that even the most muddle-headed Hermetist could have been capable of such confusion of thought as that would involve.¹

But if the speaker cannot be Hermes, who is it that is speaking? As long as we suppose that the Hermetist wrote this section, there seems only one course open to us, namely, to take § I as a preliminary note written by the author in his own person, and to interpret him as saying : 'I am writing this *libellus* first, (but I intend to write some others afterwards)'.² But this hypothesis does not work out satisfactorily. What is the meaning of καὶ τῆς φιλανθρωπίας

¹ There is a somewhat similar confusion of thought in *Ascl. Lat.* 1 b ('Tractatum hunc autem tuo (in)scribam nomine,' addressed by Hermes to Asclepius) ; but in that instance, the use of the future tense, if it does not wholly get rid of the absurdity, at any rate diminishes it. Besides, the introductory passage in which those words occur appears to have been added by a blundering redactor.

² On this assumption, it might perhaps be possible to retain ὦ τέκνον, taking the τέκνον to be, not Tat, but a pupil of the author (not necessarily a son in the literal sense), to whom the author sends or dedicates the dialogue which he writes. But it is simpler to strike out ὦ τέκνον.

ἔνεκα καὶ τῆς πρὸς τὸν θεὸν εὐσεβείας? Does the author mean 'I am composing this dialogue in order to show my benevolence and piety'? That will hardly do. And what is the point of the following remark, οὐδεμία γὰρ ἂν . . . εὐσέβεια κ.τ.λ.? Moreover, it seems clear that II B was written as a continuation of II A. Its author was probably the same man who had previously written II A; and if so, II B was *not* the first thing that he wrote. And even if he was not the same man, he would not be likely to write *πρῶτον τόδε συγγράφω* at the head of his sequel to an already existing document.

Thus the word *συγγράφω* gives rise to insuperable difficulties on the assumption that the Hermetist was the writer. If, in place of *πρῶτον τόδε συγγράφω*, we write *πρὸ πάντων προσιμῶ τόδε τὸ σύγγραμμα* (or *τῆνδε τὴν συγγραφὴν*), or something to that effect, the section becomes intelligible as a note written by a reader to express his admiration for *Exc. II B*, and inserted into the text by error. (Compare the words *Asclepius iste pro sole mihi est*, written by an admiring reader at the head of the Latin *Asclepius*, and printed in the earlier editions as the opening words of the text.) ὁ τέκνον may have been inserted by a transcriber who, finding that in the following section Hermes was addressing his son, thought that the same form of address was needed in the opening sentence.

[If *συγγράφω* be taken in the sense of 'set down', another hypothesis may be considered. The section is placed at the head of an excerpt, and the 'reader' who wrote it might be an anthologist, who placed this extract, *ἔνεκα τῆς εὐσεβείας*, at the head of a series dealing with the same subject. It may be observed that this at all events is what Stobaeus did in chapter 41 of the first book.]

Patrizzi singles out *Exc. II B* for special praise, and says there is more philosophy in it than in all the works of Aristotle;¹ and the unknown writer of this note must have been similarly impressed by it. He says that he esteems it more highly than all other writings (or at any rate, more highly than all other *Hermetica* that he has read), on account of the *φιλανθρωπία* and *εὐσέβεια* expressed or manifested in it; by way of justifying his opinion, he refers to certain phrases in § 2 (*νοῆσαι τὰ ὄντα* was suggested to him by ὁ δὲ μαθὼν οἶά ἐστι (τὰ ὄντα), and *χάριν τῷ ποιήσαντι ὑπὲρ τούτων δμολογῆσαι* is his summary of *χάριν εἰεται ὑπὲρ πάντων τῷ δημιουργῷ . . . ὁ δὲ χάριν*

¹ It is of the undivided piece in Stobaeus (i. e. *Exc. II B + Exc. XI*) that Patrizzi says this; but it must have been the first part of it (*Exc. II B*), and not the collection of aphorisms (*Exc. XI*), that he so highly valued.

ὁμολογῶν εὐσεβῆσει); and he ends by declaring his resolve to put in practice in his own life that piety which the discourse of Hermes describes and recommends.

§ 2. ὁ δὲ εὐσεβεῖν ζητῶν φιλοσοφῆσει.—(ὁ δὲ εὐσεβῶν ἄκρως φιλοσοφῆσει MSS.) The reading of the MSS. would imply that when a man has become completely εὐσεβής, he will pursue philosophy; i. e. that εὐσέβεια is the means whereby we may attain to φιλοσοφία. But the following words (χωρὶς φιλοσοφίας εὐσεβῆσαι ἀδύνατον κ.τ.λ.) show that the writer's meaning was the reverse of this. His view is that εὐσέβεια is the end to be aimed at, and φιλοσοφία is the means whereby we may attain to it.

φιλοσοφία—or rather, the earlier stage of φιλοσοφία—is here explained to mean τὸ μαθεῖν οἰά ἐστι (τὰ ὄντα), καὶ πῶς διατέτακται, καὶ ὑπὸ τίνος, καὶ ἔνεκεν τίνος (i. e. to learn that all things are ordered ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ, and ἔνεκεν τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ). Compare the definition of philosophy at the end of *Ascl. Lat. I.*

§ 3. ὁ δὲ ἄκρως φιλοσοφῶν μαθήσεται (ὁ δὲ εὐσεβῶν εἴσεται MSS.) καὶ ποῦ ἐστὶν ἡ ἀλήθεια καὶ τίς ἐστὶν ἐκείνη· καὶ (ταῦτα?) μαθὼν, ἔτι μᾶλλον εὐσεβέστερος ἔσται. The learner's progress in philosophy is divided into two distinct stages. In the first stage, he learns about the corporeal world (τὰ ὄντα). He comes to know that all things in it have been made and ordered by God; he is grateful to God for his goodness; and inasmuch as he is grateful to God, he is εὐσεβής. At this stage, he knows that God is the author of all corporeal things, but he still supposes these things to be real. But if he pursues philosophy further, he will learn 'where reality is, and what it is'; that is, he will come to know that (as has been explained in *Exc. II A*) all corporeal things are unreal, and God alone is real; and this higher and fuller knowledge of God will make him still more εὐσεβής. The higher stage is described below as ἡ κατάληψις τοῦ ὄντως ἀγαθοῦ καὶ ἀληθοῦς.—ἀλήθεια is correlative to νοῦς; and ἡ κατάληψις τοῦ ἀληθοῦς corresponds to what Platonists commonly called apprehension of τὰ νοητά. Compare Porphyry. *De abst. I. 31*: ὥστε καὶ μελετητέον, εἴπερ ἀναστρέφειν πρὸς τὰ ἐξ ἀρχῆς ἐσπουδάκαμεν, καθ' ὅσον δύναμις, αἰσθήσεως μὲν ἀφίστασθαι καὶ φαντασίας, τῆς τε ταύταις ἐπομένης ἀλογίας, καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτὴν παθῶν . . . διαρθρωτέον δὲ τὰ κατὰ τὸν νοῦν, . . . ἵνα μὴ μόνον ἀκούωμεν περὶ νοῦ καὶ τῶν νοητῶν, ἀλλὰ καὶ, ὅση δύναμις, ὁμῶς ἀπολαύοντές τε αὐτοῦ τῆς θεωρίας, καὶ εἰς τὴν ἀσωματίαν

καθιστάμενοι, καὶ ζῶντες μετ' ἀληθείας δι' ἐκείνον, ἀλλ' οὐ ψευδῶς μετὰ τῶν τοῖς σώμασι συμφύλων.

The two stages of φιλοσοφία (and of the εὐσέβεια which results from it) distinguished by the Hermetist are analogous to the two stages of the Christian's progress distinguished by Clement of Alexandria, who calls the lower stage πίστις, and the higher stage γνῶσις.

In place of εὐσεβῶν, we need some phrase signifying a further advance in knowledge. In the MSS., ἄκρως occurs in connexion with the earlier or preliminary stage. It is inappropriate there, but is just what is wanted here; and it is most likely that the author wrote ὁ δὲ ἄκρως φιλοσοφῶν.

⟨(καὶ οὐκέτι ἀποστῆναι δυνήσεται (δύναται MSS.) τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ.)⟩ As placed in the MSS., this statement is a feeble and pointless repetition of what has been more fully expressed in the words οὐδέποτε γὰρ . . . ψυχῇ . . . ὀλισθῆναι δύναται κ.τ.λ. On the other hand, something to this effect is needed *before* οὐδέποτε γὰρ κ.τ.λ., to account for the γάρ.

On the question whether it is possible for one who has got *gnosis* to fall away, see *Corp.* XIII. 14. The writer of *Exc.* II B appears to hold that a man who has attained only to the *lower* stage of 'philosophy' and 'piety' may lose what he has gained, but that he who has once attained to the *higher* stage is secure against backsliding. Cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 4. 22. 139: εἰ δὲ ἀγαπᾶν μεμάθηκε τὸν θεὸν (ὁ γνωστικός), οὐχ ἕξει τὴν ἀρετὴν ἀπόβλητον οὗτος οὐδαμῶς, κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* 6. 78: ἐν ἕξει τελειωθείσα τῇ μυστικῇ ἀμετάπτωτος δι' ἀγάπην μένει (ἢ γνῶσις).

[ἐν σώματι οὖσα καὶ]. Probably a misplaced doublet of ἐν σώματι οὖση, § 5 *fin.*

§ 4. τοῦτο εὐσεβείας ἐστὶ (ἔστω MSS.) τέλος· ἐφ' ὃ ἀφικόμενος (ἀφικνούμενος MSS.) καὶ καλῶς βιώσῃ κ.τ.λ. With these words Hermes concludes his answer to Tat's question, Τί οὖν ἂν τις πράττων . . . καλῶς διαγάγοι τὸν βίον; The way to live your life aright is to be εὐσεβής; and he who learns to 'know God' attains to the height of εὐσέβεια. But Hermes adds to this a mention of the life after death, of which Tat had said nothing. If a man knows God, all will be well with him not only in this life, but also in the life to come; for his soul, when it quits the body, will know 'whither to direct its upward flight'; that is, it will fly up to God, whom it has learnt to know on earth. Cf. *Exc.*

VI. 18: ἵνα ἐκεῖ γενομένη (ἡ ψυχὴ), ὅπου (τὸν θεὸν) ἔξῃστι θεάσασθαι, ὁδοῦ μὴ σφαλῆ.

§ 5. (. . .) αὕτη γὰρ μόνη ἐστίν, ᾧ τέκνον, [ἡ] πρὸς ἀλήθειαν ὁδός. To what does αὕτη refer? And what is meant by γὰρ? The 'way which leads to Reality' (i. e. to God) must be the mode of life of the man who is seeking to attain to εἰσέβεια; but in the preceding section, Hermes was speaking, not of this 'way', but of the goal to which it leads (εἰσεβείας τέλος). We must therefore suppose that between § 4 and § 5 a passage has been lost, in which Hermes spoke of the course which must be pursued by the man who seeks to become εἰσεβής, or of some preliminary condition which he must fulfil before he can be εἰσεβής. What would that condition be? Judging from parallel passages in other *Hermetica*, it seems most likely that the writer said that the aspirant must begin by 'freeing himself from the body', i. e. ridding himself of the πάθη which are produced by the debasing influence of the body on the soul. Cf. *Corp.* IV. 6 b: ἐὰν μὴ πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα μισήσης κ.τ.λ. *Corp.* XI. ii. 21 a: οὐδὲν γὰρ δύνασαι τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν <<νοῆσαι>>, φιλοσώματος ὢν καὶ κακός. *Corp.* VII. 2 b: πρῶτον δὲ δεῖ σε περιρρήξασθαι ὃν φορεῖς χιτῶνα (i. e. the body). *Exc.* VI. 19: ὅσοι δὲ ἄνθρωποι φιλοσώματοί εἰσιν, οὗτοι οὐκ ἂν ποτε θεάσαντο τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ καὶ ἀγαθοῦ ὄψιν. Now in § 8, the MSS. give δεῖ γὰρ σε, ᾧ τέκνον, πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα . . . ἐγκαταλεῖψαι. The words πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα . . . ἐγκαταλεῖψαι interrupt the sequence of thought there, and must be excised; but I am inclined to think that something like them originally stood at the beginning of § 5. E. g. the author may have written πλὴν δεῖ σε πρῶτον τὸ σῶμα ἐγκαταλεῖψαι αὕτη γὰρ μόνη κ.τ.λ. 'But you must begin by abandoning your body',—not in the sense of quitting it at death, but in the sense of alienating yourself from it during your life on earth;—'for that is the only road that leads to Reality'.

ἦν καὶ οἱ ἡμέτεροι πρόγονοι ᾧδευσαν, καὶ ὀδεύσαντες ἔτυχον τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ. 'Our ancestors' were once men on earth like you and me, but now are gods in the world above. In *Corp.* X. 5, Hermes is made to say much the same about two of his ancestors, who are there named Uranos and Kronos.

σεμνὴ αὕτη ὁδὸς καὶ Ἰλεία¹. σεμνὴ and λεία are not suitable words to couple together; and λεία can hardly be reconciled with χαλεπή. It would be possible to write σεμνὴ . . . καὶ θεία.

χαλεπή δὲ ψυχῆ ὀδεύσαι ἐν σώματι οὔση. Cf. *Corp.* IV. 9, as

emended: λαβώμεθα οὖν τῆς ἀρχῆς, καὶ ὀδεύσωμεν τάχει ἅπαντι. πᾶν γὰρ ἐστὶ δύσκολον κ.τ.λ. Porphyg. *Ad Marcellam* 6: οὐκ ἦν . . . πρὸς τῶν μελλόντων νόστου δὴ μιμνήσκεισθαι ἐκ τῆς ἐνταυθοῦ ξένης καταγωγῆς τὸ δι' ἡδονῆς . . . καὶ ῥαστώνης ποιείσθαι τὴν ἐπάνοδον. . . . διὰ γὰρ μερίμνης ἢ ὁδός.

§ 6. πρῶτον [μὲν] γὰρ αὐτὴν ἑαυτῇ πολεμήσαι δεῖ. πρῶτον means 'to begin with', i. e. before you can set out upon the way which leads to God.

ἐνὸς γὰρ (sc. μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς) γίγνεται πρὸς δύο ἢ [συ]στάσις. The Platonic psychology is taken for granted. The 'one' is νοῦς, or τὸ λογιστικόν; the 'two' are τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, the two subdivisions of the irrational part of the soul. Cf. *Corr.* XVI. 15: τὰ δύο (ἄλογα) μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς . . . τὸ δὲ λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς. The word στάσις shows that the writer has in mind the analogy between the human soul and a city, which is worked out in Pl. *Rep.*

[τοῦ μὲν φυγεῖν βουλομένου, τῶν δὲ κατασχεῖν σπευδόντων.] This is a doublet of τοῦ μὲν 'φυγόντος', τῶν δὲ καθελκόντων κάτω.

§ 7. τιμωρούμενον τῇ ἐνθάδε διαίτῃ. 'Impiety' or s. i. is its own punishment. Cf. *Corr.* X. 20, 21. *Corr.* XIII. 7 b: Ἰμωροὺς γὰρ ἐν ἑμαυτῷ ἔχω . . . ; Οὐκ ὀλίγους.

§ 8. οὗτός ἐστιν [] ὁ (περὶ) τῆς ἐκείσε ὁδοῦ ἀγών (ἀγωγός MSS.). It is a contest 'concerning the journey thither'; that is, a contest to decide whether the man shall enter on the upward way or not. If 'the one' is defeated by 'the two', you cannot even start upon the road which leads to God. The word ἀγών is used differently in *Corr.* X. 19 a: τὸν τῆς εὐσεβείας ἀγῶνα ἀγωνισαμένην ἀγῶν δὲ εὐσεβείας τὸ γνῶναι τὸν θεὸν καὶ μηδένα ἀνθρώπων ἀδικῆσαι.

EXCERPT III

Stob. 1. 41. 6 is given in the MSS., and printed in the editions of Stobaeus, as a single and undivided piece, headed by the lemma Ἐρμού ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ. But it is evidently made up of two distinct and unconnected excerpts. The first page (Ὁρθῶς ταῦτα . . . τοῦτο πράττουσιν, pp. 284. 4-285. 5 Wachsmuth) is a discussion of the instincts of animals. The rest (Ἐνέργειαι γὰρ . . . τὰ δὲ ἀνώματα, pp. 285. 6-289. 18 Wachsm.) is a dialogue περὶ ἐνεργειῶν, i. e. concerning the forces, put forth by the heavenly bodies, which work on

sublunar things; and with that topic the first page has nothing to do. It is most likely that Stobaeus gave the two pieces as distinct extracts, and wrote a second *lemma* (Τοῦ αὐτοῦ, meaning 'Ερμού,) at the head of the second piece, but that this *lemma* has been omitted by an error of transcription.

I call the piece about ἐνέργειαι *Excerptum* III. The piece about the instincts of animals appears to be a continuation of a passage given elsewhere by Stobaeus (*Exc.* IV A); and I call it *Excerptum* IV B.

All parts of *Exc.* III alike deal with ἐνέργειαι, and therefore presumably belong to one and the same *libellus*. But the first part of the text (*Exc.* III. 1-6) consists of a series of detached scraps, some of which are more or less intelligible in themselves, but have no connexion with their context, while others are wholly meaningless. It is only when we arrive at § 7 that we are able to get at what the author meant. From that point onward to the end of the excerpt, we can trace his line of thought, though the continuity of the text is broken by some lacunae and by some interpolations.

Moreover, § 7 appears to be the *beginning* of a discussion of ἐνέργειαι. The writer there starts by pointing out that there are forces at work in soulless bodies; he calls these forces ἐνέργειαι, and gives a definition of the term (§ 9 *fin.*); and he then goes on to discuss them. There is therefore strong reason to think that the dialogue originally began at our § 7, and that it is by error that §§ 1-6 have been placed before § 7.

Now § 7 begins with the words ἱερὸς λόγος, ὃ τέκνον, ἐστὶν οὖτος, which, in the traditional text, follow the statement αἱ δὲ ἐνέργειαι χωρὶς τῶν σωμάτων οὐ δύνανται εἶναι (§ 6 *fin.*). It is evident that there is something amiss here. There could be no reason for thus singling out, as 'holy', the proposition that forces cannot exist apart from bodies. Why should it be regarded as more 'holy' than the numerous other statements about ἐνέργειαι which are made in the course of the dialogue? On the other hand, the discourse of Hermes as a whole, or the document in which it was recorded, might very well be described as 'holy', inasmuch as Hermes was a teacher inspired by God. Compare the title of *Corp.* III: 'Ερμού τοῦ τρισμεγίστου λόγος ἱερός. Heading of the *Kore Kosmu* (*Exc.* XXIII) in Stobaeus: 'Ερμού τρισμεγίστου ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς βίβλου (τῆς) ἐπικαλουμένης Κ. Κ. Title of *Ascl. Lat.*: 'Ερμού τρισμεγίστου βίβλος ἱερὰ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιὸν προσφωνηθείσα. We may conclude then that

ἱερὸς λόγος was originally written, as a part of the title, at the head of the Hermetic *libellus* which began with our § 7. When §§ 1-6 had been prefixed, the words ἱερὸς λόγος stood no longer at the beginning, but in the midst of the text. In that position, they were meaningless; and a transcriber tried to make sense of them by adding ὁ τέκνον, ἐστὶν οὗτος.

Most of the disconnected scraps which are heaped together in §§ 1-6 appear to be passages which have been accidentally shifted from their proper places in the body of the dialogue; one or two of them may be marginal notes misplaced.

Contents of Exc. III.

A. §§ 7-13. *The forces-at-work.*

There are forces at work in bodies from which the soul has departed (e.g. in a human corpse); and there are also forces at work in bodies that have never had soul in them (e.g. in a stone). A 'force-at-work' may be defined as 'that by which any sort of process is effected'. §§ 7, 9.

And all sorts of processes are always going on; for the Kosmos never ceases to generate things by the revolving movement of the heavens. § 10.

(Consequently, the forces-at-work are everlasting.)

The forces are incorporeal, but cannot work except in bodies; and as earthly bodies are perishable, there must be an unceasing production of fresh bodies for them to work in. §§ 11, <<1>, <<4>.

They come from the heavenly bodies, and enter into earthly bodies. Some of them act on the body; others act on the soul, but only while the soul is embodied. § <<6>.

Of those which act on the soul, some begin to work in the man from the moment of his birth, but others not until his adolescence. The former act on the irrational parts of the soul; the latter cooperate with the rational part. § <<5>.

The forces are more numerous than the bodies in the Kosmos; for there are often several different forces at work in a single body. § 13.

B. §§ 14-21. *The senses, considered in relation to the forces-at-work.*

Sensations are results produced by the working of the forces; and it is through the sensations produced by them that the working of

the forces is revealed. The forces come from heaven, (and are incorporeal and everlasting;) the senses are corporeal, and perish with the body. §§ 14, 15.

The heavenly bodies have not sensation; for sensation is the apprehension of an increase or decrease of the body, and the heavenly bodies are exempt from increase and decrease. The changes (i. e. increases and decreases) that befall a body, and the sensations (by which these changes are apprehended), are inseparably connected; and both together are produced by the forces at work in the body. §§ 16, (18).

Sensation takes place in all bodies (that are subject to increase and decrease), even in those that are soulless. § 17.

In men and beasts, these changes, and the sensations that go with them, are attended by pain and joy. Pain and joy are more completely dominant in beasts than in men. In man, it is the irrational part of the soul that is affected by pain and joy; and they work mischief in his life. §§ 19, 20.

Sensation does not belong to the soul. The soul, and the forces-at-work, are incorporeal things that are in a body; but sensation is a body. § 21.

Sources. In holding that all physical processes on earth are effected by the operation of forces put in action by the heavenly bodies, the writer is merely adopting an opinion which was generally prevalent in the period of the Roman empire. This opinion was already coming into vogue in Plato's time; and its influence is manifest in the *Epinomis*, written shortly after Plato's death. It was almost universally accepted in the philosophic schools which derived their doctrines from that interfusion of Platonism with Stoicism which took place in the first century B. C.¹

But the writer of *Exc.* III formulates this widely current doctrine in a way peculiar to himself. He uses the word *ἐνέργεια* as a technical

¹ When the doctrine of which I am speaking presents itself apart from religion, it may be called 'astral physics'. But the heavenly bodies to whose influence all earthly processes were attributed were commonly regarded and worshipped as gods; and when the doctrine takes this form, it may be called 'astral religion'. See Cumont, *Astrology and religion among the Greeks and Romans*, 1912.

Astral religion is presupposed by astrology, but is not itself astrology. The astrologer was a man who not only held that all events on earth result from the operation of the heavenly bodies, but furthermore believed (or pretended to believe) that he knew the laws of their operation, and that he could consequently infer the course of future events on earth from the observed positions of the heavenly bodies. The distinction between astral religion and astrology is hardly maintained with sufficient clearness in Cumont's otherwise most instructive book.

term to denote the action of the heavenly bodies on earthly things; and though he does not personify the ἐνέργειαι,¹ he so far hypostatizes them as to put them on a par with ψυχαί. See § 21, where he says that ἐνέργειαι and ψυχαί alike are incorporeal things which 'are in bodies'.

In his recognition of incorporeal entities, the writer sides with the Platonists against the Stoics; and he shows himself a Platonist in his distinction between the 'rational part' of the soul and the (two) 'irrational parts', and in his condemnation of the emotions which belong to the 'irrational parts' (§§ 5 and 20), as well as in his mention of disembodied souls (§ 6). His statement that αἰσθησις is σῶμα (§ 21) seems to be a mark of Stoic influence. He holds the heavenly bodies to be immutable (§ 16), and apparently considers them to consist of 'the fifth substance' (§§ 16 and 8); in this respect, he agrees with the Aristotelians, and differs from the Stoics.

In this excerpt, the writer says not a word about God, and abstains from speaking of anything supracosmic.² But we have before us only that part of his system which deals with the Kosmos and the things within it. It is probable that, either in a continuation of the same *libellus*, or in other *libelli* which were meant to be read after it, he went on to speak of a supracosmic God, to whom the heavenly bodies are subordinate, and of that part of the human soul which is capable of escaping from the domination of the heavenly bodies and the physical forces which they put forth (i. e. from subjection to Heimarmene), and entering into immediate relation with the supracosmic God. If that part of the writer's teaching had been preserved, we should very likely find the distinctive doctrines of Platonism no less predominant in it than they are in most of the other *Hermetica*.

§ 7. Συνεστάναι μὲν, (ὡ τέκνον,) σῶμα χωρὶς ψυχῆς οὐ δύναται, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργεῖσθαι δυνατόν (τὸ δὲ εἶναι δύναται MS.). συνεστάναι means 'to exist as an organized whole'. A living body συνέστηκε; for the ψυχή in it holds it together, and makes it a thing in which every part is correlated to every other part. But when the ψυχή has quitted it,

¹ He does not call them 'daemons', as some of the Hermetists did.

² The only exceptions are the use of the word πρόνοια in § 2; the mention of 'divine ἐνέργειαι which act on the heavenly bodies' in § 12; and possibly, the mention of 'purer ἐνέργειαι' which 'co-operate with the rational part of the soul' in § 5. But § 2 is an isolated fragment of unknown origin; § 12 is probably an interpolation; and even if the writer held that the 'purer ἐνέργειαι' spoken of in § 5 come from a supracosmic source (which is uncertain), at any rate he refrains from saying so.

the body no longer *συνέστηκεν*; it is thenceforward an unorganized heap of matter.

According to the MSS., the Hermetist says that the body may continue to *exist* after the soul has departed. That is true, and the fact is incidentally mentioned below, in the words *ἐπιμένει αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα*; but it is not the thing to be insisted on. The point to which the writer seeks to call attention is rather that *forces are still at work* in the corpse, as is shown by the fact that processes of decomposition go on in it. He probably asserted this shortly in the first sentence, by writing *ἐνεργεῖσθαι* here, and then went on to explain his statement. If we read *ἐνεργεῖσθαι*, the topic of *ἐνέργειαι*, with which the whole dialogue deals, is introduced in the opening words.

§ 8. αὕτη οὖν ἡ διαφορά ἀθανάτου σώματος καὶ θνητοῦ . . . δοῦλον (δν) φέρεται. This section has nothing to do with the subject spoken of in §§ 7 and 9. When it has been excised, the train of thought runs on without a break through those two sections. In § 7, the writer points out that there are forces at work in bodies which have once had soul in them, but from which the soul has departed; in § 9, he adds that there are also forces at work in bodies which have never had soul in them, e. g. in a stone.

Has § 8 been shifted from some other part of the dialogue? I have failed to find any place where it would fit into the text; but it may possibly be an isolated fragment of the lost passage which followed § 10. *θεῖα* (= *ἀθάνατα*) *σώματα* are spoken of in § <<6>> as things already known to the reader; it seems not unlikely therefore that an explanation of their nature and function, such as is given in § 8, occurred somewhere before § <<6>>. But it is also possible that § 8 was written as a marginal note on the words *τὰ δὲ ἀθάνατα σώματα . . . ὡς ἐξ οὐσίας (οὐ) τοιαύτης συνεστῶτα* in § 16.

τὸ μὲν ἀθάνατον (σῶμα) ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης συνέστηκε, τὸ δὲ (θνητὸν σῶμα) οὐ ὕλη here means, not *ἄποιος* or *ἄμορφος ὕλη*, but a material substance. Earthly bodies are composed of all four elements in combination (see *Exc. II A. 1 f.*); and they are consequently subject to dissolution, because the process by which the different elements have been combined in them is liable to be reversed. The heavenly bodies consist of one element only, and are consequently indissoluble. But what is this one element? The Stoics said that the element of which the heavenly bodies consist is fire; the Aristotelians said that it is the 'fifth' and 'circularly-moving' substance. (See note on *quinta*

pars in *Ascl. Lat.* I. 6.) The writer of *Exc.* III probably adopted the view of the Aristotelians on this point; see note on § 16.

πάν γὰρ τὸ ἐνεργοῦν κρατεῖ, τὸ δὲ ἐνεργούμενον κρατεῖται. These words imply that the ἐνέργειαι which operate in earthly bodies are emitted or put in action by the heavenly bodies. This is expressly asserted in § 6: αἱ ἐνέργειαι . . . ἀπὸ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἔρχονται εἰς τὰ θνητά. That is to say, all physical processes which take place on earth result from the operation of the heavenly bodies. That is the view of the Hermetists in general. Some of them give to this operation of the heavenly bodies the name εἰμαρμένη; and some of them (e. g. the author of *Corp.* XVI) hold that the influence of the heavenly bodies is brought to bear on earthly bodies by personal agents called 'daemons'. The writer of *Exc.* VI identifies the 'daemons' with the ἐνέργειαι.

τὸ μὲν . . . ἐλεύθερον . . . , τὸ δὲ . . . δοῦλον. Cf. *Exc.* XI. 2 (26): οὐδὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ δοῦλον· οὐδὲν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐλεύθερον.

§ 9. (αἱ) ἐνέργειαι οὐ μόνον τὰ ἔμψυχα ἐνεργοῦσι σώματα, <<ἀλλ(ὰ)>> καὶ τὰ ἄψυχα. The phrase οὐ μόνον τὰ ἔμψυχα is not quite accurate; the writer ought rather to have said 'not only bodies that *have had* souls in them'. The thing of which he has been speaking is a corpse; and a corpse is not an ἔμψυχον. But his meaning is clear enough. A corpse is a body which, though it has no soul in it now, *has had* a soul in it; and as such, it is contrasted with a stone, which has never had a soul in it.

(ἐνεργοῦσι) τὰ ἄψυχα, (τὰ) ξύλα καὶ τοὺς λίθους καὶ τὰ [[]] ὅμοια, αὔξουσαι τε [καὶ καρποφοροῦσαι] καὶ πεπαίνουσαι, καὶ φθείρουσαι κ.τ.λ. καρποφοροῦσαι is obviously wrong; the ἐνέργειαι do not 'bear fruit'. It might be said that there are ἐνέργειαι which *make trees or plants* bear fruit; but the writer is not here speaking of living trees or plants, but of ἄψυχα, such as logs and stones'. On the question whether plants have 'souls' or not, opinions differed (see note on *Ascl. Lat.* I. 4); but even if they have not 'souls', they have some sort of life; and a mention of anything that has life in it would be out of place in this sentence. καὶ καρποφοροῦσαι was probably inserted by some one who wrongly assumed that πεπαίνουσαι must mean 'ripening fruit', and thought that fruit must be produced before it is ripened. The interpolator presumably took ξύλα (dead logs) to mean living trees.

It is evident that there are forces at work which make logs rot, and stones crumble (φθείρουσαι καὶ . . . θρύπτουσαι). It is not quite so

evident what is meant by *αἰξουσαι καὶ πεπαίνουσαι*, in the case of lifeless things; but we may take these words to mean 'increasing their bulk, and bringing them to maturity'. It was a common opinion that rocks 'grow'; (some stones do in fact 'grow' by crystallization;) and perhaps the author, when he wrote *αἰξουσαι*, was thinking solely of rocks or stones, and overlooked the fact that *ξύλα* increase in bulk only while they are still living trees. *πεπαίνουσαι*, in the case of stones, might mean 'softening', and in the case of timber, 'seasoning'.

ἐνέργεια γὰρ κέκληται, ᾧ τέκνον, αὐτὸ τοῦτο, (τὸ δι' οὐ γίγνεται) ὃ τί ποτέ ἐστι τὸ γιγνόμενον. Having shown by instances what he means by *ἐνέργειαι*, the writer now gives a definition of the term. τὸ γιγνόμενον may mean either 'the thing that comes into being', or 'the process that goes on'. Which of the two is meant, must be determined by the context. Here, it necessarily means the latter. But if the Hermetist said that an *ἐνέργεια* is 'any sort of process that goes on', he worded his definition very inexactly. He must have meant to say that an *ἐνέργεια* is *the force by which* any sort of process is carried on. It is most likely that he did write something to that effect; and I have accordingly inserted the words τὸ δι' οὐ γίγνεται.

§ 10. ἀεὶ δὲ φερόμενος (ὁ κόσμος) (ἀεὶ) ἐν ἑαυτῷ κυύσκει τὰ ὄντα. *φερόμενος* refers to the circular movement of the heavens and the heavenly bodies. It is this movement that gives forth the *ἐνέργειαι* by which all individual organisms (τὰ ὄντα) upon earth are brought into being. The circular movement of the heavens never ceases; and therefore the production of τὰ ὄντα upon earth can never cease. In this section, the writer seems to take τὸ γιγνόμενον in the sense of 'the thing that comes into being', rather than in the sense of 'the process that goes on'.

[οὐδέποτε ἀπολειφθισόμενα αὐτοῦ τῆς φ[θ]ορᾶς.] *φορᾶς* may be considered a certain emendation; the word refers back to *φερόμενος*. But the phrase in which it stands is awkwardly appended, and seems merely to repeat what has already been said. οὐδέποτε ἀπολειφθισόμενος τῆς φορᾶς would be a paraphrase of ἀεὶ φερόμενος; and it is possible that something of the sort occurred in a marginal note, and was inserted in the text by error.

At the end of § 10 there is evidently a lacuna. In § 11, we find the writer asserting, as an inference (οὖν) from something that has gone before, that 'every *ἐνέργεια* is ἀθάνατος (or ἀσώματος?)'. But this cannot be immediately inferred from the statement, with which

§ 10 ends, that 'the Kosmos is ever producing things'; and a passage now lost must have intervened. From what follows, it appears that in the missing passage the writer proved (1) that the *ἐνέργειαι* are everlasting, and (2) that they are incorporeal.

The forces at work are everlasting; that is, being kept in action by the ceaseless movement of the heavenly bodies, they go on working for ever without change, though the earthly bodies upon which they work perish, and are replaced by other bodies. The misplaced fragment § 3 (*ἀδύνατον ἀργά ποτε μείναι κ.τ.λ.*) may perhaps have belonged to the passage in which the everlastingness of the *ἐνέργειαι* was demonstrated.

§ 11. *πᾶσα οὖν ἐνέργεια νοεῖσθω ὡς ἀσώματος οὔσα (ὡς ἀεὶ ἀθάνατος οὔσα MSS.)*. A thing cannot be immortal (in the sense of everlasting) at one time and mortal at another time; the combination *ἀεὶ ἀθάνατος*, 'immortal at all times', is therefore meaningless; and if we retain one of these two words, we must strike out the other. But it seems more likely that the author wrote *ἀσώματος*, which corresponds better with the following words *ἐν οἰψοδήποτε σώματι*. If so, we have in this section the conclusion of the missing proof that the *ἐνέργειαι* are *ἀσώματοι*, which was probably preceded by the missing proof that they are *ἀθάνατοι* (everlasting).

(§ 1. *ἐνέργειαι γὰρ . . . εἶναι ἀεὶ ἐν σώματι.*) The thing asserted in § 1 is that *ἐνέργειαι* 'are always in bodies'; and if we place § 1 here, the words *ἐν οἰψοδήποτε σώματι* in § 11 lead on to that assertion. In § 1, it is assumed, as a thing already known, that the *ἐνέργειαι* are *ἀσώματοι*; that point must therefore have been previously established, and I suppose it to have been established in the lost passage which preceded § 11.

καθότι (μὲν) ἀσώματοί εἰσι, καὶ ἀθανάτους αὐτάς φημι (φῆς MSS.) εἶναι. The fact that the *ἐνέργειαι* are incorporeal confirms the conclusion that they are *ἀθάνατοι*. Corporeal things alone are perishable.

(§ 4. *τούτῳ τῷ λόγῳ ἔπεται . . . ἀεὶ ἔστι.*) *οὗτος ὁ λόγος* is that which was stated in § 1, namely, that *ἐνέργειαι* are everlasting, and 'are always in (earthly) bodies'. From this it follows that there must always be (earthly) bodies in existence, to serve as 'places and instruments' for the working of the *ἐνέργειαι*; and since earthly bodies are perishable, there must be a continual production of fresh bodies to replace them as they perish. It seems clear that this must have been the meaning of § 4, though the restoration of the text is

doubtful. The words *τόπους καὶ ὄργανα τῶν ἐνεργειῶν* correspond to *ἐν σώμασίν εἰσι καὶ διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἐνεργοῦσι* in § 1. [εἴ γε] may perhaps have come from *εἰ γάρ* at the beginning of the sentence.

§ 6. *αὐταὶ δὴ* (δὲ MSS.) (ἀσώματοι οὔσαι) (αἱ σωματοποιούσαι MSS.) *αἱ ἐνεργεῖαι τῶν σωμάτων εἰσὶν ἡρτημέναι.* In the MSS., *αὐταὶ* (or *αἷται*) is obscure; it becomes intelligible if we insert *ἀσώματοι οὔσαι* after it. Compare *ἀσώματοι οὔσαι ἐν σώμασίν εἰσι* in § 1; the thought expressed in § 1 is resumed in § 6, after the digression in § 4. Below in § 6 occurs the meaningless phrase *αὐταὶ αἱ σωματοποιούσαι*; and it seems probable that this is a corruption of *αὐταὶ δὴ ἀσώματοι οὔσαι*, repeated by error.

καὶ αὐτῇ (γάρ) [[μέντοι]]. *τῇ ψυχῇ συγγίγονται, (οὐ) (μέντοι) χωρὶς σώματος.* According to the MSS., we are here told that the *ἐνεργεῖαι* enter into connexion with the soul 'apart from the body'. But that is contradicted by the following words, *αἱ δὲ ἐνεργεῖαι χωρὶς τῶν σωμάτων οὐ δύνανται εἶναι*, as well as by what has been said in § 1 and in § 6 *init.* In order to get rid of the contradiction, it is necessary to insert *οὐ* before *χωρὶς σώματος*.

With the corrections which I have made, the meaning of the passage becomes clear. *ἐνεργεῖαι* must always be 'in bodies'; i. e. they can only operate in bodies. They act on the soul as well as on the body; but they act on the soul only when it is embodied. In other words, it is only while embodied that the soul is liable to be governed by the influences of the heavenly bodies, or to be subject to *εἰμαρμένη*.

§ 5. *αἱ δὲ καθαρώτεραι ἐνεργεῖαι (παραγίγονται) κατὰ μεταβολὴν τῆς ἡλικίας (ἡσυχίας MSS.), τῷ λογικῷ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς συνεργούσαι.* The *μεταβολὴ τῆς ἡλικίας* is the change from childhood to manhood. It is at adolescence that the *λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς* first begins to act. Cf. Pl. *Rep.* 3. 402 A: *ἔτι νέος ὢν, πρὶν λόγον δυνατὸς εἶναι λαβεῖν· ἐλθόντος δὲ τοῦ λόγου, κ.τ.λ.*

What is the origin of the 'purer forces' that enter into the man at adolescence, and are connected with his soul from that age onward? Some of the Hermetists say or imply that the *λογικὸν μέρος* is exempt from the domination of the heavenly bodies, or of *εἰμαρμένη*; (see, for instance, *Corp.* XII. i. 2-9;) and if the writer of *Exc.* III was of the same opinion, he might hold that the *καθαρώτεραι ἐνεργεῖαι* are worked by the supracosmic God directly, and not through the intermediate agency of the heavenly bodies. (Cf. *Corp.* XVI. 16, where the *ἀκτὶς* (τοῦ θεοῦ), which *ἐν τῷ λογικῷ ἐπιλάμπει*, is

contrasted with the action of the 'daemons', the emissaries of the planets, on τὰ δύο (ἄλογα) μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς.) In *Exc.* III, all mention of God is deliberately avoided; and if its author had occasion to speak of a kind of ἐνέργειαι which come direct from God, he might very likely refrain from expressing his meaning fully, and merely hint at the higher origin of this kind of ἐνέργειαι by calling them καθαρώτεραι.

But on the other hand, in the rest of the dialogue,¹ the term ἐνέργειαι is applied only to forces put in action by the heavenly bodies (ἀπὸ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἔρχονται εἰς τὰ θνητά, § 6); and it is here implied that the καθαρώτεραι ἐνέργειαι, as well as the others, act on the soul only while it is embodied. It seems most probable then that we are meant to understand that these 'purer forces', like the rest, come from the heavenly bodies, and not (or at any rate, not immediately) from a supracosmic source. The writer does not say that the 'purer forces' act on the λογικὸν μέρος, but that they work together with it (συνεργοῦσι),—whatever that may mean. Perhaps his notion is that there are astral influences which, without exerting compulsive force on the λογικὸν μέρος, assist that part of the human soul in its endeavour to discharge its function rightly, and to keep the body and the ἄλογα μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς in due subjection.

§ 12. [τῶν δὲ ἐνεργειῶν . . . ἕκαστόν (<τι>) τῶν ὄντων.] This section is a classification of the different kinds of ἐνέργειαι. It has no clear connexion either with what precedes or with what follows; and I think there are sufficient reasons for concluding that it is a note inserted in the text by error.

αἱ μὲν εἰσι τῶν θείων σωμάτων (ἐνεργητικάί). That ἐνεργητικάί, or some word of similar meaning, must either be inserted in the text, or supplied in thought, is proved by the equivalent phrase below, αἱ εἰς τὰ (ἀ)ῖδια σώματα ἐνεργοῦσαι. These ἐνέργειαι are forces which act on the heavenly bodies, and must therefore be put in action by the supracosmic God. But the only ἐνέργειαι spoken of elsewhere in the dialogue are forces which work in earthly bodies, and, with the possible exception of the 'purer forces' mentioned in § 5, are put in action by the heavenly bodies. Moreover, the καθαρώτεραι ἐνέργειαι of § 5, even if we take them to be of supracosmic origin, cannot be identified with the θείαι and τέλειαι ἐνέργειαι of § 12; for the former are forces which act on the embodied soul of man, and not on the heavenly bodies. Thus the use of the term ἐνέργειαι in § 12 differs from its use in the rest of *Exc.* III.

¹ The apparent exception in § 12 is probably due to interpolation.

καὶ (τῶν εἰς τὰ φθαρτὰ ἐνεργουσῶν) αἱ μὲν καθολικαί, (αἱ δὲ γενικαί,) αἱ δὲ (εἰ)δικαί. The addition of αἱ δὲ γενικαί is made necessary by the words αἱ δι' ἐνὸς ἐκάστου γένους τῶν ζῴων below. This triple division cannot be applied to 'the forces which act on the heavenly bodies'; we must therefore suppose that something like τῶν εἰς τὰ φθαρτὰ ἐνεργουσῶν has been lost.

For εἰδικός in the sense 'limited to this or that individual', see note on *Ascl. Lat.* I. 2 *fin.*

[καὶ αἱ μὲν τῶν γενῶν, αἱ δὲ [τῶν μερῶν] ἐνὸς ἐκάστου.] This appears to be a corruption of καὶ αἱ μὲν (τῶν ὄντων συμπάντων, αἱ δὲ) τῶν γενῶν, αἱ δὲ ἐνὸς ἐκάστου, which must have been written as an alternative for the preceding words καὶ αἱ μὲν καθολικαί, (αἱ δὲ γενικαί), αἱ δὲ εἰδικαί.—τῶν μερῶν is probably an alternative for τῶν γενῶν; cf. μερικαί substituted for γενικαί below.

§ 13. οὗτος ὁ λόγος, ᾧ τέκνον, συνάγει πάντα μεστὰ εἶναι ἐνεργειῶν. The λόγος from which it is inferred that 'all things are full of forces-at-work', is the proposition that 'there are often several forces at work in a single body'. That proposition has not been expressly stated in the preceding text; but it is implied in what has been said in §§ (6) and (5) about the various ἐνέργειαι which act on a man's body and soul. Thus, if we cut out § 12, and place § 13 next after § (5), we get a satisfactory sequence of thought.

εἰ γὰρ [ἀνάγκη τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐν σώμασιν εἶναι] πολλὰ [δέ] σώματα ἐν κόσμῳ, πλείους φημί εἶναι τὰς ἐνεργείας τῶν σωμάτων. The statement that ἐνέργειαι 'are always in bodies' has been made in §§ (1) and (6). But the conclusion that 'the forces-at-work are more numerous than the bodies' cannot be inferred from that statement; it therefore seems necessary to strike out the words ἀνάγκη τὰς ἐνεργείας ἐν σώμασιν εἶναι.

ἐν ἐνὶ γὰρ πολλάκις σώματι ἔστι μία καὶ δευτέρα καὶ τρίτη (< . . >), χωρὶς τῶν (τῆ γενέσει) ἐπομένων καθολικῶν. The 'first, second, and third' ἐνέργειαι here spoken of must have been qualified by some adjectival phrase which served to contrast them with the καθολικαὶ ἐνέργειαι. They were doubtless called εἰδικαί, and probably εἰδικαί of some particular kind; for the writer speaks of ἔτεραι εἰδικαὶ ἐνέργειαι below.

καθολικὰς γὰρ ἐνεργείας φημί τὰς τῶν ὄντων σωματικὰς (τὰς ὄντως σωματικὰς MSS.). We have been told that all ἐνέργειαι are ἀσώματοι; it is therefore impossible to say that some of them are σωματικαί. The meaning must be that the 'universal' ἐνέργειαι

are those forces by which bodies are brought into existence (*χωρὶς γὰρ τούτων τῶν ἐνεργειῶν τὸ σῶμα συστήναι οὐ δυνατόν*). These forces operate wherever bodies come into being, and therefore are everywhere at work throughout the sublunar world.

It is evident from the wording of this sentence that the term *καθολικαὶ ἐνεργεῖαι* is here used and defined for the first time in the dialogue; whence it follows that § 12 cannot have preceded. Perhaps § 12 is a marginal note suggested by these words in § 13.

Ἦταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ ἐνεργημάτων (. . .). As the end of the sentence is lost, the meaning of these words cannot be discovered. Possibly the author may have written something like ἕτεροι δὲ εἰσιν εἰδικαὶ ἐνεργεῖαι, (αἰτινες) ταῖς ψυχαῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων διὰ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν [καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων καὶ] ἐνεργ(ούσαις συνεργούσιν). As far as a man works with conscious and deliberate aim, what he does may be ascribed to the action of his ψυχῆ, operating διὰ τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν. (Cf. *Exc.* IV B. 1: ἔφησ γάρ που τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἐνεργείας εἶναι τοῦ λογικοῦ, 'forces put in action by the rational part of the soul'.) But he is often aided by promptings which arise he knows not how or whence,—impulses from 'the unconscious'. It might be said that such impulses are ἐνεργεῖαι in the sense in which the term is used in this *libellus*, i. e. forces of the same nature as those by which all physical processes are carried on, and that, like all ἐνεργεῖαι, they are put in action by the heavenly bodies.

§ 14. <<διὰ δὲ τῶν αἰσθήσεων [καὶ τῶν κινήσεων] (φανερὰς) γινόμενας.>> ἐνεργεῖαι are not 'brought into being by means of the senses'. We are told below that they are *made manifest* by means of the senses; I have therefore inserted *φανερὰς*. But even with this correction, the words are out of place where they stand in the MSS.; and it is most likely that they have been shifted from the passage on αἴσθησις which begins in § 14.

παρέπονται γὰρ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις [καὶ] αἰσθήσεως. From this point to the end of the excerpt, the writer is discussing the relation between ἐνεργεῖαι and αἰσθήσεως. What does he mean by αἰσθήσεως? The word αἴσθησις may signify (1) an act of sensation or perception (= τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι); (2) a faculty or permanent possibility of sensation or perception (= δύναμις τοῦ αἰσθάνεσθαι); (3) an organ of sense (= αἰσθητήριον). The writer of *Exc.* III appears to

use it sometimes in one of these senses, and sometimes in another. In § 14, his meaning seems to be that, when a physical change is produced in a man's body by the action of an *ἐνέργεια*, the man feels a corresponding sensation, and the working of the *ἐνέργεια* is manifested to him by the sensation which he feels. E. g. my body is warmed by the heat of the sun; I feel a sensation of warmth, and thereby I am informed by what the sun is doing to my body. This is *αἴσθησις* in sense (1).

§ 15. (ἢ μὲν γὰρ ἐνέργεια) ἄνωθεν πέμπεται. ἄνωθεν means 'from the heavenly bodies'.

καθάπερ αὐτὴν σωματοποιήσασα. *αἴσθησις* is inseparably connected with the body, and is dependent on the body for its existence; (in § 21, we are even told that *αἴσθησις* 'is a body';) and so, when the working of the *ἐνέργεια* manifests itself in *αἴσθησις*, the incorporeal force may be said to be 'corporealized'.

(ἐπι) τοσοῦτον συνεστῶσας ὅσον καὶ τὸ σῶμα· καὶ γὰρ συγγενῶνται τῷ σώματι αἱ αἰσθήσεις καὶ συναποθνήσκουσι. It is obviously untrue, that particular acts or processes of sensation last as long as the body does, and that they are born with the body and die with it. Thus *αἴσθησις* in sense (1) would here make nonsense; and the word must be taken either in sense (2) or in sense (3).

§ 16. τὰ δὲ ἀθάνατα σώματα [[]] αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἔχει, ὡς ἐξ οὐσίας (οὐ) τοιαύτης συνεστῶτα. The heavenly bodies consist of a substance which is not such (as to admit of *αἴσθησις*). This substance must be the *πέμπτη οὐσία* of the Aristotelians. Cf. § 8.

When the Hermetist says that the heavenly bodies *αἴσθησιν οὐκ ἔχει*, he does not mean that they are devoid of conscious life, but that they possess a higher sort of consciousness. Man has both *αἴσθησις* and *νόησις*; the heavenly bodies have *νόησις* alone, and not *αἴσθησις*.

ἢ γὰρ αἴσθησις οὐδ' ὅλως ἄλλου ἐστὶ [σωματικῆ] (καταληπτικῆ) ἢ τοῦ προσγινομένου (-γενομένου MSS.) τῷ σώματι [κακοῦ ἢ [τοῦ] ἀγαθοῦ], ἢ τοῦ πάλιν αὐ ἀπογινομένου (-γενομένου MSS.). The writer assumes that the changes in the body which are produced by the working of *ἐνέργειαι*, and are apprehended by *αἴσθησις*, always consist in either the addition of something to the body, or the subtraction of something from the body. It is not clear how this could be maintained in the case of all kinds of sense-perception; but perhaps it might be said that, when I see an object, an image of the object 'is added to' my eye.

The words *κακοῦ ἢ [τοῦ] ἀγαθοῦ* are irrelevant. The point of the passage is that, in the case of the heavenly bodies, there are no 'additions' or 'subtractions', and there can therefore be no *αἰσθησις*; and the writer could have no reason for saying here that, in the case of earthly bodies, the things added or subtracted may be bad or good.

τοῖς δὲ αἰδίοις σώμασιν οὔτε προσγίνεται (τι) οὔτε ἀπογίνεται. In other words, the heavenly bodies are not subject to *μεταβολή*. From this it appears that the writer's cosmology is Aristotelian rather than Stoic. According to the Stoics, the heavenly bodies are constantly receiving *τροφή*, in the form of *ἀναθυμιάματα* from the lower elements, which are transmuted into fire as they rise; and they are constantly giving off fire, which descends from them into the lower world, and is there transmuted into the other elements. Aristotle on the other hand held that the 'fifth substance' of which the heavenly bodies consist is confined to the heavens,¹ and is not subject to transmutation.

(§ 18. (αἱ γὰρ) αἰσθήσεις . . . ὑπὸ δὲ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν ἀποτελεῖται συναμφοτέρα.) In the MSS., this section follows an unfinished sentence in which the writer is speaking of the differences of *αἰσθησις* in different kinds of beings. But in § 18, he is still speaking of *αἰσθησις* in general; and the words *κατὰ αὔξησιν μόνον καὶ κατὰ μείωσιν γιγνόμεναι* have to do with the same topic as *τοῦ προσγινομένου . . . ἢ . . . ἀπογινομένου* in § 16. It seems clear therefore that § 18 ought to follow § 16 immediately, and precede § 17.

(αἱ γὰρ) αἰσθήσεις [μέν] εἰσὶ παθητικαὶ [δέ], κατὰ αὔξησιν μόνον καὶ κατὰ μείωσιν γιγνόμεναι. τὸ δὲ πάθος κ.τ.λ. *παθητικαὶ* is equivalent to *καταληπτικαὶ τοῦ προσγινομένου καὶ ἀπογινομένου*. The writer of *Exc. III* uses the word *πάθος* ('that which befalls a person or thing') to denote the 'additions and subtractions', or 'increases and diminutions', in which he considers that all bodily change consists. The heavenly bodies are exempt from these *πάθη*; they are immutable.

ἀπὸ μιᾶς κορυφῆς ἤρτηνται. For this phrase, cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 80 B: ὥσπερ ἐκ μιᾶς κορυφῆς συνημμένῳ δὴ ὄντε (*sc.* τὸ ἡδύ and τὸ λυπηρόν).

§ 17. Ἐν παντὶ οὖν (παθητῶ) σώματι αἰσθησις [αἰσθάνεται] (γίνεται);

¹ Some of the later Aristotelians, however, said that the human soul or mind consists of this same substance; see note on *quinta pars* in *Ascl. Lat.* I. 6 b.

—'Εν παντί. We have just been told that there is no αἴσθησις in heavenly bodies; σώματι must therefore be qualified by some adjective which limits this statement to earthly bodies. θνητῷ or φθαρτῷ would serve the purpose; but παθητῷ suits the context best.

κὰν τοῖς ἀψύχοις (καὶ ἀψύχοις MSS.). It was sometimes said that plants are ἄψυχα, and yet have αἴσθησις; see *Ascl. Lat.* I. 4: 'sine anima quidem, et tamen non carens sensibus.' But the writer of *Exc.* III asserts that not only plants, but all ἄψυχα have αἴσθησις, though not the same kind of αἴσθησις as men or animals. It seems strange to say that a stone αἰσθάνεται; but similar statements were made by some of the early Greek thinkers.

Theophrastus, *De sensibus* 4, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 500, reports Parmenides as saying τὸν νεκρὸν φωτὸς μὲν καὶ θερμοῦ καὶ φωνῆς οὐκ αἰσθάνεσθαι διὰ τὴν ἔκλειψιν τοῦ πυρός, ψυχροῦ δὲ καὶ σιωπῆς . . . αἰσθάνεσθαι, καὶ ὅλως δὲ πᾶν τὸ ὄν ἔχειν τινὰ γνῶσιν. Cf. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 390: ὁ δὲ Δημόκριτος πάντα μετέχειν φησὶ ψυχῆς ποιᾶς, καὶ τὰ νεκρὰ τῶν σωμάτων, διότι αἰεὶ ἴδιαφανῶς (ἀφανῶς?) τινος θερμοῦ καὶ αἰσθητικοῦ μετέχει, τοῦ πλείονος διαπνεομένου.

αἱ δὲ τῶν ἀλόγων ἴσωματικά¹ εἰσι μόνον. σωματικά¹ can hardly be right; for all αἰσθήσεις alike are σωματικά¹.

§ 19. τῶν δὲ ἐμψύχων [ζῴων] εἰσὶ δύο ἄλλαι ἴνέργειαι¹, αἱ παρέπονται ταῖς αἰσθήσεσι καὶ τοῖς πάθεσι, λύπη καὶ χαρά. There are no ζῴα that are not ἐμψυχα; either ζῴων or ἐμψύχων must therefore be struck out.

Pain and joy may be said to result from the working of ἐνέργειαι (as we have just been told that πάθη and αἰσθήσεις do), but cannot themselves be called ἐνέργειαι, in the sense in which that term is used throughout *Exc.* III; ἐνέργειαι must therefore have been substituted by error for some other word. The missing word may possibly be ἰδέαι, 'two other kinds of things'; cf. [τῶν παθῶν ἰδέας] below.

In a stone, the ἐνέργειαι (i. e. the physical forces which are at work in it) produce πάθη (increases and diminutions) and αἰσθήσεις (perceptions of these increases and diminutions). In a man or animal, the ἐνέργειαι produce πάθη and αἰσθήσεις in like manner; but in the man or animal, the πάθη and αἰσθήσεις are accompanied by λύπη and χαρά; i. e. the sense of diminution gives rise to a feeling of pain, and the sense of increase gives rise to a feeling of enjoyment.

The word πάθος is often used by other writers to signify 'an

emotion'; and in that sense, *λύπη* and *χαρά* might be called *πάθη*. But the writer of *Exc. III* uses *πάθος* only in the sense of 'something that befalls one', and applies it only to bodily increases and decreases. He therefore does not call pain and enjoyment *πάθη*, but says that they accompany *πάθη*.

χωρὶς τούτων ζῶων [ἔμψυχον] [καὶ μάλιστα] ἄλογον (λογικὸν MSS.) αἰσθῆσθαι ἀδύνατον. According to the MSS., we are told that it is impossible both for beasts and for men, but 'in the highest degree' impossible for men, to perceive anything without feeling *λύπη* or *χαρά*. But that is nonsense. In the first place, one thing cannot be *more* impossible than another; *μάλιστα* must therefore be rejected. In the second place, the following section clearly shows that in the writer's opinion it is *not* impossible for men to rid themselves of *λύπη* and *χαρά*. These perturbations are pernicious (*κακοδικαί*); they are connected with the irrational part of the soul, i. e. with that part of the man in respect of which he is no better than a beast; and it is to be inferred that in the man who attains to 'piety' or 'gnosis' they will be suppressed.

In order to get the sense required by the context, we must write *ἄλογον* in place of *λογικόν*. With the corrections which I have proposed, the passage becomes consistent and intelligible. 'In beasts, *αἰσθησις* is necessarily accompanied by *λύπη* and *χαρά*. These emotions may therefore be called proper to beasts rather than to men; for beasts are more completely mastered by them. In man, it is the beast-like part of the soul that is affected by them; and (if he allows himself to be mastered by them) they work mischief in his life.'

ιδίας (ιδέας MSS.) ταύτας εἶναί φημι [τῶν παθῶν ιδέας] τῶν ἀλόγων (λογικῶν MSS.) μᾶλλον ζῶων. ταύτας (τάς) τῶν παθῶν ιδέας might mean 'these kinds of emotions' (*sc. λύπην καὶ χαράν*); but if the words are thus understood, *πάθος* is used in a sense different from that in which the author of *Exc. III* employs it. *τῶν παθῶν* must therefore have been inserted by another hand. *ιδέας* may have come by duplication from the preceding *ιδίας*.

[*αἱ μὲν ἐνέργειαι (ἀφανῶς) ἐνεργοῦσιν, αἱ δὲ αἰσθήσεις τὰς ἐνεργείας ἀναφαίνουσιν.*] This has nothing to do with *λύπη* and *χαρά*, the things dealt with in § 19. It is evidently connected with the contents of §§ 14 and 15; and it would be possible to insert it in the text before *παρέπονται γὰρ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις αἱ αἰσθήσεις* in § 14. But it is not needed there, as the writer's meaning is

sufficiently expressed without it; we may therefore conclude that it is a marginal note on that passage.

§ 20. αὐταὶ δέ, οὖσαι σωματικαί, ἀνακινούνται ὑπὸ (τῶν αἰσθήσεων, ἀντέχονται δὲ) τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀλόγων μερῶν. The 'irrational parts of the soul' are τὸ θυμοειδὲς and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν (Pl. *Rep.*), or, as Platonists often called them, θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία (*Exc.* IV A. 7). The author cannot have said that λύπη and χαρά 'are stirred up by' these parts of the soul. He may have said that they are stirred up by the αἰσθήσεις, or by the πάθη and αἰσθήσεις, or by the ἐνέργειαι (which produce] the πάθη and αἰσθήσεις), and that they take hold of, or arise in, the irrational parts of the soul.

διὸ καὶ ἀμφοτέρως φημὶ κακωτικὰς εἶναι (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου?). Cf. *Corp.* XII. i. 2: ψυχὴ γὰρ πᾶσα, ἐν σώματι γενομένη, εἰθέως ὑπὸ τε τῆς λύπης καὶ τῆς ἡδονῆς κακίζεται. The writer's ideal is what some called ἀπάθεια, i. e. freedom from the perturbing emotions which result from the debasing influence of the body on the soul; and he applies the words λύπη and χαρά to these perturbing emotions. There is another sort of χαρά, which is a function of νοῦς or τὸ λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς; (see *Corp.* XIII. 8 c;) but of that higher and better χαρά the writer of *Exc.* III says nothing.

§ 21. Ἦ αὐτὴ ἂν εἴη αἴσθησις ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος¹, ὦ πάτερ; From Hermes' answer, it appears that Tat spoke of αἴσθησις ψυχῆς, i. e. implied that ἡ ψυχὴ αἰσθάνεται. But did he mean that all αἴσθησις is ψυχῆς and not σώματος? Or that there are two kinds of αἴσθησις,—an αἴσθησις ψυχῆς and an αἴσθησις σώματος? Or that all αἴσθησις is both ψυχῆς and σώματος? Most likely, I think, the last. Cf. *Corp.* IX. 2 as emended: διήρηται γὰρ ἡ αἴσθησις εἰς τε τὸ σῶμα καὶ εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν· καὶ ὅταν ἀμφοτέρα τὰ μέρη τῆς αἰσθήσεως πρὸς ἄλληλα συμφωνήσῃ, κ.τ.λ. Arist. *De somno* 454 a 7: ἐπεὶ δ' οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον τὸ αἰσθάνεσθαι οὔτε τοῦ σώματος,—οὐ γὰρ ἡ δύναμις, τούτου καὶ ἡ ἐνέργεια, ἡ δὲ λεγομένη αἴσθησις, ὡς ἐνέργεια, κίνησις τις διὰ τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς ἐστι,—φανερὸν ὡς οὔτε τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ πάθος ἴδιον, οὔτ' ἄψυχον σῶμα δύνατον αἰσθάνεσθαι. Arist. *De sensu* 436 a 6: φαίνεται δὲ τὰ μέγιστα . . . κοινὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ὄντα καὶ τοῦ σώματος, οἷον αἴσθησις κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* b 6: ἡ δ' αἴσθησις ὅτι διὰ σώματος γίνεται τῇ ψυχῇ, δῆλον.

οὐχ ἡ μὲν ψυχὴ ἀσώματος, ἡ δὲ αἴσθησις σῶμα; Wachsmuth assigns these words to Tat; but they must surely be spoken by Hermes. They give a reason for rejecting the phrase ψυχῆς αἴσθησις.

We are told in this section that αἴσθησις is σῶμα. What can the writer have meant by this? He said in § 15 that ἡ αἴσθησις ἐν τῷ σώματι ἔστι, καὶ ἀπὸ τούτου τὴν οὐσίαν ἔχει; but that is not quite the same as saying that αἴσθησις 'is a body'. The most probable explanation seems to be that the Hermetist here takes the ambiguous word αἴσθησις to signify the material *pneuma* by means of which the Stoics held that the processes of sensation and perception are carried on, and to which they attributed a function corresponding to that which, in modern physiology, is assigned to the sensory nerves. Cf. Diog. Laert. 7. 52: αἴσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τ' ἀφ' ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις (τὰ αἰσθητήρια?) διήκον, καὶ ἡ δι' αὐτῶν κατάληψις, καὶ ἡ περὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια κατασκευή. Nemesius *De nat. hom.* 77, Diels *Doxogr.* pp. 393 and 55: καλεῖται δὲ πολλάκις αἴσθησις καὶ τὰ αἰσθητήρια. ἔστι δὲ αἴσθησις ἀντίληψις τῶν αἰσθητῶν. δοκεῖ δὲ οὗτος ὁ ὅρος οὐκ αὐτῆς εἶναι τῆς αἰσθήσεως, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἔργων αὐτῆς· διὸ καὶ οὕτως ὀρίζονται τὴν αἴσθησιν· πνεῦμα νοερόν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα τεταμένον. The διὰ τῶν αἰσθητηρίων κατάληψις could not be called a body; but the αἰσθητήρια themselves (e.g. the eyes and ears) are bodies; and the *pneuma* which extends to them from the *hegemonikon* is also 'a body', i.e. a material thing. See note on αἰ αἰσθήσεις τοῦ σώματος in *Corp.* I. 24.

(. . .) ἄν εἴη, ὦ πάτερ, ἡ αἴσθησις ἢ ἐν σώματι οὐσα τυγχάνει.¹ This is meaningless. It may be guessed from the context that Tat said something like 'Why should not αἴσθησις itself be incorporeal, though it is in a body?' Cf. ἀσώματοι αὐταὶ οὐσαι, ἐν σώμασιν εἰσι, said of the ἐνέργειαι in § 1.

Ἐὰν ἀσώματον (Ἐὰν ἐν σώματι MSS.) αὐτὴν θῶμεν κ.τ.λ. According to the MSS., Hermes denies that αἴσθησις is ἐν σώματι. But he himself has said in § 15 that ἡ αἴσθησις is ἐν τῷ σώματι; and even if he had not said it, it would be impossible to deny it. The question here discussed must be, not whether αἴσθησις is ἐν σώματι or not, but whether it is ἀσώματον ἐν σώματι (as the ψυχὴ and the ἐνέργειαι are), or σῶμα ἐν σώματι, a body contained in or forming part of another body. Tat is inclined to say that it is the former; Hermes maintains that it is the latter. It is therefore necessary to alter ἐν σώματι into ἀσώματον.

ὁμοίαν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτὴν ἀποφανοῦμεν ἢ ταῖς ἐνεργείαις. The writer seems to regard the ἐνέργειαι, not as mere συμβεβηκότα of

the heavenly bodies which *ἐνεργοῦσιν*, or of the earthly bodies which *ἐνεργοῦνται*, but as incorporeal substances, in the same sense that the soul is an incorporeal substance.

Ῥοῦτε ἀσώματόν τι ἄλλο παρὰ τὰ προειρημένα¹. In these words, the very thing which Hermes is engaged in proving,—viz. that *αἴσθησις* is not a third kind of *ἀσώματον*,—is asserted without proof.

[τῶν γὰρ ὄντων δεῖ (ἀεὶ MSS.) τὰ μὲν σώματα εἶναι, τὰ δὲ ἀσώματα.] This seems to be a clumsy attempt to say 'a thing must be either *σῶμα* or *ἀσώματον*'. But it would be superfluous to say that. I take the words to be an appended note.

EXCERPTS IV A AND IV B

Stobaeus gives *Exc.* IV A and *Exc.* IV B, as separate extracts, in different chapters of his *Anthologium*. But it may be considered certain that IV B came from the same *libellus* as IV A, and followed it immediately or very closely in that *libellus*. A few lines before the end of IV A, Hermes says *διόπερ καὶ ἄλογα ἐκλήθη τὰ ζῶα ταῦτα, στερήσει τοῦ [α]λογ(ικ)οῦ τῆς ψυχῆς*. In the first section of IV B, Tat says to Hermes *νῦν δὲ φῆς* ('you have just said') *τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα στερήσει τοῦ λογικοῦ ἄλογα εἶναι καὶ κεκλήσθαι* and it can hardly be doubted that this refers to what Hermes has said in IV A. The repetition of the phrase *στερήσει τοῦ λογικοῦ* is conclusive.

I was at first inclined to think that IV A (and consequently IV B also) might be a later part of the same *libellus* from which Stobaeus took *Exc.* III; but I now see that it cannot be so. The usage of the word *ἐνέργεια* differs in the two documents; and the action of the heavenly bodies on earthly things, which is the main subject of III, is ignored in IV A, except in § 9, and in that section is regarded from a different point of view, and spoken of in different terms.

As to the relation between *Exc.* IV B and *Exc.* III, see introductory note on *Exc.* III.

Excerpt IV A

§ 1. [(ὅτι) ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος καὶ ἀεικίνητος.] This must have been written as a summary of the contents of *Exc.* IV A. (Cf.

Corp. III *init.*) The man who wrote it apparently took the phrase from § 4 (ἔστι ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος, καθότι ἀεικίνητος) after καθότι had been altered into καί.

ἔφαμεν γὰρ ἐν τοῖς γενικοῖς. As Hermes refers to the γενικοὶ λόγοι, *Exc.* IV A must be an extract from one of the διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι of Hermes to Tat. The name of Tat does not occur in IV A: but Tat takes part in the dialogue in IV B, which is a continuation of IV A.

The γάρ in the opening sentence shows that *Exc.* IV A was not the beginning of a *libellus*, but was preceded by something which has not been preserved.

(τὰς τῶν) <<σωμάτων>> κινήσεις τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν <φυσικῶν?> ἐνεργειῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν [[σωμάτων]] <ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι>.

The two classes of κινήσεις spoken of in § 1 are doubtless the same as the δύο κινήσεις spoken of in § 3; and the two passages must be considered together.

A Hermetist is not likely to have said that things (whether bodies or incorporeal things) are moved by bodies. Body is passive and inert; it cannot move anything; and if it is moved, it must be moved by something other than itself. (See *Corp.* II. 8 b, 9.) τῶν σωμάτων is therefore wrongly placed after ὑπό; and it probably stood before κινήσεις. The genitive which the author wrote after τὰς δὲ ὑπό has been lost; but there can be little doubt that it was τῶν ψυχῶν. * A σῶμα ἐμψυχον is moved by the ψυχὴ which is in it.

But we are here told that bodies are moved ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνεργειῶν also. Now in *Exc.* III, ἐνέργειαι and ψυχαί are spoken of together, as the two kinds of incorporeal things which act on bodies. It seems possible then that *Exc.* III is that very γενικὸς λόγος to which the writer of *Exc.* IV A refers; and at any rate, in the *libellus* to which he refers, ἐνέργειαι and ψυχαί must have been spoken of side by side, as they are in *Exc.* III.

In *Exc.* III however, the ἐνέργειαι are the forces put in action by the heavenly bodies. The author of *Exc.* IV A does not employ the term ἐνέργειαι in that special and restricted sense; he calls the parts of the soul ἐνέργειαι (§ 7), and might equally well have called the ψυχὴ as a whole an ἐνέργεια; indeed, he probably did so (see § 9). Hence, if he used the word ἐνεργειῶν in contrast to ψυχῶν, as he appears to have done in § 1, we should expect him to restrict its meaning by some qualifying adjective; for if

ψυχή is an ἐνέργεια, the things contrasted with ψυχαί must be, not ἐνέργειαι in general, but some particular kind of ἐνέργειαι. Now in IV B, he uses the word φύσις to denote the thing which performs a function that would have been ascribed to the ἐνέργειαι by the writer of *Exc.* III, and accordingly contrasts the working of φύσις with the working of 'the rational part of the soul'. It therefore seems probable that in IV A. 1 he wrote κινήσεις τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν (φυσικῶν) ἐνεργειῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν (ψυχῶν γίνεσθαι). At any rate, his meaning must have been that which these words would express.

§ 2. [φάμεν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἔκ τινος γεγενῆσθαι.] This is irrelevant, and interrupts the discussion of the two kinds of movement of bodies, which has been begun in § 1, and is continued in § 3. It is possible that § 2 is a fragment of a lost passage which followed § 4 and preceded § 5. We may suppose that, after bringing his discussion of the movements of bodies to a conclusion in the missing passage which followed § 3, the writer went on to speak of the soul, and showed, firstly, that it is αἰκίνητος, and consequently ἀθάνατος (§ 4), and secondly, that it is ἀσώματος (lost passage), and, being ἀσώματος, must be made ἐξ ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας (§ 2).

πάν γὰρ τὸ γεγόμενον ἀνάγκη ἔκ τινος γεγενῆσθαι. This seems better suited to precede φάμεν δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν . . . ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας than to follow it. 'Everything that has been made is made of some substance; (the soul has been made; therefore the soul is made of some substance.) And as the soul is incorporeal (this point must have been previously established), the substance of which it is made must also be incorporeal.' The making of souls is described in mythical language in the *Timaeus*, and in the *Kore Kosmu*.

What is the 'incorporeal substance' of which the soul is made? The writer might perhaps have said, as the writer of *Corp.* XII. i *init.* says with respect to νοῦς, that it is the same substance as that of which God consists, but that what that substance is, 'God only knows'.

§ 3. ὅσων μὲν οὖν (σωμάτων) τῇ γενέσει φθορὰ ἐπακολουθεῖ, τούτοις κ.τ.λ. This means τοῖς φθαρτοῖς σώμασιν; and the shorter phrase τῶν φθαρτῶν σωμάτων is used as an equivalent at the end of the section. The Kosmos and the heavenly bodies also γεγέννηται; (in this respect, the writer accepts the teaching of the *Timaeus* in its

literal sense;) but in the case of the Kosmos and the heavenly bodies, *γένεσις* is not followed by *φθορά*; having once been made, they will last for ever.

δύο κινήσεις . . . , τὴν τε (γινομένην ὑπὸ τῆς) ψυχῆς, ὑφ' ἧς κινεῖται (τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τόπον), καὶ τὴν [τοῦ σώματος] (ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως), ὑφ' ἧς αὐξεται καὶ φθίνει (sc. τὸ σῶμα). According to the MSS., the two κινήσεις spoken of are ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς κίνησις and ἡ τοῦ σώματος κίνησις. But that is clearly wrong. The subject of the section, as we are told in its closing words, is ἡ κίνησις τῶν φθαρτῶν σωμάτων; the two κινήσεις therefore must both alike be κινήσεις σωμάτων; and τοῦ σώματος, which in the MSS. is applied to the second κίνησις in contrast to the first, must have been inserted by some one who misunderstood the passage.

The distinction between the two κινήσεις τῶν φθαρτῶν σωμάτων is that they are worked or effected by two different agents. The first of the two agents is ψυχὴ; this appears from the words ψυχῆς, ὑφ' ἧς κινεῖται. The antecedent of ἧς must be ψυχῆς, not κίνησιν; for it would be impossible to say σῶμα ὑπὸ κινήσεως κινεῖται.) The word denoting the second agent has been lost, and τοῦ σώματος has been substituted for it; but the second ὑφ' ἧς, which refers to it, shows that it must have been a feminine singular substantive. What feminine singular substantive then would best serve to denote the agent ὑφ' ἧς αὐξεται καὶ φθίνει τὸ σῶμα? The two words which suggest themselves are ἐνέργεια (§ 1) and φύσις (Exc. IV B). But ἐνέργεια in the singular would not very well do; the growth, decay, and dissolution of a body might be said to be worked by ἐνέργεια, but hardly by ἐνέργεια. Thus we are led to the conclusion that the missing word is φύσις. If we read, in § 3, δύο κινήσεις . . . , τὴν τε (γινομένην ὑπὸ τῆς) ψυχῆς, ὑφ' ἧς κινεῖται (τὸ σῶμα . . .), καὶ τὴν (ὑπὸ τῆς φύσεως), ὑφ' ἧς αὐξεται καὶ φθίνει κ.τ.λ., and in § 1, κινήσεις τὰς μὲν ὑπὸ τῶν (φυσικῶν) ἐνεργειῶν, τὰς δὲ ὑπὸ τῶν (ψυχῶν) γίνεσθαι), the two passages agree with one another.

ὑφ' ἧς κινεῖται (τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τόπον). The subject of κινεῖται is certainly τὸ σῶμα or τὰ σώματα. It would be possible to supply it in thought, but the meaning is more clearly expressed if we insert τὸ σῶμα

Some qualification of κινεῖται is indispensable, as these words apply to the first kind of κίνησις only, in distinction from the other; and as the other kind is described as that which takes the forms of growth, decay, and dissolution, the first kind was presumably

described as ἡ κατὰ τόπον κίνησις, 'movement in space', or 'movement from place to place'. It is the ψυχὴ in me that moves my limbs; it is the other agent (φύσις) that makes my body grow and decay. Aristotle attributed processes of the latter kind to another sort of ψυχὴ, 'the vegetative soul'; but the writer of *Exc.* IV A does not include them under the functions of ψυχὴ; he ascribes them to a different agent.

The μέν at the beginning of § 3 shows that the writer intends, after speaking of the movement of perishable bodies, to speak of the movement of imperishable bodies (ἄφθαρτα, αἰδία, or ἀθάνατα σώματα), i. e. of the heavenly bodies. These bodies are exempt from increase, decay, and dissolution, the processes worked by the second agent (φύσις); he must therefore have said, in a lost passage which followed § 3, that the heavenly bodies have one sort of movement only, viz. that which is worked by ψυχὴ. It must be either by the one soul of the Kosmos, or by the souls by which they are severally animated, that the heavenly bodies 'are moved', i. e. are made to revolve in their orbits.

§ 4. ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ ἀεικίνητος . . . κατὰ τοῦτον οὖν τὸν λόγον ἐστὶ ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος, καθότι (καὶ MSS.) ἀεικίνητος. Having spoken of the movement of bodies, the writer goes on to speak of the movement of soul. The word ἀεικίνητος is used by Plato in one passage only, *Phaedrus* 245 C: ψυχὴ πᾶσα ἀθάνατος· τὸ γὰρ ἀεικίνητον ἀθάνατον, κ.τ.λ.¹ It is evident that the writer of *Exc.* IV A had that passage (or some paraphrase of it) in mind; and it can hardly be doubted that he, like Plato, said that soul must be ἀθάνατος because it is ἀεικίνητος. But if so, he must have written καθότι, or some such word, before ἀεικίνητος. For καθότι, cf. *Exc.* III. 1: καθότι (μὲν) ἀσώματοί εἰσι (sc. αἱ ἐνέργειαι), καὶ ἀθανάτους αὐτὰς φύσις εἶναι.

(ἐν ἑαυτῇ) ἔχουσα [κίνησιν] τὴν αὐτῆς ἐνέργειαν. 'Having its motive force within itself.' This is equivalent to αὐτοκίνητος οἶσα; cf. τὸ αὐτὸ κινεῖν in Pl. *Phaedrus* l. c.

The word ἐνέργεια has not here the special meaning which it has in *Exc.* III.

§ 5. ἡ μὲν οὖν θεία (ψυχὴ) τοῦ θεοῦ σώματος (κίνητικῆ). What does this writer mean by τὸ θεῖον σῶμα? *Exc.* III. 6, τὰ θεία σώματα

¹ Cf. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 386: Θαλῆς ἀπεφάνητο πρῶτος τὴν ψυχὴν ἀεικίνητον ἢ (καὶ!) αὐτοκίνητον. . . Ἀλκμαίων, φύσιν ('a thing') αὐτοκίνητον κατ' αἰδίον κίνησιν· καὶ διὰ τοῦτο ἀθάνατον αὐτὴν καὶ προσεμπερῆ τοῖς θεοῖς ἕπολαμβάνει. *Ib.* p. 392: Πλάτων, ἀεικίνητον μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν, τὸν δὲ νοῦν ἀκίνητον τῆς μεταβατικῆς κινήσεως. Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀκίνητον τὴν ψυχὴν, πάσης κινήσεως προηγουμένην, τῆς δὲ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς μετέχων, καθάπερ τὰ εἶδη τῶν σωμάτων.

means the heavenly bodies,—sun, moon, and stars. But in *Exx.* IV A, the term is used only in the singular. In §§ 7 and <<6>>, τὸ θεῖον σῶμα is the body which the human soul quits when it enters an earthly body, and which it enters when it quits its earthly body. The ‘divine body’ of which that is said might be a star. But the term could hardly be thus interpreted in § 9, where we are told that the agent by which soulless bodies upon earth are moved is ἡ ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι κινουμένη (ψυχὴ). This agent cannot be an individual soul residing in this or that particular star; it must be the world-soul; and the ‘divine body’ spoken of must be the body in which the world-soul resides. Now the world-soul might be said to reside either ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ, in the universe as a whole, or ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, in the sphere of heaven, which, according to the Stoics, is the seat of the cosmic ἡγεμονικόν. But in §§ 7 and <<6>>, τὸ θεῖον σῶμα cannot mean the whole universe; for it would be impossible to say that a human soul quits the universe when it enters an earthly body, and enters the universe when it quits its earthly body. It seems then that the only way to make sense of both passages together is to assume that in this document τὸ θεῖον σῶμα means ὁ οὐρανός. The agent by which soulless bodies are moved (§ 9) is ἡ ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ κινουμένη ψυχὴ, i. e. the world-soul, which resides and ‘moves itself’ in the sphere of heaven; and an individual human soul, before and after its occupation of an earthly body, is ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ, in the sphere of heaven. This does not necessarily exclude the view that each human soul, when not embodied on earth, resides in some particular star, and the writer may very likely have held that view; but he does not expressly say so.

Accordingly, in § 5, the words ἡ θεία ψυχὴ τοῦ θείου σώματος (κινητικὴ) may be taken to mean that ‘the divine soul’ (i. e. the world-soul) makes the sphere of heaven revolve.

(. . .) αὐτῆς ἐνέργεια· ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῷ κινεῖται, καὶ [ε]αὐτὸ (δε) κινεῖ. Perhaps: (διπλῆ δὲ) αὐτῆς (ἡ) ἐνέργεια· ἐν μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. ‘Its motive force (i. e. the motive force which the divine soul puts in action) is twofold; for on the one hand it (moves itself?), and on the other hand it moves the divine body also.’ (ἐνέργεια used as in § 4, and not as in *Exx.* III.) But what is the meaning of ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖται? Wachsmuth conjectures ἐν μὲν γὰρ αὐτῇ κινεῖται. That is possible, and might perhaps be accepted as a rather obscure equivalent for ‘it moves itself’, which the context seems to require. But αὐτῷ is supported by two similar phrases below, ἐν αὐτῷ (ἐαυτῷ P) κινεῖται, § <<6>>.

and ἡ ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι κινουμένη (ψυχῇ), § 9; and it is difficult to believe that the same form of words can have been introduced by corruption in all three passages. If we retain ἐν αὐτῷ, the words may be taken to mean 'the divine soul resides in the divine body, and residing therein, moves itself' (κινεῖται = εαυτὴν κινεῖ).

§ 7. ἔχει μὲν (τι) καὶ [τὸ] τοῦ θείου. The human soul has in it 'something that is divine', viz. τὸ λογικὸν μέρος, which is called νοῦς by some of the Hermetists.

καὶ (γὰρ) αὐται [μὲν ἀθάνατοι καθότι καὶ αὐται αἱ] ἐνέργειαι τυγχάνουσι (οὐσ)αι, ἐνέργειαι δὲ θνητῶν σωμάτων. The reading of the MSS. cannot be right. On the question whether ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, the irrational parts of the soul, are immortal or not, opinions might differ; and though in § ((6)) the writer expressly denies that a man's ἐπιθυμία and θυμός live on as parts of *him* after he has quitted his earthly body, he may possibly have held that they live on as separate entities. (See note on καταλιπὼν τὴν ψυχὴν κρίσει in *Corp.* X. 16.) But even if he did hold that opinion, he could have no reason for inserting here an *obiter dictum* to that effect. Moreover, if αὐται, meaning ἐπιθυμία and θυμός, has an adjective (ἀθάνατοι) for predicate, its gender is wrong; it ought to be ταῦτα. (Cf. *κάκεινα* below.) But if we write αὐται [] ἐνέργειαι τυγχάνουσι οὐσαι, the pronoun rightly takes its gender from the predicate substantive. Of the words which I have cut out, ἀθάνατοι καθότι may have found its way to this section from ἀθάνατος καθότι ἀεικίνητος in § 4; and καὶ αὐται may have come by duplication from the preceding καὶ (γὰρ) αὐται.

The ἄλογα μέρη τῆς ψυχῆς are here called ἐνέργειαι; and it is implied that the λογικὸν μέρος also is an ἐνέργεια. This is a different use of the word from that in §§ 4 and 5, but not so widely different that we need hesitate to ascribe both to the same writer. In §§ 4 and 5, ἐνέργεια means a motive force exerted by a thing upon a thing; in § 7, it means a thing which exerts a motive force. In none of these instances is it used as in *Exc.* III; and the writer of *Exc.* III would certainly not have said that the parts of the soul are ἐνέργειαι.

ἐνέργειαι δὲ θνητῶν σωμάτων. It is to be inferred from the context that these words mean 'they are things which exert a motive force *on* mortal bodies'. They move mortal bodies only, and therefore begin to act only when the soul enters a mortal body, and cease to act when it quits that body. The meaning might be more clearly expressed by writing θνητῶν σωμάτων (κινητικαί); but the addition of *κινητικαί* is hardly necessary.

ἐπειδὴν δὲ εἰσέλθῃ τοῦτο (sc. τὸ θεῖον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς) εἰς θνητὸν σῶμα, κάκεινα (sc. τὰ ἄλογα μέρη) ἐπιφύεται (ἐπιφοιτᾷ MSS.). This closely resembles the teaching of the *Timaeus* on this matter. Compare, for instance, *Tim.* 69 c, where it is said that the created gods, παραλαβόντες ἀρχὴν ψυχῆς ἀθάνατον (= τὸ λογικὸν μέρος), τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο θνητὸν σῶμα αὐτῇ περιετόρνενσαν, . . . ἄλλο τε εἶδος ἐν αὐτῷ ψυχῆς προσωκοδόμουν τὸ θνητὸν (= τὰ ἄλογα μέρη), δεινὰ καὶ ἀναγκαῖα ἐν ἑαυτῷ παθήματα ἔχον κ.τ.λ. This Platonic notion was elaborated by Basilides and his son Isidorus in their doctrine of τὰ προσαρτήματα τῆς ψυχῆς, οἱ ἢ προσφυῆς ψυχῆ. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 2. 20. 112 f.: οἱ δ' ἀμφὶ τὸν Βασιλείδην προσαρτήματα τὰ πάθη καλεῖν εἰώθασι, πνεύματά (τέ) τινα (λέγοντες) ταῦτα κατ' οὐσίαν ὑπάρχειν προσηρητημένα τῇ λογικῇ ψυχῇ κ.τ.λ. . . ὁ τοῦ Βασιλείδου υἱὸς Ἰσίδωρος ἐν τῷ Περὶ προσφυοῦς ψυχῆς . . . γράφει . . . "ἐὰν γὰρ τι πείσμα δῶς ὅτι μὴ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ μονομερῆς, τῇ δὲ τῶν προσαρτημάτων βία τὰ τῶν χειρόνων γίνεται πάθη, κ.τ.λ. δεῖ δέ, τῷ λογιστικῷ κρείττονας γενομένους, τῆς ἐλάττονος ἐν ἡμῖν κτίσεως (= τῶν ἀλόγων μερῶν) φανῆναι κρατοῦντας." δύο γὰρ δὴ ψυχὰς ὑποτίθεται καὶ οὗτος ἐν ἡμῖν.

ἐπιφοιτᾷ ('visit from time to time') is not a suitable verb to use in speaking of the ἄλογα μέρη, which attach themselves to the soul at the moment when it enters an earthly body, and cling to it without intermission until it quits that body. ἐπιφύεται ('grow on to', or 'come into being as accretions on') gives precisely the sense required; cf. the προσφυῆς ψυχῆ of Isidorus, and προσεπιφύεσθαι used in a similar connexion by Clement *l. c.* in his report of the teaching of Basilides.

τῇ παρουσίᾳ αὐτῶν γίνεται [ἀεὶ] (κακὴ ἢ) ψυχῆ [ἀνθρωπίνη]. Cf. *Corp.* X. 15 b as emended: the soul, when it has been drawn down into the body, κακὴ γίνεται.

(§ 6. ἐπὶ γὰρ . . . τῷ παντί.) It is evident that the soul here spoken of is ἡ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχῆ, and not ἡ θεία ψυχῆ, and consequently, that this section is wrongly placed in the MSS. If we put it after § 7, it fits in perfectly.

εἰσελθοῦσα (ἐξελθοῦσα MSS.) (δὲ) εἰς τὸ θεῖον σῶμα, . . . ἐν αὐτῷ κινεῖται, συμπεριφερομένη τῷ παντί. Cf. *Corp.* X. 16: ὁ δὲ νοῦς (= τὸ λογικὸν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς), when it quits its earthly body, σώματος πυρίνου (ἐπι)λαβόμενος περιπολεῖ πάντα τόπον. But the meaning in *Corp.* X appears to be that the liberated νοῦς becomes a daemon, and as such, clothes itself in a body of fire, and 'ranges through all space'. In *Exc.* IV A, the meaning is rather that the soul, having cast off its

'irrational parts', becomes an astral god, and resides in the revolving sphere of heaven. *εἰς τὸ θεῖον σῶμα* probably means *εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν*; if the writer had meant to say 'it becomes embodied in a star', he would have omitted *τό*, and written *εἰσελθοῦσα εἰς θεῖον σῶμα*, as he writes *εἰσέλθη εἰς θνητὸν σῶμα* above. He does not clearly explain the situation and condition of the soul which has 'entered into the divine body'; he may perhaps have held (though he does not say so) that each individual soul is embodied in some particular star, but that all souls thus embodied are in some sense parts of the one world-soul which resides in the sphere of heaven.

According to this writer, the soul is never completely disembodied. It is always in some sort of body; when it is not *ἐν θνητῷ σώματι*, it is *ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι*. As to this variation of Platonic doctrine, see note on *Corr.* X. 16.

§ 9. *τετάρτην δὲ νόει τὴν τῶν ἀψύχων (ἐνέργειαν), ἣτις ἔξωθεν οὐσα τῶν σωμάτων ἐνεργεῖ κινούσα*. The meaning required is 'you must understand that the thing which moves soulless bodies is the fourth kind of thing that exerts motive force'—the other three being the three kinds of soul, divine, human, and irrational. But the feminine substantive to which *τετάρτην* is predicate, and which must have meant 'thing that exerts motive, force', has disappeared. I have assumed that it was *ἐνέργειαν*. If so, it is implied that the three kinds of *ψυχή* are also *ἐνέργειαι*; and the word is here used in the same sense as in § 7, where the parts of the soul are called *ἐνέργειαι*. The meaning might be more clearly expressed by inserting *κινητικὴν* after *τῶν ἀψύχων*; compare *ἐνέργειαι δὲ θνητῶν σωμάτων* in § 7.

We have been told that the 'divine body' (i. e. the sphere of heaven), the body of a man, and the body of a beast, are moved by the souls which reside in them. But by what agent are soulless bodies moved? What is it, for instance, that makes a stone fall? That is the question that is answered in § 9. In this case, the agent does not reside in the body that is moved, but is external to it. The substantive by which this agent was denoted has fallen out of the text; but there can be little doubt that the author wrote *ἢ ἐν τῷ θείῳ σώματι κινουμένη (ψυχή)*. Cf. §§ 5 and (6), where it is said that *ἡ θεία ψυχή ἐν αὐτῷ (sc. τῷ θείῳ σώματι) κινεῖται*. If so, we must understand that the force which makes a stone fall is exerted by the world-soul, the seat of which is the sphere of heaven.

In locating the world-soul in the sphere of heaven, the writer is in agreement with the Stoics. He most likely differed from them, and

agreed with the Platonists, in holding that the world-soul (i.e. the soul which moves and governs the material Kosmos) is subordinate to a supracosmic God; but in this excerpt, he has no occasion to speak of the supreme God.

If I am right in adding *ψυχή*, the fourth agent turns out to be identical with *ἡ θεία ψυχή*, which is one of the three previously mentioned; so that there are really only three kinds of agents, and not four. But *ἡ θεία ψυχή*, when it makes a stone fall, does a different kind of work from that which it does in making the heavens revolve, and does it in a different way (*ἔξωθεν οὐσα*, and *κατὰ πάροδον*); it is therefore possible to say that it is 'a fourth *ἐνέργεια*' when it is acting in this capacity.

ὡςπερ κατὰ πάροδον ταῦτα κινούσα. κατὰ πάροδον ('in passing' or 'by the way') is equivalent to *ἐν παρέργῳ*. The main work of the *θεία ψυχή* is to make the heavens revolve; but incidentally, it also moves soulless things on earth. According to the writer of *Exc. III*, soulless bodies on earth are moved by forces put in action by the heavenly bodies; according to the writer of *Exc. IV A*, both the movement of the heavens and the movements of soulless bodies on earth are worked by the *θεία ψυχή* residing in the heavens.

Excerpt IV B

§ 1. *ἔφης γάρ που τὴν ἐπιστήμην καὶ τὴν τέχνην ἐνεργείας (-γειαν MSS.) εἶναι τοῦ λογικοῦ*. The writer refers back to a passage (either in this *libellus* or in an earlier *Hermeticum*) in which it was said that 'knowledge and skill are motive forces put forth by the rational part of the soul'; i.e. that when a man does something in which knowledge and skill are manifested, it is the rational part of the soul that is in action. Tat says that such things are done by beasts as well as men, and argues that beasts as well as men must therefore have a 'rational part of the soul'.

In *Exc. III. 13*, something was said about *τέχναι* and *ἐπιστήμαι* in connexion with *ἐνέργειαι* and 'the souls of men'; but as that passage is mutilated, we do not know whether it contained anything resembling the statement quoted in IV B. 1.

An opinion similar to that which is here ascribed to Tat is expressed by Porphyry, *De abst. 3. 1-10*.

§ 2. *τὰς τροφὰς ἀποθησαυρισμένους [τοῦ χειμῶνος]*. The text of the MSS. can only mean 'laying up their stores of food in winter'. But ants were believed to store up food in summer for use in winter.

Wachsmuth proposes (τὰς) τοῦ χειμῶνος, 'the food on which they are to live in the winter'; but it seems better to cut out τοῦ χειμῶνος, which may be a remnant of a marginal note.

§ 3. Ταῦτα, ὧ τέκνον, οὐκ ἐπιστήμη οὐδέ) τέχνη ποιεῖ, ἀλλὰ φύσει. This amounts to saying that the force at work in the bird which builds a nest is not put in action by a 'rational part' of its own soul, but is the same force which is at work in all physical processes throughout the sublunar world. The bird is not acting deliberately; it is not aiming at an end or good which it has conceived in thought, and seeks to realize by its action, as a man does when he builds a house; it is impelled by a force of the same character as that which makes a tree grow, or a stone fall. We are told in IV A. 9 that the agent to which all such processes are to be attributed is ἡ θεία ψυχή, i. e. the world-soul (presumably working in subordination to the supreme God); some of the other Hermetists (e. g. the writer of *Corp.* III) would have said that the agent is God. But φύσις, the force exerted on sublunar things by the world-soul or by God, is often spoken of as if it were itself an agent.

The thing discussed in *Exc.* IV B is one particular department of the working of this cosmic force, namely, the actions of beasts; and in that connexion, φύσις may be translated 'instinct'. For φύσις in the sense of instinct as opposed to reason, cf. *Corp.* IX. 1 b, and *Corp.* XII. 1. 1 *fin.* Arist. *De part. an.* 657 a 36: σκαρδαμύσσει τε πάντα (τὰ ζῷα), καὶ μάλιστ' ἄνθρωπος, πάντα μὲν ὅπως τὰ προσπίπτοντα τοῖς βλεφάροις κωλύωσι, καὶ τοῦτο οὐκ ἐκ προαιρέσεως, ἀλλ' ἡ φύσις ἐποίησε. I. e. the act of blinking is instinctive.

The writer distinguishes instinctive actions from rational actions by two criteria. Firstly, instinctive actions 'are not taught' (that is, the animal does the thing without having been taught to do it); and secondly, the thing is done by all animals of some one race or kind. With respect to the first of these criteria, we may compare the frequent use of φύσις in contrast to διδαχή or μελέτη in speaking of men. Epicharmus, fr. 33 Diels: ἃ δὲ μελέτα φύσιος ἀγαθῶς πλέονα δωρεῖται. Democritus, fr. 242 Diels: πλέονες ἐξ ἀσκήσιος ἀγαθοὶ γίνονται ἢ ἀπὸ φύσιος. Critias, fr. 9 Diels: ἐκ μελέτης πλείους ἢ φύσεως ἀγαθοί. Διωσοὶ λόγοι, Diels *Vorsokr.* p. 646: ἔστι δέ τι καὶ φύσις, ἧ δὴ τις μὴ μαθὼν παρὰ σοφιστῶν ἱκανὸς ἐγένετο. Cf. Pl. *Αῤῥολ.* 22 B: ἔγνω οὖν αὖ καὶ περὶ τῶν ποιητῶν . . . τοῦτο, ὅτι οὐ σοφίᾳ ποιοῖεν ἃ ποιοῖεν, ἀλλὰ φύσει τινὶ (by 'instinct') καὶ ἐνθουσιάζοντες (being possessed by a god). See Epicharmus, fr. 4 Diels, on the 'wisdom' or 'cleverness' (τὸ σοφόν) which

a hen shows in hatching her eggs: τὸ δὲ σοφὸν ἂ φύσις τὸδ' οἶδεν ὡς ἔχει μόνα· for the hen is 'self-taught' (i. e. her cleverness is not a τέχνη διδακτῆ).

Cf. Seneca, *Ep.* 121, §§ 21-23: '... Naturales ad utilia impetus, naturales a contrariis aspernationes sunt: sine ulla cogitatione quae hoc dictet, sine consilio fit quicquid natura praecepit. Non vides quanta sit subtilitas apibus ad fingenda domicilia? quanta dividendi laboris obeundique concordia? non vides quam nulli mortalium imitabilis illa aranei textura? quanti operis sit fila disponere, alia in rectum inmissa firmamenti loco, alia in orbem currentia ex denso rara, quae minora animalia, in quorum perniciem illa tenduntur, velut retibus implicata teneantur? Nascitur ars ista, non discitur, itaque nullum est animal altero doctius: videbis araneorum pares telas, par in favis angulorum omnium foramen. Incertum est et inaequabile quicquid ars tradit: ex aequo venit quod natura distribuit. Haec nihil magis quam tutelam sui et eius peritiam tradidit ideoque etiam simul incipiunt et discere et vivere. Nec est mirum cum eo nasci illa, sine quo frustra nascerentur.' This doctrine is probably drawn from Posidonius. Philo *De animalibus adv. Alexandrum*, p. 163 Aucher: 'Considera ... utrum apes et araneae, puta quod textrices istae sunt, illae favum mellis creant, iuxta artisne industriam ingeniosam (id faciunt), an absque ratione per actionem naturalem. Siquidem horum omnino ... admirabilis habenda diligentia, quae tamen non a disciplina deducta est. ... volucres solent per aerem volare, aquatilia natere, et gradi terrestria. An id per studium doctrinae? Minime; sed suapte natura singula memorata haec agunt. Similiter et apes sine doctrina naturaliter favum peragunt, et araneae quasi per se edoctae subtilem illam elaborationem textorum moliuntur.' *Ib.* p. 168: "At quid quis dicere potest," inquires, "cum antea collectione facta condit in thesauros formica, et horrea sibi prius parat? ..." Ita quidem ego etiam dico. Dico tamen haec providentiae, non animalium ratione carentium, sed eius qui universam moderatur naturam esse tribuenda. Illud enim (animal) nihil agit intellectu. Isti vero (deo) cura est variis de rebus; ut nimirum, sicut Creator, impetum singularum creaturarum constringit ac corroborat ad id propter quod factae sunt, sive ad eam quae singulis convenit perfectionem.'

Compare also Orig. *c. Cels.* 4. 81-83. Celsus spoke of the well-ordered πολιτεῖαι of ants and bees, as showing that οὐδὲν μυρμηκῶν ἢ μελισσῶν διαφέρει ὁ ἄνθρωπος παρὰ τῷ θεῷ. To this Origen replies:

οὐδ' ἐν τούτοις ἑώρακε (Celsus) τίνι διαφέρει τὰ ἀπὸ λόγου καὶ λογισμοῦ ἐπιτελούμενα τῶν ἄπ' ἀλόγου φύσεως καὶ κατασκευῆς ψιλῆς γινομένων. ὦν τὴν αἰτίαν οὐδεὶς μὲν ἐνυπάρχων τοῖς ποιούσι λόγος ἀναδέχεται· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔχουσιν αὐτόν¹ but the Son of God, to whom all things are subject, φύσιν ἄλογον πεποίηκε, βοηθοῦσαν ὡς ἄλογον τοῖς (οὐκ?) ἀξιοθεῖσι λόγου. πόλεις οὖν παρ' ἀνθρώποις μετὰ πολλῶν ὑπέστησαν τεχνῶν καὶ διατάξεως νόμων' . . . ὦν οὐδὲν ἐν τοῖς ἀλόγοις ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν. . . ἐφ' οἷς οὐδαμῶς μὲν τοὺς μύρμηκας ἢ τὰς μελίσσας ἀποδεκτέον· οὐ γὰρ σὺν λογισμῷ ποιούσι· τὴν θείαν δὲ φύσιν θαυμαστέον, μέχρι τῶν ἀλόγων ἐκτείνασαν τὸ οἰοεὶ πρὸς τὰ λογικὰ μίμημα.

Celsus spoke also (*ib.* ch. 83) of the foresight shown by ants in laying up stores for the winter, and added that they take precautions to prevent the grains which they lay up from sprouting; to which Origen replies, οὐ λογισμὸν εἶναι ἐν μύρμηξι τούτων αἴτιον ὑπονοητέον, ἀλλὰ τὴν παμμήτορα φύσιν, τὴν καὶ τὰ ἄλογα κοσμήσασαν.

⟨καὶ⟩ τὰ ⟨⟨μὲν⟩⟩ [δὲ] φύσει γιγνόμενα ἐνεργεῖα [[μὲν]] γίγνεται καθολικῆ. The term ἐνεργεῖα καθολικῆ may have been suggested to the writer by *Exc.* III. 13, if he had read that document; but he applies it differently. The ἐνεργεῖαι which are called καθολικαί in III. 13 are the forces by which bodies of all kinds are brought into being; but those called καθολικαί in IV B. 3 are forces which act alike on all individuals of some one kind of animals. They are those which, in III. 12, are called γενικαί, and from which the καθολικαί are there distinguished.

τὰ (τῇ MSS.) δὲ ἐπιστήμη καὶ τέχνη ⟨⟨γιγνόμενα⟩⟩ [εἰδόσι] ⟨τισὶ⟩ παραγίγνεται, οὐ πᾶσι. In place of εἰδόσι, we need a word meaning 'to some', in contrast to πᾶσι. Wachsmuth conjectures εἰδικῶς (cf. εἰδικαὶ ἐνεργεῖαι in *Exc.* III. 13 and 12); but παραγίγνεται requires a dative. It would be possible to write τὰ δὲ . . . τέχνη γιγνόμενα εἰδικῇ ⟨ἐνεργεῖα γίγνεται· τισὶ γὰρ⟩ παραγίγνεται, οὐ πᾶσι.

§ 4. ⟨τοῦτο μὲν γὰρ⟩ ⟨⟨ὑπὸ φύσεως ἐνεργεῖται⟩⟩. The words ὑπὸ φύσεως ἐνεργεῖται, which are out of place at the end of § 3, are wanted here, to stand in contrast to ἐπιστήμης καὶ τέχνης ἐνεργοῦσας below.

§ 5. ἐπιστήμη αὐτο(ὺς) [τοῦτο πράττειν] καὶ τέχνη συνάγειν τὰς τροφάς. τοῦτο πράττειν has come from τοῦτο ἔπραττον above.

¹ I. e. the λόγος by which the actions of the ants and bees are directed is not in the animals themselves, but acts on them from without. That which is in them is not λόγος, but an ἄλογος φύσις (i. e. instinct) implanted in them by the λόγος by which the universe is governed.

EXCERPT V

§ 1. ὁ μὲν [κύριος καὶ πάντων] δημιουργὸς τῶν αἰδίων σωμάτων. The supreme God is the Maker of 'the everlasting bodies', and as such, is distinguished from the Maker of men (ὁ ἡμέτερος δημιουργός, § 2), who is a subordinate god. πάντων cannot be right; there is no reason to insist that *all* the everlasting bodies, and not some of them only, have been made by the supreme God. It would be possible to write ὁ μὲν κύριος πάντων, καὶ δημιουργὸς τῶν αἰδίων σωμάτων. But ὁ μὲν δημιουργὸς τῶν ἀ. σ., without additional words, is better suited to stand in contrast to ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος δημιουργός. Perhaps the reading of the MSS. has resulted from a mixture of ὁ κύριος καὶ πάντων δημιουργός (a title of the supreme God) with ὁ δημιουργὸς τῶν αἰδίων σωμάτων.

What is here meant by τὰ αἰδία σώματα? In its widest application, the term might include (1) the four cosmic elements, (2) the body of the Kosmos, and (3) the heavenly bodies,—sun moon and stars. (We are told in the *Timaeus* that God made these things himself, and then committed to the gods whom he had made, i. e. chiefly the gods incorporated in the heavenly bodies, the task of making the bodies of men and other θνητὰ ζῶα.) In *Exc. II A* (§§ 1 f. and 13), τὰ αἰδία σώματα are the four cosmic elements. But in *Exc. III*, τὰ αἰδία σώματα (§§ 16 and 12), also called τὰ ἀθάνατα σώματα (§§ 16 and 8) and τὰ θεῖα σώματα (§§ 6 and 12), are the heavenly bodies. In *Exc. V*, τὰ αἰδία σώματα perhaps means both the cosmic elements and the heavenly bodies. If so, it is equivalent to τὰ στοιχεῖα in the wider sense of that term; for the heavenly bodies were sometimes called στοιχεῖα.

ταῦτα γὰρ ἑαυτοῖς παραδοῦς καὶ ἐνώσας ἀλλήλοις ἀφήκε φέρεσθαι. ἀφήκε φέρεσθαι, 'he let them go on their course', seems to apply best to the heavenly bodies (cf. εἶασε στρέφεσθαι in *Corp. I. 11 a*). But on the other hand, it is difficult to see what could be meant by saying that God 'united' the heavenly bodies 'to one another'; whereas this statement is intelligible when applied to the cosmic elements, which, according to the prevalent opinion, were continually being transmuted into one another. (See note on *Exc. II A. 13*.) And it would be possible to say that the cosmic elements 'go on their course', in the sense that they pass through the unending series of processes appointed for them.

μηδεν(ός) ἐνδέοντα [ὡς αἰδία]. εἰ δὲ δέονται τινῶν, ἀλλήλων δέ[ησ]ονται, οὐδεμιᾶς δὲ τῆς ἕξωθεν ἐπιφορᾶς. ὡς αἰδία is probably a misplaced doublet of ὡς ἀθάνατα below. The point on which the writer is insisting is that the 'everlasting bodies' do not need nutriment from without, as our bodies do (§ 4). He admits that they need and get nutriment, but only from one another. They are 'united to one another'; and if all of them are regarded together, as making up a single whole, it may be said that they are οὐδενὸς ἐνδέοντα.

This applies to the cosmic elements rather than to the heavenly bodies. Each of the four elements is perpetually maintained in existence by the transmutation of portions of the other elements into that element. The heavenly bodies, according to the Stoic physics, consist of the element fire, and receive τροφή from the other elements, in the form of exhalations which are transmuted into fire; but it could not be said that the heavenly bodies receive nutriment from one another.

(. . .) ὡς¹ ἀθάνατα. ἔδει γὰρ τὰ ὑπ' ἐκείνου σώματα γενόμενα τοιαύτην ἔχειν [καὶ] τὴν φύσιν. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing ὡς(τε ταῦτα μὲν) ἀθάνατα. The bodies hitherto spoken of are ἀθάνατα, and as such, are contrasted with the bodies of men, which are θνητά (§ 2). τοιαύτην ἔχειν τὴν φύσιν means ἀθάνατα εἶναι. Things made by the supreme God are necessarily immortal. Cf. Pl. *Tīm.* 41 C, where God says to the gods whom he has made δι' ἐμοῦ δὲ ταῦτα γενόμενα . . . θεοῖς ἰσάζουτ' ἄν' ἵνα οἶν θνητά . . . ἦ, τρέπεσθε κατὰ φύσιν ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ τὴν τῶν ζώων δημιουργίαν.

§ 2. ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος δημιουργός, ἐν σώματι ὢν. In the *Tīmaeus*, the bodies of men, and the 'mortal part' of their souls, are made, not by the supreme God himself, but by the gods whom he has made. The writer of *Exc.* V substitutes for these 'gods' a single god, who is embodied (ἐν σώματι), and, like the gods of the *Tīmaeus*, has been made by the supreme God (τὸν ἐαυτοῦ δημιουργόν). This subordinate and embodied Demiurgus must be either the Kosmos, or the Sun. For the Sun as subordinate Demiurgus, cf. *Corp.* XVI, *Exc.* XXI, and the interpolated passage *Exc.* II A. 14.

As the subordinate Demiurgus has been made by the supreme God, his body (whether the whole Kosmos or the Sun) must be regarded as one of the αἰδία σώματα.

The notion that τὰ ἀθάνατα have been made by one Maker, and τὰ θνητά by another, is discussed and rejected in *Corp.* XI. ii. 9 f.

καὶ ποιεῖ ἀεὶ καὶ ποιήσει. This is opposed to ποιήσας οὐκέτι ἐποίησεν οὐδὲ ποιεῖ in § 1. In *Corp.* XI. ii. 12 b-14 a, it is asserted that God 'is always making things'. The writer of *Exc.* V denies this with respect to the supreme God, but asserts it with respect to the 'Maker of mortal bodies'. The everlasting bodies have been made once for all; but the mortal organisms of the sublunar world are continually being made.

ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς . . . σώματα (ἔχοντας) διαλυτὰ καὶ θνητά. According to the MSS., the Hermetist here says that men are bodies. If he did say this, he expressed his meaning inexactly; for man, even if regarded merely as an earthly organism, is not σῶμα, but a thing made up of σῶμα and ψυχή. The writer seems to speak of men as if they were merely bodies in the words ἐκ τῆς . . . σωματώσεως ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς (not τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα) at the end of the section; but on the other hand he also employs the phrase τὰ ἡμέτερα σώματα, which implies that 'we' are not 'bodies'.

οὐ γὰρ θέμις ἦν αὐτῷ μιμεῖσθαι τὸν ἑαυτοῦ δημιουργόν, ἄλλως τε καὶ (. . .) ἀδύνατον· ὁ μὲν γὰρ κ.τ.λ. Wachsmuth adopts Meineke's emendation, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἀδύνατον (ὄν). This would mean 'It was not permitted to him, . . . especially as it was impossible'. But that cannot be right. οὐ θέμις and ἀδύνατον cannot be used together with reference to the same action; if a thing is impossible, the question whether it is permitted or forbidden does not arise. There must therefore be a lacuna before ἀδύνατον. Perhaps the author wrote something like this: '(And indeed) it was impossible (that our bodies should be of the same nature as the bodies made by the supreme Maker); for the supreme Maker made of incorporeal substance (the bodies which he made), but our Maker' &c.

ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης οὐσίας ἐποίησεν, οὕσης ἀσωμάτου. In *Exc.* IV A. 2, it is said that ἡ ψυχή has been made ἐξ ἀσωμάτου οὐσίας. But the writer of *Exc.* V is speaking, not of the making of soul, but of the making of the everlasting bodies. What is the 'first' and 'incorporeal' substance of which the everlasting bodies are made? In *Exc.* III. 8, we are told that the ἀθάνατα σώματα are made ἐκ μιᾶς ὕλης, and *ib.* 16, that they consist of an οὐσία different from that of which our bodies are made; but the ὕλη or οὐσία there spoken of is not said to be ἀσώματος; it is probably the 'fifth (corporeal) substance' of the Aristotelians. The view of the writer of *Corp.* V appears to be that originally nothing existed, except

'incorporeal substance', i. e., the substance of which God, νοῦς, and τὰ νοητά consist; (cf. *Corp.* I. 4, where that substance is symbolically denoted by the word φῶς;) and that God transformed portions of that incorporeal substance into the corporeal elements, and made the Kosmos out of the elements thus brought into being. If so, he rejects the Platonic doctrine of ἕλη; he holds that the ἕλη out of which all material things have been made is τὸ νοητόν.

ὁ δὲ ἐκ τῆς γενομένης (γειναμένης MSS.) σωματώσεως ἐποίησεν ἡμᾶς. γενομένης gives the sense required. ἐγεινάμην is said by Liddell and Scott to be sometimes used in the sense of ἐγενόμην 'in late poets'; but I know of no instance of this use in prose.

ἡ γενομένη σωματώσις means 'the corporeal things that had been made', i. e. the four cosmic elements, which were made by the supreme God.

§ 3. εἰκότως οὖν [κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον] ἐκεῖνα μὲν . . . ἀθάνατά ἐστι. κατὰ τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον must have been written as an alternative or substitute for εἰκότως.

ὡς τῆς ἄλλης ἡμῶν ἐκ σωμάτων συνεστῶσης. It is not ἡ ἕλη ἡμῶν, i. e. the material of which we are made, but our bodies, that are 'made up of bodies put together', i. e. of portions of the four elements. In place of ἕλης then, a feminine substantive equivalent to σῶματος is wanted.

§ 4. διὸ καὶ ἀσθενῆ ἐστι (διὰ τὸ ἀσθενῆ εἶναι MSS.). It could not be said either that the human body is made of material elements 'because it is weak and needs help', or that it is dissoluble and mortal for that reason. The meaning must have been that our bodies need help from without because they are dissoluble and mortal.

πολλῆς ἐπικουρίας δεόμενα. The two kinds of ἐπικουρία of which the Hermetist proceeds to speak are food (§ 4) and sleep (§§ 5-7). The everlasting bodies need neither.

§ 5. (. . .) ὥστε καὶ πρὸς τὰς κινήσεις ἐσμὲν ἀσθενέστεροι. There must be a lacuna here. ὥστε refers to some statement which has disappeared; and the κινήσεις could hardly be thus spoken of without some preceding explanation.

The body is moved (i. e. its muscular movements are worked) by the ψυχή which resides in it; but it would soon be worn out by these movements, if it were not refreshed and renovated by sleep.

φέροντες (αὐτάς) [κινήσεις] μηδὲ ἡμέρας μῦς. ἡμέρα seems here to mean, not day as opposed to night, but a space of twenty-four hours.

It is necessary to write either (τάς) κινήσεις or αὐτάς; and the repetition of τὰς κινήσεις would be clumsy.

ἀγαθὸς ὢν ὁ δημιουργός . . . ἐποίησε τὸν ὕπνον. Is this the 'Maker of the everlasting bodies', or the 'Maker of mortal bodies'? Probably the former. The body of this or that individual man has been made by the subordinate Demiurgus; but sleep is a force that works in all human and animal bodies alike; and in the language of *Exc.* III it might be said that, though ἐν σώματι, it is itself ἀσώματος and ἀθάνατος. The 'making' of sleep really means the making of a law that all human and animal bodies shall be recuperated by a certain process; and the making of such general laws may very well be ascribed to the supreme God. Sleep is often personified; and Ὑπνος, regarded as a person, might be classed among the gods whom the supreme God has made. The writer of *Exc.* V does not personify it; but he speaks of it as if it were a substantive thing, and puts it on a level with ψυχῆ.

ἀγαθὸς ὢν ὁ δημιουργός is a reminiscence of Pl. *Tim.* 29 E, ἀγαθὸς ἦν κ.τ.λ.

ἐπ' ἰσότητος ἔταξεν ἑκατέρῳ χρόνον (ἐκάστῳ χρόνῳ MSS.). The writer does not mean to say that men sleep exactly half their time, but merely that, night being the time appointed for sleep, and day for movement, the nights are on the average equal to the days in length.

[μᾶλλον δὲ τῇ ἀναπαύλῃ πλείονα (χρόνον ἔταξε)]. This is obviously untrue:—[unless ἀνάπαυλα be understood as 'rest from labour'.]

§ 6. καθάπερ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεώς ἐστι ἐνεργητικὴ (ἐνέργεια MSS.), τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον (ὁ ὕπνος . . .). In contrast to ἡ ψυχὴ κινήσεως, the author must have written ὁ ὕπνος followed by some genitive (ἀναπαύλης?).

ἄνεσις γάρ [καὶ ἀφεσίς] ἐστι τῶν συνδέτων τῶν μελῶν. τῶν συνδέτων μελῶν (P) is meaningless; and τῶν συνδέσμων would not give a satisfactory sense. The bonds by which the body is held together are not relaxed in sleep. It might perhaps be said that the bonds by which the soul and the body are bound to one another are relaxed in sleep (cf. *Corp.* I. 1), and that it is in consequence of this relaxation that the soul no longer works bodily κινήσεις

when the man is asleep; but if that was the meaning, the words by which it was expressed are lost.

ἀνεσις occurs in connexion with sleep in Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 436: οἱ Στωικοί, τὸν μὲν ὕπνον γίνεσθαι ἀνεσει τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ πνεύματος. (Cf. Arist. *De somno* 454 b 10: ὁ ὕπνος τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ μορίου ἐστὶν οἶον δεσμός καὶ ἀκίνησις τις.) But the writer of *Exc. V* does not speak of ἀνεσις; he describes sleep as a suspension of movement, not of sensation or consciousness.

§ 7. καὶ ἔσωθεν ἐνεργεῖ, σωματοποιῶν τὴν ἐπεισελθοῦσαν ὕλην. This is a second function of sleep, distinct from that of relieving the strain of κίνησις. The two might be connected, by saying that κίνησις expends the material substance of the body, and that sleep is therefore needed to replace the matter expended; but the writer has not thus connected them.

For the notion that nutriment is distributed within the body and worked into its structure by (or during) sleep, cf. Arist. *De somno* 454 b 32: τὸ ἔργον τὸ αὐτοῦ ποιεῖ τὸ θρεπτικὸν μόνιον ἐν τῷ καθέδδεν μᾶλλον ἢ ἐν τῷ ἐργηγορέναι· τρέφεται γὰρ καὶ αὔξεται (τὸ σῶμα) τότε μᾶλλον. Aristotle also says (*ib.* 456 b 24) that μάλιστα γίνονται ὕπνοι ἀπὸ τῆς τροφῆς.

(τοῖς) ὀστέοις καὶ μυελοῖς. There is no apparent reason why the marrow, rather than any other parts of the body, should be said to be made of earth or fed with earth; and on the other hand, some mention of the flesh seems almost necessary. If the author wrote μῦσι (muscles), this might easily be altered into μυελοῖς, which would be suggested by ὀστέοις.

τὸν δὲ ἀέρα τοῖς νεύροις [καὶ φλεψί]. According to a theory originated by Erasistratus (see *Corp. X.* 11), the νεῦρα are pipes through which flow streams of *pneuma*; and as *pneuma* consists of warm air, it might be thought that the air which enters the body passes into the νεῦρα, and serves as nutriment to the vital *pneuma* contained in them. In place of φλεψί, we might have expected ἀρτηρία; for the arteries also were commonly supposed to contain air or *pneuma*. Aetius (Diels *Doxogr.* p. 436) reports Diogenes (which Diogenes?) as saying that the φλέβες contain air as well as blood; but that is hardly enough to account for the mention of them in *Exc. V.* 7; and it seems best to bracket καὶ φλεψί.

τὸ δὲ πῦρ τῇ ὄρασει. It is assumed that the eyes contain fire, or consist partly of fire. Cf. the description of the process of

vision in Pl. *Tīm.* 45 B ff., where it is said that the eyes contain fire, which emits streams of light. Arist. *De sensu* 437 b 11: εἴ γε πῦρ ἦν (ἢ ὄψις), καθάπερ Ἐμπεδοκλῆς φησὶ καὶ ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ γέγραπται, καὶ συνέβαινε τὸ ὄραν ἐξιόντος ὡσπερ ἐκ λαμπτήρος τοῦ φωτός, κ.τ.λ. Empedocles, fr. 84 Diels, compares the eye to a lighted lantern, and speaks of the μήνιξιεν ἐεργμένον ὠγίγιον πῦρ which it contains.

EXCERPT VI

This *Libellus* gives a description of the position and functions of the star-gods called *Decāni*; to which are added some statements about other stars, and about meteors and comets. It is a sequel to an earlier dialogue, in which an account of the Zodiac and the planets had been given; and a knowledge of the contents of that earlier document is presupposed.

In *Exc.* VI we have the outlines of a system according to which the thirty-six Decani are (under God supreme and incorporeal) the chief powers by which the universe is governed. They discharge collectively that function of 'second God' and ruler of the Kosmos, which in some *Hermetica* (e. g. in *Corp.* XVI) is assigned to the Sun. The system set forth in this document includes some elements of recent origin; the Graeco-Egyptian theory of the Zodiac and the planet-spheres appears in it; and though the writer himself is not an astrologer, he has been influenced by astrological conceptions;¹ but there can be little doubt that his doctrine is, in its groundwork, a survival of one of the many religions of Pharaonic Egypt.

The conception of the δεκανοί² was of Egyptian origin. The Egyptian priests, under the native dynasties, and before the importation into Egypt of the astronomy and astral religion of Babylonia (which seems to have taken place for the most part during the Persian dominion, from 525 B. C. onward), had already been accustomed to observe the heavens, and had constructed a list of conspicuous stars or star-groups, each of which they regarded as the embodiment or domicile of a special deity. The name by which these deities were collectively denoted in the Egyptian language has not been ascertained; but we may call them 'the

¹ E. g. the phrase καθολικὰ ἀποτελέσματα (§ 16) is a technical term of astrology.

² On the Decani, see Bouché-Leclercq (*L'astrologie grecque* pp. 215-235), who refers to Lepsius, *Einleitung zur Chronologie der Aegypter*, 1848, and Brugsch, *Thesaurus Inscr. Aeg. I (Astron. und astrol. Inscr.)* 1883.

stellar gods'.¹ Egyptian observers had in early ages noted the regularity of the variations in the relative position of the sun and the fixed stars; they knew (as the Greeks, in and before the time of Hesiod, also knew) that if you observe the eastern or western horizon shortly after sunset or before sunrise, you will, as the year advances, see different star-groups there, in a fixed order of succession; and they had long recorded the results of such observations; but they had not yet marked out the zodiacal circle, by which the sun's annual course among the stars was represented in later times.² They thought of the sun's path rather as a broad equatorial zone, (the *intertropical zone*, as we might call it,) within which he moves

¹ When Aeschylus (*Agam.* 5) made his Watchman speak of *τοὺς φέροντας χεῖμα καὶ θέρος βρότοις* | *λαμπροὺς δυνάστας, ἐμπρέποντας αἰθέρι*, his notions about the stars were not very different from those which had long been current in Egypt, though his knowledge of their movements was, no doubt, less detailed. The 'stellar gods' of the Egyptians are *λαμπροὶ δυνάσται*.

² The 'zodiacal circle', or ecliptic, is a circle described on the surface of the revolving star-sphere, cutting the equator obliquely at two opposite points, and touching both tropics. Its demarcation presupposes the resolution of the sun's apparent movement into two distinct movements, viz. (1) the daily movement of sun and stars alike round the earth, and (2) the sun's annual movement relatively to the fixed stars. The zodiacal circle represents the latter movement in separation from the former. This mode of representing the sun's movement is said to have been known to Greek thinkers in the sixth century B.C.; Pliny *Nat. hist.* 2. 31: 'Obliquitatem (signiferi, i. e. of the Zodiac) intellexisse . . . Anaximander Milesius traditur primus, Olympiade quinquagesima octava (548-545 B.C.), signa deinde in eo Cleostratus (circ. 520 B.C.), et prima Arietis et Sagittarii.' See *J. H. S.* 1919.

The Greeks must have got the conception of the zodiacal circle from Babylonian astronomers, either directly or through Egyptian intermediaries. Jastrow, *Religious belief in Babylonia and Assyria*, pp. 228-230: 'The ecliptic, known as the 'path-way of the sun', was divided (by the Babylonians and Assyrians) into three sections. . . . The stars near the ecliptic were combined into groups, and designations more or less fanciful were given to them. In this way, twelve such groups were gradually distinguished, corresponding to our constellations of the Zodiac; though . . . there are no indications that the Babylonians or the Assyrians divided the ecliptic into twelve equal divisions of 30° each. . . . It appears that up to c. 1000 B.C., only four or five constellations in the Zodiac were distinguished, and we must descend to the Persian period before we find the full number twelve marked out along the ecliptic.' Cumont, *Astronomy and religion among the Greeks and Romans*, p. 11, mentions a Babylonian tablet, dated 523 B.C., which 'shows', he says, 'the astonishing advance (in astronomy) made (by the Babylonians) since the fall of Assyria (625 B.C.). Here for the first time we find the relative positions of the sun and moon calculated in advance; we find, noted with their precise dates, the conjunctions of the moon with the planets and of the planets with each other, and their situation in the signs of the Zodiac, which here appears definitely established.'

The pictures of men, beasts, and inanimate things, which Babylonians and Egyptians drew on their celestial globes to represent the signs of the Zodiac and other constellations, were taken over, with some changes, by the Greeks. Jastrow, *op. cit.*, p. 230, says 'we have ram, twins, lion, crab, scorpion, archer, and fishes, in Babylonian-Assyrian astrology. In place of the virgin, we have a constellation designated as 'plant-growth'; instead of the bull, a spear; the remainder (of the twelve *Zodia*) are still in doubt.'

in his daily journey from East to West, travelling at a pace not quite so fast as that of the fixed stars, and shifting his course northward or southward according to the season of the year. And any conspicuous star-group, the nightly circuit of which lies within this same zone, and which consequently must, on account of the difference of pace, be in proximity to the sun at some stage in the yearly movement, was qualified for enrolment in the list of stellar gods.¹

Nine lists of these gods are extant in Egyptian documents, ranging in date from the fourteenth to the fourth century B. C.² They include twenty distinct constellations; and as some of these constellations are subdivided into two or more parts, and each part is treated as a distinct stellar god,³ the number of stellar gods whose names are recorded amounts to forty.

The Egyptian doctrine of stellar gods no doubt included some theory as to their influence on terrestrial things. It may have been held that the particular stellar god who rose at sunset,—or rather, who was nearest to the eastern horizon when the stars first became visible after sunset,—was dominant for the time being; and it seems that in some such way as this the year was parted out among the stellar gods, each of them in turn being *chronocrator*⁴ for a space of nearly ten days on the average. Or again, it may have been thought

¹ This agrees in substance with Bouché-Leclercq's explanation, if I understand him rightly. But he is surely mistaken (p. 220) in connecting the theory of stellar gods with the fact that 'les Égyptiens, dès le temps des Pharaons, avaient semé le long de la route diurne et nocturne du Soleil toute espèce de génies, qui lui disputaient pour ainsi dire la maîtrise du temps, de qui il obtenait le passage au moyen de charmes magiques, et qui, lui couché, régnaient enfin à sa place sur le monde'. During a given day and night, the sun traverses a complete circle of the celestial sphere; and during the whole of that day and night,—and indeed, during ten successive days and nights, or something like that number,—he is in company with one and the same stellar god, who travels with him. It would be easier to imagine the stellar gods as successive escorts of the travelling Sun,—each of them taking his turn of duty for ten days and nights together, and then going on ahead and giving place to another who comes up from behind,—than as stationary residents on the Sun's route, who dispute his 'daily and nightly' passage. Daemons who stand fast while the Sun moves in his daily circuit must be daemons of earth, and not of sky.

² There are also some lists of later date. The several lists differ in some details.

³ E. g. in the constellation called *Kenmut*, there is one stellar god named *Point of Kenmut*, and another named *Navel of Kenmut*, as well as one named *Kenmut*. (Is each of these a single star, or a small group of stars?)

⁴ The notion of *χρονουπάτορες*,—i. e. the notion that each division of time is presided over by its own special deity,—was indigenous in Egypt (Bouché-Leclercq, p. 220). One of its many applications has survived in our names of the days of the week, which came from Egypt (Dio Cass. 37. 18). The assignment of the days to the seven planets in a fixed order is due to an artificial combination; but the practice of assigning divisions of time to *chronocratores*, of which this is one of the later instances, must have arisen out of actual observation of the positions of certain heavenly bodies, such as the 'stellar gods', at certain times.

that the issue of events was dependent on the action of the stellar god who rose at or near the critical moment.¹ Such notions, if they already existed in Pharaonic times, would afford a basis on which a system of astrology (i. e. a method of predicting future events from an observed position of the stars) could easily be built up; but there seems to be no evidence that astrology of any sort was practised in Egypt² before the time of the Persian dominion,³ when it was imported from Babylonia.

The development of a more precise astronomy by Greeks and Egyptians together, which began in the fourth century B. C., led to some changes in the doctrine of the stellar gods. The list of these deities was revised; their number was fixed at thirty-six, and a space of exactly ten days was assigned to each.⁴ Moreover, the zodiacal circle having now been accurately determined, and divided into twelve 'Signs' or parts of equal length, corresponding to the twelve months of the year, the further step was taken of assigning to each of the thirty-six stellar gods as his domicile one-third of a sign, i. e. ten of the 360 degrees of the whole circle.

To these thirty-six stellar gods the Greeks gave the name *δεκάνοι*.⁵ The origin of this word is uncertain. It was used also in the sense

¹ When the number of the stellar gods came to be fixed at thirty-six, each of them would in this sense preside over a space of forty minutes in every twenty-four hours.

² F. Boll, *Sphaera*, p. 372: 'Dass die Astrologie im alten Aegypten unbekannt war und erst in späterer Zeit aus Babylonien dorthin kam, ist seit Letronne eine ausgemachte Thatsache.'

³ In the time of Herodotus, astrology was already in existence in Egypt. Hdt. 2. 82: 'The Egyptians have likewise discovered to which of the gods each month and day belongs,' (this is the system of *chronocratores*;) 'and what a man born on a given day will meet with in the course of his life, what will be his manner of death, and what sort of man he will be.' I. e. in the fifth century B. C. there were people in Egypt who held not only that the *chronocrator* in power on the day of a man's birth determines the whole course of his life, but also that this deity works according to fixed laws, and that the laws of his working are known to men, who can thereby predict the future. This is astrology; though it is still a simple and rudimentary kind of astrology that Herodotus describes.

⁴ Thirty-six periods of ten days each make 360 days. The five (or more exactly, 5½) epagomenal days which completed the year were disposed of by some makeshift.

⁵ The word *δεκάνοι* was used in the astrological writings ascribed to Nechepso and Petosiris, and in those of the astrologer Teucer of Babylon. The date of 'Nechepso and Petosiris', the primary authority for all subsequent Graeco-Egyptian astrology,—or at least, the date of one of the books which passed under that name,—has been fixed at about 150 B. C. (Cumont, in *Clio* Bd. IX, Heft 3, 1909; Boll, in *Catal. Codd. Astrolog. Graec.* VII); but the original work may very likely have been subsequently expanded by additions, of various and undeterminable dates, which were ascribed to the same authors. Teucer of Babylon (who, despite his name, must have lived and worked in Egypt,) wrote 'certainly not later than the first century B. C.' (Boll, *Sphaera*, p. 8.) I know of no earlier instance of *δεκάνοι* in the astral sense.

of 'a commander of ten men';¹ and no doubt, when applied to the stellar gods, it was understood to mean 'a chief of ten',² i. e. one who presides over ten days of the year, or ten degrees of the zodiacal circle.³ But its formation is without parallel in Greek; and it seems probable that it was borrowed from some Oriental language, but somewhat altered to assimilate it to the Greek *δέκα*.⁴

The old Egyptian system of stellar gods did not, however, adjust itself easily to the new zodiacal theory; for some of the stars or star-groups included in the list were situated at a considerable distance north or south of the zodiacal circle, so that it was necessary to assume that the stellar god was operative in one place (viz. in a certain subdivision of the Zodiac) while he was visibly present in another. Astronomers in general, and many astrologers, ignored the Decani; Ptolemy, for instance, in his work on astrology (about A. D. 140), pays no attention to them; and those astrologers who made use of them dealt with them in various ways. One school of

¹ *δεκανικός*, signifying a man of a certain military grade, occurs in a Ptolemaic document of 259 B. C. (Grenfell and Hunt, *Hibeh Papyri* P. 1, 1906, n. 96, pp. 266-269). Bouché-Leclercq, *Hist. des Lagides*, IV, p. 48, mentions *δεκανός* or *δεκανικός* as a grade in the Egyptian cavalry, referring to *Tebt. Pap.* n. 251, and *Hibeh Pap.* nn. 30, 81, 90-91, 96, 103. In an Alexandrian inscription of the Roman period, the word *δεκανός* is applied to naval officers (Otto, *Priester und Fempel in hellen. Aeg.*, p. 46); and in the accounts of a temple in the Fayum (*ib.*) there is mention of τὸ *δεκανικὸν τῶν πλοίων*, which appears to be an impost paid to *δεκανοί* who were officers of the river-police.


² Iamblichus, as reported by Proclus in *Tim.* 5. 299 E, spoke of certain οὐράνιοι θεοί whom he called οἱ ἐξ καὶ τριάκοντα δεκαδάρχαι; i. e. he used the word *δεκαδάρχαι* as a substitute for *δεκανοί*.

³ It might be taken to mean 'an officer in command of ten *Liturgi*', if the *Liturgi* were reckoned to be 360 in number. The *Pistis Sophia* comes very near to that reckoning; for it says that there are 365 *Liturgi*. See note on *Exc.* VI. 12.


⁴ As a mere guess, the probability of which it is for experts in Aryan philology to estimate, I would suggest that *δεκανός* may perhaps be a Greek adaptation of a Persian word meaning 'a chief of ten', and used in the special sense of a sergeant of cavalry or mounted police. 'Ten' is *dah* in modern Persian, *dasa* in Avestic; and there is an adjectival termination *-āna* in Avestic (Brugmann, *Comp. Grammar*, Eng. tr. 1891, II, p. 152); so that an early Persian form of the word might be something like *dasānas*. A Persian military term may very well have been introduced into Egypt during the Persian occupation of the country, and may have been retained in use there after the Macedonian conquest; and Alexandrian translators of Egyptian astral writings may have considered it a suitable word to describe these patrolling officers of the heavenly host, who ὡσπερ φύλακες ἀκριβεῖς καὶ ἐπίσκοποι τοῦ παντὸς περιέρχονται τῷ νυκθήμερῳ τὸ πᾶν, and have under them ὑπηρέτας καὶ στρατιώτας to execute their orders (*Exc.* VI. 6 and 12).

The Latin *decānus* is late; it occurs, in the astral sense, in Firmicus Maternus, c. A. D. 340; in the military sense, in Vegetius, A. D. 386; and in the derived sense 'a chief of ten monks' (whence our 'dean'), in Jerome, c. A. D. 400. Manilius (c. A. D. 12) does not use the word; he perhaps once used *decānia* (neut. plur.), in the sense of 'thirds of a zodiacal sign' (4. 298); but the verse is hopelessly corrupt. *Decanus* is not a legitimate formation in Latin; (the words most nearly analogous are *decumanus*, *septimanus*, *tertianus*, &c., which are derived from the ordinals;) it must have been taken over by the Romans from the Greeks.

astrology, which professed to be specially 'Egyptian', retained the Decani as personal deities, each of whom is operative in a particular portion of the Zodiac, three being domiciled in each of the twelve 'Signs'.¹ Other astrologers allowed the personality of the Decani to drop out of sight, and used the term merely to signify subdivisions of the zodiacal circle. Some assigned the thirty-six subdivisions to other astral powers, in substitution for the stellar gods who had been their previous occupants. Manilius has a system peculiar to himself, by which the thirty-six portions of the Zodiac are assigned to the twelve *Zodia* in succession, as follows:—



Others assigned the thirty-six subdivisions of the Zodiac to the seven planets in succession,—or rather, as they expressed it, to the *πρόσωπα* of the planets² (i. e. Decani 'personating' planet-gods, disguised as planets and operating as such, or planet-gods 'personating' Decani),³ thus:—



This last system, in which the decan-subdivisions of the signs were occupied by planetary *πρόσωπα*, had a long and prosperous career, and passed over into Arabic, Persian, and Indian astrology.

But these vagaries of a pseudo-science do not directly concern us here; for they were confined to professed astrologers, and the writers of the religious and philosophic *Hermetica* held astrology in slight esteem.⁴ In the belief of the Egyptians in general, the old national

¹ See Bouché-Leclercq, pp. 229-235 on certain astrological systems described by Firmicus (A. D. 340) and Hephaestion (A. D. 379-395).

² This system also is described by Firmicus. The *πρόσωπα* seem to have been already known to Teucer, first century B. C. (Bouché-Leclercq, p. 224, n. 3).

³ *Catal. Astrol. Gr., Flor.* p. 16: Περὶ τῶν λς' δεκανῶν καὶ τῶν παρατελλόντων αὐτοῖς, καὶ τίνος ἀστέρος (i. e. planet) ἕκαστος (sc. δεκανός) πρόσωπον φέρει. *Ib.* p. 18: Περὶ τῶν προσώπων ἃ ἐπέχουσιν οἱ ζ' ἀστέρες ἐν τοῖς τῶν ζῳδίων δεκανοῖς.

⁴ There were of course many astrological writings which bore the name of Hermes Trismegistus; but they had little in common with the writings with which we are dealing.

doctrine of stellar gods lived on into the Hellenistic age, little affected by the more elaborate systems of astrological experts; and it is on that indigenous doctrine that the conception of the Decans as expounded in *Exc.* VI is based.

The notions of Egyptian priests of the Hellenistic period concerning the stellar gods whom the Greeks called *δεκανοί* are illustrated by an inscription of Ombos, dated 145-117 B. C. (Bouché-Leclercq, p. 222; Brugsch *Thes. Inscr. Aeg.* I, p. 135): 'The stellar gods shine after the sun. They move in a circle, succeeding one another; they appear after sunset, at their appointed times, according to the seasons. O ye souls of the stars of the gods, who rise to promise blessings, cause Ptolemy, son of the Sun, to rise, even as you rise yourselves.' A similar inscription at Tentyra (Brugsch *ib.* p. 138) speaks of 'the sublime and great and very great gods, the protecting stars who follow Sothis in the sky, the rising stars who rise in the eastern sky, who grant their protection to the deities of Tentyra, the messengers of her Majesty (Isis-Hathor), who exterminate all that act against their will, and bestow their protection on the city of Tentyra.' From the stress laid on the 'rising' of these deities 'after sunset', it may perhaps be inferred that the stellar god who rose first after sunset was *chronocrator* for the time being, and that in this way each of them in turn was dominant for ten days. It is clear that the beings invoked in these inscriptions are not merely items in an astronomical system, but are personal and potent gods, who act on earthly things according to their will.

The Egyptian, Coptic, and Greek names of the Decani are given by Brugsch, *op. cit.*, p. 166. Transliterations of these native names occur in Greek and Latin astrological writings. The first Decanus of the sign Cancer is *Sopdet* (the 'star of Isis') = Σώθις, the dog-star. Figures of these gods in bodily form, as imagined by Egyptian priests in the first century A. D., are depicted in the carvings of the temple at Tentyra.¹ Portraits of them in Graeco-Roman style may be seen in the 'Bianchini Planisphere' (Boll, *Sphaera*, ch. 12 and Taf. V), a marble tablet found at Rome, and assigned to the second century A. D. The outer ring of the circular diagram engraved on that tablet contained, when complete, figures of the thirty-six Decani in human form; and above the head of each

¹ Brugsch, *Thes.* I; Boll, *Sphaera*, ch. 10 and Taf. II-IV. The date of these carvings seems to be settled beyond doubt; the circular 'Zodiacus' is of the time of Augustus, and the rectangular 'Zodiacus', of the time of Nero.

Decanus is placed the corresponding planetary πρόσωπον, in the form of the bust of a planet-god.

In the popular beliefs of Egypt in the Graeco-Roman period, various departments of the physical world were thought to be specially subject to the influences of the Decani; and the established method of distributing divisions of *time* among the members of a class of astral deities,—Decans, Zodia, or Planets, as the case might be,—was imitated in other matters also. Thus, a document entitled Τοῦ Ἑρμοῦ πρὸς Ἀσκληπιὸν ἢ λεγομένη Ἱερὰ βίβλος (Pitra, *Anal. sacra* 5. 2, pp. 284–290) assigns to each of the Decans (here represented by the planetary πρόσωπα under which the original stellar gods are disguised) a particular kind of precious stone, and a particular kind of plant; the magic properties of the stone or plant being supposed to be due to the operation of the astral deity to whom it is assigned. And again, the human body was parted out among the Decans, each of whom was supposed to preside over one particular organ or member, and to be prepared to heal disease in it when appealed to in due form. A system of this kind was known to Celsus, c. A. D. 180 (Origen c. *Cels.* 8. 58): ὅτι μὴν ἐν τοῖσδε μέχρη τῶν ἐλαχίστων ἐστὶν ὅτῳ δέδοται ἐξουσία, μάθοι τις ἂν ἐξ ὧν Αἰγύπτιοι λέγουσιν, ὅτι ἄρα τοῦ ἀνθρώπου τὸ σῶμα ἐξ καὶ τριάκοντα διειληφότες δαίμονες, ἢ θεοὶ τινες αἰθέριοι, εἰς τοσαῦτα μέρη νεμεμημένοι, (οἱ δὲ καὶ πολὺ πλείους λέγουσιν),¹ ἄλλο ἄλλο τι αὐτοῦ νέμειν ἐπιτέτακται. καὶ τῶν δαιμόνων ἴσασι τὰ ὀνόματα ἐπιχωρίῳ φωνῇ, ὥσπερ Χνουμήν, καὶ Χναχουμήν, καὶ Κνάτ, καὶ Σικάτ, καὶ Βιού, καὶ Ἑρού, καὶ Ἑρεβιού, καὶ Ῥαμανόρ, καὶ Ῥειανόρ,² ὅσα τε ἄλλα τῇ ἑαυτῶν γλώσσει ὀνομάζουσι· καὶ δὴ ἐπικαλοῦντες αὐτοὺς ἰῶνται τῶν μερῶν τὰ παθήματα. The ‘daemons or aetherial gods’ of whom Celsus speaks are the Egyptian Decans; though he does not seem to have been aware that they were stars or star-groups. He must have met with some book in which the human body was divided into thirty-six parts, and each part was assigned to its special Decan, who, when invoked by name, would heal disease in it. The outlandish forms of the Egyptian god-names were

¹ The ‘much more numerous’ deities among whom some people distributed the parts of the body were probably the Liturgi. Cf. *Pistis Sophia*, cap. 132, C. Schmidt, p. 224, where it is said of the 365 Liturgi by whom the human body is fashioned in the womb that ‘each of them fashions one member (μέλος)’.

² The corresponding Egyptian names in Bouché-Leclercq’s list of Decani (p. 232 f.) are *Knum*, *char-knum*, *Snat*, *Si-ket*, *Biu*, *Arat*, *Hre-ua* (according to Boll, *Sphaera*, p. 177, *Hri-ib-ua* or *Her-ab-ua*), *Remen-hare*.

doubtless thought, by the Greeks who used them, to add a magic efficacy to the prayer.

Diodorus, 2. 30. 6, in his description of the astral doctrine of 'the Chaldaeans in Babylon', speaks of certain stellar gods called *βουλαῖοι θεοί*, in whom we may recognize the Egyptian Decani under another name. The Chaldaeans, he says, ascribe supreme importance to the five planet-stars, which they call *ἐρμηνεῖς* (i. e. interpreters of the purposes of the gods). ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν τούτων φορὰν λέγουσι τετάρχαι τριάκοντα (ξξ *add.* Letronne) ἀστέρας, οὓς προσαγορεύουσι βουλαίους θεούς· τούτων δὲ τοὺς μὲν ἡμίσεις τοὺς ὑπὲρ γῆν τόπους ἐφορᾶν, τοὺς δ' ἡμίσεις τοὺς ὑπὸ [τὴν] γῆν, τὰ κατ' ἀνθρώπους ἐπισκοποῦντας¹ ἅμα καὶ τὰ κατὰ τὸν οὐρανὸν συμβαίοντα· διὰ δ' ἡμερῶν δέκα πέμπεσθαι τῶν μὲν ἄνω πρὸς τοὺς κάτω καθάπερ ἄγγελον ἕνα τῶν ἀστέρων, τῶν δ' ὑπὸ γῆν πρὸς τοὺς ἄνω πάλιν ὁμοίως ἕνα. Over these (thirty-six) gods preside (*κυρίους εἶναι φασι*) twelve other gods, viz. the twelve Signs of the Zodiac.

The statement that the *βουλαῖοι θεοί* 'are posted *below* the course of the planets' must be an error, either of Diodorus himself or of the copyists. The true account may have been that these stellar gods are posted in the outermost sphere, or (as in *Exc.* VI) immediately below it, but are *subject* or *subordinate* to the planets. If so, the authority followed by Diodorus differed in this respect from the writer of *Exc.* VI (who makes the planets subordinate to the Decani), and agreed more nearly with the doctrine of planetary *πρόσωπα* operative in the Decan-divisions of the Zodiac.

According to the MSS., the number of the 'Counsellors' is thirty. But we are afterwards told that 'every ten days one of those above is sent as a messenger to those below' (i. e. disappears), 'and one of those below the earth is sent as a messenger to those above' (i. e. reappears); and it clearly follows from this that their number must be equal to the number of ten-day periods in the year, i. e. that it must be thirty-six,² and consequently, that ξξ must be inserted after *τριάκοντα*.³ The 'messenger sent to those below the earth' must be the stellar god who approaches the sun so

¹ In *Exc.* VI. 6, the Decani are called *ἐπίσκοποι τοῦ παντός*.

² The year may be reckoned for this purpose at 360 days, the five additional days being disregarded.

³ Boll, *Sphaera*, p. 337, doubts this, and considers it at least equally probable that thirty (the *λαμπροὶ ἀστέρες*) is the right number, and that *δέκα* is a mistake for *δάδεκα*. ($30 \times 12 = 360$.) But the number thirty-six is confirmed by the fact that the *βουλαῖοι θεοί* are said to be subject to the twelve *Zodia*. Thirty servants could not be assigned to twelve masters by any symmetrical arrangement.

closely as to become invisible; and if there were thirty-six of them, following one another along the sun's path, and occupying equal spaces, one would thus disappear every ten days. The 'messenger sent from below' is the stellar god who becomes visible again after having been for a time obscured by the sun's light.

'Half of them watch over the regions above the earth, and the other half, the regions below the earth'; i. e. *at any given moment of the night*, half of the stellar gods are above the horizon, and the other half below it. But every forty minutes, one of them sets in the west, and another rises in the east; so that in the course of the night, all of them are at some time visible, except the few (some six at most) who are nearest to the sun during the current decad. This must have been the view of Diodorus' informant; though it may be doubted whether Diodorus himself clearly understood it.

The gods of the twelve zodiacal Signs are *κῆρυες* of the thirty-six 'Counsellors'. This agrees with the Graeco-Egyptian method of distributing the Decans among the Signs, three to each; though it differs from the doctrine of *Exc. VI*, according to which the Decani are masters of all other astral powers.

On the whole, the 'Chaldaean' doctrine of *βουλαῖοι θεοί* described by Diodorus so closely resembles the Graeco-Egyptian doctrine of Decani, that the two must certainly be connected. There were in the time of Diodorus two schools of astrology, one called 'Egyptian', and the other 'Chaldaean'. Both systems were ultimately based on beliefs and practices which had originated in Babylonia, but had been imported from Babylonia into Egypt; both alike had been developed and elaborated in Ptolemaic Egypt, and were in reality Graeco-Egyptian. They agreed in their main principles, and differed only in details,—chiefly, it seems, in the fact that astrologers of the 'Chaldaean' school attached more importance to the planets, whereas those of the 'Egyptian' school attached more importance to the Zodiac and its subdivisions. Now Diodorus was in Egypt in 20 B. C.; and he probably got his account of the Chaldaean astral system from an astrologer of the 'Chaldaean' school in Egypt. But even if he got it directly or indirectly from Babylonia, it might none the less include Egyptian elements; for by his time the Graeco-Egyptian astrology had spread to other countries, and the writings of 'Nechepso and Petosiris' were doubtless studied in Babylonia as well as in Egypt.

There is no reason then to be surprised at finding the Egyptian Decani included, under the name of *βουλαῖοι θεοί*, in a professedly 'Chaldaean' system of this period; and the mention of these deities by Diodorus is no proof that the conception of the Decani was indigenous in Babylonia. On the other hand, there is evidence that this conception, or at least something out of which it could be evolved without any large alteration, had existed from ancient times in Egypt.

§ 1. ἐν τοῖς ἔμπροσθεν γενικοῖς λόγοις. Either *ἔμπροσθεν* or *γενικοῖς* seems superfluous. If *γενικοῖς* is sound, it is to be presumed that *Exc. VI* is one of the *διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι*.

ὁ κυριώτατος πάντων λόγος καὶ κορυφαιώτατος οὗτος (αὐτὸς MS.) ἂν εἴη. Cf. *Corr.* XVI. 1 a: μέγαν σοι (τοῦτον) τὸν λόγον . . . διεπεμψάμην, πάντων τῶν ἄλλων ὡςπερ κορυφὴν καὶ ὑπόμνημα. Compare also the first sentence of *Ascl. Lat.*, and the title *Τέλειος λόγος* borne by the Greek original of *Ascl. Lat.*


σὺ (εὐ MS.) δὲ νῦν [οὕτως]. Cf. *Corr.* I. 20: οὐκ ἔφην σοι νοεῖν;— οὕτως may have come either from the preceding οὗτος, or from the following οὕτως βούλομαι σε νοεῖν.

§ 3. (Ἐ)φαμεν . . . περιεκτικὸν τῶν ἀπάντων εἶναι σῶμα. This σῶμα is the outermost sphere.

ὑπὸ δὲ τὸν κύκλον τοῦ σώματος τούτου[s] τετάχθαι τοὺς τριάκοντα ἔξ δεκανοὺς, μέσους τοῦ (τοῦ) παντὸς κύκλου (καὶ) τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ. The circle of the *περιεκτικὸν σῶμα* could not be called ὁ πᾶς κύκλος, 'the whole circle'; but it might be called ὁ τοῦ παντὸς κύκλος, 'the circle of the universe'. I have therefore written τοῦ (τοῦ) παντὸς κύκλου.

According to the cosmology popularized by the Stoics, and commonly accepted in the time of the Roman empire, all the fixed stars are at the same distance from the earth, and the sphere in which they are situated is the outermost sphere of the universe. If that view were adopted, it would follow that the Zodiac (a band or zone consisting of twelve groups of fixed stars) and the Decans (fixed stars or star-groups in or near the Zodiac) are situated in that same sphere. But the writer of *Exc. VI* conceives the structure of the universe differently. According to him, there is an outermost sphere (τὸ περιεκτικὸν τῶν ἀπάντων σῶμα); there is a 'zodiacal circle', which is not situated in the outermost sphere, but is at some distance below it (i. e. nearer to the earth); and the Decans float in aether below the outermost sphere and above the Zodiac. His description appears to be based on a diagram drawn on the flat; this may

account for the fact that, in speaking of the outermost sphere, he uses the word *κύκλος*, and not *σφαῖρα*. The diagram which he had before him must have represented a section of the universe in the plane of the zodiacal circle, and must have been something like that which is here appended. He does not mention the obliquity of the zodiac, and there is nothing to show that he distinguished the 'zodiacal circle' from the equator.



A, circle of the outermost sphere
 B, the 36 Decans
 C, circle of the Zodiac
 DE, circles of the seven planets
 F, the earth

In this paragraph the writer indicates the positions of two classes of fixed stars, viz. (1) the thirty-six Decans, and (2) the stars of which the Zodiac is composed, but says nothing about the position of the rest of the fixed stars. Where did he suppose the rest of them to be situated? They might conceivably be located (1) in the outermost sphere, or (2) in the inner sphere in which the Zodiac lies, or (3) together with the Decans, in the space between those two spheres. In § 12, we are told that those fixed stars which are called *Liturgi φέρονται ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι αἰωρούμενοι*, i. e. doubtless in the same inter-

mediate space in which the Decans are situated; and it is probable that the writer would have said the same of the 'nameless stars' spoken of in § 14. His view then appears to be that the stars of the Zodiac (and possibly some other star-groups) are fixed in a certain inner sphere, and that the Decani and Liturgi, and other fixed stars also, float in aether in the space between that sphere and the outermost sphere; but that no stars are situated in the outermost sphere.

As to the position of the Great Bear (§ 13), we are told only that it is situated *κατὰ μέσον τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ*, i. e. near the axis of heaven; and as nothing is said about its distance from the earth, we do not know whether the writer located it in the same inner sphere as the Zodiac, or in the space between the two spheres.

In § 17, it seems to be implied that the fixed stars in general are divided into two classes, called respectively *ἀστέρες* and *ἄστρα*, and that the *ἀστέρες* float free (*ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ αἰωρούμενοι*), presumably in that intermediate space in which the Decans float, whereas the *ἄστρα* are fixed in a celestial sphere (*ἐγκείμενα ἐν τῷ σώματι τοῦ οὐρανοῦ*), i. e. presumably in that inner sphere in which the Zodiac lies. But there is reason to think that § 17 was not written by the author of the *libellus*.

§ 4. (. . .) «*συμφερομένους τοῖς πλάνησι καὶ ἰσοδυναμῆν τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλάξ τοῖς ἑπτὰ*»¹. In the preceding clauses, the writer has been speaking of the *positions* of the heavenly bodies; he here goes on to speak of their *movements*. This distinct topic ought to be introduced by a fresh sentence; and it is most likely that something has been lost before *συμφερομένους*.

The words *συμφερομένους . . . τοῖς ἑπτὰ* are unintelligible. According to the MS., the writer says that the Decans move together with the planets (*συμφερομένους τοῖς πλάνησι*). But he cannot have said that.¹ The *πλάνητες* ('wanderers') are so called just because their movements *differ* from the movement of the fixed stars, among which the Decans are included. Perhaps *τοῖς πλάνησι* may be a misplaced doublet of *τοῖς ἑπτὰ* below. If we assume that *καὶ ἰσοδυναμῆν*, as well as *τοῖς πλάνησι*, has been inserted here by error, we get the reading *συμφερομένους τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ*. This reading is at any rate less obviously impossible than that of the MS. But what is meant by *ἡ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ*? These words would most

¹ Bouché-Leclercq, *Astrol. gr.*, p. 233, n. 3, alters *τοῖς πλάνησι* into *τοῖς ἀπλανέσι*. But as the Decans are themselves *ἀπλανεῖς ἀστέρες*, we should rather have expected *τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀπλανέσι*.

naturally mean the movement of the outermost sphere (cf. τοῦ <τοῦ> παντὸς κύκλου in §§ 3 and 4); but perhaps they might also be taken to mean the movement of the fixed stars. It might be said with truth that the Decans (being themselves fixed stars) move with the same velocity as the other fixed stars. Whether the writer held that the outermost sphere (which is invisible) moves with the same angular velocity as the fixed stars (which are situated below it), we do not know; on that subject he tells us only that the outermost sphere moves more swiftly than the planets, and that it would move still more swiftly than it does, if it were not held back by the Decans.

καὶ ἰσοδυναμεῖν [τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ] κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλάξ τοῖς ἑπτὰ. Taken in connexion with the context, these words are inexplicable; but apart from the context, it is possible to make sense of them, if we cut out τῇ τοῦ παντὸς φορᾷ, and write καὶ ἰσοδυναμεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλάξ τοῖς ἑπτὰ (or καὶ τοῖς πλάνησιν ἰσοδυναμεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλάξ). The Decans 'have equal power with the planets by way of interchange'; that is, they take on themselves the functions which primarily belong to the planets; they act on sublunar things as if they were planets. This may be taken as referring to the astrological doctrine of planetary πρόσωπα.

The statement that the Decans 'have equal power with the planets' cannot however have been written by the author of *Exc. VI*; for it is contradicted in § 9, where we are told that the planets are subject to the Decans. Moreover, it would be out of place in a passage in which the writer is speaking only of the *movements* of the heavenly bodies, and not of their influence on terrestrial things, with which he first begins to deal in § 7. It seems then that καὶ ἰσοδυναμεῖν κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλάξ τοῖς ἑπτὰ must be a marginal note written by some one who was thinking of the πρόσωπα.

κατὰ τὸ ἐναλλάξ is equivalent to κατ' ἐναλλαγῆν, and means either 'alternately' or 'interchangeably'.¹

καὶ τὸ μὲν περιεκτικὸν ἐπέχειν σῶμα, . . . ἐπισπεύδειν δὲ τοὺς ἑπτὰ ἄλλους κύκλους. The 'seven other circles' are the orbits of the seven planets; but the orbit of each planet is regarded as a sort of revolving wheel-rim in which the planet is fixed, and by which the planet is carried round. The writer does not tell us where

¹ Liddell and Scott give 'crosswise' as one of the meanings of ἐναλλάξ, referring to *Ar. Nub.* 983, οὐδ' ἴσχειν τὴν πῶδ' ἐναλλάξ. But the word cannot mean 'at an inclination to another thing', and cannot be intended to refer to the oblique angle at which the 'zodiacal circle' or ecliptic cuts the equator.

the planets are located; (that must have been explained in the earlier dialogue to which he refers in § 2;) but it is to be presumed that they move in seven concentric circles situated between the 'zodiacal circle' and the earth.

He knows that the planets travel round the earth more slowly than the fixed stars do; and he assumes (on what grounds, I do not know,) that the outermost sphere moves more swiftly than the planets,—perhaps with the same angular velocity as the fixed stars below it. The Decans, who are (subject to the supreme God) the rulers of the whole universe, exert a controlling influence both on the movement of the outermost sphere above them and on the movements of the planets below them, restraining the former, and urging on the latter.

ἔσχατον γὰρ ἂν ἦν [ἐν] (τῷ τάχει) τῆς φορᾶς (τῇ φορᾷ MS.) αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτὸ ὄν (ἐν MS.) [τῷ πάσχειν]. The meaning must be, 'the outermost sphere would move with extreme velocity if it were left to itself', i. e. if it were not retarded by the action of the Decans. But to express this meaning, it seems necessary to alter ἐν τῇ φορᾷ into τῷ τάχει τῆς φορᾶς. The meaningless τῷ πάσχειν of the MS. may be a misplaced corruption of τῷ τάχει.

[ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνάγκη] [αὐτοὺς κινεῖσθαι καὶ τοῦ παντός]. αὐτοὺς . . . παντός has probably come by duplication from (αὐτοὺς) κινεῖσθαι τοῦ (τοῦ) παντός κύκλου above. I can make nothing of ὥσπερ οὖν ἀνάγκη.

(§ 13. ὑπὸ δὲ τούτους ἐστὶν ἡ καλουμένη ἄρκτος κ.τ.λ.) This section is certainly out of place where it stands in the MSS., between an account of the Liturgi (§ 12) and a mention of the unnamed stars (§ 14). If it formed part of the document at all, the most suitable position for it seems to be that in which I have placed it.

It deals with the movements of the heavenly bodies, which is the topic discussed in § 4. The Decans control those movements; and in discharging this function, they employ the Bear as their instrument.

κατὰ μέσον τοῦ ζῳδιακοῦ. The Bear is situated near the North Pole, round which it revolves at a short distance; and the North Pole is situated 'over against the middle of the zodiacal circle'. That is to say, the North Pole is at the apex of a cone, the base of which is the zodiacal circle. (The obliquity of the ecliptic is ignored; or in other words, the zodiacal circle is identified with

the equator.) The Decans are ranged in an outer circle concentric with the zodiacal circle, and in the same plane with it; the Bear is therefore centrally situated with respect to the Decans, though not in the same plane with them; it is approximately equidistant from all of them. ὑπὸ τούτους means 'subject to the Decans', not 'situated below them in space'.

ἔχουσα ἀντίζυγον ἐτέραν ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς. The ἐτέρα (ἄρκτος) is the Little Bear. In the *Planisphaerium* reproduced 'aus Vaticanus gr. 1087' in Boll, *Sphaera*, Tafel I, the two Bears are depicted moving round the Pole on opposite sides of it, and are so placed that, if we assume the Great Bear to be walking on level ground, the Little Bear appears to be vertically above the Great Bear (ὑπὲρ κεφαλῆς), with back downward and feet upward.

ταύτης [μὲν] ἢ ἐνέργειά ἐστι καθάπερ ἄξονος, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Corp.* II, 7, τὰς γὰρ ἄρκτους ταύτας κ.τ.λ., and the passages in the Mithraic *Apathanatismos* ('*Mithrasliturgie*') which are quoted in vol. ii, p. 97.

In a magic incantation (*Par. mag. Par.* i. 1279), the heading of which is ἀρκτικῆ (sc. πρᾶξις) πάντα ποιούσα, the Great Bear is invoked thus: ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε τὴν μεγίστην δύναμιν τὴν ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ (ἄλλοι τὴν ἐν τῇ ἄρκτῳ) ὑπὸ κυρίου θεοῦ τεταγμένην ἐπὶ τῷ στρέφειν κραταιᾷ χειρὶ τὸν ἱερὸν πόλον.¹ *Ib.* 1301: ἄρκτη, θεὰ μεγίστη, ἄρχουσα οὐρανοῦ, βασιλεύουσα πόλον, ἀστέρων ὑπερτάτη, καλλιφεγγή (-γῆς?) θεά, στοιχείον ἀφθαρτον, σύστημα τοῦ παντός, πανφεγγῆς ἁρμονία (τοῦ) τῶν ὄλων αἰηουῶ πλινθίου,² ἢ ἐπὶ τοῦ πόλου ἐφεστῶσα, ἦν ὁ κύριος θεὸς ἔταξε κραταιᾷ χειρὶ στρέφειν τὸν ἱερὸν πόλον.

ἐνεργούσης δὲ τὴν (τοῦ) ζψ(ο)φόρου κύκλου (περιφοράν). Is the Bear situated in the outermost sphere, or in the inner sphere in which the zodiacal circle lies, or (like the Decans) in the space between those two spheres? In any case, the meaning is that the Bear, working in subordination to the Decans, moves the framework in which the fixed stars are contained, and makes it rotate. The writer appears to hold that the constellations of the Zodiac, though not all the fixed stars, are fastened to this framework, and that even those stars which are not fastened to it move together with it.

¹ This appears to be based on a passage in iambic metre: σὲ τὴν μεγίστην τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ — | — | — — — — — ὑπὸ θεοῦ τεταγμένην | στρέφειν κραταιᾷ χειρὶ τὸν ἱερὸν πόλον.

² This probably means 'bright-shining coadjustment of the ordered group of the seven planets'. The seven vowels were often used to represent the seven planets; and the seven stars of the Bear are, I think, here identified with the seven planets, or assumed to be under the charge of the same star-gods; they are, so to speak, πρῶσωπα of the planets.

(. . .) παραδιδούσα τὸ πᾶν τοῦτο ἀπὸ μὲν [τῆς] νυκτὸς ἡμέρα, ἀπὸ (δ') ἡμέρας νυκτί. What was the substantive to which παραδιδούσα belonged? Wachsmuth writes παραδιδούσα(ν), making the participle agree with τὴν τοῦ ζωοφόρου κύκλου (περιφορᾶν). But that is not quite satisfactory. The immediate cause of the change from night to day and from day to night is, not the movement of the Zodiac, but the diurnal movement of the sun. It might be said that the diurnal [movement of the sun is caused by the movement of the Zodiac, which carries the sun along with it (the retardation of the sun, which is too slight to be perceptible from day to day, being neglected); but that could hardly be tacitly assumed. It is probable therefore that a passage dealing with the movement of the sun (and the other planets) has been lost before παραδιδούσα.

§ 6. οὔτε γὰρ ἐπεχόμενοι τὸν δρόμον στηρίζουσιν οὔτε κωλυόμενοι ἀναποδίζουσιν. Planets sometimes 'stand still' and 'go backward'; (see note on *Ascl. Lat.* I. 13, 'stationes praefinitas cursu(um)que commutationes';) but none of the fixed stars are subject to these πάθη. In this respect then the Decans differ from the planets alone, and not from 'the other stars' in general; and for that reason, something like (ἄπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ πλάνητες) ought to follow after ἀναποδίζουσιν.

ἀλλ' οὐδὲ μὴν ἔντὸς τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἡλίου σκέπονται, ἄπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄλλοι ἀστέρες. The Decans 'are not hidden (?) by the light of the sun, as the other stars are'. There must be some blunder here. No one could be so blind to obvious facts as to suppose that there are thirty-six stars or star-groups which remain visible in full daylight. The writer ought to have mentioned some πάθος from which the Decans are exempt, but to which other fixed stars are subject; but what could that πάθος be? Possibly his view may have been that the stars in general act on things below only while they are visible, and that their operation is suspended during the daylight, but that the Decans, unlike the other stars, act at all times, whether they are visible or not. That might be expressed by writing something like οὐδὲ μὴν ἔντὸς τοῦ φωτὸς τοῦ ἡλίου σκεπόμενοι (ἀποστεροῦνται τῆς δυνάμεως), ὅπερ πάσχουσιν οἱ ἄλλοι ἀστέρες.

περιέ(ρ)χονται τῷ νυχθημέρῳ τὸ πᾶν. Each of the Decans, in the course of twenty-four hours, traverses a complete circle parallel to and not far distant from the equator.

§ 8. τῶν (μὲν γὰρ) καθολικῶς πάντων συμβαινόντων ἢ ἐνέργεια (τῆ

ἐνεργεία MSS.) ἀπὸ τούτων ἐστίν. Events which affect men in the mass are produced by the immediate action of the Decans. It is to be inferred from § 9 that the writer added that events which befall an individual man are produced by the action of the planets; but the passage containing the latter statement, which must have followed § 8 and preceded § 9, has disappeared.

§ 9. [ἔτι τε πρὸς τούτοις νόησον]. This appears to be a wrongly placed doublet of ἔτι δὲ πρὸς τούτοις (ἄλλο) νόησον in § 11 *in*it.

οὐ νοεῖς καὶ εἰς ἡμᾶς τὴν (τινα MSS.) ἐκείνων φθάνειν ἐνέργειαν, ἧτοι ὅπ' (υἰεῖς F) αὐτῶν ἢ δι' ἐκείνων (ἐνεργουμένην); Since the planets are subject to the Decans, even those events of which the planets are the immediate authors (viz. those which befall this or that man as an individual) result from the working of the Decans. In such events then, the Decans work on us through the planets, which they employ as their instruments.

«§ 11.» καὶ εἰς τὴν γῆν σπερματίζουσιν [] (ἐνεργείας) τινὰς (κ. ε. τ. γ. σπ. ἄς καλοῦσι τάνας MSS.) . . . (ἄς) «καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ δαίμονας»). τάνας is not Greek. It might conceivably be a transliteration of some Egyptian word; but it is more likely that the reading of the MSS. is a corruption of something written in good Greek. The context suggests that the Hermetist is here speaking of daemons; and I have accordingly written ἐνεργείας τινὰς . . . ἄς καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ δαίμονας. The so-called 'daemons' are, as we are told in § 10, ἐνέργειαι of the Decans. We may suppose that a copyist, having τινὰς τὰς μὲν before him, overlooked τινὰς, and began to write τὰς μὲν, but having got as far as τα, noticed and corrected his mistake, and thus produced τανας; and that a later transcriber retained the α and omitted the ι.

The words καὶ εἰς τὴν γῆν seem intended to contrast this mode of action of the Decans with their action on the planets. The 'daemons' operate only in the sublunar world.

§ 10. Τίς (δ' ἂν) αὐτοῖς εἶη, ὦ πάτερ, ὁ τοῦ σώματος τύπος; In the traditional text, αὐτοῖς refers to the beings spoken of in § 9, viz. the Decans. But Tat could have no reason for asking 'what is the bodily shape of the Decans?' The Decans are stars or star-groups; their bodies are visible to us, and it was commonly taken as a known fact that the bodies of all stars are spherical. On the other hand, the question 'what is the bodily shape of the daemons?' is one that might well be asked; and we find Hermes speaking of the bodies of daemons in his reply. It may be considered certain then that αὐτοῖς

means τοῖς δαίμοσιν, and consequently, that § 10 was preceded by some mention of daemons. And as we have concluded that daemons were spoken of in § 11, the best way to make sense of the passage is to put § 11 before § 10.

[τούτους οὖν] [[καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ δαίμονας.]] I assume that the words καλοῦσιν οἱ πολλοὶ δαίμονας were wrongly transposed to this place from the end of § 11, and that, after the transposition had taken place, τούτους οὖν was inserted by way of an endeavour to make sense.

[οὐδὲ γὰρ ἴδιόν τι ἔστι γένος τὸ τῶν δαιμόνων.] The reply of Hermes to Tat's question cannot have begun with these words. But if we put them after ὡσπερ ἡμεῖς, and write ἔχουσι and κινοῦνται in place of ἔχοντες and κινούμενοι, we get a perfectly satisfactory sense. 'What is the bodily shape of the so-called daemons?' 'They have no bodies, nor have they souls; (<<for they are not a distinct race of living beings,>> they are merely forces put in action by the Decans.) (As to ἐνέργειαι εἰσι, cf. *Corr.* XVI. 13: δαίμονος γὰρ οὐσία ἐνέργεια.)

The writer rejects the doctrine, taught by the author of *Corr.* XVI and some of the other Hermetists, that physical processes in the sublunar world are worked by personal agents called daemons. The only personal agents (other than men and the supreme God) that he recognizes are the star-gods; and he refuses to regard as persons the ἐνέργειαι put forth by the star-gods. His attitude in this respect resembles that of the writer of *Ex.* III.

It is not clear how those ἐνέργειαι 'which men call daemons' are to be distinguished from the other ἐνέργειαι which have been spoken of in §§ 8 and 9. We have been told that there are καθολικαὶ ἐνέργειαι, in which the Decans work on the sublunar world directly and immediately, and (εἰδικαὶ) ἐνέργειαι, in which they work by means of the planets. It would seem that the ἐνέργειαι which men call daemons must be another sort of εἰδικαὶ ἐνέργειαι; but what sort? The effects of the ἐνέργειαι previously spoken of seem to be events in the external world, by which men are affected only from without; perhaps then the daemon-ἐνέργειαι may be forces which act directly and immediately on the man's own body, and through his body, on his soul also, thus influencing his will and actions. On the operation of daemons within the human soul, see *Corr.* IX. 3.

§ 12. ἔτι καὶ (ἄλλοι) ἐν οὐρανῷ φερόμενοι ἀστέρες ἰδὲ αὐτοῖς, (οἱ καλούμενοι) [ὑπο]λειτουργ(οί), οὓς καὶ ὑπηρέτας καὶ στρατιώτας ἔχουσιν. γεννῶσιν is meaningless, and must have been wrongly

substituted for some other verb, such as ἀκολουθοῦσιν or πειθαρχοῦσιν. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

The word ὑπολειτουργοί does not occur elsewhere; and the true reading is doubtless λειτουργοί. (ὑπο may have resulted from the blunder of a copyist who began to write ὑπηρέται here.) λειτουργοί was a term used to denote certain stars or star-gods subordinate to the Decans. On the Liturgi, see Bouché-Leclercq *Astr. gr.* p. 217. As to their number, authorities differ. According to Martianus Capella 2. 200, there are seven Liturgi to each Sign of the Zodiac, i. e. eighty-four in all.¹ According to a system mentioned by Firmicus Maternus, there are three Liturgi to each Decan, i. e. nine to each Sign, and 108 in all.² In the *Pistis Sophia* (see C. Schmidt, *Kopt.-gnost. Schriften* I, index, s. v. λειτουργός), we are told that there are 365 Liturgi (i. e. one for each day of the year), and that they are the agents by whom the human body is fashioned in the womb, and by whom the process of incarnating human souls is carried out.

Are the Liturgi of a given Decan identical with the παρανατέλλοντες of that Decan? (Cf. the title Περὶ τῶν λς' δεκανῶν καὶ τῶν παρανατέλλοντων αὐτοῖς, *Cat. Cod. Astrol. gr., Flor.* p. 16.) The παρανατέλλοντες are conspicuous stars, situated in any part of the celestial sphere north or south of the Zodiac, which rise simultaneously with a given star in the Zodiac, or with a given subdivision of the Zodiac. It would be natural to regard the stars which rise simultaneously with a Decan as subordinates employed in executing his commands.

ἐξ ὧν αἱ (καὶ MSS.) κατὰ τὰς χώρας φθοραὶ γίνονται τῶν ἄλλων ἐμφύχων [ζώων]. The writer's view appears to be that the Liturgi execute the will of the Decans by acting on beasts, and thereby *indirectly* affecting the interests of men. A cattle-plague and a swarm of locusts would be instances of the action of the Liturgi. These are ἀποτελέσματα καθολικά, and in that respect correspond to the λιμοί, λοιμοί, &c., which are attributed to the Decans in § 8. It seems strange that the working of the Liturgi should be so narrowly limited; but if the writer ascribed any other function to them, the passage in which he did so has been lost.

It is to be noted that both the Decans and the Liturgi are thought

¹ Those who reckoned them thus can hardly have connected them closely with the Decans; for the seven Liturgi could not be symmetrically distributed among the three Decans of the Sign. The number seven suggests rather that these people considered them to be subordinates of the Planets.

² Firm. Mat. *Math.* 2. 4. 4: 'Quidam . . . terna numina decanis singulis applicarunt, quos munifices appellandos esse voluerunt, id est liturgos, ita ut per signa singula novem possint munifices inveniri, ut ternis munificibus decani singuli praeferantur.'

of chiefly, if not solely, as maleficent. It is true that in § 11 the *daemon-ἐνέργειαι* of the Decans are said to be in part *σωτήριοι*, as well as in part *δλεθριώταται*; but the instances given of the *καθολικά ἐνεργήματα* of Decans and Liturgi are calamities. The stars were held to be instruments of *εἰμαρμένη*; and it was commonly thought that *εἰμαρμένη* is a maleficent power, and that the salvation of man consists in escape from *εἰμαρμένη*, i. e. from the dominance of astral influences.

§ 14. μετὰ δὲ τούτους (ταύτην MSS.) ἐστὶν ἄλλος χορὸς ἀστέρων. The writer knows that in his own time the whole extent of the sky has been mapped out by astronomers, and that every visible star, if not distinguished by an individual name, has at least been included in this or that constellation. But he knows that this systematic mapping of the stars is recent; and he assumes that, in the time of the prehistoric Hermes, most of the constellations were still nameless.

ἄλλος χορὸς ἀστέρων. Cf. Ps.-Plato, *Epin.* 982 E: πορείαν δὲ καὶ χορείαν πάντων χορῶν καλλίστην καὶ μεγαλοπρεπεστάτην χορεύοντα πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσι τὸ δέον ἀποτελεῖν. Philo frequently uses ἡ τῶν ἀστέρων χορεία in an astrological connexion (*De Abrah.* 17. 77).

According to the MSS., these nameless stars are placed μετὰ ταύτην, i. e. after the Great Bear. But it seems clear that § 13, in which the Bear is spoken of, has been wrongly inserted here, and that the mention of the 'other stars' (§ 14) ought to follow that of the Liturgi (§ 12). If so, the original reading must have been μετὰ τούτους, and τούτους must have been altered into ταύτην after the insertion of § 13.

§ 15. κάτωθεν δὲ τῆς σελήνης εἰσὶν ἕτεροι ἀστέρες φθαρτοὶ κ.τ.λ. These perishable stars are the shooting stars or meteors. Cf. Arist. *Meteor.* 1. 4, 341 b, where they are called οἱ διαθέοντες ἀστέρες and οἱ δοκοῦντες ἀστέρες διάττειν, and are said to result from ἀναθυμίασις of dry vapour from the earth. Aristotle says that κάτω ταῦτα σελήνης γίγνεται (342 a 30). See also Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 1. 1 and 7. 23.

παρακολούθηματα ὄντα τῆς φύσεως. The writer has adopted this notion from the Stoics, who made use of the word παρακολούθησις in their endeavours to show that the existence of noxious things was not inconsistent with their belief in the beneficent providence of God. Gellius 7. 1. 7: 'Chrysippus (in libro περὶ προνοίας quarto) tractat consideratque . . . εἰ αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων νόσοι κατὰ φύσιν γίνονται, id est, (si) natura ipsa rerum, vel providentia quae compagem hanc

mundi et genus hominum fecit, morbos quoque et debilitates et aegritudines corporum, quas patiuntur homines, fecerit. Existimat autem non fuisse hoc principale naturae consilium, ut faceret homines morbis obnoxios, nunquam enim hoc convenisse naturae auctori parentique omnium rerum bonarum. "Sed cum multa" inquit "atque magna gigneret pareretque aptissima et utilissima, alia quoque simul adgnata sunt incommoda, his ipsis, quae faciebat, cohaerentia;" eaque (non) per naturam, sed per sequellas quasdam necessarias facta dicit, quod ipse appellat κατὰ παρακολούθησιν.¹ Cf. M. Aurel. 6. 44: εἰ δὲ μὴ ἐβουλεύσαντο (οἱ θεοὶ) κατ' ἰδίαν περὶ ἐμοῦ, περὶ γὰρ τῶν κοινῶν πάντως ἐβουλεύσαντο, οἷς κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν καὶ ταῦτα συμβαίνοντα ἀσπάξασθαι καὶ στέργειν ὀφείλω. The phrase κατ' ἐπακολούθησιν occurs again in a similar connexion in M. Aurel. 9. 28.

§ 16. τῶν καλουμένων κομητῶν. Comets are discussed by Aristotle, *Meteor.* 1. 6, 342 b, and by Seneca, *Nat. quaest.* lib. 7. Seneca refers to Posidonius on this subject; and it is probable that what Posidonius wrote about comets had been transmitted to the writer of *Exc.* VI also.

τὸν τόπον ἔχουσιν ὑπὸ τὸν κύκλον τὸν τοῦ ἡλίου. This is a vague statement; but the writer's view appears to be that the comets are permanently existing bodies, more or less similar to planets,¹ and that in ordinary times they are situated a little below (i. e. nearer to the earth than) the orbit of the sun (which, according to the commonly received opinion, was the fourth of the seven 'circles of the planets'), and so close to the sun itself that the sun's light makes them invisible to us.² But occasionally one of them sallies forth from that position, moves in some direction to a part of the sky more remote from the sun, and so becomes visible. After a time, it returns to its former position near the sun, and is thenceforth again invisible as before (πάλιν ὑπὸ τὸν κύκλον ἐλθόντες τοῦ ἡλίου ἀφανεῖς μένουσιν). It seems that 'the circle of the sun' must here mean the sun itself, and not the sun's orbit; for if the comet were close to some part of the sun's orbit, but distant from the sun, it would not be hidden.

¹ Seneca holds this opinion, and maintains it against others who thought otherwise.

² Cf. Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 7. 20. 4: 'Multos cometas non videmus, quod obscurantur radiis solis, quo deficiente quondam cometen adparuisse, quem sol vicinus texerat, Posidonius tradit. Saepe autem cum occidit sol, sparsi ignes non procul ab eo videntur: videlicet ipsa stella (i. e. the head or nucleus of the comet) sole perfunditur et ideo adspici non potest, com[et]ae autem (i. e. the tail) radios solis effugiunt.'

ἐν τῷ ἀπηλιώτῃ φανέντες (ἄλλοι), ἄλλοι (ἄλλα MSS.) δὲ ἐν τῷ βορρᾷ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Sen. *Nat. quaest.* 7. 11. 1: 'illud inprimis praesumendum est, cometas non in una parte coeli adspici nec in signifero tantum orbe, sed tam in ortu quam in occasu, frequentissime tamen circa septemtrionem.' *Ib.* 7. 12. 8: 'Stellis (i. e. planets) intra signiferum cursus est, hunc premunt gyrum: at cometae ubique cernuntur.'

§ 17. [ἀστéρες δὲ ἄστρον διαφορὰν ἔχουσιν κ.τ.λ.] Cf. Macrobius, *Comm. in Somn. Scip.*, 1. 14. 21: nunc uideamus quae sint haec duo nomina quorum pariter meminit (Cicero) cum dicit *quae sidera et stellas uocatis*. . . sunt *stellae* quidem singulares, ut erraticae quinque et ceterae quae non admixtae aliis solae feruntur, *sidera* uero quae in aliquod signum stellarum plurium compositione formantur, ut Aries Taurus Andromeda Perseus vel Corona, et quaecumque uariarum genera formarum in caelum recepta creduntur, sic et apud Graecos ἀστήρ et ἄστρον diuersa significant et ἀστήρ stella una est, ἄστρον signum stellis coactum, quod nos sidus uocamus.' Cicero appears to owe this distinction to Posidonius; cf. Arius Didymus in Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 466.

The Hermetist's words imply that, besides the stars of which the ἄστρα (i. e. the known constellations) are composed, there are other stars which do not form part of any ἄστρον, and that he limits the term ἀστéρες to stars of the latter class. His meaning appears to be that the stars of which the ἄστρα consist are firmly fixed in a revolving sphere, but the rest of the stars (i. e. those which he calls ἀστéρες) float free in aether.

This limitation of the meaning of ἀστéρες is peculiar to § 17, and disagrees with the wider extension of the term in the rest of the document. It is therefore probable that § 17 was not written by the author of the dialogue.

§ 18. ὁ ταῦτα μὴ ἀγνοήσας ἀκριβῶς δύναται νοῆσαι τὸν θεόν, κ.τ.λ. What is meant by ταῦτα? If we retain § 17, we are told that he who understands the difference between ἀστéρες and ἄστρα is thereby enabled to 'see God' and attain to bliss; which is absurd. If we cut out § 17, we get the hardly less absurd statement that he who knows certain facts about shooting stars and comets is thereby enabled to attain to the same blessed condition. And even if we take ταῦτα to include the whole contents of the dialogue down to this point, the difficulty is not much diminished. It could hardly be said that a knowledge of the position of the Decans in the structure of the universe, and of their functions in its administration, is enough

to enable a man to 'see God'. It seems certain therefore that something has been lost before § 18. It is possible that this concluding paragraph (§§ 18, 19) was originally unconnected with §§ 1-17; it may be a fragment of another document, and may have been appended to *Exc.* VI by mere accident.

ἀδύνατον, ὡ τέκνον, τὸν ἐν σώματι τούτου εὐτυχήσαι. Cf. *Corp.* X. 6: ἀδύνατον γάρ, ὡ τέκνον, ψυχὴν ἀποθιωθῆναι (= τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ τὸ κάλλος θεάσασθαι) ἐν σώματι ἀνθρώπου (μένουσαν).

ἵνα ἐκεῖ γενομένη, ὅπου αὐτὸν (αὐτὴν MSS.) ἕξεισι θεάσασθαι, ὁδοῦ μὴ σφαλῆ. If a man has rightly trained his soul in this life, it will, when released from the body by death, know how to find its way to God. (ἐκεῖ γενομένη means 'when it has entered the other world', i. e. after death.) Cf. *Exc.* II B. 4: εὐδαιμόνως τεθνήξῃ, τῆς ψυχῆς σου μὴ ἀγνοούσης ποῦ αὐτὴν δεῖ ἀναπτῆναι.

§ 19. ὅσοι δὲ ἄνθρωποι φιλοσώματοί εἰσιν κ.τ.λ. See note on *Exc.* II B. 5 *in it.* (p. 324 above).

οἶον γάρ ἐστι κάλλος, ὡ τέκνον, τὸ (τοῦ) μήτε σχῆμα μήτε χρώμα [μήτε σῶμα] ἔχον(τος). The meaning must have been that 'that which has neither shape nor colour' (i. e. the incorporeal, which coincides with, or at any rate includes, τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν, the object of the beatific vision,) is beautiful in a higher degree than all corporeal things.¹ For τὸ μήτε σχῆμα μήτε χρώμα ἔχον, cf. *Exc.* II A. 15: τὸν ἀχρώματον, τὸν ἀσχημάτιστον, and *Exc.* VIII. 2. μήτε σῶμα must have been written as an alternative for μήτε χρώμα.

Εἴη δ' ἂν τι, ὡ πάτερ, χωρὶς τούτων καλόν; χωρὶς τούτων means χωρὶς σχήματος καὶ χρώματος. Tat has not yet grasped the conception of the incorporeal.

Μόνος ὁ θεός. It is implied that τὸ καλὸν καὶ ἀγαθόν is identical with God.

μᾶλλον δὲ τὸ μεῖζόν τι ὄν [τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ ὄνομα]. The writer must have meant to say that the thing in question (viz. τὸ χωρὶς σχήματος καὶ χρώματος καλόν) 'is too great to be called God'. He is obliged to use the term ὁ θεός, for want of a better; but he feels that this name, like all others, is inadequate to describe the object of his aspiration. Cf. *Corp.* V. 1 a: τοῦ κρείττονος θεοῦ ὄνοματος.

¹ A suitable sense might be got, for instance, by writing (ἀνόμοιον γάρ (i. e. ἀνόμοιον τῷ τῶν σωμάτων κάλλει) ἐστι (τὸ) κάλλος το(ῦ) μήτε σχῆμα μήτε χρώμα ἔχον(τος).

EXCERPT VII

§ 1. δαίμων γάρ τις μεγίστη: viz. ἡ Δίκη. The justice of God is already personified as a goddess in Hesiod *Op.* 256 ff.: ἡ δέ τε παρθένος ἐστὶ Δίκη, Διὸς ἐκγεγαυῖα | . . . καὶ ῥ' ὀπότ' ἂν τίς μιν βλάβητ' σκολιῶς ὀνοτάζων, | αὐτίκα παρ Διὶ πατρὶ καθεζομένη Κρονίῳ | γηρύετ' ἀνθρώπων ἀδίκων νόον, ὄφρ' ἀποτίσῃ κ.τ.λ. Cf. Pl. *Legg.* 715 E: ὁ μὲν δὴ θεός, . . . ἀρχὴν τε καὶ τελευτὴν καὶ μέσα τῶν ὄντων ἀπάντων ἔχων, εὐθείᾳ περαίνει, κατὰ φύσιν περιπορευόμενος τῷ δὲ αἰετῶν ἐξενέπεται δίκη, τῶν ἀπολειπομένων τοῦ θείου νόμου τιμωρός. Cf. the Orphic line: τῷ δὲ Δίκη πολύποιος ἐφέσπετο πᾶσιν ἀρωγός (Procl. *In remp.* 2. 145. 3 Kroll).

For δαίμων cf. Parmenides, fr. 12 (Diels, *Vorsokr.* p. 123), ἐν δὲ μέσῳ τοῦτων δαίμων ἢ πάντα κυβερνᾷ; Empedocles, fr. 126 (*ibid.* p. 210).

τέτακται . . . ἐν μέσῳ τοῦ παντός [εἰλουμένη]. Cf. Parmenides, fr. 12 above, and Simplicius, *Phys.* 34. 14: τὴν ἐν μέσῳ πάντων ἰδρυμένην . . . δαίμονα τίθησιν (Παρμενίδης). Aet. 2. 7. 1 (*Doxogr.* p. 335): τὴν μεσαιτάτην . . . ἦντινα καὶ δαίμονα κυβερνήτην καὶ κληδοῦχον ἐπονομάζει Δίκην τε καὶ Ἀνάγκην. Ancient commentators on Parmenides disputed whether Δίκη went in the midst with the sun (Procl. *In Tim.* 1. 34. 20 Diehl) or was stationed at the centre with the Pythagorean Ἔσθια (see Simplicius above). If the latter, Δίκη can hardly be said 'to go to and fro in the centre of the universe'. It seems best therefore to bracket εἰλουμένη.

ἐπὶ τῆς θείας τάξεως (ἢ) [πρόνοια καὶ] ἀνάγκη τέτακται. The phrase τῆς θείας τάξεως is explained by what follows in § 2 (as emended): κρατεῖ τὴν τάξιν τῶν ἄνω, ὡς θείων ὄντων. This shows that ἡ θεία τάξις (which is equivalent to ἡ τῶν θεῶν τάξις) means the heavenly bodies regarded collectively.

As the Power which watches over the actions of erring men is denoted by a single name (δίκη), it may be considered certain that the Power contrasted with it (viz. that which presides over the unerring movements of the heavenly bodies) was also denoted by a single name, and consequently, that either πρόνοια or ἀνάγκη ought to be struck out. The only question is, which of these two words we are to retain. In support of ἀνάγκη may be quoted the analogous passage in *Ascl. Lat.* III. 22 b: *diis* (as opposed to erring men) . . . *ordinem* (= τάξιν) *necessitatis* (= ἀνάγκης) *lege conscriptum aeterna constituit (deus)*.

[ταῦτὰ ἐκείνοις ἐνεργοῦσα.] In place of ἐκείνοις, we ought to have

either *ἐκείναις* (*sc. προνοία καὶ ἀνάγκη*) or *ἐκείνῃ* (*sc. ἀνάγκη* or *προνοία*). But the author cannot have said that the work of *δίκη* is the same as that of *ἀνάγκη* (or *πρόνοια*); for he goes on to explain the *difference* between the function of the one and that of the other. These words must therefore be bracketed.

§ 2. [ἐξ οὗ καὶ τὸ ἀναμάρτητον (ἀναμαρτεῖν MSS.) συμβαίνει.] This is a pointless repetition of what has been said in the preceding words.

§ 3. [καὶ μάλιστα ἐκείνοις . . . ἐπικρατεῖ δίκη.] This passage interrupts the sequence of thought; I therefore take it to be a note appended by a reader. (If it is not to be rejected altogether, it would be best to place it after *τὰς ἐν τῷ βίῳ ἀμαρτίας*, at the end of the extract.) The words imply that even those who possess 'the power of seeing God' are liable to fall, though less than other men.

θεοπτικὴ δύναμις. Cf. *Exc.* II A. 6: *οὓς ἐὰν ὁ θεὸς τὴν θεοπτικὴν δωρήσῃται δύναμιν.*

τῇ (μὲν) εἰμαρμένη ὑπόκειται (*sc. ἀνθρώπων γένος*) διὰ τὰς τῆς γενέσεως ἐνεργείας. The *ἐνεργεῖαι τῆς γενέσεως* are the forces which operate in the process by which a man is born, and which thereby determine the course of his life,—except so far as he is able to 'escape from *εἰμαρμένη*' in virtue of the divine *νοῦς* implanted in him. According to the view which prevailed among the Hermetists, these forces are put in action by the stars.

EXCERPT VIII

This extract, as transmitted in the MSS., is utterly meaningless. I have tried to make sense of it by freely altering the text. My emendations in detail are open to much doubt; but I think the general meaning of what the author wrote must have been that which is given by this attempt at restoration.

§ 1. τίνα ἐστὶ (τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσωμάτων) τὰ κατὰ πρόνοιαν. The things spoken of throughout *Exc.* VIII are neither things in general, nor incorporeal things in general, but incorporeal things 'in us', i. e. in man. (See ἐν ἡμῖν in § 2 *init.* and § 3 *init.*) The words τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσωμάτων are therefore required after τίνα,—unless indeed this limitation was so clearly implied by the preceding context that it was needless to express it here.

For the same reason, I have inserted ἐν ἡμῖν in § 4 *init.*

§ 2. τὸ μὲν τι ἐστὶ νοητὸν (. . .). The first of the three kinds of 'incorporeal things in us' is the higher and diviner of the two parts of

which the human soul consists. It is that which, in Pl. *Rep.*, is called τὸ λογιστικόν. Platonists more commonly called it the νοῦς. But the writer of *Exc.* VIII uses neither of these terms; his name for it is ἡ νοητὴ οὐσία (§ 3 and § 5).

We are here told that it is νοητόν. But for the purpose of distinguishing it from the two other kinds of 'incorporeals in us', it is not enough to say that it is νοητόν. This word differs little in meaning from ἀσώματον; and all the three things alike are ἀσώματα. The second of the three is the other part of the human soul (τὸ παθητικόν); and it could hardly be denied that this also is νοητόν; for it is certainly not αἰσθητόν. It seems probable therefore that νοητόν was accompanied by some word or phrase, in conjunction with which it would be applicable to the νοῦς alone, and not to the παθητικόν also. Better sense might be got by writing νοητόν (ἀπλῶς), i. e. 'νοητόν absolutely, or without qualification'. The παθητικόν, though it is νοητόν, might be said to be less absolutely νοητόν than the νοῦς, inasmuch as it is more closely connected with the material body. νοητόν (κυρίως) is also possible.

ἀχρόματον, ἀσχημάτιστον, [ἀσώματον]. Cf. *Exc.* II A. 15: τὸν ἀχρόματον, τὸν ἀσχημάτιστον, and VI. 19. The author cannot have said that one of three kinds of incorporeals 'is incorporeal'; I have therefore bracketed ἀσώματον. But even when this word is struck out, the two other adjectives still present the same sort of difficulty as νοητόν above. We want marks by which the first kind of ἀσώματον is to be distinguished from the other two; but all ἀσώματα alike are devoid of colour and shape. If the text is sound, the writer must be charged with some confusion of thought in this respect.

ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς πρώτης [καὶ] νοητῆς οὐσίας (προβεβλημένον?). The πρώτη νοητὴ οὐσία is God, or the divine νοῦς. The νοητὴ οὐσία in man (i. e. the human νοῦς is an emanation from the divine νοῦς, or a detached portion (ἀπόρροια or ἀπόσπασμα) of it. Cf. *Abammonis Responsum* 8. 6 (*Testim.*), where it is said that the higher of man's 'two souls' is ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου νοητοῦ.

§ 3. ἔστι δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ (εἰσὶ δὲ καὶ ἐν ἡμῖν MSS.) (ἕτερον εἶδος) (ἀσωμάτων, . . .). The words in which the 'second kind of incorporeal in us' was described have been lost; but we can infer from the context that it is τὸ παθητικόν μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς, i. e. that part of the soul in which the passions reside,—the θνητόν εἶδος ψυχῆς of Pl. *Tim.* (In Pl. *Rep.*, this part of the soul is subdivided into two parts, called respectively τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.) The

probable sense of the missing words might be given by writing ἄλογον μὲν (αὐτὸ καθ' αὐτό), κινήσεως δὲ λογικῆς ὑποδεκτικόν. This part of the soul is in itself irrational, but is capable of being impelled or directed by the reason which resides in the νοῦς. Cf. Ar. *Eth. Nic.* I. 1098 a 4 and 1103 a 1, where τὸ λόγον ἔχον ὡς ἐπιπειθὲς λόγῳ (= the second ἀσώματον of *Exc.* VIII) is distinguished from τὸ λόγον ἔχον κυρίως καὶ ἐν αὐτῷ (= the first ἀσώματον of *Exc.* VIII).

It would be possible to get the same meaning in another way, and at the same time to utilize the unintelligible words τούτῳ ἐναντία σχηματότητες, by rewriting the passage thus: ἔστι δὲ ἐν ἡμῖν καὶ ἕτερον εἶδος ἀσωμάτων. (ἄλογον μὲν) τοῦτο, ἐναντίας δὲ σχηματότητος [τοῦτο] ὑποδεκτικόν. 'It is irrational, but is capable of receiving a contrary (i. e. a rational) configuration'. But it seems more likely that τούτῳ ἐναντία (αἱ σωματικαί?) σχηματότητες is a fragment of a marginal note suggested by ἀσχημάτιστον.

τὸ γοῦν (ἄλογον), κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας, πρὸς τινα λόγον (κινεῖται). Cf. τὸ δὲ ἄλογον . . . κινεῖται πρὸς τινα λόγον in § 6. The παθητικόν, though irrational in itself, is rationally moved when it is moved by the νοῦς. But why πρὸς τινα λόγον, and not simply πρὸς λόγον? The addition of τινα is perhaps meant to signify that the movement of τὸ παθητικόν under the direction of the νοῦς is rational *in some degree*, or *in a certain sense*, but not absolutely; whereas the action of the νοῦς itself (provided that it has 'drawn near to God') is absolutely rational.

εὐθέως μεταβάλλεται εἰς [] [] [] εἰδωλόν [] τι τοῦ νοήματος τοῦ δημιουργοῦ. The λόγος of the human νοῦς coincides with God's νόημα (i. e. with what is purposed or willed by God); consequently, the παθητικόν, when it is obedient to the νοῦς, becomes 'an image of God's νόημα', i. e. a thing fashioned in the likeness of God's purpose, or a reflection of God's purpose as in a mirror.

§ 4. τρίτον δὲ ἔστιν (ἐν ἡμῖν) εἶδος ἀσωμάτων, ὃ περὶ τὰ σώματα ἔστι συμβεβηκός. (Perhaps ἃ περὶ τὸ σῶμά ἐστι συμβεβηκότα?) The third kind of ἀσώματον is of a different character from the others. The first and second, being parts of the human soul, are substances; but ἀσώματα of the third kind are merely attributes of the human body, and have no substantive existence. Cf. Porphyry, Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητά, 19: ἡ τῶν ἀσωμάτων προσηγορία οὐ κατὰ κοινότητα ἑνὸς καὶ ταυτοῦ γένους προσήγορευται, καθάπερ

τὰ σώματα, κατὰ δὲ ψιλὴν τὴν πρὸς τὰ σώματα στέρησιν ὅθεν τὰ μὲν αὐτῶν ὄντα (substances), τὰ δὲ οὐκ ὄντα (not substances) εἶναι οὐ κεκώλυται . . . καὶ τὰ μὲν καθ' ἑαυτὰ ὑφεστηκότα, τὰ δὲ ἄλλων εἰς τὸ εἶναι δεόμενα. Incorporeal substances,—the class to which νοῦς and ψυχή belong,—are called by Porphyry τὰ καθ' αὐτὰ ἀσώματα (ib. 1 ff.), or αἱ ἀσώματοι ὑποστάσεις (ib. 11).

The writer of *Exc.* VIII might have expressed his meaning more simply by saying that the human body is governed by εἰμαρμένη. But instead of this, he prefers to say that the attributes or qualities of the human body are καθ' εἰμαρμένην (§ 7), and to class these attributes or qualities, together with the two parts of the human soul, under the general term ἀσώματα.

[τόπος, χρόνος, κίνησις, σχῆμα, ἐπιφάνεια, μέγεθος, εἶδος]. A few lines below, we have a nearly identical list: τὸ σχῆμα, ἡ χροῖα, τὸ εἶδος, ὁ τόπος, ὁ χρόνος, ἡ κίνησις. In the second list, ἐπιφάνεια and μέγεθος are omitted; but as the MSS. give καὶ ἡ ἐπιφάνεια καὶ τὸ μέγεθος a little further on, it seems probable that these words originally followed ἡ κίνησις in the second list, and have been separated from it by error. If so, the only difference between the two lists is that χροῖα is added in the second.

This string of substantives is evidently meant for a list of συμβεβηκότα of the human body. It is possible that the author gave one list only, and that the other is a misplaced doublet. But as he proceeds to divide the συμβεβηκότα into two distinct classes, it would seem most natural to give instances of each class separately. It may therefore be suspected that there were originally two distinct lists; that one of them stood where the second list now stands, and consisted of instances of ἰδίως ποιῶ; that the other consisted of instances of the other kind of συμβεβηκότα, but has been shifted from its proper place; and that the similarity of the two lists has been brought about by transcribers who added to each of them items which belonged to the other.

τόπος and χρόνος, as attributes of a human body, must mean the position of the body in space and time. Heimarmene has determined that my body should come into being at a certain place and at a certain time, and should continue to exist for a certain time.

The inclusion of κίνησις in the list implies that the movements of the human body are determined by Heimarmene. It might be objected that some of the movements of the body are voluntary

actions, and that, according to the doctrine of this Excerpt, the voluntary actions of a man whose *νοῦς* is joined to God, and whose *παθητικόν* is obedient to his *νοῦς*, ought to be said to be *κατὰ πρόνοιαν*, and not *καθ' εἰμαρμένην*. But at any rate the *involuntary* movements of the body (e.g. the beating of the heart) are *καθ' εἰμαρμένην*.

What is the difference between *σχῆμα* and *εἶδος*? *σχῆμα* means 'bodily shape'; *εἶδος*, in this connexion, perhaps means 'visible appearance'.

ἄ μὲν γὰρ αὐτῶν (*sc.* τῶν περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότων) *ιδίως ποιὰ*. τὸ *ιδίως ποιόν* is a term employed by the Stoics. (See Zeller, *Stoics*, Engl. tr. pp. 102-105; Arnim *Sto. vet. fragm.* vol. ii, §§ 395-398; Prantl, *Gesch. der Logik*, vol. i, pp. 428-432.) It is sometimes opposed to τὸ *κοινῶς ποιόν*.¹ As used by Stoics, τὸ *ιδίως ποιόν* appears to mean the individual thing, as characterized by the permanent and inseparable qualities by which it is distinguished from other individuals of the same species. For instance, Socrates, regarded as a person, is an *ιδίως ποιόν*, and is, as such, contrasted with the *οὐσία* (the material substance) of which he consists. Socrates *qua οὐσία* (a *σύνθετον* composed of material elements which are in ceaseless flux) is perpetually changing; but Socrates *qua ιδίως ποιόν* continues to be one and the same from his birth to his death.

Sometimes ὁ *ιδίως ποιός*, masculine, is used instead of τὸ *ιδίως ποιόν*.² Prantl and Zeller say that in these cases the masculine

¹ Dexippos in *Cat.* 23, 25 Busse (Zeller, *Sto.* p. 102): ἔστι τὸ ὑποκείμενον διττόν, . . . ἐν μὲν τὸ λεγόμενον πρῶτον ὑποκείμενον, ὡς ἡ ἀποιος ὕλη, . . . δεύτερον δὲ ὑποκείμενον τὸ ποιόν (i.e. the thing as characterized by qualities), ὃ κοινῶς ἢ ιδίως ὑφίσταται· ὑποκείμενον γὰρ καὶ ὁ χαλκός (a *κοινῶς ποιόν*) καὶ ὁ Σωκράτης (an *ιδίως ποιόν*). Syrianus in *Arist. Metaph.* 852 a 3 (Arnim II, p. 131): the Stoics τοὺς κοινῶς ποιούς πρὸ τῶν ιδίως ποιῶν ἀποτίθενται.

² E. g. Diog. Laert. 7. 137: the Stoics λέγουσι κόσμον (in one sense) αὐτὸν τὸν θεόν, τὸν ἐκ τῆς ἀπάσης οὐσίας *ιδίως ποιόν*, . . . καὶ ἔστι κόσμος ὁ *ιδίως ποιός* τῆς τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας. Plut. *Comm. nol.* 36, 1077 D: the Stoics say ἐπὶ μίας οὐσίας δύο *ιδίως γενέσθαι* ποιούς, καὶ τὴν αὐτὴν οὐσίαν, ἕνα ποιὸν *ιδίως* ἔχουσαν, ἐπιόντος ἑτέρου δέχεσθαι (*sc.* τὸν ἕτερον), καὶ διαφυλάττειν ὁμοίως ἀμφοτέρους. (Compare Plut. *Comm. nol.* 44.) Chrysippus, as reported in Philo *De aetern. mundi* 14. 48-51, VI, p. 87 Cohn: δύο 'εἰδοποιούς' (*ιδίως ποιός* Arnim: *ιδίως ποιὰ* Cumont, Cohn) ἐπὶ τῆς αὐτῆς οὐσίας ἀμήχανον συστήναι, . . . δύο 'εἰδοποιοί' (*ιδίως ποιὰ* Cumont: *ιδίως ποιοί* Arnim) περὶ 'τοῦ αὐτοῦ ὑποκειμένου' (τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον edd.) οὐ δύναται εἶναι, . . . διὰ τὸ μὴ δύνασθαι δύο 'εἰδοποιούς' (*ιδίως ποιὰ* Cumont) εἶναι περὶ τὸ αὐτὸ ὑποκείμενον. (On this point Plutarch contradicts the author of the *De aetern. mundi*; one of the two must therefore have misunderstood what Chrysippus wrote in the passage to which they refer: and it may be suspected that both of them failed to understand it.)

See also Posidonius and Mnesarchus *ap. Stob.* 1. 20. 7, vol. i, pp. 177-179 W. (Arius Didymus, Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 462).

substantive understood is λόγος; but in some at least of the instances given, a satisfactory sense can be got by understanding ἄνθρωπος (or, where the thing spoken of is the universe as a whole, θεός or κόσμος).

In most of the instances collected by Zeller *l.c.*, τὸ ἰδίως ποιόν appears to mean, not the quality (or complex of qualities) by which the individual thing is characterized,¹ but the thing itself as characterized by that quality. In *Exc.* VIII, on the other hand, we are told that τὰ ἰδίως ποιὰ are συμβεβηκότα belonging to bodies, i. e. qualities or attributes of bodies. There are two kinds of συμβεβηκότα; and τὰ ἰδίως ποιὰ are one of the two kinds. It may be inferred from the Stoic use of the term that the ἰδίως ποιὰ of a given man are the qualities by which he is distinguished from all other men,—the peculiarities by which his acquaintances recognize him when they meet him.

ἃ δὲ τοῦ σώματος (. . .). The writer must have here described the second of the two classes into which he divides the attributes of the human body; but owing to the corruption of the text, we are left in doubt what this second class was. It might consist of τὰ κοινῶς ποιὰ, i. e. qualities possessed by all human bodies in common, e.g. the attribute of being situated somewhere or other in space, and that of having a shape of a certain type (two legs, &c.). Or on the other hand, it might consist of temporary and separable accidents, e.g. that of being situated in a certain place at a given moment, or posed in a certain attitude; for such accidents might equally well be contrasted with the ἰδίως ποιὰ, which persist unchanged throughout the man's life.

τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἴδια ἐστὶ κ.τ.λ.¹ ἴδια in the sense of 'properties' can hardly be right; for 'properties of the body' could not stand in contrast to τὰ ἰδίως ποιὰ, which are themselves properties of this or that human body.

τὰ δὲ τοῦ σώματος corresponds to ἃ δὲ τοῦ σώματος above. In both places, it is strange that τοῦ σώματος should occur in connexion with the second kind of attributes only, seeing that both kinds alike are attributes of the human body.

τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον σχῆμα καὶ τὸ κεχρωσμένον χρῶμα [ἔστι δὲ] καὶ ἡ μεμorfωμένη μορφή.¹ These phrases are meaningless. Perhaps it might be possible to make sense of them by writing τὸ (κατὰ τόπον

¹ In Posidonius *ap. Stob. l.c.*, the quality in this sense is called ἡ ἐκάστου ποιότης. The words are παραμένειν τὴν ἐκάστου ποιότητα [τὰ] ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τῆς ἀναιρέσεως.

καὶ χρόνον) ἐσχηματισμένον σχῆμα κ.τ.λ., and taking this to mean 'the particular shape and colour imposed on the body at a given place and time'. If we assume that the second class consists of separable accidents, these might serve as instances of such accidents.

ἡ μεμορφωμένη μορφή may be an alternative for τὸ ἐσχηματισμένον σχῆμα.

Ἦ ταῦτά ἐστι τούτων ἀμέτοχα¹. This may perhaps be a remnant of something like ταῦτά ἐστι (τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότα· τὰ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς μόρια) τούτων ἀμέτοχα. I. e. the νοῦς and the παθητικόν have no part in the attributes which belong to the body; they are ἀχρόματα, ἀσχημάτιστα.

§ 5. ἡ μὲν οὖν νοητὴ οὐσία, πρὸς (μὲν) τῷ θεῷ γενομένη, κ.τ.λ. The first μὲν points forward to τὸ δὲ ἄλογον in § 6; the second μὲν is needed to point forward to ὑπολειφθεῖσα δὲ [ὑπὸ] τοῦ θεοῦ.

ἐαυτῆς ἐξουσίαν ἔχει. The human νοῦς, if it 'draws near to God' (who is the source from which it has sprung), is αὐτεξούσιος, 'self-determining'; i. e. in this case it acts with free will, and is not subject to compulsion from without.

καὶ [τοῦ] σώζει[ν] (τὸ) ἕτερον (sc. τὸ παθητικόν) αὐτὴν σώζουσα. It saves itself (from subjection to ἀνάγκη); and in doing so, it also saves from that subjection the παθητικόν (which, in this case, is controlled and directed by the νοῦς). Thus the soul of the man whose νοῦς has drawn near to God is wholly free.

Ἔπειθ¹. Some connecting word or phrase is needed; but neither ἔπειτα nor ἐπεὶ gives a satisfactory connexion.

αὐτὴ [ἡ] (καθ' αὐτὴν) οὐσα ὑπὸ ἀνάγκην οὐκ ἔστι[ν]. In itself, or when it is by itself, (i. e. when it is not hampered by the body and the things of the body,—cf. αἰρεῖται τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν below,—) the νοῦς is not subject to ἀνάγκη.

«καὶ ἡ αἴρεσις αὐτῆς κατὰ πρόνοιαν» «γίνεται». It exerts its own will freely; but in doing so, it acts in accordance with the will of God.

ὑπολειφθεῖσα δὲ [ὑπὸ] τοῦ θεοῦ. If we strike out ὑπό, this means literally 'having lagged behind God'. God goes on his way; the human νοῦς, which ought to keep up with him, lags behind, and so is separated from him. ὑπολειφθεῖσα ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ would mean 'having been left behind by God', and would rather imply that it is God, and not man, that is responsible for the separation.

αἰρε(ῖ)ται τὴν σωματικὴν φύσιν. The νοῦς chooses the wrong alternative; it sets its affections on τὰ σωματικά, instead of on τὰ θεῖα. Cf.

Corp. IV. 6 b: δύο γὰρ ὄντων τῶν ὄντων, σώματος καὶ ἀσωμάτου, ἐν οἷς τὸ θνητὸν καὶ τὸ θεῖον, ἢ αἴρεσις θατέρου καταλείπεται τῷ ἐλέσθαι βουλομένῳ. Compare also *Corp.* I. 14, where the fall of man is figuratively described by saying that Anthropos (i. e. the human νοῦς) took φύσις to wife.

οὕτω (τοῦτο MSS.) δὲ (τῇ) τοῦ κόσμου (ἀνάγκη ὑποπίπτει). The paragraph must have ended with something to this effect. If a man's νοῦς 'chooses the corporeal world' and rejects the incorporeal, it becomes subject to the ἀνάγκη by which the Kosmos (i. e. the corporeal world) is governed.

§ 6. τὸ δὲ ἄλογον [πάν], (τῇ μὲν νοητῇ οὐσίᾳ πειθόμενον (?),) κινεῖται πρὸς τινα λόγον, (. . . μὴ πειθόμενον δέ (?), . . .). The author must have here dealt with τὸ παθητικόν as he had previously dealt with the νοῦς; but of the section in which he did so, only a few words remain. He told us above that ἡ νοητῇ οὐσίᾳ σώζει τὸ ἕτερον αὐτὴν σώζουσα and we may infer thence that he here said that, if the παθητικόν is obedient to the νοῦς, its action is κατὰ πρόνοιαν, but that if it is disobedient to the νοῦς, its action is κατ' ἀνάγκην.

This section must have been followed by another, now lost, in which the attributes of the body (τὰ περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότα) were similarly discussed, and shown to be subject to εἰμαρμένη.

§ 7. καὶ ὁ μὲν λόγος κατὰ πρόνοιαν, τὸ δὲ ἄλογον κατ' ἀνάγκην, τὰ δὲ περὶ τὸ σῶμα συμβεβηκότα καθ' εἰμαρμένην. In these words the writer sums up the contents of the three preceding paragraphs (§ 5, § 6, and the lost section which followed § 6), and in so doing, gives his answer to Tat's question, τίνα ἐστὶ (τῶν ἐν ἡμῖν ἀσωμάτων) τὰ κατὰ πρόνοιαν κ.τ.λ. (§ 1).

ὁ λόγος κατὰ πρόνοιαν is equivalent to τὸ πρὸς λόγον γινόμενον κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται. The νοῦς acts πρὸς λόγον when it 'has drawn near to God'; and the παθητικόν acts πρὸς λόγον when it is directed by a νοῦς which acts πρὸς λόγον.

The νοῦς, when it 'has fallen away from God', and therefore acts ἀλόγως,—and the παθητικόν, when it is not directed by a νοῦς which acts πρὸς λόγον,—are κατ' ἀνάγκην. That is, the man whose soul is in this condition is no longer free; having 'chosen the material world', he is driven by the forces which work in the material world.

To the power which drives him other Hermetists give the name εἰμαρμένη. But the writer of *Exc.* VIII prefers to call it ἀνάγκη, and restricts the term εἰμαρμένη to the force to which 'the attributes

of the human body' are subject, i. e. that by which the human body is governed. As the human body is a part of the material world,—and indeed, is that very part of it through which compulsion is brought to bear upon the human soul,—it would seem that *είμαρμένη*, in the limited sense in which the word is here used, ought to be regarded as one particular branch or aspect of *ἀνάγκη*; and we might have expected to be told that *ἀνάγκη*, when acting on the human body, is called *είμαρμένη*. Yet the writer speaks of *ἀνάγκη* and *είμαρμένη* as if they were mutually exclusive.

A different account of the relation between *ἀνάγκη* and *είμαρμένη* is given in *Ascl. Lat.* III. 39: '*είμαρμένη* rerum omnium initia parit, necessitas (*ἀνάγκη*) vero cogit ad effectum quae ex illius primordiis pendent.'

EXCERPT IX

This passage is an answer to the question (presumably asked by Tat in a preceding sentence) 'has ὕλη begun to be (*γέγονεν*), or is it without beginning (*ἀγέννητος*)?' The answer is based on the description of the ὑποδοχή in Pl. *Tim.* 48 E ff. The form in which the question is stated may perhaps have been suggested by the question asked (not about ὕλη, but about the Kosmos) in Pl. *Tim.* 28 B: *σκεπτόν . . . πότερον ἦν αἰεὶ (ὁ κόσμος), γενέσεως ἀρχὴν ἔχων οὐδεμίαν, ἢ γέγονεν, ἀπ' ἀρχῆς τινος ἀρξάμενος.* The answer given by the writer of *Exc.* IX is to the effect that ὕλη, *qua* ἄμορφος, ἦν αἰεὶ, or is ἀγέννητος, but *qua* μεμορφωμένη γέγονεν.

§ I. καὶ γέγονεν . . . καὶ (αἰεὶ) ἦν. If we accept the reading of the MSS., we must take ἦν to mean ἦν αἰεὶ or προῆν. Cf. *Ascl. Lat.* II. 14 b: *Fuit (= ἦν) deus et ὕλη.* But it seems better to add αἰεὶ, as in Pl. *Tim.* 28 B.

ὕλη γὰρ ἀγγεῖον γενέσεώς ἐστι. ἀγγεῖον, if sound, is the writer's substitute for Plato's term ὑποδοχή (*Tim.* 49 A: *πάσης εἶναι γενέσεως ὑποδοχὴν αὐτήν*). The meaning of that term is explained by the phrases τὸ ἐν ᾧ ἐγγιγνόμενα αἰεὶ ἕκαστα φαντάζεται (*Tim.* 49 E), ἢ τὰ πάντα δεχομένη σώματα φύσις (50 B), τὸ ἐν ᾧ γίγνεται τὸ γιγνόμενον (50 C), τὸ τὰ πάντα ἐκδεξόμενον ἐν αὐτῷ γένη (50 E). [The editor considers that the metaphor of 'vessel' is hardly appropriate, and tentatively suggests ἐμαγεῖον (Pl. *Tim.* 50 C). But τὸ σπέρμα τῆς γενέσεως below suggests the parallels of Plutarch, *De Ei*, 392 F: *ὡσπερ ἀγγεῖον φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως ὁ χρόνος; De Defect. orac.*

423 E : τὴν φύσιν ὁρῶμεν (τὰ) καθ' ἕκαστα γένεσιν καὶ εἶδесιν οἶον ἀγγείοις ἢ περικαρπίοις σπέρματος περιέχουσαν, where the word means the seed-capsule of a plant. Compare ἐναγγειοσπέρματος, and see Kroll, *Lehren des Herm. Trism.* p. 127, for other examples. See also note on ἄντρον in Vol. II. p. 197.]

τοῦ ἀγεν[ν]ήτου καὶ προόντος [τοῦ] θεοῦ. In most instances, we have no means of knowing whether a Hermetist wrote ἀγέννητος or ἀγέννητος. But in this passage, the word is associated with γένεσις and γέγονε, not with γεννᾶν; and for that reason it seems better to write ἀγέννητος here, and ἀγενησία in § 2.

The writer appears to have held that the world has had a beginning; (that is implied by the past tenses γέγονε and ἐγένετο;) and for one who took that view, the statement that God is προών would mean that God was in existence before the world began. But those who held, as the Aristotelians and some of the Platonists did, that the world is without beginning, or in other words, that the world-process has been going on from all eternity, might still say that God is προών, meaning that he is prior to τὰ ὄντα, or ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας, as being the cause or author of all that is.

τὸ σπέρμα οὖν τῆς γενέσεως (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ) λαβούσα (λαμβάνουσα MSS.) γέγονε. ἕλη is, as it were, a matrix, in which God, at some definite moment in the past, implanted a quickening germ, and thereby caused the world to come into being. Cf. Pl. *Tim.* 50 D : προσεικάσαι πρέπει τὸ μὲν δεχόμενον (= τὴν ἕλην) μητρί, τὸ δ' ὄθεν πατρί.

τὸ σπέρμα τῆς γενέσεως means τὸ σπέρμα τῶν γενησομένων, the germ from which all things were to spring. The writer's meaning would have been more clearly expressed if, instead of saying ἢ ἕλη γέγονε, he had said ὁ κόσμος (or τὰ ὄντα) γέγονε, τῆς ἕλης τὸ σπέρμα ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λαβούσης.

καὶ τρεπτή ἐγένετο, καὶ ἰδέας ἔχει (εἶχε MSS.) (πολλὰς, ποικίλως) μορφοποιουμένη. When ἕλη first 'came into being', (i. e. when the world was brought into being by the implanting of the 'germ' of it in ἕλη, or in other words, by the first imposition of forms on formless matter,) it came into being as a thing subject to change; and so it has ever since been passing through an uninterrupted succession of changes, forms ever fresh and different being ceaselessly imposed on it.

The imperfect εἶχε is impossible. Meineke and Wachsmuth alter

εἶχε into ἔσχε. But the tense wanted is the present; for the process of change is continually going on. And ἔχει is confirmed by the following ἐφέστηκε, which ought to have been ἐφειστήκει if ἔσχε had preceded.

ἐφέστηκε γὰρ αὐτῇ τρεπομένη ἢ (τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια). Some feminine substantive is needed; and ἐνέργεια is suggested by ἐνεργείας above and τὸ ἐνεργεῖσθαι below.

In order to make sense, I have found it necessary to assume three lacunae, viz. (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ), (ι πολλάς, ποικίλως), and (τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργεια). Between the first and the second, there are (in my emended text) 40 letters; between the second and the third, there are 39 letters. If the archetype was written in lines of about 54 letters, all three lacunae together may have been caused by a single blot or rent, by which three lines were damaged.

τὰς τῆς τροπῆς ἰδέας. This must be taken to mean 'the (various) forms which ὕλη (successively) receives in the course of its continual mutation'. But possibly some words which would have made the meaning clearer have been lost.

ἀγει[ν]ησία οὖν ((ἢ)) τῆς ὕλης (or possibly ἄ. οὖν τῇ ὕλῃ ἢ?) ἀμορφία ἦν, γένεσις δὲ τὸ ἐνεργεῖσθαι (ἢ δὲ γένεσις τὸ ἐνεργεῖσθαι MSS.). The author might have expressed his meaning more simply by writing ἀγένητος ἦν ἢ ὕλη ἀμορφος οὖσα, ἐγένετο δὲ (or γίγνεται δὲ) ἐνεργουμένη (sc. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ). The past tense ἦν is used, because there is now no matter without form; it was only before the beginning of the world that ἀμορφος ὕλη existed. As the substantive γένεσις gives no indication of time present or past, we are left in doubt whether the writer meant to say that matter 'came into being' by 'being worked on' (i. e. by having forms imposed on it) at the beginning of the world, or that it continually 'comes into being' afresh, by having ever fresh forms imposed on it.

EXCERPT X

Wachsmuth thinks that the superscription 'Ἑρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ', which stands at the head of *Exc. X* in the MSS., belonged, not to this piece, but to a lost *ecloga* which preceded it in the *Anthologium* of Stobaeus. The reason which he gives,—namely, that this extract 'is so different from the Hermetic writings',—is not quite conclusive; for we have *Hermetica* in many different styles. But as the text contains no ὦ Τάτ or ὦ τέκνον, and no indication that the writing from which the passage is taken was a dialogue, it is not unlikely that Wachsmuth is right, and that *Exc. X* is not a *Hermeticum*,—that is, that its author did not put his teaching into the mouth of Hermes, but spoke in his own person.

The passage is an extract from a discussion of *time*. It deals with two distinct questions, viz. (1) Are past time, present time, and future time united with one another or separate from one another? Do past, present, and future time exist? The first question is discussed in §§ 1, 2, 4, 5, and the second in § 3. It is evident therefore that § 3 is out of place; and it most likely stood where I have put it, after § 5. But perhaps something which followed § 5 and preceded § 3 has been lost.

See Arist. *Phys.* 4. 10-14, 217 b-224 a, where time is discussed at considerable length. Stobaeus (1. 8. 40 e-42) gives, together with Herm. *Exc. X*, short extracts from Zeno, Apollodorus, Posidonius, and Chrysippus on the subject of time. (According to Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 461, Stobaeus took over this group of extracts, with the exception of Herm. *Exc. X*, from the *Epitome* of Arius Didymus.) The influence of Chrysippus is apparent in the passages from Apollodorus and Posidonius; and *Exc. X*, whether written by a 'Hermetist' or not, is based on the same Stoic tradition.

§ 1. οὔτε γὰρ καθ' ἑαυτοῦς εἰσιν οὔτε συνήντωνται· καὶ πάλιν, (καὶ) συνήντωνται καὶ καθ' ἑαυτοῦς εἰσιν. καθ' ἑαυτοῦς is equivalent to χωρὶς ἀλλήλων. The meaning must have been that the three times 'are united' in one sense or aspect, and 'are separate' in another sense or aspect; but it is doubtful in what words this was said. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing οὔτε γὰρ κ. εἰσιν, ἀλλὰ συνήντωνται, καὶ πάλιν, (οὐ) συνήντωνται, ἀλλὰ κ. εἰσιν.

Compare Ar. *Phys.* 220 a 4: καὶ συνεχῆς τε δὴ ὁ χρόνος [τῶ νῦν?], καὶ διήρηται κατὰ τὸ νῦν. *Ib.* 222 a 10: τὸ δὲ νῦν ἐστὶ συνέχεια χρόνου . . . συνέχει γὰρ τὸν χρόνον τὸν παρελθόντα καὶ ἐσόμενον. καὶ ὅλων

πέρας χρόνου ἔστιν' ἔστι γὰρ τοῦ μὲν ἀρχῆ, τοῦ δὲ τελευτῆ. . . . διαιρεῖ δὲ δυνάμει. καὶ ἢ μὲν τοιοῦτο, ἀεὶ ἕτερον τὸ νῦν, ἢ δὲ συνδεῖ, ἀεὶ τὸ αὐτό. . . . τὸ νῦν τὸ μὲν τοῦ χρόνου διαίρεσις κατὰ δύναμιν, τὸ δὲ πέρας ἀμφοῖν¹ καὶ ἐνότης' ἔστι δὲ ταῦτο καὶ κατὰ ταῦτο ἢ διαίρεσις καὶ ἢ ἔνωσις, τὸ δ' εἶναι οὐ ταῦτό.

§ 2. εἰν (μὲν γὰρ) χωρὶς εἶναι . . . ὑπολάβης κ.τ.λ. In §§ 2 and 4, the writer deals with the hypothesis that the three times 'are separate', and gives reasons for saying that they are not separate, but united. We must suppose that in § 5 he similarly dealt with the hypothesis that the three times 'are united', and gave reasons for saying that they are not united, but separate; but of that part of his argument, only the last clause (οὕτω . . . διεστῶς γίνεται . . . ὁ) χρόνος) has been preserved.

§ 4 ((οὐκ ἄρα (οὐ γὰρ MSS.) χωρὶς (ἐ)αυτῶν εἰσι(ν).)) These words, where they stand in the MSS., break the connexion between εἰς γίνεται and τῇ συνεχείᾳ. If we put them here, and alter οὐ γὰρ into οὐκ ἄρα, they supply just what is wanted to conclude the argument which began with εἰν χωρὶς εἶναι . . . ὑπολάβης in § 2 *iniit.*

§ 5. (. . .) οὕτω [καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ] διεστῶς γίνεται, εἰς ὧν καὶ ὁ αὐτός, (ὁ) χρόνος. Time, though it is 'one and the same' throughout (as has been shown in §§ 2 and 4), is nevertheless διεστῶς; that is to say, time past, time present, and time future χωρὶς εἰσιν (as has been shown in the lost part of § 5).

εἰς ὧν καὶ ὁ αὐτός is equivalent to συνεχῆς ὧν; and either καὶ συνεχῆς καὶ or εἰς ὧν καὶ ὁ αὐτός must be struck out. For the latter phrase, cf. Ar. *Phys.* 222 a 31: δῆλον δ' ὅτι ὡς ἂν ἡ κίνησις, οὕτω καὶ ὁ χρόνος· εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἡ αὐτῇ καὶ μία γίνεται ἴποτε¹, ἔσται καὶ χρόνος εἰς καὶ ὁ αὐτός, εἰ δὲ μῆ, οὐκ ἔσται.

((§ 3. εἰ δὲ δεῖ . . . ἐστάναι δυνάμενος;)) Past time and future time are not in existence; and even present time cannot properly be said to be in existence, because the present is a mere point of time, and is no sooner come than gone. Cf. Ar. *Phys.* 217 b 32: ὅτι μὲν οὖν ἢ ὅλως οὐκ ἔστιν (ὁ χρόνος) ἢ μόλις καὶ ἀμυδρῶς, ἐκ τῶνδ' εἰς ἂν ὑποπτεύσειεν. τὸ μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ γέγονε καὶ οὐκ ἔστι, τὸ δὲ μέλλει καὶ οὕτω ἔστιν. ἐκ δὲ τούτων καὶ ὁ ἀπειρος καὶ ὁ ἀεὶ λαμβανόμενος χρόνος σύγκειται τὸ δ' ἐκ μῆ ὄντων συγκεῖμενον ἀδύνατον ἂν εἶναι δόξειε μετέχειν οὐσίας.

¹ Sc. of past time and future time. But there seems to be something wrong here. The meaning might be made clearer by striking out πέρας ἀμφοῖν, or by shifting it. One might write, for instance, τὸ νῦν, ((πέρας ἀμφοῖν (ὄν))), τὸ μὲν τοῦ χρόνου διαίρεσις κ. δ., τὸ δὲ ἐνότης.

Chrysippus (Stob. I. 8. 42): ἐμφανέστατα δὲ τοῦτο λέγει (ὁ Χρ.), ὅτι οὐθεὶς ὅλως ἐνίσταται χρόνος· ἐπεὶ γὰρ εἰς ἄπειρον ἢ τομὴ τῶν συν-εχόντων ἐστὶ, κατὰ τὴν διαίρεσιν ταύτην καὶ πᾶς χρόνος εἰς ἄπειρον ἔχει τὴν τομὴν, ὥστε μὴθένα κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν ἐνεστάναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πλάτος λέγεσθαι.—μόνον δ' ὑπάρχειν φησὶ (ὁ Χρ.) τὸν ἐνεστώτα.¹ τὸν δὲ παρῳχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφιστάναί μιν, ὑπάρχειν δ' οὐδαμῶς [εἰ μὴ] ὡς καὶ κατηγορήματα ὑπάρχειν λέγεται μόνα τὰ (ἐν τῷ παρόντι) συμβεβηκότα, ὅλον τὸ περιπατεῖν ὑπάρχει μοι ὅτε περιπατῶ, ὅτε δὲ κατακέκλιμαι ἢ κάθημαι οὐχ ὑπάρχει.² Posidonius (Stob. I. 8. 42): τοῦ χρόνου τὸν μὲν εἶναι παρεληλυθότα, τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα, τὸν δὲ παρόντα, ὅς ἐκ τινος μέρους τοῦ παρεληλυθότος καὶ τοῦ μέλλοντος περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν αὐτὸν συνέστηκε· τὸν δὲ διορισμὸν σημειώδη εἶναι. τὸ δὲ νῦν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἐν πλάτει [χρόνου] καὶ οὐχὶ κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν νοεῖσθαι. λέγεσθαι δὲ τὸ νῦν καὶ [κατὰ] τὸν ἐλάχιστον πρὸς αἴσθησιν χρόνον (τὸν) περὶ τὸν διορισμὸν τοῦ μέλλοντος καὶ παρεληλυθότος συνιστάμενον. Apollodorus³ (Stob. I. 8. 42): τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ χρόνου) παρεληλυθός, τὸ δὲ ἐνεστηκός, τὸ δὲ μέλλον. ἐνεστάναι δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον ὡς τὸν

¹ This second statement of Chrysippus is inconsistent with the first, and must have occurred in a different connexion.

² The teaching of Chrysippus on this subject is criticized by Plutarch, *Comm. nat.* 41, 1081 C: παρὰ τὴν ἐννοίαν ἐστὶ, χρόνον εἶναι μέλλοντα καὶ παρῳχημένον, ἐνεστώτα δὲ μὴ εἶναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν ἄρτι καὶ τὸ πρῶν ὑφιστάναί, τὸ δὲ νῦν ὅλως μὴδὲν εἶναι. καὶ μὴν τοῦτο συμβαίνει τοῖς Στωικοῖς ἐλάχιστον χρόνον μὴ ἀπολείπουσι, μὴδὲ τὸ νῦν ἡμέρες εἶναι βουλομένοις, ἀλλ' ὅ τι ἂν τις ὡς ἐνεστώτος οἴηται λαβὼν διανοεῖσθαι, τοῦτο τὸ μὲν μέλλον, τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον εἶναι φάσκουσιν, ὥστε μὴθὲν κατὰ τὸ νῦν ὑπομένειν, μὴδὲ λείπεσθαι μύριον χρόνον παρόντος, ἂν δὲ λέγεται παρῳχῆναι, τούτου τὰ μὲν εἰς τὰ μέλλοντα, τὰ δ' εἰς τὰ παρῳχημένα διανέμονται. διούνη οὖν συμβαίνει θάτερον· ἢ τὸ "ἦν χρόνος" καὶ τὸ "ἔσται χρόνος" τιθέντας ἀναεῖναι τὸ "ἔστι χρόνος". ἢ ((λέγειν ὅτι)) ἔστι χρόνος ἐνεστηκός οὐ τὸ μὲν ἐνεστήκει, τὸ δ' ἐνστήσεται, καὶ [[λέγειν ὅτι]] τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος τὸ μὲν μέλλον ἐστὶ, τὸ δὲ παρῳχημένον, καὶ τοῦ νῦν τὸ μὲν πρότερον τὸ δὲ ὕστερον, ὥστε νῦν εἶναι τὸ μὴδέπω νῦν, καὶ τὸ μὴκέτι νῦν· οὐκ ἐστὶ γὰρ νῦν τὸ παρῳχημένον, καὶ οὐδέπω νῦν τὸ μέλλον. . . . τούτων Ἀρχέδημος μὲν . . . Χρῆσιππος δὲ, βουλόμενος φιλοτενεῖν περὶ τὴν διαίρεσιν, ἐν μὲν τῷ Περὶ τοῦ κενοῦ καὶ ἄλλοις τισὶ "τὸ μὲν παρῳχημένον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλ' ὑφιστάναί" φησὶ, "μόνον δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεστηκός"· ἐν δὲ τῷ τρίτῳ καὶ τετάρτῳ καὶ πέμπτῳ Περὶ τῶν μερῶν τίθησι "τοῦ ἐνεστηκός χρόνου τὸ μὲν μέλλον εἶναι, τὸ δὲ παρεληλυθός." ὥστε συμβαίνει τὸ ὑπάρχον αὐτῶ τοῦ χρόνου διαεῖναι εἰς τὰ μὴ ὑπάρχοντα [τοῦ ὑπάρχοντος], μᾶλλον δὲ ὅλως τοῦ χρόνου μὴδὲν ἀπολείπειν ὑπάρχον, εἰ τὸ ἐνεστηκός οὐδὲν ἔχει μέρος ὃ μὴ μέλλον ἐστὶν ἢ παρῳχημένον. The view that time does not exist is expressed as follows by a Platonist in Plut. *De Ei arud Delph.* 19, 392 F: κινήτων γὰρ τι, καὶ κινουμένην συμφαναζόμενον ἕλη, καὶ βέον αἰεὶ καὶ μὴ στέγων, ὥσπερ ἀγγεῖον φθορᾶς καὶ γενέσεως, ὃ χρόνος· οὐ γὰρ δὴ τὸ μὲν ἔπειτα καὶ τὸ πρότερον, καὶ τὸ "ἔσται" λεγόμενον καὶ τὸ "ἦν" λεγόμενον, αὐτόθεν ἐξομολογήσῃς ἐστὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος· τὸ γὰρ [ἐν τῷ εἶναι] τὸ μὴδέπω γεγονός, ἢ πεπαυμένον ἦη τοῦ εἶναι, λέγειν ὡς ἐστίν, εὐθὺς καὶ ἀποποι. ᾧ δὲ μάλιστα τὴν νόσην ἐπερείδοντες [τοῦ χρόνου] (τὸν χρόνον (εἶναι λέγομεν)!) , τὸ "ἐνέστηκε" καὶ τὸ "πάρεστι", [(δ) καὶ τὸ νῦν φτεγγόμεθα,] τοῦτο αὐ πάλιν [ἀναδυόμενος] [ἀναλυόμενος?] ὃ λόγος ἀπόλλυσιν. ἐκθλίβεται γὰρ (τὸ νῦν) εἰς τὸ μέλλον καὶ τὸ παρῳχημένον, ὥσπερ [ἀκμῆ] βουλομένοις ἰδεῖν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης διιστάμενον.

³ Doubtless the Stoic Apollodorus who is frequently mentioned by Diog. Laert.

ἐνιαυτὸν ἐνεστηκέναι λέγομεν κατὰ μείζονα περιγραφὴν.¹ καὶ ὑπάρχειν ὁ πᾶς χρόνος λέγεται, οὐδενὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ὑπάρχοντος ἀπαρτιζόντως. Pseudo-Archytas (*ap. Simplic. in Arist. Phys.* 186 a (Mullach, *Fr. rh. Gr.* II. 118 a): τὸ δὲ πόκα καὶ ὁ χρόνος καθόλου μὲν ἴδιον ἔχει [τὸ ἀμερὲς καὶ] τὸ ἀνυπόστατον. τὸ γὰρ νῦν, ἀμερὲς ἐόν [καὶ λεγόμενον], ἅμα [καὶ] νοεῖμενον παρελήλυθε, καὶ οὐκ ἔντι παραμένον· γινόμενον γὰρ συνεχῶς, τωτὸ [μὲν]² οὐδέποκα σώσεται κατ' ἀριθμόν, κατὰ μέντοι γε τὸ εἶδος· ὁ γὰρ ἐνεστῶς νῦν χρόνος [καὶ ὁ μέλλων] οὐκ ἔντι αὐτὸς τῷ προγεγονότι, (οὐδὲ ὁ μέλλων τῷ ἐνεστῶτι)³ ὁ μὲν γὰρ (προγεγονῶς) ἀπογέγονε καὶ οὐκ ἔτι ἔντι, ὁ δὲ («ἐνεστακῶς») ἅμα νοεῖμενος [καὶ] [[ἐνεστακῶς]] παρῳχῆκε. καὶ οὕτως αἰεὶ συνάπτει τὸ νῦν,⁴ συνεχῶς ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γινόμενον καὶ φθειρόμενον, κατὰ μέντοι γε τὸ εἶδος τωτὸ. . . . ἔντι ὧν ὁ χρόνος συνεχῆς·⁵ οὐ γὰρ ἦς ποκα φύσις⁶ ὅποκα χρόνος οὐκ ἦς, οὐδὲ κίνασις ὅποκα τὸ νῦν οὐ παρῆς· ἀλλ' αἰεὶ ἦς καὶ ἐσσεῖται καὶ οὐδέποκα ἐπιλείψει τὸ νῦν, ἄλλο καὶ ἄλλο γινόμενον, καὶ ἀριθμῶ μὲν ἄτερον, εἶδει δὲ τωτὸν. διαφέρει δὲ [γραμμὰ] (χρόνος) τῶν ἄλλων συνέχεων, ὅτι τὰς μὲν γραμμᾶς καὶ τῷ χωρίῳ καὶ τῷ τόπῳ τὰ μέρη (ἅμα) ὑφέστακε, τῷ δὲ χρόνῳ τὰ μὲν γενόμενα ἔφθαρται, τὰ δὲ γενασόμενα [φθαρήσεται] (οὕτω ἔντι ᾖ).⁷

τὸν μὲν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον ἴσχεσθαι εἰς τὸ μηκέτι [ἴσχεσθαι εἰς τὸ μηκέτι] εἶναι τούτου¹, τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα μὴ ὑπάρχειν, ἐν τῷ μηδέπω παρῆναι. It would be possible to say ἴσχεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ ὄν, and perhaps οἴχ. εἰς τὸ μὴ εἶναι, but hardly οἴχ. εἰς τὸ μηκέτι εἶναι. It would be an improvement to write οἴσχεσθαι, ὥστε μηκέτι εἶναι. But even this would not be quite satisfactory. It is superfluous to tell us that ὁ παρεληλυθὼς οἴσχεται; and the statement that the past is not in existence, being the main point, ought to stand in the principal clause, and not merely to be brought in subordinately. It is most likely that the writer had in mind the passage of Chrysippus which is given by Stobaeus in the words μόνον ὑπάρχειν τὸν ἐνεστῶτα, τὸν δὲ παρῳχημένον καὶ τὸν μέλλοντα ὑφέσταναι μὲν, ὑπάρχειν δὲ οὐδαμῶς, and by Plutarch in the words τὸ μὲν παρῳχημένον τοῦ χρόνου καὶ τὸ μέλλον οὐχ ὑπάρχειν ἀλλ' ὑφέστηκέναι, μόνον δὲ ὑπάρχειν τὸ ἐνεστηκός. If so,

¹ Perhaps: ἐνεστάναι δὲ τὸν πάντα χρόνον («λέγοντες»), ὡς (καὶ) τὸν ἐνιαυτὸν ἐνεστηκέναι [[]], κατὰ μείζονα περιγραφὴν (λέγοντες).

² μὲν is out of place; we must either strike it out, or write τωτὸ («κατ' ἀριθμόν») μὲν οὐδέποκα σώσεται [[]], κατὰ μέντοι γε τὸ εἶδος (sc. τωτὸ σώσεται).

³ Cf. *Exc.* X. 5.

⁴ Cf. *Exc.* X. 4, ὁ παρεληλυθὼς συνάπτει τῷ ἐνεστῶτι κ.τ.λ.

⁵ Cf. *Exc.* X. 4.

⁶ Is φύσις right? And if so, what does it mean?

⁷ This passage occurs again, but written in Attic instead of Doric, in Simplicius *Comm. ad Categ.* 130 B.

he may have written something like τὸν μὲν παρεληλυθότα χρόνον μὴ ὑπάρχειν δῆλον ἐν τῷ οἴχεσθαι καὶ μηκέτι παρῆναι, τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα (*sc.* μὴ ὑπάρχειν δῆλον) ἐν τῷ μηδέπω παρῆναι. It seems necessary to insert δῆλον, or something of the sort, before the first ἐν τῷ (*cf.* Xen. *Cyr.* I. 6. 2: ὅτι οἱ θεοὶ . . . πέμπουσί σε, . . . δῆλον . . . ἐν οὐρανόις σημείοις). Otherwise, we should have to translate τὸν δὲ μέλλοντα μὴ ὑπάρχειν ἐν τῷ μηδέπω παρῆναι 'and that the future is not in existence *in respect of* (or *on account of*) its not yet being present'; but such a use of ἐν would be difficult to justify.

ἀλλὰ μὴδὲ τὸν ἐνεστῶτα 'συμπαρῆναι,¹ ἐν τῷ (μὴ) μένειν. συμπαρῆναι is probably a corruption of ὑπάρχειν; and I am inclined to think that -αι is a remnant of ἀπαρτιζόντως, 'exactly' or 'precisely'. *Cf.* Chrysippus *ap.* Stob.: ὅστε μὴθένα κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν ἐνεστάναι χρόνον, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πλάτος λέγεσθαι. Posidonius *ap.* Stob.: τὸ δὲ νῦν καὶ τὰ ὅμοια ἐν πλάτει [χρόνον] καὶ οὐχὶ κατ' ἀπαρτισμὸν νοεῖσθαι. Apollodorus *ap.* Stob.: ὑπάρχειν ὁ πᾶς χρόνος λέγεται, οὐδενὸς αὐτοῦ τῶν μερῶν ὑπάρχοντος ἀπαρτιζόντως.

ὁ μὴδὲ <<βοπήν>> ἐστάναι δυνάμενος. This is superfluous, being merely a repetition, in other words, of ὃς οὐχ ἔστηκεν, ἔχων οὐδὲ κέντρον μονήν; but it may nevertheless have been written by the author. The argument sounds more effective in Greek than in English, owing to the connexion between ἐνεστῶς and ἐστάναι.

EXCERPT XI

In the MSS. of Stobaeus, the document which I have named *Exc.* XI follows that which I have named *Exc.* II B without a break, as if it were a part of the same extract from the 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat'. But the contents of *Exc.* XI have nothing to do with those of *Exc.* II B; and from internal evidence it may be inferred with certainty that the two pieces were originally unconnected, and that *Exc.* XI was once headed by a superscription of its own. It is possible that the two documents had already been joined into one in the book of Ἐρμοῦ πρὸς Τὰτ λόγοι, before that book came into the hands of Stobaeus. But it seems more likely that Stobaeus read them in it as two distinct 'discourses', and copied these pieces into his *Anthologium* as two distinct excerpts; that he wrote a *lemma* (τοῦ αὐτοῦ, meaning Ἐρμοῦ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς Τάτ) at the head of the second; and that this *lemma* was subsequently lost by an error of transcription.

Exc. XI appears to be a complete *libellus*. Its writer makes

Hermes say that he has previously given instruction to his son in a number of discourses (διὰ πλειόνων λόγων, § 3), and that he now sums up the teaching of those discourses in the string of brief *sententiae* or aphorisms (κεφάλαια, §§ 1 and 3; περιοχαί, § 3) which we read in § 2, (1)-(48). This implies that the author of *Exc. XI* had in his possession a collection of written 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat', and that he wrote this *libellus* with the intention of placing it at the end of that collection, so that readers might find in the series of aphorisms contained in it a short and handy summary of the doctrines taught in the preceding λόγοι. The *sententiae* were no doubt meant to be learnt by heart (τούτων τῶν κεφαλαίων μεμνημένος κ.τ.λ., § 3), and to serve as a sort of catechism of the Hermetic philosophy. Compare the Epicurean Κύρια δόξαι, in which the essentials of the teaching of Epicurus are briefly formulated.¹

In §§ 4 and 5, the writer appends a warning with regard to the teaching contained in the collection of discourses (οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι, § 4) and summarized in the *sententiae*. That passage is to be taken as meaning that those who are permitted to read this body of *Hermetica* must be on their guard against making known the truths taught in it to any except the few who are worthy to receive them.

Exc. XI must certainly have been the last of a series of 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat'; but we do not know what that series was. It may have consisted of the whole number of those which were afterwards called οἱ γενικοί λόγοι, or of the earlier of them alone; or again, it may have included, together with the γενικοί, some or all of the διεξοδικοὶ λόγοι. (The word διεξήλθον in § 3 is suggestive of διεξοδικοί; but this may be merely accidental. Cf. διεξελεύσομαι in § 1.) If we could identify the sources from which the several *sententiae* were taken, we should have a list of the Ἐρμού πρὸς Τὰτ λόγοι which were known to the writer. But the brevity of the aphorisms, and the textual corruption of some of them, make it difficult to do this; and while some of the λόγοι in question are probably to be found among the extant *Hermetica*, it is to be presumed that others have perished.

¹ Lucian *Alexand.* 47: τὰς Ἐπικούρου Κυρίας δόξας, τὸ . . . κεφαλαῖωδῃ περιέχον (cf. κεφάλαια and περιοχαί in *Exc. XI*) τῆς ἀνδρὸς σοφίας τὰ δόγματα. But the Epicurean K. δόξαι are not nearly so concise as the *sententiae* of *Exc. XI*; and in respect of form, a closer analogy is to be found in a condensed summary of the first four K. δόξαι, which was known to Epicureans as ἡ τετραφάρμακος ('the fourfold remedy' for human ills); viz. ἀφοβὸν ὁ θεὸς ἀναίσθητον ὁ θάνατος· τὰ γὰρ θὼν εὐκτῆτον· τὸ δεινὸν εὐεκαρτέρητον. (*Voll. Herc.* Coll. alt. I, f. 148; Usener, *Epicurea*, p. 69.)

By what principles was the writer guided in the *arrangement* of his aphorisms? He certainly had a preference for grouping together *sententiae* which deal with the same topic, and especially those which have one or more prominent words in common (è. g. (2)-(5), *διαλυτά* and *αίδια σώματα*; (8) and (11)-(13), *ψυχή* and its functions; (18)-(21), *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν*; (25)-(29), *οὐρανός* and *γῆ*). But there are also a good many *sententiae* which have no apparent connexion with those adjacent to them; and topics already dealt with present themselves again later on. (È. g. *διαλυτά* and *αίδια σώματα* are spoken of again in (32)-(34), and *οὐρανός* and *γῆ* again (41)-(45).) It is very likely that there are some displacements and some interpolations; and if we had the document before us in its original form, we might find the arrangement of the *sententiae* somewhat more systematic; but it does not seem probable that there was any continuous sequence of thought running through the whole series. Perhaps the author after reading the first of the 'Discourses' in his collection, wrote down in a more or less orderly group the *sententiae* which it suggested to him, and then went on to deal in the same way with each of the other 'Discourses' in succession.

It is to be noted that most of the *sententiae* have to do with the Kosmos alone, and not with the supracosmic God. They speak, for the most part, of things visible, not of things invisible; and the contrast on which the writer most strongly insists is not the Platonic contrast between the corporeal (= τὰ αἰσθητά) and the incorporeal (= τὰ νοητά), but that between the two parts of the corporeal world (*οὐρανός* and *γῆ*, *αίδια σώματα* and *διαλυτά σώματα*). The writer does not indeed wholly ignore the incorporeal; he shows recognition of it in (1) (τὸ ἄσώματον?), (6) and (7) (ὁ θεός contrasted with ὁ κόσμος), (16) (μόνον τὸ ἄσώματον ἀψευδές), and (46) (*πρόνοια* distinguished from *ἀνάγκη*); and in the doctrine that the Kosmos, the elements, and the celestial gods 'have come into being' or 'have been made', which is implied in (5), (17), and (31), the existence of a supracosmic Maker is virtually asserted. This is enough to show that the author of the *sententiae*, like the Hermetists in general, believed in an incorporeal and supracosmic God, and was in that fundamental point a true Platonist; but about that part of his belief, he says little. This may be accounted for by assuming that he wrote the *sententiae* chiefly for the use of novices. The pupil must first be taught to understand the Kosmos and the things in it; he must learn to despise all that is earthly and perishable, and to revere the immortal gods who circle

in the material heavens. When that part of his education has been completed, he will then be ready to rise above the material Kosmos, and draw near to the supracosmic God. See *Exc.* II B. 2. 4, where a lower and a higher stage of philosophy are distinguished.

§ 1. (ἐν) κεφαλαίοις πάντα (τὰ ὄντα MSS.) διεξιέεσσομαι. If we retain τὰ ὄντα, we must translate: 'I will expound in summary sentences the things that are'. But διεξιέναι does not suit well with ἐν κεφαλαίοις; for it implies ample and detailed rather than concise and summary treatment. This difficulty can be got rid of by altering τὰ ὄντα into πάντα, and taking the meaning to be 'I will go through all (the things that I have taught you), summing them up in brief sentences'. Hermes intends to give only the main principles of his teaching, and to state them concisely (ἐν κεφαλαίοις); but he will give *all* the main principles, and in that way he will cover the whole ground (πάντα διεξιεύσομαι).

§ 2 (1). πάντα τὰ σώματα (τὰ ὄντα MSS.) κινεῖται· μόνον τὸ ἀσώματον (τὸ μὴ ὄν MSS.) ἀκίνητον. The statement πάντα τὰ ὄντα κινεῖται agrees with (10) as emended (πάν τὸ ὄν κινήτον); but it is contradicted by (11) as emended (οὐ πάντα κινεῖται); and it is hardly consistent with (37) as emended (τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι, τὰ δὲ κ.τ.λ.). It can be accepted only if we take τὰ ὄντα to mean *corporeal* things, and neither to mean nor to include the ὄντως ὄντα of the Platonists. τὰ ὄντα is sometimes used by Hermetists to denote corporeal things; but what could be meant by saying that 'the non-existent is immovable'? τὸ μὴ ὄν could not mean 'things which exist but are incorporeal'; and unless we give it that sense, the second clause is difficult to explain. It seems most likely therefore that ὄντα and μὴ ὄν are false readings for σώματα and ἀσώματον. (Cf. *Corp.* XII. i. (*to Tat*) 11: πάν γὰρ τὸ κινῶν ἀσώματον, πάν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον σῶμα. *Corp.* XI. ii. 18, as emended: πάν σῶμα κινήτον· τὸ δὲ ἀσώματον ἀκίνητον.) And this is confirmed by the fact that σώματα are spoken of in the next *sententia*. If we thus emend the text, *sent.* (1), in which σώματα are distinguished from ἀσώματα, is naturally followed by (2)-(5), in which the two kinds of σώματα are distinguished from one another.

All bodies are in motion; even in bodies which are apparently motionless for a time, invisible movement is continually going on. See *Exc.* III. (*to Tat*) 7-10; and cf. *Corp.* XII. ii. (*to Tat*) 18: πάν

. . . ἴσθι . . . τὸ δὲ ἐν κόσμῳ (= πᾶν σῶμα) κινούμενον [ἢ κατὰ μείωσιν ἢ ἀΐξῃσιν].

The *ἀσώματα* here spoken of are chiefly, if not solely, ὁ θεός, νοῦς, and ψυχή. Of these, God at least is ἀκίνητος (cf. *Corp.* V. (to *Tat*) 5, θεάσασθαι τὸν ἀκίνητον (sc. τὸν θεόν) διὰ (τῶν κινήτων) κινούμενον); it would commonly be said that νοῦς is ἀκίνητος; and in *Corp.* II. (to *Ascl.*) 6 b, we are told that ψυχή also is ἀκίνητος, though the Platonists usually preferred to say that it is ἀεικίνητος and αὐτοκίνητος. Compare Pseudo-Archytas Περὶ ἀρχῶν, Stob. 1. 41. 5, vol. i, p. 282 W.: νοσὰτὰ μὲν τὰ ἀκίνητα, αἰσθατὰ δὲ τὰ κινούμενα.

(2) πᾶν σῶμα μεταβλητόν· οὐ πᾶν σῶμα διαλυτόν. This *sententia* may have been suggested by *Exc.* II (to *Tat*); see especially II A. 13. The bodies which are μεταβλητά but not διαλυτά are τὰ αἰδία σώματα; i. e. the Kosmos as a whole, the four cosmic elements, and the heavenly bodies. Cf. *Corp.* XVI. (*Ascl.* to *Ammon*) 9: παντὸς γὰρ σώματος διαμονὴ μεταβολή, καὶ τοῦ μὲν ἀθανάτου ἀδιάλυτος, τοῦ δὲ θνητοῦ μετὰ διαλύσεως.

(3) Ἦ οὐ πᾶν ζῶον θνητόν· οὐ πᾶν ζῶον ἀθάνατον¹. The author cannot have written such a pointless truism as οὐ πᾶν ζῶον ἀθάνατον. The first οὐ should be struck out; the form employed was probably πᾶν . . ., οὐ πᾶν . . ., as in (2). θνητόν in the first clause may be a corruption of γενητόν; and we might make sense by writing πᾶν ζῶον γενητόν· οὐ πᾶν ζῶον θνητόν. (Cf. *Corp.* IV. (to *Tat*) 2: τὸν ἄνθρωπον, (εἰκόνα) ζῴου ἀθανάτου ζῶον θνητόν.) The αἰδία σώματα are ζῶα γενητά; for they have been made and endowed with life by God. But they are not ζῶα θνητά; they will never perish, and their life will never cease.

As *sent.* (3) stands between and separates two *sententiae* in which the word διαλυτόν is prominent, it may be suspected that it is out of place. If γενητόν is the right word in (3), this *sententia* might very well be followed by (5), which deals with τὸ γινόμενον; we should therefore get a better order by interchanging (3) and (4).

(4) μόνον τὸ ἀδιάλυτον (τὸ μένον ἀμετάβλητον MSS.) αἰδίων. For μόνον τό, cf. (1). The writer appears to be talking about bodies, and we have just been told that there are no bodies which are ἀμετάβλητα; I have therefore altered ἀμετάβλητον into ἀδιάλυτον.

(5) τὸ αἰεὶ γινόμενον αἰεὶ καὶ φθείρεται. All διαλυτὰ σώματα, i. e. all earthly organisms (e. g. the human body), αἰεὶ γίνονται. This

might be taken to mean either that the individual body is continually renewed by the absorption of fresh nutriment, or that the race is continually renewed by the birth of fresh individuals. But where γένεσις is going on, φθορά also must be going on; the individual body is continually perishing, and the race is continually dying in the successive deaths of individuals.

The interdependence of γένεσις and φθορά is spoken of in *Exc.* II A. (*to Tat*) 16. Cf. *Exc.* IV A. (*to Tat*) 3: ὄσων μὲν οὖν (σωμάτων) τῇ γενέσει φθορὰ ἐπακολουθεῖ κ.τ.λ.

τὸ δὲ ἀπαξ γενόμενον (γινόμενον MSS.) οὐδέποτε φθείρεται. This is the teaching of Plato's *Timaeus*,—at least if the statements of the speaker in that dialogue are taken literally, as they were by most readers, though some Platonists refused to accept them in that sense. The Kosmos γέγονε (*Tim.* 28 c), or ἀπαξ ἐγένετο; it was made by God once for all; but its Maker has decreed that, having once come into being, it shall never cease to be. Cf. *Corp.* VIII. (*to Tat*) 2, as emended: (ὁ κόσμος) ἀείζωος ὢν, ὡς ἀθανατιζόμενος ὑπὸ ἀδίδου ὄντος τοῦ πατρός. And the same might be said of the cosmic elements and the heavenly bodies. *Exc.* V. (*to Tat*) I, 2: ὁ μὲν . . . δημιουργὸς τῶν ἀδίδων σωμάτων . . . ἀπαξ ποιήσας κ.τ.λ.

(6) πρῶτον ὁ θεός, δεύτερον ὁ κόσμος, τρίτον ὁ ἄνθρωπος. This may have been taken from *Corp.* VIII. (*to Tat*) 2 and 5: πρῶτος γὰρ πάντων . . . (ὁ) . . . θεός· δεύτερος δὲ (ὁ κόσμος). . . τὸ δὲ τρίτον [[]] ὁ ἄνθρωπος. Cf. *Corp.* X. (*to Tat*) 14 b and 22 b.

(7) Ἦ ὁ κόσμος διὰ τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τὸν θεόν¹. Does this mean 'the Kosmos (was made) for the sake of Man, and Man (was made) for the sake of God'? That will not do; for it implies the order 'God first, Man second, Kosmos third', and is therefore inconsistent with (6). The author probably wrote something like ὁ κόσμος ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ (*sc.* γέγονε οἱ διοικεῖται), ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος διὰ τοῦ κόσμου. God works on the Kosmos directly and immediately, but he works on man through the intermediate agency of the Kosmos. That would agree with the teaching of the *Timaeus*, according to which the Kosmos was made by God, but man (or at least the mortal part of him) was made by 'the gods whom God had made', i. e. by the cosmic forces. Cf. *Corp.* X. (*to Tat*) 25: διὰ τούτων τὰ πάντα διοικεῖται τῶν δύο, κόσμου καὶ ἀνθρώπου, ὑπὸ δὲ ἐνὸς τοῦ θεοῦ (ὑπὸ δὲ τοῦ ἐνὸς MSS.) τὰ πάντα.

(9) [πᾶσα οὐσία ἀθάνατος·] πᾶσα οὐσία μεταβλητή· (οὐ πᾶσα οὐσία φθαρτή). The only things that are both ἀθάνατα and μεταβλητά are the αἰδία σώματα. The reading of the MSS. could therefore be made intelligible only by taking οὐσία to mean αἰδιον σῶμα; but there is no authority for such a use of the word.

If πᾶσα οὐσία (= πᾶν τὸ ὄν) here means πᾶν σῶμα, this *sententia*, in the form in which I have rewritten it, is a duplicate of (2). Compare also (17).

(10) πᾶν τὸ ὄν κινητόν (διττόν MSS.)· οὐδὲν τῶν ὄντων ἔστηκεν. This is, in part, a repetition of *sent.* (1) as given in the MSS. (πάντα τὰ ὄντα κινεῖται· μόνον τὸ μὴ ὄν ἀκίνητον); and it is necessary either to alter τὸ ὄν . . . τῶν ὄντων into σῶμα . . . τῶν σωμάτων, as I have there altered τὰ ὄντα into σώματα, or to assume that τὸ ὄν here means σῶμα. As the difficulty caused by τὸ μὴ ὄν in (1) does not arise in (10), the traditional text is less open to objection in the latter.

(11) οὐ πάντα κινεῖται, πᾶν δὲ τὸ κινούμενον ψυχῇ κινεῖται. (οὐ πάντα ψυχῇ κινεῖται, πᾶν δὲ ὄν ψυχῇ κινεῖ MSS.). In the text of the MSS., there is an impossible antithesis between πάντα and πᾶν τὸ ὄν.

'Not all things are moved.' The Hermetist would presumably have said that πάντα τὰ σώματα κινεῖται, but τὰ ἀσώματα, or at any rate some of them (e.g. ὁ θεός and ὁ νοῦς), are ἀκίνητα. (See (1).) But οὐ πάντα κινεῖται is difficult to reconcile with the preceding *sententia* (πᾶν τὸ ὄν κινητόν κ.τ.λ.), which is, verbally at least, contradicted by it; and I am inclined to think that the first clause of (11) has been added with a view to assimilating the form of this *sententia* to that of most of the others, and that the author wrote simply πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον ψυχῇ κινεῖται. For this statement, which is ultimately derived from Pl. *Phaedrus* 245 C, D (τοῖς ἄλλοις ὅσα κινεῖται τοῦτο (sc. ἡ ψυχῇ) πηγῇ καὶ ἀρχῇ κινήσεως), cf. *Corp.* II. (to *Ascl.*) 1, πᾶν τὸ κινούμενον . . . κινεῖται . . . ὑπὸ τινός, and *ib.* 8 b, 9.

⟨⟨(8) ψυχῆς τὸ μὲν αἰσθητ(ικ)ὸν θνητόν, τὸ δὲ λογικὸν ἀθάνατον.⟩⟩ This is the doctrine of the *Timaeus*. It is only the νοῦς or λογιστικόν (the part of man that has come direct from God) that is immortal; the αἰσθητικόν has come into being together with the body, and perishes with the body.

If we place (8) between (11) and (12), *sententia* (10)–(13) form a connected group, in which each *sententia* leads on to the next by a natural sequence of thought.

(12) [πᾶν τὸ πάσχον αἰσθεται·] πᾶν τὸ αἰσθ(αν)όμενον πάσχει· (μόνος) ⟨⟨ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθής.⟩⟩ The statement that 'everything which is passively

affected is sensitive' could hardly be maintained. A stone *πάσχει* when I break it; but most people would not say that a stone *αἰσθάνεται*; though it is true that something of the sort seems to be asserted in *Exc.* III. 17.

In (15), the MSS. give *ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθής*, which is there irrelevant; and as *ἀπαθής* may very well stand in contrast to *πάσχει*, and *νοῦς* to *αἰσθησις* or *τὸ αἰσθανόμενον*, it seems most likely that (*μόνος*) *ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθής* was the latter part of (12). In *Corp.* XII. i. (*to Tat*) 11, the question whether *νοῦς* is *ἀπαθής* or *παθητός* is discussed; the conclusion there arrived at appears to be that embodied *νοῦς* (i. e. the *νοῦς* of a man living upon earth) is *παθητός*, but unembodied *νοῦς* is *ἀπαθής*.

αἰσθομαι sometimes occurs, in MSS. at least, as a later form of *αἰσθάνομαι*. We have no means of knowing whether the Hermetist used that form or not; but as there would be an advantage in distinguishing the present participle (which is required here) from the aorist *αἰσθόμενον*, it is probable that he wrote *αἰσθανόμενον*.

(13) *πάν τὸ λυπούμενον καὶ ἤδεται []*: *οὐδὲ πᾶν τὸ ἠδόμενον λυπεῖται []*. If we retain *οὐ*, the second clause means that some beings (e. g. God, or *νοῦς*, or the celestial gods) feel pleasure unaccompanied by pain. But *ἠδονή* is usually limited to the lower forms of pleasure; and inasmuch as it is a *πάθος*, to say that *νοῦς ἠδεται* would be inconsistent with saying that *νοῦς* is *ἀπαθής*. It seems probable then that the Hermetist, if he spoke of *ἠδονή* and *λύπη* together, would put them on a par; and he may perhaps have said that pain is always accompanied or followed by pleasure, and *pleasure by pain*.¹ This meaning might be got by striking out *οὐ*, and writing *πάν τὸ ἠδόμενον (καὶ) λυπεῖται*. That, however, is not quite satisfactory; for why should this connexion between pleasure and pain be insisted on as a leading principle of the Hermetic doctrine?

[*ζῶον θνητὸν*] . . . [*ζῶον αἰδίου*]. The person who inserted these words apparently took the *sententia* to mean that the *θνητὰ ζῶα* feel both pain and pleasure, but the *αἰδία ζῶα* feel pleasure and do not feel pain.

(14) *οὐδὲ πᾶν σῶμα νοσεῖ*: *πᾶν σῶμα νοσοῦν διαλυτόν*. 'Not all bodies are diseased' implies that *τὰ αἰδία σώματα* are not diseased. That is doubtless true; but was it worth while to say it? As (13) also, in its present form, is somewhat dubious, I am inclined to suspect that (13) and (14) have been produced by the expansion of a single

¹ As to the inseparable connexion between pleasure (of the lower sort) and pain, see Pl. *Phaedo* 60 c, where Socrates, speaking of *τὸ ἡδύ* and *τὸ λυπηρόν*, says *ἢ ἂν τὸ ἕτερον παραγένηται, ἐπακολουθεῖ ἕστερον καὶ τὸ ἕτερον*.

sententia, which ran thus: $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \tau\acute{o} \lambdaυ\pi\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu [] \nu\omicron\sigma\epsilon\acute{\iota} \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha \nu\omicron\sigma\omicron\upsilon\nu$ (or $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \tau\acute{o} \nu\omicron\sigma\omicron\upsilon\nu$) *διαλυτόν*. Having in us an *αισθητικόν*, we feel pain; and every pang of pain is an intimation that (*quia αισθητικοί*) we are mortal.

(15) $\delta \nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \theta\epsilon\acute{\omega}$ [$\delta \lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omega$] $\delta \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \nu\omicron\acute{\iota}$. $\delta \lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma$ would mean the function $\tau\acute{o} \lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ (= $\delta \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\iota\omicron\varsigma \nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$), the rational or intelligent part of the human soul. But $\delta \lambda\omicron\gamma\iota\sigma\mu\acute{o}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \acute{\alpha}\nu\theta\rho\acute{\omega}\pi\omega$ is most likely a corrupted doublet of $\delta \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \nu\omicron\acute{\iota}$ ($\nu\omicron\acute{\iota}$ having been altered into $\acute{\alpha}\nu\psi$.)

With this *sententia* should be compared *Corp.* XII. i. (*to Tat*) 13 a: $\delta \omicron\upsilon\acute{\nu} \lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\varsigma$ (speech) $\acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu \epsilon\iota\kappa\acute{\omega}\nu$ ($\tau\omicron\upsilon \nu\omicron\acute{\iota}$), $\kappa\alpha\iota (\delta) \nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \tau\omicron\upsilon \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon$. *Ib.* 13 b, the MSS. give $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu \delta\epsilon \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \nu\acute{\omega}$, which agrees with *sent.* (15); but the original reading there was probably $\theta\epsilon\omicron\nu \delta\epsilon \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \nu\acute{\omega}$,¹ in which the relation between $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ and $\theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma$ as stated in *sent.* (15) is reversed. It is possible, however, that $\lambda\omicron\gamma\omicron\nu$ had already been substituted for $\theta\epsilon\omicron\nu$ in *Corp.* XII. i. 13 b before these *sententiae* were written.

'A is in B' probably here means 'A is to B as a part to the whole'. The human $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$ is a part of God (cf. *Corp.* XII. i *init.*, $\delta \nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\xi \acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma \tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma \tau\omicron\upsilon \theta\epsilon\omicron\upsilon \omicron\upsilon\sigma\iota\acute{\alpha}\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\sigma\tau\iota\nu$); and the human faculty of speech (or reasoning) is a part of the human $\nu\omicron\upsilon\varsigma$.

(16) $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu \acute{\alpha}\lambda\theta\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ ($\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon} \acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota \acute{\alpha}\lambda\theta\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ MSS.) $\mu\acute{o}\nu\omicron\nu \tau\acute{o} \acute{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ ($\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\sigma\omega\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega \tau\acute{o} \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \acute{\alpha}\psi\epsilon\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\varsigma$ MSS.). It is not $\tau\acute{o} \acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$, 'that which is embodied' (e.g. the incarnated soul), that is unreal, but body itself, or the corporeal. And $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\sigma\omega\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$ presents a similar difficulty. It therefore seems necessary to write $\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha$ or $\sigma\omega\mu\alpha\tau\iota\kappa\acute{o}\nu$ in place of $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\iota$, and $\acute{\alpha}\sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\omicron\nu$ in place of $\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\sigma\omega\mu\acute{\alpha}\tau\omega$. Compare the misreadings in (37).

This *sententia* sums up the teaching of *Exc.* II A (*to Tat*).

(17) $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \tau\acute{o} \gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu \mu\epsilon\tau\alpha\beta\lambda\eta\tau\acute{o}\nu$ $\omicron\upsilon \pi\acute{\alpha}\nu \tau\acute{o} \gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\omicron\nu \phi\theta\alpha\rho\tau\acute{o}\nu$. Cf. (2)-(5), $\tau\acute{\alpha} \gamma\epsilon\nu\acute{o}\mu\epsilon\nu\alpha$ are $\tau\acute{\alpha} \sigma\acute{\omega}\mu\alpha\tau\alpha$. The *διαλυτά σώματα* are both *μεταβλητά* and *φθαρτά*; the *αίδια σώματα* are *μεταβλητά* but not *φθαρτά*.

Sent. (17) may have been suggested by *Exc.* II A. 13; and perhaps this may account for its being placed next to (16), which is a summary of *Exc.* II A.

(18) $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\pi\iota \tau\acute{\eta}\varsigma \gamma\acute{\eta}\varsigma$ $\omicron\upsilon\delta\acute{\epsilon}\nu \kappa\alpha\kappa\acute{o}\nu \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \omicron\upsilon\rho\alpha\nu\acute{\omega}$. *Sententiae* (18)-(21) deal with the contrast between *ἀγαθόν* and *κακόν*. In *Exc.* II A, we are told that there is nothing *ἀληθές* on earth, and (*ib.* 9) that $\acute{\eta} \acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{\eta}\theta\epsilon\iota\alpha$ is $\acute{\alpha}\upsilon\tau\acute{o} \tau\acute{o} \acute{\alpha}\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\omicron\nu \acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\theta\acute{o}\nu$; so that this topic also may

¹ Cf. *Corp.* XI. i. 4 b: $\delta \mu\acute{\epsilon}\nu \theta\epsilon\omicron\varsigma \acute{\epsilon}\nu \tau\acute{\omega} \nu\acute{\omega}$.

possibly have been suggested by that same *libellus*. In *Corp.* X (*to Tat*) also, the words *ἀγαθός* and *κακός* are prominent.

'There is nothing good on earth.' This is strongly asserted in *Corp.* VI (*to Ascl.*). But in that document, as well as in *Corp.* II (*to Ascl.*) *sub fin.*, it is not the corporeal heaven, but the incorporeal God, that is spoken of in contrast to the lower world in which we live, and the leading thought is 'God is good, man (as an earthly organism) is bad', or 'the incorporeal is good, the corporeal is bad'.

The words *οὐδὲν κακὸν ἐν οὐρανῷ* may be compared with *Corp.* X. 10 b (as emended): *οὐ κακὸς ὁ κόσμος*. But the writer of *Corp.* X adds *οὐκέτι δὲ ἀγαθός, ὑλικὸς γάρ*; whereas in the *sententiae* it is implied that *ὁ οὐρανός* is *ἀγαθός*.

(19) *ὁ θεὸς ἀγαθός· ὁ ἄνθρωπος κακός*. This agrees verbally with *Corp.* VI, II, and X; but there is nothing to tell us whether the writer meant by *ὁ θεός* the incorporeal God, or the corporeal gods who circle in the heavens, and who are spoken of as *οἱ θεοί* in (21). *ὁ ἄνθρωπος* means *οἱ ἄνθρωποι*; and *ὁ θεός*, being coupled to it, might here mean *οἱ θεοί*.

(20) *τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκούσιον, τὸ κακὸν ἀκούσιον*. This is based on the saying of Socrates, that vice is ignorance (of the good), and is therefore involuntary. Compare the verse quoted in *Ar. Eth. Nic.* 3. 5, 1113 b 15: *οὐδεὶς ἐκὼν πονηρός, οὐδ' ἄκων μάκαρ*. (Aristotle disputes the first clause, and maintains that *ἡ μοχθηρία ἐκούσιόν ἐστι*.) Some of the Hermetists expressed a similar thought by saying that he who has attained to *γνώσις* is free from *εἰμαρμένη*, but all other men are in subjection to *εἰμαρμένη*. Cf. (26), *οὐδὲν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐλεύθερον*.

(21) *οἱ θεοὶ τὰ ἀγαθὰ αἰροῦνται· (οἱ ἄνθρωποι τὰ κακὰ αἰροῦνται) ὡς ἀγαθὰ*. The astral gods act by free choice (*οὐδὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ δοῦλον*, (26) but choose the good, and so, act always in accordance with God's will. For the second clause, cf. *Corp.* VI. (*to Ascl.*) 3 b: *ἕκαστον τούτων . . . πεπίστευται ἐνθάδε μέγιστον εἶναι ἀγαθόν, τὸ μᾶλλον ἀνυπέβλητον κακόν*. *Ib.* 6: *τὸ κακὸν πιστεύσαντα ἀγαθὸν εἶναι*.

Sententiae (18), (19), (21), and (29) should be compared with *Exc.* VII. (*to Tat*) 2.

(22)-(24) *Ἡ εὐνομία . . . ἀνθρώπου φθορά*¹. This is one mass of corruption. As a guess, I propose (22) *ἡ εὐνομία μετὰ θεοῦ ὁμόνοια· ἡ ἀνομία (πρὸς θεὸν ἔρις)*. (23) *νόμος θεῖος ἀρετή (οἱ εὐνομία)· νόμος ἀνθρώπινος κακία (οἱ ἀνομία)*. (24) *ὁ χρόνος κόσμου στροφή· ὁ χρόνος*

ἀνθρώπου φθορά. *Sententiae* (22) and (23), when thus rewritten, have to do with the good and bad in human action, and so continue the topic of (18)–(21). For νόμος θεῖος, cf. Porphyry. *Ad Marcellam* 25 f.: τρεῖς δὲ νόμοι διακεκρίσθωσαν οἷδε· εἷς μὲν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ, ἕτερος δὲ ὁ τῆς θνητῆς φύσεως, τρίτος δὲ ὁ θετὸς κατ' ἔθνη καὶ πόλεις. . . ὁ δὲ γὰρ θεῖος ἀγνοεῖται μὲν ψυχῇ δι' ἀφροσύνην καὶ ἀκολασίαν ἀκαθάρτου, ἐκλάμπει δὲ δι' ἀπαθείας καὶ φρονήσεως.

In (24), *τρυφή* may be a corruption of *στροφή* or *περιστροφή*. Time is measured by the revolving movement of the heavenly bodies, and was often said by the Greeks to be constituted by that movement.

The movement of the Kosmos, being cyclic, is unending; but to men the lapse of time brings destruction (ὁ χρόνος ἀνθρώπου φθορά).

(25) πᾶν (τὸ) ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀμετάθετον· πᾶν τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς μεταθετόν. Human decrees and resolves may be altered or annulled; but the star-gods, in their movements and workings, maintain a law which is unalterable.

This unalterable working of the star-gods, through which the will of the supreme God finds fulfilment in all physical processes in the sublunar world, is frequently denoted by the term *εἰμαρμένη*. See *Ascl. Lat.* III. 40 a.

(26) οὐδὲν ἐν οὐρανῷ δοῦλον· οὐδὲν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐλεύθερον. Cf. *Exc.* III. (*to Tat*) 8: αὕτη οὖν ἡ διαφορὰ ἀθανάτου σώματος καὶ θνητοῦ, ὅτι . . . τὸ μὲν, . . . ἐλεύθερον (ὄν), ἄγει, τὸ δὲ, . . . δοῦλον (ὄν), φέρεται. *Corp.* I. 15: (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) (εἰμαρμένης) γέγονε δοῦλος. All corporeal things on earth are subject to *εἰμαρμένη*, i. e. to the working of the star-gods; man therefore, as long as the corporeal predominates in him, is a slave of *εἰμαρμένη*. But the star-gods are not slaves; (they act in accordance with God's will, but willing accordance with God's will is not *δουλεία*;) and man also, in virtue of the divine element in him, may, after death at least, if not in this life, 'join the company of the celestial gods' (*Corp.* X. 7), and be free, as they are free.

How is οὐδὲν ἐπὶ γῆς ἐλεύθερον in (26) to be reconciled with πᾶν τὸ ἐπὶ γῆς μεταθετόν in (25)? It might be objected that if the movements of the heavenly bodies (τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ) are ἀμετάθετα, and all corporeal things on earth are governed by the movements of the heavenly bodies, then τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς also must be ἀμετάθετα. How can that which is determined by *εἰμαρμένη* be μεταθετόν?

To this objection a Hermetist might perhaps reply that a man's will may be variable without being free, and indeed only ceases to be variable when it becomes free. As long as he is in subjection to

his earthly body and the things of the body, he is driven to and fro by the *πάθη* (desires and aversions) generated in his soul by bodily processes ; he shifts and changes, wills one thing to-day and another to-morrow ; and so his aims and actions are *μεταθετά*. But when he escapes from this servitude, his will no longer varies ; for like that of the celestial gods, it is harmonized with the will of God, and unalterably fixed upon the Good.

There remains however a further difficulty. If τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς are worked by τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ, and τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ are good, how is it that τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς are bad? (οὐδὲν ἀγαθὸν ἐπὶ γῆς, (18).) If all things on earth (including the *πάθη* of the man who is in subjection to *εἰμαρμένη*) are wrought by the *δὲ caelestes*, who are good, it ought to follow that all things on earth are good. A Hermetist, if he was conscious of this difficulty, could evade it only by having recourse to the Platonic conception of *ἄτακτος ὕλη*. God and his ministers the star-gods do the best that can be done ; but they cannot eliminate evil in the sublunar world, because the matter on which they have to work is, in part at least, irremediably evil. See *Ascl. Lat.* II. 16 a.

(27) οὐδὲν ἀγνωστον ἐν οὐρανῷ· οὐδὲν γνώριμον ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς. We might have expected rather to be told that *God*, or *the Good*, cannot be (fully) known on earth, but only in heaven ; that is, that perfect *gnosis* (of God or the Good) is possible for men only when they have quitted the earthly body and ascended to heaven. (That is what is taught in *Corp.* X, for instance.) But the object of the knowledge here spoken of is not God or the Good, but 'anything'. For man, as long as he remains on earth, true knowledge (not merely knowledge of God, or of all things, but even knowledge of any one thing) is impossible ; what he thinks to be knowledge is only a dim and doubtful opinion. As *γνώσις* is correlative to *ἀλήθεια*, this statement is connected with the thesis maintained in *Exc.* II A, *ἀληθὲς οὐδὲν ἐν τῇ γῆ*. (Cf. *sent.* (16).) Perhaps the writer may have been thinking of the saying of Socrates, 'I know that I know nothing'.

(28) οὐ κοινωνεῖ (τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς· κοινωνεῖ) τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ. The Stoics were accustomed to say that there is *κοινωνία* between God and man, or between the gods (= τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ) and men. (See *Corp.* X. 22 b, and *Ascl. Lat.* I. 5.) But the point on which the writer of the *sententiae* insists is that in this *κοινωνία* the two parties are not on equal terms ; men are dependent on the gods, but the gods (being *ἀνεκδέεις*) are not dependent upon men. *Sententiae* (38), (40), and (41) are to the same effect.

(29) πάντα τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἄμωμα· πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐπίμωμα. The primary meaning of μῶμος seems to have been 'a bodily blemish'. μωμοσκόπος (Philo) means 'one who looks for blemishes' in sacrificial victims. Cf. *Orac. Sib.* I. 351: νοσερούς ἰήσεται ἢ δ' ἐπιμώμους. (ἐπιμωμούς, literally 'having blemishes upon them', is there coupled with νοσερούς, and stands on a par with τυφλοί, χωλοί, and κωφοί in the following lines. Leprosy, for instance, would be a μῶμος.) If so, μωμᾶσθαι must have meant 'to find or point out blemishes' in a person; and thence must have come the secondary sense of μῶμος, 'blame'.

(30) Ἐτὸ ἀθάνατον οὐ θνητόν· τὸ θνητόν οὐκ ἀθάνατον.¹ Possibly: τὸ ἀθάνατον οὐ (παθητόν· μόνον τὸ) θνητόν (πάσχει). Cf. (12) as emended: πᾶν τὸ αἰσθανόμενον πάσχει· μόνος ὁ νοῦς ἀπαθής. In the human soul, τὸ θνητόν is τὸ αἰσθανόμενον, and τὸ ἀθάνατον is ὁ νοῦς. (See (8).) From the loss (through *homoioteleuton*) of the words παθητόν μόνον τό, the silly statement τὸ ἀθάνατον οὐ θνητόν would result; and we may suppose that some one tried to complete the damaged *sententia* by adding the equally silly statement τὸ θνητόν οὐκ ἀθάνατον.

(31) τὸ σπαρέν οὐ πάντως θνητόν (γενητόν MSS.)· τὸ δὲ θνητόν (γενητόν MSS.) πάντως καὶ σπαρέν. The reading of the MSS. is impossible; for anything that is σπαρέν ('begotten') necessarily ἐγένετο. If we write θνητόν in place of γενητόν, this *sententia* repeats what was said in (5). The 'everlasting bodies' ἐσπάρη (= ἄπαξ ἐγένετο), but are not θνητά (= οὐδέποτε φθείρεται).

(32) διαλυτοῦ σώματος δύο χρόνοι, ὁ ἄπὸ τῆς σποράς μέχρι τῆς γενέσεως¹ καὶ ὁ ἄπὸ τῆς γενέσεως μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου. [τοῦ] αἰδίου σώματος χρόνος ἕκ τῆς γενέσεως μόνος. σπορά, if distinguished from γένεσις, must mean 'begetting' as opposed to 'birth'; so that the text of the MSS. must be taken to mean 'a dissoluble body (e.g. the body of a man or animal) has two times, that of its existence as an embryo, and that of its life from birth to death; an everlasting body (e.g. the Kosmos, the element fire, or the sun) has one time only, which began when it was made by the Demiurgus'. That amounts to saying that an earthly organism has, and an 'everlasting body' has not, an embryonic stage of existence. But why should any one want to call attention to this insignificant point of difference between the two kinds of bodies? (See *Addenda* in vol. iv.)

I am inclined to think that the author must have written something like διαλυτοῦ σώματος δύο χρόνοι, ὁ τῆς ἀγζήσεως καὶ ὁ τῆς μειώσεως· αἰδίου σώματος χρόνος ὁ τῆς ταγτότητος μόνος. (Note that αὔξησις and

μείωσις are spoken of in the following *sententia* (33). But (32), emended as I propose, would be an amplification of the thought expressed in (33), and ought therefore to follow (33) rather than to precede it.) A 'dissoluble body' passes through two successive stages, a stage of growth (which lasts from birth to maturity), and a stage of diminution or decay (which lasts from maturity to death). An 'everlasting body', when it has once come into being, persists, not indeed without change of any kind, (for it is μεταβλητόν, *sent.* (2),) but without that kind of change which is called αὔξεισις καὶ μείωσις.

Assuming that this was the original wording of the *sententia*, we might account for the text of the MSS. by supposing that some one added ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς σπορᾶς μέχρι τῆς τελειότητος as a note in explanation of ὁ τῆς αὔξεσεως, and ὁ ἀπὸ τῆς τελειότητος μέχρι τοῦ θανάτου as a note in explanation of ὁ τῆς μείωσεως; and that γένεσεως, having been written as an alternative for σπορᾶς, was afterwards wrongly substituted for τελειότητος (*bis*) and ταυτότητος.

Cf. *Corp.* VIII. (*to Tat*) 4, as emended: αὕτη δὲ ἡ ἀταξία (*sc.* ἡ τῆς αὔξεσεως καὶ μειώσεως) περὶ τὰ ἐπίγεια ζῶα (the bodies of which are διαλυτά) γίνεται. τῶν γὰρ οὐρανίων τὰ σώματα (which are αἰδία) μίαν τάξιν ἔχει, ἣν εἴληχεν ἀπὸ τοῦ πατρὸς τὴν ἀρχήν. For τῆς ταυτότητος, cf. *Corp.* XII. ii (*to Tat*) 14 c, as emended: ἔχεται γὰρ τῆς ταυτότητος τὰ ἀσύνθετα σώματα (i. e. the cosmic elements), καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν εἰς ἄλλα ποιούμενα, αἰεὶ τῆς ταυτότητος τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν σώζει.

(34) Ἡ διαλυτὴ ὕλη εἰς τὰ ἐναντία ἐναλλοιοῦται [], ἡ δὲ αἰδῖος [] εἰς τὰ ὅμοια¹. I can find no sense in ἡ διαλυτὴ ὕλη and ἡ αἰδῖος ὕλη. It may be suspected that ὕλη has come by duplication from the last three letters of διαλυτή, and has driven out some other substantive. Possibly, ἡ διαλυτὴ οὐσία (meaning 'thing') εἰς τὰ ἐναντία (*sc.* ἀδιάλυτα) ἐναλλοιοῦται, ἡ δὲ αἰδῖος εἰς τὰ ὅμοια (*sc.* αἰδία). An earthly organism, when it is broken up, 'is changed into' the elements (of which it was composed); and the elements are ἀδιάλυτα and αἰδία. An αἰδῖον σῶμα (e. g. the element water) is (part by part, though not as a whole) transmuted into other elements; and each of these other elements is likewise (as a whole) αἰδῖον.

(35) γένεσις [ἀνθρώπου] φθορά(ς), φθορά [ἀνθρώπου] γένεσεως ἀρχή. There is no reason to restrict the application of this *sententia* to men; it is equally true of all διαλυτὰ σώματα. Cf. *sent.* (5), and *Exc.* II A. 16.

(36) τὸ ἀπογιγνόμενον κ.τ.λ. Cf. *sent.* (5).

(37) τῶν ὄντων τὰ μὲν σώματά ἐστι (τὰ μὲν ἐν σώμασιν εἰσι MSS.), τὰ δὲ ἰδέαι (τὰ δὲ ἐν ἰδίαις MSS.), τὰ δὲ ἐνέργειαι (ἐνεργείαις MSS.). In this classification of τὰ ὄντα, as in most of the *sententiae*, cosmic things alone are spoken of, and supracosmic entities are disregarded. The ἰδέαι are the *formae visibiles* of bodies, and not Plato's νοητὰ εἶδη; for the latter could not be said to be 'in bodies'. νοῦς might possibly be called an ἐνέργεια of the supracosmic God; but it is not an ἐνέργεια of the kind the writer is here speaking of; for νοῦς is not (always or necessarily) 'in a body'. And the supracosmic God himself is neither a σῶμα, an ἰδέα nor an ἐνέργεια. God is not one of τὰ ὄντα; he is ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας.

ἰδέα (ἰδία MSS.) δὲ καὶ ἐνέργεια, (ἀσώματα ὄντα,) ἐν σώματί ἐστι. The meaning would be better expressed by writing ἰδέαι δὲ καὶ ἐνέργειαι, (ἀσώματοι οὐσαι,) ἐν σώμασιν εἰσι. As regards ἐνέργειαι, this statement agrees with *Exc. III. (to Tat) 1: ἐνέργειαι . . . , ἀσώματοι αὐταὶ οὐσαι, ἐν σώμασιν εἰσι, καὶ διὰ τῶν σωμάτων ἐνεργοῦσι. Ib. 21: ταῖς ἐνεργείαις ταῦτα γὰρ ἀσώματα ὄντα φημὲν ἐν σώμασιν εἶναι.*

It seems that the phrase ἐν σώματι (or ἐν σώμασιν), which is rightly used here, caused a transcriber to write ἐν σώμασιν in place of σώματα in the preceding clause; and that gave rise to the false readings ἐν ἰδέαις and ἐνεργείαις. A similar error occurs in (16).

(38) τὸ ἀθάνατον οὐ μετέχει τοῦ θνητοῦ κ.τ.λ. Cf. (28) and (41).

(39) τὸ μὲν θνητὸν εἰς ἀθάνατον σῶμα οὐκ ἔρχεται. The 'immortal bodies' (setting aside the Kosmos as a whole and the cosmic elements, which cannot here be meant,) are the corporeal heavens, and the several bodies contained in them, viz. the fixed stars and the planets. τὸ θνητόν here means especially the mortal part of man, i. e. the body and τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς (see (8)). This part of man cannot ascend to heaven. At his death, his body remains on earth; and his αἰσθητικὸν perishes or is dispersed, and can never be re-embodied in a star, though his νοῦς, the immortal part of him, possibly may. Cf. *Corp. I. 24*, where we are told that the ascending soul casts off its αἰσθήσεις.

τὸ δὲ ἀθάνατον εἰς θνητὸν (σῶμα) παραγίνεται. The immortal part of man, i. e. the νοῦς, descends from above, and is, for a time, incorporated in a mortal body upon earth.

Sententia (39) would serve to remind the pupil of what is said at greater length in *Exc. IV A. (to Tat) 7, <<(6)>>*.

(40) αἱ ἐνέργειαι οὐκ εἰσὶν ἀνωφερεῖς, ἀλλὰ κατωφερεῖς. The ἐνέργειαι are the forces which are at work in all life and movement upon earth. (See *Exc.* III, *to Tat.*) They 'work downward from above, not upward from below'. That is, all life and movement upon earth result from the action of the heavenly bodies on the things below; but the life and movement of the heavenly bodies do not result from any action of the things below, but are infused into them by the supracosmic God. Cf. *Exc.* III. 6: (αἱ ἐνέργειαι) ἀπὸ τῶν θείων σωμάτων ἔρχονται εἰς τὰ θνητά. *Ib.* 15: (ἡ ἐνέργεια) ἄνωθεν πέμπεται.

(41) οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖται τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς (οὐδὲν ὠφελεῖ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ MSS.)· πάντα ὠφελεῖται τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ (πάντα ὠφελεῖ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ MSS.). The celestial gods do all for us; we can do nothing for them. They are ἀνευδεεῖς; they have no unsatisfied wants, and therefore no offerings or services of men can benefit them.

It would be grammatically possible to take the text of the MSS. in the same sense; but the phrases would be absurdly ambiguous.

(42) ὁ οὐρανὸς σωμάτων αἰδίων δεκτικός· ἡ γῆ σωμάτων φθαρτῶν δεκτική. It is somewhat surprising to find this elementary statement so near the end of the string of *sententiae*. It would seem more appropriate if it were either placed in connexion with (2)-(5), in which the distinction between the two kinds of bodies is first spoken of, or put at the beginning of the group (25)-(29), in which οὐρανὸς and γῆ are contrasted. For similar reasons, it may be suspected that (45) also is out of place.

(43) ἡ γῆ ἄλογος· ὁ οὐρανὸς λογικός (λοξός MSS.). Cf. *Corp.* I. 10 and 11 b, where we are told that ὁ λόγος (personified), after doing his part in the *demiurgia*, flew up to heaven, and that his departure left the sublunar world ἄλογον, and consequently capable of producing only ἄλογα ζῶα (and the ἄλογον μέρος of man).

(44) Ἦ τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ὑπόκειται· τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς τῇ γῆ ἐπὶκειται. I propose τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ (πρόνοια) ὑπόκειται· τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς [] (ἀνάγκη) ὑπόκειται. That would agree with what is said in (46), and in other *Hermetica*, as to the relation between πρόνοια and ἀνάγκη. But if πρόνοια and ἀνάγκη were spoken of both in (44) and in (46), that would be an additional reason for thinking that (45), which deals with a different subject, is out of place.

(45) ὁ οὐρανὸς πρῶτον (τῶν) στοιχείων· ἡ γῆ ὕστατον (τῶν) στοιχείων (στοιχεῖον *bis* MSS.). The heavenly bodies were sometimes called

στοιχεῖα; but as the word *στοιχεῖον* is here applied to *γῆ* also, it presumably means 'an element'. If so, *οὐρανός* must here be taken to mean *πῦρ*, the element of which the heavens consist. Cf. *Corp.* XII. ii. (*to Tat*) 21: τοῦ κόσμου μέρη εἰσὶν οὐρανός καὶ γῆ καὶ ὕδωρ καὶ ἀήρ.

(46) πρόνοια θεία τάξις· ἀνάγκη προνοία ὑπηρετίς. Cf. *Exc.* XII. 1 (*to Ammon*): ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη ὑπηρετεῖ προνοίᾳ. See also *Exc.* XIII and *Exc.* XIV (*to Ammon*), and *Exc.* VIII. (*to Tat*) 5. God works on the heavenly bodies immediately; and his will, regarded as acting on *them*, is called *πρόνοια*. But he works on sublunar things through the intermediate agency of the heavenly bodies; and the force which the heavenly bodies exert on sublunar things is called *ἀνάγκη* (or *εἰμαρμένη*). Thus *ἀνάγκη* is subservient to *πρόνοια*.

(47) τύχη φορὰ (ἄτακτος), [ἀτάκτου ἐνεργείας (προσηγορία)]. Cf. the anonymous definition in *Stob.* 1. 7. 9 b, vol. 1, p. 92 W. (*Diels Doxogr.* p. 326): τύχη ἀτάκτου ἐνεργείας ἐστὶ προσηγορία. It may be conjectured that the Hermetist wrote *τύχη φορὰ ἄτακτος*; that some reader, having met with the similar definition which has been preserved for us in *Stob.* 1. 7. 9 b, added the words *ἀτάκτου ἐνεργείας προσηγορία*; and that *ἄτακτος* was omitted before *ἀτάκτου* by an error of transcription.

For *τύχη φορὰ ἄτακτος*, cf. Eurysus Pythagoreus *Περὶ τύχας*, *Stob.* 1. 6. 19, vol. 1, p. 90 W.: δύο φύσεις ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ τῷδε . . . ἐνυπάρχοντι ἐναντία ἀλλάλαϊς· καὶ ταυτῶν ἃ μὲν ἐντι ῥητὰ καὶ τεταγμένα καὶ λόγον ἔχουσα ποτὶ πάντα, ἃ δ' ἄρητος καὶ ἄτακτος καὶ ἄλογος καὶ οὐδεμίαν σύνταξιν ἔχουσα. . . . τὸ μὲν ἀπὸ τύχας καὶ τῷ αὐτομάτῳ γινόμενον γίνεται ἐμπεσοῦσας τῆς ἀλόγου καὶ ἀτάκτου φύσεως ἐς τὰ πράγματα.

If this *sententia* was similar in form to most of the others, there must have been a second clause; and as *τύχη* and *τέχνη* are often contrasted, and Eurysus *ib.* speaks of *τέχνα καὶ φρόνιμοις τις ἀνθρωπίνα καὶ θεία*, it is possible that something like *τέχνη ἐνέργεια εὐτακτος* followed. The meaningless words *εἶδωλον δόξα ψευδής*, which re appended in the MSS., may be a remnant of a lost *sententia*.

(48) τί θεός; ἄτρεπτον, ἀγαθόν. This might be said either of the star-gods, or of the supreme and supracosmic God. For *θεός ἄτρεπτον, ἄνθρωπος τρεπτόν*, cf. *Exc.* II A. 15 (of the supracosmic God): τὸν ἄτρεπτον, τὸν μὴ ἀλλοιούμενον. *ib.* 11: τρέπεται δὲ καὶ μεταβάλλεται (ὁ ἄνθρωπος). For *θεός ἀγαθόν, ἄνθρωπος κακόν*, cf. *sent.* (19).

§ 4. τὰς μέντοι πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς ὁμιλίας παραιτοῦ, κ.τ.λ. As to this injunction of silence and concealment, cf. *Corp.* XIII *fin.* Porphyry. *Ad Marcellam* 14-15: πάντα φιλοσόφωτον ὡς ἄθεον καὶ μιαρὸν

ἐκτρέπεσθαι χρή' καὶ οὐ ταῖς δόξαις οὐκ ἂν χρῆσαιο, τούτῳ μίτε βίου μίτε λόγον τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ κοινώνει. λόγον γὰρ (περὶ) θεοῦ τοῖς ὑπὸ δόξης διεφθαρμένοις λέγειν οὐκ ἀσφαλές· καὶ γὰρ καὶ τᾶληθῆ λέγειν ἐπὶ τούτων περὶ θεοῦ καὶ τὰ ψευδῆ κίνδυνον ἴσον φέρει. οὔτε αὐτόν τινα προσῆκεν ἀνοσίῳ ἔργων μὴ καθαρύοντα φθέγγεσθαι περὶ θεοῦ, οὔτε εἰς τοιούτων ἀκοὰς ἐμβάλλοντα τὸν περὶ θεοῦ λόγον οἶσθαι μὴ μιαίνειν· ἀλλ' ἀκροᾶσθαι καὶ λέγειν τὸν περὶ θεοῦ λόγον ὡς ἐπὶ θεοῦ. προηγήσθω οὖν τοῦ περὶ θεοῦ λόγου τὰ θεοφιλῆ ἔργα, καὶ σιγᾶσθω ὁ περὶ αὐτοῦ λόγος ἐπὶ πλήθους· ἀνοικειοτάτῃ γὰρ θεολογία κενοδοξία ψυχῆς. νόμιζε αἰρετώτερον εἶναι σιγᾶν ἢ λόγον εἰκῆ προέσθαι περὶ θεοῦ.

φθονεῖν μὲν γάρ σε οὐ βούλομαι. If a man refuses to tell to others truths which he knows, he may seem to lay himself open to a charge of φθόνος, i. e. malicious unwillingness to impart to one's neighbour something that would be good for him. (Cf. *Ascl. Lat.* I. 12 b: 'nec sinit partem divinitatis agnoscere invidens immortalitate malignitas.') But he who does what is here enjoined is not really open to that charge; for he will speak without reserve to the few who are worthy to receive the true doctrine; and (as we are told in § 5) if the unworthy hear it, they will be the worse for it, and not the better.

μᾶλλον δὲ ὅτι τοῖς πολλοῖς δόξεις καταγέλαστος εἶναι. Wachsmuth says 'post μᾶλλον δὲ haud scio an haustum sit ἀπαγορεύω vel simile quid'. But it is hardly necessary to insert a verb. The writer means to say '(I warn you against talking to the many) for this reason, that' &c.; but the text of the MSS. can be understood to mean that, though it is defective in grammatical construction.

The first of the two reasons given for concealment is that the unworthy will *laugh at* the man who speaks of these things to them.¹ What harm would that do? It is unpleasant to be laughed at; but a good man does not refrain from doing what he thinks right because it might result in some unpleasantness to him. To speak to those who only laugh at what you say is, no doubt, a waste of time and energy; but that is hardly an adequate reason for enjoining silence. And though the laughers will certainly get no good from what they hear, it is not self-evident, and has not yet been shown, that they will be positively harmed by it. The harm implied is probably that

¹ Cf. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* I. 55: ταῦτα ἦν ἐμποδῶν τοῦ γράφειν ἐμοί, καὶ νῦν ἐτι εὐλαβῶς ἔχω, ἢ φησιν, "ἐμπροσθεν τῶν χοίρων τοὺς μαργαρίτας βάλλειν, μὴ ποτε καταπατήσωσι τοῖς ποσὶ καὶ στραφέντες βήξωσιν ὑμᾶς" (*Matth.* 7. 6). Χαλεπὸν γὰρ τοὺς περὶ τοῦ ἀληθινοῦ φωτὸς καθαρὸς ὄντας καὶ διανγείς ἐπιδείξει λόγους ἀκρατῶν τοῖς ὁδοεσὶ τε καὶ ἀπαιδέυτοις· σχεδὸν γὰρ οὐκ ἔστι τούτων πρὸς τοὺς πολλοὺς καταγλαστότερα ἀκούσματα.

which the speaker himself is liable to suffer, not from the mere unpleasantness of incurring ridicule, but from the weakening of his own convictions. As religious fervour is fostered and intensified by the companionship of others who are fervent in the faith, so it is liable to be lowered and deadened by the sarcastic comments of unsympathetic hearers.

οὗτοι δὲ οἱ λόγοι ὀλίγους παντελῶς τοὺς ἀκροατὰς ἔξουσιν (ἔχουσιν MSS.) (ἀξίους), ἢ τάχα οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀλίγους [ἔξουσιν]. ἀξίους, which is needed to make sense, may easily have been omitted through its resemblance to ἔξουσιν.

οὗτοι οἱ λόγοι, in the mouth of Hermes, means the discourses by which he has previously given oral instruction to Tat, and the substance of which it is assumed that Tat will hereafter repeat to a few other persons. For the reader, it means a collection of written 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat', at the end of which *Exc.* XI was placed as an appendix.

Even the few who may rightly be permitted to read these sacred writings, or to hear them read, are not wholly 'worthy' to do so; and all other men are utterly unworthy.

§ 5. ἔχουσι δὲ τι καὶ ἴδιον ἐν ἑαυτοῖς· τοὺς κακοὺς μᾶλλον παροξύνουσι πρὸς τὴν κακίαν. A second reason for silence and concealment is here given, namely, the harm that indiscriminate talk about holy things (or the indiscriminate circulation of the Hermetic writings) may do to the hearers (or readers).

[διὸ χρὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς φυλάττεσθαι, (ὡς) μὴ νοοῦντας τῶν λεγομένων τὴν ἀρετήν.] This sentence is evidently out of place; for it breaks the connexion between what precedes (ἔχουσι δὲ . . . τὴν κακίαν) and what follows (Πῶς εἶπας κ.τ.λ.). The only question is whether it is better to reject it altogether, or to transpose it. The most suitable place for it would be after οὐδὲ τοὺς ὀλίγους, at the end of § 4. But it is not needed there; for it merely repeats what has been said before in that section, and repeats it in a less expressive form, μὴ νοοῦντας τῶν λεγομένων τὴν ἀρετήν being a comparatively feeble substitute for δόξεις καταγέλαστος εἶναι. It seems most likely then that χρὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς . . . τὴν ἀρετήν is a marginal summary of § 4, which has been inserted into the text, with διὸ prefixed to make connexion.

[πᾶν] τὸ ζῶον (τὸ) τῶν ἀνθρώπων ἐπιρρεπέστερόν ἐστιν εἰς τὴν κακίαν. Wachsmuth adopts Usener's correction, τὸ ζῶον τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. That gives the meaning required; but perhaps the author may have written τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων in the sense of τὸ ἀνθρώπινον. Cf. Ps.-Pl.

Epinomis 976 D: τίς ποτ' . . . ἐπιστήμη . . . μὴ παραγενομένη . . . ἀνοητότατον ἂν . . . παράσχοιτο ζῶον τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων;

We must not translate 'the animal part of men'; that would be τὸ ἄλογον τῶν ἀνθρώπων. A star-god, as well as a beast, is a ζῶον.

ὅτι γενητὸς ὁ κόσμος. This is implied in *sent.* (5), (17), and (31); and it is expressly said in extant 'Discourses of Hermes to Tat' (e. g. *Corp.* IV *init.*).

καὶ (ὅτι) πάντα κατὰ [πρόνοιαν καὶ] ἀνάγκην γίνεται, εἰμαρμένης πάντων ἀρχούσης. See *sent.* (46) and (44). πάντα must be taken to mean πάντα τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς. According to the doctrine of the Hermetists in general, it is only earthly things that are governed by εἰμαρμένη, and therefore determined κατ' ἀνάγκην.¹ The man who 'has got *gnosis*', being no longer a mere thing of earth, is freed from subjection to εἰμαρμένη; his actions are κατὰ πρόνοιαν (i. e. in accordance with God's will), but not κατ' ἀνάγκην. (See *Exc.* VIII.) But 'the many' will not understand that. The only things they recognize or take into account are earthly things; and when they are told that these things are governed by εἰμαρμένη, they will infer that all things without exception, and therefore the actions of all men alike, are determined κατ' ἀνάγκην.

πρόνοιαν is irrelevant here, and impairs the force of the argument. It was doubtless inserted by some one who rightly thought that its addition would be needed for a *complete* statement of the Hermetic doctrine on the subject, but failed to see that an incomplete statement of it suits the context better. To be consistent, the interpolator ought also to have added *προνοίας καί* before εἰμαρμένης.

πολλῷ ἑαυτοῦ χεῖρον ἔσται, καταφρονήσαν μὲν τοῦ παντὸς ὡς γενητοῦ. It is bad to 'despise the universe'. See *Ascl. Lat.* III. 25, where the *contemptus mundi* of the Christians is denounced. Even the most pessimistic of the Hermetists, the writer of *Corp.* VI, admits that the Kosmos is good in one respect (τούτον τὸν τρόπον ἀγαθὸς ὁ κόσμος, καθὰ . . . πάντα ποιεῖ, § 2 b), though in all other respects, he says, it is not good. The writer of *Exc.* XI holds that the higher part of the Kosmos is good, and the lower part of it alone is bad (*sent.* (18)).

But why should a man 'despise the universe' because he is told that it has come into being? The writer has not given his answer to that question; but it might perhaps be answered in some such way as this. The many have no conception of an incorporeal and

¹ The writer of *Exc.* VII probably said that the movements or operations of the heavenly bodies are determined by ἀνάγκη (πρόνοια καὶ ἀνάγκη MSS.); but that statement is exceptional.

supracosmic God, and would fail to understand any such notion if it were put before them. The highest religion of which they are capable is a worship of cosmic and corporeal gods (i. e. of the material universe in its several parts), a cult of Sun, Moon, and Stars in heaven, Mother Earth, and the gods or daemons identified with material things on earth. Such a religion is better than nothing, and may be enough to keep them from gross wickedness. They probably assume that the cosmic gods, or powers of nature, that they worship,—the highest beings that they know or can conceive,—are everlasting, and without beginning. If you tell one of 'the many' that these gods have had a beginning, he will infer that they are less worthy of worship than he had supposed; and as he cannot transfer his reverence to the supreme God who made them,—for of that God he knows nothing,—he will be in danger of losing such religion as he has, and sinking into sheer atheism.

τὰς δὲ αἰτίας τοῦ κακοῦ τῇ εἰμαρμένῃ ἀναφέρον (-φέρων MSS.). See *Corp.* XII. i. 5 as emended, where Tat asks διὰ τί κολάζεται ὁ ἀναγκασάσης τῆς εἰμαρμένης δράσας τὸ ἔργον; εἰμαρμένης γὰρ πάντα τὰ ἔργα. The doctrine of Heimarmene, when not safeguarded by the Hermetic theory of man's power to escape from subjection to Heimarmene (which is explained in *Corp.* IV, for instance, but which the many would fail to comprehend,) appears to annul the responsibility of the human agent.

ὅπως ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ ὄντες ἔλαττον ὦσι κακοί. Does this mean 'in order that they may (continue to) be in ignorance, and so, may be less wicked (than they would be if they learnt the truth)'? Or does it mean 'in order that, since they are (and will in any case continue to be) without true knowledge, they may be less wicked (than they would be if they were told truths which they cannot understand)'? Probably the latter. The many are ἐν ἀγνοίᾳ, i. e. without *gnosis* (cf. οἱ ἐν γνώσει ὄντες), and will always be so, whether you talk to them or not. If you tell them truths, they will misunderstand them, and the truths will turn into pernicious falsehoods in their minds.

[φόβῳ τοῦ ἀδήλου]. What is 'the uncertain thing' that the man is afraid of? How does his fear of it restrain him from wicked actions? And how will he be relieved of his fear if you talk to him? There is nothing in what has preceded to suggest an explanation. These words must have been added by a reader. The man who added them was probably thinking of some doctrine of penal suffering; but it is not clear what he meant.

EXCERPT XII

In the passages extracted by Stobaeus from 'The teachings of Hermes to Ammon' (viz. *Excerpts* XII–XVII, and probably XVIII and XIX also), there is no trace of dialogue; ὁ Ἄμμων occurs once, in *Exc.* XVII, but Ammon never speaks. It is possible therefore that the *libelli* from which these excerpts were taken were not dialogues, but epistles or treatises addressed by Hermes to Ammon. Cf. *Corp.* XIV, which is an epistle of Hermes to Asclepius, and *Corp.* XVI, which is a treatise written by Asclepius and addressed to Ammon.

§ 1. πάντα δὲ γίνεται ἰφύσει καὶ εἰμαρμένη¹. εἰμαρμένη cannot have been mentioned here; the Hermetist must have first spoken of πρόνοια, the supreme or sovereign power of God, and then gone on to speak of the two other powers, ἀνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη, which he regards as subordinate to πρόνοια.

The words πάντα γίνεται φύσει would imply that there is a fourth power, called φύσις, which operates in the same sort of way as πρόνοια, ἀνάγκη, and εἰμαρμένη. But in what follows, these three powers alone are recognized; nothing more is said about φύσις, except in § 2 *fin.* (τῇ φύσει καὶ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις), and there the word means, not a power which operates, but the world which is operated on. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing πάντα δὲ (κατὰ πρόνοιαν) γίνεται (τὰ) φύσει (γινόμενα). Inasmuch as ἀνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη are subject to πρόνοια, it might be said that 'all things', including those which result from ἀνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη, 'come to pass κατὰ πρόνοιαν'.

πρόνοια δὲ ἐστὶν αὐτοτελῆς λόγος τοῦ ἐπουρανίου θεοῦ. πρόνοια is called αὐτοτελής ('sovereign') in contrast to ἀνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη, which are not αὐτοτελεῖς.

λόγος probably means 'design', 'plan', or 'purpose'. God's λόγος is not actually personified here; but πρόνοια, to which λόγος stands as predicate, is in this excerpt, as often elsewhere, on the verge of personification, as are ἀνάγκη and εἰμαρμένη also.

ἐπουράνιος is usually nothing more than a synonym for οὐράνιος. But the writer probably meant here, not 'the God of heaven' (who would be a cosmic god), but 'the God who is above the corporeal heaven', i. e. the supracosmic God of the Platonists and Hermetists. If so, we must suppose either that he used ἐπουράνιον in that exceptional sense, or that he wrote ὑπερουράνιον. (Cf. *Exc.* XXI. 2.)

The word οὐράνιος would be more fitly applied to the subordinate power Heimarmene, who 'uses the stars as her instruments'.

Δύο δὲ τούτου ἰαυτοφνεῖς ἰδνάμεις, ἀνάγκη καὶ εἰμαρμένη. Does τούτου mean τοῦ θεοῦ, or τοῦ λόγου (= προνοίας)?

αὐτοφνεῖς is a synonym of αὐτογέννητος, which means 'having no begetter other than itself', and is commonly used as equivalent to ἀγέννητος, 'without beginning'. To say that Necessity and Destiny are αὐτοφνεῖς would be inconsistent with saying that they are subordinate to Providence. αὐτοφνεῖς must therefore be rejected. It has probably been substituted by error for some other adjective, such as ὑπηρητικάι. αὐτο- may have come from αὐτοτελής above.

(καὶ ἡ μὲν ἀνάγκη . . .) ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη κ.τ.λ. The Hermetist must have spoken of the two 'powers' in the order in which he had just named them; what he says about εἰμαρμένη must therefore have been preceded by a corresponding statement about ἀνάγκη. Stobaeus, who in this chapter of his *Anthologium* was collecting passages περὶ εἰμαρμένης and not περὶ ἀνάγκης, may perhaps have intentionally omitted what the Hermetist here wrote about ἀνάγκη.

Now in the preceding chapter (*Anthol.* 1. 4, περὶ ἀνάγκης), Stobaeus gives, as an extract from *Hermes to Ammon*, the detached sentence which I call *Excerpt XIII*. It seems probable that this is the very sentence which has been omitted in *Exc.* XII. If we write here (καὶ ἡ μὲν) (*Exc.* XIII, ἀνάγκη ἐστὶ κρίσις βεβαία καὶ ἀμετάτρεπτος [δύναμις] προνοίας) ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη κ.τ.λ., we get just such a supplement as the context requires. The insertion of δύναμις in *Exc.* XIII, where it is clearly out of place, may, on this hypothesis, be accounted for by taking it to be a misplaced duplication of δυνάμεις, which occurs in the preceding sentence of *Exc.* XII.

ἡ δὲ εἰμαρμένη ὑπηρετεῖ προνοία ἰκαὶ ἀνάγκη]. This statement, as given in the MSS., seems to place Necessity on a level with Providence; but the author's view was rather that both Necessity and Destiny are subservient to Providence. We might either strike out καὶ ἀνάγκη, or alter it into κατ' ἀνάγκην.

§ 2. [οὔτε γὰρ εἰμαρμένην φυγεῖν τις δύναται, οὔτε φυλάξαι ἑαυτὸν ἀπὸ τῆς τούτων δεινότητος.] This sentence interrupts the sequence of thought. If we cut it out, ὅπλον γὰρ κ.τ.λ. follows rightly on εἰμαρμένη ὑπηρετοῦσιν οἱ ἀστέρες. Its writer must have intended it to be read after τοῖς ἀνθρώποις below; but it is probably a marginal note, and not a part of the original text. Its doctrine is Stoic, and differs from that which is usually taught by Hermetists when they

speak on this subject. We are told in other *Hermetica* that the man who attains to *gnosis* can and does 'escape from Heimarmene'.

EXCERPT XIII

See note on *Exc.* XII. 1.

EXCERPT XIV

This passage appears to be a statement of the relations between *πρόνοια*, *ἀνάγκη*, and *εἰμαρμένη*; but the text is so corrupt that no continuous sense can be made out. We are told in *Exc.* XII that *ἀνάγκη* and *εἰμαρμένη* are subordinate to *πρόνοια*, which is the supreme power of God; and it is to be presumed that in this respect the writer of *Exc.* XIV agreed with the writer of *Exc.* XII.

An exposition of the relation between *πρόνοια* and *εἰμαρμένη*, as understood by a Platonist, is given by Boethius, *Philos. consol.* 4. 6: 'Omnium generatio rerum cunctusque mutabilium naturarum progressus et quidquid aliquo movetur modo, causas ordinem formas ex divinae mentis stabilitate sortitur. Haec in suae simplicitatis arce composita multiplicem regendis modum statuit: qui modus cum in ipsa divinae intellegentiae puritate conspicitur, providentia (i. e. *πρόνοια*) nominatur: cum vero ad ea quae movet atque disponit refertur, fatum (i. e. *εἰμαρμένη*) a veteribus appellatum est: quae diversa esse facile liquebit, si quis utriusque vim mente conspexerit. Nam providentia est ipsa illa divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta quae cuncta disponit: fatum vero inhaerens rebus mobilibus dispositio per quam providentia suis quaeque nectit ordinibus. Providentia namque cuncta pariter quamvis diversa quamvis infinita complectitur, fatum vero singula digerit in motum locis formis ac temporibus distributa: ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio, in divinae mentis adunata prospectu[m], providentia sit, eadem vero adunatio, digesta atque explicata temporibus, fatum vocetur. Quae licet diversa sint, alterum tamen pendet ex altero: ordo namque fatalis ex providentiae simplicitate procedit. Sicut enim artifex faciendae rei formam mente praecipiens movet operis effectum, et quod simpliciter praesentarieque prospexerat, per temporales ordines ducit: ita deus providentia quidem singulariter stabiliterque facienda disponit, fato vero haec ipsa quae disposuit multipliciter ac temporaliter administrat. Sive

igitur famulantibus quibusdam providentiae divinis spiritibus fatum exercetur, seu anima, seu tota inserviente natura, seu caelestibus siderum motibus, seu angelica virtute, seu daemonum varia sollertia, seu aliquibus horum seu omnibus fatalis series textitur: illud certe manifestum est, immobilem simplicemque gerendarum formam rerum esse providentiam, fatum vero eorum quae divina simplicitas gerenda disposuit mobilem nexum atque ordinem temporalem. Quo fit, ut omnia quae fato subsunt providentiae quoque subiecta sint, cui ipsum etiam subiacet fatum, quaedam vero quae sub providentia locata sunt fati seriem superent: ea vero sunt quae primae propinqua divinitati stabiliter fixa fatalis ordinem mobilitatis excedunt. . . . Quod longius a prima mente discedit, maioribus fati nexibus implicatur; ac tanto aliquid fato liberum est, quanto illum rerum cardinem vicinius petit. Quod si supernae mentis haeserit firmitati, motu carens, fati quoque supergreditur necessitatem. Igitur uti est ad intellectum ratiocinatio, ad id quod est id quod gignitur, ad aeternitatem tempus, ad punctum medium circulus: ita est fati series mobilis ad providentiae stabilem simplicitatem.'

It appears from what remains of *Exc. XIV* that its writer, like Boethius, connected *είμαρμένη* (as opposed to *πρόνοια*) with *κίνησις*; and he probably said that *είμαρμένη* is the cause of two different kinds of movement, viz. (1) the invariable movement of the stars in heaven, and (2) the alternating process of birth and destruction upon earth.

§ I. ἡ μὲν διακρατοῦσα τὸν ὅλον κόσμον πρόνοιά ἐστιν ἢ δὲ συνέχουσα καὶ περιέχουσα ἄνάγκη ἐστίν. The second clause must have contained something which stood in contrast to τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ('the Kosmos as a whole') in the first clause. Perhaps, ἢ δὲ (τὰ καθ' ἕκαστον) συνέχουσα [] ἄνάγκη ἐστίν.

είμαρμένη δὲ ἄγει καὶ περιάγει πάντα, κατ' ἀνάγκην (ἐνεργ)οῦσα (καταναγκάζουσα MSS.). ἄγει is equivalent to *κινεῖ*; and *περι-άγει* implies that the movement caused by Heimarmene is cyclic. In heaven, it takes the form of circular movement in space; on earth, it takes the form of a cyclic succession of births and deaths.

φύσις γάρ ἐστιν αὐτῆς (sc. τῆς *είμαρμένης*) τὸ ἀναγκάζειν. Cf. 'fati necessitatem' in Boethius *l. c.*

[αἰτία γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς βίου.] The process of *γένεσις* and *φθορά* is the kind of movement which Destiny causes upon earth. But these words are out of place here; and it may be suspected that they originally stood after what is said about *οὐρανός* in § 2.

The *γένεσις* and *φθορά* which take place on earth result from the movement of the stars in heaven, and ought to be spoken of after that movement, not before it.

βίου is impossible. There is no need to qualify *γενέσεως καὶ φθορᾶς* by adding a genitive. *ζωῆς* would be superfluous; and *βίος* is not used as a synonym of *ζωή*, except sometimes in early poetry.

§ 2. ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος ἄπρωτος ἔχει τὴν πρόνοιαν¹. *πρῶτος*, applied to the *Kosmos*, is unintelligible; and it seems probable that it has come from the following *πρῶτος γάρ*. I propose ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος ὅλος ἔχεται τῆς προνοίας (a repetition of what was said in § 1 *init.*). With this reading, 'the *Kosmos* as a whole' would stand in contrast to *οὐρανός*, which is a *part* of the *Kosmos*.

ἡ δὲ πρόνοια (perhaps ἡ δὲ (τῆς) προνοία(ς) ἐνέργεια) ἐξήπλωται ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ. *ἐξαπλοῦσθαι* means *explicari*. Cf. Boethius *l. c.*: 'ut haec *temporalis ordinis explicatio*, in divinae mentis adunata prospectu[m], providentia sit, eadem vero adunatio, *digesta atque explicata temporibus*, fatum vocetur.' It is in the movement of the heavenly bodies that the unity of the eternal present is 'spread out' into temporal succession.

What the author probably meant might be more fully expressed by writing the passage thus: ὁ μὲν οὖν κόσμος ὅλος ἔχεται τῆς προνοίας' [[]] ἡ δὲ τῆς προνοίας ἐνέργεια (πρῶτον) ἐξήπλωται ἐν τῷ οὐρανῷ: ((πρῶτος γὰρ αὐτῇ ἐντυγχάνει)) (ὁ οὐρανός). The working of Providence issues from God (who is thought of as located in the boundless space above the *Kosmos*), and descends into the *Kosmos*. In the course of this descent, the first thing that meets it is the sphere of heaven (which is the highest or outermost part of the *Kosmos*); and it takes effect there in causing the unvarying movement of the stars. But secondarily, and by means of the stars (which are ὄπλον εἰμαρμένης, *Exc.* XII. 2), God's Providence operates on terrestrial things also.

(οἱ) θεοὶ περὶ αὐτὸν (*sc.* τὸν οὐρανὸν) στρέφονται [καὶ κινοῦνται] ἀκάματον καὶ ἄπανστον κίνησιν ἔχοντες. The circling movement of the star-gods is ἀκάματος καὶ ἄπανστος; and as such, it is contrasted with the process of *γένεσις* and *φθορά* which takes place upon earth.

ἡ μὲν πρόνοια (. . .) προνοεῖ. No sane writer can have thought his readers needed to be told that ἡ πρόνοια προνοεῖ. If *προνοεῖ* is sound, it must have been accompanied by some qualifying word or phrase; perhaps (συμπάντων ὁμοῦ) προνοεῖ (cf. τὸν ὅλον κόσμον in § 1 *init.*).

είμαρμένη δὲ αἰτία ἐστὶ τῆς τῶν ἄστρον διαθέσεως¹. It may be suspected that διαθέσεως is corrupt; either κινήσεως or διοικήσεως would seem more suitable. It might be said that Heimarmene is (in subordination to Providence) αἰτία τῆς τῶν ἄστρον κινήσεως; but she is αἰτία of another kind of κίνησις also, viz. the γένεσις and φθορά of earthly things, and that part of her action could hardly be ignored here. It is therefore probable that some words have been lost, and that the sentence ended with a statement that Heimarmene (τοῖς ἐπιγείοις) αἰτία ἐστὶ (γένεσεως καὶ φθορᾶς διὰ) τῆς τῶν ἄστρον διαθέσεως (or διοικήσεως).

Ἰούτος¹ νόμος ἄφυκτος καθ' ὃν πάντα τέτακται. νόμος ἄφυκτος κ.τ.λ. appears to be a definition of πρόνοια. Cf. *Ascl. Lat.* III. 40 a: 'haec ergo tria, εἶμαρμένη, necessitas (= ἀνάγκη), ordo (= τάξις), dei nutu sunt effecta, qui mundum gubernat sua lege (= νόμῳ) et ratione divina (= λόγῳ θεῖῳ). The words *sua lege et ratione divina* are there equivalent to *sua providentia* (προνοία).

But such a definition of πρόνοια is not in its right place here. It may have originally stood at the beginning of the Excerpt; or possibly it may have been taken from some other document, and appended by a transcriber.

EXCERPT XV

The doctrine of this Excerpt is Platonic in its essentials; the writer recognizes the supracosmic, and speaks of pre-existent souls. His embryology resembles that of Aristotle; but it is probable that the Aristotelian ingredient was transmitted to him by Stoic intermediaries. Compare *Exc.* XXII (from the *Aphrodite* of Hermes), in which a problem of embryology is discussed.

§ 1. κινεῖται δὲ τὸ κινούμενον κατὰ τὴν ἐνέργειαν τῆς [κινήσεως] (φύσεως), τῆς κινούσης τὸ πᾶν. The δέ points back to something which has preceded. There may have been an opening passage in which τὸ κινούμενον was distinguished from τὸ ἀκίνητον, as in *Exc.* XI. 2 (1) as emended: πάντα τὰ σώματα κινεῖται μόνον τὸ ἀσώματον ἀκίνητον.

κινήσεως is evidently wrong; and as the name given to τὸ κινούμενον in the following sentence and in § 2 *init.* is ἡ φύσις, the word wanted here is φύσεως. For the same reason, I have inserted ἡ φύσις in § 4 *fin.* and in § 5.

ἡ (μὲν) γὰρ φύσις [] τῷ παντὶ παρέχει κινήσεις []· (ἡ δὲ νοερά οὐσία . . .) As given in the MSS., this passage is meaningless. But a clue to the writer's meaning is to be found in the following words: καὶ ἡ μὲν διήκει διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου καὶ ἐντὸς συνέχει, ἡ δὲ ἴσχυς (ὑπερέχει?) καὶ ἐκτὸς περιέχει. Two entities are here distinguished and contrasted. One of them is cosmic, and the other supracosmic; the one permeates the universe, and the other transcends it. That is a distinction familiar to all Platonists;¹ but there was much variation in the terms used to express it. In the *Timaeus*, the two are called ἡ τοῦ παντός ψυχὴ and ὁ δημιουργός; they are named by Philo ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος and ὁ θεός, and by others, ψυχὴ (ἡ τοῦ παντός) and νοῦς.²

The name employed by the writer of *Exc.* XV to denote the lower of the two,—the thing which pervades the Kosmos and moves all things in it,—is ἡ φύσις, a term commonly used in this sense by Aristotelians and Stoics. But what did he call the higher of the two, the supracosmic entity? He must have named it here; as he refers to it by a feminine pronoun (ἡ δὲ . . . ἐκτὸς περιέχει), the name he used must have been feminine; and as the phrase νοερὰν οὐσίαν occurs in § 9, it seems most likely that his name for it was ἡ νοερά οὐσία.³ The clause in which he spoke of it is lost; but it may be conjectured that he wrote something like ἡ μὲν γὰρ φύσις τῷ παντὶ παρέχει κινήσεις, (ἡ δὲ νοερά οὐσία τῇ φύσει χορηγεί τὴν ἐνέργειαν.)

[μίαν μὲν τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν ἰσχύος, ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν κατὰ ἐνέργειαν.] I can make no sense of these words. The person who wrote them appears to have been thinking of the Aristotelian antithesis between δυνάμει, 'potentially', and ἐνέργειᾳ, 'actually'. But that antithesis is inapplicable here. The substantive which must be understood with μίαν and ἑτέραν is κίνησις; and what could be meant by saying 'Nature gives to the universe two movements, one of which is potential, and the other actual'? Even supposing that it were possible to make that distinction between two kinds of

¹ The Stoics recognized only the first of the two, and ignored the second.

² Some of the later Platonists (e. g. the writer of *Corp.* II) superimposed on these two a third entity, τὸ ἐπέκεινα νοῦ; and to this third and highest entity Plotinus gave the names τὸ εἶν and τὸ ἀγαθόν. Whether the author of *Exc.* XV also recognized a third beyond and above the second, we do not know; but there is nothing to suggest it in the fragment of his writing which we have before us.

³ In *Exc.* VIII, ἡ νοητὴ οὐσία is used as an equivalent for ὁ νοῦς; and in *Exc.* XVII, XVIII, and XIX, ἡ νοητικὴ οὐσία is used in the same sense.

cosmic movement,¹ what could any such distinction have to do with the distinction between something cosmic and something supra-cosmic, which is spoken of in the following sentence? Moreover, the word *ἐνέργεια* has just been used to signify 'a working force', the sense which it usually bears in the *Hermetica*; and it is not likely that the same writer would use it in a different sense a few lines after.

Perhaps the text of the MSS. might be accounted for as follows. The clause *ἢ δὲ νοερά οὐσία κ.τ.λ.* was accidentally omitted; and the following words (*καὶ ἢ μὲν διήκει . . . , ἢ δὲ . . . ἐκτὸς περιέχει*) thereby became unintelligible. A reader, finding nothing else to which *ἢ μὲν* and *ἢ δέ* could refer, assumed that they must refer to two different kinds of *κινήσεις*; and trying to think of some way of dividing *κινήσεις* into two classes, he chanced to hit on the Aristotelian distinction between *τὰ δυνάμει ὄντα* and *τὰ ἐνεργείᾳ ὄντα*, and accordingly inserted the words *μίαν μὲν τὴν κατὰ δύναμιν, ἑτέραν δὲ τὴν κατ' ἐνέργειαν*.²

αὐτῆς must have got in through some subsequent error. If the writer had wished to say 'according to the *δύναμις* of *φύσις*' (whatever that may mean), he would have written, not *κατὰ δύναμιν αὐτῆς*, but *κατὰ τὴν δύναμιν αὐτῆς*.

[*καὶ διὰ πάντων πεφοιτήκασι κοινῇ.*] These words, as written in the MSS., can only mean that both the thing which pervades the universe (*διήκει διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμου*), and the other thing which is contrasted with it, alike pervade the universe. But that is absurd. If we write *πεφοιτηκνίας* instead of *πεφοιτήκασι*, the phrase fits in well at the place to which I have transposed it. Possibly *-κασι* and *κοινῇ* are two different corruptions of *-κνίας*.

§ 2. *σπεύρουσα μὲν (εἰς ὕλην) τὰ ἑαυτῆς σπέρματα [γένεσις]*. Cf. *Exc. IX. 1* as emended: *τὸ σπέρμα οὖν τῆς γενέσεως (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ) λαβούσα γέγονε (sc. ἢ ὕλη)*. It is possible that the author of

¹ It might perhaps be said that the movement of the element fire is *κατ' ἐνέργειαν*, and that of the element water is *κατὰ δύναμιν*, inasmuch as fire is active, and water passive (*τὸ μὲν ποιοῦν, τὸ δὲ πάσχον*, § 2). But if the words had been meant to refer to that distinction, it would have been necessary for the writer to explain his meaning more fully; he could not expect his readers to anticipate in § 1 what they are first told in § 2.

² In the phrase which I have written to express the probable meaning of the lost clause, the last word happens to be *ἐνέργειαν* (used in the Hermetic sense, not the Aristotelian). Supposing that this word remained when the rest of the clause was lost, and that the interpolator consequently found in the text before him a lacuna followed by *ἐνέργειαν*, that may have suggested to him the supplement which he inserted.

Exc. XV used a similar phrase, and wrote τὰ σπέρματα τῆς γενέτεως. That would account for the meaningless word γένεσις, which we must otherwise suppose to be a remnant either of a lost clause (e. g. <καὶ κινούσα αὐτὴν εἰς> γένεσιν), or of a marginal summary of the paragraph.

κινουμένη δὲ θερμαίνεται <καὶ ψύχεται ἢ> <<ἕλη>>, καὶ γίγνεται [[]] πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ. ἕλη is in itself ἄμορφος or ἄποιος; but φύσις imposes on it (i. e. on different portions of it) two opposite 'forms' or qualities, that of heat and that of coldness. ἕλη, when the quality of heat is imposed on it, becomes fire;¹ when the quality of coldness is imposed on it, it becomes water. The word κίνησις, as applied to the action of φύσις on ἕλη by which fire and water are brought into being, means 'change' (ἀλλοίωσις) rather than 'movement' (κίνησις κατὰ τόπον).

πῦρ καὶ ὕδωρ, τὸ μὲν σθεναρὸν καὶ ἰσχυρόν, (τὸ δὲ ἀσθενές, καὶ τὸ μὲν ποιούν,) τὸ δὲ πάσχον. Fire is the active element, and water the passive element. See note on *Corr.* I. 17.

καὶ ἐγένετο (ἢ γῆ) [[ὄχουμένη ἐπὶ τοῦ ὕδατος]]. It is contrary to common sense to say that earth 'is carried on water', i. e. rests or floats on water. If you place earth on water, it does not float, but sinks. The relative positions of these two elements might be described by saying either that water rests on earth (sea and sea-bottom), or that water and earth lie side by side (sea and land). A satisfactory sense can be got by shifting this phrase to the following sentence, and writing there ἐγένετο ἀήρ, <<ὄχουμενος ἐπὶ (τῆς γῆς καὶ) τοῦ ὕδατος.>> Air comes into being as an exhalation given off by earth and water; and having come into being, it rests on the two elements out of which it has arisen; that is, the atmosphere lies above land and sea.

περιξηραινομένων (-μένου MSS.) δὲ (τούτων), ἀτμός ἐγένετο ἐκ [τῶν τριῶν] τοῦ τε ὕδατος <καὶ> τῆς γῆς [καὶ τοῦ πυρός], καὶ ἐγένετο ἀήρ. Fire and water having been produced, the heat of the fire (which is presumably situated above the water) transforms some of the water into earth. At this stage, we have fire above, water and earth below. The heating action of the fire now takes effect both on the water and on the earth, and causes a vapour to rise from them; this vapour is the air.

¹ Cf. Galen *De elementis sec. Hippocr.* I. 6, vol. i, p. 469 K. (Amim *Sto. vet. fr.* II, § 408): ὅτι τε ταύτης (sc. τῆς ἀκρας θερμότητος) ἐγγινομένης τῇ ἕλη πῦρ ἀποτελεῖται, τοῖς φιλοσόφοις ἀμολόγηται πᾶσιν.

The part assigned to the fire must have been that of heating the earth and the water, and thereby causing them to emit vapour, not that of emitting vapour from itself. I have therefore bracketed τῶν τριῶν and καὶ τοῦ πυρός. The Stoics spoke of ἀναθυμιάσεις which rise from earth and water; but no one spoke of ἀναθυμιάσεις which issue from fire.

In speaking of the formation of fire and water, the writer uses the present tense (γίγνεται), which might seem to imply that the process is continually going on. But in speaking of the formation of earth and air, he uses the past tense (ἐγένετο). His view therefore appears to be that the Kosmos γέγονεν, and that the elements came into being once for all; and if so, γίγνεται must be taken as a historic present, i. e. as equivalent to ἐγένετο. He probably held, like most men of his time, that, having once come into being, the elements are continually transmuted into one another; but in this passage he says nothing about their continual transmutation.

With this *cosmogonia* should be compared those of *Corp. I* and *Corp. III*, in which the formation of the elements is differently described. The author of *Exc. XV* has not been influenced by the first chapter of *Genesis*, as the writers of those *libelli* were.

§ 3. ταῦτα (δέ) συνήλθε κατὰ τὸν τῆς ἁρμονίας λόγον, θερμὸν ψυχρῶ, ξηρὸν ὑγρῶ. ἡ ἁρμονία apparently means 'the structure of the Kosmos'. In § 5, the same term is used to signify the structure of the human or animal body (which is a microcosm). In *Corp. I*, ἡ ἁρμονία means 'the structure of the heavens'.

ὁ λόγος τῆς ἁρμονίας must be taken to mean 'the plan or design according to which the universe is constructed'. If the phrase were used by some one who was speaking of a personal *Demiurgus*, it would mean the plan which the Builder of the universe had in his mind when he began to construct it. The elements combine together in such a way as to carry out this plan or design.

θερμότης, ψυχρότης, ὑγρότης and ξηρότης are the four primary qualities of matter.¹ The Stoics said that fire is τὸ θερμόν, air τὸ ψυχρόν, water τὸ ὑγρόν, and earth τὸ ξηρόν (*Diog. Laert. 7. 137*). Aristotle connected the elements with the four primary qualities in

¹ Galen *Methodi med.* 1. 2, vol. x, p. 15 K. (*Arnim Sto. vet. fr.* II, § 411): τὸ γὰρ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν καὶ τὸ ξηρὸν καὶ τὸ ὑγρὸν Ἰπποκράτης μὲν πρῶτος εἰσηγήσατο, μετ' αὐτὸν δ' Ἀριστοτέλης ἀπέδειξεν· ἔτοιμα δ' ἤδη παραλαβόντες . . . οἱ περὶ τὸν Χρῆσιππον . . . ἐκ τούτων τὰ σύμπαντα κεκρᾶσθαι λέγουσι, καὶ ταῦτ' εἰς ἄλλα πάσχειν καὶ δρᾶν.

a different and more complicated way; according to him, fire is θερμὸν καὶ ξηρὸν, air is θερμὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν,¹ water is ψυχρὸν καὶ ὑγρὸν, and earth is ψυχρὸν καὶ ξηρὸν (*Ar. Gen. et corr.* 2. 3, 330 b 3). It is to be inferred from what is said in *Exc.* XV. 2 about the formation of fire, water, and earth, that the author of this *Hermeticum* agreed with the Stoics in assigning one of the primary qualities only to each of the four elements, and in holding fire to be τὸ θερμὸν, and earth to be τὸ ξηρὸν; but if I am right in inserting καὶ ψύχεται after θερμαίνεται, he must have made water, not air, τὸ ψυχρὸν, and consequently air, not water, τὸ ὑγρὸν. It would be possible to write θερμαίνεται (καὶ ὑγραίνεται) instead of θερμαίνεται (καὶ ψύχεται); but it seems more likely that the two opposite qualities of heat and coldness were spoken of together.

καὶ ἐκ τῆς συμπτώσεως τούτων ἐγένετο (τὰ σύνθετα σώματα (?). . .). In a lost passage which followed these words, the writer must have spoken of the first formation of (plants?), beasts, and men. In § 4, we find him speaking of the process by which existing beasts and men generate others of their kind. His account of reproduction resembles in some respects that given by Aristotle in his *De gen. an.*

§ 4. (. . . ἔστι δ' ἐν τῷ τῶν ζώων σπέρματι (?)) πνεῦμα [καὶ σπέρμα] ἀνάλογον τῷ περιέχοντι πνεύματι. πνεῦμα is air mixed with fire, or warmed air.² τὸ περιέχον πνεῦμα is the atmosphere, regarded as air permeated by the heat infused into it from the region of fire which lies above it, or more simply, air warmed by the heat of the sun. The atmospheric *pneuma* was held to be the life-breath (i.e. the material vehicle of life) of that great ζῶον, the Kosmos, and the ὄργανον by means of which life is conveyed into individual ζῶα upon earth. (See *Ascl. Lat.* III. 17 a.) This conception of the cosmic *pneuma* was elaborated by the Stoics out of earlier physical theories.

There is in the individual ζῶον a *pneuma* analogous to the cosmic *pneuma*, of which it is a detached portion; and this individual *pneuma* is the material vehicle of the individual's life. The *semen genitale*, being a part of the father's living body, contains a portion of his *pneuma*; and that portion of *pneuma*, in virtue of the vital force residing in it, is the source or germ of the life of the new

¹ ὑγρός, when applied to air, means 'fluid', or 'yielding to pressure', rather than 'moist'. Air is more ὑγρός, in that sense of the word, than water.

² See Arnim, *Sto. vet. fr.* II, §§ 439-446. *Ar. De gen. an.* 2. 2, 736 a 1: τὸ δὲ πνεῦμα (sc. the *pneuma* in the *semen*) ἔστι θερμὸς ἀήρ.

organism which is brought into being by procreation. The '*pneuma* in the *semen*' is spoken of by Aristotle, *De gen. an.* 2. 3, 736 b 33: ἐν τῷ σπέρματι ἐννάρχει, ὅπερ ποιεῖ γόνιμα εἶναι τὰ σπέρματα, τὸ καλούμενον θερμόν. τοῦτο δ' οὐ πῦρ οὐδὲ τοιαύτη δύναμις ἐστίν, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐμπεριλαμβανόμενον ἐν τῷ σπέρματι . . . πνεῦμα, καὶ ἢ ἐν τῷ πνεύματι φύσις, ἀνάλογον οὖσα τῷ τῶν ἀστρῶν στοιχείῳ.¹

οὐκ ἠρεμεῖ [ἐν τῷ σπέρματι]. The words ἐν τῷ σπέρματι are out of place here, but probably occurred in the lost part of the first sentence of § 4.

οὐκ ἠρεμοῦν δὲ (τὸ ἐν τῷ σπέρματι πνεῦμα), μεταβάλλει τὸ ἴσπέρμα¹. If the text is sound, the writer says that the matter on which the *pneuma* works, and which it develops into a foetus, is the *semen*. But if so, there would be no point in ἐς τὴν μήτραν ἐμπεσόν; for the *pneuma*, being in the *semen* from the first, might just as well begin its work on it without waiting till it had entered the μήτρα. It is therefore probable that in this respect the writer agreed with Aristotle, who says that the ὕλη worked on is supplied by the female.² If so, τὸ σπέρμα must have been substituted by error for something equivalent to τὸ περίττωμα τὸ τοῦ θήλεος, the term used in Ar. *De gen. an.*³

ἐπὶ τῷ μεγέθει δὲ ἐπισπάται σχῆμα (εἰδῶλον ἐπισπάται σχήματος MSS.). The insertion of εἰδῶλον here, and the alteration of εἰδοποιεῖται below into εἰδωλοποιεῖται, must have resulted from some misunderstanding on the part of a transcriber; but what he supposed the words to mean, I cannot guess.

εἶτα (ὀχεῖται MSS.) δὲ ἐπὶ τῷ σχήματι (προσδέχεται) τὸ εἶδος. What is the difference between τὸ σχῆμα and τὸ εἶδος? Probably τὸ σχῆμα is the shape of the embryo at a time when it does not yet

¹ These last words imply that 'the *pneuma* which is in the *semen*' contains something which is not composed of any of the four sublunar elements, but is analogous to the 'fifth substance' of which the heavens consist. But that is a distinctively Aristotelian notion, and no trace of it appears in *Exc.* XV. 4, the immediate sources of which must have been Stoic rather than Aristotelian.

Zeller, *Arist.* Eng. tr. II, p. 6, says that Aristotle 'is wholly unable to give any clear account of the qualities' of the thing of which he speaks in that passage, 'or to harmonize this conception with the general teaching of the *Physics*'.

² Ar. *De gen. an.* 2, 3, 737 a 20: the *semen*, ὅταν ἔλθῃ εἰς τὴν ὑστέραν, συνίστησι καὶ κινεῖ τὸ περίττωμα τὸ τοῦ θήλεος. *Ib.* 2. 4, 738 b 20: παρέχει τὸ μὲν θῆλυ τὴν ὕλην, τὸ δ' ἄρρεν τὸ δημιουργοῦν. Zeller, *Arist.* Eng. tr. II, p. 50: 'Aristotle denies any participation on the part of the male seed in the material composition of the embryo, declaring that it only communicates the necessary impulse to the substance derived from the female.'

³ The sense required might perhaps be expressed by writing τὸ σπέρμα (τὸ τοῦ θήλεος). Cf. Aetius, Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 423: the Stoics say ἠροῖσθαι καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα σπέρμα.

resemble any living animal, and τὸ εἶδος is the form distinctive of this or that particular species of animals. The writer distinguishes three successive stages in the development of the foetus. In the first stage, it increases in bulk, but remains a semi-liquid or plastic mass, without any fixed or definite shape (σχῆμα). In the second stage, it assumes a certain shape, but not a *specific* shape; at this stage, a human embryo and that of a sheep would be indistinguishable. In the third stage, it acquires the distinctive shape of a certain species (εἶδος); one can see that it is a human being, or that it is a sheep. Cf. Ar. *De gen. an.* 2. 3, 736 b 2: οὐ γὰρ ἅμα γίνεται ζῶον καὶ ἄνθρωπος, οὐδὲ ζῶον καὶ ἵππος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων ζῴων ὕστερον γὰρ γίνεται τὸ τέλος, τὸ δ' ἴδιόν ἐστι τὸ ἐκάστου τῆς γενέσεως τέλος. I. e. there is a stage at which it can be said that the foetus is a ζῶον, but not that it is a ζῶον of this or that species. That which Aristotle there calls τὸ ἴδιον, the Hermetist calls τὸ εἶδος.

ὀχεῖται, the reading of the MSS., is hardly possible. It may be conjectured that the author wrote εἶτα . . . προσδέχεται, or something of the sort, and that ὀχεῖται has resulted from a mixture of εἶτα with the verb.

(〈τὸ δ' ἐν τῇ νηδί . . . εἰς τὸν ἕξω ἀέρα ἀγει.〉) If this sentence occurred at all in the original text, it must have stood at the end of § 4. The development of the foetus is followed by the birth. The missing subject of the verbs must be ἡ φύσις, which τῷ παντὶ παρέχει κινήσεις (§ 1). It cannot be the *pneuma* which has been working in the foetus; for the *pneuma* works only within the organism to which it belongs, and has no power to change the relations between that organism and other bodies.

ἀριθμοῖς λοχεύει καὶ μαιοῦται. ἀριθμοῖς, 'by numberings', must mean 'according to fixed measurements of time'. In the case of the human foetus, for instance, the ἀριθμός would be nine months. But possibly ἀριθμοῖς may be a corruption of some more easily intelligible phrase to the same effect.

§ 5. τὸ πνεῦμα οὐκ εἶχεν ἐν τῇ νηδί τὴν ζωτικὴν κίνησιν, τὴν δὲ βλαστικὴν (βραστικὴν MSS.) (μόνην). βλαστικός is equivalent to θρεπτικός, the word used by Aristotle in similar connexions. The only life which the foetus possesses is that of a vegetable, and its only movement is that of vegetable growth. ζωτικὴ κίνησις is the movement of an animal (ζῶον) as opposed to a vegetable; and animal life begins at birth.

καὶ [ταύτην] (ψυχὴν προσ)ῆρμοσεν (ἢ φύσις τῇ) ἁρμονία, ὑποδοχὴν οὖσαν

τῆς [διανοητικῆς] ζω(τικ)ῆς (ἐνεργείας). The meaning of this passage as originally written, if not the exact words, can be inferred with confidence from the context. The πνεῦμα gives only vegetable life and movement to the organism to which it belongs; the ψυχή gives animal life and movement. Animal life begins at birth; and accordingly, it is at birth that a ψυχή is added to the organism. The words which I have transposed from § 7 (παρεισέρπει γὰρ τῷ πνεύματι (ἢ ψυχῇ) καὶ κινεῖ ζωτικῶς) supply precisely the addition which is wanted here to make the meaning clear.

διανοητικῆς cannot be right; for a mention of διάνοια, which is the characteristic of adult men as opposed to young children and the lower animals, would be out of place at this stage. We may suppose that ἐνεργείας or some other substantive was omitted after ζωτικῆς; that ζωτικῆς was then altered into ζωῆς; and that a transcriber, seeing that some qualification of ζωῆς was needed, but misunderstanding the writer's distinctions, wrongly inserted διανοητικῆς.

In his view of the successive grades of life, the Hermetist agrees in the main with Aristotle; but he differs from him in his application of the word ψυχή. He says that there is no ψυχή until birth, and that the growth of the foetus is a function of the *pneuma* alone; whereas Aristotle says that the unborn foetus already has a ψυχή θρεπτική. *Ar. De gen. an.* 2, 3, 736 a 31: πότερον ἐνυπάρχει (ψυχῇ) τῷ σπέρματι καὶ τῷ κήματι ἢ οὐ . . . ; οὔτε γὰρ ὡς ἄψυχον ἂν θείη τις τὸ κήμα κατὰ πάντα τρόπον ἐστερημένον ζωῆς· οὐδὲν γὰρ ἦπτον τὰ τε σπέρματα καὶ τὰ κήματα τῶν ζώων ζῆ τῶν φυτῶν,¹ καὶ γόνιμα μέχρι τινός ἐστιν. ὅτι μὲν οὖν τὴν θρεπτικὴν ἔχουσι ψυχὴν, φανερόν. . . . προϋόντα δὲ καὶ τὴν αἰσθητικὴν (ἔχουσι ψυχὴν), καθ' ἣν ζῶν.² . . . πρῶτον μὲν γὰρ ἅπαντ' ἔοικε ζῆν τὰ τοιαῦτα φυτοῦ βίον, ἐπομένως δὲ δῆλον ὅτι καὶ περὶ τῆς αἰσθητικῆς λεκτέον ψυχῆς καὶ περὶ τῆς νοητικῆς.

The writer of *Exc.* XV agrees with the Stoics against Aristotle in saying that the ψυχή first presents itself in the organism at birth; but he shows himself a Platonist, and not a Stoic, in saying that at the moment of birth a pre-existent (and presumably incorporeal) ψυχή enters into the organism from without,³ whereas the Stoics said that the ψυχή (which they held to be a corporeal thing) comes into

¹ 'Embryos are no less alive than plants.' The Hermetist would have expressed this by saying that they have βλαστικὴν κίνησιν.

² The αἰσθητικὴ ψυχή of Aristotle corresponds to the ζωτικὴ κίνησις of the Hermetist.

³ Aristotle, *De gen. an.* 2, 3, 736 b 27, says τὸν νοῦν μόνον θύραθεν ἐπεισιέναι, καὶ θεῖον εἶναι μόνον· οὐδὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ κοινωνεῖ σωματικὴ ἐνέργεια.

existence at birth, being a modified form of the corporeal *pneuma* which was already present in the foetus.

§ 6. καὶ ἡ ἐγγυτάτω παρούσα ψυχὴ προσοικειοῦται—(καὶ ἐγγυτάτω ψυχὴ οὐσα οἰκειοῦται MSS.). If a pre-existent ψυχὴ enters the body at birth, how is it determined which of the innumerable unembodied ψυχαί is to do so? The writer's answer to this question appears to have been that the ψυχὴ which enters the body is that ψυχὴ which is nearest at hand (hovering in the adjacent air?) at the moment of birth; and that it is there at the right moment, not (as some people mistakenly suppose) because of any kinship or resemblance between it and the body it is about to enter, but because it has been assigned to this body by Heimarmene.

οὐ κατὰ τὴν συγγενικὴν οὐσιότητα (ιδιότητα P)¹ (παραγενομένη), ἀλλὰ [τὴν] καθ' εἰμαρμένην. οὐσιότητα, the reading of F, may be a corruption of ὁμοιότητα, or of οἰκειότητα (cf. κατὰ συγγενικὴν οἰκειότητα in *Exc.* XVI. 4). It would be possible to write οὐ κατὰ [τὴν] συγγενικὴν οἰκειότητα, 'not on the ground of a relationship which has to do with kinship'; but it is perhaps more likely that the original reading was οὐ κατὰ συγγένειαν, and that οἰκειότητα or ὁμοιότητα was written as an alternative for συγγένειαν. At any rate, οὐ κατὰ συγγένειαν would serve to express what the author probably meant.

οὐ γὰρ ἔρωσ (ἐρώτων MSS.) ἐστὶν αὐτῇ (τοῦ) μετὰ σώματος εἶναι. Some Platonists said that the soul is drawn down into the body by its own morbid desire for bodily things. But the writer of *Exc.* XV rejects that view, and holds that the soul has no choice in the matter; its incarnation is determined for it by Heimarmene.

§ 7. ἡ δὲ φύσις ζωτικῶς ἤδη κινουμένη(?) παρέχει τῷ γενομένῳ (γιγνομένῳ MSS.) διανοητικὴν κίνησιν. διάνοια is this writer's name for what is often called λόγος, viz. the mental function by the possession of which man is distinguished from τὰ ἄλογα ζῶα. All that the Hermetist has hitherto said about the development of the living organism applies to men and beasts alike; but he now goes on to speak of the further development which is peculiar to men. The διανοητικὴ κίνησις begins, not at birth, (for a new-born baby has no διάνοια,) but after some years of life,—perhaps at adolescence. (Cf. *Exc.* III. 5 as emended: τινὲς μὲν (τῶν ἐνεργειῶν) ἄμα τῷ γενέσθαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον παραγίγονται, . . . αἱ δὲ καθαρώτεραι ἐνέργειαι κατὰ μεταβολὴν τῆς ἡλικίας, κ.τ.λ.) But it is present in all adult men. The agent to whose operation the writer attributed its presence was doubtless ἡ φύσις.

(ὁ δὲ θεὸς ὀλίγοις τισὶ παρέχει (?)) καὶ νοερὰν [ζωῆς αὐτῆς] οὐσίαν. The νοερὰ οὐσία is the νοῦς (in the higher and more restricted sense of that term), which is conferred on a few men only. It is an ἀπόσπασμα or ἀπόρροια of the divine νοῦς (*Corp.* XII. i *init.*), and is bestowed, not by cosmic Nature, but by the immediate action of the supracosmic God. The few who receive it are thereby raised above the Kosmos, and become θεῖοι, or even θεοί.

(ἔστι δὲ αὕτη ἀμερῆς καὶ ἀμετάβλητος, οὐδέποτε ἐξισταμένη τῆς ἀμεταβλησίας.) In the MSS., this sentence is placed in § 5; and in that position, αὕτη would mean, according to the traditional text of § 5, ἡ διανοητικὴ ζωή, and according to my emendation of it, ἡ ζωτικὴ ἐνέργεια or κίνησις. But neither of these things is ἀμετάβλητος. The only thing in man that is exempt from μεταβολή is ὁ νοῦς; this sentence must therefore have followed the mention of νοερὰ οὐσία in § 7. It is just because ὁ νοῦς is ἀμετάβλητος, that in speaking of it the writer uses the word οὐσία, and not κίνησις. His series is βλαστικὴ κίνησις, ζωτικὴ κίνησις, διανοητικὴ κίνησις, νοερὰ οὐσία.

EXCERPT XVI

In § 1, the writer is speaking of ψυχή; in §§ 2-5, he is speaking of σῶμα, and of certain things (τόπος, χρόνος, and φυσικὴ κίνησις) which are connected with σῶμα. In the last sentence of § 6, ψυχή is spoken of again.

§ 1. (ἡ) ψυχὴ τοῖνυν οὐσία ἐστὶν ἀσώματος. The soul is an οὐσία (a 'substance', i. e. a thing which exists independently), and not a mere attribute of some οὐσία (e. g. of the body).

But there are οὐσίαι of different kinds. Bodies also are οὐσίαι; but the soul is οὐσία ἀσώματος, 'an incorporeal substance'. The word ἀσώματος is here equivalent to νοητή. Cf. *Exc.* XXI. 1: ἡ οὐσιότης, [ἡ] καθόλου λεγομένη, κοινὴ (ἐστὶ τῶν νοητῶν (καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν)). . . (ἡ δὲ) φύσις (i. e. the corporeal world) οὐσία αἰσθητή, ἔχουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ (τὰ) αἰσθητὰ πάντα.

καὶ ἐν σώματι δὲ οὐσα οὐκ ἐκβαίνει τῆς ἰδίας οὐσιότητος. There are unembodied souls; and even when a soul is embodied, it still continues to be an οὐσία ἀσώματος, as it was before.

τυγχάνει γὰρ οὐσα ἰαεικίνητος κατ' οὐσίαν κατὰ νόησιν αὐτοκίνητος¹. I propose to read τυγχάνει γὰρ οὐσα αὐτοκίνητος, κατ' οὐσίαν νοητὴν κινουμένη. (If this conjecture is right, αὐτοκίνητος has been repeated

by error after νοητήν (νόησιν MSS.), and has been altered into ἀκίνητος (P) and ἀεικίνητος (F) after οὔσα.) See § 6 *fin.*, where I read ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν νοη(τήν κίνη)σις. Cf. *Exc.* XIX. 3: δύο τοίνυν εἰσι ζωαὶ καὶ δύο κινήσεις, μία μὲν ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν, ἑτέρα δὲ ἡ κατὰ φύσιν. (The οὐσία of *Exc.* XIX is ἀσώματος or νοητῆ οὐσία.)

The writer of *Exc.* XVI holds that there are two different kinds of οὐσίαι, and in correspondence with them, two different kinds of κινήσις. The movement of bodies is called by him ἡ φυσικὴ κίνησις (§ 5) and ἡ κατὰ φύσιν κίνησις (§ 3); and the sort of movement that is appropriate to an ἀσώματος οὐσία might very well be called by him ἡ κατ' οὐσίαν νοητὴν κίνησις.

Compare Aetius, Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 387: οὗτοι πάντες . . . ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν ὑποτίθενται, φύσιν ('a thing') λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον καὶ οὐσίαν νοητὴν. Perhaps we ought to read there φύσιν λέγοντες αὐτοκίνητον, κατ' οὐσίαν νοητὴν (κινουμένην?): 'saying that the soul is a thing which is self-moved, being moved in the manner of an οὐσία νοητή.'

Both ἀεικίνητος (which is used in Pl. *Phaedr.* 245 c) and αὐτοκίνητος (which is not used by Plato, but was suggested by the same passage in the *Phaedrus*) were habitually applied to the soul by Platonists. Cf. Aetius, Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 386 (quoted in note on *Exc.* IV A. 4).

οὐκ ἔν τινι ἴκινουμένη¹ (οὔσα?), οὐ πρὸς τι, οὐ(χ) ἔνεκέν τινος. οὐκ ἔν τινι seems inconsistent with καὶ ἐν σώματι δὲ οὔσα above, which implies that a soul sometimes *is* 'in something'. But the words might perhaps be understood as an expansion of the statement that the soul is an οὐσία. 'It does not exist (merely) *in* something, &c.'

[Since the soul has been defined as αὐτοκίνητος, the writer might proceed to deny that it is moved *in* something, i. e. has its motion from without. This is one of the senses of ἐν discussed in *Ar. Phys.* 4. 3: καὶ ὅλως ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ κινητικῷ.]

§ 2. Ἐν τινι τοίνυν ἐστίν¹ ὁ τόπος καὶ (ὁ) χρόνος ἴκαὶ φύσις¹. This section appears to be meant for an explanation of the words ἐν τινι, πρὸς τι, and ἔνεκέν τινος in § 1; but as given in the MSS., it is unintelligible.

It would be possible to make sense of the first clause of it by writing τὸ ἐν τίνι, and taking this to mean 'the answer to the question "in what?"'. We might then translate 'That in which things are is place and time'; and καὶ φύσις might be a remnant of something like (ἐν τούτοις γὰρ) ἡ φυσικὴ κίνησις, 'physical movement

is in place and time'. But if ἐν τίνι were written here, πρὸς τι in the following clause could hardly be retained, and we should have to assume that τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι . . . σχῆμα is an interpolation,—which seems probable on other grounds also. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι ἔστιν ἁρμονία καὶ εἶδος καὶ σχῆμα.¹ Perhaps a nearer approach to the original reading might be made by writing τὸ δὲ πρὸς τι, ὅσον ἁρμονία κ.τ.λ.: 'by "that which exists merely in relation to something" I mean, for instance, ἁρμονία' &c.

The word ἁρμονία occurs again in § 3 and in § 6; but in both those places, there is reason to bracket the phrase in which it occurs. There is no other mention of εἶδος or σχῆμα in this Excerpt.

It may be suspected that the man who wrote these words was thinking of the doctrine that the soul is a ἁρμονία; and the argument implied may perhaps have been to this effect: 'a ἁρμονία is πρὸς τι (a coadjustment of things), not οὐσία; but the soul is οὐσία, not πρὸς τι; therefore the soul cannot be a ἁρμονία.'

The doctrine that the soul is a ἁρμονία is discussed and rejected in Pl. *Phaedo* 86 A-D and 91 C-94 E; and it is there presented in two different forms, viz. (1) that the soul is to the body as the ἁρμονία of a lyre (i. e. the coadjustment or tuning of its strings) is to the lyre, and (2) that the soul is a ἁρμονία or κρᾶσις (i. e. a coadjustment or 'contemperation') of the elements (τὸ θερμόν, τὸ ψυχρόν, τὸ ξηρόν, τὸ ὑγρόν) of which the body is composed. In either form alike, it implies that the soul is not an οὐσία, but is dependent on the body for its existence, and that it ceases to exist at death.

Aristotle, *De an.* I. 4, 407 b 27 *sqq.*, speaks of the doctrine that the soul is a ἁρμονία, and says it is a δόξα πιθανὴ πολλοῖς. This doctrine was asserted by Aristoxenus, who took the word ἁρμονία in its musical sense (Cic. *Tusc.* I. 10. 20); and by Dicaearchus, who took it in the other sense (Aetius, Diels, *Doxogr.* p. 387: Δικαίαρχος (ἔφη τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι) ἁρμονίαν τῶν τεσσάρων στοιχείων). It is discussed and rejected by Lucretius, 3. 98 *sqq.* Macrobius, *Sonn. Scip.* I. 14. 19, says 'Pythagoras et Philolaus (dixerunt animam esse) harmoniam'; but there appears to be no earlier evidence that the doctrine was of Pythagorean origin; and it is inconsistent with the Pythagorean belief in the existence of disembodied souls.

Aristotelians might say that the soul is the εἶδος of the living body. (Arist. *Fragm.* 42, 1482 b 37: εἶδος τι ἢ ψυχῆ. W. D. Ross,

Aristotle, 1923, p. 134: 'Animate bodies . . . are individual independent substances concrete of matter and form. In this concrete unity, . . . body plays the part of matter or possessor of attributes, and soul that of form or essential attribute.') That might possibly account for the mention of *εἶδος* in this clause, if we assume that the writer knew the Aristotelian doctrine of the soul and rejected it, as he rejected the *ἁρμονία*-doctrine. But I do not know that it was ever said that the soul is a *σχῆμα*.

[*ταῦτα δὲ κατὰ συγγενικὴν οἰκειότητα κοινῶνεί ἀλλήλοις.*] For *κατὰ συγγενικὴν οἰκειότητα*, cf. *κατὰ τὴν συγγενικὴν οὐσιότητα* (*al. ιδιότητα*) in *Exc.* XV. 6.

What are 'these things' (*ταῦτα*)? They appear to be the three things which, in the preceding clause, were said to be *ἔνεκα σώματος*; namely, *χρόνος*, *τόπος*, and *φυσικ(ῆ) κίνησις*. But the following sentence, *ἀμήχανον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.*, does not fit on well to this statement; and we get a better connexion if we cut out *ταῦτα δὲ . . . κοινῶνεί ἀλλήλοις* (as well as *ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν τὸ σῶμα ἐδέϊτο τόπου*) and make *ἀμήχανον γὰρ κ.τ.λ.* follow immediately on *ἔνεκα γὰρ σώματος καὶ χρόνος καὶ τόπος καὶ φυσικὴ κίνησις*, which it seems intended to explain.

[*ἐπεὶ τοῖνυν τὸ σῶμα ἐδέϊτο τόπου*] . . . [*καὶ μεταβάλλεται φυσικῆ (κίνησει)*]. These misplaced phrases may perhaps be fragments of a sentence which followed at the end of § 3.

ἀμήχανον γὰρ [ἦ] συστήναι σῶμα ἄνευ τόπου. Cf. *Sext. Empir. Pyrrh.* 3. 121: *εἶγε μὴν ἔστι τι σῶμα, φασίν, ἔσται καὶ ὁ τόπος ἄνευ γὰρ τούτου οὐκ ἂν εἶη τὸ σῶμα.*

ἀδύνατον δὲ μεταβολὴν (σώματος) εἶναι ἄνευ χρόνου. It is necessary to add *σώματος*. Soul, as well as body, is subject to *μεταβολή*; but the writer is here speaking of body only, and not of soul. Cf. *τὰς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολάς* in § 4.

[*οὔτε σώματος οἶόν τε σύστασιν εἶναι ἄνευ ἁρμονίας.*] This is doubtless a later addition. If it was to be said at all, it could have been said better in two words, by adding *καὶ ἁρμονίας* after *ἀμήχανον γὰρ συστήναι σῶμα* (= *σώματος σύστασιν εἶναι*) *ἄνευ τόπου*.

§ 4. *ἔνεκα* 'τοῖνυν' τοῦ σώματος ἔστιν ὁ τόπος. *τόπος*, 'place', means the space which is occupied by body. But what is meant by saying that place exists 'for the sake of' body? The word *ἔνεκα* (in its primary sense at least) implies a purpose; and a purpose implies some one who purposes. This statement therefore, if we give the words their full significance, would seem to imply that the Creator first said to himself 'I will make body', and then added 'in order

that I may do so, I must first make a space for the body to occupy'. But the writer was probably not here thinking of a personal Creator; and perhaps he meant merely that body could not exist if there were not a place for it. If so, the same thought is expressed in a different way by the phrase τὸ σῶμα ἐδεῖτο τόπου in § 3; 'body was in need of place (in order that it might exist).'

παραδεχόμενος γὰρ (ὁ τόπος) τὰς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολὰς οὐκ ἐὰ ἀπόλλυσθαι τὸ μεταβαλλόμενον. Bodies change (e.g. a lump of ice turns into water); and if the body still exists after the change, there must be something belonging to it which persists,—some permanent substrate on which different qualities (e.g. the qualities of ice and those of water) are successively imposed. This permanent substrate the writer apparently holds to be ὁ τόπος, i.e. the space which the body occupies. Thus he assigns to τόπος the function which, in the *Timaeus*, is assigned to the ὑποδοχή, and which, after Plato's time, was commonly assigned to ὕλη. This notion may have been suggested to the Hermetist by Pl. *Tim.* 52 A, where the ὑποδοχή is identified with χώρα. Cf. Ar. *Phys.* 4, 2, 209 b 11: διὸ καὶ Πλάτων τὴν ὕλην καὶ τὴν χώραν ταῦτό φησιν εἶναι ἐν τῷ Τιμαίῳ.

It might be objected that one of the kinds of change to which bodies are subject is motion from one place to another, and that when a body is in motion, ὁ τόπος does not, with respect to that body, persist unchanged, and therefore cannot 'save the body from destruction'. The writer ignores this difficulty; he seems to be thinking only of a body which remains in the same place throughout the series of changes to which it is subjected.

τῆς μὲν ἕξεως στερίσκεται, τοῦ δὲ εἶναι σῶμα οὐχί. The ἕξις of a body is the sum of the qualities which it manifests at a given moment. When a body changes, it loses the ἕξις which it had before, and receives another ἕξις instead; but it still remains a body.

⟨τὸ σῶμα τοῖνυν κατὰ διάθεσιν μεταβάλλεται⟩ τὸ γὰρ σῶμα, ἢ σῶμα, μένει [σῶμα], ἢ δὲ ποιά διάθεσις οὐ μένει. What has just been said is here repeated in other words, διάθεσις being used as a synonym for ἕξις. The repetition is superfluous; and there is no apparent reason for writing κατὰ διάθεσιν and ἢ δὲ ποιά διάθεσις instead of καθ' ἕξιν and ἢ δὲ ποιά ἕξις. It may therefore be suspected that τὸ σῶμα τοῖνυν . . . οὐ μένει is a parallel passage appended in the margin.

§ 5. ⟨ἐνεκ)α σώματος τοῖνυν ὁ τόπος καὶ ὁ χρόνος καὶ ἡ φυσικὴ κίνησις. This has already been asserted in § 3 *ini*. In § 4, it is shown that

the assertion is true in respect of *τόπος*. It seems probable that § 4 was followed by a passage, now lost, in which *χρόνος* and *φυσικὴ κίνησις* were similarly dealt with, and it was shown of each of them in turn that it is *ἐνεκα σώματος*. If so, the proposition which was asserted in § 3, and proved in § 4 and the lost passage together, is repeated in § 5, when the proof has been completed.

§ 6. *ἰδιότης* δὲ [τοῦ] *τόπου παραδοχῆ*. Wachsmuth alters *παραδοχῆ* (*παρασχῆ* P) into *περιοχῆ*; but *παραδοχῆ* is confirmed and explained by *παραδεχόμενος γὰρ τὰς τοῦ σώματος μεταβολάς* in § 4.

χρόνου δὲ (*ἰδιότης*) *διάστημα* καὶ *ἀριθμός*. Cf. Arius Didymus, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 461 (Stob. I. 8. 40 e and 42, vol. i, pp. 104 ff. W.): *Ζήνων* ἔφησε *χρόνον* εἶναι *κινήσεως διάστημα*, τοῦτο δὲ καὶ *μέτρον* καὶ *κριτήριον τάχους* τε καὶ *βραδύτητος*. . . . Ἀπολλόδωρος δ' . . . οὕτως ὀρίζεται τὸν *χρόνον* " *χρόνος* δ' ἐστὶ τῆς τοῦ κόσμου *κινήσεως διάστημα*." . . . τὸν δὲ *χρόνον* οὕτως ὀρίζεται (Posidonius), *διάστημα κινήσεως*, ἢ *μέτρον τάχους* τε καὶ *βραδύτητος*. . . . ὁ δὲ Χρῦσιππος, *χρόνον* εἶναι *κινήσεως διάστημα*, Ἦ καθ' ὃν (ὁ Heeren) ποτὲ λέγεται¹ *μέτρον τάχους* καὶ *βραδύτητος*.¹ Plut. *Quaest. Plat.* 8. 4, 1007 A: ῥητέον οὖν τοὺς ὑπὸ τούτων παραττομένους δι' ἄνοιαν οἰεσθαι τὸν *χρόνον* "*μέτρον*" εἶναι "*κινήσεως*", καὶ "*ἀριθμὸν κατὰ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον*" ὡς Ἀριστοτέλης εἶπεν, . . . ἢ "*διάστημα κινήσεως*" ἄλλο δ' οὐδέν, ὡς εἶναι τῶν Στωικῶν. Simplicius *in Ar. Phys.* p. 700 Diels: τοῦ Ἀρχύτου λέγοντος καθόλου τὸν *χρόνον διάστημα* τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, Ἦ ὡς¹ (ὡς καί?) *τινες* τῶν Στωικῶν ἔλεγον. These passages show that *διάστημα* was the most prominent word in one of the Stoic definitions of time; and the Hermetist, when he said that the *ἰδιότης* of time is *διάστημα*, must have been thinking of that definition.

Similarly, the word *ἀριθμός* must have been suggested by Aristotle's definition, *Phys.* 4. 11, 219 b 1: τοῦτο γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁ *χρόνος*, *ἀριθμὸς κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον*. But as the *ἰδιότης* of each of the other things spoken of is indicated by a single word, it may be suspected that *διάστημα* alone was originally given as the *ἰδιότης* *χρόνον*, and that *καὶ ἀριθμός* has been added later.

Ἦ *φύσεως* δὲ (*ἰδιότης*) *κίνησις*, [*ἁρμονίας* δὲ *φιλία*], *σώματος* δὲ *μεταβολή*. This cannot be right. It might be expected that something would be here said about *φυσικὴ κίνησις*, which is coupled with *τόπος* and *χρόνος* in § 5, and appears therefore to be one of the things referred to by the words *ἕκαστον τούτων*. But it could not be said

¹ Cf. Stob. I. 8. 40 b, vol. i, p. 103 W: (τὸν *χρόνον*) *μέτρον βραδύτητος ἢ τάχους* εἶπε Χρῦσιππος.

that *κίνησις* (without qualification) is *ιδιότης φύσεως*; for *ψυχή* also *κινείται*, and the *κίνησις* of *ψυχή* differs from *φυσική κίνησις*, and is contrasted with it in this document. Nor could it be said that *μεταβολή* is *ιδιότης σώματος*; for *ψυχή* also *μεταβάλλεται*. It would be possible to make sense by cutting out these words, and rewriting the following sentence thus: *ιδιότης δὲ (σώματος μὲν ἢ φυσικῆ κίνησις), ψυχῆς (δὲ) ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν νοη(τὴν κίνη)σις*.

EXCERPT XVII

This piece is an extract from a discourse or epistle addressed by Hermes to Ammon (ὧ "Αμμων, § 1). In style and terminology, *Exc.* XVII closely resembles *Exc.* XVIII and *Exc.* XIX. It is therefore probable that these three pieces were written by the same author; and it is possible that all three were extracted by Stobaeus from the same *libellus*. If so, *Exc.* XVIII and *Exc.* XIX, as well as *Exc.* XVII, ought to be reckoned among 'the teachings of Hermes to Ammon'. All three are badly damaged by corruption of the text, and much of their meaning is lost beyond hope of recovery.

§ 1. *ψυχή . . . ἐστίν . . . οὐσία αὐτοτελής ἐν ἀρχῇ. αὐτοτελής*, 'independent of external authority', or 'self-determining', is equivalent to *αὐτεξούσιος*. The soul, 'in the beginning', i. e. before it has been incarnated and affected by material things, is *αὐτοτελής*; for in that condition it is not subject to Heimarmene.

It may be suspected that there is a lacuna after *οὐσία*, and that *αὐτοτελής ἐν ἀρχῇ* belongs to another clause, the beginning of which has been lost.

ἐλομένη (δὲ) βίον τὸν καθ' εἰμαρμένην, (. . .). Cf. *Exc.* XVIII. 3, 4: *τὸ δὲ αἰρεῖσθαι ἔχομεν κ.τ.λ. Exc.* XIX. 3: *ἢ μὲν [] κατ' οὐσίαν (ζωῆ) αὐτεξούσιος, ἢ δὲ (κατὰ φύσιν ζωῆ) ἀναγκαστικῆ*. See also *Exc.* VIII. 5. For *ἐλομένη* cf. Pl. *Rep.* 10. 617 E-618 B.

καὶ ἐπεσπάσατο ἑαυτῇ (ἄ)λογόν (τι) ὅμοιον τῇ ὕλη. λόγον ὅμοιον τῇ ὕλη is inexplicable; and there can be little doubt that we ought to read *ἄλογον* in place of *λόγον*. (Cf. *ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον* in § 6.) The soul, when embodied, adds to itself something which is of like nature with the matter of which the body consists. This thing which is added or appended to the soul in consequence of its incarnation is called *τὸ ἄλογον (μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς)*. It might equally well be called *τὸ παθητικόν*; and the *πάθη* by which it is affected fall under the two heads *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία*. The writer has been

influenced by Pl. *Rep.*, in which τὸ ἄλογον τῆς ψυχῆς is divided into τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν.

ἐαυτῇ after ἐπισπάσαστο is redundant, and may perhaps have been inserted by error. The verb ἐπισπᾶσθαι probably occurs again in a similar connexion in § 7, and also in *Exc.* XIX. 1.

§ 2. ὁ μὲν θυμός [], ἐὰν ἔξιν ποιήσῃ πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόημα, γίνεται ἀνδρεία. θυμός is an irrational πάθος; but when rightly directed and controlled by νοῦς or τὸ λογιστικόν, it is changed into the moral virtue ἀνδρεία. And the relation between ἐπιθυμία and σωφροσύνη is analogous to that between θυμός and ἀνδρεία.

πρὸς τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς νόημα appears to be identical in meaning with πρὸς τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμὸν below; and it seems probable that τὸν . . . λογισμὸν was the original reading in both places (cf. ἔχηται . . . τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοῦ in § 3), and that τὸ . . . νόημα has been substituted for it by a transcriber. It appears that in this excerpt ὁ λόγος means what Plato calls τὸ λογιστικόν (μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς), and ὁ λογισμός signifies the function or operation of the λόγος.

In §§ 2 and 3 as given in the MSS., ἔξιν ποιήσῃ occurs twice, and ἔξιν ποιήσεται once. The author must have used the same phrase in all three places; but neither ἔξιν ποιήσῃ nor ἔξιν ποιήσεται is quite satisfactory.¹ The meaning of ἔξιν here seems to be that which is given to the word in Aristotle's *Ethics*. Cf. *Ar. Eth. Nic.* 2. 5. 2: λέγω δὲ πάθη μὲν ἐπιθυμίαν, ὀργήν, κ.τ.λ., ἔξεις δέ, καθ' ἃς πρὸς τὰ πάθη ἔχομεν εὖ ἢ κακῶς. A ἔξιν in this sense is a διάθεσις ('disposition') which is firmly established and lasting (*Ar. Cat.* 8. 9 a 8). The phrase ἐὰν ἔξιν ποιήσῃ (or -σεται) πρὸς τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμὸν corresponds to ἔξιν . . . ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα . . . ὀρισμένη λόγῳ in Aristotle's definition of ἠθικὴ ἀρετή, *Eth. Nic.* 2. 6. 15.²

(ὁ θυμός) οὐ παράγεται ὑπὸ δειλίας. The corresponding phrase with reference to σωφροσύνη is (ἡ ἐπιθυμία) οὐ κινεῖται ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς. But δειλία, being a vice (i. e. a κακὴ ἔξιν), does not rightly correspond to ἡδονή, which is a πάθος and not a vice. Perhaps the author wrote ὑπὸ δέϊματος, or ὑπὸ τῶν δεινῶν.

[ὑπάρχει ἄλλῃ. οὗτος] . . . [παρέχεται. αὕτη]. These are unintelligible remnants of two parallel phrases, which may or may not

¹ One might perhaps compare Pl. *Rep.* 4. 443 E: ὀνομάζοντα δικαίαν . . . πράξιν, ἢ ἂν ταύτην τὴν ἔξιν σφίξῃ τε καὶ συναπεργάζηται.

² Prof. Stewart says that ὀρισμένη λόγῳ there means 'determined according to the proper ratio or proportion', and not 'determined by Reason'. But whatever Aristotle may have meant by the words, the Hermetist, if he had read them, might take them to mean 'determined by the rational part of the soul'.

have been present in the original text. *παρέχεται* might be a corruption of *ὑπάρχει*, or of *παράγεται*.

§ 3. [ἀναπληροῖ γὰρ ὁ λογισμὸς τὸ ἐνδέον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.] This appears to be a doublet of *ἐπανισοῖ δὲ τὸ ἐνδέον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας* at the end of the section. There is no corresponding clause with reference to *θυμός*.

ὅταν δὲ ἀμφοτέρα (sc. ὁ θυμός and ἡ ἐπιθυμία) ὁμοιοσύνη καὶ ἴσην ἕξιν ποιήσῃ, καὶ ἔχῃται ἀμφοτέρα τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοῦ, γίνεται δικαιοσύνη. In Pl. *Rep.*, it is not *δικαιοσύνη*, but *σωφροσύνη*, that is described as consisting in a certain 'unanimity'. *Rep.* 4. 432 A: ὀρθότατ' ἂν φαίμεν ταύτην τὴν ὁμόνοιαν σωφροσύνην εἶναι, χείρονός τε καὶ ἀμείνονος κατὰ φύσιν ξυμφωνίαν, ὁπότερον δεῖ ἄρχειν, καὶ ἐν πόλει καὶ ἐν ἐνὶ ἐκάστῳ. *Ib.* 442 C: σώφρονα (καλοῦμεν ἕνα ἕκαστον) τῇ φιλίᾳ καὶ ξυμφωνίᾳ (of the three parts of the soul), ὅταν τό τε ἄρχον καὶ τὸ ἀρχομένω τὸ λογιστικὸν ὁμοδοξῶσι δεῖν ἄρχειν.

What is the meaning of *ἴση ἕξις*? Does it mean *ἕξις ἐν μεσότητι οὔσα*? Or, a state in which *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* are evenly balanced against one another? The phrase is obscure, and it may be suspected that the text has been altered. The passage might be made more intelligible by cutting out *καὶ ἴσην ἕξιν ποιήσῃ*, and substituting some other term (e. g. *ὁμόνοια*?) for *ἴση ἕξις* in the following sentence.

ἡ γὰρ ἴση ἕξις αὐτῶν ἀφαιρεῖ μὲν τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ, ἐπανισοῖ δὲ τὸ ἐνδέον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας. I do not understand this. The words seem to imply that *θυμός*, when not governed by *λογισμός*, errs by excess, and that *ἐπιθυμία*, when not governed by *λογισμός*, errs by defect; that is to say, that if a man's passions are not controlled by reason, he will be too much disposed to fight, and too little disposed to seek pleasure. But a Hermetist would be more on his guard against having too much *ἐπιθυμία* than against having too little of it. Moreover, it is difficult to reconcile this statement with § 2, in which it is implied that the man whose passions are not governed by reason *παράγεται ὑπὸ δειλίας* (i. e. errs by *defect* of *θυμός*), and *κινεῖται ὑπὸ ἡδονῆς* (i. e. errs by *excess* of *ἐπιθυμία*). Aristotle would have said that in the case of *θυμός* and *ἐπιθυμία* alike there are both errors of excess and errors of defect. Cf. *Etc.* XVIII. 2: (τὸ ἄλογον) καὶ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ἐλλείπει. Perhaps a better sense might be got by striking out *τοῦ θυμοῦ* and *τῆς ἐπιθυμίας*.

§ 4. [ἀρχὴ δὲ τούτων ἡ διανοητικὴ οὐσία.] This appears to be a doublet of § 5 *init.*

[καθ' αὐτὴν ἑαυτῆ οὔσα ἐν τῷ αὐτῆς περινοητικῷ λόγῳ] [κράτος ἔχουσα

τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον]. These meaningless words have a curious resemblance to the two phrases αὐτῆ ἑαυτῆς οὐσα ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ, and νόημα ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον, which occur in *Exc.* XIX. 1.¹ Assuming that *Exc.* XVII and *Exc.* XIX were parts of the same *libellus*, it is possible that doublets of phrases which belonged to one of them may have been inserted by error in the other.

§ 5. ἀρχεὶ δὲ (τούτων) [[]] ἢ (νοητικῆ) οὐσία, ((καὶ ἡγεμονεύει)) ὡσπερ ἀρχων, ὁ δὲ λόγος (συνακολουθεῖ) αὐτῇ (αὐτῆς MSS.) ὡσπερ σύμβουλος. The addition of τούτων (*sc.* τοῦ θυμοῦ καὶ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας) and νοητικῆ is suggested by the doublet in § 4 *init.* The term ἢ νοητικῆ οὐσία occurs in *Exc.* XIX. 4 (cf. νοητικῆ οὐσ(ι)α in *Exc.* XIX. 1 *init.*); and I have restored it by conjecture in *Exc.* XVII. 6 and *Exc.* XVIII. 4. It is presumably equivalent to ὁ νοῦς. (Compare the use of ἢ νοητῆ οὐσία—possibly ἢ νοητ(ικ)ῆ οὐσία?—in the sense of ὁ νοῦς in *Exc.* VIII. 5, and that of ἢ νοερά οὐσία, apparently in the same sense, in *Exc.* XV. 7.) In Plato, ὁ νοῦς and τὸ λογιστικόν are two names for the same thing; but the Hermetist divides the thing which Plato called by those names into two distinct but closely interconnected things, one of which is named by him ἢ νοητικῆ οὐσία, and the other, ὁ λόγος.² We are told that the former is ‘ruler’ or ‘commander’, and the latter ‘counsellor’. This may perhaps be taken to mean that the function of the one is that which, in Aristotle’s *Ethics*, is called βούλησις, and that of the other corresponds to Aristotle’s βούλευσις and προαίρεσις; i. e. that the νοητικῆ οὐσία determines the good to be aimed at, and the λόγος deliberates and decides concerning the action to be taken with a view to realizing that good.

§ 6. ὁ [περινοητικός] λόγος τοίνυν τῆς ((νοητικῆς)) οὐσίας ἐστὶ. The MSS. give περινοητικός λόγος here, νοηματικῷ (*al.* νοητικῷ) λόγῳ in *Exc.* XVIII. 2, περινοηματικός (or περὶ νοηματικός) λόγος in *Exc.* XVIII. 4, διανοητικὸν λόγον in *Exc.* XVIII. 5. The λόγος of which the Hermetist is speaking might possibly be called νοητικός (as being closely connected with the νοητικῆ οὐσία), or διανοητικός (as to διάνοια, see note on *Exc.* XVIII. 1); but περινοητικός (‘shrewd’ or ‘subtle’) cannot be right; and neither νοηματικός nor περινοηματικός, as far as I know, occurs elsewhere in Greek literature. It may be conjectured that περι has been inserted by error, and

¹ Perhaps it is worth while to note also the resemblance between ἀρχ(ε)ὶ δὲ τούτων in *Exc.* XVII. 4 *init.* = 5 *init.* (as emended) and ἀρχεὶ δὲ τοῦ in *Exc.* XIX. 1.

² Cf. *Exc.* XI. 2. (15) as emended: ὁ νοῦς ἐν τῷ θεῷ· ὁ λόγος ἐν τῷ νοί.

that νοητικός has come from νοητικῆς misplaced. Emended as I propose, the words mean 'The λόγος belongs to the νοητικὴ οὐσία'. (As we have just been told, the relation between them is like that between an ἄρχων and his σύμβουλος.) Cf. ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας in *Exc.* XIX. 5 (MSS.), and ὁ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἐστὶ τὸ φρονεῖν, *ib.* 6 (MSS.). It would be possible to add (τὸ φρονεῖν), or something of the sort, after οὐσίας ἐστὶ in *Exc.* XVII. 6; but that is hardly necessary.

(. . .) ἀπείκασμα (εἰκασμὸν MSS.) λογισμοῦ [τῷ ἀλόγῳ], ἀμυδρὸν μὲν ὡς πρὸς λογισμὸν, . . . (σαφές) ((δὲ ὡς πρὸς τὸ ἄλογον.)) The missing subject of this sentence must have been the name of some mental faculty or function intermediate between λογισμὸς and τὸ ἄλογον. It may have been δόξα; and this seems the more probable, because γνώσις, with which δόξα is contrasted in *Exc.* XIX. 5, has been mentioned just before in *Exc.* XVII. In *Pl. Rep.* 5. 478 c, δόξα is said to be γνώσεως μὲν σκοτωδέστερον, ἀγνοίας δὲ φανότερον. In *Rep.* 6. 509 d ff., Plato distinguishes four mental functions, which he arranges in series according to their respective degrees of 'clearness'; he names them (1) νόησις, (2) διάνοια, (3) πίστις, (4) εἰκασία; the object of νόησις and διάνοια he calls νοητόν, and the object of πίστις and εἰκασία, ὄρατόν or δοξαστόν. The Hermetist may have been thinking of one of those two passages, or both of them.

§ 7. [ἤρμωσται δὲ θυμὸς καὶ ἐπιθυμία πρὸς τινα λογισμὸν.] This must be a misplaced fragment of the passage concerning θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία, §§ 2 and 3. Do the words mean that θυμὸς and ἐπιθυμία are 'put in tune with' one another (i. e. rightly adjusted with reference to one another)? Or, that both of them are 'put in tune with' λογισμὸς? The metaphor of a musical ἄρμονία is used by Plato, *Rep.* 3. 411 E, in speaking of the relation between τὸ θυμοειδές and τὸ φιλόσοφον (= τὸ λογιστικόν); music and gymnastic, he says, have been given to men ἐπὶ τὸ θυμοειδές καὶ τὸ φιλόσοφον . . . ὅπως ἂν ἀλλήλοις ξυναρμοσθῆτον ἐπιτεινομένῳ καὶ ἀνιεμένῳ μέχρι τοῦ προσήκοντος. (Adam's note *ad loc.*; 'The soul has, so to speak, two strings, the φιλόσοφον and the θυμοειδές, which make a kind of ἄρμονία when they are tuned to the proper pitch'.) See also *Rep.* 4. 441 E. But in *Rep.* 4. 443 D, E, where Plato uses the same metaphor again, he speaks of *three* strings of the soul-lyre (ξυναρμόσαντα τρία ὄντα ὥσπερ ὄρους τρεῖς ἄρμονίας κ.τ.λ.), the three being τὸ λογιστικόν, τὸ θυμοειδές, and τὸ ἐπιθυμητικόν, to which the Hermetist's λογισμὸς, θυμὸς, and ἐπιθυμία correspond.

τινα is obscure, and may possibly be a misreading for τόν; but the similar phrase πρὸς τινα λόγον occurs in *Exc.* VIII. 3 and 6.

[καὶ ἐπίσταται ἐν ἑαυτοῖς κυκλικὴν διάνοιαν]. ἐπίσταται is very likely a corruption of ἐπισπᾶται. Usener's conjecture ἐλικήν for κυκλικήν may be right; but the combination ἐλικήν διάνοιαν is hardly possible, for διάνοια must surely belong to that part of the soul which is not ὁμοιον τῇ ὕλῃ (§ 1).

EXCERPT XVIII

§ 1. Ἔστι τοίνυν . . . οὐ μὲναι¹. It appears that the writer was here explaining the relations between certain 'things in the soul', or parts of the soul; and perhaps a meaning more or less resembling that of the original text might be expressed by re-writing the passage as follows:—ἔστι τοίνυν (ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ νοητικῇ) οὐσία καὶ λόγος []. (ἀνα)φέρεται δὲ ἐπὶ (μὲν) τὴν (νοητικὴν) οὐσίαν (τὸ νόημα, ἐπὶ δὲ τὸν λόγον ἢ διάνοια.) [] ἐπιπλέκεται δὲ τῷ νοήμα(τι καὶ) τῇ διανοίᾳ (<δόξα καὶ αἴσθησις>); ἐλθόντα δὲ δι' ἀλλήλων μία ἰδέα ἐγένοντο. αὕτη [δὲ] ἐστὶν ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς (σύνθεσις). I assume that ἡ νοητικὴ οὐσία and ὁ λόγος are used as in *Exc.* XVII; that νόημα (= νόησις) is the function of the νοητικὴ οὐσία, and διάνοια (= λογισμός) is the function of the λόγος;¹ and that δόξα and αἴσθησις are functions of τὸ ἄλογον. On these assumptions, the Hermetist's series νόημα, διάνοια, δόξα, αἴσθησις would be comparable to the series νόησις, διάνοια, πίστις, εἰκασία in Pl. *Rep.* 6. 511 D.

§ 2. ἔνθεν καὶ ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ἑλλείπει (ἐκλείπει MSS.). The missing subject of the verbs in this section is probably τὸ ἄλογον (μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς). The statement that τὸ ἄλογον ὑπερβάλλει καὶ ἑλλείπει may be taken to mean that when a man's passions or impulses are not controlled by reason he is apt to diverge from the mean on either side. Compare *Exc.* XVII. 3: τὴν ὑπερβολὴν τοῦ θυμοῦ . . . τὸ ἐνδέον τῆς ἐπιθυμίας.

¹ διάνοια is associated with λόγος in Pl. *Soph.* 263 E: διάνοια μὲν καὶ λόγος ταυτὸν πλὴν ὃ μὲν ἐντὸς τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς αὐτὴν διάλογος ἀνευ φωνῆς γιγνόμενος τοῦτ' αὐτὸ ἡμῖν ἐπανομάσθη, διάνοια, . . . τὸ δὲ γ' ἀπ' ἐκείνης ρεύμα διὰ τοῦ στόματος ἰὸν μετὰ φθόγγου κέκληται λόγος. In that passage, διάνοια means what the Stoics called the ἐνδιάθετος λόγος, in opposition to the προφορικὸς λόγος. Cf. Pl. *Theaet.* 189 E: τὸ δὲ διανοεῖσθαι ἄρ' ὑπερ ἐγὼ καλεῖς;—Τί καλῶν;—Λόγον ἐν αὐτῇ πρὸς αὐτὴν ἢ ψυχῇ διεξέρχεται περὶ ὧν ἂν σκοπῇ. In my translation, I have written 'thought' for νόημα, and 'discursive thought' for διάνοια.

χείρον μὲν γίνεται (*sc.* τὸ ἄλογον) ὅταν ἀποσπασθῇ τῆς διανοίας· ὅταν δὲ ἀκολουθῆ καὶ πείθεται, κοινωνεῖ τῷ [νοηματικῷ (*al.* νοητικῷ)] λόγῳ [διὰ τῶν μαθημάτων¹. Cf. *Exc.* VIII. 3: τὸ γοῦν (ἄλογον), κινούμενον ὑπὸ τῆς νοητῆς οὐσίας, πρὸς τινα λόγον (κινεῖται). Compare also *Ar. Eth. Nic.* I. 7. 3 and I. 13 on τὸ λόγον ἔχον ὡς ἐπιπευθὲς λόγῳ. For the last clause, one might conjecture *κοινωνεῖ τῷ λόγῳ τῶν διανοημάτων*, 'shares with the λόγος in its διανοήματα'.

This passage gives support to the assumption that *διάνοια*, as used by the writer of *Exc.* XVIII, means the function of the λόγος.

§ 3. τὸ γὰρ αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ κρείττον ἐφ' ἡμῖν ἐστίν, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ τὸ χείρον. Cf. *Corp.* IV. 6 b-8 a.

(. . .) ἀκουσίως. Cf. *Exc.* XI. 2 (20): τὸ ἀγαθὸν ἐκούσιον τὸ κακὸν ἀκούσιον. We are free to choose the higher life; whence it necessarily follows that we are also free to choose the lower life. But when we have once chosen the lower life, we are under compulsion, and thenceforth our evil actions are involuntary. The bad man is a slave of Heimarmene; but it is by his own choice that he has become a slave.

ἐχομένη γὰρ [αἴρεσις] (ἢ ψυχὴ) τῶν κακῶν πλησιάζει τῇ σωματικῇ φύσει. It is not the 'choice', but the soul which has chosen wrongly, that 'draws near to bodily nature', and is consequently governed by Heimarmene, as bodies are. The sense required might perhaps be better expressed by writing *ἐχομένη γὰρ ἢ ψυχὴ τῶν σωματικῶν* (or *ἐλομένη γὰρ ἢ ψυχὴ τὰ σωματικὰ*) *πλησιάζει τῇ φύσει*.

§ 4. <<ἀμέτοχος οὐσα τῆς τῶν γινομένων φύσεως>>. Cf. *ἀμέτοχος οὐσα τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος* in *Exc.* XIX. 4.

§ 5. [παραθεῖσα δὲ τὸν πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ διανοητικὸν λόγον προίησι καὶ ὄλον τὸν λόγον¹. Sense might be made of this by writing *προθεῖσα δὲ τὸ[ν] πρῶτον ἀπὸ τοῦ πρώτου θεοῦ, [] προίησι [] καὶ τὸν (διανοητικὸν ?) λόγον*. The *νοητικὴ οὐσία* (i. e. the *νοῦς*, which is the divine part of the human soul,) was emitted from God in the beginning (cf. *Corp.* XII. i *init.*, ὁ νοῦς . . . ἐξ αὐτῆς τῆς τοῦ θεοῦ οὐσίας ἐστίν); and having thus come into being, it emits from itself the λόγος. If *διανοητικὸν λόγον* is right, we may suppose that the full names of the two things were ἡ *νοητικὴ οὐσία* and ὁ *διανοητικὸς λόγος*, but that the writer sometimes called them by the shorter names ἡ οὐσία and ὁ λόγος. But it is also possible that *διανοητικόν* may have arisen out of *διάνοιαν* written as an alternative for λόγον.

I cannot explain *καὶ ὄλον τὸν λόγον*. Possibly ὄλον may be a corrupted doublet of λόγον.

τούτοις (δέ ἡ) ψυχὴ κοινωνήσασα κοινωνεῖ καὶ τῆς τούτων εἰμαρμένῃς. τούτοις means τοῖς γιγνομένοις, i.e. material or corporeal things. These things are governed by Heimarmene (i.e. by physical laws); and consequently the soul, when it has entered into association with them, is subject to Heimarmene. τῆς τούτων εἰμαρμένῃς, if that is the right reading, must be taken to mean 'the destiny to which they are subject'. This meaning might be more clearly expressed by writing τῆς τούτων (κρατούσης) εἰμαρμένῃς.

EXCERPT XIX

§ 1. Ἦ ψυχὴ τοῖνυν . . . ἑαυτῆς λόγον¹. The only intelligible part of this corrupt section is the sentence ἀπαλλαγείσα δὲ τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος, αὐτὴ καθ' αὐτὴν μένει [] ἐν τῷ νοητῷ κόσμῳ. The subject of that sentence must be either ἡ ψυχὴ, or ἡ νοητικὴ οὐσία, which presumably means ὁ νοῦς, as in *Exc.* XVII and *Exc.* XVIII. The δέ implies a μέν; and the probable sense of the preceding words might be expressed by writing (καὶ σώματι μὲν συνοῦσα, ἄλογόν τι ἀπὸ τῆς (φυσικῆς) ἁρμονίας ἐπισπᾶται (cf. *Exc.* XVII. 1). ἀπαλλαγείσα δὲ κ.τ.λ. The word ἁρμονία, in this connexion, might mean either the structure of the material universe, or the structure of the human body (see *Exc.* XV. 3 and 5).

Soul is, no doubt, αἰδῖος; but as that fact has no connexion with anything that is said in the rest of this excerpt, it may be suspected that αἰδῖος is corrupt.

The four terms οὐσία, λόγος, νόημα, διάνοια occur together here, as in *Exc.* XVIII *init.*; but what was said about them, it is difficult to guess. In the phrases νόημα ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον and ἄρχει δὲ τοῦ ἑαυτῆς λόγον, the writer seems to be speaking of the relation between the νοητικὴ οὐσία and the λόγος. With νόημα ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον should be compared κράτος ἔχουσα τὸν ἑαυτῆς λόγον in *Exc.* XVII. 4; but neither νόημα nor κράτος makes sense. We are told in *Exc.* XVII. 5 that ἡ (νοητικὴ) οὐσία ἄρχει (τῶν παθῶν), and has the λόγος for its σύμβουλος; and it would be possible to get a similar meaning here by writing ἄρχει δὲ τοῦ [] (ἀ)λόγου (ἡ νοητικὴ οὐσία, σύμβουλον) <<ἔχουσα [[] ἑαυτῆς <<τὸν>> λόγον>>.

§ 2. (. . .) Ἦ φέρουσα ὁμοίαν κίνησιν ἐν τῷ ἑαυτῆς νοήματι ὀνόματι ζωὴν τῷ εἰς ζωὴν ἐρχομένῳ¹. τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον ψυχῆς, τὸ παρέχειν ἐτέροις ὁμοίον

(τι) τῆ ἰδιότητι αὐτῆς. It may be conjectured that this passage, in its original form, was to the following effect: ἡ ψυχὴ, εἰς σῶμα ἐρχομένη, φέρεי (οἱ παρέχει) αὐτῷ ζωὴν· τοῦτο γὰρ ἴδιον ψυχῆς, τὸ παρέχειν ἑτέροις κίνησιν ὁμοίαν τῇ ἑαυτῆς. Cf. *Exc.* XX. 3, 4 as emended: μετεληφὸς δὲ ψυχῆς ζῆ (τὸ σῶμα) κ.τ.λ.—*ὄνοματι* is most likely a doublet of *νόηματι*; and both may perhaps be corruptions of *σώματι*.

§ 3. δύο τοίνυν εἰσι ζωαὶ καὶ δύο κινήσεις, μία μὲν ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν, ἑτέρα δὲ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν [σώματος]. As to these 'two kinds of κίνησις', compare *Exc.* XVI. 1 and 6. The *ζωὴ ἢ κατ' οὐσίαν* is that of the *νοητικῆ οὐσία* or *νοῦς*; the *ζωὴ ἢ κατὰ φύσιν* is that of τὸ ἄλογον, which is added to the soul at its incarnation. The man in whom the *νοητικῆ οὐσία* has the upper hand is *αὐτεξούσιος*, i. e. his will is free; the man in whom τὸ ἄλογον has the upper hand is under compulsion, being a slave of Heimarmene.

§ 4. (< . . .) ἀμέτοχος οὐσα (οὐσία MSS.) τοῦ φυσικοῦ σώματος. The subject of this sentence must have been either ἡ ψυχὴ or ἡ νοητικῆ οὐσία.

εἰ γὰρ ἔχει [ἔχει σῶμα], οὔτε λόγον ἔχει οὔτε νόησιν. The subject is probably ἡ ψυχὴ. But if so, ἔχει σῶμα is impossible. Sense might be made by writing εἰ γὰρ <κατ' ἔχει(αι) <<ἔρωτι>> σώμα(τος), οὔτε λόγον ἔχει οὔτε νόησιν. (Cf. *Corr.* I. 19 as emended: ὁ δὲ ἀγαπήσας ἐκ πλάνης ἔρωτος τὸ σῶμα, οὗτος μένει ἐν τῷ σκότει κ.τ.λ.) *νόησις* is the function of the *νοητικῆ οὐσία*; and in the man who is overpowered by desire for bodily things, the *νοητικῆ οὐσία* (and with it, the *λόγος*, which is its 'counsellor'), is absent or dormant, and τὸ ἄλογον alone is active.

In *Exc.* XX. 1, the MSS. give ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀσώματος οὐσία. εἰ γὰρ ἔχει σῶμα κ.τ.λ. In *Exc.* XIX. 4, the MSS. give εἷη γὰρ ἂν ψυχὴ ἀσώματος. . . . εἰ γὰρ ἔχει σῶμα κ.τ.λ. Is the resemblance between these two passages merely accidental?

πάν γὰρ σῶμα ἀνόητον· μεταλαβὼν δὲ οὐσίας, τὸ εἶναι ζῶον ἐμπροὺν ἔσχε. Bodies are incapable of *νόησις*, but are capable of *ζωή*. If a soul enters a body, the body thereby becomes a *living* body. This applies to the bodies of all animals alike, and not to human bodies only.

As to *μεταλαβὼν οὐσίας*, cf. *Exc.* XX. 3 as emended: μετεληφὸς δὲ ψυχῆς ζῆ (τὸ σῶμα), καὶ κοινωνεῖ τοῦ εἶναι τῇ ψυχῇ. . . . τὸ δὲ εἶναι νῦν λέγω τὸ μετέχειν ζωῆς. Even the lower animals partake of *οὐσία* (i. e. 'true being'), inasmuch as they are alive; though they do not partake of *νοητικῆ οὐσία*.

ἔμπνουν means 'having πνεῦμα in it', and thus leads on to what is said about πνεῦμα in the following section.

§ 5. καὶ τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος (ἔστι τὸ αἰσθητικόν), ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας (ἔστι τὸ φρονοῦν κ.τ.λ.). The MSS. give, in § 5 *iniit.*, καὶ τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος, ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας, and in § 6 *iniit.*, τοῦ γὰρ σώματος ἔστι καὶ δεκτικὸν πάντων, ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἔστι τὸ φρονοῦν. It seems probable that one of these two passages is a misplaced doublet of the other; and in my conjectural reconstruction of the text, I have assumed that the right place, not only for these opening words of § 6, but for what follows in that section, is at the beginning of § 5.

It would be possible to write τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα τοῦ σώματος ἔστι without any further predicate, taking the words to mean 'the *pneuma* is a part of the body', or 'belongs to the body'; but if we read ὃ δὲ λόγος τῆς οὐσίας ἔστι τὸ φρονοῦν in the following clause, a corresponding phrase is needed in connexion with τὸ πνεῦμα; and αἰσθητικόν, which occurs below as an epithet of πνεῦμα, is the right word to stand in contrast to φρονοῦν. The words καὶ δεκτικὸν πάντων in § 6 *iniit.* can hardly be right; (the πνεῦμα is receptive of sense-impressions, but not of 'all things';) and it may be suspected that καὶ δεκτικόν is a corruption of αἰσθητικόν, and that πάντων was added by a transcriber who thought that a genitive was needed after δεκτικόν.

We must either write τῆς (νοητικῆς) οὐσίας, or take τῆς οὐσίας to mean τῆς νοητικῆς οὐσίας, i. e. τοῦ νοῦ. The use of the word φρονοῦν implies that in the writer's terminology φρόνησις is a synonym for διάνοια or λογισμός, the function of the λόγος.

The πνεῦμα is the material vehicle or organ of animal life, and of the lower grade of human life. According to this Excerpt, its special function is αἴσθησις; but δόξα also is associated with it (συνυπάρχει τῷ πνεύματι ἢ δόξα). The πάθη (θυμός and ἐπιθυμία, spoken of in *Exc.* XVII) would presumably be regarded by the writer as likewise connected with the *pneuma*; but they are not mentioned in *Exc.* XIX.

⟨. . . συνυπάρχει δὲ τῷ (μὲν) λόγῳ ἢ τῶν ἱτιμίων ἡ γνῶσις, τῷ δὲ πνεύματι ἢ δόξα⟩ (ὃ μὲν γὰρ) τοῦ ἱκαλοῦ θεωρητικός ἔστι, τὸ δὲ [αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα] τῶν φαινομένων κριτικὸν ἔστι. αἰσθητικὸν πνεῦμα gives the right sense, but is superfluous. τῶν τιμίων (meaning τοῦ καλοῦ?) is hardly satisfactory; and as there is no corresponding genitive after δόξα, it seems best to strike it out. As to γνῶσις and

δόξα in contrast, see *Exc.* XVII. 6. If my reconstruction of the passage is right, it is implied that γνώσις is τοῦ καλοῦ θεωρία, and δόξα is τῶν φαινομένων κρίσις. But there seems to be something amiss in τοῦ καλοῦ; the term opposed to τῶν φαινομένων should rather be τοῦ ὄντος. As to κριτικόν here, and κρίνει below, cf. *Ar. Anal. post.* 99 b 35: (τὰ ζῶα ἔχει) δύναμιν σύμφυτον κριτικὴν, ἣν καλοῦσιν αἰσθησιν. *Diog. Laert.* 7. 54: ὁ δὲ Χρυσίππος . . . κριτήριά φησιν εἶναι αἰσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν.

διήρηται δὲ (τὸ πνεῦμα) εἰς τὰς ὀργανικὰς αἰσθήσεις (perhaps εἰς τὰ ὄργανα τῆς αἰσθήσεως), καὶ ἔστι [τι] μέρος αὐτοῦ [πνευματικῆ] ὀρατικὸν (ὄρασις MSS.) καὶ ἀκουστικὸν καὶ ὄσφρητικὸν καὶ γευστικὸν καὶ ἀπτικόν. Stoic influence is manifest here. *Chrysippus ap. Galen. de Hipp. et Plat. plac.* 3. 1: ἡ ψυχὴ πνεῦμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν συνεχὲς παντὶ τῷ σώματι¹ διήκον. . . . ταύτης οὖν τῶν μερῶν ἐκάστῳ διατεταγμένων μορίῳ, τὸ διήκον αὐτῆς εἰς . . . ὀφθαλμοῦς ὄψιν (εἶναι φαμεν), τὸ δὲ εἰς ὤτα ἀκοήν, τὸ δὲ εἰς ῥίνας ὄσφρησιν, τὸ δ' εἰς γλῶτταν γεῦσιν, τὸ δ' εἰς ὄλην τὴν σάρκα ἀφην. *Diocles Magnes ap. Diog. Laert.* 7. 52: αἰσθησις δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τοὺς Στωικοὺς τό τε ἀφ' ἡγεμονικοῦ πνεῦμα [καὶ] ἐπὶ τὰς αἰσθήσεις διήκον, καὶ κ.τ.λ. 'The Stoics', as reported by *Aetius, Diels, Doxogr.* p. 394: 'αἰσθητήρια¹ λέγεται πνεύματα νοερά ἀπὸ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ ἐπὶ τὰ ὄργανα τεταμένα. *Philo De fuga et inv.* 32, 182, *Wendland*, vol. iii, p. 149: ποτιζέται οὖν ὡσπερ ἀπὸ πηγῆς τοῦ κατὰ ψυχὴν ἡγεμονικοῦ τὸ σώματος ἡγεμονικὸν πρόσωπον, τὸ μὲν ὀρατικὸν πνεῦμα τείνοντος εἰς ὄμματα, τὸ δὲ ἀκουστικὸν εἰς οὖς, εἰς δὲ μυκτῆρας τὸ ὄσφρήσεως, τὸ δὲ αὖ γεύσεως εἰς στόμα, καὶ τὸ ἀφῆς εἰς σύμπασαν τὴν ἐπιφάνειαν.

τοῦτο τὸ πνεῦμα ἀνάγον (αἰ. ἀνάλογον) γενόμενον διανοίας¹ κρίνει τὸ αἰσθητικὸν (< . . .), εἰ δὲ μή, φαντάζεται μόνον. The sense required might be expressed by writing, in place of ἀνάγον γενόμενον διανοίας, something like ὅταν μὲν ἔχηται τῆς διανοίας (cf. ὅταν . . . ἔχηται . . . τοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς λογισμοῦ, *Exc.* XVII. 3).

κρίνει must have been followed by some qualifying word or phrase, e. g. ὀρθῶς or κατ' ἀλήθειαν; for without some such addition, it could not stand in contrast to φαντάζεται μόνον.

In saying that the material *pneuma* κρίνει and φαντάζεται, the writer is following the usage of the Stoics, who made no clear distinction between bodily and mental processes, and held the soul to be πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον. As a Platonist, he ought rather to have said that τὸ αἰσθητικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς κρίνει.

§ 7. τὸ μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ τοῦ περιέχοντος [κόσμου?] τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει,

ἡ δὲ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς. The connexion of this with what precedes is lost ; but it is probable that τὸ μὲν means τὸ πνεῦμα, and that ἡ δέ means ἡ ψυχῆ. The πνεῦμα of the individual man or animal derives its force from the atmosphere, which is the πνεῦμα of the Kosmos, and of which the individual's πνεῦμα is a detached portion. To say that ἡ ψυχῆ ἀφ' ἑαυτῆς τὴν ἐνέργειαν ἔχει is equivalent to saying that the soul is αὐτοκίνητος.

EXCERPT XX

The teaching of this Excerpt appears to have been to the following effect :—

The bodies of men and animals are produced by Nature. In the composition of the bodies which she produces, Nature combines τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν in varying proportions ; and the proportionate quantities of τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν which she puts into this or that body are determined by the influences of the stars.

But a body, as produced by Nature alone, cannot be said to be ' real '. In order that it may be real, it must have life ; and life is conferred on body by soul, which is not a product of Nature, but a thing independent of Nature, inasmuch as it is incorporeal.

The life conferred on bodies by the soul which enters into them is of two grades. Life of the lower grade (called simply ζωή) is conferred on all animals ; life of the higher grade (called ζωὴ νοερά) is conferred on man alone. But the ζωὴ νοερά of men varies in quality ; and the difference between the ζωὴ νοερά of one man and that of another results from the different proportions of τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν in the composition of their bodies.

§ I. ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀσώματος οὐσία. Cf. *Exc.* XVI *init.* : (ἡ) ψυχὴ τοίνυν οὐσία ἐστὶν ἀσώματος. *Exc.* XVII *init.* : ψυχὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν . . . οὐσία αὐτοτελῆς κ.τ.λ. *Exc.* XVIII *init.* : ἔστι τοίνυν οὐσία κ.τ.λ. *Exc.* XIX *init.* : (ἡ) ψυχὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν αἰδῖος νοητικὴ οὐσία. But there is no intelligible connexion between these words and what follows them in *Exc.* XX (εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.). It would seem that either ἔστι . . . οὐσία has been wrongly inserted ; or a passage which connected it with what follows has been lost ; or it is a corruption of something which led on to εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ. (e. g. it would be possible to write ἔστι τοίνυν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἡ τοῦ σώματος οὐσία· εἰ γὰρ κ.τ.λ.).

εἰ γὰρ (μὴ ψυχῆν) ἔχει (τὸ) σῶμα, οὐκέτι ἔσται [ἑαυτῆς σωστὴ ἡ]. εἰ γὰρ ἔχει (ἡ ψυχὴ) σῶμα is impossible. The passage seems to have

been altered with a view to connecting it with the preceding words as given in the MSS. (ἔστι τοίνυν ἡ ψυχὴ ἀσώματος οὐσίας); but in order to do that satisfactorily, it would be necessary to write εἰ γὰρ (ἡ ψυχὴ) ἦν σῶμα, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἑαυτῆς σωστικῆς, or something of the sort. If on the other hand it is to be connected with what follows, some such corrections as I have made are needed. [See Addenda, vol. iv.]

πάν γὰρ σῶμα πρὸς τὸ εἶναι δεῖται ζωῆς.—(πάν γὰρ σῶμα δεῖται τοῦ εἶναι δεῖται καὶ ζωῆς MSS.) τὸ εἶναι must here be taken as meaning 'to be an οὐσία', i. e. to have real and substantive existence. The soul is an οὐσία; and a living body also is an οὐσία, though not an οὐσία of the same kind as the soul. But a lifeless body is not an οὐσία; it is mere ἔλη, and as such, is μὴ ὄν.

These words might be taken to imply that not only men, beasts, and plants, but all existing bodies without exception (including stones, for instance) are to some extent alive; and as this writer makes life dependent on the presence of ψυχὴ, it would seem to follow that even stones have in them some portion of ψυχὴ. That, however, is an unusual doctrine; and perhaps the writer meant rather that lifeless bodies, such as stones, are not ὄντως ὄντα, but are merely φαινόμενα.

§ 2. παντὶ γὰρ τῷ γένεσιν ἔχοντι . . . μειώσει (δὲ) φθορά. This section breaks the connexion between § 1 and § 3, and must have been inserted here by error. It may have come either from some other part of this *libellus*, or from another document.

In *Exc.* XI. 2 (2) and elsewhere we are told that there are bodies (viz. τὰ αἰδία σώματα) which are γενητά but not φθαρτά. But the writer of this fragment must have thought otherwise, and held the Aristotelian view that the Kosmos and the heavenly bodies are ἀγένητα, i. e. have had no beginning, but have always been in existence.

§ 3. μετελιφθὸς δὲ [εἶδους] [ζωῆς] (ψυχῆς), ζῆ. It looks as if εἶδους and ζωῆς were due to two different attempts to fill the gap left by the accidental omission of ψυχῆς.

τὸ δὲ εἶναι νῦν λέγω τὸ [ἐν λόγῳ γενέσθαι καὶ] μετέχειν ζωῆς [νοερῶς]. ἐν λόγῳ is probably a corruption of ἔλλογον or λογικόν.

In order to make sense of this sentence, it is necessary either to strike out ἐν λόγῳ γενέσθαι καὶ and νοερῶς, or to write τὸ δὲ (ἄνθρωπον) εἶναι κ.τ.λ. If the latter emendation were adopted, we should have to take the words in connexion with § 4, in which man is spoken of. But so taken, they would be out of place here. It seems probable that man was first spoken of in § 4 *init.*, where the term ἄνθρωπος is defined; and if so, τὸ δὲ εἶναι κ.τ.λ. must have been connected

with what precedes, and the insertion of the words which limit the application of the statement to man must have resulted from a misunderstanding.

§ 4. καλεῖται δὲ (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) κ.τ.λ. This implies the definition ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἐστὶ ζῶον λογικὸν θνητόν. The addition of θνητόν is needed to differentiate man from the Kosmos and the stars, which are ζῶα λογικὰ ἀθάνατα.

θνητόν δὲ διὰ τὸ σῶμα. Man is mortal, not 'because he has a body' (for the Kosmos and the stars also have bodies, and yet are immortal), but 'because of *his* body', which is φθαρτόν.

(ἢ) ψυχὴ ἄρα [ἀσώματος], ἀμετάπτωτον ἔχουσα τὴν δύναμιν (τοῦ ζώην παρέχειν, τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ) <<παρέχει [δὲ ἢ ψυχῇ] ζώην νοεράν>>. This restoration of the text is very doubtful; but it gives the sense which the context seems to require. Soul has the power of conferring life on any sort of body into which it may enter (e. g. the body of a beast); and when it enters a *human* body, it retains that power unchanged. But the life which it confers on human bodies is life of a special kind; it is not merely ζωή, but ζωὴ νοερά.

λέγειν ζῶον [νοερόν] (τὸν ἄνθρωπον). The word νοερόν may perhaps be a corruption of (τὸ)ν ἄρον, i. e. τὸν ἄνθρωπον.

μὴ οὐσίας [τῆς διανοητικῆς] οὐσίας τῆς καὶ παρεχούσης νοεράν ζωήν. Man's 'reason' (λόγος), i. e. the thing by the possession of which man is distinguished from the lower animals, is called in this document τὸ νοερόν, or ἢ νοερά ζωή. The equivalent term in *Exc.* XV. is ἡ διανοητικὴ κίνησις. The words τῆς διανοητικῆς must have been inserted here by some one who used the language of *Exc.* XV, and not that of *Exc.* XX.

§ 5. εἰδὼν γὰρ ὑπερέχει ἐν τῇ συστάσει τὸ θερμόν, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Exc.* XXVI. 14: εἰ μὲν γὰρ . . . πλεονάσειε τὸ πῦρ, κ.τ.λ.

(ἢ μὲν) <<γὰρ>> φύσις [[]] ἀρμόζει τὴν τοῦ σώματος σύστασιν πρὸς τὴν ἁρμονίαν. ἡ φύσις is the force at work in the production of organic bodies. Cf. *Exc.* XV. 2, where we are told that ἡ φύσις πάντα φύει τὰ γιγνόμενα.

The verb ἀρμόζειν and the corresponding substantive ἁρμονία (which might be translated 'temperament') are used in this document to denote the 'coadjustment' or 'contemperation' of τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ψυχρόν (i. e. the determination of the proportions of these elements relatively to one another) in the composition of the human body. That is what ἁρμονία means in τὴν ἁρμονίαν τοῦ σώματος, § 7, and τῆς (τοῦ σώματος) ἁρμονίας, § 6. This use of ἁρμονία occurs in

Pl. *Phaedo* 86 A-D and 91 C-94 E, side by side with its use to denote the tuning of a lyre. (See note on *Exc.* XVI. 2.)

[The phrase ἡ τῶν ἀστέρων ἁρμονία is used below as the equivalent of ἡ τ. ἀ. σύγκρασις. The assumption of the astrological theory underlying this passage is that the 'coadjustment' of the stars with one another influences the destiny of men on earth, through συμπάθεια, and that the proportion of elements in living bodies depends upon a corresponding 'coadjustment' of stars. In practice the astrologer would select a group of stars in certain prominent positions at a given time (see note on § 7) and reason from their ἁρμονία or σύγκρασις. Cf. a chapter-heading in Laurentinus 27. 34: Ἀνάκρισις ἐκ τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων συγκράσεως περὶ οὗ τις ἐρωτᾶν βούλεται (Boll, *Sphaera*, p. 10). The ἁρμονία-theory is criticized by such phrases as οὔτε ἀλλήλοις συνάδουσιν.]

§ 6. τὸ κατὰ τὸ θερμὸν καὶ τὸ κατὰ (τὸ) ψυχρόν. Of the four primary qualities of matter (heat, cold, dryness, and fluidity,—see *Exc.* XV), heat and cold alone are spoken of in *Exc.* XX.

ἀρμόζει δὲ (ἡ φύσις) κατὰ τὸν ἐπικρατήσαντα ἀστέρα τῆς συγκράσεως (συγκρατήσεως MSS.). Supposing, for instance, that among the influences of the stars that of a 'cold' planet predominates at the time when a certain man's body comes into being, there will be an excess of τὸ ψυχρόν in the 'commixture' of that man's body. But we are not told at what time the 'mixing' takes place; is it at the moment of conception, or at that of birth, or during the interval between the one and the other?

§ 7. ἡ φύσις τοίνυν ὁμοιοὶ τὴν ἁρμονίαν τοῦ σώματος τῇ τῶν ἀστέρων συγκράσει. [According to Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 5. 42) the Chaldaeans practised both a simple and a refined method of astrology, according as a single star or a combination of stars was observed: ἀκριβέστερα δὲ τὰ κατὰ συνδρομὴν καὶ ὡς αὐτοὶ λέγουσι τὰ κατὰ σύγκρασιν πλειόνων (sc. ἀστέρων), οἷον "ἐὰν ὅδε μὲν ὠροσκοπῇ ὅδε δὲ μεσουρανή ὅδε δὲ ἀντιμεσουρανή οἱ δὲ ἄλλοι οὕτως ἔχωσι, συμβήσεται τάδε." The text may therefore stand.]

καὶ ἐνοῖ τὰ πολυμιγῆ πρὸς τὴν τῶν ἀστέρων ἁρμονίαν. [Cf. Ps.-Philolaos, fr. 10 Diels: ἁρμονία δὲ πάντως ἐξ ἐναντίων γίνεται· ἔστι γὰρ ἁρμονία πολυμιγέων ἔνωσις κ.τ.λ. The νοῦς of Anaxagoras is described by Sextus Empiricus (*Math.* 9. 6) as ordering τὴν τῶν ὁμοιομερειῶν πολυμιγίαν ὑλικήν.]

ὥστε ἔχειν πρὸς ἀλλήλα συμπάθειαν. The word συμπάθεια was used by the Stoics to express the notion that the several parts of the

Kosmos are (like the several parts of a human or animal body) so interconnected, that one is affected by what takes place in another; and in particular, that things on earth are affected by the influence of the stars in heaven. Cf. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 79: ὡς δείκνυμεν ἐκ τῶν περὶ (τὸν κόσμον) συμπαθειῶν' κατὰ γὰρ τὰς τῆς σελήνης αἰξήσεις καὶ φθίσεις πολλὰ τῶν τε ἐπιγείων ζώων καὶ θαλασσίων φθίνει τε καὶ αὔξεται. . . . ἐξ ὧν συμφανὲς ὅτι ἠνωμένον τι σῶμα καθέστηκεν ὁ κόσμος. . . . ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἠνωμένων συμπαθειὰ τίς ἐστίν, εἶγε δακτύλου τεμνομένου τὸ ὄλον συνδιατίθεται σῶμα. ἠνωμένον τοίνυν ἐστὶ σῶμα καὶ ὁ κόσμος. Sext. Emp. *Math.* 5. 4: τῷ συμπαθεῖν τὰ ἐπίγεια τοῖς οὐρανίοις, καὶ κατὰ τὰς ἐκείνων ἀπορροίας ἐκάστοτε ταῦτα νεοχμοῦσθαι.

It was commonly held that the συμπαθεια between τὰ ἐπίγεια and τὰ οὐράνια is one-sided; that is to say, that what takes place on earth is influenced by what takes place in heaven, but not *vice versa*. (See *Exc.* XI. 2. (28), (38), (40), (41).) [But compare Philo's words, used of the Chaldaeans, *De somn.* I. 10. 53 (III. p. 216 Wendl.): τί δὲ περὶ τῆς τῶν ἄλλων ἀστέρων φύσεως ἢ περιφορᾶς ἢ συμπαθείας πρὸς τε ἀλλήλους καὶ τὰπίγεια; *De Abr.* 15. 69 (IV. p. 17 Cohn): κατὰ τὴν τῶν οὐρανίων πρὸς τὰ ἐπίγεια συμπαθειαν.]

Ἔτελος γὰρ τῆς τῶν ἀστέρων ἁρμονίας τὸ γεννᾶν συμπαθειαν καθ' εἰμαρμένην αὐτῶν. τὸ γεννᾶν συμπαθειαν is impossible; perhaps we ought to read τὸ γεννᾶν σώματα. But it could hardly be said that the τέλος of the (system? or movement?) of the stars (i. e. the purpose for which it exists) is to generate bodies; that is rather the ἔργον of the stars. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

If αὐτῶν is struck out, καθ' εἰμαρμένην may be allowed to stand. The stars are (as we are told elsewhere) 'the instrument by means of which Heimarmene works'; that which the stars do is therefore καθ' εἰμαρμένην.

EXCERPT XXI

§ I. ἔστι τοίνυν τὸ προὐν ἐπέκεινα (ἐπὶ MSS.) πάντων τῶν ὄντων, καὶ τῶν ὄντως ὄντων προὐν. τὰ ὄντως ὄντα are τὰ νοητά.

τὸ προὐν, 'the Pre-existent', is a term applicable to God, either as being prior to the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος (cf. τοῦ ἀγενητοῦ καὶ προόντος θεοῦ in *Exc.* IX. 1), or as being prior to τὰ νοητά also. The writer of this passage uses it in the latter sense.

The word ἐπέκεινα, which I propose in place of ἐπί, was in common use among the later Platonists; they got it from εἶτι ἐπέκεινα τῆς οὐσίας

in Pl. *Rep.* 6. 509 B. It is frequently used by Plotinus (e.g. *Enn.* 3. 8. 9) in speaking of τὸ ἔν (= τὸ ἀγαθόν), which is beyond, above, or 'prior to' νοῦς and τὰ νοητά (= τὰ ὄντως ὄντα). See *Abammonis Resp.* 8. 2 (*Testim.*).

ἔν γὰρ ἔστι δι' οὗ . . . ἔχουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ (τὰ) αἰσθητὰ πάντα. Notwithstanding the corruption of the text, it seems clear that in this passage the writer was speaking of τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά as two different kinds of ὄντα, and contrasting the one kind of ὄντα with the other. It is possible therefore that the meaningless δι' οὗ is a corruption of διπτοῦ. A satisfactory sense could be got by writing ὄντος γὰρ τοῦ "ἔστι" διπτοῦ, or τὸ γὰρ "ἔστι" διπτῶς λέγεται ('the word ἔστι is used in two different senses').

ἡ οὐσιότης, [ἡ] καθόλου λεγομένη, κοινή (ἔστι τῶν) νοητῶν (καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν). The word οὐσιότης means 'the attribute of being an οὐσία'; and ἡ οὐσιότης κοινή ἔστι τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν must be taken to mean that both τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά are οὐσίαι (= ὄντα) Cf. *Exc.* XVI. 1: (ἡ ψυχὴ) οὐκ ἐκβαίνει τῆς ἰδίας οὐσιότητος (i. e. does not cease to be an ἀσώματος οὐσία) when it is ἐν σώματι.

(. . .) τῶν ὄντως ὄντων καὶ [τῶν ὄντων τῶν] καθ' ἑαυτὰ νοουμένων. This must be the end of a sentence concerning τὰ νοητά. The νοητά are existent καθ' ἑαυτά, 'by themselves', or 'of themselves'.

τὰ δὲ (αἰσθητά), ἐνάντια (ὄντα) τοῦτοις, κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον πάλιν (ἔστιν οὐ γὰρ) αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔστι. As the writer has just said that the νοητά are existent καθ' ἑαυτά, he must have denied this of the αἰσθητά, which are ἐνάντια τοῖς νοητοῖς. It is therefore necessary to insert οὐ before αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἔστι. The αἰσθητά also are ὄντα, but they are not ὄντα of the same kind as the νοητά; the existence of the αἰσθητά is derivative or secondary.

Compare Pl. *Tim.* 35 A, B. Plato there speaks of two kinds of οὐσία, viz. ἡ ἀμέριστος καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἔχουσα οὐσία (= ἡ ταυτοῦ φύσις), and ἡ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένη μεριστὴ οὐσία (= ἡ θατέρου φύσις), and also mentions a third kind of οὐσία (τρίτον οὐσίας εἶδος) which is intermediate (ἐν μέσῳ) between the two; and as the writer of *Exc.* XXI likewise speaks of two kinds of οὐσία and of something intermediate (μεταξύ), it seems probable that he was thinking of that passage in the *Timaeus*. Perhaps he did not fully understand it;¹ but he may have taken it to mean that the

¹ The language of *Tim.* 35 A, B is clumsy and confused; commentators differ in their construing of the words; and there can be little doubt that the text is corrupt. (One of the difficulties in it could be got rid of by writing μὴ γὰρ δὲ μετὰ τῆς (τρίτης) οὐσίας and ἐκ τε ταυτοῦ καὶ θατέρου καὶ τῆς (τρίτης) οὐσίας μεμιγμένη in 35 B.)

three things of which the soul is composed are νοῦς, δόξα, and αἰσθησις, i. e. the three functions or faculties the objects of which are respectively τὰ νοητά, τὰ δοξαστά, and τὰ αἰσθητά.

What is the meaning of κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον? I was at first inclined to think that in this phrase the writer used τὸ ἕτερον, as Plato used θάτερον, to signify that which is many and mutable, in contrast to ταῦτόν, that which is one and changeless. (Cf. τῆς τε ταυτοῦ φύσεως καὶ τῆς θατέρου in Pl. *Tim.* 35 A.) On that hypothesis, one might conjecture τῶν ὄντων ὄντων, τῶν κατὰ ταυτόν (καθ' ἑαυτὰ MSS.) νοουμένων. τὰ δὲ ἐνάντια τούτοις, τὰ κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον πάλιν . . . But seeing that the soundness of the reading καθ' ἑαυτά is confirmed by its recurrence in the phrase αὐτὰ καθ' ἑαυτὰ ἐστὶ which follows, and that, if we do not alter the text, there is no mention of ταυτόν in this Excerpt, it seems better to take κατὰ τὸ ἕτερον as meaning simply 'in the other way', or 'in the other sense (of the word ἐστίν)'.

(ἢ δὲ) φύσις οὐσία αἰσθητή, ἔχουσα ἐν ἑαυτῇ (τὰ) αἰσθητὰ πάντα. ἢ φύσις must here mean ὁ φυσικὸς κόσμος, 'the world in which the force called φύσις operates', that is, the material world.

The statement that ἢ φύσις is οὐσία αἰσθητή κ.τ.λ., as given in the MSS., appears to have little connexion with the context; but that objection disappears if we assume that this was preceded by a corresponding statement about the νοητά. The author may have written something like this: (καὶ ὁ μὲν ἄνω κόσμος ἐστὶν οὐσία νοητή, ἔχων ἐν ἑαυτῷ τὰ νοητὰ πάντα ἢ δὲ) φύσις κ.τ.λ. After speaking of the contrast between τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά, he may very well have added that all the νοητά are massed together in a higher world, and all the αἰσθητά in a lower world.

μεταξὺ δὲ τούτων [νοητοὶ (νοηματικοὶ MSS.) καὶ αἰσθητοὶ θεοί] (τὰ δοξαστά). τούτων means τῶν νοητῶν καὶ τῶν αἰσθητῶν. The things which are intermediate between the νοητά and the αἰσθητά cannot be two kinds of gods, and certainly cannot be αἰσθητοὶ θεοί, that is, gods who are themselves αἰσθητά. The words νοητοὶ καὶ αἰσθητοὶ θεοί must therefore be struck out. They may perhaps be a superscription that was intended to stand at the head of the lost passage which preceded (τῶν αἰσθητῶν) θεῶν in § 2 *ini.*

νοηματικοὶ is doubtless a misreading for νοητοὶ. There is no good authority for the existence of the word νοηματικός; but the terms νοητοὶ θεοί and αἰσθητοὶ θεοί were in frequent use among the later Platonists; and ἥλιος, as spoken of in § 2, is an instance of an αἰσθητὸς θεός who is an εἰκὼν of a νοητὸς θεός.

The missing subject must have been a neuter plural; (that is shown by the words τὰ μὲν μετέχοντα which follow;) and it was almost certainly τὰ δοξαστά. The word δοξαστά has dropped out here, but is given by the MSS. in the next line.

The use of the term τὰ δοξαστά to denote things intermediate between τὰ νοητά and τὰ αἰσθητά may perhaps have been suggested to the writer by Pl. *Rep.* 5. 476-480, where δόξα is said to be a state of mind intermediate between γνώσις and ἀγνοσία, and its object, τὸ δοξαστόν, is described as a thing intermediate between τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν (μεταξὺ τοῦ εἰλικρινῶς ὄντος καὶ τοῦ αἰ μῆδαμῆ ὄντος). The writer of *Exc.* XXI likewise makes his δοξαστά intermediate between two other things; those two things, however, are not, as in Pl. *Rep.* 5, τὸ ὄν and τὸ μὴ ὄν, but are called by him two different kinds of ὄντα.

(τὰ δοξαστά), τὰ μὲν μετέχοντα τῶν νοητῶν, τὰ δὲ (οὔ). δόξα, 'opinion', is sometimes true, and sometimes false. The writer (if I understand this sentence rightly), accordingly divides τὰ δοξαστά, the 'things opined' or 'objects of opinion' (which appears to mean the context of the opining mind) into two classes, the objects of right or true δόξα and the objects of wrong or false δόξα, and says that the former 'partake of' τὰ νοητά, and the latter do not. The statement that some of the δοξαστά 'partake of' the νοητά may perhaps be understood as meaning that some of the δοξαστά (but not all of them) are 'images' or copies of τὰ νοητά, which are necessarily and invariably true or real. Cf. *Exc.* II A. 3 as emended: πάντα . . . τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀληθῆ μὲν οὐκ ἔστι τῆς δὲ ἀληθείας μιμήματα οὐ πάντα, ὀλίγα δέ. τὰ δὲ ἄλλα ψεῦδος καὶ πλάνος.

δοξαστά τὰ κοινωνοῦντα τῶν νοητῶν (νοηματικῶν MSS.). This may possibly be a remnant of a sentence in which something more was said about τὰ δοξαστά; but it seems more likely that it is merely a doublet of the preceding phrase τὰ δοξαστά τὰ μὲν μετέχοντα τῶν νοητῶν, the word κοινωνοῦντα being written as an alternative for μετέχοντα.

§ 2. (. . . τῶν αἰσθητῶν) θεῶν. οὗτοι (αὐταὶ MSS.) γὰρ εἰκόνες εἰσὶ (τῶν) νοητῶν (νοημάτων MSS.) (θεῶν). The writer has here passed on from speaking of νοητά and αἰσθητά to speaking of νοητοὶ θεοί and αἰσθητοὶ θεοί. Perhaps his classification of τὰ ὄντα was merely preparatory to a classification of gods. Compare the classification of gods in *Ascl. Lat.* III. 19 a, where, as here, *dii intellegibiles* (νοητοί) are contrasted with *dii sensibiles* (αἰσθητοί).

ἥλιος εἰκὼν ἐστὶ τοῦ ἐπουρανίου δημιουργοῦ [θεοῦ]. Cf. Plut. *De defect. orac.* 42, 433 D: οἱ μὲν πολλοὶ τῶν προγενεστέρων ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν ἡγροῦντο θεὸν Ἀπόλλωνα καὶ ἥλιον· οἱ δὲ τὴν καλὴν καὶ σοφὴν ἐπιστάμενοι καὶ τιμῶντες ἀναλογίαν, ὅπερ σῶμα πρὸς ψυχὴν, ὅψις δὲ πρὸς νοῦν, φῶς δὲ πρὸς ἀλήθειάν ἐστι, τοῦτο τὴν ἡλίου δύναμιν εἴκαζον εἶναι πρὸς τὴν Ἀπόλλωνος φύσιν, ἕκγονον ἐκείνου καὶ τόκον¹ ὄντως (ὄντος) [ἀεὶ] γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ² τοῦτον ἀποφαίνοντες. ἐξάπτει γὰρ καὶ προάγεται καὶ συνεξορμῆ τῆς αἰσθήσεως τὴν ὁρατικὴν δύναμιν οὗτος, ὡς τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν μαντικὴν ἐκείνος.

Julian, *Or.* 4 (Eis τὸν βασιλέα ἥλιον), distinguishes two³ different suns: above the αἰσθητὸς ἥλιος, who reigns over the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, is the νοερός ἥλιος, who reigns over the νοεροὶ θεοί.⁴ And above the νοερός ἥλιος is ὁ πάντων βασιλεύς (also called τὸ ἐπέκεινα τοῦ νοῦ, ἰδέα τῶν ὄντων, ἔν, and ἀγαθόν, *Or.* 4. 132 D, and ὁ πάντων ἐπέκεινα, *ib.* 136 D), who reigns over the νοητοὶ θεοί. Julian's πάντων βασιλεύς corresponds to the προόν of *Exc.* XXI; and his νοερός ἥλιος corresponds to the ἐπουράνιος δημιουργός of whom, in *Exc.* XXI, the visible sun is said to be an 'image'.

ἐπουρανίου, if that is the right reading, must here mean 'above the heavens', i. e. supracosmic; for ὁ τοῦ ὄλου δημιουργός, the Maker of the αἰσθητὸς κόσμος, must be a νοητὸς θεός. But ἵπερουράνιος would be a more suitable word to express that meaning. Cf. *Exc.* XII. 1.

καθάπερ γὰρ ἐκείνος τὸ ὄλον ἐδημιούργησε(ν, οὕτω) καὶ ὁ ἥλιος δημιουργεῖ τὰ ζῶα καὶ [γεννᾷ] τὰ φυτά. For the distinction between a higher and a lower Demiurgus, cf. *Exc.* V. 1, 2: ὁ μὲν [] δημιουργὸς τῶν αἰδίων σωμάτων . . . ὁ δὲ ἡμέτερος δημιουργὸς κ.τ.λ. (See also *Exc.* II A. 14.) The doctrine here taught, or one that resembles it, is mentioned and rejected in *Corr.* XI. ii. 9 f.

¹ A reminiscence of Pl. *Rep.* 6. 507 A, where the sun is called τόκος τε καὶ ἕκγονος of τὸ ἀγαθόν.

² Bernardakis gives ἕκγονον ἐκείνου καὶ τόκον ὄντως ἀεὶ γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ κ.τ.λ. That is manifestly wrong; and by writing ἕκγονον ἐκείνου . . . ὄντως ὄντος γιγνόμενον ἀεὶ we get precisely the sense wanted. Plutarch's Apollo is ὄντως ὄν (= νοητός); the sun is γιγνόμενος ἀεὶ (= αἰσθητός).

³ Dr. W. C. Wright, in her introduction to Julian's *Or.* 4, speaks of a 'hierarchy of three suns in the three worlds'. But as far as I can see, Julian does not anywhere in this oration call the supreme God by the name ἥλιος, or speak of a νοητὸς ἥλιος; and if he does not, there are in his system only two suns, not three. There are three worlds, and three kings who reign over them; but the name ἥλιος is given by him only to the second and third of the three kings, not to the first. The special object of Julian's worship is the νοερός ἥλιος, king of the second and intermediate world.

⁴ The term νοεροὶ θεοί, meaning a class of gods intermediate between the νοητοὶ θεοί and the αἰσθητοὶ θεοί, seems to have been first introduced by Iamblichus, whose teaching Julian tells us he is reproducing in *Or.* 4.

Compare Julian *Or.* 4. 140 A: εἰς μὲν ὁ τῶν ὄλων δημιουργός, πολλοὶ δὲ οἱ κατ' οὐρανὸν περιπολοῦντες δημιουργικοὶ θεοί· μέσην ἄρα καὶ τούτων τὴν ἀφ' ἡλίου καθήκουσαν εἰς τὸν κόσμον δημιουργίαν θετέον.

The change of tense (ἐδημιούργησεν . . . δημιουργεῖ) is explained by what is said in *Exc.* V. 1, 2. The universe was made once for all; but animals and plants are always being made.

[καὶ τῶν πνευμάτων πρυτανεύει]. Does πνευμάτων mean 'winds', or 'spirits'? (If 'spirits', this phrase has probably been added by a Christian transcriber.) In either case, these words (which are omitted in F) must be rejected; πρυτανεύειν is not δημιουργεῖν, and this sentence has to do with δημιουργία alone.

EXCERPT XXII

The *libellus* from which this extract was taken was entitled Ἀφροδίτη. Compare the titles Κόρη κόσμον (*Exc.* XXIII), Ποιμάνδρης (*Corp.* I), Κρατήρ (*Corp.* IV), and Κλείς (*Corp.* X). For the contents of the extract, cf. *Exc.* XV. 4.

Lydus *De mens.* 4. 64 (*Testim.*) says that Hermes ἐν τῇ κοσμοποιίᾳ spoke of a bisexual Aphrodite. It is possible that the *libellus* which Lydus there calls ἡ κοσμοποιία is the same that is called *Aphrodite* in *Exc.* XXII.

παρὰ τί (δέ) τὰ βρέφη ὅμοια τοῖς γονεῦσι γίνεται ἢ συγγενείαις ἀποδίδεται ἑκθήσω λόγον. It may be doubted whether παρὰ τί . . . γίνεται is a superscription, or a part of the text. In the latter case, it may be an indirect question, dependent on ἐκθήσω (or ἀποδώσω?) λόγον. It might possibly be a direct question asked by the pupil, and answered by the teacher in a sentence ending with ἐκθήσω λόγον; but if so, we should have expected the answer to be marked by ὃ τέκνον or something of the sort.

It may be conjectured that ἀποδίδεται is a corruption of ἀποδώσω (σοι?), and that ἐκθήσω was added as a variant. συγγενείαις may perhaps have something to do with the resemblance of children to kinsmen other than the parents; cf. ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ εἰς μακρὰς γενεάς (. . .) below.

The resemblance of child to parent is discussed by Aristotle, *Gen. an.* 4. 3, 767 a 36 ff. Compare also Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 422: Πόθεν γίνονται τῶν γονέων αἱ ὁμοιώσεις καὶ τῶν προγόνων. Ἐμπεδοκλῆς, . . . Παρμενίδης, . . . οἱ Στωικοί, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος

ὄλου καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς¹ φέρεσθαι τὰ σπέρματα, καὶ ἴτὰς ὁμοιότητος^{1 2} ἀναπλάττεσθαι ἴεκ τῶν αὐτῶν γενῶν^{1 3} τοὺς τύπους καὶ τοὺς χαρακτήρας, ὡσπερ ἂν εἰ ἴζωγράφον^{1 4} ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων χρωμάτων εἰκόνα τοῦ βλεπομένου (ποιήσειεν²).—προίεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναικα σπέρμα· κἂν μὲν ἐπικρατήσῃ τὸ τῆς γυναικός, ὅμοιον εἶναι τὸ γεννῶμενον τῇ μητρί, εἰὰν δὲ τὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός, τῷ πατρί.⁵ Galen *De foet. format.* 6, IV, 699 K: μάλιστα δ' ἂν τις θαυμάσειε τὴν πρὸς τοὺς γεννήσαντας ὁμοιότητα τῶν ἐκγόνων, ὅπως γίγνεται. φαίνεται γὰρ πάλιν ἡ διαπλάττουσα τὸ σῶμα ψυχὴ παρὰ τῶν γονέων εἰς τὸ κούμενον ἦκειν, ὡς ἐν τῷ σπέρματι περιεχομένη. Origen *In ev. Ioann.* 20. 2: τὸ μὲν σπέρμα [τινὸς] ἔχει τοὺς λόγους τοῦ σπείραντος ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἔτι ἴσυχάζοντας καὶ ἀποκειμένους· τὸ δὲ τέκνον, μεταβαλόντος τοῦ σπέρματος καὶ ἐργασαμένου τὴν περικειμένην αὐτῷ ὕλην ἀπὸ τῆς γυναικός καὶ τῶν ἐπισυναγομένων τροφῶν, μορφωθὲν καὶ εἰς γένεσιν εὐτρεπισθὲν ὕφίσταται. *Ib.* 20. 5: ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἔχει ἐν ἑαυτῷ προγονικούς τε καὶ συγγενικούς λόγους ὁ σπείρων, ὅτε μὲν κρατεῖ ὁ αὐτοῦ λόγος, καὶ ἀποτίκτεται τὸ γεννῶμενον τῷ σπείραντι ὅμοιον· ὅτε δὲ ὁ λόγος τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ τοῦ σπείραντος ἢ τοῦ πατρὸς τοῦ σπείραντος ἢ τοῦ θείου τοῦ σπείραντος, ἐνίοτε καὶ πάππου τοῦ σπείραντος, παρ' ὃ γίνονται οἱ ἀποτικτόμενοι ὅμοιοι τοῖσδε ἢ τοῖσδε. ἔστι δὲ ἰδεῖν ἐπικρατοῦντα καὶ τὸν λόγον τῆς γυναικός, . . . ἢ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ αὐτῆς ἢ τοῦ πάππου αὐτῆς, κατὰ τοὺς ἐν ταῖς μίξεσι βρασμούς ἅμα πάντων σειομένων ἕως ἐπικρατήσῃ τις τῶν σπερματικῶν λόγων.⁶

The teaching of Zeno the Stoic concerning the σπέρμα is reported as follows by Arius Didymus, Diels *Dox.* p. 470 (Arnim *Sto. vet. fr.* I, § 128): τὸ δὲ σπέρμα φησὶν ὁ Ζήνων εἶναι ὁ μεθίσιν ἄνθρωπος, πνεῦμα μεθ' ὕγρου, ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα,⁷ καὶ ἴτου σπέρματος τοῦ τῶν προγόνων¹ κέρασμα,⁸ καὶ μίγμα (ἐξ ἀπάντων) τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν

¹ Perhaps καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ought to be either bracketed, or altered into καὶ (πάντων τῶν) τῆς ψυχῆς (μερῶν). Compare μίγμα (ἐξ ἀπάντων) τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν συνελλυθός in the quotation from Zeno which is given below.

² Perhaps εἰς ὁμοιότητα.

³ "γενῶν vix sanum: tentabam γόνων . . . vel μερῶν" Diels. I have thought of λόγων; cf. ἔχον τοὺς λόγους τῷ ὄλω τοὺς αὐτοὺς in Zeno, quoted below. But something analogous to ἀπὸ τῶν ὁμοίων χρωμάτων is wanted; possibly ἐξ ὁμογενῶν?

⁴ Read ζωγράφος.

⁵ "προίεσθαι . . . πατρί non sunt Stoicorum," says Diels.

⁶ This is a restatement, in Stoic terms, of the theory of πανσπερμία spoken of by Aristotle, *Gen. an.* 4, 3, 769 a 29. The σπερματικὸς λόγος of the Stoics is the plan or design of the human or animal body which is to be formed; but it is at the same time a corporeal thing, a πνεῦμα, which is present in the σπέρμα, and by the action of which the body is fashioned in the womb.

⁷ Perhaps: (τῆς τοῦ σπείραντος) ψυχῆς μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα. (ἴτου σπέρματος¹ may have come from τοῦ σπείραντος misplaced.)

⁸ Perhaps: καὶ [τοῦ σπέρματος τοῦ] τῶν προγον(ικ)ῶν (λόγων) κέρασμα. Cf. ἔχει

συνεληλυθός.¹ ἔχον γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τῷ ὄλῳ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦτο, ὅταν² ἀφεθῆ εἰς τὴν μήτραν, συλληφθὲν ἵπ' ἄλλου πνεύματος, μέρος ψυχῆς τῆς τοῦ θηλέος καὶ³ συμφυῆς γενόμενον, (. . .).³ Ἰκρυφθέν τε φύει⁴ κινούμενον καὶ ἀναρριπιζόμενον ὑπ' ἐκείνου, προσλάμβανον ἀεὶ [εἰς]⁵ τὸ ὑγρὸν καὶ αἰζόμενον ἐξ αὐτοῦ.

Chrysippus used the resemblance of children to parents in qualities of soul as an argument against the Platonic doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul. His argument is criticized by Plutarch, *Sto. rep.* 41. 8, 1053 C, D: γίνεσθαι μὲν γάρ φησι (sc. Chrysippus) τὴν ψυχὴν ὅταν τὸ βρέφος ἀποτεχθῆ, καθάπερ στομῶσει τῇ περιψύξει τοῦ πνεύματος μεταβαλόντος.⁶ ἀποδείξει δὲ χρήται τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μεταγενεστέραν εἶναι, μάλιστα τῷ καὶ τὸν τρόπον καὶ τὸ ἦθος ἐξομοιοῦσθαι τὰ τέκνα τοῖς γονεῦσι. . . . εἰ δὲ φησί τις ὅτι ταῖς κράσεσι τῶν σωμάτων ἐγγυομένης τῆς ὁμοιότητος αἱ ψυχαὶ γεννόμεναι μεταβάλλουσι, διαφθεῖρει τὸ τεκμήριον τοῦ γεγονέναι τὴν ψυχὴν' ἐνδέχεται γὰρ οὕτω καὶ ἀγέννητον οὖσαν, ὅταν ἐπεισέλθῃ, μεταβάλλειν τῇ κράσει (τοῦ σώματος) ἵτῆς ὁμοιότητος⁷ (read εἰς ὁμοιότητα).⁷

A passage closely resembling *Exc.* XXII occurs in Lactantius *De opif. dei*, 12. 4 ff.: 'Ipsum semen quidam putant ex medullis

ἐν αὐτῷ προγονικοῦς . . . λόγους δὲ σπείρων, κ.τ.λ., in Origen, quoted above, and 'κατὰ μῆζόν τοῦ τῶν προγόνων λόγου' in Diog. Laert. (see following note).

¹ This passage (τὸ δὲ σπέρμα . . . μερῶν συνεληλυθός) is repeated, with slight variations, in Theodoret *Gr. aff. cur.* 5. 25: τὸν γὰρ τοὶ ἀνθρώπινον θορόν, ἵγρὸν ὄντα καὶ μετέχοντα πνεύματος, τῆς ψυχῆς ἐφήσεν (sc. Ζήνων ὁ Κιτιεὺς) εἶναι μέρος [τε] καὶ ἀπόσπασμα, καὶ τὸ τῶν προγόνων σπέρματος¹ κέρασμα [τε], καὶ μίγμα ἐξ ἀπάντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μορίων συναθροισθέν. Compare also Diog. Laert. 7. 158: ἀνθρώπου δὲ σπέρμα (λέγουσιν οἱ Στωικοὶ) δὲ μεθίσιν δὲ ἀνθρώπος (πνεῦμα) μεθ' ὑγροῦ, συγκίρνασθαι τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς μέρεσι κατὰ μῆζόν τοῦ τῶν προγόνων λόγου'. (This might be corrected into (καὶ) [συγκίρνασθαι τοῖς] τῆς (τοῦ σπείραντος;) ψυχῆς μέρος (καὶ ἀπόσπασμα), καὶ μῆζόν [τοῦ] τῶν προγον(ικ)ῶν λόγων).—Galen Ὀροὶ ἰατρ. 94, XIX, p. 370 K: σπέρμα ἐστὶν ἀνθρώπου δὲ μεθίσιν ἀνθρώπος (πνεῦμα) μεθ' ὑγροῦ, ψυχῆς μέρους ἀρπαγμα¹ (read μέρος καὶ ἀπόσπασμα), καὶ σύμμιγμα τὸ τῶν προγόνων γένους¹ (perhaps [τοῦ] τῶν προγον(ικ)ῶν λόγων), ὅλον τε αὐτὸ ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ συμμιχθὲν ἀπεκρίθη¹. (Is ὅλον τε αὐτὸ ἦν καὶ αὐτὸ a corruption of something like (ἔχον γὰρ τοὺς λόγους) τῷ ὄλῳ τοὺς αὐτοὺς τοῦτο in Arius Didymus?)—Plut. *De colid. ira* 15, 462 f.: δὲ Ζήνων ἔλεγε τὸ σπέρμα σύμμιγμα καὶ κέρασμα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς δυνάμεων ὑπάρχων ἀπεσπασμένον.

² Perhaps: ἔχειν γὰρ τοὺς λόγους τῷ ὄλῳ τοὺς αὐτοὺς. τοῦτο (δὲ), ὅταν κ.τ.λ.

³ Perhaps: συλληφθὲν [ὑπ' ἄλλου πνεύματος] ((καὶ)) [μέρος] ψυχῆ τῆ τοῦ θηλέος [[καὶ]] συμφυῆς γενόμενον, (. . .). Possibly ὑπὸ (τοῦ) ἄλλου πνεύματος is a misplaced gloss on ὑπ' ἐκείνου below.

⁴ Perhaps: (τὸ δὲ) κρυφθὲν [τε] φύεται (or φύεσθαι).

⁵ εἰς del. Diels.

⁶ Chrysippus said that the πνεῦμα of the embryo is chilled and 'tempered' by the cold of the external air, to which the child is exposed at birth, and that the πνεῦμα is thereby changed into a ψυχή. Plutarch's meaning might be made clearer by writing τοῦ πνεύματος (εἰς ψυχὴν) μεταβαλόντος.

⁷ For this last clause, cf. *Exc.* XXVI, 13: προσεπιγίγνεται δὲ . . . καὶ ἔτερα τῶνα ἡμῶν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ φεράματος συσταθμίας.

tantum, quidam ex omni corpore ad venam genitalem confluere ibique concrecere. . . . Conceptum igitur Varro et Aristoteles sic fieri arbitrantur. Aiunt enim non tantum maribus inesse semen, verum etiam feminis, et inde plerumque matribus similes procreari. Sed earum semen sanguinem esse purgatum: quod si recte cum virili mixtum sit, utraque concreta et simul coagulata informari. . . . Similitudines autem in corporibus filiorum sic fieri putant: cum semina inter se permixta coalescunt, si virile superaverit, patri similem provenire seu marem seu feminam; si muliebres praevaluerit, progeniem cuiusque sexus ad imaginem respondere maternam. Id autem praevallet e duobus, quod fuerit uberius; alterum enim quodammodo amplectitur et includit: hinc plerumque fieri ut unius tantum liniamenta praetendat. Si vero aequa fuerit ex pari semente permixtio, figuras quoque misceri,' &c. According to Brandt (*Wiener Studien* 13, pp. 255 ff.), the source from which Lactantius got the contents of that passage was a book by Varro, entitled *Tubero, de origine humana*. The Greek authority followed by Varro must have referred to Aristotle (*Gen. an.* 4. 3). The writer of *Exc.* XXII probably made use of Varro's Greek source, or some document derived from it.

ὅταν νοστίμου αἵματος ἐξαφρούμενον (ἐξαφεδρουμένου MSS.) ἡ γένεσις¹ ἀποθησαυρίζῃ γόνον. ἐξαφεδρουμένου was probably written by some one who was thinking of ἀφροδρος, *menses muliebres*. But that cannot be right, because this clause has to do with the father; the mother is not spoken of till later (τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γυναικός). For αἵματος ἐξαφρούμενον . . . ἀποθησαυρίζῃ γόνον, cf. Clem. Alex. *Paed.* 1. 6. 48: τινὲς δὲ καὶ τὸ σπέρμα τοῦ ζῶου ἀφρὸν εἶναι τοῦ αἵματος κατ' οὐσίαν ὑποτίθενται, ὃ δὴ τῇ ἐμφύτῳ τοῦ ἄρρενος θέρμη [παρὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς ἐκταραχθέν]¹ ἐκριπιζόμενον ἐξαφροῦται, κὰν ταῖς ἑσπερματίσι παρατίθεται² φλεψίν ἐντέθεν γὰρ ὁ Ἀπολλωνιάτης Διογένης τὰ ἀφροδίσια κεκλήσθαι βούλεται. Philo *De opif. mundi* 22. 67, vol. i, p. 22 Cohn: τοῦτο (sc. τὸ σπέρμα τῶν ζῶων), ὡς ἔστι (ἔως ἔστι?) φανλότατον, εὐκὸς ἀφρῶ θεωρεῖται· ἀλλ' ὅταν εἰς τὴν μήτραν καταβληθὲν στηρίσῃ, κ.τ.λ. Pseudo-Galen *Hist. phil.*, Diels *Dox.* p. 640: Πυθαγόρας (τὸ σπέρμα εἶναι φησιν) ἀφρὸν τοῦ χρηστοτάτου αἵματος. (νοστίμον in *Exc.* XXII corresponds to χρηστοτάτον in Ps.-Galen.)

¹ παρὰ τὰς συμπλοκάς ἐκταραχθέν appears to have been added by some one who misunderstood the writer's meaning. It is not at the συμπλοκή, but before it, that the σπέρμα is formed and stored up.

² Probably σπερματικαῖς ἀποτίθεται. Cf. ἀποθησαυρίζῃ in *Exc.* XXII.

The subject of ἀποθησαυρίζῃ cannot have been ἡ γένεσις. The agent is presumably nature, operating in the man's body; and this may have been expressed by ἡ φύσις, with or without some additional words such as εἰς γένεσιν.

συμβαίνει πως ἐκπεῖν ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ὄλου [μελῶν] οὐσίαν τιὰ (< . . .). An οὐσία which ἐκπεῖ is a πνεῦμα; and the thing meant is the πνεῦμα spoken of in the same connexion by the Stoics. The writer's meaning might be expressed by saying that the *semen* is πνεῦμα μετ' ἀφροῦ; cf. Zeno's πνεῦμα μεθ' ὑγροῦ. The πνεῦμα is the active component of the *semen*; it is that in which the life resides.

μελῶν is perhaps a remnant of (καὶ πάντων τῶν) μελῶν (or μερῶν), which may have been written as an alternative for ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ὄλου. But it is also possible that it may be a remnant of (καὶ πάντων τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς) μερῶν; cf. Zeno *ap.* Arius Didymus, quoted above.

For ἐκ τοῦ σώματος ὄλου, cf. Aetius (Diels, p. 422, quoted above): οἱ Στωικοί, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ὄλου καὶ (πάντων τῶν?) τῆς ψυχῆς (μερῶν?) φέρεσθαι τὰ σπέρματα. Diog. Laert. 7. 159: καὶ ἀφ' ὄλων δὲ τῶν σωμαίων (τὸ σπέρμα) φασὶ καταφέρεσθαι οἱ περὶ τὸν Σφαῖρον πάντων γούν γεννητικὸν εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν.

(< . . .) κατὰ θείαν ἐνέργειαν, ὡς [τοῦ αὐτοῦ] ἀνθρώπου γινομένου. It is impossible to say that 'the same human being' is brought into existence by the process of reproduction; the son may be like the father, but cannot be identical with him. If we strike out τοῦ αὐτοῦ (which may have come by duplication from the following τὸ δ' αὐτό), we may suppose the writer's thought to have been that the production of a human being is a thing that requires a special putting forth of divine power. The formation of a beast, or of a human body, might be sufficiently accounted for by the working of merely physical forces; but there is something in man that comes direct from God, and must have been breathed into him by God at his birth. But it is difficult to see how anything of this kind can have been connected with the context; and it may be suspected that the words κατὰ . . . γινομένου have come from a marginal note.

τὸ δ' αὐτὸ καὶ ἐπὶ τῆς γυναικὸς εἰκὸς (εἰς τὸ MSS.) γίγνεσθαι. ὅταν (οὖν) καθυπερτερήσῃ (-ρίσῃ MSS.) τὸ βυέν ἀπὸ τοῦ ἀνδρός . . ., τῷ πατρὶ ὅμοιον (ὁμοιούμενον MSS.) τὸ βρέφος ἀποδειχθήσεται, ὡς τὸ ἀνάπαλιν τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον τῇ μητρὶ. This agrees closely in meaning with the corresponding passage in Aetius *l.c.*: προίεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὴν γυναῖκα σπέρμα· κὰν μὲν ἐπικρατήσῃ τὸ τῆς γυναικὸς, κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Ar. Gen. an.*

4. 3, 767 b 21 : κρατούσης μὲν (τῆς τοῦ ἄρρενος κινήσεως ἢ γονῆς), ἄρρεν τε ποιήσει καὶ οὐ θήλυ, καὶ ἑοικὸς τῷ γεννῶντι ἀλλ' οὐ τῇ μητρὶ μὴ κρατήσαν δέ, κ.τ.λ.

καὶ ἄτηκτον (ἄθικτον MSS.) γένηται. ἄθικτον is impossible; but ἄτηκτον (which, for a transcriber, would differ very little in pronunciation from ἄθικτον) gives a satisfactory sense: 'if the vigour of the *semen* is not softened or relaxed.'

ἐὰν (δὲ ἐπὶ) τινος μέρους (ἢ) καθυπερτέρησις (καθυπέρθεσις MSS.) γένηται, πρὸς ἐκεῖνο τὸ μέρος ἀφομοιοῦται (sc. τὸ βρέφος τῷ πατρὶ ἢ τῇ μητρὶ). Cf. Ar. *Gen. an.* 768 b 1 : ὁ δ' αὐτὸς τρόπος καὶ ἐπὶ τῶν μορίων καὶ γὰρ τῶν μορίων τὰ μὲν τῷ πατρὶ ἔοικε πολλάκις, τὰ δὲ τῇ μητρὶ, τὰ δὲ τῶν προγόνων τισίν. *Ib.* 769 a 6 : εἰρήκασι δὲ τινες τῶν φυσιολόγων καὶ ἕτεροι περὶ τούτων, διὰ τίν' αἰτίαν ὅμοια καὶ ἀνόμοια γίγνεται τοῖς γονεῦσιν. . . ἔνιοι μὲν γὰρ φασιν, ἀφ' ὁποτέρου ἂν ἔλθῃ σπέρμα πλέον, τούτῳ γίγνεσθαι μᾶλλον ἑοικὸς, ὁμοίως παντὶ τε πᾶν καὶ μέρει μέρος, ὡς ἀπίοντος ἀφ' ἐκάστου τῶν μορίων σπέρματος.

ἔσθ' ὅτε δὲ καὶ εἰς μακρὰς γενεάς (. . .). This may have referred to the case of a child's resemblance to some πρόγονος other than the father and the mother (cf. τὰ δὲ τῶν προγόνων τισίν in Aristotle, quoted above). μακρὰς γενεάς, if sound, must mean 'remote generations'.

(. . .) ἑκείνου (τοῦ) δεκανοῦ (τοῦ) λόγον ἔχοντος πρὸς τὴν ὥραν ἐν ἣ ἢ γυνὴ ἐπαιδοποιεῖ. As to the Decani, see *Exc.* VI. The reading of the MSS. would appear to mean 'since he (sc. ὁ γεννήσας) stands in the relation of a Decanus to the hour in which' &c. But it could hardly be said that there is the same relation between a man and a certain hour as between a Decanus and that hour; and the true reading is probably τοῦ δεκανοῦ τοῦ κ.τ.λ., 'of the Decanus who has to do with the hour' &c. (ἐκείνου may be a corrupted doublet of δεκανοῦ.) At a given hour, one of the thirty-six Decani—presumably the Decanus who is at that time rising above the eastern horizon—is dominant; and the writer must have said that the child is in some way affected by the influence of the Decanus who is dominant at the hour in which the child's existence begins. In the *Pistis Sophia*, it is the function of the 365 Liturgi (who are subordinates of the Decani) to fashion the body in the womb; and the writer of *Exc.* XXI may have assigned a similar function to the dominant Decanus.

Does ἡ ὥρα ἐν ἣ ἢ γυνὴ ἐπαιδοποιεῖ mean the hour of birth, or the hour of conception?

EXCERPT XXIII

(KORE KOSMU.)

Exc. XXIII contains a narrative (§§ ⟨50⟩ ff.) preceded by two detached fragments of other documents (§§ ⟨32⟩, 1, 2, and §§ 3-8), and interrupted by the insertion of three other unconnected passages (§§ 27-29, § 42, and §§ 43-48), as well as by some smaller interpolations.

Setting aside these extraneous additions, and confining our attention to the main narrative, we have in *Exc.* XXIII the greater part of a *libellus* which must have been one of a collection of documents in which the teachings of the writers were presented in the form of instruction given by Isis to her son Horus. Excerpts XXIV-XXVII are extracts from other *libelli* of the same collection.

These *Isis to Horus* documents differ in character from those of the *Hermes to Tat*, *Hermes to Asclepius*, and *Hermes to Ammon* collections, and must have originated among somewhat different surroundings. They are 'Hermetic' only in the sense that the knowledge which Isis imparts to Horus is supposed to have been learnt by her, in part at least, from Hermes,—and possibly also in the sense that the spoken words of Isis and Horus were assumed to have been set down in writing by Hermes. (The headings of *Exc.* XXIII, XXV, and XXVII in Stobaeus imply that these pieces were extracted from books written by Hermes; but we do not know that the original *libelli* bore any superscriptions to that effect.) In respect of the doctrines taught, however, the *Isis to Horus* documents do not differ much more widely from the other *Hermetica* than the other *Hermetica* differ among themselves.

The doctrinal position of the writer of *Exc.* XXIII is somewhat obscured by the mythical form of his narrative. He employs for his purpose the chief figures in the mythology of the Egyptian Isis-cult (the deities Osiris, Isis, and Horus, and the god Thoth-Hermes); and he makes use of conscious and deliberate personifications (Φύσις, § 10; Γῆ, § ⟨52⟩; the four Elements, §§ 55-64). The greater part of what he says, or makes Isis say, is evidently not intended to be taken as literally and historically true; he cannot have believed, or expected his readers to believe, that his descriptions of the making of plants (§§ 9-⟨52⟩), the making

of souls (§§ 14-16), and the making of beasts (§§ 18-23), were, in all their details, true accounts of things that had actually taken place, any more than he believed, or expected it to be believed, that the speeches which he ascribes to God, and the words which he puts into the mouths of the Elements, had really been spoken by them. But it is difficult to draw a precise line between what he meant to be accepted as true and what he meant to be understood as symbolic fiction. His narrative is presumably based, in its main outlines at least, on pre-existing traditions; much of the detail is doubtless of his own invention. But how much he invented for himself, and how much he took over from earlier writers, we have no means of finding out. (It would be interesting to know, for instance, what authority he had for saying that the bodies of the beasts were made by 'holy daemons', § 19.)

The writer of this document, though he can hardly be called a thorough-going Platonist, has been much influenced by Platonic teachings. He recognizes a supreme and incorporeal God, by whom the Kosmos has been made out of a Chaos of formless matter (§ <<50>>). He assumes the pre-existence of human souls, and holds that, before their incarnation on earth, they resided in a higher world; he describes the body as a prison (§ 34 *fin.* &c.), and speaks of the *lethe* to which the soul is subjected during its earthly life (§§ 37 and 41); and he says that, when the soul departs from the body, it will, according to its merits or demerits, either return to its home above, or be reincarnated in the body of a beast (§ 39). All this must have been derived, directly or indirectly, from Plato; and in his description of the making of souls, as well as in his conception of God as Demiurgus, the influence of the *Timaeus* is manifest.

On the other hand, the distinction between the *αἰσθητόν* and the *νοητόν*,—the corporeal and the incorporeal,—which is one of the most fundamental principles of Platonism, appears to be of but slight importance to the writer of the narrative. It is here and there implied (e. g. in the conception of the pre-cosmic God and a pre-cosmic group of gods, § <<50>>), and in the contrast between seeing with bodily eyes and seeing with the eyes of the mind, § 36); but little stress is laid on it, and for the most part the incorporeal is ignored. The distinction on which the writer insists is not that between things cosmic and things supracosmic, but rather that between different parts of the Kosmos, τὰ ἄνω and τὰ κάτω, things

celestial and things terrestrial; and the supreme reward promised to virtuous souls is not transference into a supracosmic world, but admission to heaven, or in other words, transformation into star-gods (§ 17). This might indeed be accounted for to some extent by the mythical form of the discourse of Isis; and it might perhaps be said that the corporeal things spoken of are meant to be understood as symbols of incorporeal realities. But there remains a fact which cannot be thus explained away. The religion which is said to have been introduced among mankind by Osiris and Isis, and which it seems to have been the writer's main object to uphold or recommend, is not a Platonic mysticism such as we find in some of the *Hermetica*,—a religion the aim of which is the soul's escape from the world of sense, and its union with a supracosmic God; it is little more than a belief in penalties imposed by superhuman beings,—the sort of religion which might be described as a substitute for a police-force.

Signs of Stoic influence are apparent in the terms used to describe the materials of which souls are made (*νοερὸν πῦρ*, and a portion of God's *πνεῦμα*, § 14); in the writer's conception of the *πνεύματα* of beasts (§§ 18–21); and in the statement that the soul is situated in the heart (§ 36). The notion that animal births are brought about by the working of the Zodiac (§ 20) implies acceptance of the doctrine of astral influence, to which greater prominence was given by the later Stoics than by Chrysippus. The view that unembodied souls reside in the atmosphere, the division of the atmosphere into distinct strata, and the notion that each soul is located in one particular stratum, but is capable of rising from a lower stratum to a higher (§ 19), must have been derived from the system of the Platonizing Stoic Posidonius.

The framework of the dialogue is Egyptian, and the writer shows familiarity with Egyptian traditions about Isis and Osiris (e. g. in the list of the benefits which they conferred on mankind, §§ 66–69). The statements that Osiris and Isis are an *ἀπόρροια* of the supreme God, and that these deities came down from heaven to dwell for a time on earth, and then returned to heaven, may perhaps be of Egyptian origin; but apart from the mythology, this document contains few traces of native Egyptian speculation independent of Greek thought.

There are certain expressions which appear to show that the writer had some knowledge of the first chapter of the Jewish *Genesis* (see notes on *ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ προῆλθεν* in § 10; *εἶπε καὶ . . . ἐγένετο* in

§ <<50>>, and *ἔπειν ὁ θεὸς, καὶ ἦν* in § <<11>>; *ἔχαυρε δὲ ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ.* in § <<5>>; *ὁμοιογονίας* in § 21; and the word *θρόνοι* in § 17 may have come from a Jewish source. It is therefore not unlikely that throughout his narrative of the *demiurgia* the author was more or less influenced by *Genesis* ch. 1, as well as by the *Timaëus*.

I can find no evidence that anything in the teaching of *Exc.* XXIII was derived from Christian sources.

Date. The intermixture of Platonic and Stoic conceptions in the *Kore Kosmu*, and more especially the writer's dependence on Posidonius in his doctrine concerning the souls, makes any date earlier than 50 B. C. impossible. We may therefore begin by setting down as the extreme limits 50 B. C. on the one hand, and A. D. 500 (the approximate date of Stobaeus) on the other. But we should most likely be right in striking off two hundred years at either end of this long period, and fixing on A. D. 150 as the *terminus a quo*, and A. D. 300 as the *terminus ante quem*.

There is one thing which seems to tell somewhat in favour of a more definite date. In my note on § 61, I have pointed out the resemblance between the petition of the Elements in this document and the prophecy of Hermes in *Ascl. Lat.* III. 24 b-26 a. The writer of the *Kore Kosmu*, like the writer of *Ascl. Lat.* III, is endeavouring to uphold the established worship of the gods of Egypt, and does so by describing, in similar language, the disastrous results of *ἀθεότης*, which, according to both alike, not only causes mutual slaughter among men, but also tends to produce disorder in the world of nature. (See *Kore Kosmu* 63, where it is implied that the Elements were on the point of abandoning their functions in disgust at the misdeeds of men, and compare this with *Ascl. Lat.* III. 25, *tunc nec terra constabit* &c.) Now a man would not be likely to write thus in defence of the established cults unless he knew or thought that some attack on them was to be feared. The danger which the writer of *Ascl. Lat.* III had in view was the spread of Christianity, which he expected to result in the abolition of all Pagan cults. Is it not probable then that the author of the *Kore Kosmu* also wrote at a time when this same danger was already becoming apparent? As I have pointed out in the introduction to *Ascl. Lat.*, this would indicate a date hardly before A. D. 260 at the earliest.

There is good reason for thinking that the distress of the author of *Ascl. Lat.* was intensified by the Palmyrene invasion of Egypt in A. D. 268, and that he wrote in the midst of the troubles to which

that invasion gave rise. The calmer tone of the *Kore Kosmu* would agree very well with the assumption that it was written shortly before the Palmyrene invasion, at a time when the aggressive temper of the Christians was beginning to give pious Pagans cause for apprehension, but when Egypt was enjoying an interval of repose after preceding troubles. On that assumption, the calamities endured by the Alexandrians in A. D. 262-263, and described in the letters of bishop Dionysius (Euseb. *H. E.* 7. 21 ff.), would be still recent, and would be vividly pictured in the writer's memory; and that might account for the resemblance between the complaints of the Elements in the *Kore Kosmu* and the bishop's descriptions of the state of things in Egypt. For this reason, a date between A. D. 263 and 268 may perhaps be thought a little more probable than any other; but the argument is not one to which much weight ought to be attached.

Excerpts XXIV, XXV, and XXVI were presumably written by members of the same group of Egyptian worshippers of Isis, and cannot be far separated in date from *Exc.* XXIII.

Title. The superscription in Stobaeus tells us that *Exc.* XXIII is an extract from a book written by Hermes Trismegistus, and entitled *Κόρη κόσμου*. What is the meaning of this title? It has sometimes been translated 'The virgin of the world'. But that is certainly wrong. *κόρη* means, not a virgin, but a girl or young woman; and if the word is to be understood in that sense, *κόρη κόσμου* could only mean 'Daughter of the Kosmos'.¹ But to whom could that term be applied? Certainly not to Isis, who, as described in this document, is not daughter of the Kosmos,² and who, moreover, is here depicted neither as a virgin nor as a girl, but as a matron, wife of Osiris, and mother of a glorious son.

Since *κόρη* in the sense of 'girl' is inappropriate, we must take the word in its other sense, and understand the title to mean 'The pupil of the eye of the Kosmos'.³ But who or what was denoted by that term, it is difficult to guess.

¹ Athena, for instance, is called *Διὸς κόρη* (daughter of Zeus), Aesch. *Eum.* 415; and the Eumenides are called *Γῆς τε καὶ Σκότου κόραι* (daughters), Soph. *O. C.* 40.

² In § 65, she is spoken of as an 'efflux' of the supreme God.

³ It is possible, however, that those who used the term in this sense sometimes bore in mind the other meaning of *κόρη* also. Cf. Plut. *De facie in orbe lunae* 27. 3, 942 D: *Κόρη δὲ καὶ Φερσεφόνη κέκληται (ἢ ἐν σελήνῃ θεά), τὸ μὲν (sc. Φερσεφόνη) ὡς φωσφόρος οὖσα, Κόρη δέ, ὅτι ((τὸ ἡλίου φέγγος (ἀντιλάμπου) ἐνορᾶται τῇ σελήνῃ,)) ((ὥσπερ)) καὶ τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ (τὸ) ἐν ᾧ τὸ εἶδωλον ἀντιλάμπει τοῦ βλέποντος [[ὥσπερ]] ((τὸ ἡλίου φέγγος ἐνορᾶται τῇ σελήνῃ)) κόρην προσαγορεύομεν.* That passage shows that Plutarch could easily have found a reason for calling the Moon-goddess *κόρη κόσμου*; but there is no evidence that he or any other Greek ever did call her by that name.

The sun was often called 'the eye of heaven', both in Greek poetry and in Egyptian documents;¹ and as Horus was one of the numerous deities whom the Egyptians identified with the sun, he might very well be called 'the eye (ὄφθαλμός) of the Kosmos', and perhaps even 'the eye-pupil (κόρη) of the Kosmos'.² But the fact that Horus takes part in the dialogue as a disciple of his mother Isis is hardly a sufficient reason for using a name of Horus as the title of the book.

Brugsch, *Rel. und Myth. der alten Aeg.* p. 81, says that the name Osiris³ meant (or might be taken to mean) 'the power of the eye-pupil', or 'powerful is the eye-pupil', and that the Egyptians understood 'the eye-pupil', in his connexion, to mean the sun. If so, perhaps Osiris might be called *κόρη κόσμου*.

Hathor of Tentyra is called in inscriptions 'the pupil of the eye of the light-god Ra', 'the female sun, the head of the light-god Ra', and 'the right pupil of the two pupils of the holy eye'.⁴ It seems therefore that the name 'eye-pupil of the universe' might be applied to Hathor; and if to Hathor, perhaps to Isis also.

It is most likely then that *κόρη κόσμου* is an appellation of some particular god or goddess.⁵ But we do not know which out of many possible deities was called by this name; nor do we know why the book was thus entitled. It must be remembered, however, that we have only the Excerpt given by Stobaeus; if the whole book were before us, both the meaning of the title and its

¹ Cf. *περιλαμπή τε, ὄφθαλμοὶ θεῶν, ἄστρα*, in *Kore Kosmu* 34.

² 'The eye of Horus' is a term which occurs very frequently in Egyptian documents, and was used in some cryptic sense in the ritual formulae of Egyptian worship. But to speak of the eye of Horus is not the same as to call Horus himself an eye; and to call him an eye is not quite the same as to call him the pupil of an eye.

³ *Us-iri*; in Coptic, *ουσίρε*. The second part of the word (*-iri*) was represented in hieroglyphic writing by the picture of an eye. Brugsch says that in late times the name was sometimes written *Us-rā* (i. e. with a picture of the sun in place of that of an eye).

⁴ Brugsch *ib.* pp. 118 and 122.

⁵ The possibility of a different interpretation of the term *κόρη κόσμου* is suggested by the words of Plutarch, *Is. et Os.* 33: *τὴν Αἴγυπτον, ἐν τοῖς (ταῖς Reitzenstein) μάλιστα μελάγγειον οὖσαν, ὥσπερ τὸ μέλαν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ, Χημίαν καλοῦσιν.* (Erman, *Aeg. Glossar*, says that in the Egyptian language *km*, Coptic *κααε*, meant 'black', and *km-t*, Coptic *κηαιε*, meant 'Egypt'.) Assuming that the same Egyptian word meant both 'the land of Egypt' and 'the black of the eye', it is conceivable that Egypt might be called 'the eye-pupil of the universe'. Ebers ('*Die Körpertheile in Altägyptischen.*' *Abh. d. k. bayr. Akad.* 1897, p. 111) quotes from an ancient text found at Edfu 'Egypt (lit. the Black), which is so called after the eye of Osiris, for it is his pupil'. (Mead, *Thrice Greatest Hermes*, III, p. 158.)

connexion with the contents of the dialogue might be less obscure.¹ See note on § <<50>>.

(§ 32. Πρόσεχε, τέκνον Ὀρε . . . σὺ παρ' ἐμοῦ.) In the MSS., the Excerpt begins with the words ταῦτα εἰπούσα Ἴσις (§ 1). A passage containing something said by Isis must therefore have preceded; but as we are told in § 1 that Isis *begins* her discourse (τοῦ λόγου ἀρχεται) in § 2, the missing passage cannot have amounted to more than a few sentences.

Now § 32 is evidently out of place where it stands in the MSS. It must have stood at or near the beginning of a dialogue in which Isis gave instruction to Horus; and if we put it here, ταῦτα εἰπούσα κ.τ.λ. follows quite satisfactorily.

κρυπτῆς γὰρ ἐπακούεις (ἐπακούσεις?) θεωρίας, ἧς ὁ μὲν προπάτωρ Καμήφης (ἦν ἀρχηγέτης, Ἑρμῆς δὲ) <<παρὰ τοῦ πάντων προγενεστέρου Καμήφους>> ἔτυχεν ἐπακούσας, (ἐγὼ δὲ) παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ. Καμήφης is a name of the Egyptian god Khnum, whom Greeks called the Agathos Daimon. In the sentence as given in the MSS., the words παρὰ τοῦ πάντων προγενεστέρου Καμήφους are meaningless, and the words Καμήφης ἔτυχεν ἐπακούσας παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ yield an impossible meaning. If Kamephis was the 'forefather' of the other persons mentioned, and 'older than all' of them (πάντων προγενέστερος), how could he have been a pupil of Hermes, his junior and descendant? There can be little doubt that here, as elsewhere, the Agathos Daimon was spoken of as the teacher from whom Hermes learnt the *gnosis*, and that what Isis said was 'Kamephis taught the doctrine to Hermes; Hermes taught it to me;² and I will now teach it to you'.

¹ Dieterich, *Abraxas*, p. 110, n. 1, speaking of 'the coin (Münze) which is published as no. 13 by Engel in *Bull. de corr. hellénique VIII*', says that it bears the inscription ΚΟΡΨ ΚΟC; and he takes this to mean ΚΟΡΗ ΚΟCΜΟΥ. Dieterich's note gave me some hope of finding a portrait of the Kore Kosmu. But that hope was vain; for I cannot accept his reading of the inscription. The things dealt with in Engel's article are not coins, but leaden *tesserae*; and the *tessera* in question is not no. 13, but no. 68, which Engel describes as follows: 'ΚΟΡΨ—ΚΟC. Némésis debout tenant un frein; à ses pieds une roue.—Rev. ΑΙΑ (pour ΑΙλιου) ΠΥΡ—ΦΟ—ΡΟΥ. Autel, le tout dans une couronne.—Corycus, ville de Cilicie?' In Engel's reproduction of the obverse, one sees a standing human figure, with a wheel beside its right foot, and something (which does not look like 'a bridle') in its left hand; and the letters ΟΡΨ ΚΟC (not ΟΡΨ ΚΟC) are quite plain and unmistakable. A letter which stood before ΟΡΨ is almost completely obliterated; and the little that is left of it is (if Engel's copy may be trusted) more like the bottom of a B than the bottom of a K. The inscription on the obverse then is not κῶρη κόσμου. The only intelligible word on the *tessera* is *πυρφόρον* on the reverse.

² It was commonly said that Isis learnt from Hermes. Diodorus (I. 27) gives an epitaph of Isis (regarded as a mortal woman) which was said to have been found 'at Nysa in Arabia'; it begins thus: Ἐγὼ Ἴσις εἰμι ἡ βασίλισσα πάσης χώρας, ἡ παιδευθεῖσα ὑπὸ Ἑρμοῦ.

The text has been thrown into confusion by the shifting of *παρὰ τοῦ* . . . *Καμήφωος*.

Ἑρμοῦ τοῦ [πάντων ἔργων] ὑπομνηματογράφου. Kamephis taught the doctrine orally to Hermes; but Hermes was the first to set it down in writing. (Cf. § 5, and *Corp.* XII. i. 8.) In § 43, Hermes is called *θεῶν ὑπομνηματογράφος*.

ὅπότε ἐμὲ καὶ τῷ τελείῳ μέλανι ἐτίμησε¹. 'At the time when he honoured me with the perfect ink.' That is nonsense. Wachsmuth supposes that the 'ink' is that with which Hermes wrote his books. But if the writer had meant to make Isis say 'at the time when he permitted me to read the books which he had written', he would surely have found some better way of expressing that meaning.

Reitzenstein, *Poimandres*, p. 139, quotes from a magic papyrus (Wessely, *Denkschr. d. k. k. Akademie* 1893, p. 37, l. 500) the words *ἐπικαλοῦμαι σε, κυρία Ἴσι, ἣ συνεχώρησεν ὁ Ἄγαθός Δαίμων βασιλείων ἐν τῷ τελείῳ μέλανι*. The occurrence of the words *τῷ τελείῳ μέλανι* in the papyrus is significant, as it seems to exclude the hypothesis that their presence in the *Kore Kosmu* is due merely to corruption of the text.¹ But that passage gives little help towards the explanation of the phrase.²

¹ A satisfactory sense could be got by writing *τοῖς τέλεσι τοῖς μεγάλοις* (or *τῇ τελετῇ τῇ μεγάλῃ*) ἐτέλεσε. (*τῷ τέλει τῷ μεγάλῳ* would be nearer to the reading of the MSS.; but it is usually *τέλη*, plural, and not *τέλος*, singular, that is used in the sense of 'initiation'.)

² Reitzenstein *ib.* begins his attempt to explain the passage by saying (if I understand him rightly) that *τὸ τέλειον μέλαν* means the land of Egypt; and in support of this, he refers to *Plut. Is. et Os.* 33: *τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐν ταῖς μάλιστα μελάγγειον οὖσαν ὥσπερ τὸ μέλαν τοῦ ὀφθαλμοῦ Χημίαν καλοῦσιν*. (But it may be objected that, even if we assume that *τὸ μέλαν* could mean 'the black earth', and that 'the black earth' could mean 'the land of Egypt', the epithet *τέλειον* remains unexplained.)

But to this Reitzenstein appends a different and inconsistent interpretation of the phrase, namely, that *τὸ τέλειον μέλαν* means, not the land of Egypt, but a particular part of that land, viz. the district in which Syene was situated, and which was called the Dodekaschoinos. He refers to an inscription in which it is said that king Doser gave this district to the god Khnum; he mentions the known facts that in early times the chief seat of the cult of Khnum was in that region, and that in the time of the Ptolemies the cult of Khnum had been partly superseded there by that of Isis; he assumes the existence of a 'priestly tradition of Syene' that Khnum had, by a definite act, transferred his rights over the district to Isis (natürlich muss der Gott es ihr freiwillig überlassen, sich mit ihr vereinigt haben?); and he takes both the words *ἣ συνεχώρησεν ὁ Ἄγαθός Δαίμων ὁ βασιλείων ἐν τῷ τελείῳ μέλανι* in the magic papyrus, and the words *ὅπότε ἐμὲ καὶ τῷ τελείῳ μέλανι ἐτίμησεν* in the *Kore Kosmu*, to refer to that transfer.

Against this it may be said that in the first place Reitzenstein brings forward no adequate evidence to show that any such tradition existed; in the second place, assuming the tradition of a transfer of the Dodekaschoinos from Khnum to Isis to

I am inclined to suspect that ἐτίμησε is a corruption of ἐτέλεσε, and that the words refer to a τελετή, i. e. a sacramental initiation, by which the instructor of Isis prepared her for the reception of the secret doctrine which he was about to impart to her. If the words τῷ τελεῖω μέλανι are sound, we may suppose them to have signified something which had to do with the ritual of the sacrament spoken of;¹ but their meaning is unknown to us.

§ I. ἐγγεῖ πρῶτον Ὠρω γλυκύ τι ποτὸν (ἐγγεῖ ποτὸν Ὠρω γλυκὸν τὸ πρῶτον MSS.) ἀμβροσίας. ποτὸν ἀμβροσίας means a draught of a liquid which makes those who drink it immortal. Isis then *makes Horus immortal* by giving him this draught. Cf. Diodorus I. 25: (φασὶ δ' Αἰγύπτιοι τὴν Ἴσιν) εὐρεῖν . . . τὸ τῆς ἀθανασίας φάρμακον, δι' οὗ τὸν υἱὸν Ὠρον, ὑπὸ τῶν Τιτάνων (i. e. the followers of Set) ἐπιβουλευθέντα καὶ νεκρὸν εὐρεθέντα . . ., μὴ μόνον ἀναστήσαι, δοῦσαν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας ποιῆσαι μεταλαβεῖν. *Oxyrhynchus Pap.* (1915) no. 1380, l. 242 (addressed to Isis): σὺ τὸν μέγαν Ὀσιριν ἀθάνατον ἐποίησας, . . . ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ὠρον.

The notion that immortality is to be got by drinking something existed in many different cults. It was probably derived from sacramental rites, in which the worshippers drank blood, wine, or some other liquid, and thereby received into themselves the substance of their god. And the mention of such a draught here makes it probable that a sacrament of this nature was in use in the cult of Isis at the time when the passage was written. We are told that Isis administered a draught to Horus *before she revealed the secret doctrine to him*. Why is this said? Perhaps because it was usual for a teacher to give a sacramental draught to his pupil on a like occasion. It may have been the rule in the writer's community that those to whom the *gnosis* is to be revealed must first be made worthy of that high privilege by 'receiving the sacrament'.

If Horus needs a 'draught of ambrosia' to make him immortal, it seems to follow that he is a mortal. And if so, it is to be presumed that his mother Isis also either is or has been a mortal. (See *Exc.* XXV. 1 and 9, and *Exc.* XXVI. 12 and 13.) We may take it then that in this paragraph the scene is laid on earth, and that Horus is a mortal. If he had already been immortal, there is no reason why Khnum should have chosen the occasion of that transfer to reveal the *gnosis* to her; and in the third place, it was probably not from Khnum, but from Hermes, that Isis was supposed by the writer of this section (as by other people) to have learnt the *gnosis*.

¹ On this assumption, Mead's translation, 'when he did honour me with the Black [Rite] that gives perfection', might be accepted as giving something like the probable meaning.

young king of Egypt; and we may suppose either that Isis is a living woman, holding the position of queen-mother and regent, or that she has died and gone to heaven, and now, having become a goddess, revisits and instructs her mortal son. (Compare what is said about the gods Asclepius, Hermes, and Isis in *Ascl. Lat.* III. 37.)

§ ⟨⟨32⟩⟩ does not conflict with this view, but rather confirms it; for the passing down of the *gnosis* from Kamephis to Hermes, from Hermes to Isis, and from Isis to Horus is more easily understood if the persons spoken of are human beings than if they are gods. Assuming that they are human beings, the writer must have regarded Kamephis, whom he calls the *προπάτωρ*, as the founder of the dynasty.

On the other hand, in the narrative which begins at § ⟨⟨50⟩⟩, Isis neither is nor has been a mortal woman, but is a goddess, who, after having been sent down to earth, and having resided there for a time, has returned to her home in heaven. See note on § ⟨⟨50⟩⟩.

ὁ αἱ ψυχαὶ λαμβάνειν ἔθος ἔχουσιν ἰθεῶν. It would perhaps be better to write οἶον (*sc. ποτόν*) instead of ὁ.

But who are 'the souls', and how and where and when do they 'habitually receive draughts of ambrosia'? Probably some words which would have made the meaning clearer have fallen out. One might conjecture αἱ (μακάριαι) ψυχαί, or something of the sort. That might be taken to mean that pious souls, when they have quitted the body at death, ascend to heaven, and 'drink ambrosia' there,—that is to say, dwell among the gods, and in their company enjoy the bliss of immortality. The notion of drinking ambrosia among the gods may have been suggested by Homeric descriptions of the banquets of the gods (e. g. *Il.* I. 596-604).

θεῶν, by itself, is meaningless; and ἀπὸ θεῶν is not satisfactory. It would be easy to strike out θεῶν; but how did it get in? Possibly it is a remnant of some such phrase as (μετὰ τῶν) θεῶν (διάγουσαι). Cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 81 A: ὄνκοῦν οὕτω μὲν ἔχουσα (ἢ ψυχῇ) εἰς τὸ ὅμοιον αὐτῇ τὸ ἀδὲς ἀπέρχεται, τὸ θεῖόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον . . ., οἱ ἀφικομένη ὑπάρχει αὐτῇ εὐδαιμόνι εἶναι, . . . ὥσπερ δὲ λέγεται κατὰ τῶν μεμνημένων, ὡς ἀληθῶς τὸν λοιπὸν χρόνον μετὰ θεῶν διάγουσα (διαγούση Heindorf);

§ 2. Ἐπικειμένου . . . τῇ τῶν ὑπο(κάτω) [κειμένων] φύσει πάσῃ τοῦ πολυστέφους οὐρανοῦ κ.τ.λ. In this section, the Kosmos is divided into two parts, viz. 'the things above' (i. e. heaven and its contents) and 'the things below' (i. e. the sublunar world); and it is asserted that 'the things below' are subject to 'the things above', and must

have been set in order by them; i. e. that, so far as chaos has been reduced to order in the sublunar world, that order must have resulted from the action of heaven, or the gods of heaven, on the things below.

The contrast between 'the things above' and 'the things below' is similar to that between τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ and τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς in the *Periochae* of *Exc.* XI.

The many *στέφη* of heaven are the orbits of the heavenly bodies.

Ἔκαὶ κατ' οὐδένα τόπον στερουμένου τινὸς ὧν νῦν ὁ σύμπας ἔχει κόσμος. I cannot understand this. Why *σύμπας*? And the contrast between 'then' and 'now', which is implied by the word *νῦν*, seems inappropriate.

A better sense might be got by writing καὶ τοῦ σύμπαντος κόσμον κατ' οὐδένα τόπον στερουμένου τινος ὧν χρεῖαν ἔχει. Every part of the *Kosmos* (i. e. not only heaven, but the sublunar world also) has been supplied with what it needs (or in other words, *συγκεκόσμηται καὶ πεπλήρωται*); and if the sublunar world has been 'set in order, and filled (with living organisms)', this must have been done by the agency of 'the things above'.

οὐ γὰρ δῆπου δυνατὰ (<<τὰ κάτω>>) κοσμηῆσαι [[]] τὸν ὑπερθεν [δια]-κόσμον. τὸν ὑπερθεν κόσμον, 'the world above', is a synonym for τὰ ὑπερκείμενα. Cf. *Exc.* XI. 2 (41) as emended: οὐδὲν ὠφελείται τὰ ἐν οὐρανῷ ἀπὸ τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς· πάντα ὠφελείται τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν οὐρανῷ.

ἀνάγκη τοίνυν τοῖς κρείττοσι μυστηρίοις εἶκειν τὰ ἐλάσσονα. These words cannot have anything to do with the distinction between τὰ μικρὰ μυστήρια and τὰ μεγάλα μυστήρια, the two stages of the Eleusinian initiation. The word *μυστήρια* ('holy powers') is repeatedly used in the *Kore Kosmi* to denote the stars or the star-gods (see § 3 and § 51); but what are the *μυστήρια* of the sublunar world? Perhaps *μυστηρίους* ought to be bracketed.

κρείσσων δὲ (δῆ F) τῶν ὑποκειμένων ἢ τῶν μετεώρων ἐστὶ [δια]τάξις. Compare the term οἱ κρείσσονες, frequently used to signify 'the gods'.

ἢ τῶν μετεώρων τάξις, 'the order (i. e. rank or class) of things on high', is equivalent to τὰ ὑπερκείμενα. The word *διάταξις* ('arrangement' or 'disposition') is less suitable.

καὶ τῷ παντὶ ἀσφαλῆς [τε], καὶ θνητῶν οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσα διανοία. The connexion of thought between these words and what precedes is far from clear. It might perhaps be said that 'the things above'

are incomprehensible to mortal men (though there is some inconsistency in saying so in a discourse the very purpose of which is to make men comprehend them); but even if we admit this to be true, there is no apparent reason for asserting it here.

Perhaps the author wrote something like τῶ παντὶ ἀσφαλῆς οὐσα, καὶ θανάτῳ οὐχ ὑποπίπτουσα. 'The things above' are κρείσσονα, because they are not subject to change and death, as are the things below.

§§ 3-8. ἔνθεν ἐστέναζον . . . (ἐν)τεμενίζεται ζώναις. This passage describes the origin of the Hermetic *gnosis*. It may be summarized as follows. 'At first, men did not know God. They looked up at the sky, and were struck with fear when they looked at it; they asked questions, but could not answer them. But after a time, God decided to make himself known to men; and so He put into certain men, who were of higher nature than the common sort, both the will to seek Him and the power to find Him. And of these men the first and greatest was Hermes. Hermes found out the truth, and wrote it down in books; but he hid the books which he had written. When he departed to heaven, he left his son Tat to succeed him as a teacher upon earth; and Tat was followed by Asclepius and others. But Tat had learnt from his father only a part of the true doctrine; the rest lay hidden in the books of Hermes, to be discovered anew in a later age.'

This passage has no connexion with § 2, and cannot have been written to follow it. It ought rather to precede any such exposition of doctrine as is begun in § 2. It deals with the same subject as § <<32>>, which I have placed before § 1; but it deals with it in a different way, and is inconsistent with that section. According to § <<32>> (as emended), the first teacher of the *gnosis* was Kamephis; Hermes learnt it from Kamephis, and transmitted it to Isis; and Isis passed it on to Horus. In §§ 3-8, on the other hand, there is no mention of Kamephis; Hermes discovers the truth for himself, unaided, except by divine inspiration; part of the truth which he has discovered he conceals, and the rest he transmits to his fellow-men, not through Isis and Horus, but through Tat, Asclepius, 'and others'. It is evident then that § 32 and §§ 3-8 cannot have originally belonged to the same document.

It seems incongruous that Isis should give her son Horus information about Tat, Asclepius, and other successors of Hermes.

What have they to do with him, or he with them? Isis and Hermes are apparently regarded as contemporaries; if so, the successors of Hermes belong to later generations, and it is an anachronism to make her talk about them as if she were narrating past events. This suggests a suspicion that the passage (§§ 3-8), in its original form, was not put into the mouth of Isis. If we cut out the words ὦ τέκνον ἀξιοθαύμαστον ὦρε in § 5, and ὦ τέκνον in § 8,¹ we have in §§ 3-8 such a narrative of the origin and early history of the *gnosis* as might have been given by a writer speaking in his own person, or attributed to an imaginary speaker of a later age than Hermes and his first successors; and it is possible that the words by which Isis is made the speaker were added by the man who inserted the passage into the *Kore Kosmu*.

§ 3. (. . .) ἔνθεν ἐστέναζον (ἐστέναξε MSS.) τὰ κάτω φόβον ἔχοντες (ἔχοντα MSS.). As the beginning of the paragraph is lost, we do not know to what ἔνθεν referred. A satisfactory sense might be got by inserting here (with a slight alteration) the detached fragment which in the MSS. stands at the beginning of § 53, and writing <<καὶ μὴν ἄγνωστα ἦν κατ' ἀρχὰς πάντα πᾶσι (τοῖς ἐπὶ γῆς (ὅρ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις))>> ἔνθεν ἐστέναζον κ.τ.λ. (Cf. ἀγνωσία κατέειχε τὰ σύμπαντα in § 4 *init.*). Men did not know that all things have been made by God, and are subject to His will; and consequently they dreaded the unknown powers the working of which they saw around them.

It is clear from what follows that those who 'moaned' and 'were afraid' were the *men* of early times; therefore, if τὰ κάτω is the subject of the verb, it must mean 'the *men* who lived on earth'. But the use of the neuter to express that meaning would be strange. See note on § 4.

(ἄμα δ' ἐθαύμαζον?) τὴν περικαλλῆ (τάξιν? or ἀρμονίαν?) καὶ εἰς αἰεὶ διαμονὴν τῶν ἐπικειμένων. Primitive man could see the beauty of the heavens; but he could not, by looking at the heavenly bodies, find out that they were destined to last for ever. It may therefore be suspected that καὶ εἰς αἰεὶ διαμονὴν is an interpolation.

ἦν γὰρ ἄξιον θεωρίας ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀγωνίας ὄραν κ.τ.λ. The state of mind which the writer is describing is a mixture of admiration and

¹ Indeed, it is only the two words ἀξιοθαύμαστον ὦρε that make it absolutely necessary to take the passage to be spoken by Isis; for any teacher might say ὦ τέκνον in speaking to his pupil.

terror. But these words are puzzling. The thing seen might be called *ἄξιον θεωρίας*, 'well worth looking at'; but could it be called *ἄξιον ἀγωνίας*, 'worth painful effort'? And the act of seeing (*ὄραν*) could not properly be called either the one or the other. The passage might be made more intelligible by cutting out *ἦν γὰρ . . . ἀγωνίας* (which may perhaps be a marginal note), and altering *ὄραν* into *ὄρωντες*.

ὄραν οὐρανοῦ κάλλος [[*θεῶ*]] (*ἡλίω*) *καταφωτιζομένου* (*καταφανταζόμενον* MSS.) [[*τῷ ἔτι ἀγνώστῳ*]], *παραπλησίαν* (*πλουσίαν* MSS.) *τε νυκτὸς σεμνότητα*, *ἐλάττωνι μὲν ἡλίου δ᾽εἰ δὲ πυρφορουμένης* (*προσφορουμένην* MSS.) *φωτί*. The writer speaks of the sky first as seen by day, and then as seen by night. From the words *ἐλάττωνι . . . ἡλίον . . . φωτί* in the description of the night-sky, it may be inferred that the light of the sun was spoken of in the earlier part of the sentence; I have therefore written (*ἡλίω*) *καταφωτιζομένου* in place of the meaningless *καταφανταζόμενον*. A mention of 'the yet unknown God' (*θεῶ . . . τῷ ἔτι ἀγνώστῳ*) may very well have occurred somewhere in §§ 3-8, but is out of place in this sentence; and as the phrase is just what is wanted to supply the missing object of the verbs *ζητεῖν* and *εὔρεῖν* in § 4, I have inserted *θεὸν τὸν ἔτι ἄγνωστον* there.

In place of *προσφορουμένην*, I propose *πυρφορουμένης*, 'lit up by torches borne along'. The stars look like torches carried by a crowd of men at night. Seeing that *δορυφορεῖν* is commonly used as a transitive verb, there is no reason why *πυρφορεῖν* should not be used in the same way, though I have not found an instance.

διὰ (τέ) τινων κρυπτῶν ἀπορροϊῶν τὰ κάτω συγκοσμούντων καὶ συναξόντων. Could it be assumed that men were aware of these *κρυπταὶ ἀπόρροιαί* at a time when *ἀγνωσία κατέειχε τὰ σύμπαντα*? Primitive man could see the stars, and might perhaps notice that their movements are periodic; (the regularity with which they sweep across the sky night after night is evident enough, though an exact knowledge of their periodic changes of position could be got only by long and careful observation;) but the theory of their 'secret effluences' belongs rather to that *gnosis* of which Hermes was the originator. There is therefore some reason to suspect that these words, as well as *καὶ εἰς αἰὲ διαμονήν* above, have been added by a transcriber.

καὶ οὕτως (ἐγένοντο) φόβοι μὲν ἐπάλληλοι (φόβος μὲν ἐπάλληλος MSS.), *ζητήσεις δὲ (τε* MSS.) *ἄληκτοι (al. ἄδεκτοι)*. The first results of men's observation of the heavens were 'fears' and 'questionings'.

Men feared the unknown, and sought to know it; but, till Hermes came, they sought in vain.

§ 4. ἔρωτα ἐνεφύσησε θείοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις.—(ἔρωτας ἐνεθουσίασε θεοῖς MSS.). Perhaps a genitive (e. g. γνώσεως or σοφίας) has been lost after ἔρωτα. At any rate, the ἔρωσ spoken of is a passionate desire for knowledge of God.

ἐνθουσιάζειν is an intransitive verb, meaning 'to be ἐνθεος', i. e. 'to have a god inside one', and so 'to be inspired'. ἐνεθουσίασε then is impossible here. The sense required could be got by writing either ἐνέπνευσε or ἐνεφύσησε; but the latter involves a smaller change. A similar correction must be made in § 18, where the MSS. give καὶ ζωοποιὸν ἐνθουσιάζας.

If we retain θεοῖς, the reading of the MSS., it is implied that Hermes (who, as we are told in § 5 and § 8, was the first discoverer of the *gnosis*,) was a god at the time when he made the discovery. But that is certainly wrong. The writer of §§ 3-8 thought of Hermes as a man living like other men on earth, and assumed that he became a god only when he departed to heaven after hiding his books. In this very sentence, the words αὐτὴν ἦ(ς) εἶχον ἐν στέροις πλείονα ταῖς τούτων ἐχαρίσατο διανοίαις are more suitable if said of men than if said of gods. And there is plenty of other evidence also. The ψυχὴ συμπάθειαν ἔχουσα τοῖς οὐρανῶν μυστηρίοις (§ 5) must be a human soul; gods are themselves celestial μυστήρια. Hermes wrote his books on earth, and hid them on earth; for in § 8 he says that they are to remain for a long time undiscovered by 'those who go to and fro on the plains of this land'. When his work was done, he 'ascended to the stars' (§ 6), 'departed to heaven' (§ 7), and 'entered the sanctuary of the everlasting zones' (§ 8); he must therefore, until then, have been living upon earth. And when he died and went to heaven, he left his son Tat,—evidently a man and not a god,—to succeed him here below.

On the other hand, there are, besides θεοῖς in § 4, two phrases which, as given in the MSS., appear to imply that Hermes was a god at the time spoken of. These are τοῦτο δ' . . . οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ θνητῆς σπορᾶς ἐγεγόνει, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν οὐδέπω, in § 5, and ἀφθάρτων . . . μου ἰχίρονας¹ (χειρῶν ἄς Meineke) in § 8. But in § 5 the traditional text is unintelligible; and in § 8 it seems to me certain that the right reading is φθαρτῶν, and not ἀφθάρτων. We must conclude then that the writer of §§ 3-8 regarded Hermes as a man, and that the three phrases which seem to tell against that view are due either to

accidental corruption of the text or to intentional alteration. It is possible that a transcriber assumed that the Hermes of §§ 3-8 must be the god Hermes who is spoken of later on in the *Kore Kosmu* (§ 26 ff.), and altered the words at these three points to make them agree with that mistaken assumption.¹

I have therefore expressed what I take to have been the author's meaning by writing *θείοις τισὶν ἀνθρώποις* in place of *θεοῖς*. Hermes and his successors were *θεοὶ ἄνθρωποι*; i. e. they were not gods, but men who 'were in sympathy with the mysteries of heaven' (§ 5), and were therefore better qualified than other men to 'search out the secrets of the heavenly *theoria*' (§ 6).

αὐγὴν ἧς εἶχον (αὐτὴν ἢ εἶχεν MSS.) ἐν στέρνοις πλείονα ταῖς τούτων ἐχαρίσατο διανοίαις. These men had some 'light' in their breasts already; but God gave them more. *αὐγὴν ταῖς τούτων ἐχαρίσατο διανοίαις* is equivalent to *ἐφότισεν αὐτούς*. Cf. Plut. *De Pyth. orac.* 7, 397 c, concerning the inspiration of the Pythia: (ὁ θεὸς) φῶς ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ποιεῖ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον· ὁ γὰρ ἐνθουσιασμὸς τοιοῦτόν ἐστι.

ἴνα <<θεόν>> <<τὸν ἔτι ἄγνωστον>> πρῶτον μὲν ζητεῖν θελήσωσιν, εἶτα (δὲ καὶ) [ἐπιθυμήσωσιν] εὐρεῖν [εἶτα καὶ κατορθῶσαι] δυνηθῶσι. ἐπιθυμήσωσιν εὐρεῖν is a pointless repetition of *ζητεῖν θελήσωσιν*; and *κατορθῶσαι δυνηθῶσι*, 'be able to succeed', is intolerably feeble. Altered as I propose, the words give precisely the sense required. God gave them both the will to seek Him, and power to find Him. *Ζητεῖν θελήσωσιν* and *εὐρεῖν δυνηθῶσι* correspond respectively to *ἔρωτα* (*γνώσεως*) and *αὐγὴν*.

§ 5. τοῦτο δ' . . . οὐκ ἂν (ἦν) ἐπὶ θνητῇ σπορά, (εἰ μὴ) ἐγεγόνει [] ψυχῇ [] συμπάθειαν ἔχουσα τοῖς οὐρανοῦ μυστηρίοις—(τοῦτο δ' . . . οὐκ ἂν ἐπὶ θνητῆς σποράς ἐγεγόνει, οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν οὐδέπω, ψυχῆς δὲ τὴν συμπάθειαν ἐχούσης τοῖς οὐρανοῦ μυστηρίοις MSS.). With my corrections, this means 'It would not have been possible for mortal men to discover the truth, if there had not arisen among them a soul capable of being affected by heavenly influences; and such a one was Hermes'.

οὐδὲ γὰρ ἦν οὐδέπω appears to mean 'for as yet there was no θνητῇ σπορά in existence', i. e. 'men had not yet been made'. We may

¹ Perhaps the puzzling phrase *τὰ κάτω* in § 3 *init.* may be accounted for in the same way. We may suppose that the author of §§ 3-8 wrote in § 3 some term denoting men, and that the same person who made the other alterations changed that term into the vague neuter *τὰ κάτω*, because he thought that 'no men yet existed' at the time spoken of. Who were the beings, other than men, that he imagined to have been frightened at the sight of the sky, it is difficult to guess; possibly the elements, which are personified later on in the *Kore Kosmu* (§ 56 ff.).

suppose these words to have been inserted by some one who mistakenly thought §§ 3-8 to be the beginning of a continuous narrative which ran on through the whole of the *Kore Kosmu*, and in which the incidents followed one another throughout in chronological order. This person saw that the making of men comes later in the book (§§ 14-42), and thence inferred that, at the time when Hermes (whom he took to be a god) discovered the *gnosis*, there were no men in existence.

κατανόησας ἴσχυσε δηλῶσαι [τε καὶ δεῖξαι]. (. . .) καὶ γὰρ ἂ ἐνόησεν ἐχάραξε, καὶ χαράξας ἔκρυψε(ν) <<ἀσφαλῶς>>, τὰ πλεῖστα σιγήσας. 'He had power to make the *gnosis* known; for he wrote it down, and hid what he had written, leaving most of the truth untold.' There is a want of sequence here. What is the point of γάρ? If the sentence had ended at ἐχάραξε, we might have supposed that it was his knowledge of writing (of which he was said to have been the inventor) that gave Hermes power to make the *gnosis* known; i. e. that he made it known by means of his books. But as we are told that he hid the books, that explanation is excluded, and γάρ is unintelligible. In order to make sense, we must assume that something like οὐ μὴν οὐδ' ἀπερισκέπτως εἰδείξε has been lost before καὶ γάρ. He had power to make it known; but he thought fit to make known only the smaller part of it (which he taught orally to Tat and others).

τὰ πλεῖστα σιγήσας [[ἀσφαλῶς]] [ἢ λαλήσας]. This seems to be a mixture of two alternative readings, viz. τὰ πλεῖστα σιγήσας, and πλείονα σιγήσας ἢ λαλήσας.

§ 6. τοὺς συγγενεῖς θεοῦς δορυφορεῖν (προσταχθεῖς), ἀνέβαινεν εἰς ἄστρα. Hermes was summoned to quit the earth, and become one of the escort or attendants of the gods who dwell in heaven. In plainer language, he was warned of his approaching death; but the writer, holding death to be merely a change of abode and condition, prefers not to say straight out that Hermes died.¹

Hermes is a θεῖος ἄνθρωπος, and as such, he is 'akin' to the gods; but as long as he remains on earth, he is not one of them. If the writer had meant to class him as a god, he would have written τοὺς ἄλλους θεοῦς rather than τοὺς συγγενεῖς θεοῦς.

The imperfect ἀνέβαινεν is used here, and not the aorist ἀνέβη; the tense implies that his death was imminent, but had not yet taken place.

¹ Cf. *Corp.* VIII. 1 b, where we are told that there is no such thing as death, and that θάνατος is a word without meaning.

ἦν αὐτῷ διάδοχος ὁ Τάτ, . . . οὐκ εἰς μακρὰν δὲ καὶ Ἀσκληπιὸς . . . , ἄλλοι τε ὄσοι κ.τ.λ. This passage shows that the writer of §§ 3-8 knew some at least of the *libelli* entitled Ἐρμου πρὸς Τάτ and Ἐρμου πρὸς Ἀσκληπιόν. Among the 'other men' is probably included Ammon; and the writer may perhaps have had in mind more recent teachers also, such as Pythagoras and Plato.

Ἀσκληπιὸς ὁ (καὶ) Ἰμούθης, ὁ Π(τ)ανὸς (τοῦ) καὶ Ἡφαίστου [βουλαῖς]. ὁ Πτανός is a certain correction of σπανός, the reading of the MSS. Ἰμούθης is Imhotep, the native name of the Egyptian god whom the Greeks called Ἀσκληπιός; and Πτάς¹ is Ptah, the native name of the Egyptian god whom the Greeks called Ἡφαιστος. Imhotep was said to be son of Ptah.² ὁ καὶ is often used to couple together two different names of the same person. In illustration of its use in the case of Egyptian gods, Reitzenstein (*Poim.* p. 122) quotes *C. I. Gr.* 4893: Χνούβει τῷ καὶ Ἀμμωνι, Σάτει τῇ καὶ Ἡρα, Ἀνούκει τῇ καὶ Ἐστία, Πετεμπαμέντει τῷ καὶ Διονύσω, Πετενσήτει τῷ καὶ Κρόνῳ, Πετενσήνει τῷ καὶ Ἑρμεί.

The word βουλαῖς must have slipped in through some mistake; possibly it may have come by duplication from βουλομένης below.

§ 7. Ἑρμῆς μὲν οὖν ἄπελογεῖτο τῷ περιέχοντι ὡς¹ οὐδὲ τῷ παιδὶ παρέδωκεν ὀλοτελῆ (τῆν) θεωρίαν. ἀπελογεῖτο τῷ περιέχοντι is impossible. Hermes was under no accusation; he had no occasion to 'make his defence to the atmosphere', or to any one else; and what follows is not an ἀπολογία. Most likely these words are a corruption of something equivalent to ἀνέβαινε εἰς ἄστρα. One might propose, for instance, Ἑρμῆς μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἀπελύετο τοῦ σκήνους, οὐδὲ τῷ παιδὶ κ.τ.λ.

(εἶπε δὲ οὕτως). Usener was the first to point out that the words Ἐγὼ κ.τ.λ. are spoken by Hermes. But he made the speech of Hermes end at στοιχείων σύμβολα; I have included in it the following words (ἐπικατευξάμενον . . . ἀπελθεῖν) also.

Ἐγὼ δὴ [τῆς ἀνατολῆς γενόμενος] τοῖς πάντα βλέπουσιν ὀφθαλμοῖς (τοῦ νοῦ) τὰ τῆς ἀνατολῆς¹ ἐθεώρησα ἀειδῆ (θεωρήσαι τι ἀειδεῖ MSS.). I can find no meaning in τῆς ἀνατολῆς. It may be conjectured that τῆς ἀνατολῆς γενόμενος is a corruption of τῆς ἐντολῆς γενομένης, which would be out of place here, but may perhaps have occurred in the missing passage which preceded πλησίον τῶν κ.τ.λ. below.

It seems necessary to add τοῦ νοῦ after ὀφθαλμοῖς. It is only with

¹ This name was sometimes written Φθάς. Suidas: Φθάς ὁ Ἡφαιστος παρὰ Μεμφίταις.

² Cf. *Oxyrhynchus Pap.* (1915) no. 1381, l. 201: τὸν τοῦ Φθᾶ σεβήσεται Ἰμούθην. *Ib.* l. 228: Ἀσκληπίου παιδὸς Ἡφαίστου.

'the eyes of the mind' that it is possible to see τὰ ἀειδῆ, i. e. things which are invisible to the bodily eyes.

It is probable that ἀνατολῆς before ἐθεώρησα has come by repetition from the preceding ἀνατολῆς, and has driven out some other word or phrase which originally stood here (e. g. τῶν ὅλων οὐσίας).

I have altered θεωρήσαί τι into ἐθεώρησα, and put a colon after ἀειδῆ. The sense wanted might be got in another way, by accepting Heeren's correction Ἐμοὶ . . . θεωρήσαντι for Ἐγὼ . . . θεωρήσαί τι, and writing Ἐμοὶ δὴ . . . τὰ τῆς ἀνατολῆς θεωρήσαντι ἀειδῆ [καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντι] . . . ἦλθεν ἡ ἀκριβῆς γνῶσις. But this involves a larger alteration of the text. The present participle ἐπισκοποῦντι ought not to be coupled to the aorist θεωρήσαντι; it is therefore necessary, if we construct the sentence in this way, to assume that καὶ ἐπισκοποῦντι (ἐπισκοποῦντι MSS.) has been added by a blundering transcriber. If we take ἐθεώρησα to be the true reading, it is possible that this was altered into θεωρήσαντι through the influence of the following ἐπισκοποῦντι, and that by a second error θεωρήσαντι was altered into θεωρήσαί τι.

ἦλθεν ἡ ἀκριβῆς γνῶσις (διάγνωσις MSS.). διάγνωσις is certainly wrong; γνῶσις is the word required. It may be suspected that δια- is a corruption of ιδία, which may very likely have occurred somewhere in the sentence, though the place where δια stands in the MSS. hardly seems the right position for ιδία.

(. . . χρη μέ) πλησίον τῶν Ὀσίριδος κρυφίων ἀποθέσθαι τὰ ἱερά τῶν κοσμικῶν στοιχείων σύμβολα. The probable meaning of the missing words might be given by writing 'and that knowledge I have written down in books; (νῦν δέ, ἄνωθέν μοι <<τῆς ἐντολῆς γενομένης>>), χρη μέ) πλησίον κ.τ.λ.' Hermes has been warned that the hour appointed for his (death and) 'departure to heaven' is at hand, and has received command from God to hide his books before he departs.

The writings of Hermes are here called τῶν κοσμικῶν στοιχείων σύμβολα. The word στοιχεῖα meant 'cosmic elements'; but it also meant 'letters of the alphabet'. Democritus compared atoms to letters, and found in the composition of bodies out of atoms variously grouped and arranged an analogy to the formation of words by putting letters together.¹ This comparison was borrowed from Democritus

¹ Arist. *Metaph.* I. 4, 985 b 4: Λεύκιππος δὲ καὶ . . . Δημόκριτος στοιχεῖα μὲν τὸ πλήρες καὶ τὸ κενὸν εἶναι φασί . . . τούτων δὲ ὁ μὲν "βυσμός" σχῆμά ἐστιν, ἡ δὲ "διαθιγή" τάξις, ἡ δὲ "τροπή" θέσις. διαφέρει γὰρ τὸ μὲν Α τοῦ Ν σχήματι, τὸ δὲ ΑΝ τοῦ ΝΑ τάξει, τὸ δὲ Ξ (an earlier form of Ζ) τοῦ Η θέσει. Cf. Ar. *De gen. et corr.* I. 2, 315 b 6.

by the Epicureans,¹ and occurs repeatedly in Lucretius.² Posidonius,³ arguing against the Epicureans, referred to it; his argument is reproduced in Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 93: 'Hic ego non mirer esse quemquam qui sibi persuadeat corpora quaedam solida atque individua vi et gravitate ferri, mundumque effici ornatissimum et pulcherrimum ex eorum corporum concursione fortuita? Hoc qui existimat fieri potuisse, non intellego cur non idem putet, si innumerabiles unius et viginti formae litterarum vel aureae vel quales libet aliquo coniciantur, posse ex iis in terram excussis Annales Ennii, ut deinceps legi possint, effici.' Stoics and Platonists rejected the atomic theory of Epicurus; but there was no reason why they should not compare their own four elements to letters of an alphabet, and say that the universe is, as it were, a book written in that script,—not indeed a book produced by throwing letters to ether at random, as the Epicurean doctrine implied, but a book deliberately written by God. This thought would the more naturally present itself by reason of the double meaning of the word *στοιχεῖα*; and it was probably some such thought that was in the mind of the author of this passage when he called the writings of Hermes 'symbols of the cosmic elements'.

It is possible, however, that he was thinking more especially of the hieroglyphic script, which it was assumed that Hermes had used in his writings, and which he was reputed to have invented. The hieroglyphic signs, which might be called *στοιχεῖα* (letters), are pictures of things; and it might be supposed, especially by those who could not read the writing, that each of these little pictures had some cryptic significance, and was a symbol of some religious or cosmological conception. Cf. Philo, *Vita Mos.* 1. 5. 23, Cohn IV, p. 125 (quoted by Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 23. 153): ἀριθμοὺς μὲν οὖν . . . καὶ μουσικὴν τὴν σύμπασαν . . . Αἰγυπτίων οἱ λόγοι παρεδίδωσαν (to Moses), καὶ προσέτι τὴν διὰ συμβόλων φιλοσοφίαν, ἣν ἐν τοῖς λεγομένοις ἱεροῖς γράμμασιν (ἐν τοῖς ἱερογλυφικοῖς γράμμασιν Clem.) ἐπιδείκνυνται. Clement *Strom.* 5. 7. 41 sq. gives instances of symbolic meanings of hieroglyphs (which he calls τὰ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων αἰνίγματα); e. g. ἐν Διοσπόλει τῆς Αἰγύπτου ἐπὶ τοῦ ἱεροῦ καλουμένου πυλῶνος διατετύπωται παίδιον μὲν γενέσεως σύμβολον, φθορᾶς δὲ ὁ γέρων, θεοῦ τε αὖ ὁ ἱέραξ, ὡς

¹ See Diels *Elementum* 1-14, where the history of this comparison of atoms to letters is more fully set forth.

² Lucr. 1. 196 ff.; 823 ff.; 907 ff.; 2. 686 ff.; 1013 ff.

³ Diels *ib.* gives sufficient reasons for holding Posidonius to have been the source whence Cic. *N. D.* 2. 93 and similar passages in other authors were derived. The same argument occurs, for instance, in Plut. *De Pythiae oraculis* 11, 399 E.

ὁ ἰχθύς μίσους, καὶ κατ' ἄλλο πάλιν σημαίνονμενον ὁ κροκοδείλος ἀναίδειας. φαίνεται τοῖσιν συντιθέμενον τὸ πᾶν σύμβολον δηλωτικὸν εἶναι τοῦδε: "ὡ γινόμενοι καὶ ἀπογινόμενοι, θεὸς μισεῖ ἀναίδειαν". See also Clem. *Strom.* 5. 4. 20.

τὰ Ὀσίριδος κρύφια might mean either sacred writings connected with the cult of Osiris, or holy things of some other kind, e. g. parts of the body of Osiris. Whatever these 'secret things' may have been, they were probably kept, or believed to be kept, in some Egyptian temple. If any definite place is meant, it is most likely the temple and reputed burial-place of Osiris at Abydos.

For the notion that the books of Hermes had long remained hidden or buried, and had but recently been discovered and made known, cf. Syncellus I, p. 72 Dindorf: ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ γῆ κειμένων στηλῶν, ἱερᾶ [φησι] διαλέκτῳ καὶ ἱερογραφικοῖς¹ γράμμασι κεκαρκτηρισμένων ὑπὸ Θώθ, τοῦ πρώτου Ἑρμοῦ, καὶ [[ἐρμηνευσιῶν]] μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν [[ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνήν]]² [γράμμασιν ἱερογλυφικοῖς]³ [[καὶ ἀποθεθέντων]]⁴ (ἀπογραφεισῶν) ἐν βίβλοις ὑπὸ τοῦ Ἀγαθοδαίμονος υἱοῦ, τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ,⁵ πατὴρ δὲ τοῦ Τάτ, ((καὶ ἀποθεθειῶν)) ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγύπτου, (ὑστερον δὲ) ((ἐρμηνευσιῶν)) ((ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνήν)).⁶ The meaning of the story told in that passage appears to be this.

¹ Read ἱερογλυφικοῖς.

² It would be absurd to say that the writings were translated into Greek 'after the Flood'; how could any one imagine that they were translated into Greek before the Flood, or even shortly after it? The traditional text may be accounted for by assuming that the words ἐρμηνευσιῶν ἐκ τῆς ἱερᾶς διαλέκτου εἰς τὴν Ἑλληνίδα φωνήν were accidentally omitted by a copyist, but were added in the margin, and that a later copyist put them back into the text, but placed them wrongly.

³ A misplaced doublet of ἱερογραφικοῖς γράμμασι above.

⁴ ἀποθεθέντων Dindorf: ἀποθεθειῶν Reitzenstein. I assume that καὶ ἀποθεθειῶν was shifted by error, and that its insertion here caused the loss of the participle (probably ἀπογραφεισῶν) with which the words μετὰ τὸν κατακλυσμὸν were originally connected.

⁵ Trismegistus the teacher is here called 'the second Hermes', and is distinguished from the Egyptian god Thoth, who is called 'the first Hermes'. Cf. *Ascl. Lat.* III. 37.

Varro (*Augustine De civ. dei* 18. 8 and 39 f.) spoke of a 'second Mercurius, called Trismegistus', and said that he was grandson of 'the first Mercurius'. But Varro's 'first Mercurius' is the Greek god Hermes, son of Zeus and Maia; and he appears to have known of only one Egyptian Hermes.

The authority (possibly Mnaseas) followed by Cicero in his list of gods in *De nat. deor.* 3. 55 ff. distinguished two Egyptians named Hermes; but it is doubtful whether they corresponded to the elder and younger Hermes spoken of by some of the Hermetists.

⁶ The connexion of this passage with its context is obscure. The text of Syncellus, as given by Dindorf, runs as follows: προκείται δὲ λοιπὸν καὶ περὶ τῆς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων δυναστείας μικρὰ διαλαβεῖν ἐκ τῶν Μανεθῶ τοῦ Σεβεννύτου, ὃς ἐπὶ Πτολεμαίου τοῦ Φιλαδέλφου ἀρχιερεὺς τῶν ἐν Αἰγύπτῳ εἰδωλείων χρηματίσας || ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ γῆ κειμένων στηλῶν . . . ἐν τοῖς ἀδύτοις τῶν ἱερῶν Αἰγύπτου || προσεφώνησε τῷ

The *gnosis* was inscribed on tables of stone by the first Hermes, and in that form escaped destruction in the Flood; after the Flood, the second Hermes transcribed it¹ from the stone tables into books (i. e. rolls of papyrus), which were deposited in certain Egyptian temples; and at some later time, the contents of these books were translated from the Egyptian language into Greek.

Another version of the same legend occurs in Joseph. *Ant.* I. 71. Josephus there says that the primaeval wisdom² was engraved on two *στήλαι*, one of clay, and the other of stone, these materials being chosen in order that the table of clay might escape destruction in the coming devastation of the world by fire, and the table of stone, in the coming deluge of water;³ and that the *στήλη* of stone remains to this day *κατὰ γῆν τὴν Σιριάδα*.⁴ But Josephus attributes the

αὐτῷ Φιλαδέλφω βασιλεῖ δευτέρῳ Πτολεμαίῳ ἐν τῇ βίβλῳ τῆς Σάθως γράφον ἐπὶ λέξεως οὕτως:—Ἐπιστολὴ Μανεθῶ κ.τ.λ. βασιλεῖ κ.τ.λ. “Μανεθῶ ἀρχιερεὺς καὶ γραμματεὺς τῶν κατ’ Αἴγυπτον ἱερῶν ἀδύτων . . . τῷ δεσπότην μου Πτολεμαίῳ χαίρειν. Ἡμᾶς διὲ λογιζέσθαι, μέγιστε βασιλεῦ, περὶ πάντων ὧν ἐὰν βούλῃ ἡμᾶς ἐξετάσαι πραγμάτων. ἐπιζητοῦντί σοι περὶ τῶν μελλόντων τῷ κόσμῳ γίγνεσθαι καθὼς ἐκέλευσάς μοι παραφανήσεται σοὶ ἃ ἔμαθον || ἱερὰ βιβλία γραφέντα ὑπὸ τοῦ προπάτορος τρισμεγίστου Ἑρμοῦ. ἔρρωσὸ μοι, δέσποτά μου βασιλεῦ.”—ταῦτα περὶ τῆς ἑρμηθείας τῶν ὑπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ λέγει. At the points where I have put the mark || (i. e. at the beginning and end of the passage about the *stelae*, and near the end of Manetho's letter,) there are manifest breaches of continuity. ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ κ.τ.λ. cannot be dependent on ἀρχιερεὺς . . . χρηματίσας, which means ‘having borne the title of Chief Priest’; nor can it be dependent on the verb προσεφώνησε which follows. But if we cut out ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ . . . ἱερῶν Αἰγύπτου, and make προσεφώνησε follow χρηματίσας immediately, the sentence reads smoothly. In Manetho's letter, on the other hand, something is missing after ἃ ἔμαθον; and the words of Syncellus which follow the letter (and in which a participle, e. g. γραφέντων, must have been lost after ὑπὸ τοῦ δευτέρου Ἑρμοῦ) show that in the missing passage Manetho spoke of ‘the interpretation of the writings of the second Hermes’. Now that very thing is spoken of in the passage about the *stelae*. It appears therefore that the best remedy is to transpose that passage (ἐκ τῶν ἐν τῇ Σηριαδικῇ . . . ἱερῶν Αἰγύπτου), and insert it (corrected as I have proposed) in the letter, after the words ἃ ἔμαθον. When this is done, there still remains a gap before ἱερὰ βιβλία; but apart from that lacuna, the whole becomes intelligible.

On this hypothesis, the passage about the *stelae* is a part of a letter which was believed by Syncellus to have been written by Manetho.

¹ By a slight inaccuracy, the writer says that the *stelae* themselves were ‘transcribed’, ‘laid up’, and afterwards ‘translated’; but what he means is that the writings inscribed on the *stelae* were transcribed &c.

² σοφία ἢ περὶ τὰ οὐράνια καὶ τὴν τοῦτων διακόσμησιν.

³ Cf. Ammian. Marcell. 22. 15. 30: ‘Sunt (in Egypt) et syringes subterranei quidam et flexuosi secessus, quos, ut fertur, periti rituum vetustorum, adventare diluvium praescii, metuentesque ne caerimoniarum obliteraretur memoria, penitus operosis digestos fodinis per loca diversa struxerunt, et excisis parietibus volucrum ferarumque genera multa sculpsērunt, . . . quas hierographicas litteras appellarunt.’ These *σύνριγγες* (or *σῆραγγες*) are evidently ancient tombs, such as the tombs of the kings near Thebes; and the tales about writings ‘hidden’ or ‘buried’ doubtless resulted from the discovery of tombs containing hieroglyphic inscriptions.

⁴ Σιριάδα Naber: Σειριάδα Reitzenstein. The γῆ Σιριάς of Josephus is evidently the same as the Σηριαδικῇ γῆ of Syncellus. What land is this? In view of *πλησίον*

inscription, not to Hermes, but to the family of Seth the son of Adam.¹

Compare also Philo of Byblos (Euseb. *Pr. ev.* i. 9. 26): ὁ δὲ (Σαρχουναίων), συμβαλὼν τοῖς ἄπο τῶν ἀδύτων² εὐρεθεῖσιν ἀποκρύφους Ἀμμονέων γράμμασι συγκεκλιμένοις³, ἃ δὴ οὐκ ἦν πᾶσι γνώριμα, τὴν μάθησιν ἀπάντων αὐτὸς ἤσκησε. From what Philo Bybl. had said before (*ib.* i. 9. 24) it is evident that the writings here spoken of are writings of Thoth-Hermes.³

§ 8. Ὡς ἱεραὶ βίβλοι, τῶν [ἀ]φθαρτῶν ἄτ τετεύχεται¹ μου χειρῶν, ἃς (μου χείρονας MSS.) τῷ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας φαρμάκῳ ἡχορείας ἐπικρατῶ¹. χείρον- must certainly be corrected into χειρῶν (Meineke); and it seems no less certain that the adjective applied to χειρῶν was not ἀφθάρτων, but φθαρτῶν. The books were written by 'the perishable hands' of the man Hermes, but were made imperishable. τετεύχεται no doubt stands for some form of the verb τεύχειν, 'to make'. (The fact that τεύχος means 'a book' makes this verb the more appropriate.) For χορείας we must read χρίσας (Meineke) or some other form of χρίειν, which is a suitable verb to go with φαρμάκῳ. The phrase 'anointed them with the drug of imperishability' must have been suggested by some magical or ritual practice, but is here used metaphorically, and means merely 'made them imperishable'. Since that could be done only by superhuman power, the person who did it cannot have been the man Hermes; and if not Hermes, it was presumably God.

τῶν Ὀσίριδος κρυφίων in *Kore Kosmu*, it seems possible that in both passages the land was originally called γῆ Ὀσιριάς or Ὀσιριακή (cf. Ἰσιῶς and Ἰσιακός), and that the place meant is the district of Abydos in Egypt.

¹ Seth and Enoch were sometimes identified or confused with Agathodaemon and Hermes; see *Testim.* (Arabic).

² Probably τῶν (Ἄμμονε(ί)ων) ἀδύτων. It is doubtful how the corrupt text ought to be corrected; but the meaning must have been that Sanchuniathon found and read certain writings of Hermes which had been hidden in the temple of Ammon.

³ Similar notions appear in a passage quoted by Reitzenstein (*Poim.* p. 121) from an unpublished MS. in the Laurentian library (*Cod. Antonini* 101, fol. 361 v.): a medical prescription is there described as ἀντίδοτος ἐκ τῶν Ἡφαίστου ἀδύτων τοῦ ἐν Μεμφίτιδι μεταληφθείσα, κρίσει καὶ φιλανθρωπία, φασί, τοῦ Τριμεγίστου Ἑρμοῦ οὗτος γὰρ ἔκρινεν ἐκδοθῆναι ταύτην (ταύτης MS.), τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φροντίζων σωτηρίας. εὐρέθη δὲ αὕτη ἐν χρυσῇ στήλῃ γράμμασιν Αἰγυπτίως ἀναγεγραμμένη, ἣ συνεγέγραπτο φρικώδης ἄρα, μηδενὶ βεβήλω τοὺς ἱεροφύλακας τολμᾶν ταύτην μεταδοῦναι· ἐξεδόθη δὲ ἀπὸ Αἰγύπτου ἐνταῦθα ἐπὶ βασιλείῳ ἀρθρίτιδι καὶ ποδάγρα πικρῶς διοχλουμένου. There is something wrong in the text; the meaning must have been that the prescription was written by Hermes on a gold tablet, which was left in charge of the priests of Ptah at Memphis, with a strict injunction to keep it secret; and that this injunction was disobeyed only when the remedy was needed to cure a king (or Roman emperor) suffering from gout. A satisfactory sense might be got by inserting a participle (e. g. συγγραφείσα) after Ἑρμοῦ; shifting οὗτος γὰρ . . . σωτηρίας, and

The sense wanted can be got by writing ὦ ἱεραὶ βίβλοι, ἄς διὰ τῶν φθαρτῶν τετενημέναις μου χειρῶν τῷ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας φαρμάκῳ ἔχρισεν ὁ ἐπὶ πᾶσι κρατῶν.

ἀσαπεῖς πάντας αἰῶνας (παντὸς αἰῶνος MSS.) [καὶ ἀφθαρτοὶ] διαμεῖναιτε [χρόνους]. ἀφθαρτοὶ is a feeble repetition of ἀσαπεῖς, and is the more objectionable because φθαρτῶν and ἀφθαρσίας have occurred just before. χρόνους is an alternative for αἰῶνας.

παντὶ τῷ τὰ γῆς (τῆς MSS.) ταύτης παροδεύειν μέλλοντι πεδία. [παροδεύειν may be retained in the sense 'fergere', 'traverse'. Cf. Plut. *Symp. probl.* 670C, ἡλίον τὸν λέοντα παροδεύοντος, and 700A; *De Sol. anim.* 973D, κωφὸν ἀκρόαμα τοῖς συνήθως παροδεύουσι τὸν τόπον.]

ἄχρις οὗ γέρων (γενόμενος?) οὐρανὸς συστήματα ὑμῶν ἄξια τεκνώσεται. All earthly συστήματα ('organisms') are 'children of heaven'; that is, they are brought into being by the action of 'the things above' (cf. § 2). But the συστήματα here spoken of are men; and the meaning is 'until, in a late age of the world's history, men shall be born who shall be worthy to read the books of Hermes'. There is a momentary personification of οὐρανός; Heaven, born when the world was made, will have grown old before that time comes.

[ἄς ψυχὰς ὁ δημιουργὸς προσηγόρευσε]. Perhaps προσαγορεύσει ought to be written in place of προσηγόρευσε; but with or without that correction, the words are out of place here. The men who are to find and read the books of Hermes are not ψυχαί, but συστήματα; they, like all men on earth, consist of soul and body joined together. The person who inserted ἄς ψυχὰς ὁ δ. π. was doubtless thinking of the making of souls which is described in § 14 ff.

(ταῖς ἀ)ιδίοις (ιδίαις MSS.) (ἐν)τεμενίζεται ζῶναις. The ἀδίοι ζῶναι are the spheres of heaven. Cf. *Corp.* I. 25, where each of the seven planetary spheres is called a ζῶνη.

τεμενίζεται would mean 'is dedicated as a τέμενος to a god'. That could not be said of Hermes. The word required is ἐντεμενίζεται, 'is placed in the τέμενος'. Heaven is a τέμενος, i.e. a region assigned to the gods; and Hermes takes up his abode in it.

(§§ 50. [πάλι] ὁ μόναρχος . . . διάστασις ἐγένετο· καὶ)). In the MSS., the passage which describes the origin of the *gnosis* (§§ 3-8) is followed by a fragment of a *cosmogonia* (§§ 9-12); and this is

placing these words after διαχλουμένον (the man who 'ordered it to be published' would then be the gouty king, and not Hermes, who had forbidden publication); and adding a participle (e.g. μεταληφθεῖσα) after ἐνταῦθα.

followed by a narrative which begins with the making of souls (§ 14 ff.), and runs on to the end of the Excerpt. But the continuity of that narrative is broken by §§ 50, 51, and 52, which, like §§ 9-12, are disconnected scraps of a *cosmogonia*.

These facts may be accounted for as follows. The description of the making of souls was preceded by a description of the making and equipping of heaven and earth. Parts of this have been lost; but a piece of it (§§ 9-12) remains in its right position; and another piece of it (§§ 50-52) has been preserved, but misplaced. Both these pieces, as given in the MSS., are incoherent; but if we rearrange the fragments of which they consist, it is possible to fit them into their places as parts of a continuous narrative which leads on to § 14 ff. The order which I propose is <<50>>, <<11>>, 9, 10, 12, <<52>>, <<51>>. When the sections are read in this order, the story runs thus: 'There was a chaotic mass. God resolved to organize this mass. He divided it (into two parts; the upper part he fashioned into heaven, and the lower part, into earth) (§ 50). He peopled heaven with star-gods (§ 11); then, he set about producing living things on earth. To this end, he created Nature, and bade her make seeds (§§ 9, 10, 12); these seeds he flung forth on earth, and bade Earth develop them into plants (§ 52). Thus both heaven and earth were organized and filled with living things (§ 51). But the space between heaven and earth still remained unoccupied; and in order that this region also might have inhabitants, God proceeded to make souls, and assigned to them the atmosphere as their abode (§ 14 ff).'

In the narrative which begins at § <<50>>, and runs on to the end of the Excerpt, Isis is a goddess, who has for a time resided upon earth, but has returned to her home in heaven (§ 70) before the dialogue takes place. Some part at least of the story which she tells to her son Horus had been told to her by Hermes (§§ 25, 26, 30); and Hermes, her informant, is a god, who was in existence before men were made, and had taken part in the events which he narrated to her. But what sort of being is Horus? And where is the scene of the dialogue laid,—in heaven, or on earth? These questions are not explicitly answered in the text; and it is not quite clear how the writer would have answered them. Horus, being son of a god and a goddess, must be in some sense a god; but the author most likely assumed that he had been born to Osiris and Isis during their residence on earth; and if so, he must

have been for a time a god incarnate, as his parents were when he was born. We may suppose then that, at the time when the dialogue took place, Horus was a god incarnate upon earth,—in outward semblance a human being, and presumably a young king of Egypt;¹ and that his mother, the goddess Isis, who had already returned to heaven, came down thence to visit and instruct him. (Cf. *Corp.* I, in which a prophet is visited and instructed by Poimandres, and *Corp.* XI, in which the man Hermes is visited and instructed by Nous.)

Neither of the two introductory passages (§§ <<32>>, 1, 2, and §§ 3-8) which precede this narrative in the MSS. is in any way connected with it; and each of them contains things inconsistent with it. In §§ 3-8, Hermes is a man, and does not become a god until after his death; in §§ <<50>> ff., Hermes is a god, and has been a god from the first. It may therefore be considered certain that §§ 3-8 did not originally form part of the *libellus* which contained §§ <<50>> ff. The other introductory passage (§§ <<32>>, 1, 2) evidently stood at the beginning of one of the *libelli* of the *Isis to Horus* collection; but the *libellus* to which it belonged can hardly have been that which contained §§ <<50>> ff. In § <<32>>, Isis speaks of Kamephis as the source of the κρυπτή θεωρία which she is about to impart to her son, and (if I have rightly reconstructed the text) says that she had learnt it from Hermes, and Hermes from Kamephis. But in the narrative of §§ <<50>> ff., there is no teaching that can have been derived from Kamephis; the goddess Isis has got her information partly from the god Hermes,—who had not received it from any one else, but had been an eyewitness of the events of which he spoke, and had himself participated in them,—and partly (e. g. in § 70) from her own memory of what had taken place. In § 2, we have an exposition of doctrine, which appears to be the beginning of the θεωρία promised in § <<32>>; and the word θεωρία applies better to an exposition of that kind than to a narrative of events, such as is contained in §§ <<50>> ff.

We must conclude then that the first introductory passage (§§ <<32>>, 1, 2) is the beginning of a *libellus* of which the rest is lost, and that it had originally no connexion with the narrative

¹ The epithets which Isis applies to Horus (μεγαλόδοξε, §§ 33 and 59: μεγαλόψυχε, § 58: μεγαλοσθενés, § 64) are such as might be used in addressing an earthly king; they may be taken as equivalent to 'your Majesty'. Cf. ὦ μέγιστε βασιλεῦ in *Exc.* XXVII, where it is to be presumed that Isis is the speaker, and that she is speaking to Horus.

of which the bulk of *Exc.* XXIII consists, but has been prefixed to that narrative by error. The mistake might be accounted for by assuming that, in a book which contained a collection of *Isis to Horus* documents, some pages, containing the end of one *libellus* and the beginning of another, were accidentally lost. (Compare the gap between *Corp.* I and *Corp.* II, and that between *Corp.* XVI and *Corp.* XVII.)

This being so, it is possible that the title *Kore Kosmu* belonged to the *libellus* of which §§ <<32>>, 1, 2 are the only extant fragment, and that the narrative which follows in §§ <<50>> ff. did not originally bear that title. But as a matter of convenience, it seems best, in any case, to continue to use the title *Kore Kosmu* as it is used in the MSS. of Stobaeus, i. e. to apply it to *Exc.* XXIII as a whole.

The beginning of the narrative is lost; but § 50 must have stood near the beginning. At the stage with which it deals, nothing exists except (1) God, (2) a group of gods subordinate to God, and (3) an inert and undifferentiated mass of matter (*ἀργή σύστασις, χάος, ἕνωσις*).

Who are the *θεοί* whom God summons and addresses? Since there is as yet no *Kosmos* and no heaven, they cannot be star-gods; they must be incorporeal and supracosmic beings,—*θεοὶ νοητοί*. The *Hermes* spoken of in § 26 and § 30 appears to be a god of this kind; perhaps then the writer assumed the 'senate of the gods' (*σύγκλητον τῶν θεῶν συνέδριον*) of which he speaks to consist of the chief gods worshipped in Egypt, one of whom was Thoth-Hermes.

The notion of such a *συνέδριον* may have been suggested by the councils of the gods described in the *Iliad*; but the writer may perhaps have had in mind also Jewish descriptions of God enthroned in heaven as a king surrounded by his ministers and attendants. He may possibly have been influenced by Jewish comments on the plural verb in *ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον*, *Gen.* 1. 26; see, for instance, Philo *De opif. mundi* 24. 72-76, Cohn I, p. 25: *φησὶν ὅτι εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς "ποιήσωμεν", ὅπερ ἐμφαίνει συμπαράληψιν ἐτέρων ὡς ἂν συνεργῶν, κ.τ.λ.*

We do not know how the narrative began, or what was told in the lost passage which preceded § 50; but it would seem that there are only two things which could possibly have been placed earlier in time than the situation presented in this section; namely, the origin

of the gods, and the origin of the chaotic mass. It seems probable that the origin of the gods at least was spoken of, and that the story began in some such way as this: 'In the beginning was God; and God generated, or put forth from himself, the (supracosmic) gods.' Cf. § 64, where it is implied that Osiris and Isis are an ἀπόρροια of the supreme God.¹

It is more doubtful whether anything was said about the origin of the chaotic mass. The Platonists in general assumed the pre-existence of unformed matter, and made no attempt to account for its presence; but in *Corp.* I. 4 its beginning is described, and something of the same kind may possibly have been said about it here.

The MSS. give πάλιν . . . ἐποίησε συνέδριον . . . καὶ πάλιν . . . ἐφώνησε. If we retain πάλιν, it is implied that a similar meeting of the gods had taken place before. But for what purpose could a previous meeting have been summoned and addressed? The only thing which could possibly be supposed to have been done by God after the emission of the gods, and before the time spoken of in § 50, is the creation of the chaotic mass of matter; and even if we assume that the writer said that this mass was created by God, he is not likely to have said that God called on the gods to help him in creating it. I have therefore bracketed πάλιν. When § 50 had been shifted to the place where it stands in the MSS., it came later in the narrative than the meeting of gods which is described in § 27; and we may suppose that a transcriber, reading it in that position, said to himself 'this is the second meeting', and accordingly inserted πάλιν twice in § 50.

ἄσοι [τῆς κορυφαίας], ἄσοι καὶ ἀφθάρτου φύσεως τετεύχατε. Perhaps the author's meaning might be expressed by writing ἄσοι τῆς πάντων κορυφῆς ἐπιβεβήκατε, καὶ ἀφθάρτου φύσεως τετεύχατε. (Or possibly τῆς κορυφαίας (ἀρχῆς) or the like, 'the topmost summit of dominion', with some suitable verb?). [Cf. Pl. *Phaedr.* 247 ff.]

οἱ τὸν μέγαν αἰῶνα διέπειν ἐς αἰὲ κεκλήρωσθε. The functions of the gods have already been determined, though they have not yet begun to discharge their functions.

τὸν μέγαν αἰῶνα appears to mean either 'the course of things in time', or 'the universe'.

οἱ ἑαυτοῖς ἀντιπαραδιδόντες οὐδέποτε κοπιάσετε τὰ σύμπαντα—(οἱς αὐτὰ ἑαυτοῖς ἀντιπαραδιδόντα οὐδέποτε κοπιάσει τὰ σύμπαντα MSS.).

¹ According to the old Egyptian theogony of Heliopolis, the chief gods issued from the primal god Tum by successive processes of generation.

The gods are ἀκοπίαστοι (cf. φῶς ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης ἀκοπίαστον, § 34); but it could not be said that the things subject to their rule are ἀκοπίαστα.

The word ἀντιπαραδιδόντες implies the conception of *chronocratores*; each god in turn takes charge for a certain time, and then hands over his charge to another (e. g., according to one system out of many, Helios is on duty on Sunday, and Selene on Monday). This notion, which seems to have been of Egyptian origin, was originally applicable only to astral gods, but is here assumed to apply also to gods who existed before the formation of the Kosmos.

μέχρι πότε ἀνεπίγνωστοι ταύτης δεσπόσομεν τῆς ἡγεμονίας;—(μέχρι πότε τῆς ἀνεπιγνώστου ταύτης δεσπόσομέν ἡγεμονίας MSS.). God and the gods rule over the mass of matter; but the mass, being as yet unorganized, contains no living beings to recognize their rule.

μέχρι πότε [ἀθεώρητα γενήσεται ταῦτα ἡλίῳ καὶ σελήνῃ] [[ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ γεννάτω]] ἀργὴν καταλείψομεν τὴν σύστασιν ταύτην;—(ἀπαλείψομεν τῷ δύνασθαι τὴν ἔτι ἀργὴν σύστασιν ταύτην; MSS.). The mass is inert and lifeless; it must no longer be left so.

The mention of sun and moon is out of place at a stage at which neither sun nor moon has yet come into existence; and the words ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἐφ' ἑαυτῷ γεννάτω ought to form part of the exhortation which follows. The future -λείψομεν has been altered into -λείψομεν through the influence of γεννάτω. I cannot account for τῷ δύνασθαι.

ἄπιστος τοῖς μεταγενεστέροις μῦθος δὴ (δὲ MSS.) δοξάτω (τὸ) χάος εἶναι. Chaos now exists; let us so completely do away with it, that the beings who are to be produced hereafter (i. e. men, and perhaps star-gods also,) will find it difficult to believe that it has ever existed.

εἶπε, καὶ εὐθέως [κοσμικῶς] τῆς ἔτι [μελαίνης] ἐνώσεως διάστασις ἐγένετο. The ἐνωσις is the undifferentiated mass of formless matter, which was called σύστασις above. It might perhaps be called σκοτεινή (cf. the σκότος spoken of in *Corp.* I. 4); but μελαίνης is a less suitable word. Besides, the writer of the *Kore Kosmu* thinks of the διακόσμησις, for the most part, not as an outpouring of light into darkness, but as a process by which a mass of matter hitherto inert and lifeless is filled with living beings. It seems probable therefore that μελαίνης has been substituted for some other adjective. If we assume this adjective to have been ἀκοσμήτου, the meaningless adverb κοσμικῶς may have come from it by corruption.

The *διάσπασις* is a separation of the mass into two parts, out of which God made heaven and earth. It corresponds to the separation of 'the waters above the firmament' from 'the waters below the firmament' in *Gen.* i. 7, and to the first stage of the separation of the elements in Stoic cosmogonies. (See *Corp.* I. 5 b and *Corp.* III.)

There can be little doubt that both *εἶπε καὶ . . . ἐγένετο* here, and *εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς καὶ ἦν* in § 11, were suggested by the similar phrases in the first chapter of *Genesis*: v. 3, *εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς Γενηθήτω φῶς· καὶ ἐγένετο φῶς.* *Ib.* vv. 6, 9, 14, 20, 24, 29: *καὶ εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς . . . καὶ ἐγένετο οὕτως.* Cf. *Ps.* 32 (33). 9: *αὐτὸς εἶπεν, καὶ ἐγενήθησαν.*

§ 11. "Ἔστω πεπληρωμένος ὁ οὐρανὸς ἀστρασιν (ἀπασιν MSS.) (. . .) [ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ]. *πεπληρωμένος* here means 'supplied with inhabitants'. The inhabitants of heaven are the astral gods; and the simplest way to obtain the sense required is to alter *ἀπασιν* into *ἀστρασιν*. It may be doubted whether the writer said that God at this stage created a second order of gods (*viz.* the astral gods), or that He made the material sun, moon, and stars, and incorporated in them the gods of § 50, who had till then been unembodied. In either case, § 11 corresponds to *Gen.* i. 14, *Γενηθήτωσαν φωστῆρες κ.τ.λ.*

The peopling of the atmosphere is a thing distinct from the peopling of heaven, and the two cannot have been mixed together in the same clause. The inhabitants of the atmosphere are the souls, the making of which is described in §§ 14 ff. The words *ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ* must therefore have been inserted here by error.

The peopling of heaven (§ 11) ought to precede the filling of the earth with living things (§§ 9, 10);¹ and as the star-gods are spoken of as already existing in § 9 (*οἱ ἤδη περιπολεῖν τὸν οὐρανὸν κελευσθέντες*), it is certain that § 11 originally stood before §§ 9 and 10.

§ 9. *ἱκανὸν δὲ τὸν μέσον ἤργει χρόνον (ἱκανὸς δὲ ὁ μέσος ἤργει χρόνος MSS.) [ἐκέκρυπτο] [[καὶ]] ἢ (τῶν ὑποκειμένων) φύσις, ὧ τέκνον, ((καὶ)) ἐτύγχανε στείρα.* In the text of the MSS., we have here (omitting the unintelligible word *ἐκέκρυπτο*) two distinct statements, *viz.* 'the intermediate time was inert', and 'nature was barren'. But *χρόνος* is not a suitable subject for *ἤργει*; and since the writer goes on to tell us how *the earth* was made active and fruitful, it must have been *the earth* that was till then inert and barren. The sense required can

¹ It is true that in *Gen.* i the making of plants precedes the making of sun, moon, and stars; but that is a strange inversion of the natural order.

be got by changing ὁ μέσος χρόνος into τὸν μέσον χρόνον, and making φύσις the subject of ἤρξει as well as of ἐτύγχανε στείρα. It would perhaps be possible to make ἡ φύσις mean the region in which 'nature' operates, i. e. the earth or the sublunar world; but that would be awkward here, as the creation of Φύσις is described a few lines below, and this would give rise to the objection that, at the time spoken of, there was no φύσις in existence. It is therefore most likely that the author wrote something like ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων φύσις (cf. φύσις ἡ τῶν ὑποκειμένων in § 27). This would be merely a periphrasis for τὰ ὑποκείμενα, 'the things below', i. e. the earth; and the word φύσις, thus used, would pass unnoticed, or would be forgotten by the time the reader comes to the creation of Φύσις.

τὴν τῶν (κάτω) ὄντων ἡσυχίαν ἀπήγγειλαν, καὶ ὅτι δεόν ἐστὶ συγκοσμηθῆναι (καὶ ταῦτα) [σύμπαντα]. Heaven has already been organized and peopled, as is shown by the words οἱ ἤδη περιπολεῖν τὸν οὐρανὸν κελυσθέντες; it is only the sublunar world that remains to be dealt with. I have therefore written τῶν κάτω ὄντων and καὶ ταῦτα in place of τῶν ὄντων and τὰ σύμπαντα.

Δεόμεθά σου, ἔλεγον, τὰ νῦν ὄντα καὶ [ὦν] ὕστερον (ἐσόμενα τίνος) ἔχει χρείαν διασκέψασ(θαι). The star-gods see that it is desirable that living things should be produced on earth, but are unable to devise means of bringing this to pass; they therefore appeal to God to solve the problem; and he solves it by creating Φύσις, the force which makes living things spring up. This force is needed both by τὰ νῦν ὄντα (earth in its present state of inertness and lifelessness), and by τὰ ὕστερον ἐσόμενα; i. e. it is needed both to produce the first generation of living things, and to maintain an unending succession of them.

τίνος having been lost, ὦν was inserted to give the sentence a grammatical construction.

§ 10. ἐμειδιάσεν ὁ θεός, καὶ εἶπε φύσιν εἶναι. As to ἐμειδιάσεν, compare a Κοσμοποιία (extracted by Dieterich, *Abraxas*, p. 182 ff., from a magic papyrus, Leiden W) in which God creates by *laughing*; e. g. ἐγέλασεν ὁ θεὸς ἐπτὰκις "χα χα χα χα χα χα χα." γελάσαντος δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐγεννήθησαν θεοὶ ἐπτὰ, οἵτινες τὸν κόσμον περιέχουσιν. . . ἐκάκχασε τὸ τέταρτον ὁ θεός, καὶ ἐφάνη Γέννα, πάντων κρατοῦσα σποράν, δι' ἧς τὰ πάντα ἐσπάρη.¹

καὶ θῆλυ πάγκαλον χρῆμα ἐκ τῆς φωνῆς αὐτοῦ προήλθεν. The notion

¹ The function of this Γέννα (or Γενεά) is the same as that of Φύσις in the *Κορε Κοσμου*.

that God creates by his voice is Jewish; 'By the word of the Lord were the heavens made, and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth' (*Ps.* 33. 6). See *Corp.* I. 5 a.

ὁ θεὸς ὁ προπάτωρ. On *προπάτωρ* as an appellation of the supreme God, see *Exc.* II (A. 13 and B. 3), the only other *Hermeticum* in which the word is thus used. In § ⟨⟨32⟩⟩, Kamephis is called ὁ *προπάτωρ*; but Kamephis, in that passage, does not seem to be regarded as the supreme God, and is possibly not even a god, but a man.

⟨⟨καὶ τῇ φύσει τὸ τῶν κάτω πάντων (καὶ τῇ εὕρεσει τούτων τὸ κατὰ τούτων MSS.) ἐχαρίσατο ἡγεμονικόν⟩⟩. In the MSS., these words stand at the end of § 13; but they are unintelligible there. With the corrections proposed, they make good sense where I have placed them; *Φύσις* is mistress of the sublunar world. After the words had been shifted to § 13, *Φύσις* might easily be altered into *Εὔρεσις*, the feminine personage spoken of in that section.

καὶ ταύτην (ταύτης MSS.) προσέταξεν εἶναι (παντοίων (?) σπερμάτων) γεννητικὴν. There must have been a genitive dependent on *γεννητικὴν*; and what follows in § ⟨⟨52⟩⟩ makes it almost certain that the missing word is *σπερμάτων*. God bade Nature 'generate' or bring into existence certain things; and when she had done so, God filled his hands with these things (which, in § ⟨⟨52⟩⟩, are called τὰ ἐκ τῆς *Φύσεως ὑπάρχοντα* (. . .)), and flung them forth upon the earth, saying that Earth was to be *γεννήτειρα πάντων*. The things thus spoken of must surely be seeds. Cf. *Γέννα, πάντων κρατοῦσα σποράν, δι' ἧς τὰ πάντα ἐσπάρη*, in the *Κοσμοποιά* quoted above. *Corp.* XIV. 10: ἴδε γεωργὸν σπέρμα καταβάλλοντα εἰς γῆν. . . οὕτω καὶ ὁ θεὸς κ.τ.λ. *Exc.* IX. 1 as emended: τὸ σπέρμα οὖν τῆς γενέσεως (ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ) λαβοῦσα γέγονε (*sc.* ἡ ὕλη). *Exc.* XV. 2 as emended: ἡ φύσις . . . σπείρουσα μὲν (εἰς ὕλην) τὰ ἐαυτῆς σπέρματα κ.τ.λ.

§ 13. [καλὴν Πόνῳ συνελθοῦσα[ν] θυγατέρα ἐποίησεν, ἣν Εὔρεσιν ἐκάλεσε]. § 13 appears to consist of four unconnected fragments, of which this is the first.

Some person became the wife of Πόνος ('Hard Work'), and gave birth to a daughter named Εὔρεσις ('Discovery' or 'Invention'). According to the traditional text, this wife and mother is the *Φύσις* spoken of in §§ 10 and 12. But that is impossible. There is no place for *πόνος* and *εὔρεσις* in a *cosmogonia*; they belong to human life. It is men, not gods or cosmogonic forces, that have to 'work hard' and 'discover things'. This sentence must therefore be a

fragment of a passage in which the life of men on earth was spoken of. (Cf. τῆ εὐρέσει συνών in § 29.) One might compare the saying 'Necessity is the mother of invention'.

If Εὐρεσις were said to be the daughter of Φύσις and Πόνος, it would be necessary to take the word φύσις in a sense different from that which it bears in §§ 10 and 12, and understand it to mean *ingenium*, 'innate ability' (cf. εὐφύης). But as the sentence is out of place here, and has no connexion with what precedes it in the MSS., we have no reason to suppose that the mother was named Φύσις. Her name may very likely have been Σύνεσις. At any rate, the meaning of the allegory must have been this: 'In order that a man may make discoveries, two things are needed; he must be intelligent, and he must take pains.'

[τῆ δὲ ὁ θεὸς ἐχαρίσατο «εἶναι», καὶ χαρισάμενος]. This looks like an alternative for καὶ τῆ . . . ἐχαρίσατο ἡγεμονικόν, which I have transposed to § 10.

[διέκρινε τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα, καὶ ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτὰ μυστηρίων.] What are τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα? Heaven and earth? If συνεκόσμησε were written in place of διέκρινε, this might be a summary of the contents of §§ <<11>>, 9, 10, 12, <<52>>.

§ 52. καὶ μηδενὸς (μηδενὶ MSS.) ἐντεῦθεν λείπεσθαι δόκει. Earth has hitherto remained barren and desolate, and has in that respect 'lagged behind' heaven, which has already been supplied with inhabitants; but that reproach is now to be done away with. It is true that earth must always be inferior to heaven; but she will have no cause for shame when she also is πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν συγκεκοσμημένη καλοῖς (§ 51).

The meaning might be more fully expressed by writing μηδενὸς <τῶν> <<ἐν τῆ τῶν ὄντων συστάσει>>, 'no part of the universe'.

What were the living things that were produced on earth at the time here spoken of? The inhabitants of earth as we know it are men, beasts, and plants. But the making of beasts comes later on in the story (§§ 18-23); and the making of men comes later still (§ 24 ff.). The process described in §§ 10, 12, <<52>>, must therefore be the making of plants alone; and the things which God flings forth must be seeds of plants. These sections then correspond to *Gen.* 1. 11, εἶπεν ὁ θεὸς Βλαστησάτω ἡ γῆ βοτάνη χόρτου κ.τ.λ.

It follows from this that Φύσις, as here regarded, is a personification of the force which manifests itself in plant-life, rather than

of 'nature' in general. The action of Φύσις might the more easily be thus restricted, because the Stoics used the word φύσις to signify the principle of life in plants (φυτά), as distinguished from that in beasts and men, which they called ψυχή.¹

It is true that in the words τῇ Φύσει τὸ τῶν κάτω πάντων ἐχαρίσατο ἡγεμονικόν (if that is the right reading) the writer recognizes that Φύσις has other functions also; but it is only in the making of plants that she is brought into action in his myth; he gives her no part in the making of beasts and men.

τὰς χεῖρας [οἷας δὴ (δεῖ MSS.) θεὸν (εἰκὸς) ἔχειν]. The words οἷας . . . ἔχειν are a reminder that χεῖρας is not to be taken literally. (God has no hands; He is incorporeal.) But such a reminder is hardly in keeping with the tone of the mythical narrative; and it seems most likely that these words were not written by the author, but were added by a transcriber. Cf. [(οἷ)οις ἔτυχεν ἔχουσα] . . . ἀφθαλμούς in § 34 as emended.

§ 51. (οὕτω δὴ) «ἐφάνη μὲν οὐρανὸς . . . τὰ ἔργα κινούμενα.» This section must have stood after § 52; for it is a summing up and conclusion of the narrative of which the making of plants in § 52 is the last part. God has made heaven and earth, and filled both heaven and earth with living beings; he looks upon his work, and sees that it is good.

[κραδαιομένη ἔτι γῆ ἡλίου λάμπαντος ἐπάγη.] These words have to do with the formation of the earth; and if they occurred anywhere in the *Kore Kosmu*, they must be a fragment of the lost passage which preceded § 9. We may suppose the writer to have there said that, after the heavenly bodies had been made (§ (11)), the lower world was still an undifferentiated watery mass; and that God divided this mass, and separated out the earth from the water. (Cf. *Gen.* 1. 9: *συνήχθη τὸ ὕδωρ . . . καὶ ὤφθη ἡ ξηρά*.) The land thus formed was at first only half solid, and 'quivered' like jelly; but the heat of the sun soon dried it up, and made it hard and firm. Cf. *Herm. fragm.* 31 (a *cosmogonia*): ἐφάνη [ὄλη] ἡ γῆ, ἔμπηλος καὶ τρέμουσα· ἡλίου δὲ . . . ἀναλάμπαντος, καὶ . . . ξηραίνοντος, ἡ γῆ ἔστηρίζετο.

καλὰ γὰρ τῷ θεῷ καὶ τὰ θνητοῖς εἶναι νομιζόμενα φαῦλα, ὅτι δὴ τοῖς τοῦ θεοῦ νόμοις δουλεύειν ἐποιήθη. Cf. the Hymn of Cleanthes, *Stob.* 1. 1. 12, vol. i, p. 26. l. 7 W.: ἀλλὰ σὺ καὶ τὰ περισσά (τε) ἐπίστασαι ἄρτια θεῖνα | καὶ κοσμεῖν τάκοσμα, καὶ οὐφίλα σοὶ φίλα ἔστιν.²

¹ See, for instance, *Sext. Emp. Math.* 9. 81, quoted in note on *Ascl. Lat.* I. 4.

² Possibly the original reading there may have been οὐ καλὰ σοὶ καλὰ ἔστιν.

The preceding mention of earthly *καλά* might give rise to the objection that there is nothing *καλόν* or *ἀγαθόν* on earth (see *Corp.* VI), or that at any rate there are many things on earth that are not *καλά*; and the statement that all things are *καλά* in God's sight is intended to answer that objection. But this sentence is not needed, and rather interrupts the sequence of thought; it may therefore be suspected that *καλὰ γὰρ . . . δουλεύειν ἐποιήθη* is a note added by a reader.

ἔχαιρε δὲ ὁ θεὸς ὄρων ἤδη ἑαυτοῦ τὰ ἔργα κινούμενα. This corresponds to *Gen.* 1. 31: *καὶ ἶδεν ὁ θεὸς τὰ πάντα ὅσα ἐποίησεν, καὶ ἶδὸν καλὰ λίαν.* It also corresponds to *Pl. Tim.* 37 c: *ὡς δὲ κινήθην αὐτὸ καὶ ζῶν ἐνόησε . . . ὁ γεννήσας πατήρ, ἡγάσθη τε καὶ εὐφρανθεὶς κ.τ.λ.* The writer may very likely have been thinking of both those passages.

§ 14. οὐκέτι βουλόμενος ἀργὸν τὸν ὑπουράνιον (ὑπεράνω MSS.) κόσμον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ [πνευμάτων] πληρῶσαι δοκιμάσας (καὶ) τοῦτον, ὡς μὴ τὰ κατὰ μέσον (μέρος MSS.) ἀκίνητα [καὶ ἀργὰ] μένη, οὕτως εἰς ταῦτα ἤρξάτο τεχνιτείας (-τείαις MSS.). God sets about making souls, in order that a certain region may not remain uninhabited. What is that region? Since heaven (§ (11)) and earth (§§ 9, 10, 12, (52)) have already been provided with inhabitants, the only region that is still ἀργόν and ἀκινήτον, and has not yet been 'filled' (with living beings), is the space between earth and heaven; this therefore must be the place assigned to the souls as their abode. (Cf. *Exc.* XXV. 9: *τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ σελήνης, ὃ τέκνον, ἐφ' ἡμᾶς ψυχῶν ἐστὶν οἰκητήριον.* *Exc.* XXIV. 1: *ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀέρι (κατοικοῦσι) ψυχαί.* The text then must be corrected accordingly. The sense required may be got by writing *τὸν ὑπουράνιον κόσμον* ('the region next below heaven') instead of *τὸν ὑπεράνω κόσμον*, and *τὰ κατὰ μέσον* ('the intermediate space') instead of *τὰ κατὰ μέρος*.

The souls are beings of the same nature as the *δαίμονες* of the Platonists, and the *δαίμονες* and *ἥρωες* of Posidonius; and like them, they dwell in the atmosphere. Their incarnation on earth does not take place till later on, § 24 ff.

The word *πνεύματα* was used by Jews and Christians as an equivalent for the Pagan *δαίμονες*; and it is probable that *πνευμάτων*, in that sense, was written here by a Christian transcriber, in substitution for some word meaning 'inhabitants'.

The description of the process of soul-making was evidently suggested by *Pl. Tim.* 34 B-36 D (the making of the world-soul) and 41 D (the making of individual souls).

πνεῦμα . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου λαβών, καὶ νοερῶ (νοερῶς MSS.) τοῦτο πυρὶ μίξας. The souls are made of a mixture of πνεῦμα ('breath' or air)¹ and fire, combined with certain 'unknown materials'. The notion that the soul is a material thing, and consists of the two material elements air and fire, is Stoic; and the writer, for the purpose of his myth at least, has adopted that notion, with such modification as his Platonic principles seemed to him to demand.²

The Epicureans described the composition of the soul in similar terms. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 388: Epicurus says that the soul is κρᾶμα ἐκ τεττάρων, ἐκ ποιοῦ πυρώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ ἀερώδους, ἐκ ποιοῦ πνευματικοῦ,³ ἐκ τετάρτου τινὸς ἀκατονομάστου' . . . ὧν τὸ μὲν πνεῦμα κίνησιν, τὸν δὲ ἀέρα ἡρεμίαν, τὸ δὲ θερμὸν τὴν φαινομένην θερμότητα τοῦ σώματος, τὸ δ' ἀκατονομάστον τὴν ἐν ἡμῖν ἐμποιεῖν αἴσθησιν' ἐν οὐδενὶ γὰρ τῶν ὀνομαζομένων στοιχείων εἶναι αἴσθησιν. See also Plut. *Adv. Coloten* 20. 4, 1118 D, and Lucr. 3. 231-245.

Even Epicurus appears to have felt the difficulty of attributing feeling and thought to such things as fire and air, and to have been thereby led to add his 'unnamed fourth substance' to the three other components of the soul. The writer of the *Kore Kosmu*, being, to some extent at least, a Platonist, would feel that difficulty more strongly; and it is presumably for that reason that he adds to the πνεῦμα and πῦρ certain 'unknown' ingredients (ἀγνώστους τισὶν ἐτέραις ὕλαις ἐκέρασε).⁴ We are doubtless meant to understand that it is in virtue of these 'unknown' or incomprehensible (i. e. incorporeal) constituents that the soul possesses conscious life and thought, and is akin to God.

But at the same time, the writer so qualifies the πῦρ and πνεῦμα as to make it appear that he regards these material things themselves as conscious and intelligent; and in this respect, he is closely following his Stoic authorities. The fire is described as πῦρ νοερόν,—

¹ Cf. *Exc.* XXV. 11, γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ παντὸς τοῦ μέσου [ἱεροῦ] πνεύματος, where τὸ ἱερόν πνεῦμα means the atmosphere. In *Exc.* XXVI. 13-30, πνεῦμα means the element air.

² The position which he here adopts approximates to that of Posidonius, who appears to have said that the soul, as long as it remains in its proper abode (viz. the upper atmosphere), consists of air and fire alone, but that when it descends to lower levels, it is corrupted by an intermixture of water.

³ Epicurus seems to have meant by πνεῦμα 'wind', i. e. air in motion, and by ἀήρ, air at rest; though it is strange to speak of air in motion and air at rest as if they were two different substances.

⁴ A man who had read the *Tymaeus*, and was puzzled by its obscurities, might well describe as ἀγνώστα the materials which the Demiurgus is there said to have used in the making of soul: τῆς ἀμερίστου καὶ αἰεὶ κατὰ ταῦτὰ ἐχούσης οὐσίας καὶ τῆς αὐτῆς περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένης μεριστῆς τρίτον ἐξ ἀμφοῖν ἐν μέσῳ ξυκεκράσαστο οὐσίας εἶδος, τῆς τε ταύτου φύσεως καὶ τῆς θατέρου, κ.τ.λ. (35 A).

a phrase which the Stoics employed to denote that substance which is at once material fire and God; and the πνεῦμα is 'a portion of God's own πνεῦμα' (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου),—that is to say, the atmosphere, from which it is taken, is God's life-breath. This conception of πνεῦμα is Stoic, and implies the Stoic view that God is immanent in the Kosmos. But it is possible that the writer also had in mind *Gen.* 2. 7: ἐνεφύσησεν (ὁ θεὸς) εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον (τοῦ ἀνθρώπου) πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν.

μετὰ τινων ἐπιφωνήσεων κρυπτῶν. Cf. μετὰ λόγου τοῦ καθήκοντος, § 15 *fin.*, and κρυπτῶν ἐπειπῶν λόγους in § 18. God pronounces a spell, just as a human magician would do on a like occasion; without this, his manipulation of the materials would not produce the desired effect.

ἐπεγέλασέ τις ἄλη τῷ μίγματι λεπτοτέρα τε καὶ καθαρωτέρα μᾶλλον [καὶ διαφανεστέρα] ἢ ἐξ ὧν ἐγένετο· διειδής δὲ ἦν αὐτή, ἦν δὴ καὶ μόνος ὁ τεχνίτης ἑώρα. διαφανής is a synonym of διειδής, and seems unnecessary.

The substance of which the souls are made is not the mixture as a whole, but the 'purer' stuff which rises to the surface of the mixture. This stuff is perfectly transparent,—like clear water or pure air,—and therefore invisible; 'God alone could see it'. That is a hint that the stuff of which souls consist is in reality ἀσώματον or νοητόν, though in the mythical style of the *Kore Kosmu* it is spoken of as if it were a chemical product.

§ 15. ἐπειδὴ δὲ «(τελειουργηθεῖσα)» οὔτε [ὡς ἐκ πυρὸς] καιομένη διετήκετο, οὔτε μὴν [ὡς ἐκ πνεύματος][] ψύχει (ἔψυχεν MSS.) (ἐπήγγυτο), ἀλλὰ τινα ἰδιογενῆ [καὶ οἰκίαν] εἶχε [τὴν τοῦ κράματος] σύστασιν διετήκετο means '(a solid) was melted'; and in the contrasted phrase, we need a verb meaning '(a liquid) was solidified'. I have therefore added ἐπήγγυτο. We might have supposed the stuff spoken of to be gaseous, since it is the lightest and rarest part of a mixture the only known ingredients of which are air and fire; but it is here pictured as something between a solid and a liquid. The heat tends to make it liquid, the cold tends to make it solid; and when the hot component and the cold component have been thoroughly blended together, there results a substance neither liquid nor solid, but of an intermediate and jelly-like consistency. The writer calls this surface-layer of the mixture the ἐπίπαγος; and ἐπίπαγος means a half-solid scum which forms on the surface of a liquid,—e. g. a layer of cream on the surface of a pan of milk. On the other hand, in § 16 *ini.* he

calls it τὸ ἐκ τῆς κί(ρ)νήσεως ἐξατμιζόμενον ἄνθος; and the word ἐξατμιζόμενον seems to imply that he there thinks of it as gaseous.

The words ὡς ἐκ πυρός and ὡς ἐκ πνεύματος were intended to indicate that the hot ingredient in the mixture is the πῦρ, and the cold ingredient is the πνεῦμα. (In the Stoic system, air is τὸ ψυχρόν.) That is probably a correct explanation of the author's meaning; but the explanation is awkwardly expressed, and it seems most likely that it was added by a reader.

⟨ταύτην δὴ [καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐφημοτέρου ὀνόματος καὶ τῆς καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἐνεργείας] ψύχωσιν ὁ θεὸς ἐκάλεσε(ν). God gave a name to the ἐπίπαγος; he called it ψύχωσις. The word ψύχωσις properly means 'the act of making soul', or 'the act of giving soul (to a body)'; but it is here made to mean 'the stuff of which souls are made'. As ψῦχος, 'cold', has been spoken of just before, it is possible that the writer meant to suggest that ψύχωσις and ψυχή are derived from ψῦχος;¹ and something of the sort seems to be implied in the words ἀπὸ τοῦ εὐφημοτέρου ὀνόματος. But those words are unintelligible. Is ψῦχος the εὐφημοτέρον ὄνομα? And if so, what is the δυσφημοτέρον ὄνομα with which it is contrasted? Possibly θερμόν? But why should 'cold' be thought more εὐφημον than 'heat'?

The phrase τῆς καθ' ὁμοιότητα ἐνεργείας is equally inexplicable.

μυριάδας ψυχῶν ἱκανὰς ἐγενεσιούργησε. The number of souls is large, but finite. They were all made at the same time; and when once made, they are everlasting (πάσας αἰδίους, § 16).

§ 16. ὀλοκληρότερον (πληρέστερον MSS.) ἦν τοῦ δευτέρου τὸ πρῶτον καὶ τῷ παντὶ καθαρώτερον, . . . καὶ οὕτως ἄχρι βαθμῶν ἐξήκοντα ὁ πᾶς ἀπῆρτιστο ἀριθμός. The ἄνθος or ἐπίπαγος of which the souls are made is not homogeneous. The Craftsman again and again skims off the scum which is continually forming, until the number of skimmings amounts to sixty; and the stuff yielded by each successive skimming is inferior in 'integrity' and 'purity' to that yielded by the one before. Consequently, the souls made of this soul-stuff are of sixty different grades.

This graduation of souls is further elaborated in *Exc.* XXV. 11-13, where we are told that the atmosphere is divided into sixty distinct strata (χωραί), and that each soul has its abode assigned to it in that particular stratum which is suited to its nature.

ταύταις (ταῖς MSS.) δὲ καὶ τμήματα [καὶ ταμεία (τμεία MSS.)] ἐν

¹ Cf. Plut. *Sto. ref.* 41, 1052 F: Chrysippus says οὐκ ἀπὸ τρεῖνον τὴν ψυχὴν ὀνόμασθαι παρὰ τὴν ψύξιν.

μεταρσίῳ διέταξε [τῆς ἄνω φύσεως] [οὐρανοῦ]. Cf. § 24: τῶν ἰδίων τμημάτων [καὶ ταμείων] προήρχοντο. The τμήματα are the sixty subdivisions of the atmosphere which are called χῶραι in *Exc.* XXV. ταμείον, properly a storehouse or treasury, must here be taken to mean a chamber.¹ But strata of the atmosphere are not much like chambers; and there is no need of a second substantive beside τμήματα. It seems most likely then that ταμεία was written as a variant for τμήματα in § 16, and that this caused the addition of καὶ ταμείων in § 24.

The abodes of the souls are ἐν μεταρσίῳ, 'up above the earth', but not in heaven. οὐρανοῦ must have been added by some one who mistakenly supposed that the souls resided in heaven before their incarnation; and τῆς ἄνω φύσεως is an alternative for οὐρανοῦ. Cf. τῆς μακαρίας [μετὰ θεῶν] πολιτείας in § 34, (πλησίον) τοῦ οὐρανοῦ in § 38, and ἴ οὐρανό^ν bis in § 39.

ὅπως τὸν τε κύλινδρον περιστροφῶσι τάξει τινὶ καὶ οἰκονομίᾳ καθηκούσῃ, καὶ τὸν πατέρα τέρπωσιν. [The κύλινδρος may be the 'pillar' in Pl. *Rep.* 10. 616 B εἰς ὃ ἀφικέσθαι προελθόντες ἡμερησίαν ὁδὸν καὶ ἰδεῖν αὐτόθι κατὰ μέσον τὸ φῶς ἐκ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ τὰ ἄκρα αὐτοῦ τῶν δεσμῶν τεταμένα· εἶναι γὰρ τοῦτο τὸ φῶς σύνδεσμον τοῦ οὐρανοῦ . . . οὕτω πᾶσαν συνέχον τὴν περιφορὰν. . . ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν κύκλων αὐτοῦ (sc. τοῦ ἀτράκτου) ἄνωθεν ἐφ' ἑκάστου βεβηκέναι Σειρήνα συμπεριφερομένην, φωνὴν μίαν ἰέισαν, ἓνα τόνον.

Some commentators understood this φῶς to be the axis of the Universe, and called it the cylinder. Cf. Photius p. 501 (Porson): τεταμένον φῶς εὐθὺ οἶον κίονα· τὸ οὐράνιον λέγει. τὸ γὰρ συνεχὲς τὴν ὑποφορὰν (συνέχον τὴν περιφορὰν) τὸ ὑπόζωσμα τοῦ κόσμου, κατ' ἄκρα δ' αὐτὸ διήκον (διήκων) ἐπινοεῖται ὁ ἄξων. εὐθὺ δὲ ἀντὶ τοῦ ὀρθόν. τινὲς τὸν ἄξονα τοῦ κόσμου, οἱ δὲ κύλινδρον τινα πυρὸς αἰθερίου περὶ τὸν ἄξονα ὄντα. Possibly the reference to the πάλος in the soul's protest (§ 34) should be interpreted in this connexion.

The natural sense of περιστροφῶσι is 'revolve round'. The verb στροβεῖν is usually transitive. But it is not likely that the souls were set to turn the axis of the universe, and there seems to be no reason why the writer of this document should not use the word in a sense

¹ ταμείον, in the sense of a chamber or cell in which souls are imprisoned, occurs repeatedly in the *Pistis Sophia*; e.g. (C. Schmidt) p. 214, l. 37: 'the ταμεία of the δράκων of the outer darkness.' *Ib.* p. 215, l. 20: 'the door of the ταμείον in which are the ψυχαί of those men is opened.' Perhaps the person who wrote ταμεία in the *Kore Kosmu* was thinking of some similar application of the word.

A ψυχοταμίας is spoken of in *Exc.* XXVI. 3.

similar to περιχορεύειν. Cf. Aristophenes, *Vesp.* 1529: στρόβει, παράβαινε κύκλω καὶ γάστρισον σεαυτόν, where στρόβει is apparently intransitive.

The words τάξει τινὶ καὶ οἰκονομία καθηκούση may be interpreted of the regular orbit in which the souls circle about the cylinder. It would appear as if this passage should be counted among those which regard the souls as being ἐν μεταρσίῳ τῆς ἄνω φύσεως. The Father's pleasure is presumably caused by their seemly order. When the souls left their stations (§ 24), they aroused the Father's anger and were embodied by his command.]

§ 17. ἐν τῇ περικαλλεῖ τοῦ αἰθέρος στάς (στάσει MSS.) (ἀψίδι ?), καὶ τὰς τῶν ἤδη οὐσῶν (ὄντων MSS.) (ψυχῶν) μεταπεμφάμενος φυλάς (φύσεις MSS.). The word αἰθήρ, as used in the *Kore Kosmu*, probably means the upper part of the atmosphere. The atmosphere, which fills the space between the earth and the lunar sphere, is divided (as in Pseudo-Pl. *Epinomis*) into a lower, darker, and more turbid part called ἀήρ, and a higher, brighter, and purer part called αἰθήρ. Cf. αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἀήρ in § 34, and [ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ] in § <<11>>; 'air and aether' means the atmosphere as a whole. (See note on *Exc.* XXIV. 1.) The distinction between a higher and a lower stratum of the atmosphere was adopted and elaborated by Posidonius, by whom the writer of the *Kore Kosmu* was doubtless influenced.

The souls are located in the atmosphere; and when God wishes to address them, he descends from his abode in or above the highest heaven, and takes his stand in or on 'the (vault?) of aether', that is, at the upper boundary of the region within which the souls are confined.

φύσεις cannot be right; and φυλάς, which I have written in place of it, is the more appropriate, because we have just been told that the souls are divided into sixty graduated classes or 'tribes'.

[πνεύματος ἐμοῦ καὶ] μερίμνης ἐμῆς [[ψυχαί]] καλὰ τέκνα. πνεύματος ἐμοῦ must be understood as a reference to πνεῦμα ὅσον ἄρκετον ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου λαβῶν in § 14. But if God mentions the πνεῦμα, why does he not also mention the πῦρ, which was the other of the two known materials? Besides, the souls are not children of the πνεῦμα and the πῦρ (the materials of which they were made) in the same sense that they are children of God's μερίμνη. It is therefore probable that πνεύματος ἐμοῦ καί was added by a transcriber.

ἄ . . . ἐν τῷ μέσῳ (μῶ MSS.) καθιδρύω (καθιερώ MSS.) κόσμῳ. Cf. § 14 as emended: ὡς μὴ τὰ κατὰ μέσον ἀκίνητα μένη.—κόσμος here means, not 'the universe', but 'a region of the universe'. Cf. τὸν

ὑπο(υ)ρανο(υ) κόσμον in § 14 ; τοῦ μεταρσίου κόσμον τούτου in § 36 ; ὁ ἐπιχθονίος σου κόσμος in § 60 ; and τὸν ὑπερθεῖν [δια]κόσμον in § 2.

καθιεροῦν (ἀγαλαμα, ἱερέα, or the like) means to *dedicate* or *consecrate* something or some one to a god. The word is hardly appropriate here ; καθιδρύω better gives the sense required.

[λόγων ἐμῶν ὡς] νόμων τούτων ἐπακούσατε. λόγων ἐμῶν is probably an alternative for νόμων τούτων.

τόπου μηδεὶς ἄλλου θίγητε πλὴν τοῦ διαταγέντος ὑμῖν. The souls are here warned against the transgression which they are afterwards described as committing (§ 24). If τόπου is sound, the thing which they are forbidden to do is to trespass beyond the bounds of the region assigned to them. This would agree with τῶν ἰδίων τμημάτων προήρχοντο in § 24. But τόπου θιγγάνειν, 'to lay hands on a place', is a strange expression ; and perhaps we ought to bracket τόπου. If τόπου were struck out, the prohibition would be expressed in less definite terms, and would in that respect correspond more closely to εἴ τι νεώτερον παρὰ τὰμὰ πράξετε βουλευμάτα below.

εὐσταθισάσαις μὲν οὖν ὑμῖν οὐρανὸς [τε καὶ μένει πάλιν] ὁ μισθός (ὁμοίως MSS.), καὶ [ὁ διαταγείς] (κατ)αστερισμός, θρόνοι τε ἀρετῆς πεπληρωμένοι. I suppose the writer's meaning to have been this. The souls, when first made, are placed in the atmosphere, to dwell there during a period of probation. If they are obedient to God's commands, they will, at the expiration of that period, be permitted to rise to a higher level, and enter heaven ; which implies that they will be transformed from 'souls' into gods.¹ On the other hand, if they are disobedient, they will be punished by incarnation in human bodies upon earth.

ὁ μισθός (if that is the right reading) may have been altered into ὁμοίως by accident ; but πάλιν must have been inserted intentionally, by some one who wrongly assumed that heaven was the original abode of the souls, and therefore that, if they went to heaven, they would be going 'back' to the place they came from. μένει was presumably added because, after ὁ μισθός had disappeared, a verb was felt to be needed. But μένει ought to have an accusative object (ὑμᾶς), and does not rightly go with the dative ὑμῖν.

¹ Posidonius seems to have said that the upper atmosphere is the proper home of souls in general, and the place to which most of them will sooner or later return after their incarnation upon earth ; but that a few exceptionally noble souls will ultimately rise still higher, and become gods in heaven. In the system of Posidonius then, heaven is the highest reward for embodied souls ; and the writer of the *Kore Kosmu*, when he made God promise heaven, as a reward for obedience, to unembodied souls, was probably influenced by what Posidonius had said.

[ὁ διαταγείς] has come from τοῦ διαταγέντος above.

ἀστερισμός, the reading of the MSS., is not satisfactory. This word occurs in the two senses 'a making with stars' and 'a constellation'; and in Plut. *Plac. Phil.* 2. 13 (Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 341), the verb ἀστερίζειν means 'to make (a stone) into a star'.¹ But the recognized term for 'the making of a man into a star-god', which is what we want here, is καταστερισμός.

The word θρόνοι ('judgment-seats') expresses a conception which is probably of Jewish origin. Cf. *Daniel* 7. 9: θρόνοι ἐθέτησαν, καὶ παλαιὸς ἡμερῶν ἐκάθητο. *Ev. Matth.* 19. 28: ὅταν καθίσῃ ὁ υἱὸς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐπὶ θρόνον δόξης αὐτοῦ, καθίσεσθε καὶ ὑμεῖς ἐπὶ δώδεκα θρόνους κρίνοντες τὰς δώδεκα φυλὰς τοῦ Ἰσραὴλ. *Αἴφoc.* 20. 4: εἶδον θρόνους, καὶ ἐκάθισαν ἐπ' αὐτούς, καὶ κρίμα ἐδόθη αὐτοῖς. *Col.* 1. 16: εἶτε θρόνοι εἶτε κυριότητες εἶτε ἀρχαὶ εἶτε ἐξουσίαι. In coupling together (κατ)-αστερισμός and θρόνοι, the writer combines a Pagan and a Jewish mode of picturing the powers and dignities conferred on those who are admitted to heaven.

ἀρετή here means, not moral virtue, but supernatural force or potency. A plant or stone efficacious in magic would be said to possess ἀρετή.

ἱερὸν [ὑμῖν] δμνύω [πνεῦμα καὶ] κρᾶμα τοῦτ' ἀφ' οὗπερ ὑμᾶς ἐγέννησα, ψυχοποιούς τε ταύτας μου τὰς χεῖρας. Here, as before, πνεῦμα has been added by a transcriber,—perhaps a Christian. The 'mixture' and the hands by which it was manipulated go well together; but it would be superfluous to mention the ingredients of the mixture also, and it is still more inappropriate to mention one of them only, the πνεῦμα, and omit the πῦρ.

§ 18. τὰ λοιπὰ τῶν στοιχείων [συγγενῆ] μίξας, ὕδωρ καὶ γῆν. Here begins the making of beasts. They are made of a 'mixture' which is analogous to that out of which the (human) souls were made, but is composed of coarser materials; in place of πῦρ and πνεῦμα (fire and air), God this time uses the two grosser elements, water and earth.

⟨⟨καὶ Ἰσοποιὸν ἐμφυσήσας⟩⟩ (ἐνθουσιάζας MSS.) ⟨τινὰ οὐσίαν⟩. This phrase corresponds to ἀγνώστους τισὶν ἑτέροις ὕλαις ἐκέρασε in § 14, and ought to stand in the corresponding position; I have therefore transposed it.

¹ Ἀναξαγόρας, τὸν περικείμενον αἰθέρα . . . ἀναρπάσαντα πέτρους ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς καὶ καταφλέξαντα τούτους ἡστερικέναι. But the reading is doubtful; in the same passage as given by Stobaeus, the verb is ἡστερωκέναι.

(τὸν) τῷ κράματι ἐπιπλέοντα [ὁμοίως] ἐπίπαγον, [εὐβαφῆ τε καὶ] εὐαγῆ (εὐπαγῆ MSS.) γενόμενον. ὁμοίως, both here and before *κρυπτοῦς ἐπιειπὼν λόγους* above, seems intended to mean 'as in the case of the first mixture (§ 14)'. But both clauses read better when ὁμοίως is struck out; and in both places it is probably a misplaced duplication of (οὐ τοῖς πρώτοις δ') ὁμοίου.

εὐβαφῆ (*well steeped* or *dye'd*) is meaningless in this connexion; and εὐπαγῆ (*compact* or *solid*) is not a suitable adjective to apply to a thing which must be imagined as semi-liquid. It is most likely that the original reading was εὐαγῆ, and that both εὐπαγῆ and εὐβαφῆ were written as substitutes or variants.¹ εὐᾶγῆ, *bright* or *clear*, gives the sense wanted; cf. *καθαρωτέρα* and *δειδής*, applied to the corresponding substance in § 14. The adjective εὐᾶγῆς (not to be confused with εὐᾶγῆς, from *ἄγος*), occurs twice in Plato (*Tim.* 58 D, *ἄερος, τὸ μὲν εὐαγέστατον ἐπίκλιν αἰθῆρ καλούμενος, ὁ δὲ θολερῶτατος κ.τ.λ.*; *Legg.* 952 A, *εὐαγέστερον* opposed to *σκοτωδέστερα*); but it is not a common word, and transcribers may have been puzzled by it.

ἐκ τούτου (*sc.* τοῦ ἐπιπάγου) τὰ [ἄνθρωποιδῆ] (πνεύματα) τῶν ζῴων διέπλασε· τὸ δὲ τοῦ μίγματος λείψανον κ.τ.λ. There is evidently something wrong here. The word *ἄνθρωποιδῆ* seems to be in some way connected with *πρὸς τοῖς ἀνθρωποιδέσι τῶν ζῳδιακῶν τὰ ἐξῆς ἀπαρτίσας* in § 20. Perhaps the man who altered the text wrote *τοῖς ἀνθρωποιδέσι τῶν ζῳδίων* in § 20, and *τὰ ἀνθρωποιδῆ τῶν ζῳδίων* in § 18, and meant the words to signify 'those Signs of the Zodiac which are of human form' (Gemini, Virgo, Sagittarius, Aquarius). But it is clear that the author, in § 18 at any rate, was speaking, not of the making of Signs of the Zodiac, but of the making of beasts. What then is the missing word for which *ἄνθρωποιδῆ* has been substituted?

We are told that God first makes certain things out of the 'scum' (*ἐπίπαγος*) of the mixture, and then (§ 19) directs the souls to make certain things (which, from § 23, we know to be birds, fishes, quadrupeds, and reptiles) out of the 'residuum' (*λείψανον*) of the mixture; and God promises (§ 21 *init.*) *τοῖς ὄρατοῖς*

¹ Usener conjectures *εὐαφῆ*, 'soft' or 'delicate', for *εὐβαφῆ*. In support of this, Prof. Stuart Jones has pointed out to me that in an anonymous medical text, *Rheinisches Museum* vol. 58, *εὐβαφῶς* occurs for *εὐαφῶς*, p. 72, and *εὐβαφία* for *εὐαφία*, p. 87; and that in Paul of Aegina 4. 21, *εὐβαφῶν σπόγγων*, 'well-steeped' sponges, may perhaps be an error for *εὐαφῶν σπ.*, 'soft'. It would be possible to write *εὐαφῆ τε καὶ εὐαγῆ*; but it seems more likely that the author wrote one adjective only.

ἔργοις αὐτῶν τὸ ὄρατὸν¹ πνεῦμα ἐπιζεύξαι. If we write τὰ ἀόρατα πνεύματα in place of τὸ ὄρατὸν πνεῦμα in § 21, all becomes clear. The things which the souls make are ὄρατά; i. e. they are the visible and tangible *bodies* of the animals; and when the bodies have been made, God completes the animals by adding a πνεῦμα to each body. That is to say, every beast, when completed, consists of two parts, a body and a πνεῦμα. (Most Greeks of the period would rather have said either that a beast is composed of σῶμα and ψυχή, or that it is composed of σῶμα, πνεῦμα, and ψυχή; but the writer of the *Kore Kosmu* restricts the word ψυχή to *human* souls,¹ and calls the 'invisible' part of a beast,—the part in which its life resides,—πνεῦμα, not ψυχή.) The bodies of the beasts are made out of the λείψανον of the mixture; the things which are made by God out of the ἐπίπαγος must therefore be the πνεύματα of the beasts. And so, in place of ἀνθρωποειδῆ, we must write the πνεύματα.

When the passage is thus understood, we see that the use made of the ἐπίπαγος of the second mixture is analogous to the use made of the ἐπίπαγος of the first mixture. Out of the ἐπίπαγος of the first mixture are made the ψυχαί of men; out of the ἐπίπαγος of the second mixture are made the πνεύματα of beasts. (As to the question what is done with the λείψανον of the first mixture, see note on § 30.)

§ 19. ταῖς ἤδη προκοψάσαις ψυχαῖς ἔδωκε, [ψυχαῖς δὲ ταύταις] ταῖς εἰς [χωρία θεῶν καὶ] τοὺς ἐγγύς ἄστρον τόπους (ἀναβάσαις), καὶ ἱεροῖς δαίμοσι μετακεκλημέναις (ἱεροῦς δαίμονας μετακεκλημένας MSS.) These words imply that, though each soul was originally placed in and confined to one particular *τμήμα* of the atmosphere, it was permitted after a time to rise to higher *τμήματα*, if it showed sufficient merit. (Posidonius said something not unlike this. Compare the promise in § 17, that obedient souls shall ultimately be permitted to rise above the highest limit of the atmosphere, and enter heaven.) Some time has now elapsed; and some souls which were originally placed in lower *τμήματα* have risen to the highest stratum of the atmosphere, that stratum which is 'near to the stars', i. e. immediately below the sphere of heaven. When they have attained to that position, they are called 'holy daemons',—i. e. not gods, but beings of the next grade below that of a god. It is to these

¹ I. e. souls either destined to be incarnated in human bodies, or actually incarnated in human bodies.

'advanced' souls, and not to the souls in general, that the task of making the bodies of beasts is assigned.

In the extant text, nothing has hitherto been said about the advancement of souls to higher *τμήματα* of the atmosphere. But the words of § 19 seem to imply that this matter has been previously spoken of. If so, the passage in which it was spoken of has been lost.

[*χωρία θεῶν καί*] must have been added by some one who misunderstood the author's meaning, and thought that the advanced souls were already in heaven. (Cf. [*οὐρανῶν*] in § 16, which may have been added by the same person.) *εἰς χωρία θεῶν* is equivalent to *εἰς οὐρανόν*, and is inconsistent with *τοὺς ἐγγὺς ἀστρον τόπους*, which means places not *in* heaven, but *near* it.

After a participle (probably *ἀναβάσας*) had been lost, the phrase *ἱεροῖς δαίμοσι μετακεκλημέναις* was altered into the accusative by some one who supposed it to be coupled to *τόπους*.

ἐκάστη τῇ ἐαυτῆς φύσει (<*πεποιθυῖα*>) *πλαστέω τι* [*παραπλήσιον*]. There would be no sense in saying that the bodies of the various beasts are 'somewhat like' or 'nearly equal to' the 'natures' of the souls by whom they are made. If we write *τῇ ἐαυτῆς φύσει πεποιθυῖα*, the meaning is that each of the souls is to do the best it can, 'relying on its own ability', i. e. without any assistance from God (beyond that of supplying a model). Cf. *ἀπέστη* (ὁ θεός below. *παραπλήσιον* is probably a corrupted doublet of *παραθήσομαι*).

The words *ἐκάστη τι πλαστέω* seem to imply that each of the souls spoken of made a different kind of beast, or in other words, that each species of beasts known to us was made by a different soul.

παραθήσομαι δ' ἐγὼ (δέ τι MSS.) [*καί*] *ταῦθ' ὑμῖν παραδείγματα. ταῦτα* must mean the things which God has just made, viz. the *πνεύματα* of the beasts. The writer imagines the *πνεῦμα* of a horse, for instance, as a sort of gaseous body, of the same shape and size as the gross body of the horse,¹ but invisible to mortal eyes, and

¹ Perhaps a similar notion underlies the obscure term τὸ ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα in *Pistis Sophia*, C. Schmidt *Kopt.-Gnost. Schriften* I, p. 182 ff. According to that passage, a man, when living on earth, consists of four parts: viz. the 'Power' (i. e. ἡ θεία δύναμις, the divine principle in the man, which corresponds to the Platonic *νοῦς*; the *ψυχὴ*; the *ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα*; and the *σῶμα*. (The *μοῖρα*, the man's 'destiny', though it is sometimes coupled with the *ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα*, and is reckoned as a fifth thing beside the other four, *ib.* p. 194, l. 31, can hardly be regarded as a part of the man in the same sense.) The *ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα* is the thing in which

visible only to God and to unembodied souls (cf. ἦν δὴ καὶ μόνος ὁ τεχνίτης ἑώρα, said of the soul-stuff in § 14). God, having made the πνεῦμα of a horse, sets it before the soul whose business it is to make the gross body of the horse, and says 'take this πνεῦμα for your model, and make a copy of it in gross matter'; and when the gross body has been made, God puts the πνεῦμα into it. The πνεῦμα, being of the same shape and size as the gross body, permeates and gives life to every part of it; and thus there results a living horse.

The word παράδειγμα may perhaps have been suggested by passages in Plato where the νοητὸν εἶδος is spoken of as the παράδειγμα of which material things are copies (e. g. Pl. *Tim.* 28 A); but the πνεῦμα of a horse, as conceived by the author of the *Kore Kosmi*, has little in common with the αὐτοίππος, or νοητὸν εἶδος of the horse, as conceived by the Platonists.

§ 21. τὰ ἀόρατα πνεύματα (τὸ ὄρατὸν πνεῦμα MSS.). The epithet ὄρατὸν is not applicable to πνεῦμα in any of the various senses of that word. It would perhaps be possible to say τὸ ἀόρατον πνεῦμα, 'the invisible πνεῦμα (of each of the animals which were about to be made)'; but as τοῖς ὄρατοῖς ἔργοις (the gross bodies of the animals) is in the plural, the sense required is better expressed by writing either τὰ ἀόρατα πνεύματα, or τὰ πνεύματα without any adjective.

(ἐξ)ουσίαν τε ὁμοιογονίας (δοῦναι) ἐκάστῳ, ὅπως [αὐτῷ [αὐτοῖς] ἕτερα γεννᾷ ὁμοία,] αὐταὶ (αὐτά MSS.) [τε] μηκέτι ἀνάγκην ἔχουσιν (οὐκ ἔτι ἀνάγκην ἔχουσιν MSS.) ἄλλο τι ποιεῖν (παρ') ἃ ἐφῆσαν ἐργάσασθαι. The production of a first specimen of every species of animals has

the passions reside. It is bound to the ψυχή, but is hostile to it, and causes it to sin. When the soul quits the body at death, the ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα still clings to the ψυχή, and testifies against it before the judgement-seat. But if the ψυχή has obtained forgiveness of its sins by means of sacraments, the bonds by which the ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα is bound to it are loosed, and the ψυχή, released from this appendage, attains to 'the place of its inheritance'.

Ib. p. 39, l. 29: Sophia says 'I am become as an ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα which finds itself in a ἄλικὸν σῶμα, and in which is no Light-power (i. e. no θεῖον φῶς or νοῦς)'. The ἀντίμιμον πνεῦμα then is something intermediate between the ψυχή and the σῶμα. It corresponds partly to τὸ ἀλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς in the Platonic system, and partly to the πνεῦμα which is spoken of in *Corp.* X and other *Hermetica*,—the 'vehicle' or 'garment' of the embodied soul. But why is it called ἀντίμιμον? Probably because it is thought of as a copy or 'double' of the σῶμα,—a gaseous body of the same shape as the visible and tangible body.

Compare Tertullian *De an.* 9: 'Recognita enim, cum Deus "flasset in faciem hominis flatum vitae, et factus esset homo in animam vivam", totum utique per faciem statim flatum illum in interiora transmissum, et per universa corporis spatia diffusum, simulque divina aspiratione densatum, omni intus linea expressum esse, quam densatus impleverat, et velut in forma gelasse. . . . Hic erit homo interior, alius exterior, dupliciter unus, habens et ille oculos et aures suas, . . . habens et cacteros artus.'

now been provided for; but how is a *succession* of animals to be produced? That is the question which is answered by the words *ἐξουσίαν ὁμοιογονίας δοῦναι ἐκάστω*. God promised to give to each of the animals made by the souls and vivified by Him 'power to breed others like to itself'.

This corresponds to *Gen. i. 12*, *σπεῖρον σπέρμα κατὰ γένος καὶ καθ' ὁμοιότητα*, . . . οὐ τὸ σπέρμα αὐτοῦ ἐν αὐτῷ κατὰ γένος,—except that the writer of *Genesis* is there speaking of plants, and not of animals. The corresponding phrase with regard to animals is *Αὐξάνεσθε καὶ πληθύνεσθε*, *Gen. i. 22*.

The words *ὅπως αὐτῷ ἕτερα γενῆ ὅμοια* correctly explain the meaning of *ὁμοιογονία*; but the explanation is superfluous, and was doubtless added by a reader. In the words *ὅπως αὐταὶ (αἱ ψυχαὶ) μηκέτι ἀνάγκην ἔχουσι κ.τ.λ.* we are told that God undertook to do this in order to save the souls the trouble of making each successive generation of animals by a separate act, as they would otherwise have had to do. I have not ventured to bracket this clause; but it may be suspected that the sentence originally ended at *ἐκάστω*, and that all that follows is a later addition.

§ 22. *Τὸ κεκρασμένον . . . [τῆς ὕλης] λαβοῦσαι (λαβόμεναι MSS.) κατενόουν πρῶτον [καὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προσεκύουν κρᾶμα], καὶ ὁπόθεν ἦ(ν) συμπεπλεγμένον ἐπεζήτουν. τῆς ὕλης λαβόμεναι*, 'having taken hold of the material' will not do. *λαβοῦσαι*, 'having received the mixture (from God, who handed it over to them)', gives the sense required.

καὶ τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς προσεκύουν κρᾶμα is manifestly inappropriate. The souls, when they first receive the mixture, are not disposed to 'worship' it, nor even to worship God who has committed it to them; on the contrary, they are tempted to irreverent curiosity. After a time, they fear they may have angered God by their irreverence; and so they set to work. They obey God's command; but we are meant to understand that they ought to have obeyed it more promptly, and that their conduct on this occasion is a first indication of that presumptuous spirit which afterwards caused their fall.

Probably *τὸ τοῦ πατρὸς κρᾶμα* was written in the margin as an alternative for *τὸ κεκρασμένον*, and when the words had got into the text, *προσεκύουν* was added to give them a grammatical construction.

§ 23. *ἐκ μὲν τῆς ἀνωτέρω ὕλης, τῆς ὑπερβολῆς κοῦφον ἐχούσης (τῆ . . . ἐχούση MSS.) τὸν [ἐπίπαγον], τὸ τῶν ὀρνέων γένος ἐμόρφουν (εὐμόρφουν MSS.)*. The *ἐπίπαγος* of the mixture has already been skimmed off, and used up in making the *πνεύματα* of the animals; and ἡ ἀνωτέρω

ἔλη means the upper layer of the *λείψανον* of the mixture. The words *κούφον ἐχούσης τὸν ἐπίπαγον* would imply that a fresh *ἐπίπαγος* has formed on the surface of the upper layer of the *λείψανον*. But the stuff of which the birds are made is the upper layer (ἢ ἀνωτέρα ἔλη) as a whole, not an *ἐπίπαγος* of the upper layer; and there would be no use for any such *ἐπίπαγος*. The word *ἐπίπαγον* must therefore have been substituted by error for some other substantive. A satisfactory sense could be got by writing *κούφην ἐχούσης τὴν σύστασιν*, 'its consistency'.

Four portions of the *λείψανον* are dealt with in succession. We are told that the second portion is denser than the first, because it is situated lower down; that the third is denser than the second, because it is dealt with later; and that the fourth is denser than the third, because it is dealt with later still. It is assumed then that the *λείψανον* increases in density from the surface downward, and also that any given part of it becomes more dense by lapse of time.

[ἐν τούτῳ δ' ἡμιπαγούς ἦδη . . . τὸ τῶν τετραπόδων γένος ἔπλασσον]]. This has evidently been shifted. The order must have been birds, fishes, quadrupeds, reptiles. Birds fly in air; fishes swim in water; quadrupeds walk on earth; reptiles creep on the ground, or live in holes beneath the surface of the earth. Accordingly, the birds are said to have been made of the lightest of the four portions of the *λείψανον*; the fishes, of the next lightest; the quadrupeds, of the third portion, which is heavier, and half-solid; and the reptiles, of the fourth portion, which is heavier still, and quite solidified.

The phrases *κατωφέρους ὑπάρχοντος* and *στερεὰν τὴν (τὴν στερεὰν MSS.) πῆξιν λαβόντος* are wrongly placed in the traditional text; to make the scheme work out rightly, we must interchange them.

[καὶ ἑτέρας ὑγρᾶς οὐσίας (ὑγρασίας οὐσίας F¹) δεόμενον εἰς διάνηξιν]. As there is no corresponding phrase concerning the birds, the quadrupeds, or the reptiles, it is to be presumed that these words have been added by a reader. *ἑτέρας* is probably a variant for *ὑγρᾶς*; and we may suppose that the interpolator wrote <τὸ ὑγρᾶς οὐσίας δεόμενον εἰς διάνηξιν, as an amplification of τὸ τῶν ἰχθύων (sc. γένος).

§ 20. <ὁ δὲ θεὸς . . . >> <τὸν ζῳδιακὸν . . . διέταξε [], καὶ <τούτῳ [τὰς] παν(τ)ουργούς χαρισάμενος (ἐχαρισάμεν MSS.) δυνάμεις [], γεννητικὸν <ἐκέλευσεν εἶναι) τῶν εἰς αἰὲ μelleόντων ἔσσεσθαι > [καθολικῶς] πάντων >> <ζῳῶν). This passage is obviously out of place where it stands in the MSS. If we put it here, it describes the fulfilment of the second of God's two promises in § 21 (ἐξουσίαν ὁμοιογονίας δοῦναι ἐκάστῳ).

God has to contrive some means by which a continual succession of animal births may be effected; and he does so by making or arranging the Zodiac, and assigning to it the function of causing animals to be born. The writer did not think it enough to make God merely say that the animals were to breed; it was generally believed that births were brought about by the operation of astral influences, and it is here assumed that the source of birth-producing influences is the Zodiac. The phrase *παντουργοὺς δυνάμεις*, 'powers of bringing into existence all manner of creatures', corresponds to the term *παντόμορφος* (*omniformis*) which is applied to the Zodiac in *Ascl. Lat.* III. 35 and elsewhere. (The MSS. give *πανούργους*; but *πανούργος* usually means 'crafty' or 'knavish'.)

καθολικῶς is superfluous, as the meaning which it seems intended to express is adequately given by *εἰς ἀεί* and *πάντων*. Some word or phrase meaning 'in succession' would be more appropriate.

It is most likely that this section was preceded by a passage, now lost, in which was described the fulfilment of the first of God's two promises in § 21 (*τοῖς ὄρατοῖς ἔργοις αὐτῶν τὰ ἀόρατα πνεύματα ἐπιζεύξαι*). We may suppose the writer to have said in the lost passage that God put the *πνεύματα* into the bodies of the animals, and thereby gave them life.

τὸν ζῳδιακὸν συμφώνως ταῖς φυσικαῖς (*ψυχικαῖς* MSS.) *κινήσει* (*τῶν ζῴων?*) *διέταξε* [*κόσμον*]. *ψυχικαῖς* is certainly wrong; according to the *Kore Kosmu*, beasts have no *ψυχαί*. Probably the author wrote *φυσικαῖς*. (Cf. § 29: *ὅταν ἡ ἐπικειμένη αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀστέρων κίνησις σύμφωνον ἔχη τὴν ἐνδὸς ἐκάστου φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν*.) The notion implied in these words seems to be that the *κρυπταὶ ἀπόρροιαι* of the stars co-operate with *φύσις* in producing births; i. e. that the astral influences work in accord with the workings of nature in the animals themselves.

Possibly the writer's view may have been that the *bodies* of the offspring are generated by the parent-beasts (that is, by *φύσις* operating in the bodies of the parent-beasts), but that the *πνεύματα* which enter and animate the bodies of the offspring are generated by the Zodiac, or more exactly, that the *πνεῦμα* of each animal that is born is generated by that particular Sign of the Zodiac which is rising above the eastern horizon at the moment of the birth.

[*πρὸς τοῖς ἀνθρωποειδέσι τῶν ζῳδίων* (*ζῳδιακῶν* MSS.) *τὰ ἐξῆς ἀπαρτίσας*]. The person who inserted these words apparently divided the twelve *Zodia* into two classes, the man-shaped *Zodia* (Gemini, Virgo, &c.), and the beast-shaped *Zodia* (Aries, Taurus, &c.). But what

can have been his reason for speaking in this way about the *Zodia*? Perhaps he misunderstood what was said about παραδείγματα in § 19 *fin.*, and assumed that the things which God set before the souls as models to copy from when they were making beasts were the beast-shaped *Zodia*.

[καὶ πάντεχρον πνεῦμα], καὶ πνεῦμά may have been added by the same man who inserted [πνεύματος ἐμοῦ καί] and [πνεῦμα καί] in § 17; and πάντεχρον may perhaps have come from παντέχνους written as an alternative for παντουργούς.

§ 24. ὡς (μέγα) τι πράξασαι, ἤδη. It was only the 'advanced' souls that had actually taken part in the making of the beasts; but all the souls alike were puffed up with sinful pride when they thought of the great thing that had been done by some of them, and consequently all alike incurred the penalty of incarnation.

περίεργον ὠπλίζοντο τόλμαν. Cf. περίεργον ὀπλισθήσονταί (-θήσεται MSS.) τόλμάν in § 45.

⟨τοῖς (γὰρ) ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοῖς ἐφιλονείκουν κ.τ.λ.⟩ In the MSS., this sentence occurs in § 53. But if we read them in the context in which they stand there, we are told that the souls claimed equality with the star-gods at a time 'when they had just been imprisoned (in mortal bodies), and found their degradation unendurable'; which is absurd. If the sentence was written by the author of the narrative, he must have written it in connexion with what is said in § 24 about the presumptuous behaviour by which the souls incurred the penalty of embodiment.

The souls claimed equality with the celestial gods; this implies that they sought to rise above the atmosphere, and enter heaven, in which the star-gods dwell. Admission to heaven had been promised to them as the ultimate reward for obedience (§ 17); but they demanded it before they had deserved it.

As to περικρατοῦσαι, see note on *Exc.* XXIV. 6.

καὶ ἤδη τῶν ἰδίων τμημάτων [] προήρχοντο. This is an overt act of disobedience to God's express command (§ 17). Each of the souls attempted to quit the particular stratum of the atmosphere in which God had placed it, and rise into higher strata; and this they did at their own pleasure, without waiting for God's permission. That would be the first step towards the accomplishment of the design which seems to be ascribed to them in the preceding sentence, viz. that of quitting the atmosphere altogether, and rising to heaven.

ἀεὶ δὲ ἐκινούντο. This phrase may perhaps have been suggested by the Platonic *dictum* that ψυχή is ἀεικίνητος and αὐτοκίνητος (see *Exc.* XVI. 1). But if so, the writer here gives an unusual meaning to that familiar saying.

§ 25. τὸ τῶν ἀνθρώπων σύστημα [τι] τεχνήσασθαι. Man is a σύστημα, i. e. a being composed of body and soul. The ψυχαί, as long as they remain unembodied, are not called ἄνθρωποι. At this point then begins the making of 'man' in the proper sense of that term.

§ 26. Τότε δὴ μεταπεμψάμενος ἐμέ, φησὶν Ἑρμῆς, εἶπεν κ.τ.λ. Hermes, in §§ 26 and 31, is a god, and not a man; he is in existence before the making of men, and is entrusted with the task of making the bodies in which the (human) souls are to be incarnated. Moreover, God calls him 'soul of my soul and mind of my holy mind', which seems to imply that he is placed above all the other gods, and stands next in rank to the supreme God himself. The Hermes thus spoken of is a being of totally different nature from the man Hermes of §§ 3-8; nor can he be identified with the Hermes of § <<32>>, who learnt the *gnosis* from Kamephis.

§§ 27-29. Ἄχρι ποῦ . . . φύλον τὸ ἀνθρώπων. This passage is unconnected with what precedes and follows, and describes things from a different point of view. In § 25, and in §§ 31 ff., the making of men is spoken of as the incarnation of souls hitherto unembodied, and this incarnation is regarded as a punishment. But in §§ 27-29 (with the exception of some words in the speech of Aphrodite, which are out of keeping with the rest of the paragraph, and have presumably been interpolated), nothing is said about punishment; there is not the slightest hint that the souls have offended, or are in disgrace; indeed, there is no mention at all of hitherto unembodied souls; and of the seven gods who speak in the council, two only (Kronos and Ares) announce intentions adverse to mankind, while the other five, so far from desiring to punish men, undertake to confer boons upon them, and we are expressly told that the supreme God is pleased by the benevolent promises of Aphrodite and Hermes. God's reason for making men is here a different one; he is not seeking to punish offenders; he merely observes that the earth is uninhabited, and decides to remedy that defect. Moreover, the gods whom God consults, and on whom it is assumed that the welfare of men depends, are the

seven planet-gods; whereas in the rest of the *Kore Kosmu* no prominence is given to planet-gods or planets.

We must conclude then that §§ 27-29 are an extract from another document, in which the making of men was differently dealt with. This extract may perhaps have been appended by a reader, as a parallel to the passage on the same subject in the *Kore Kosmu*.

According to the traditional text, God says to Hermes, 'Thou soul of my soul, and mind of my holy mind, . . . summon the gods'. But why should Hermes be thus solemnly addressed, if he is merely to be told to deliver notices of a meeting? The 'soul of God's soul' must be something more than a mere messenger; and we expect some more important task to be assigned to him. That expectation is fulfilled, and a satisfactory sequence is obtained, if we cut out §§ 27-29, and assume that the story told by Hermes to Isis ran thus: (§ 26) 'God sent for me, and said, "Thou soul of my soul, and mind of my holy mind, (make bodies in which the offending souls may be incarnated.)" And (§ 30) I looked for material out of which I might make them' &c.

§ 27. "Ἀχρι ποῦ στυγνὴ φύσις ἢ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὀράται; ἄχρι τότε τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα [ἀργὰ] μένει [καὶ] ἀνεγκωμίαστα; φύσις ἢ τῶν ὑποκειμένων, 'the world of things below', means the earth. The earth is *στυγνὴ* (gloomy or dismal), because it is uninhabited; it will cease to be *στυγνὴ* when God has peopled it with men.

Compare § 9 as emended, where we are told that the earth was at first inert and barren. The two passages are inconsistent. According to § 9 ff., God supplied what was lacking by making plants, and the earth was thenceforth *πᾶσι τοῖς περὶ αὐτὴν συγκεκοσμημένη καλοῖς* (§ <<51>>); but according to § 27, the earth remained *στυγνὴ* until the making of men.

τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα ought to mean, not the earth alone, but all parts of the Kosmos, including heaven. But heaven was not *ἀργός* at the time spoken of; its inhabitants, the star-gods, were already in existence. It is therefore necessary to bracket *ἀργά*. The addition of this adjective may have been suggested by § 14 *ἰνί*.

ἀνεγκωμίαστα, on the other hand, goes rightly with τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα. Until men are made, there is no one to sing the praises of the universe and its Maker. Cf. § <<50>> as emended: *μέχρι τότε ἀεπίγνωστοι ταύτης δεσπόσομεν τῆς ἡγεμονίας*;

τοὺς ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοὺς (κάλεσον) πάντας ἤδη. To whom is this

addressed? To Hermes, as messenger of the supreme God? If so, Hermes in this paragraph combines the function of messenger with that of planet-god. But it is possible that the command was addressed to no one person in particular. Would it be better to write <καλείτω τις> instead of <κάλεσον>?

All the star-gods are summoned to the council; but it is only the seven planet-gods that speak. The writer of this paragraph must have ranked the planets above all the other gods of heaven.

[εἶπεν ὁ θεός, ᾧ τέκνον, ὡς φησιν Ἑρμῆς]. These words imply that the speaker is Isis, and that she is repeating to her son Horus a story which she has heard from Hermes. But they are awkwardly placed; and ὡς φησιν Ἑρμῆς can hardly be reconciled with § 29, in which Hermes (the planet-god) is spoken of in the third person. It is therefore most likely that the words εἶπεν . . . Ἑρμῆς were added by the man who inserted the passage into the text of the *Kore Kosmu*. If we omit them, there is nothing to show that Isis is speaking; and we are free to suppose that, in the document to which this paragraph originally belonged, the story of the council of the star-gods was neither put into the mouth of Isis nor said to have been told to her by Hermes, but was narrated by the writer in his own person.

“Ἀπίδετε” εἶπεν “εἰς τὴν γῆν καὶ πάντα τὰ χαμαί. (. . .)” Some description of what was to be seen on earth is wanted. The words which stand at the beginning of the section (ἄχρι ποῦ στυγνὴ φύσις ἢ τῶν ὑποκειμένων ὀρᾶται; ἄχρι πότε τὰ ἤδη γεγονότα μένει ἀνεγκωμίαστα;) would serve the purpose well enough; and it is possible that these words have been shifted, and originally followed τὰ χαμαί.

§ 28. ἔλεγεν Ἡλιος “Ἐπὶ πλέον¹ λάμψω.” It is not clear why the Sun should undertake to shine ‘to a larger extent’; and his speech was probably not quite so curt. As the Moon promises other benefits besides that of giving light, we should have expected the Sun to do likewise.

ἔλεγε δὲ (Σελήνη) καὶ προπεπαιδοποιηκέναι [φόβον καὶ] σιγὴν καὶ ὕπνον [καὶ τὴν μέλλουσαν αὐτοῖς ἔσεσθαι <π>ανωφελῆ μνήμην]. The Moon, inasmuch as she presides over the night, may very well be called the mother of Silence and Sleep; but why should she be called the mother of Memory?¹

¹ The Egyptian god Thoth, the scribe and recorder (ὑπομνηματογράφος) of the gods, is said to have been originally a moon-god; but I know of no evidence that

φόβον was probably added by some one who thought of nightly terrors. But terror is not a thing that can be fitly coupled with the boons of silence and sleep.

Κρόνος ἀπήγγειλεν ἤδη πατῆρ γεγονέναι δίκης καὶ ἀνάγκης. The influences of the planet Saturn are maleficent. ἀνάγκη is a force to which men submit with reluctance; and δίκη means 'penal justice', as in *Exc.* VII.

Ζεὺς ἔλεγεν "Ὡς μὴ παντάπασι πολέμοις ἀπόληται (πολεμήσαι MSS.) τὸ φύλον τὸ ἐσόμενον (ἐσομένων MSS.), ἤδη αὐτοῖς καὶ τύχην καὶ ἐλπίδα καὶ εἰρήνην γεγέννηκα." [Fortune and Hope were thought to play a decisive part in war. Cf. Dion Chrysost. *De Fort.* I. 2 f: αὕτη πολεμουμένων μὲν ἐστὶ νίκη . . . ὡς δὲ ναὺς εἰκὴ φέρεται καὶ ταχὺ βυθίζεται, κυβερνήτου στερομένη, . . . οὕτω πόλις εἰς φθορὰν ὄλη χωρεῖ σπάνει τύχης; II. 8, ὠνόμασται δὲ ἡ τύχη καὶ πολλοῖς τισὶν ἐν ἀνθρώποις ὀνόμασι, τὸ μὲν ἴσον αὐτῆς νέμεσις, τὸ δὲ ἄδηλον ἐλπίς κ.τ.λ. Plut. *De fort. Rom.* 5: καὶ τάχα που τῇ τύχῃ τὴν ἀνδρείαν παρωνόμασεν, ἢ πλείστον εἰς τὸ νικᾶν τύχης μέτεστι, and *passim.*]

[Ὡς μὴ χαλεπωτάτην αἱ συγγενεῖς ψυχὰι τὴν καταδίκην ὑπομένωσιν (ὑπομένουσαι MSS.)] [ἐπὶ πλέον κολάζωνται]. ἐπὶ πλέον κολάζωνται is an alternative for χαλεπωτάτην . . . τὴν καταδίκην ὑπομένωσιν. The planet Venus is here made to speak of God's decision to punish the souls by incarnation (§ 25). But as there is no mention of punishment in the speeches of the six other planets, there can be little doubt that these words were added after §§ 27-29 had been inserted in the *Kore Kosmu*.

§ 29. Ἐγὼ δέ, εἶπεν Ἑρμῆς, [καὶ] (συνετήν) ποιήσω τὴν (τῶν) ἀνθρώπων φύσιν [ἔφη], καὶ σοφίαν αὐτοῖς [καὶ σωφροσύνην καὶ πειθῶ] καὶ ἀλήθειαν παραθήσω (ἀναθήσω MSS.). The Hermes here spoken of is neither the man Hermes of §§ 3-8, nor the great god Hermes of §§ 26 and 30; he is the planet Mercury. The thing which this planet-god is to do for men must have been indicated by some lost adjective such as *συνετήν*. He will make them intelligent, and will thereby enable them to attain to 'wisdom and (knowledge of the) truth'.

I know of no authority for attributing *σωφροσύνη* to the influence of this planet; and as the moral virtues are not elsewhere spoken of in §§ 27-29, it is not likely that one of them would be mentioned here. *πειθῶ* (persuasive eloquence) might be reckoned among the gifts of the Greek god Hermes and the planet assigned to him; but it is inappropriate in this passage.

in the third century A. D. memory was thought to be in any way connected with the moon.

καὶ οὐ παύσομαι [τῇ εὐρέσει συνών] [ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ ζφιδίων τῶν ἐμῶν γινομένων ἀνθρώπων] εἰσαεὶ τὸν θνητῶν βίον ὠφελῶν (ὠφελήσω MSS.) [ζφῖδια γὰρ [[τὰ]] ἐμοὶ ἀνέθηκεν ὁ πατήρ καὶ δημιουργὸς <<τὰ>> ἔμφρονα [γε] καὶ νοερά]. The addition of τῇ εὐρέσει συνών may have been suggested by the mention of Εὐρεσις in § 13.¹

The words τῶν ὑπὸ ζφιδίων τῶν ἐμῶν γινομένων ἀνθρώπων would imply that there are certain Signs of the Zodiac which are placed under the control of the planet-god Hermes, and that he limits his benefits to the men who are born under those Signs. And in the following clause, the Signs placed under his control appear to be called ζφῖδια τὰ ἔμφρονα καὶ νοερά. But a distinction between certain Signs of the Zodiac which are ἔμφρονα καὶ νοερά, and certain others which are not ἔμφρονα καὶ νοερά, would be unexampled; and there can be little doubt that there is some corruption. The text of the MSS. may be conjecturally accounted for as follows. Some one wrote ζῶα γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἀνέθηκεν ὁ πατήρ καὶ δημιουργὸς τὰ ἔμφρονα καὶ νοερά, using the phrase ζῶα τὰ ἔμφρονα καὶ νοερά to signify men as opposed to beasts, and meaning that men, *qua* intelligent, are under the special charge of Hermes, the god who confers intelligence; and a later transcriber, whose thoughts were running on the Zodiac, (perhaps the same man who inserted the words πρὸς τοῖς ἀνθρωποειδέσι τῶν ζφιδί[ακ]ων τὰ ἐξῆς ἀπαρτίσας in § 20,) altered ζῶα into ζφῖδια, and added the words τῶν ὑπὸ ζφιδίων τῶν ἐμῶν γινομένων ἀνθρώπων above. But the clause ζῶα γὰρ . . . καὶ νοερά cannot have been written by the original author of the paragraph. Hermes ought not to be made to speak thus of the Demiurgus in answer to a question put to him by the Demiurgus himself; if he said anything of the sort, he ought to say ἐμοὶ σὺν ἀνέθηκας rather than ἐμοὶ ἀνέθηκεν ὁ πατήρ καὶ δημιουργός.

καὶ τότε πλέον (*sc.* ὠφελήσω), ὅταν [καὶ] (ἢ) ἐπικειμένη αὐτοῖς τῶν ἀστέρων κίνησις σύμφωνον ἔχη τὴν ἐνὸς ἐκάστου φυσικὴν ἐνέργειαν. The influence of the stars on a man is here distinguished from the operation of φύσις in him (*cf.* § 20 *init.*). φύσις so works in some men (*i. e.* their bodies are so composed and constructed) as to qualify them for attaining to a high degree of intelligence; and in such men, the work of φύσις co-operates with the stellar influence which is brought to bear on them by the planet Hermes.

¹ I had thought of transposing τῇ εὐρέσει συνών, and placing it before σοφίαν αὐτοῖς . . . παραθήσω. If it is to be retained, that is perhaps the best place for it; but it is not needed there.

§ 30. ὁ δὲ ταῖς ψυχαῖς προσέταξε τοῦ κράματος τὸ λείψανον δοῦναι. It seems hardly fitting that God should order the souls to take action conducive to their own punishment;¹ perhaps therefore it would be better to bracket ταῖς ψυχαῖς, and translate 'God commanded that the residuum of the mixture should be given to me'. But whether we retain ταῖς ψυχαῖς or cut it out, the λείψανον here spoken of must be the residuum of the second mixture (i. e. the stuff out of which the bodies of the beasts had been made by the advanced souls), and not the residuum of the first mixture. The bodies of men consist of the same materials as the bodies of beasts; both alike are composed chiefly, if not solely, of the grosser elements; and it was the second mixture, and not the first, that contained the grosser elements.

At this point, the writer's scheme does not work out quite satisfactorily. The πνεύματα of beasts are made out of the ἐπίπαγος of the second mixture, and the bodies of beasts out of the λείψανον of the second mixture; the ψυχαί of men are made out of the ἐπίπαγος of the first mixture, and symmetry would seem to require that the bodies of men should be made out of the λείψανον of the first mixture. But the writer knew that the chief components of human bodies, as well as of the bodies of beasts, were earth and water; he was therefore obliged to say that the bodies of men and beasts alike were made out of the λείψανον of the second mixture, and to leave the λείψανον of the first mixture unutilized.

καὶ λαβὼν εὗρον αὐτὸ παντελῶς ξηρόν. ἔνθεν πολλῶ [πλείονι τοῦ δέοντος] ἐχρησάμην (εἰς) κατὰμξιιν ὕδατι, οὕτω (ὡς MSS.) (δὲ) τὴν τῆς ὕλης σύστασιν νεαροποιήσας (-ποιήσασθαι MSS.) [] ἔπλασα. We were told in § 23 that the portion of the λείψανον which remained when the souls were finishing their work was already completely solidified, and was consequently not fit for making anything above the grade of reptiles. If human bodies are to be made of it, it must first be restored to a liquid condition; and this is what Hermes does by adding water to it.

The words πλείονι τοῦ δέοντος imply that he did his work badly, and are inconsistent with καλὸν ὑπῆρχέ μου τὸ ἔργον, καὶ ἐτεροπόμην βλέπων.

[ὡς ἔκλυτον παντάπασι καὶ ἀσθενές καὶ ἀδύνατον τὸ πλασσομένο εἶναι]. This must have been inserted by some one who misunderstood the writer's reason for saying that Hermes added water to the mixture.

¹ It is not till later (§ 31) that the souls become aware that they are sentenced to incarnation.

The words imply that the addition of water caused the bodies made of the mixture to be feebler than they would otherwise have been ; but it follows from § 23 that this is a reversal of the author's meaning. Water stands higher than earth in the scale of elements ; and an addition of water to the solidified mass is needed if human bodies are to be made from it, because human bodies, though imprisonment in them is a degradation to unembodied souls, stand higher in the scale of existence than the bodies of reptiles.

[ὡς μὴ πρὸς τῷ συνετὸν εἶναι ἔτι καὶ δυνάμειως ἢ πεπληρωμένον.] These words were probably added by another person in consequence of the same misunderstanding.

καὶ καλὸν ὑπήρχε <<μου τὸ ἔργον>>. Incarnation is a punishment ; but the human body is a well made thing (cf. *Corp.* V. 6-8 a), and Hermes had good reason to be proud of his workmanship.

§ 31. [ἐθαύμασα οὖν]. ἐθαύμασα is perhaps a corrupted doublet of ἐστύγνασαν.

[§ 32. πρόσεχε . . . παρ' ἐμοῦ]. This section is manifestly out of place. There is no reason why Isis should describe her report of the lamentations of the souls about to be embodied, in distinction from the rest of her discourse, as a κρυπτή θεωρία ; nor is there any reason why she should interrupt her narrative at this particular point to tell her son whence she got her information. And supposing that she did so, she would have no occasion to mention Kamephis, seeing that in the preceding sections her sole informant is the god Hermes, who was an eyewitness and participant in the events narrated.

The proper place for such a statement as this is at the *beginning* of a discourse of Isis to Horus ; and I have accordingly transposed § 32 to the beginning of the Excerpt.

§ 33. αἱ μὲν [γὰρ] αὐτῶν αὐτὸ μόνον ὠδύροντο καὶ ἐστέναζον, <<αἱ δὲ <καὶ ἀντε>πάλαιον>>. The clause beginning with αἱ μὲν must have been followed by a clause beginning with αἱ δέ, in which it was said that others did something more than merely (αὐτὸ μόνον) lament ; and the simile which follows (ὄνπερ τρόπον τῶν θηρίων κ.τ.λ.) shows that what these others did was to struggle against the compulsion to which they were subjected. It may therefore be conjectured that the author wrote αἱ δὲ καὶ ἀντεπάλαιον, and that the meaningless words αἱ δὲ παλαιῶν (αἱ δὲ πλέον), which occur at the end of the section, are a misplaced corruption of that phrase.

ὄνπερ τρόπον τῶν [γεγονότων] θηρίων τὰ ἐλευθέρ(ι)α δό[υ]λοις πονηρῶν [μελήσει] (οἱ δούλων πονηρῶν μελέταις?) τῆς συνήθους [καὶ φιλῆς]

ἀποσπώμενα ἐρημίας (ἐπιχειρεῖ) μάχεσθαι [καὶ στασιάζειν] [καὶ οὐχ ὁμονοεῖν] πρὸς τοὺς κρατήσαντας αὐτῶν [καὶ στασιάζειν]. The souls are compared to wild beasts (e. g. lions, or possibly elephants,) entrapped and vainly struggling against their captors. As to τῶν θηρίων τὰ ἐλευθέρια, cf. Arist. *Hist. an.* I. I, 488 b 16: τὰ δὲ (τῶν ζώων ἐστίν) ἐλευθέρια καὶ ἀνδρεία καὶ εὐγενή, οἷον λέων. The word γεγονότων may have been added by some one who was thinking of the making of beasts in §§ 18–23. στασιάζειν and οὐχ ὁμονοεῖν are feeble alternatives for μάχεσθαι.

[ἀλλὰ καί, ἐὰν τύχη περιγενόμενα, θανάτῳ παραδίδωσι (παραδώσουσι MSS.) τοὺς (τοῖς MSS.) αὐτοῖς ἐπιβάλλοντας]. This is an inappropriate amplification of the simile. Lions sometimes kill their assailants; but the souls cannot have killed or tried to kill God's agents (presumably gods of the same type as Hermes) by whom they were being imprisoned in bodies.

ἔτριζον δίκην ἀσπίδων. [In *Od.* 24. ll. 5, 7, 9 *τρίζειν* is used of the suitors' souls conducted by Hermes to the abode of the dead. The passage was so often quoted that this seems the natural word for the impotent cry ('vox exigua') of a soul under compulsion, and not inconceivably the expansion of the previous simile may imitate Homer too. 'Like asps' is a local touch. It is true that *τρίζειν* means primarily the shrill noise of a bat or mouse or locust, and that *συρίζειν* is the κύριον ὄνομα for a snake's hiss. But there seems no reason why, by the Hermetist's time, *τρίζειν* should not have had the same extension of meaning as *stridere*. In *Ar. H. A.*, 535 b, where ψόφος is distinguished from φωνή, τριγμός and συριγμός are both used to describe the inarticulate ψόφοι of fish.]

§ 34. πολλάκις ἄνω τε καὶ κάτω [[τοὺς]] [οἷους (ὡς MSS.) ἔτυχεν ἔχουσα] μεταφέρουσα <<τοὺς>> ὀφθαλμούς. The distressed soul, still situated in the atmosphere, directs its eyes alternately upward to heaven, from which it is henceforward to be separated by a greater distance, and downward to earth, to which it is to be banished.

For [οἷους ἔτυχεν ἔχουσα], cf. *χείρας [οἷας δὴ θεὸν εἰκὸς ἔχειν]* in § <<52>> as emended. Unembodied souls have no bodily eyes; and some one (probably not the author) thought it worth while to remind the reader of that fact.

<<περιλαμπή τε [ὀφθαλμοὶ θεῶν] ἄστρο, καὶ [[]] ἡλίου καὶ σελήνης <<φῶς>> ἀκοπίαστον>>. In the MSS., these words are separated from Οὐρανέ by the intervening mention of αἰθήρ, ἀήρ, and πνεῦμα. But the stars, sun, and moon are inhabitants of heaven, and ought to be spoken of in connexion with it.

The writer of the *Kore Kosmu* regards the stars as gods, and therefore would hardly call them 'eyes of gods', though a person who was not thinking of them as gods might very well describe them by that phrase.

αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἀήρ, καὶ τοῦ μονάρχου [θεοῦ] [χειρές τε καὶ] ἱερὸν πνεῦμα, [[]] τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἄρχῆς¹ σύντροφα. αἰθήρ τε καὶ ἀήρ means the atmosphere. Cf. [ἀήρ τε καὶ αἰθήρ] in § <<11>>; and see note on αἰθέρος in § 17.

The ἱερὸν πνεῦμα of God is also the atmosphere, regarded as God's life-breath; cf. πνεῦμα ἀπὸ τοῦ ἰδίου λαβῶν in § 14. The soul, after appealing to heaven and its inhabitants, goes on to appeal to the atmosphere. The addition of χεῖρες may have been suggested by ἱερὸν ὀμνύω [πνεῦμα καὶ] κρᾶμα τοῦτο . . . ψυχοποιοῦς τε ταύτας μου τὰς χεῖρας in § 17; but the mention of God's hands is irrelevant in § 34.

The phrase τὰ τῆς ἡμετέρας ἄρχῆς¹ σύντροφα refers to αἰθήρ, ἀήρ, and πνεῦμα, from which it has been separated in the MSS. by the interposition of the misplaced words περιλαμπῆ . . . ἀκοπίαστον. The souls have hitherto dwelt in the atmosphere; the components of the atmosphere are therefore called by the soul which speaks 'the sharers of our home'. ἀρχῆς, which may have come from ἀρχὴ γενέσεως above, has been substituted by error for some other substantive, possibly φύσεως.

Ἰπλέον οὐδ' ὅτι¹ ἀπὸ [[μεγάλων τε καὶ λαμπρῶν]] [καὶ] τοῦ ἱεροῦ περιχύματος καὶ (τόπου) πλησίου (πλουσίου MSS.) (τοῦ) πόλου (< . . >). τὸ ἱερὸν περίχυμα means the atmosphere. If the souls lived in the atmosphere, they lived not *in* the sphere of heaven, but *near* it; the meaningless πλουσίον must therefore be altered into πλησίον. Cf. § 3, where I have corrected πλουσίαν into παραπλησίαν.

[ἐπὶ] τῆς μακαρίας [μετὰ θεῶν] πολιτείας (<ἐκπεσοῦσαι>). The μακαρία πολιτεία of which the souls are to be deprived is the life they have been living in the atmosphere. For πολιτεία in this sense, cf. πολιτεύεται in *Exc.* XXIV. 18 and *Exc.* XXVI. 19. The words μετὰ θεῶν, which would imply that they have hitherto dwelt in heaven, may have been added by the same person who inserted οὐρανῶ in § 16.

§ 35. [[τί ταῖς δυστήναις . . . τούτων ἄξιον;]] The question 'What have we done to deserve these punishments?' ought to stand at the end of the speaker's description of the punishments, and not in the middle of it; I have therefore transposed these words to the begin-

ning of § 37. But it is possible that § 37 originally followed immediately on § 35 *imit.*, and that all that intervenes (οἶαι τὰς δειλαίας . . . καρδίας ὄγκος) has been added by a later hand.

οἶα (ᾠσα P) [] πράξομεν, ἴνα τῷ [ὔδαρεῖ καὶ] ταχὺ διαλύτῃ σώματι πορίζωμεν τὰ ἐπιτήδεια. Embodied souls are troubled by the necessity of providing for the needs of the body, and are forced by this necessity to do things unworthy of them. Cf. *Corp.* VI. 6 *fin.*

ὔδαρεῖ implies the same notion which was expressed by the interpolated words ὡς ἐκλυτον . . . τὸ πλασσόμενον εἶναι in § 30.

§ 36. (οἶ) ὀφθαλμοὶ [] χωρήσουσιν ὀλίγον (ὀλίγοι MSS.), καὶ [[] τῷ ἐν τούτοις τοῖς κύκλοις ὑγρῷ (τῶν ἐν τούτοις ὑγρῶν καὶ κύκλων MSS.) <<παντελῶς μικρὸν>> τὸν ἑαυτῶν πρόγονον οὐρανὸν δρῶσαι στενάξομεν αἰ. The souls have hitherto seen with 'the eyes of the mind'; they will henceforth have to see with bodily eyes instead, and this passage describes the disadvantages of the latter kind of vision. The bodily eyes 'have little room to take things in' (χωρήσουσιν ὀλίγον); that is, the images of things must be reduced to small compass if they are to enter the eyes; (this seems to be the writer's way of accounting for the fact that the apparent size of objects is diminished by distance;) and consequently, heaven, as seen by bodily eyes, will look 'very small'. Moreover, the eyes, being composed of watery matter, are ill suited for seeing the fiery sphere of heaven. [See Addenda in vol. iv.]

καὶ <βλέποντες δ'> οὐ βλέψομεν <<ἀντικρυς>> [ἐνθ(εν) Ὀρφεὺς κ.τ.λ.] ἀθλίαις γὰρ κατεκρίθη ἡμῖν <σκότος> (ἀθλιαὶ γὰρ κατεκρίθημεν MSS.). The author probably wrote something to this effect, though his words cannot be restored with certainty. 'We shall not see clearly; for one cannot see unless there is light, and there will be little light in the place to which we are to be banished.' Light is at its maximum in heaven, and diminishes as one descends; so that, as compared with the home of the souls ἐν μετασίῳ, the surface of the earth, on which they are henceforth to dwell, is a region of darkness.

The quotation from Orpheus must have been appended by a reader. It appears to mean 'we see, not with our eyes, but with the light or fire contained in the eyes'.

τῶν συγγενῶν φυσ[σ]ώντων ἐν ἀέρι πνευμάτων ἀκούουσαι (ἀκούσαι MSS.) τλημόνως οἶσομεν ὅτι μὴ συμπνέομεν αὐτοῖς. Next to seeing comes hearing. But the speaker deals with the sense of sight in one way, and with that of hearing in another. We have been

told that the souls will see less fully and clearly than they did before; but we are here told, not that they will hear less clearly, but that something which they will hear will cause them sorrow.

τὰ πνεύματα here means the winds. Souls and winds are 'akin', because both alike are made of the gaseous materials of which the atmosphere consists; and the sound of the wind will remind them of their home in the atmosphere, where they were companions of the winds.

οἶκος (γὰρ) ἡμᾶς ἀντὶ τοῦ μεταρσίου κόσμου τούτου ὁ βραχὺς περιμένει καρδίας ὄγκος. κόσμος is here used in the sense of 'a region of the universe', as in §§ 14 and 17.

Chrysippus and most of the Stoics said that the soul permeates the whole body, but that the ἡγεμονικόν of the soul resides in the heart. (See Arnim *Sto. vet. fr.* vol. ii. §§ 879-911.) The writer of the *Kore Kosmu* says that the embodied soul is confined to the heart; but the soul of which he is speaking corresponds to the ἡγεμονικόν of the Stoics rather than to the ψυχή which, according to them, extends throughout the body.

§ 37. ((διάταξον ἡμῖν τινὰς ὅρους (τῆς κολάσεως)) ((εἰ (ἀεὶ MSS.) δὲ (ἀμετάθετος ἢ καταδίκη?), ἐπιλήσας (ἀπολύσας MSS.) ἡμᾶς ἀφ' οἶων (ὦν MSS.) εἰς οἷα κατέβημεν ἀπόλυε τοῦ (ἀπολεῖ τὸ MSS.) λυπεῖσθαι.)) These petitions are wrongly placed in the MSS.: they ought to stand at the end of the speech. The spokesman of the souls prays for two distinct alleviations of their punishment, viz. (1) that limits may be set to the duration of their life in the body, and (2) that during their residence on earth they may be spared the sorrow of remembering their happier home above. We are told that both these requests were granted (ἐπέτυχον κ.τ.λ., § 38 *init.*). The first of them, however, is not granted unconditionally; God's answer to it is given in § 39, where he promises release from the body as a reward for good conduct, but at the same time announces that souls which do amiss in their human life on earth will incur the still severer punishment of reincarnation in the bodies of beasts. God's answer to the second request,—the petition for *lethe*,—is given in § 41 (τυφλωθήσεται δ' ἑμῶν ἢ φρόνησις κ.τ.λ.).

§ 38. [λόγοι τοῦ θεοῦ.] If λόγοι is the right reading, the plural word must refer to §§ 38-39 and §§ 40-41, regarded as two different speeches of God. But it is possible that the man who inserted this superscription wrote λόγος.

God's speech, as given in the MSS., is incoherent; and in order

to make sense, it is necessary to assume that four distinct pieces of it have been shifted.

ἄσαι τὴν ἀγήρατόν μου σκηπτουχίαν θεραπεύετε. This does not mean that there are some souls that refuse submission to God's rule; even those who resisted at first have now submitted, and the speech is addressed to all of them together. Cf. Θεοί, ὅσοι τῆς κορυφαίας . . . φύσεως τετεύχαστε, in §⟨⟨50⟩⟩.

τὰ (πλησίον) τοῦ οὐρανοῦ ὤκεῖτε (οἰκῆσετε MSS.) χωρία. In this phrase, and in the words τὸν ἑαυτῶν ἰοῦρανόν¹ ἀσπάσσεσθε and ἰοῦρανόν¹ μὲν οὐκέτι οἰκῆσετε in § 39, the text has been altered by some one who assumed that the souls dwelt in heaven before their incarnation. In each of these three places, some term denoting the atmosphere is needed.

⟨⟨σπλάγγνοις καταδικασθεῖσαι⟩⟩ θητοῖς, καὶ αὐταὶ (τὸν τοῦτοις) προσμεμοιρα[σ]μένον χώρον [[]] ἐνοικήσετε. The souls are sentenced to imprisonment in organs of the body (cf. καρδίας ὄγκος in § 36 *fin.*), and must therefore reside in the place assigned to carnal bodies, i. e. on earth.

For the dative with καταδικασθεῖσαι, cf. καταδικασθῆναι θανάτῳ in Diod. 13. 101. As there is good authority for the verb μοιράω, and none for μοιράζω, it is to be presumed that the author wrote προσμεμοιραμένοι.

§ 39. (εἰς) Ἰῶα δ' ἄλογα μετα(βᾶσαι, χαμαὶ) πλανώμεναι (μεταπλανῶμεναι MSS.) (τὸ) λοιπὸν διατελέσετε. The compound μεταπλανῶσθαι does not occur elsewhere; and some such change as I have proposed is needed to make the clause intelligible.

As the bodies of beasts are (according to the writer of this document) animated by πνεύματα, and not by ψυχαί, it may perhaps be inferred that the degraded souls which incur this punishment will be transformed into mere πνεύματα.

§ 40. πάσαις αὐταῖς ἔχαρίσατο πνεύματα¹. If πνεύματα is sound, the meaning must be that God wrapped or clothed the naked souls in πνεύματα (cf. *Cor.* X. 13 and 16), as a preparation for their incarnation in gross bodies. This would imply that a man consists of σῶμα, πνεῦμα, and ψυχή, whereas a beast consists of σῶμα and πνεῦμα alone. But as there is no mention of human πνεύματα elsewhere in the *Kore Kosmu*, it seems more likely that πνεύματα is a misreading for σώματα or πλάσματα.

§ 41. (. . . ἀρχ)ῆ τοίνυν [διαφορὰ] [τῆς] παλιγγενεσίας ὑμῖν ἔσται ἢ τῶν σωμάτων [ὡς ἔφην] διαφ(θ)ορά, [εὐεργεσία δὲ] καὶ (τῆς) πρόσθεν

εὐδαιμονία(ς ἀνανέωσις) ἢ διάλυσις. The destruction of the body will result in the 'rebirth' of the soul; that is, the soul, when released from the body by death, will return to its home above, and will there begin a new and happier life. This promise must be understood to be conditional on the good conduct of the souls during their life on earth; it does not hold good in the case of those who do ill, and thereby incur the penalty of reincarnation in the bodies of beasts (§ 39 *fin.*).

[διαφορά] is a misplaced doublet of διαφ(θ)ορά; and [εὐεργεσία δὲ] has come from εὐεργεσίαν in the following sentence.

τυφλωθήσεται δ' ὑμῶν ἢ φρόνησις, [ἐάν τι ἀνάξιον ἐμοῦ δόξητε πρόσσειν,] ὥστε . . . τὴν μὲν κόλασιν ὡς εὐεργεσίαν ἵπομένειν¹ (ὑπονοεῖν?), τὴν δὲ εἰς τὰ βελτίονα μεταβολὴν (ὡς) ἀτιμίαν [τε] καὶ ὕβριν. This, like the preceding sentence, applies to those souls only who shall live good lives on earth; for it is in the case of such souls alone that death is 'a change for the better'. The words ἐάν τι ἀνάξιον ἐμοῦ δόξητε πρόσσειν must therefore be struck out. ἀνάξιον ἐμοῦ is a strange phrase; perhaps it is a misreading for something like ἀνάξιον τῆς γενέσεως ὑμῶν, 'unworthy of your origin' (cf. τῆς ἐαντῶν γενέσεως ἄξιον in § 40).

Death is, for good men, a change for the better; but men will be deluded into thinking that it is an evil for all alike, and will do all they can to postpone it. All men fear death,—except the few who have learnt that for them it is the entrance into a new and happier life; and even these few must have shared the delusion of the rest before they were enlightened.

αἱ δικαιοτέραι δ' ὑμῶν καὶ τὴν εἰς τὸ [θεῖον] μεταβολὴν ἐκδεχόμεναι (< . . .). ἢ εἰς τὸ θεῖον μεταβολή would mean the transformation of 'souls' into gods, or in other words, admission to heaven. In § 17, speaking to the souls before their fall, God set before them the prospect of admission to heaven as the ultimate reward for obedience; but as nothing appears to have been hitherto said about it in God's speech to them *after* their fall (§§ 38-41), there is probably some error in the text. Perhaps τὸ θεῖον has been substituted for τὸ βέλτιον. But τὴν εἰς τὸ (βέλτιον?) μεταβολὴν would hardly have been written by the author so soon after τὴν δὲ εἰς τὰ βελτίονα μεταβολὴν in the preceding sentence; it may therefore be suspected that καὶ τὴν . . . ἐκδεχόμεναι is a later addition. In any case, the men spoken of in these words are the few who have attained to *gnosis*, and are no longer subject to the general delusion about death.

What was said about these 'more righteous souls', we do not know, as the rest of the sentence is lost.

§ 42. [εἰς μὲν ἀνθρώπους, βασιλεῖς δίκαιοι . . . τοῦ τῶν ἐνύδρων γένους.] The meaning of this section appears to be as follows: 'The noblest of the souls, when they are incarnated in human bodies, become righteous kings &c.; when in bird-bodies, eagles; when in quadruped bodies, lions; when in reptile bodies, dragons; and when in fish-bodies, dolphins.' But this is inconsistent with § 39 *fin.* (where it is implied that vicious souls alone will be incarnated in the bodies of beasts), and cannot have been written by the same person.

The quaint statements about eagles, lions, dragons, and dolphins, by which the writer of the passage seeks to prove that these animals are the noblest of their respective orders, are of the same character as many that are to be found in the medieval 'Bestiaries', the contents of which are derived chiefly from the so-called *Physiologus*¹ ascribed to Epiphanius (A. D. 367-403). The verbs in these statements ought to be in the present tense, but have been altered into the future by some one who was trying to make the passage agree with the context, when it had been inserted in the *Kore Kosmu*.

οὐδὲ [πλησίον τούτων] ζῶον ἕτερον ἀσθενέστερόν τι αὐτῶν (αὐτοῦ MSS.) ἀδικεῖν ἀφεθήσεται¹. The writer of these words seems to have been unaware that eagles are birds of prey. ἀφεθήσεται and μετελεύσεται are probably two different attempts to fill the gap left by the loss of some such verb as ἐφίενται.

[καὶ φύσεως ἔτυχεν ἀκοιμήτου τρόπῳ τιμ.] If these words are retained, οὔτε κοιμῶνται is mere iteration.

οὔτε γὰρ κάμνουσιν (κάμνωσιν MSS.) οὔτε κοιμῶνται. Cf. Aelian *De animalibus* 5. 39: λέγει Δημόκριτος τῶν ζῶων μόνον τὸν λέοντα ἐκπεπταμένοις τίκτεσθαι τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς. . . ἐφύλαξαν δὲ ἄλλοι καὶ καθεύδων ὅτι κινεῖ τὴν οὐρὰν, ἐνδεικνύμενος ὡς τὸ εἰκὸς ὅτι μὴ πάντῃ ἀτρεμεῖ, μηδὲ μὴν κυκλωσάμενος αὐτὸν καὶ περιελθὼν ὁ ἵππος καθεῖλεν, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τῶν ζῶων τὰ λοιπά. τοιοῦτόν τι φυλάξαντας Αἰγυπτίους ὑπὲρ αὐτοῦ κομπάζειν φασί, λέγοντας ὅτι κρείττων ἵπνου λέων ἐστίν, ἀγρυπνῶν αἰεῖ. ταύτῃ τοι καὶ ἡλίω ἀποκρίνειν αὐτὸν αὐτοῦς πέπυσμαί

¹ Christ, *Gesch. der griech. Litt.* p. 911, says that the *Physiologus* is a Christian revision of a book which 'originated in Alexandria in the circle of the Hellenistic Jews, in the first half of the second century A. D.', and was 'a product of Egyptian and Hebrew beast-symbolism'. That book may have been known to the writer of *Exc.* XXIII. 42. The *Physiologus* has many points of resemblance with Aelian's book on animals.

καὶ γάρ τοι καὶ τὸν ἥλιον, θεῶν ὄντα φιλοπονώτατον, κατὰ τὸ ἢ ἄνω τῆς γῆς ὁρᾶσθαι ἢ τὴν κάτω πορείαν ἰέναι, μὴ ἡσυχάζοντα. See also Cramer *Anecd. Oxon.* II. 235, 32.

(ὁ δράκων) ἰδὼν οὐκ ἔχει (οὐχ ἔξει MSS.). Cf. Plin. *Nat. hist.* 29. 67: 'draco non habet venena.'

νεάζει (ἐάσει M-S.) δὲ καὶ γηράσαν. I. e. it casts off its old skin. This might be said of snakes in general. Cf. Aristot. *Hist. an.* 8. 17, 600 b 15: τῶν δὲ φωλούντων ἐνιοὶ τὸ καλούμενον γῆρας ἐκδύνουσιν ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο τὸ ἔσχατον δέρμα. . . ἐκδύνει δὲ τὸ γῆρας ὄσων (sc. φολιδωτῶν) τὸ δέρμα μαλακὸν . . ., καὶ μάλιστα πάντων οἱ ὄφεις.

τοὺς μὲν ἔμπνοους διακομίζουσιν (τὰ μὲν ἔμπνοα διακομοῦσιν MSS.) εἰς γῆν. The story of Arion was the best known instance.

τοσαῦτα ὁ θεὸς εἰπὼν ἀόρατος (ἄφθαρτος MSS.) [νοῦς] γίγνεται. ἄφθαρτος νοῦς cannot be right. Neither God nor νοῦς can at any time be other than ἄφθαρτος; and if God is νοῦς, he must have been νοῦς during his speech as well as before and after it. If we read ἀόρατος, the meaning is that God, when he addressed the souls, assumed a form visible to them, and put off that visible form when his speech was ended.

God 'became invisible' to the souls at the time when they were embodied; possibly this is meant to imply that for embodied souls (i. e. for men living on earth) God is always invisible.

[§§ 43-48. τούτων οὕτως γενομένων . . . ἤδη τὸ ὄργανον ἐκινεῖτο]. It is impossible to reconcile this passage with what has preceded. We have been told that God condemned the souls to incarnation as a punishment for their presumption. The condition to which the souls were about to be reduced by the infliction of this punishment (i. e. by the making of men) has been described as intensely miserable (§§ 31-37); and the misery which their incarnation involves is but slightly alleviated by God's subsequent announcements (§§ 38-41). But in §§ 43-48, the making of men is differently conceived. In this passage, there is no suggestion that incarnation is a punishment. We are here told that Hermes made men; that, if his first design had been carried out without alteration, the men he made would have been free from trouble and sorrow; and that a device by which they were subjected to trouble and sorrow was added by an after-thought. It is evident then that §§ 43-48 cannot have been written by the author of the preceding narrative; this passage must have been extracted from some other document, and inserted in the *Kore Kosmu* by a transcriber.

ἰσχυρότατόν τι ἀπὸ γῆς ἀνίσταται πνεῦμα (ᾧ ὄνομα Μῶμος²). The word πνεῦμα is here employed as equivalent to δαίμων or δαιμόνιον,— a use which seems to indicate Jewish influence.

In the MSS., the name of this 'spirit' is not given until § 48 *init.*, where he is incidentally spoken of as Momus (Μῶμον ταῦτα λέγοντος). But the writer must surely have named him Momus when he first mentioned him.

In Greek literature, Μῶμος is a personification of fault-finding, τὸ μωμάσθαι.¹ Pl. *Rep.* 6. 487 A: οὐδ' ἂν ὁ Μῶμος τό γε τοιοῦτον μέμψαιτο. Lucian *Hist.* 33: ὁ οὐδεὶς ἄν, ἀλλ' οὐδ' ὁ Μῶμος, μωμήσασθαι δύναίτο. Id. *Dial. deor.* 20. 2 (Aphrodite *log.*): εἰ καὶ τὸν Μῶμον αὐτὸν ἐπιστήσεως ἡμῖν δικαστήν, θαρροῦσα βαδιοῦμαι πρὸς τὴν ἐπίδειξιν τί γὰρ ἂν καὶ μωμήσαιτό μου; Id. *Icaromen.* 31: ὥσπερ ὁ Μῶμος τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἄλλων γιγνόμενα συκοφαντῶ. In two of Lucian's dialogues, *Deorum concilium* and *Zeus tragoedus*, Momus takes part as fault-finder in debates of the gods. But a closer parallel to the part assigned to Momus in *Kore Kosmu* 43-48 is to be found in a tale reported by Lucian *Hermotimus* 20: ὁ γοῦν Μῶμος ἀκηκόας, οἶμαι, ἄτινα ἠτιάσατο τοῦ Ἡφαιστοῦ . . . φησὶ γὰρ ὁ μῦθος ἐρίσαι Ἀθηρᾶν καὶ Ποσειδῶνα καὶ Ἡφαιστον εὐτεχνίας πέρι, καὶ τὸν μὲν Ποσειδῶ ταῦρον ἀναπλάσαι, τὴν Ἀθηρᾶν δὲ οἰκίαν ἐπινοῆσαι· ὁ Ἡφαιστος δὲ ἀνθρωπον ἄρα συνεστήσατο. καὶ ἐπέπερ ἐπὶ τὸν Μῶμον ἦκον, ὄνπερ δικαστήν προεῖλοντο,² . . . τῶν μὲν ἄλλων ἄτινα ἠτιάσατο περιττὸν ἂν εἶη λέγειν,³ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου δὲ τοῦτο ἐμέμψατο καὶ τὸν ἀρχιτέκτονα ἐπέπληξε τὸν Ἡφαιστον, διότι μὴ καὶ θυρίδας ἐποίησεν αὐτῷ κατὰ τὸ στέρνον, ὡς ἀναπερασθεισῶν γνώριμα γίγνεσθαι ἅπασιν ἂ βούλεται καὶ ἐπινοεῖ, καὶ εἰ ψεύδεται ἢ ἀληθεύει. Lucian's evidence shows then that there was current in the second century A. D. a tale according to which Momus found fault with a god engaged in making men, and pointed out to him how he might have done his work better. This tale was put into verse by Babrius,⁴ *Fable* 59 (Rutherford), who differs from

¹ The name occurs in Hesiod *Theog.* 214: δεῦτερον αὖ Μῶμον καὶ Ὀϊζὺν ἀλγυόεσσαν (*sc.* Νύξ ἔτεκεν). It is on the authority of this Hesiodic verse that Momus is called 'son of Νύξ' in Lucian *Deor. conc.* 14.

² Lucian was doubtless thinking of this story when he wrote *Dial. deor.* 20. 2, quoted above.

³ What fault Momus found in the construction of the bull, we are told by Lucian in two other passages, which evidently refer to the same tale. *Nigrinus* 32: τοῦ Μῶμου τὸν λόγον μωμάμενος· ὡς γὰρ ἐκείνος ἐμέμφετο τοῦ ταύρου τὸν δημιουργὸν θεόν (i. e. Poseidon) οὐ προθένα τῶν ὀφθαλμῶν τὰ κέρατα, οὕτω δὴ κ.τ.λ. *Vera hist.* 2. 3: οἱ δὲ ταῦροι οὗτοι τὰ κέρατα οὐκ ἐπὶ τῆς κεφαλῆς εἶχον, ἀλλ' ὑπὸ τοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς, ὥσπερ ὁ Μῶμος ἤξιον.

⁴ According to Rutherford, Babrius wrote in the reign of Alexander Severus, A. D. 222-235 (i. e. later than Lucian, who lived c. A. D. 120-180). Both Lucian

Lucian only in substituting Zeus for Hephaistos as the god by whom man was made. The story may very well have been known to the writer of *Exc.* XXIII. 43-48, and may have suggested to him his use of the name Momus. But his Momus manifests a malignant desire to thwart and harm mankind, which is not in accordance with the character of Momus as represented in the tale of which Lucian speaks, nor, as far as I know, with anything that is said about him elsewhere in Greek literature; and in this respect, the writer may perhaps have been influenced by the Jewish conception of Satan, ὁ διάβολος, who, as a 'fault-finder', had something in common with the Momus of the Greeks.

§ 43. ἀκατάληπτον μὲν περιοχῆ (περιοχῆς FP¹) σώματος. He was of enormous size. Cf. *Corp.* I. 1, where Poimandres is described as ὑπερμεγέθους μέτρῳ ἀπεριορίστῳ.

τὸ σῶμα [[μὲν]] κατὰ (καὶ MSS.) τύπον ἀνδρὸς περικείμενον, καὶ καλὸν (<μὲν>) καὶ σεμνοπρεπὲς ὄν, ὑπερβολῇ δὲ ἄγριον καὶ πλήρες φόβου. τὸ σῶμα, following close on περιοχῆ σώματος, is awkward. Possibly τὸ σῶμα κατὰ τύπον ἀνδρὸς περικείμενον may have been added by a later hand.

The words ἄγριον καὶ πλήρες φόβου would not be applicable to Momus as conceived by Lucian.

παραυτικά τὰς ψυχὰς εἰσιούσας εἰς τὰ πλάσματα θεωρήσαν (θεωρήσαι ἂν MSS.). This is the only mention of previously unembodied souls in §§ 43-48. Perhaps this phrase may have been added when the passage was inserted in the *Kore Kosmu*.

§ 44. ὦ Ἑρμῆ, τολμηρὸν ἔργον ποιῆσαι τὸν ἄνθρωπον . . . τούτου ἀμέριμνον καταλεῖψαι κέκρικας, ὦ γενεσιουργέ . . . ; In §§ 26 and 30, we were told that Hermes, acting under God's orders, made the bodies in which the souls were to be incarnated, and that God inspected and approved the bodies which Hermes made. But in §§ 43-48, Hermes makes men on his own initiative; there is no suggestion that God either told him to do so, or approved of his work when it was done; and it is implied that he made a mistake when he began, but saw and corrected his mistake when it was pointed out to him.

and Babrius say that Athena made a 'house' (οἰκία); and according to Babrius, Momus found fault with her for not having put the house on wheels, so that its owner might take it about with him when he travelled (a notion which may have been suggested by what Herodotus says about the Scythians). But why a house? Houses are made by men, and not by gods; and the story would have gone better if it had been said that Athena, like her two competitors, made some kind of animal.

Both Momus in his advice, and Hermes in his acceptance of it, manifest that disposition towards mankind which some Greeks ascribed to the gods under the name of *φθόνος*. (Herodotus 3. 40: τὸ θεῖον ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔστι φθονερόν.) The gods, it was thought, took care that men should not be powerful or prosperous beyond certain fixed limits.

λίχρον (λίχρων MSS.) <γεύσει, καὶ (τρυφερὸν?)> ὀσφρήσει. As four of the five senses are spoken of, there can be little doubt that the fifth also, viz. γεῦσις, was mentioned.

§ 45. <<εἶτα [οὐ καὶ μέχρις οὐρανοῦ περιέργον ὀπλισθήσονται (ὀπλισθήσεται MSS.) τόλμαν οὗτοι;] οὐκ [ἀμερίμους] [ἐκτενοῦσιν] ἐπ[ε]! [καὶ] τὰ στοιχεῖα [τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν]>> <<τολμηρὰς ἐκτενοῦσι (ἐκτείνουσι MSS.) χεῖρας;>> The words εἶτα . . . στοιχεῖα are out of place in § 46; a general statement such as this ought to precede, and not to follow, the particular instances of audacious action which are given in § 45. But if we place the words here, καὶ μέχρις οὐρανοῦ must be rejected, because it unduly anticipates τὰ [μέχρις] ἄνω διώξουσι below. Meddling with heaven is the climax of men's audacity, and ought not to be mentioned until their dealings with things on earth (ρίζας, λίθων φύσεις, &c.) have been disposed of.

As to περιέργον ὀπλισθήσονται τόλμαν, cf. περιέργον ὀπλιζόντο τόλμαν in § 24. The author of §§ 43-48 was probably not the same person as the author of the narrative to which § 24 belongs; and it is unlikely that two men would independently hit on this same form of words. It therefore seems probable that οὐ καὶ μέχρις . . . τόλμαν οὗτοι was added in § 45 after §§ 43-48 had been inserted in the *Kore Kosmu*, and that the interpolator borrowed the phrase περιέργον ὀπλισθήσονται τόλμαν from § 24.

The sentence which began with οὐκ ἐπὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα probably ended with τολμηρὰς ἐκτενοῦσι χεῖρας (misplaced in the MSS.), whence [ἐκτενοῦσι] by duplication. But if so, τόλμαν is too closely followed by τολμηρὰς; and this is an additional reason for bracketing οὐ . . . τόλμαν οὗτοι.

[ἀμερίμους] has come from ἀμερίμνον καταλείψαι in § 44, or from ἀμερίμνω βίῳ in § 46.

ρίζας φυτῶν ἀνασκάψουσιν ἄνθρωποι, καὶ [ποιότητα(ς) ἐξετάσουσι χυλῶν,] λίθων φύσεις ἐπισκοπήσουσι. This refers to the use of plants and precious stones for medicinal or magical purposes. From the writer's point of view, certain kinds of magic might be hardly distinguishable from medicine.

The words *ποιότητος ἐξετάσουσι χυλῶν*, which describe what men do with the roots when they have dug them up, destroy the symmetry of the sentence, and must have been added by a later hand.

διὰ μέσου (μέσον F) ἀνατεμ[ν]οῦσι τῶν ζώων τὰ ἄλογα, οὐ μόνον (δὲ ταῦτα), ἀλλὰ καὶ ἑαυτοῦς. Dissection of the dead bodies of men as well as beasts was much practised in the medical schools of Alexandria under the Ptolemies;¹ and dissection of dead animals at least must have been in general use among physicians under the Roman empire also.² But as there is here no mention of dead bodies, the writer was probably thinking rather of vivisection. *ἑαυτοῦς* means 'fellow-men'.³ Vivisection of human beings is spoken of by Celsus,⁴ *Prooem.* p. 4 (Darembert): '(Ii qui rationalem medicinam profitentur,) cum in interioribus partibus et dolores et morborum varia genera nascantur, neminem putant his adhibere posse remedia, qui ipsas ignoret. Ergo necessarium esse incidere corpora mortuorum, eorumque viscera atque intestina scrutari: longeque optime fecisse Herophilum et Erasistratum, qui nocentes homines, a regibus ex carcere acceptos, vivos inciderint, considerantque, etiamnum spiritu remanente, ea quae natura ante clausisset. . . . Neque esse crudele, sicut plerique proponunt, hominum nocentium, et horum quoque paucorum, supplicii remedia populis innocentibus saeculorum omnium quaeri.—Contra ii qui se ἐμπερικούς . . . nominant . . . crudele (dicunt) vivorum hominum alvum atque praecordia incidi, . . . cum praesertim ex his, quae tanta violentia quaerantur, alia non possint omnino cognosci, alia possint etiam sine scelere. . . . ne mortuorum quidem lacerationem necessariam esse, quae, etsi non crudelis, tamen foeda sit.' Celsus (*ib.* p. 12) gives his own opinion thus: 'Incidere autem vivorum corpora et crudele et supervacuum est: mortuorum, discentibus necessarium.' Tertullian

¹ See Puschmann, *Hist. of medical education*, Eng. tr. 1891, pp. 76-78, on the anatomical investigations of Herophilus and Erasistratus (third century B. C.).

² Greenhill (Smith, *Dict. Biog.* s. v. *Galenus*) says that he is not aware of any passage in Galen's writings in which it is distinctly stated that he dissected human bodies; while 'the numerous passages in which he recommends the dissection of apes, bears, goats, and other animals would seem indirectly to prove that human bodies were' (*sc.* in Galen's time, second century A. D.) 'seldom or never used for that purpose. In one passage however (*De compos. medicam. sec. Gen.* 3. 2, Kühn vol. viii, p. 604) he mentions, as something extraordinary, that those physicians who attended the emperor M. Aurelius in his wars against the Germans had an opportunity of dissecting the bodies of the barbarians.'

³ Possibly ἀλλήλους after διαπορθμεύουσιν below may be a misplaced alternative for this ἑαυτοῦς.

⁴ Celsus wrote in or about the time of Tiberius.

De an. 10: 'Herophilus ille medicus aut lanius, qui sexcentos exsecuit ut naturam scrutaretur.'

πῶς (ὡς MSS.) (. . .) ἐγένοντο ἐξετάζειν θέλοντες, («καὶ τίς ἐνδοτέρω τῶν [ἱερῶν ἀδύτων] (σαρκῶν?) φύσις ὑπάρχει.») It could not be said that the dissector is trying to find out 'how men or animals came into being'. Something must have been lost before ἐγένοντο. What the author probably meant might be expressed by writing πῶς (ἐμφυχοί) ἐγένοντο, 'how they have come to be alive'. The dissector is searching for the hidden cause or source of life.

The question τίς ἐνδοτέρω τῶν ἱερῶν ἀδύτων φύσις ὑπάρχει, 'what thing exists further in than the holy sanctuaries', is meaningless. If ἐνδον were substituted for ἐνδοτέρω, it might be possible to understand these words as referring to the impious curiosity of men who force their way into holy places in order to find out what is concealed in them. (The intrusion of Pompeius into the Holy of Holies at Jerusalem might serve as an instance.) But such conduct as that could not have anything to do with 'sailing across the sea', with which this question is connected in the MSS. A satisfactory sense may be got by placing καὶ τίς . . . ὑπάρχει after ἐξετάζειν θέλοντες, and assuming that some such word as σαρκῶν has been lost, and that a transcriber inserted ἱερῶν ἀδύτων to fill the gap. The investigator cuts through the flesh of the body, in the hope of finding 'further in' some φύσις (thing) which will account for the phenomena of life.

τὰς αὐτοφυεῖς ὕλας τέμνοντες [] [] διαπορθμεύ(σ)ουσι[ν ἀλλήλους] (θάλασσαν) ἐπὶ ζήτησιν («τῶν πέραν»). They will cut down the woods which grow in their own country (αὐτοφυεῖς), in order to build ships in which they may sail across the sea and find out what lies beyond it. For διαπορθμεύουσι θάλασσαν, 'they will ferry (themselves) across the sea', cf. Ps.-Pl. *Axióchus* 371 C: οὖς (sc. ποταμοὺς) χρὴ πορθμεύσαντας ἀχθῆναι ἐπὶ Μίνω. The mention of cutting down trees in this connexion may have been suggested by Eurip. *Med. init.*: εἴθ' ὤφελ' Ἀργοῦς μὴ διαπτάσθαι σκάφος | . . . μῆδ' ἐν νάπαισι Πηλίου πεσεῖν ποτε | τμηθεῖσα πεύκη. For the tone in which navigation is here spoken of, compare Hor. *Od.* 1. 3. 21 ff.: 'Nequicquam deus abscedit | prudens Oceano dissociabili | terras, si tamen impiae | non tangenda rates transiliunt vada. | Audax omnia perpeti | gens humana ruit per vetitum nefas. | . . . Nil mortalibus ardui est: | caelum ipsum petimus stultiitia.'

«δρύσσοντες μέταλλα τὴν ἐσχάτην τῶν ὑπογείων ἐρευνήσουσι νύκτα.— (ἀλλὰ καὶ τούτων τὴν ἐσχάτην τῷ θέλειν ἐρευνήσουσι νύκτα MSS.)» In

the traditional text, the unintelligible words ἀλλὰ . . . νύκτα occur after τὰ ἄνω διώξουσι κ.τ.λ. But it is clear that in the phrase which ends with ἐρευνήσουσι νύκτα the writer must have given an instance of men's audacity comparable to navigation (διαπορθμεύσουσι θάλασσαν), and that τὰ ἄνω διώξουσι (which corresponds to Horace's *caelum ipsum petimus*) must have been the climax with which the series concluded. Now it is beneath the surface of the earth that 'the uttermost darkness' is to be found; and searching for what is hidden under the earth may very well be put on a par with searching for what lies beyond the sea. I therefore conjecture that these words referred to mining;¹ and I have accordingly altered ἀλλὰ into (δρύσσοντες μέτ)αλλα, and inserted τῶν ὑπογείων, out of which the meaningless τῷ θέλειν may possibly have arisen by corruption.

παρατηρήσαι βουλόμενοι τίς οὐρανοῦ (οὖν MSS.) καθέστηκε κίνησις. οὖν is a corruption of the *compendium* οἰνοῦ. Men cannot actually climb up to heaven; but they can and do violate the sanctity of heaven, by investigating the movements of the heavenly bodies.

[λείπει γὰρ οὐδὲν ἔτι πλὴν γῆς τόπος ἔσχατος.] This is probably a note appended to τὴν ἐσχάτην (τῶν ὑπογείων) ἐρευνήσουσι νύκτα.

§ 46. [ἵνα ἔχῃσι καὶ τῆς ἀποτυχίας τὸ χαλεπὸν φοβηθῆναι]. This is an alternative for the following words, ἵνα τῷ τῆς λύπης δακνηρῷ δαμασθῶσι, τῶν ἐλπίζομένων ἀποτυχόντες. Even when one of these two clauses has been struck out, there is still too much iteration in this section.

χρεωκοπέισθω [τῶν ψυχῶν] αὐτῶν τὸ περιέργον [ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ φόβοις καὶ λύπαις καὶ ἐλπίσι πλάνοις]. χρεωκοπία is equivalent to χρεῶν ἀποκοπή, 'cancelling of debts'. Hence χρεωκοπεῖν comes to mean 'to disappoint (an expectation)'. Cf. the Mithraic *Apathanatismos* (Dieterich *Mithrasliturgie*) p. 4, l. 24: ἦν (sc. δύναμιν) ἐγὼ πάλιν μεταπαραλήψομαι . . . ἀχρεοκόπητον. (The speaker will be deprived of a certain power for a time; but it will afterwards be restored to him 'without annulment of the debt'; i. e. he expects to receive it back again, and his expectation will not be disappointed.)

τὸ περιέργον, 'their meddlesomeness', is hardly a suitable subject for χρεωκοπέισθω; one might propose τὸ περισσόν followed by some word in the genitive: 'let their excessive expectations be disappointed'. But their expectations could not be disappointed 'by desires . . . and deceptive hopes'; I have therefore bracketed ἐπιθυμίαις . . . πλάνοις.

¹ Cf. Hor. *Od.* 3. 3. 49: 'aurum irrepertum et sic melius situm, | cum terra celat.

ἵνα αὐτοῖς καὶ (τὸ) τῆς ἐπιτυχίας ἡδὺ δέλεαρ ἢ εἰς ἄθλησιν τελειοτέρων κακῶν. τὸ ἡδὺ is subject and δέλεαρ is predicate. ἄθλησιν vis hardly the right word; perhaps it would be better either to bracket εἰς ἄθλησιν, or to strike out αὐτοῖς and alter εἰς ἄθλησιν into τοῖς ἀθλοῖς. δέλεαρ κακῶν would then mean 'a bait to allure them into miseries'; cf. ἡδονήν, μέγιστον κακοῦ δέλεαρ, Pl. *Tim.* 69 D.

Ἰβαρεῖτω πυρετὸς αὐτοῦς, ἵνα ἐκκακήσαντες κολάσῃσι τὴν ἐπιθυμίαν.¹ πυρετὸς cannot be right. Possibly the author wrote something like καίετω αὐτοῦς τὸ πῦρ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας, ἵνα . . . κολασθῶσι. For desire regarded as a fire by which men are tortured, see *Corr.* I. 23.

§ 47. [λυπῆ, τέκνον ὦρε, τάδε ἀκούων]; . . . ἔτι (τὸ MSS.) δεινότερον ἐπάκουσον.] For the form of expression, cf. *Ascl. Lat.* III. 25: 'Quid fles, o Asclepi? Et his amplius multoque deterius' &c.

What are 'these things' (τάδε)? In the words which follow, τάδε is explained as meaning πῶς ὁ τάλας ἄνθρωπος ἐβαρήθη. But in §§ 43-46, Horus has not been told that man 'was weighed down', but only that Momus *advised* Hermes to inflict trouble and sorrow on mankind; and it is not until after this that Isis tells her son that Hermes did what Momus had advised. Moreover, the contents of § 48 (ἐτέρπετο Μώμον ταῦτα λέγοντος Ἑρμῆς κ.τ.λ.) cannot be described as 'still more terrible' (ἔτι δεινότερον) than those of §§ 43-46. It is evident therefore that § 47 is out of place. It may possibly have stood at the end of a lost passage which preceded νεωστὶ γὰρ αἱ ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ. in § 53. In that case, the δεινότερον would be the contents of § 53.

§ 48. [ἀλλ' οὐκέτ' ἀργή (οὐκ ἐναργή MSS.) γενήσεται [πνεύματος θείου] φύσις ἢ τοῦ περιέχοντος. 'The nature (or substance) of the atmosphere' has nothing to do with the topic of § 48, viz. the machinery constructed by Hermes for the purpose of frustrating men's hopes. This misplaced fragment may perhaps have belonged to the passage which deals with the making of souls; cf. § 14 *init.* as amended: οὐκέτι βουλόμενος ἀργὸν τὸν ὑπουράνιον κόσμον εἶναι κ.τ.λ.

[εἶπε γὰρ εἶναι με ταμίαν καὶ προνοητὴν ὁ τῶν συμπάντων δεσπότης.] With the exception of this disconnected sentence, there is no mention of the supreme God in §§ 43-48.

ταμίαν and προνοητὴν require dependent genitives. If we assume that the original reading was ταμίαν (πνεύματος θείου) καὶ προνοητὴν (τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς), that might account for the insertion of [πνεύματος θείου] above, and [τοῖνν τὰ γῆς] below.

[[ἐποπτετῆρα τοίνυν τὰ γῆς ἔσται τῶν ὅλων ἐξυδερκῆς θεὸς Ἀδράστεια]].
 If Adrasteia was spoken of anywhere in § 48, it must have been at the end of the section. Hermes constructed his 'engine'; and when he had done so, Adrasteia took her stand above it to supervise its working. But if we put the words there, the future verb ἔσται must be altered into an aorist, and τοίνυν, as well as τὰ γῆς, must be struck out. A satisfactory sense may be got by writing ἐπόπτειρα δ' ἐπέστη.

The ὄργανον which Hermes devises and constructs is the astral system, which is the instrument by means of which Heimarmene operates on human life and on all terrestrial things (see *Exc.* XII). The name Ἀδράστεια¹ is here used as a synonym for Εἰμαρμένη. The working of the stars is regarded as mainly maleficent; it is by their action that men's hopes are thwarted.

This section is incompatible with the preceding narrative of the *Kore Kosmi*. If God made the stars (§ § 11) before he made the souls, and 'arranged the Zodiac and bestowed on it παντουργοὺς δυνάμεις' (§ § 20) before the souls were incarnated, the ὄργανον was already in existence at the time spoken of in §§ 43-48, and it could not have been left to Hermes to construct it.

[[ἐχουσα (ἔχον MSS.) τὴν (τῶν) ἀποτελουμένων πῆξιν.]] ἀποτελουμένων must be taken as equivalent to ἀποτελεσμάτων, which may perhaps be the true reading. The results produced by the influences of the stars were called ἀποτελέσματα. The astral 'engine' produces ἀποτελέσματα, and Adrasteia 'makes these ἀποτελέσματα firm', i. e. fixes them so that they cannot be altered.

§ 49. [καὶ ἐπαίου ὑπὲρ τῶν γενομένων αὐτὸς ἔτυχεν (ἔτυχον MSS.)]. Does this mean that Hermes was praised by God (cf. § 30, ἐπεκαλεσάμην τὸν μόναρχον θεωρῆσαι· ὁ δὲ καὶ εἶδε καὶ ἐχάρη), or that God was praised by his creatures (cf. § 27, ἄχρι πότε τὰ ἦδη γεγονότα μένει ἀνεγκομίαστα;)? In either case, the words are out of place here.

§ 53. [καὶ τὴν ἀτιμίαν μὴ φέρουσαι]. This is hardly relevant. It is not clear what the fact that the incarnated souls found their degradation unendurable has to do with their fighting among themselves,

¹ Cf. Ammianus Marcellinus 14. 11. 25: 'Haec . . . aliquoties operatur Adrastia, . . . quam vocabulo duplici etiam Nemesin adpellamus: . . . quam theologi veteres fingentes Iustitiae filiam ex abdita quadam aeternitate tradunt omnia despectare terrena. Haec ut regina causarum et arbitra rerum ac disceptatrix unam sortium temperat. . . Eademque necessitatis insolubili retinaculo mortalitatis vinciens fastus tumentes incassum . . . opprimit.' *Ib.* 22. 3. 12: 'humanorum spectatrix Adrastia.'

which is the topic of this section ; and it certainly can have nothing to do with the misplaced fragment which follows in the MSS. (τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοῖς ἐφιλονείκουν κ.τ.λ.).

καὶ (οἱ κρείσσονες), τοῖς λειπομένοις ἀνθρώποις ὀργάνοις χρώμενοι (-ναι MSS.), ἐποιοῦν αὐτοῖς ἑαυτοῖς ἐπιτίθεσθαι. Men in the mass do not themselves desire war, but are driven into it. Kings quarrel, and make their subjects do the fighting.

καὶ [κατὰ τῶν ἱερῶν] τοῦτο μὲν ζῶντας (ἡνδραπόδιζον), τοῦτο δὲ καὶ νεκροὺς ἔρριπτον (ἀθάπτους) [κατὰ τῶν ἀδύτων]. κατὰ τῶν ἱερῶν is a doublet of κατὰ τῶν ἀδύτων. But at this stage there can have been no ἱερά and no ἄδουτα ; for men were ἄθροιστοι (§§ 56 and 61) until worship of the gods was introduced by Osiris and Isis (§ 65).

§ 55. «οὐκ ἐῷσι . . . τὸ ἄφθαρτον» «μ(ι)αίνομαι γὰρ . . . ἀναγκάζομαι τήκειν.» In the MSS., these two statements stand (in inverse order) at the end of the speech (§ 56 *fin.*). But the speaker ought to state his grievance first, and then go on to ask that it may be remedied (ἀνάδειξον ἤδη σεαυτὸν κ.τ.λ., § 56). When this error has been corrected, the speech ends suitably, with the words ἴνα . . . εὐώδεις ἀτμοὺς ἀπ' ἐσχάρας προπέμψω σοι.

παραχαράσσοντες οὐ καθηκόντως τὸ ἄφθαρτόν. This is a metaphor from coining. Fire is the metal ; the use men make of fire is the stamp impressed on the metal.

§ 56. καὶ τοῦ βίου τὸ ἄγριον λύσον. [[εἰρήνη χάριστο κ.τ.λ.]]—(κ. τ. β. τ. ἄ. μύησον εἰρήνη· χάριστο κ.τ.λ. MSS.) μύνειν requires a personal object, and τοῦ βίου τὸ ἄγριον is not a person. Moreover, μύησον εἰρήνη is an impossible phrase ; and even μύησον εἰρήνην, though it might be somewhat better, (cf. τὰ ἐρωτικά μνηθῆναι, Pl. *Symp.* 209 E,) could hardly be accepted. λύσον (or κατάλυσον) gives the sense wanted.

[ἐπαξίους ἁμαρτημάτων μισθοὺς ἂν ἀπολάβωσιν οἱ ἁμαρτόντες], φυλάσσονται οἱ λοιποὶ τὸ ἀδικεῖν.] This is presumably a marginal paraphrase of φοβεῖσθωσαν . . . ἁμαρτήσῃ, which expresses the same thought more concisely. οἱ ἁμαρτόντες, or something of the sort, must be inserted, to give a meaning to οἱ λοιποί.

[φοβηθήσονται ὄρκους, καὶ οὐδὲ εἰς ἔτι ἀνύσιον φρονήσῃ.] φοβηθήσονται has probably been written by error for φοβεῖσθωσαν. If so, the sentence is of the same form as the preceding φοβεῖσθωσαν . . . ἐκδικίαν, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτήσῃ. It has most likely been added by a later hand.

«εἰρήνην χαρισάμενος (εἰρήνη· χάριστο νόμους MSS.) τῷ βίῳ [χάρισαι

νυκτὶ χρησμούς] πλήρωσον καλῶν ἐλπίδων πάντα)). In the MSS., the petitions are arranged thus: (1) confer benefits on men; (2) let them be threatened with punishment; (3) let them give thanks for the benefits they have received. But that is evidently wrong. The order ought to be (2), (1), (3); i. e. the mention of benefits to be conferred on men (εἰρήνην . . . πάντα) ought to precede immediately the mention of thanksgiving.

'Give oracles to night' is meaningless. If the writer had meant to say 'give oracles *by* night', he would have written νυκτός, not νυκτί; but oracles are given by day as well as by night, and there is no reason to speak of night at all in connexion with them.

The sense might be improved by striking out ἐλπίδων, which is hardly consistent with εὐεργετηθέντες in the following clause. Men give thanks for benefits already received, not for hopes of benefits to come.

[παρὰ λουβαῖς] παρὰ θυσίαις ὑπηρετοῦν ἐγὼ (ὑπηρετήσω MSS.) τὸ πῦρ. Fire renders service at sacrifices, but not at libations.

§ 58. Πάτερ [] αὐτογόνε (αὐτόγενε MSS.). God is αὐτογέννητος, i. e. ἀγέννητος. See note on *ex se nata* in *Ascl. Lat.* II. 14 b.

καὶ τῆς διὰ σέ πάντα γεννώσης ποιητὰ φύσεως. All organisms on earth are generated by φύσις; and φύσις has been made by God. (Cf. § 10.) On the relation between God and φύσις, see *Corp.* III. Nature generates things 'on account of' God (διὰ σέ),—i. e. to please God, or in obedience to his will; cf. *Ascl. Lat.* I. 3 c: 'natura . . . producit cuncta dei visibus placitura.' But διὰ σέ is perhaps superfluous here.

[ἦ] <<ἀεὶ>> γὰρ ἀπολούουσι ποταμοὶ καὶ θάλασσαὶ τοὺς φονεύσαντας [ἦ] (καὶ) δέχονται τοὺς φονευθέντας. 'Either . . . or' is wrong. The waters are polluted in two different ways; they *both* wash off the blood with which the hands of the slayers are defiled, *and* receive the corpses of the slain that are flung into them.

§ 59. Ἰτάξομαι τῆς ἀπὸ τῶν λόγων¹. This is probably a corruption of something corresponding to πρώτον γὰρ εἶχε τὴν τοῦ λέγειν ἐξουσίαν in § 55, and ἐξῆς . . . τὴν τοῦ λέγειν εἶχεν ἐξουσίαν in § 58.

ἐξ ὧν [αὐξήσεως καὶ μειώσεως] ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὰ πάντα, εἰς ἃ καὶ πάλιν καταλήγοντα ἀναγκαίως ὀφειλόμενον τέλος ἔχει. τὰ πάντα means all terrestrial organisms.

Things do not get μειώσεως ἀρχὴν ('the beginning of their diminution') out of the elements. It might perhaps be said that they get out of the elements αὐξήσεως ἀρχὴν ('the beginning of their growth');

but even this would be somewhat obscure, and it seems best to cut out αὐξήσεως as well as καὶ μειώσεως.

καταλήγοντα τέλος ἔχει is tautologous; and the two clauses (ἐξ ὧν κ.τ.λ. and εἰς ἃ κ.τ.λ.) would match better if ἀναγκαιώς (or ἀνάγκη?) ὀφειλόμενον were struck out. The meaning might be more clearly and compactly expressed by writing ἐξ ὧν συντιθέμενα ἀρχὴν ἔχει τὰ πάντα, εἰς ἃ καὶ πάλιν διαλυόμενα τέλος ἔχει.

[ἀλόγιστος, ὦ πολυτίμητε, καὶ ἄθεος] [[ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐπ' ἐμέ χορός ἔπεισι.]] From this point onward, Earth's speech, as given in the MSS., is in great confusion. In my attempt to reconstruct it, I have assumed that it falls into three distinct parts. In the first part (Βασιλεῦ . . . φέρω πάντα καὶ [] δέχομαι) Earth describes the functions of the elements, and distinguishes her own function from those of the others; in the second part (ἀτιμοῦμαι δὲ ἤδη . . . σωματῶν χυλοῖς) she states her grievance; in the third part (ἐντεῦθεν, κύριε . . . ἱερὰν ἀπόρρουαν) she petitions for redress.

The words ἀλόγιστος . . . ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων ἐπ' ἐμέ χορός ἔπεισι (ἐπέστη Meineke) apparently refer to the misdeeds of men from which Earth suffers. If so, they are out of place in the first part of the speech, and ought to stand in the second part. But they could not be put there without alteration. 'A band is upon me (or has risen up against me) from men' is meaningless. Heeren and Wachsmuth strike out ἀπ'; but that is not an adequate remedy, for the human race as a whole could not be called ἀνθρώπων χορός. There can be little doubt that χορός is a misreading; perhaps it has been substituted for some such word as θόρυβος. Moreover, ἀλόγιστος, 'unreasoning', is hardly appropriate; and ἄθεος unduly anticipates the contents of § 61. It seems best then to cut out ἀλόγιστος . . . καὶ ἄθεος, and to place ἀπ' ἀνθρώπων . . . ἐπέστη immediately before πάντα γὰρ . . . παρανομοῦσι, § 60.

«στοιχείων τιμωτέραν τῶν ἄλλων τὴν γῆν ἐποίησας (τὴν γῆν μετεποίησαν MSS.)). Something must have been lost before αὐτῇ γάρ κ.τ.λ.; and these words serve very well to fill the gap. They deal with the same topic as the preceding clauses, in which the elements are spoken of; and if we put them here, τιμωτέραν . . . ἐποίησας leads on to ἀτιμοῦμαι δὲ ἤδη.

μετ- may have arisen out of ἐμέ; but ἐμέ beside τὴν γῆν would be superfluous.

§ 60. πάντα γάρ, ὃ φοβηθῶσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες, παρανομοῦσι. The words ὃ φοβηθῶσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες hint at Earth's most pressing reason for

desiring to have gods sent down to her (cf. § 56, φοβείσθωσαν ἄνθρωποι τὴν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἐκδικίαν, καὶ οἰδεῖς ἁμαρτήσῃ). But we should have expected this reason to be more plainly and directly stated; and we should also have expected the statement of it to occur at a different place. It ought rather to come at the end of the second part of the speech (§ 60 *fin.*), and make connexion between that and the third part (ἐντεῦθεν κ.τ.λ., § 61 *init.*). Besides, the order of the words in this sentence is not satisfactory; πάντα γάρ is awkwardly separated from παρανομοῦσι by the intervening ὁ . . . ἔχοντες. It may be suspected therefore that ὁ φοβηθῶσιν οὐκ ἔχοντες has been shifted, and originally formed part of a sentence, now lost, which stood between § 60 and § 61.

πάσῃ πονηρᾷ τέχνῃ (φονευόμενοι) καταπίπτουσι. π. π. τέχνῃ requires some participle; and if the missing word is φονευόμενοι, this may have given rise to [τὰ φονευθέντα] above.

καταβρέχομαι δὲ πᾶσα διαφθειρομένων (-μένη MSS.) σωμαίων χυλοῖς. As to this complaint of Earth, and the similar complaints of the other elements, compare *Ascl. Lat.* III. 24 b: 'tunc terra ista sanctissima . . . sepulcrorum erit mortuorumque plenissima: . . . undaeque divinae (of the Nile) non solum polluentur sanguine, sed totae corrumperentur.' In *Ascl. Lat.* III, Hermes says that such things will take place when men cease to worship the gods; in *Kore Kosmu*, we are told that such things did take place until men began to worship the gods.

Compare also the letter written in or about A. D. 262 by Dionysius, bishop of Alexandria, *Euseb. H. E.* 7. 21: ἀεὶ δὲ αἵματι καὶ φόνοις καὶ καταποντισμοῖς κάτεισι μεμιασμένος (ὁ ποταμός), κ.τ.λ. The writer of *Ascl. Lat.* III had probably witnessed the calamities of which Dionysius speaks (see Introduction to *Ascl. Lat.*); and it is possible that the writer of *Kore Kosmu* also had lived in Alexandria during those same events, and had seen there such horrors as he describes.

§ 61. οὐ γὰρ σὲ χωρεῖν ὑπομένω. Cf. *Corp.* II. 14: σῶμα γάρ ἐστι καὶ ψυχὴ τόπον οὐκ ἔχοντα χωρῆσαι δυνάμεον τὸ ἀγαθόν.

[μόνη γὰρ αὐχεῖν τῶν ἀπὸ σοῦ πρέπει τὰ πάντα παρεχούσῃ]. This is obscure. If it was intended to follow στοιχείων τιμωτέραν τῶν ἄλλων τὴν γῆν ἐποίησας, the meaning might perhaps be expressed by writing μόνη γὰρ αὐχεῖν τῶν ὑπὸ σοῦ πεποιημένων πρέπει τῇ πᾶσι τροφήν παρεχούσῃ: 'Earth alone of all things made by thee has a right to boast, because it is she that supplies sustenance to all.'

If on the other hand it was intended to follow *χάρισαι τῇ γῆ . . .* *σαντοῦ τινα ἱερὰν ἀπόρροϊαν*, it may be a corruption of something like *μόνη γὰρ ἀπολαύειν τῶν ἀπὸ σοῦ προβληθέντων* (i. e. to enjoy the presence of gods emitted from thee) *πρέπει τῇ κ.τ.λ.* But in either case, it is not needed.

§ 62. ὁσιος ἔσται τῶν πραττομένων ἐπόπτης. This is inconsistent with § 39, where the supreme God says *ἐγὼ γὰρ [καὶ οὔτις ἕτερος] ἐπόπτης αὐτὸς [] ἔσομαι*; but the inconsistency is one that might easily escape the notice of the writer.

ζώντων μὲν κριτῆς ἀμεθόδευτος, φρικτὸς δ(ἐ) [] τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν τύραννος. This is Osiris, who was known to the Egyptians as 'king of the dead', but was also thought to watch over the living.

κριτῆς ἀμεθόδευτος, 'a judge that cannot be turned aside from his course'. This might mean either one that cannot be turned aside by *entreaty* from the course he has decided on, i. e. 'inexorable'; or one that cannot be turned aside by *deception* or *cunning devices* from deciding rightly (no culprit can 'pull his leg'). The instances of *μεθοδεύω* and *μεθοδεΐα* given in Liddell and Scott tell in favour of the latter meaning.

Who are οἱ ὑπὸ γῆν? We have been told that after death the souls of good men return to their home above, and the souls of bad men are reincarnated in the bodies of animals. If then the writer assumed the existence of a subterranean Hades, he must have thought of it as a prison in which wicked souls are confined in the interval between death and reincarnation. But more probably he took over the phrase *τῶν ὑπὸ γῆν τύραννος* from popular descriptions of Osiris, and made no attempt to reconcile it with his own theories.

§ 64. Παραιτοῦμαι [[]] [[]] σῆς σπορᾶς καταλέγειν ἀρχήν, ᾧ μεγαλοσθενὲς ὦρε' <<οὐ γὰρ θεμιτὸν>> [] θεῶν <<γένεσιν ἱστορεῖν>>. There is evidently some dislocation; and this rearrangement of the words gives the sense required.

The sending down of 'an efflux of God' to earth means the incarnation of the deities Osiris and Isis in human bodies. The question asked by Horus is therefore equivalent to the question 'How did that incarnation take place?' or 'By what process was the birth of the deities Osiris and Isis in the form of human beings on earth brought to pass?' As Horus is son of Osiris and Isis,—and presumably a son born to them during their residence on earth,—to answer that question would be to explain 'the source of the

begetting of Horus' (σῆς σπορᾶς ἀρχήν). But such things are holy secrets, and must not be revealed to the readers of this *libellus*; the writer therefore makes Isis refuse to reveal them. He probably had in mind a *ιερός λόγος* which had been told to him, but which he was forbidden to repeat to others. It may have resembled the myth reported by Plutarch, *Is. et Os.* 12, which describes the birth of the gods Osiris, Arueris (i. e. *Har-wer*, 'the elder Horus'), Typhon (Set), Isis, and Nephthys, and contains things at which the *profanum vulgus* would be apt to scoff.

[ὡς μήποτε ὕστερον εἰς ἀνθρώπους ἀθανάτων (δι)έλθη γένεσις]. The grammatical connexion of these words with the context is faulty; ὡς μήποτε . . . διέλθη can hardly be made to depend either on οὐ γὰρ θεμιτόν or on παραιτοῦμαι. Moreover, γένεσις stands too close to γένεσιν ἱστορεῖν. It therefore seems best to assume that this clause has been added by a reader. It is an attempt to answer the question why Isis should be unwilling to reveal the truth to her son. But it does not answer that question satisfactorily.

Since Osiris and Isis were gods, their son Horus also must have been a god (though perhaps, at the time spoken of, a god incarnate); and a god might surely be permitted to know the facts, and might be trusted not to reveal to men what ought to be kept hidden from them. The true explanation is rather that the writer was thinking of his own obligation not to reveal the secret to his readers, and did not stop to ask himself whether Isis had any good reason for not revealing it to Horus.

ὁ τῶν συμπάντων [κοσμοποιητῆς καὶ] τεχνίτης. *κοσμοποιητῆς* could not stand with *συμπάντων*. It is an alternative, not for *τεχνίτης* alone, but for τῶν συμπάντων τεχνίτης. It may be a misreading for κόσμου ποιητῆς; but neither the one nor the other can have been written by the author.

καὶ τὴν μεγίστην θεὰν ἴσιν. Both in this phrase, and in the reiterated οἱτοί of §§ 65-68, Isis somewhat strangely speaks of herself in the third person. This might be accounted for by assuming that the writer of *Exc.* XXIII took over the contents of the passage beginning at ὁ μόναρχος θεός in § 64, down to the end of § 68, from some document in which the teaching was not put into the mouth of Isis. In § 69, the first person is again employed ("Ὅσιρίς τε κἀγώ, . . . ἀπηγούμεθα).

§ 65. οἱτοί, (τοῦ) θεοῦ (βίου MSS.) τὸν βίον πληρώσαντες (ἐπλήρωσαν MSS.), [οἱτοί] τὸ τῆς ἀλληλοφονίας ἔπαυσαν ἄγριον. The

Elements had prayed God to put an end to the mutual slaughter of mankind by sending gods down to earth; and we are now told how God did what the Elements had asked him to do. Osiris and Isis, sent down by God (i. e. incarnated on earth, and reigning as king and queen of Egypt), introduced religion among men (who had till then been *ἄθεοι*), and thereby put a stop to *ἀλληλοφονία*.

Thus the climax to which the narrative of *Exc.* XXIII leads up, and with which it concludes, is the institution of religion; and the chief lesson which the story is intended to teach is that religion is indispensable for the welfare of human society.

What follows in §§ 65–68 ought to be merely an amplification of the statement *οὔτοι . . . ἔπαυσαν ἄγριον*. But the text of these sections has been corrupted by the insertion of irrelevant matter.

With this list of boons conferred on men by Osiris and Isis may be compared an inscription found in the island of Ios (*C. I. G.* xii. v. 14; Kaibel, *Epigrammata Gr. ex lapid. conl.* p. xxi) in which Isis says (ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον ἰσχυρὸν ἐποίησα. ἐγὼ (γ)υ(ν)αῖκα καὶ ἄνδρα συνήγαγα· ἐγὼ γυναι(κί) δεκά(μη)νον βρέφος ἑνεαξά¹. ἐγὼ ὑπὸ τέκνωι γονεῖς φιλοστοργεῖσθαι ἐνομοθέτησα· ἐγὼ τοῖς ἀστού(ργως γ)ονεῦσι διακειμένο(ι)ς τεμωρίαν ἐπέθηκα. ἐγὼ μετὰ τοῦ ἀδελφοῦ Ὅσει(ρ)ε(ος) τὰς ἀνθρωποφαγίας ἔπαυσα· ἐγὼ πυ(ρὸν)ς ἀνθρώποις ἀνέδειξα. ἐγὼ ἀγάλματα (ἰστ)ᾶν ἐδ(ίδαξ)α· ἐγὼ τεμένη θεῶν ε(ι)δρυσάμην. (ἐ)γὼ τυρά(νν)ω(ν) ἀρχὰς κατέλυσα· ἐγὼ στέργεσθαι (γ)υν(αῖκα)α(ς) ὑπ' ἀνδ(ρῶν) ἠγάπησα. ἐγὼ τὸ δίκαιον εἰσχυρότερον χρυσοῦ καὶ ἀργυρίου ἐποίησα· ἐγὼ τὸ ἀληθὲς καλὸν ἐνομοθέτησα ν(ο)μ(ί)ζεσθαι(ι). ἐγὼ συγγραφὰς Ἐ(ρ)μοῦ(?) . . . Compare also a hymn to Isis (*C. I. G.* xii. v. 739, Kaibel 1028, Abel *Orphica* p. 295 ff.) which was probably composed in the fourth century A. D., and was found inscribed on stone in Andros. Lines 26–47 of the Andros hymn are a versified paraphrase of the contents of the Ios inscription. Another document of similar character is Oxyrhynchus Pap. (1915) no. 1380, early second century A. D.,—an invocation of Isis, probably written by a priest of the goddess. Cf. a magic invocation in Pap. mag. Lond. 46. 101 sqq.: σὺ εἶ ὁ Ὅσορὸννοφρις (i. e. Osiris Wen-nofre). . . σὺ διέκρινας τὸ δίκαιον καὶ τὸ ἄδικον. σὺ ἐποίησας θῆλυ καὶ ἄρρεν. σὺ ἔδειξας σπορὰν καὶ καρπούς. σὺ ἐποίησας τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἀλληλοφιλεῖν καὶ (μὴ) ἀλληλομισεῖν.

¹ *ενεαξα* inscr.: *ἐνέταξα* Wilamowitz; *ἐνέσαξα* Kaibel. Perhaps *συνέταξα*, 'ordained' or 'prescribed'.

«οὔτοι [] πρὸς κάθετον (ὁμολογούσας) (τὰς προσκαθέτους MSS.) τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ μυστηρίοις ἱεροποιίας ἀνέστησαν ἐν γῆ.» The establishment of religious worship ought to be placed at the beginning of the list of benefits; and the mention of ἱεροποιίαι ought to be closely connected with that of τεμένη. I have therefore transposed this sentence from § 68 to § 65.

The adjective προσκάθετος does not occur elsewhere. κάθετος means 'a plumb-line', Lat. *perpendicularum*; and πρὸς κάθετον sometimes means 'perpendicularly' or 'vertically'. Plut. *Fac. in orbe lunae* 24. 7, 938 A: τοῦ ἡλίου πρὸς κάθετον αὐτοῖς ἐφισταμένου, 'vertically overhead'. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 353: Thales said ἐκλείπειν τὸν ἥλιον τῆς σελήνης αὐτὸν ὑπερχομένης κατὰ κάθετον, 'perpendicularly beneath'. If πρὸς κάθετον is to be taken in this sense, some participle such as ὑποκειμένας is needed to go with it. But we should expect to be told, not that earthly rites 'are situated perpendicularly beneath' the mysteries of heaven, but that they 'correspond exactly to' the mysteries of heaven; and it seems best to take πρὸς κάθετον as here meaning 'exactly' (compare the metaphorical use of *ad perpendicularum* and *ad amussim*), and to assume that the missing participle is ὁμολογούσας or some word of similar sense.

For the thought, cf. *Ascl. Lat.* III. 24 b: 'An ignoras . . . quod Aegyptus imago sit caeli, aut . . . translatio aut descensio omnium quae gubernantur atque exercentur in caelo?'

[παρ' Ἑρμοῦ μαθόντες ὡς τὰ κάτω συμπάθειν τοῖς ἄνω ὑπὸ τοῦ δημιουργοῦ διετάγη]. The words παρ' Ἑρμοῦ μαθόντες occur three times in the traditional text of §§ 65-68; but each of these three mentions of Hermes was probably inserted by a transcriber. μαθόντες ὡς τὰ κάτω . . . διετάγη was written to explain the following words πρὸς κάθετον . . . ἐν γῆ; but the explanation is not needed. As to the συμπάθεια of τὰ κάτω with τὰ ἄνω, see note on *Exc.* XX. 8.

«οὔτοι» τεμένη (τοῖς) προγόνοις θεοῖς [[αὐτοῖς]] καὶ θυσίας καθιέρωσαν. The word προγόνοις seems intended to prevent the reader from supposing that Osiris and Isis dedicated temples to *themselves*. (One of these 'gods of earlier generations' might be Kamephis; see § (§32).) But if the following clause is to be retained, θνητοῖς appears to be contrasted with θεοῖς, and this contrast is impaired by the addition of an epithet to θεοῖς; perhaps therefore it might be better to bracket προγόνοις.

As θυσίαι are included under ἱεροποιίαι, which (if my transposition

of οὔτοι . . . ἐν γῆ is accepted) have just been spoken of, καὶ θυσίας is superfluous; and the verb καθιέρωσαν, which goes well with τεμένη, does not go so well with θυσίας. I am therefore inclined to think that καὶ θυσίας ought to be cut out.

οὔτοι καὶ τροφᾶς θνητοῖς καὶ σκέπην ἐχαρίσαντο. As to τροφή, cf. the epitaph of Isis, Diod. 1. 27. 4, in which she says ἐγὼ εἰμι ἡ πρώτη καρπὸν ἀνθρώποις εἰρουῦσα. Ios inscr.: ἐγὼ πυ(ροῦ)ς ἀνθρώποις ἀνέδειξα. Augustine *Civ. dei* 8. 27: 'parentibus suis illa (sc. Isis) cum sacrificaret, invenit hordei segetem, atque inde spicas marito regi (Osiris) et eius consiliario Mercurio (Thoth-Hermes) demonstravit; unde eandem et Cererem volunt.' But in those passages, grain or vegetable food alone is spoken of. How did the writer of *Exc.* XXIII suppose that men had lived during the time of ἀλληλοφονία? They must at least have had some kind of τροφή, if not σκέπη (clothes and houses) also. Moreover, τροφή and σκέπη are not directly connected with religion, which is the main subject of this list of benefits. It may therefore be suspected that καὶ τροφᾶς . . . ἐχαρίσαντο is a later addition. It is possible that the text originally ran thus: οὔτοι τεμένη θεοῖς καθιέρωσαν, καὶ πρὸς κάθετον ὁμολογούσας τοῖς ἐν οὐρανῷ μυστηρίοις ἱεροποιίας ἀνέστησαν ἐν γῆ.

§ 66. "οὔτοι τὰ κρυπτά", φησὶν Ἑρμῆς, ". . . ὀβελίσκοις χαράξουσιν." This section is evidently out of place. In no other part of the list of benefits (§§ 65-68) does Isis say that she is repeating words spoken by Hermes; and the verbs in § 66 are in the future tense, whereas in the rest of the list they are in the aorist.

As this fragment has no connexion with its present context, οὔτοι does not necessarily mean Osiris and Isis. It would be possible to put the passage at the end of the speech of Hermes in § 8. If it were placed there, οὔτοι would mean the men who were destined to discover in a later age the books which Hermes had written and hidden.

Ἰαὐτοὶ κατασχῶσιν¹ is probably a corruption of some phrase meaning 'they will keep secret'. The persons spoken of will read the books of Hermes, and will divide their contents into two parts. One part they will keep to themselves; the other part they will inscribe on slabs of stone (exposed in public places) and on obelisks, so that all may read it. Cf. § 5 *fin.*, where it is said that Hermes himself did something partly similar to this.

§ 67. [οὔτοι πρῶτοι δέξαντες δικαστήρια] [[εὐνομίας τὰ σύμπαντα καὶ δικαιοσύνης ἐπλήρωσαν.]] Justice and obedience to law may be

enforced on men either by fear of punishments inflicted by human judges, or by fear of punishments inflicted by the gods. *δικαστήρια* have to do with punishments inflicted by men; 'the great god "Όρκος' has to do with punishments inflicted by the gods. But as Osiris and Isis are in §§ 65-68 regarded chiefly, if not solely, as the introducers of *religion*, it is the religious enforcement of *εἰνομία*, rather than the civic, that ought to be here spoken of, and the mention of *δικαστήρια* seems irrelevant. (Cf. § 56: *φοβείσθωσαν ἄνθρωποι τὴν ἀπὸ θεῶν ἐκδικίαν, καὶ οὐδεὶς ἁμαρτήσῃ. . . [φοβηθήσονται ὄρκους, καὶ οὐδὲ εἰς ἔτι ἀνόσιον φρονήσῃ.]*) I have therefore bracketed οἱτοί . . . *δικαστήρια*, and placed *εἰνομίας* . . . *ἐπλήρωσαν* after "Όρκον *εἰσαγαγόντες εἰς τὸν βίον*.

If courts of justice were to be spoken of at all, the mention of them would be better placed after the sentence about *νομοθεσία* in § 68.

δεξιᾶς καὶ πίστεως ἀρχηγέτην (*ἀρχηγέται γενόμενοι καὶ MSS.*) *τὸν μέγιστον θεὸν "Όρκον εἰσαγαγόντες* (*εἰσηγάγοντο MSS.*) *εἰς τὸν βίον*. The middle verb *εἰσηγάγοντο* cannot be defended.

ὄρκος meant primarily the thing by which a man swears, and thence the oath itself. To swear an oath (*ὄρκος* in the latter sense) is to bind oneself to fulfil an engagement (*δεξιὰ καὶ πίστις*) by praying the gods to punish one if one breaks it. The thing sworn by (*ὄρκος* in the former sense) is some object in which divine force is believed to be inherent, and with which the swearer puts himself in connexion (sometimes by touching it, sometimes by invoking it verbally), in order to ensure that the gods will hear the prayer and act accordingly. In primitive times it was assumed that only when the gods had been brought into action by such a rite would they concern themselves about the fulfilment of a contract, or punish its violation. 'The great god "Όρκος' is a personification of the divine force which is put in operation by the swearing of an oath; he is therefore rightly described as *δεξιᾶς καὶ πίστεως ἀρχηγέτης*.

The god "Όρκος occurs in Hesiod, *Theog.* 231: "Όρκον θ' (*sc.* "Έρις τέκε), ὃς δὴ πλείστον ἐπιχθονίου ἀνθρώπου | πημαίνει, ὅτε κέν τις ἐκὼν ἐπίορκον ὁμόσση. See also Hes. *Op.* 219 and 804; Soph. *O. C.* 1767; Orac. *ap.* Herodot. 6. 86.

(*τὸ φθόριμον τῶν σωμάτων ἐπιγόντες*). In the MSS. this is connected with *τὸ . . . τῶν προφητῶν ἐτεχνάσαντο* in § 68. But the fact that bodies decay has nothing to do with the functions

of prophets; and the words must have been intended to go with what is said about the burial of the dead (τοὺς παυσαμένους . . . περιστέλλειν ἐδίδαξαν). It may be suspected however that they did not occur at all in the original text, but were added in § 67 by a later hand, and afterwards transposed to § 68.

τοὺς παυσαμένους τοῦ ζῆν ὡς δέον ἐστὶ περιστέλλειν ἐδίδαξαν (ὡς δέον ἐστὶν ἐδίδαξαν περιστέλλειν MSS.). We were told in § 53 that one of the bad things done by men in the time of ἀλληλοφονία was the casting out of corpses without burial. The burial of the dead was a religious rite; its introduction is therefore rightly included among the boons conferred by Osiris and Isis. περιστέλλειν, 'to enwrap', is used in Greek literature, from Homer downward, to describe the process of preparing a corpse for burial; but the writer was probably thinking of the Egyptian practice of swathing mummies in linen bands.

οὗτοι . . . ἔγνωσαν ὡς τοῦ ἔξωθεν (ἐἰς τὰ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πλάσματα) (εἰσελθόντος) πνεύματος φιλυποστρόφου τυγχάνοντος [[]] ἔὰν ὑστερήσῃ ποτέ, ἀνάκτησιν οὐκ ἔχουσαν ἐργάζεται λε[ι]ποθυμίας¹. The meaning of this passage was probably somewhat as follows: 'They (who?—hardly Osiris and Isis) discovered the cause of death; they found out that the πνεῦμα (life-breath or vital spirit) tends to quit the body and return to the atmosphere, from which it came, and that if it quits the body partially, the man falls into a swoon (λιποθυμία), but if it quits the body wholly, it does not come back, and so the man dies.' I take φιλυποστρόφου to mean 'apt to return to the place whence it came'; and I suppose τοῦ . . . πνεύματος φιλυποστρόφου τυγχάνοντος to be a genitive absolute. But it is difficult to reconstruct the last part of the sentence. One might propose something of this sort: ἐὰν (μὲν) ὑστερήσῃ ποτέ (αὐτοῦ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, κατέχεται) (λιποθυμία), (ἐὰν δὲ παντάπασιν ἀποστερηθῆ,) ἀνάκτησιν οὐκ ἔχων (ἀποθνήσκει). 'If the man runs short of it (or fails to get enough of it), he swoons; but if he is wholly deprived of it, he cannot get it back, and dies.' Compare *Exc.* XXVI. 12.

The insertion of this inopportune explanation of the process of death was doubtless suggested by τοὺς παυσαμένους τοῦ ζῆν in the preceding sentence. The words λιποθυμία, ἀνάκτησις, and φιλυπόστροφος occur as medical terms in the Hippocratic writings.

οὗτοι, τὸ περιέχον ὅτι δαιμόνων ἐπληρώθη παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ μαθόντες, (τὰ ὀνόματα (or τὰς ἐπικλήσεις) αὐτῶν (?) ἐν) κρυπταῖς στήλαις ἐχάραξαν. What was it that Osiris and Isis (or possibly some other persons)

'engraved on hidden tablets'? It cannot have been merely a statement of the fact that 'the atmosphere is full¹ of daemons'; for that was no secret to be concealed from the profane, but a thing well known to every Greek and Egyptian. There must therefore be a lacuna before *κρυπταῖς στήλαις ἐχάραξαν*. A good sense may be got by inserting *τὰ ὀνόματα αὐτῶν*. Knowledge of the names by which daemons could be invoked was highly valued by the practitioners of magic and theurgy; and those who used these names in their invocations were sometimes unwilling to let them become known to the general public. But the invocation of daemons belongs to magic rather than religion, or at any rate has little to do with the kind of religion by which men are restrained from crime; there is therefore no occasion to speak of it in this list of benefits, and it seems best to regard the sentence as an interpolation.

§ 68. οὔτοι [μόνοι], τὰς κρυπτὰς νομοθεσίας τοῦ θεοῦ [παρὰ Ἑρμοῦ] μαθόντες, [τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀπάντων εἰσηγηταὶ] τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο [καὶ] νομοθέται. This sentence, as given in the MSS., implies that the arts and sciences are based on 'the secret lawgivings of God'. But that cannot be right. The arts and sciences might be said to be based on what we call 'the laws of nature'; but to a Greek, αἱ νομοθεσίαι τοῦ θεοῦ would mean, not the establishment of the laws of nature, but the laying down of the principles of morality; and with this the arts and sciences have no connexion. The reading of the MSS. seems to have resulted from the intermixture of two distinct statements, viz. οὔτοι, τὰς κρυπτὰς νομοθεσίας τοῦ θεοῦ μαθόντες, τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο νομοθέται, and οὔτοι τεχνῶν καὶ ἐπιστημῶν [καὶ ἐπιτηδευμάτων ἀπάντων?] εἰσηγηταὶ ἐγένοντο. The latter statement is hardly to the point; knowledge of arts and sciences does not prevent mutual slaughter, and the men who slaughtered one another before the coming of Osiris and Isis must at least have known something of the art of war. But the former statement, οὔτοι . . . τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐγένοντο νομοθέται, may have formed part of the original text. The distinction between the law of God and human laws was familiar to the Greeks, from the time of Sophocles (*Ant.* 449 ff.) o ward.

τὸ ἔν ἅπασι τέλειον¹ τῶν προφητῶν ἐτεχνάσαντο. Ἀ προφήτης, in

¹ We should have expected *πεπληρωται* rather than *ἐπληρώθη*. The tense may have been altered when the sentence was inserted into the *Kore Kosmu*.

the wider sense of the term, is a man who makes known to other men the will of a god, or of the gods. But *προφήτης* also meant a member of a certain class or order of Egyptian priests;¹ and as the *προφήται* spoken of in this passage have to do with healing the sick as well as with philosophy, it seems clear that the word here means Egyptian priests, or a certain class of them. The writer may possibly have been himself an Egyptian priest of this class; if so, he might think fit to conclude his list of the benefits which Osiris and Isis had conferred on mankind by saying that his own order or profession had been instituted by them.

The genitive τῶν προφητῶν must have been dependent on some word (e. g. *ἔθνος* or *γένος*) which could serve as subject to *τρέφῃ* and *σώζῃ* below; and the meaningless ἐν ἅπασιν τέλειον may be a corruption of a phrase by which the missing substantive was qualified. Sense might be made by writing τὸ ἐν ἅπασιν ὠφέλιμον (*ἔθνος*) (or *τέλειον ἔμπειρον*) τῶν προφητῶν.²

[ὡς μήποτε ὁ μέλλων θεοῖς προσάγειν χεῖρας προφήτης ἀνοφ' τι τῶν (δε)όντων]. This clause appears to have been written as an alternative for the following ἵνα . . . *τρέφῃ* κ.τ.λ. It evidently refers to those Egyptian priests whose duty it was to enter the innermost sanctuary of the temple in which they served, and perform there certain prescribed ceremonies (τὰ δέοντα), especially that of clothing the image, which would necessitate 'laying hands on the god'. (See Otto, *op. cit.* I, pp. 83-86.) The priests to whom this duty was assigned are described in the Canopus and Rosetta inscriptions as οἱ εἰς τὸ ἄδυτον εἰσπορευόμενοι πρὸς τὸν στολισμὸν τῶν θεῶν. They were called *στολισταί* (Plut. *Is. et Os.* 39), *ιεροστόλοι* (*ib.* 3), or *ιεροστολισταί* (Porphyr. *De abst.* 4. 8), and were commonly distinguished from the *προφήται*; but the writer of this clause apparently included them under the term *προφήτης*.

ἵνα φιλοσοφία μὲν [καὶ μαγεία] (τὴν) ψυχὴν τρέφῃ (*sc.* τὸ τῶν προφητῶν *ἔθνος*?). It might be said of the Egyptian priests called *προφήται*, that it was their business to study and teach 'philosophy',

¹ See Otto, *Priester und Tempel in hellen. Aegypten*, I, pp. 75-83. Otto says that *προφήται* 'held the most eminent position in the Egyptian priesthood, with the exception of that of the presidents of temples'; and that the title borne by priests of this order (i. e. the Egyptian title for which *προφήτης* is the Greek equivalent) was *hn-ntr*, 'servant of the god'.

² It has occurred to me that τὸ ἐν ἅπασιν τέλειον may possibly have arisen out of some phrase equivalent to τὴν τελετήν, 'the initiatory rite' by which the priests called *προφήται* were consecrated. That rite might be said to have been 'devised' by Osiris and Isis; but ἡ τελετή would not be a suitable subject for *τρέφῃ* and *σώζῃ*.

which, to the Hermetists, was indistinguishable from theology. Cf. Diog. Laert. *prooem.* 1: Αἰγύπτῳ μὲν γὰρ Νείλου (φασί) γενέσθαι παιδα Ἡφαιστον (Ptah), ὃν ἄρξαι φιλοσοφίας, ἧς τοὺς προεστῶτας ἱερέας εἶναι καὶ προφήτας. Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 1. 15. 71: φιλοσοφία . . . πάλαι μὲν ἤκμασε παρὰ βαρβάροις . . . προέστησαν δ' αὐτῆς Αἰγυπτίων τε οἱ προφῆται, κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* 6. 4. 37: (ὁ προφήτης) τὰ ἱερατικὰ καλούμενα δέκα βιβλία ἐκμανθάνει· περιέχει δὲ (ταῦτα) περὶ τε νόμων καὶ θεῶν καὶ τῆς ὄλης παιδείας τῶν ἱερέων. Porphyr. *De abst.* 4. 8: τὸ μὲν κατ' ἀλήθειαν φιλοσοφοῦν ἔν τε τοῖς προφήταις ἦν καὶ ἱεροστολισταῖς καὶ ἱερογραμματεῦσιν, ἔτι δὲ ὠρολόγοις.

σώζῃ δ' [[]] ἱατρικῇ (τὸ) σῶμα <<ἔθαν τι πάσχη>>. Clem. Alex., *Strom.* 6. 4. 37, includes medicine among the subjects studied by Egyptian priests, but says that it was studied, not by the προφῆται, but by the παστοφόροι (who were priests of lower rank): τὰς μὲν λς' (Ἐρμού βιβλούς), τὴν πᾶσαν Αἰγυπτίων περιεχοῦσας φιλοσοφίαν, οἱ προειρημένοι (sc. ὁ ψδός, ὁ ὠροσκόπος, ὁ ἱερογραμματεὺς, ὁ στολιστής, and ὁ προφήτης) ἐκμανθάνουσι, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ἐξ οἱ παστοφόροι, ἱατρικὰς οὔσας, περὶ τε τῆς τοῦ σώματος κατασκευῆς, καὶ περὶ νόσων, καὶ περὶ ὀργάνων, καὶ (περὶ) φαρμάκων, καὶ περὶ ὀφθαλμ(ι)ῶν, καὶ τὸ τελευταῖον περὶ τῶν γυναικ(ε)ίων. See Zosimus i. 20 (*Testim.*) concerning a priest called in to heal a broken bone. To heal the sick was the chief function of the Egyptian god Imhotep-Asclepius (see *Ascl. Lat.* III. 37); and priests must have been employed in medical work at his temples, and at those of other gods who were believed to heal diseases. This priestly art of medicine doubtless consisted chiefly in the administration of remedies prescribed by oracles or suggested by dreams, and the casting out of daemons; but in later times, and under Greek influence, some of the Egyptian priests may perhaps have adopted more scientific methods in their treatment of the sick.

§ 69. <<ἀπητούμεθα λοιπὸν>> (< . . .). Having done all that they had been sent down from heaven to do, Osiris and Isis asked the supreme God to permit them to quit the earthly bodies in which they were incarnated, and return to their home above. During their residence on earth they must have lived as human beings, and reigned as king and queen of Egypt; they differed from the men and women among whom they lived in this respect only, that they were incarnate θεοί, whereas men and women in general are incarnate ψυχαί.

ἀλλ' οὐκ ἦν ἀνελεῖν πρὶν (ὑμῶ) ἐπικαλέσασθαι τὸν μόναρχον. It is

necessary to insert ὕμνῳ here, in order to give a meaning to the words κάμοι χάρισαι τὴν τοῦ ὕμνου ἐπίγνωσιν in the following section.

αὐτοὶ τε εὐπαράδεκτοι (-δεκτον MSS.) [εὐτυχήσωμεν] <ποιησώμεθα> τὴν ἀνάβασιν. Either εὐπαράδεκτοι or εὐτυχήσωμεν is redundant. The reading of the MSS. appears to be a mixture of the two alternatives αὐτοὶ τε εὐπαράδεκτοι ποιησώμεθα τὴν ἀνάβασιν and αὐτοὶ τε εὐτυχήσωμεν τὴν ἀνάβασιν.

[χαίρει γὰρ ὕμνοις ὁ θεός.] This is superfluous, and makes the speech of Isis end feebly. It was probably added by a reader. Cf. *Ascl. Lat.* I. 9: 'hominum enim admirationibus, adorationibus, laudibus, obsequiis caelum caelestesque delectantur,' &c.

§ 70. κάμοι χάρισαι τὴν τοῦ ὕμνου ἐπίγνωσιν. Cf. *Corp.* XIII. 15, where Tat asks Hermes to repeat to him the hymn sung by the Powers.

Πρόσεχε, παῖ. In the *Kore Kosmu*, the hymn must have followed. But it was either omitted by Stobaeus, or lost at some stage in the transmission of his text to us.

The *libellus* probably ended either with the hymn itself, or with a short passage which followed it, and in which the return of Osiris and Isis to heaven was described.

EXCERPT XXIV

The superscription Ἐν ταύτῳ, if strictly interpreted, would mean that *Exc.* XXIV is a part of the same book from which Stobaeus got *Exc.* XXIII,—i. e. that this piece also is an extract from 'the holy book of Hermes Trismegistus which is entitled *Kore Kosmu*'. But Stobaeus may have meant by his superscription merely that he took *Exc.* XXIV from the same volume of 'Discourses of Isis to Horus' from which he took *Exc.* XXIII. It is also possible that the title *Kore Kosmu*, though originally belonging to one *libellus* alone of the *Isis to Horus* collection, had, by the time of Stobaeus, come to be applied to the collection as a whole (just as the heading *Poimandres*, which properly belonged only to *Corp.* I, came to be used in recent times as the title of the whole *Corpus*). The superscription of *Exc.* XXIV cannot therefore be considered to prove that this Excerpt was a part of the same *libellus* as *Exc.* XXIII (or the narrative which forms the bulk of *Exc.* XXIII); and the question whether it was so or not must be decided on other grounds. Both

the difference of form and certain differences in doctrine (see especially the description of the four regions in *Exc.* XXIV. 1) make it probable that it was not so.

Exc. XXIV consists of answers given by Isis to a series of questions asked by Horus. All the six questions asked are questions about human souls. The *libellus* from which the Excerpt was taken may have included questions and answers on other subjects also; if it did, only that part of it which dealt with the soul would be suitable for insertion in the chapter (headed *Περὶ ψυχῆς*) in which Stobaeus has placed it, in his *Anthologium*, and he would necessarily reject the rest.

The first four of the questions are expressed in the same form (*Πῶς γίνονται κ.τ.λ.*); the fifth is a sequel to the fourth, being a further question on the same subject of *σύνεσις*; and the sixth, though the word *σύνεσις* does not occur in it, is also concerned with human intelligence. It seems therefore that the document from which the extract was taken was at least so far continuous, that questions and answers on connected topics were grouped together. But a string of *quaestiones* such as this would admit of and invite additions; and we can have no certainty that the several paragraphs were all written by the same person.

In any case, *Exc.* XXIV probably originated in the same group of Isis-worshippers as *Exc.* XXIII.

The writer of §§ 11-16 (if we assume the two answers contained in those sections to have been written by one man) must have been not only an inhabitant of Egypt, but an Egyptian by race. He had learnt to write Greek with ease in the literary style of his time, but shows ignorance of things which he would have known if his schooling in Greek science and philosophy had been more than rudimentary. In other paragraphs, we find the Platonic doctrine of unembodied souls assumed, and, as in *Exc.* XXIII, there are traces (e. g. in § 3 and § 7) of the special modification of that doctrine which was taught by Posidonius.

§ 1. εἴ τι θέλεις ἕτερον ἐπερώτα. These words show that, in the *libellus* from which this piece was extracted by Stobaeus, at least one question and answer had preceded.

πῶς γίνονται βασιλικαὶ ψυχαί. This probably means 'how kingly souls come into being', the souls of kings being assumed to be different in quality from those of other men. But it would be grammatically possible to translate 'how souls become kingly'; and the

person who inserted *αι* before *ψυχαί* in § 10 *init.* took the adjective *συνεταί* as a predicate.

[ἐπεὶ γὰρ] τόποι τέσσαρες εἰσιν . . . καὶ ἄνω μὲν . . . θεοὶ κατοικοῦσιν. The construction of this passage has been confused by some slight alteration of the text. Meineke hesitates between (1) putting a comma after *γῆ* and bracketing *καὶ* before *ἄνω*, and (2) putting a full stop after *γῆ* and writing *εἰσὶ γὰρ τόποι τέσσαρες* in place of *ἐπεὶ γὰρ τόποι τέσσαρες εἰσιν*. Wachsmuth adopts the first of Meineke's two proposals. I have made sense in another way, by putting a full stop after *γῆ* and bracketing *ἐπεὶ γάρ*.

τόποι τέσσαρες εἰσιν ἐν τῷ παντί, οἵτινες ἀπαραβάτῳ νόμῳ καὶ (βασιλικῇ) προστασίᾳ ὑποπίπτουσιν. The thing which the writer is seeking to show is that the function of the human king on earth is analogous to that of God, who is king of the gods in heaven; to that of the Sun, who is king of the stars in the aether; and to that of the Moon, who is queen of the unembodied souls in the air. The *προστασία* spoken of in this preliminary statement must therefore be *kingly* rule; and the connexion of thought is more clearly brought out if we insert *βασιλικῇ* before *προστασίᾳ*.

ἀπαραβάτῳ νόμῳ seems irrelevant; and as the laws enacted by earthly kings are often transgressed, it can hardly be said that they are *ἀπαραβάτοι*. It may therefore be suspected that *ἀπαραβάτῳ νόμῳ καὶ* has been added by a later hand.

ὁ τε οὐρανὸς . . . καὶ ἡ [ἱερωτάτη] γῆ. There is no reason why *γῆ* alone of the four substantives should have an epithet; and earth could not be thought more holy than heaven. The addition of *ἱερωτάτη* may have been suggested by *τῆς ἱερωτάτης ἡμῶν χώρας* in § 11 and *ἡ . . . ἱερωτάτη χώρα* in § 13 (the land of Egypt as opposed to other lands).

ἐν οὐρανῷ θεοὶ κατοικοῦσιν, . . . ἐν δὲ τῷ αἰθέρι ἀστέρες. The writer of this paragraph agrees with the author of *Exc.* XXIII in dividing the space between heaven and earth into two regions, the higher of which is called *αἰθήρ*, and the lower, *ἀήρ*. (See note on *Exc.* XXIII. 17.) But he differs from him, and from the Hermetists in general, as well as from most other Pagan writers of his time, in distinguishing the stars from the gods, and in saying that the stars are situated, not in heaven, but in a region below heaven. The prevailing opinion was that the stars were gods, and, if not the only gods, were at least a very important class of gods. Platonists might speak of an order of *νοητοὶ θεοὶ* whose abode was above the

stars, but placed the star-gods in heaven; and in locating the stars not in heaven, but below it, this writer implies a cosmology differing widely from that of any of the recognized Greek schools of thought.

The peculiarity in his arrangement of the several regions and their inhabitants may possibly have resulted from a confusion between two different uses of the word *αιθήρ*. A Greek might say that the stars were *ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι*, using *αιθήρ* as a synonym for *οὐρανός* (see for instance *Exc.* VI. 12: *ἐν οὐρανῷ φερόμενοι ἀστέρες . . . φέρονται ἐν τῷ αἰθέρι αἰωρούμενοι*); another Greek might say that *αιθήρ* was below *οὐρανός*, meaning by *αιθήρ* the higher part of the atmosphere, cf. the *Epinomis*; and half-educated Egyptians, putting these two statements together, might infer from them that the stars are not in heaven, but in a region below heaven.

Of what nature are the 'gods' who dwell in heaven? As the stars are not in heaven, the gods spoken of cannot be star-gods. We are told that their king is the supreme God (*ὁ τῶν ὄλων δημιουργός*). They seem to correspond in some respects to the *νοητοὶ θεοί* of the Platonists; but it is unlikely that this writer had any clear conception of *νοητά*. Perhaps he was thinking of the gods of popular Egyptian worship,—Isis, Osiris, &c.,—and assumed that these gods lived in a place called *οὐρανός* which was situated above the stars.¹

ἐν δὲ τῷ ἀέρι ψυχαὶ [δὲ μόναι]. Meineke alters *δὲ μόναι* into *δαιμόνια*. If we accept his conjecture, we must take *ψυχὰι δαιμόνια* to mean souls in the condition of daemons, i. e. unembodied souls. (Cf. *Exc.* XXIII. 19 as emended: *ταῖς ἤδη προκοψάσασαι ψυχαῖς, . . . ταῖς . . . ἱεροῖς δαίμοσι μετακεκλημέναις*.) But as the corresponding substantives *θεοί*, *ἀστέρες*, and *ἄνθρωποι* have no epithets, the sentence reads better if *ψυχὰι* also stands without an epithet; and it is more probable that *δὲ μόναι* has arisen out of *δαίμονες* written as a substitute or alternative for *ψυχὰι*.

ὦν ἄρχει σελήνη. The *air* then extends from the earth up to a limit immediately above the moon; and the *aether*, in which are situated the sun and the stars, begins immediately above the moon, and extends thence up to the lower limit of *heaven*.

The view that the moon has more in common with the earth than

¹ I have assumed that *ἀστέρες* means 'stars'. But the word was sometimes used to mean 'planets', and not stars in general. It is therefore possible that the writer located the gods and the fixed stars in heaven, and the planets alone in a region called 'aether' which is below heaven. But if so, he would still be contradicting the commonly received opinion that the planets are gods, and are situated in heaven.

with the other heavenly bodies, and is included in the terrestrial atmosphere, is maintained (by a Platonist, in opposition to the Stoics,) in Plut. *De facie in orbe lunae*; and the notion that the moon presides over disembodied souls, or at least has much to do with them, is to be found in that dialogue, and in some of Plutarch's other writings.

ἐπὶ δὲ τῆς γῆς (κατοικοῦσιν) ἄνθρωποι [καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα], ὧν ἄρχει ὁ . . . βασιλεύς. There would be no point in saying that the reigning king or emperor governs the cows and sheep. It is therefore most likely that καὶ τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα was added by some one who disregarded the following words ὧν ἄρχει ὁ βασιλεύς, and thought fit to supplement the statement 'upon earth dwell men' by mentioning the beasts also.

ὧν ἄρχει ὁ (ἀεὶ) [[κατὰ καιρὸν]] γενόμενος βασιλεύς· γεννῶσι γὰρ <<κατὰ καιρὸν>>, ὧ τέκνον, [βασιλεῖς] (ἄνθρωπον) οἱ θεοὶ ἐπάξιον (ἐπαξίους MSS.) τῆς ἐπιγείου ἡγεμονίας (γονῆς MSS.). κατὰ καιρὸν, at the right time', does not go well with γενόμενος βασιλεύς. A better sense is got by writing ἀεὶ ('at any given time') here, and transposing κατὰ καιρὸν into the following clause. The rulers of the three higher regions hold office permanently; but men on earth are governed by a *succession* of kings; and in order that they may never be left without a king, the gods supply a man fit for the post 'at the right time', i. e. cause him to be born at such a time that he will be ready to become king when a vacancy occurs. (γενόμενος was inadvertently omitted from the text.)

If βασιλεῖς is retained, the following words ἐπαξίους κ.τ.λ. become superfluous. What the writer meant to say was, not that kings are generated by the gods, but that the gods take care that there is at hand a man who is worthy to be made king when a new king is wanted. It would be possible to write ἀνθρώπους ἐπαξίους; but as the king is spoken of in the singular in the preceding clause, it is most likely that here also the singular was used. The writer speaks as if there were only one king at a time on earth; that is, he is here thinking only of the Roman empire, and ignores all other kingdoms.

γεννῶσι probably means, not 'beget' or 'engender' in the literal sense, but merely 'cause to come into existence'. All men are 'sons' of the gods, in the sense that they have been brought into being by the creative activity of the powers above; and the man who is worthy to be king is a son of the gods in that sense, but not in any sense peculiar to himself. It is true that the Egyptians had in ancient times imagined each of their native kings to have been begotten by a god; but the writer of *Exc.* XXIV does not appear to

have had any such notion in his mind. According to him, the souls of kings, like those of other men, are pre-existent (§§ 3 and 4); an their bodies are presumably produced by the same process as other human bodies.

§ 2. καὶ εἰσιν οἱ (ἄλλοι) ἄρχοντες τοῦ (ἐν οὐρανῷ) βασιλείως ἀπόρροιαι. We have just been given a list of four ἄρχοντες, the first of whom is the supreme God; and οἱ ἄλλοι ἄρχοντες are the other three, viz. the Sun, the Moon, and the earthly king. The Sun and the Moon, being gods, might be called 'effluxes' of the supreme God (see *Exc.* XXIII. 64, where the word ἀπόρροια is used with reference to Osiris and Isis); but as the writer of *Exc.* XXIV holds earthly kings to be men and not gods (§ 3), it is difficult to see what he could mean by saying that the earthly king is an ἀπόρροια of the supreme God; for the term, if not wholly inapplicable to him, would be applicable only in a sense in which it might equally well be applied to all other men also. It may therefore be suspected that § 2 is an addition by another hand. If it were absent, it would not be missed; for § 3 is quite as well suited to follow § 1 as to follow § 2.

[ὧ δὲ δευτερεύει ἢ σελήνη καὶ κατὰ τάξιν καὶ κατὰ δύναμιν]. This is merely a repetition of the preceding statement, ὁ . . . ἥλιος . . . τῆς σελήνης ἐστὶ μείζων καὶ δυναμικώτερος. But ὁ μὲν γὰρ ἥλιος κ.τ.λ. must have been followed by a clause beginning with ἢ δὲ σελήνη, in which it was said that the Moon is mightier than the earthly king.

§ 3. πρῶτος δὲ ἀνθρώπων. Here the writer plainly and unmistakably says that the king is a man; and any phrases which appear to imply that he thought the king to be a god must be corrected accordingly. The preceding words (τῶν μὲν ἄλλων θεῶν ἐστὶν ἔσχατος) must therefore be altered into τῶν μὲν τεσσάρων ἀρχόντων ἐστὶν ἔσχατος, or something equivalent. And for the same reason I have written παρ(ὰ τοὺς ἄλλους) ἀνθρώπου below.

This writer differs from those who believed (and those who said without believing) that the living emperor was an incarnate god; though at the same time he holds that the emperor's soul may become a god after death (μέλλουσαι ἀποθεοῦσθαι, § 4), and in this respect agrees with the view which found expression in the state-established cult of the *Dion*.

τῆς μὲν ἀληθοῦς θε[ι]ότητος ἀπήλλακται, ἔχει δὲ ἐξαιρέτόν τι παρ(ὰ τοὺς ἄλλους) ἀνθρώπου (παρ' ἀνθρώποις MSS), ὁ ὁμοίον ἐστὶ τῷ θεῷ. The living king or emperor is not a god, but a man who has something godlike in him. This might be expressed by saying that he is not

θεός, but θεῖος ἄνθρωπος. (Cf. Pl. *Soph.* 216 B: καί μοι δοκεῖ θεός μὲν ἀνὴρ οὐδαμῶς εἶναι, θεῖος μὴν.) We must therefore read θεότητος ἀπήλλακται, which means 'he is not θεός', and not θειότητος ἀπήλλακται, which would mean 'he is not θεῖος'.

ἀπήλλακται is not a past tense; it does not imply that he was once a god and has now ceased to be one, but merely that he is not a god as long as he remains on earth (though his soul may be destined to become a god when it quits the body).

ἡ γὰρ εἰς αὐτὸν καταπεμπομένη ψυχὴ ἔστιν ἐκ χωρίου (ἐξ ἐκείνου ἔστι τοῦ χωρίου MSS.) ὃ ὑπεράνω κείται ἐκείνων ἀφ' ὧν εἰς τοὺς ἄλλους καταπέμπονται ἀνθρώπους. This shows that the writer of *Exc.* XXIV, like those of XXIII, XXV, and XXVI, holds that the atmosphere is divided into a number of distinct strata, and that each unembodied soul has a residence assigned to it in that particular stratum which corresponds to its quality. The 'kingly' souls are souls which, before their incarnation, have been residing in the highest of these atmospheric strata. In that respect, they correspond to the 'advanced' souls spoken of in *Exc.* XXIII. 19 (ταῖς εἰς [] τοὺς ἐγγύς ἀστρων τόπους (ἀναβάσαις)).

§ 4. καταπέμπονται δὲ ἐκεῖθεν εἰς τὸ βασιλεύειν διὰ δύο ταῦτα αἱ ψυχαί. Kingly souls are divided into two classes. Those of the first class are souls which have lived blameless lives in a series of previous incarnations,¹ and have thereby made such progress that, after one more life on earth, they will be qualified to be transmuted from 'souls' into 'gods'. Such a soul, when it is sent down to earth for the last time, is made a king, in order that, by doing a king's work here below, it may get the training which it needs to enable it to discharge efficiently the functions of a god when it returns to the world above. Before this last incarnation, it resided in the highest stratum of the atmosphere; and we may infer that, when it quits the body and becomes a god, it ascends beyond the upper limit of the atmosphere, and thenceforth dwells in the abode of the gods.

But where is the abode of the gods? On this point § 4 seems inconsistent with § 1. According to § 1, the souls dwell in the atmosphere, and the gods dwell in heaven, but between these two regions is interposed the aether, in which are the stars. We should therefore have expected to be told that a soul which was sufficiently

¹ This is probably what is meant by καλῶς καὶ ἀμέμπτως δραμοῦσαι τὸν ἴδιον ἀγῶνα (αἰῶνα MSS.).

advanced to rise above the atmosphere would, to begin with, enter the aether, and become a star there, and that only after a further period of probation, if at all, would it be possible for it to rise to the still higher level of heaven, and become a god. But if that had been the writer's meaning in § 4, he would have written *μέλλονσαι καταστερίζεσθαι* instead of *μέλλονσαι αποθεοῦσθαι*. If then we assume that § 1 and § 4 were written by the same person, we must conclude that he did not consistently adhere to the peculiar scheme of four regions which is set forth in § 1, and that in § 4 he speaks as if he accepted the commonly prevailing view, according to which the stars are gods, and the gods dwell in a heaven situated immediately above the atmosphere.

Kingly souls of the second class are souls of the highest quality (*θεΐαι*, 'godlike'), and have, before their incarnation, been residing in the highest stratum of the atmosphere. So far, there is no difference between the one class and the other. But those of the second class have, while residing in that abode, committed some small offence; and they are sent down to earth and incarnated there by way of punishment. They are made kings, because it is fitting that these souls, though not wholly blameless, should still, in virtue of their higher quality, be exalted above the rest, and the position of a king, though inferior to that which the soul held above while unembodied, is superior to that of other men on earth.

We are not directly told what becomes of kingly souls of the second class when they depart from the body; but as it is not said of them, as it is of those of the first class, that they are 'about to become gods', we may infer that they remain 'souls', and accordingly, that, at the termination of their life on earth, they return to the place from which they came, i. e. to the highest stratum of the atmosphere.

What was the writer's reason for dividing kingly souls into these two classes? Would he have put some of the Roman emperors into the one class, and some of them into the other? And if so, on what principle would he have distinguished them? There was this manifest distinction among the emperors, that after their deaths some of them were, by order of the Roman government, worshipped as *Divi* at Alexandria and throughout the empire,¹ and others were not; and that might perhaps be thought to afford ground for saying that some kingly souls become gods when they quit the body, while others remain mere 'souls'.

¹ See note on *Ascl. Lat.* III. 27 d, p. 236 ff.

θείαι τινες ἤδη οὐσαι. ἤδη implies that these souls, like those of the first class, have attained to *θειότης* by a gradual progress upward.

παραθεμιστεύσασαι τὸν θεῖον (ἔνθεον MSS.) γνώμονα. The adjective *ἔνθεον*, 'inspired', would be applicable only to a man, and is meaningless in this connexion. *γνώμων* means a carpenter's square, and metaphorically, a 'rule' or 'regulation' (*norma*). In the Egyptian civil service, a code of regulations was called *γνώμων*. A document written about A. D. 150, which is discussed by Prof. Stuart Jones, *Fresh light on Roman bureaucracy*, Oxford 1920, begins thus: τοῦ γ)νώμον(ος), ὃν ὁ θεὸς Σεβαστὸς τῇ τοῦ ἰδίου λόγου ἐπιτροπῇ (παρ)εστήσατο, . . . τὰ ἐν μέ(σ)ῳ (κεφ)άλαια συντεμῶν ἐπέταξ(ά) σοι. 'I have made an abridgement of the middle chapters of the code of regulations drawn up by Augustus for the department of the ἴδιος λόγος.' Taken in this sense, *γνώμονα* may be retained, and there is no need to alter it into *νόμον*. Cf. *Exc.* XXVI. 2 : (παρὰ) . . . τὴν τοῦ θείου νόμον παραγγελίαν πεπραχυῖαι.

§ 5. αἱ μέντοι περὶ τὰ ἦθη τῶν βασιλευόντων γινόμεναι διαφοραὶ κ.τ.λ. Kings differ from one another in disposition and conduct; one, for instance, is eager to wage war, another seeks to maintain peace. If all kingly souls alike are 'godlike', how are these differences to be explained? The writer answers this question by saying that the conduct of the king or emperor is determined, not by the character of his own soul, but by that of the 'angels and daemons' by whom his soul was escorted down to earth.

The writer does not say 'some kings are good and others bad', and the instances which he gives are not instances of moral virtue and vice. It would seem that he did not presume to judge or criticize the moral characters of the Roman emperors; for him, the soul of Nero and that of Marcus Aurelius alike are 'godlike'. But he could not help being aware that emperors differed in their pursuits and aims; and he tried to devise a theory by which these differences might be accounted for. His explanation is a strange one. If the activity of the king's soul is suspended during its residence on earth, and he is merely a passive instrument in the hands of superhuman agents, a king might just as well have been provided without sending down a soul at all; a human body animated by a group of angels and daemons would have served the purpose, and would indeed have been, in practical effect, the very same thing. Moreover, a soul in a state of suspended activity would not get the training which is spoken of in § 4.

οὐκ ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς φύσει (κρίσει MSS.) κρίνονται. For φύσει, cf. τῆς μὲν ἰδίας φύσεως ἐπιλαθόμεναι in § 6.

οἶδε γὰρ ἡ ἄνω δίκη τὴν ἀξίαν ἐκάστη νέμειν, κἂν ἐκ τῆς εὐημερούσης χώρας ἀποθῶνται (ἀποθῶνται MSS.) ἡ ἄνω δίκη is God's justice, momentarily personified. θεῖαι ψυχαί are worthy to be conducted by an escort of angels and daemons, even if they have committed some slight offence, and have been sentenced to incarnation as a punishment; other souls are not worthy of that honour.

ἡ εὐημεροῦσα χώρα, 'the Happy Land', means the abode of the θεῖαι ψυχαί, which, according to this writer, is the highest stratum of the atmosphere. Did the 'angels and daemons' reside in that same stratum?

§ 6. [τούτων γὰρ περικρατεῖ τῆς γνώμης ἡ ψυχὴ, ἐπιλαθομένη τῶν ἑαυτῆς ἔργων (ἐνεργειῶν?), μόνων δὲ μεμνημένη τῶν ἀπὸ τῆς ἱερᾶς συνοδίας προσγεγονότων (προσγεγονυῶν?)—(τούτων περικρατεῖν τῆς γνώμης ἡ ψυχὴ ἔχει ἢ ἐπιλαθομένη τῶν ἑαυτῆς ἔργων, μᾶλλον δὲ μεμνημένη τούτων μέχρι τῶν τῆς ἐτέρας συνοδίας προσγεγονότων MSS.)]. This appears to be a misplaced and badly corrupted doublet of αἱ ψυχαὶ αὐταὶ τῆς τῶν καταγόντων περικρατοῦσι γνώμης κ.τ.λ. at the end of the section. With the corrections which I propose, it expresses the same meaning as that passage.

περικρατεῖ here means 'keeps hold of' or 'clings to'. Similar instances occur in *Exc.* XXIII. 53, (24), where περικρατοῦσαι is coupled to ἀντιλαμβανόμεναι, and in *Exc.* XXVI. 4 (ὅπως ἡ φύσις . . . περικρατῆ τοῦ . . . τύπου).

The meaningless ἔχει ἢ may perhaps be a corruption of ἔχεται, written as a substitute for περικρατεῖ.

συνοδία means a party of people travelling in company. ἡ ἱερὰ συνοδία then is the troop of angels and daemons by which the kingly soul is escorted on its way down to earth.

ὄταν δὲ μουσικοί, τότε καὶ αὐτὴ ᾄδει. The instance in the writer's mind was probably Nero, whose musical performances were long remembered. (He may possibly have heard of King David also.) Marcus Aurelius might be his instance of a king who φιλοσοφεῖ.

§ 7. πῶς δὲ εὐγενεῖς γίνονται ψυχαί. This section appears to have been written without regard to the preceding question and answer. A man who, after speaking of 'kingly souls', went on to speak of 'noble' souls, might be expected to explain the relation between the two classes; he might say, for instance, that kingly souls are

εὐγενέσταται, but that there are lower degrees of εὐγένεια also. But nothing of the sort is said here. Moreover, in the statement that the souls τόπους ἔχουσι ὅθεν ὠρμῶσι κ.τ.λ., we are told, as if it were previously unknown to us, a thing which we have already been told in § 3 *fin.* It is probable then that § 7 was originally written independently of §§ 1-6, but was afterwards appended to those sections because of the similarity of its subject-matter.

εἰσί τινες πολιτεῖαι διαφέρουσαι ἀλλήλων. τινες and ἀλλήλων do not go well together. We might either strike out τινες, and translate 'there are πολιτεῖαι which differ from one another', or, retaining τινες, alter ἀλλήλων into τῶν ἄλλων, and translate 'there are certain πολιτεῖαι which are superior to the rest'.

πολιτεῖα seems here to mean a man's civic or social status. In what follows, it is implied that the status of a free man and the status of a slave are instances of πολιτεῖαι διαφέρουσαι ἀλλήλων.

ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδοξοτέρου τόπου ὠρμηκῦα. This means the soul which, before its incarnation on earth, resided in a higher atmospheric stratum than the other soul with which it is compared.

τὸ γὰρ [] ὑπερέχον καὶ βασιλικὸν δουλοποιεῖ(ται) τὸ ὑπερεχόμενον ἐξ ἀνάγκης. The fact that the one man is a master and the other a slave proves that the former is superior to the latter; and he who is superior must be εὐγενέστερος.

βασιλικὸν seems to be here used as a synonym for εὐγενές. It could hardly be thus used by a man who had just written §§ 1-6. But perhaps it would be best to strike out καὶ βασιλικὸν.

§ 8. αἱ ψυχαί . . . ὁμοφυεῖς εἰσιν ἑαυταῖς, καθάπερ ἐξ ἐνὸς οὐσαι χωρίου. This is inconsistent (verbally at least, if not necessarily in meaning,) both with ἐστ(ιν ἐκ) [τοῦ] χωρίου ὃ ὑπεράνω κεῖται ἐκείνων κ.τ.λ. in § 3, and with ἡ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐνδοξοτέρου τόπου ὠρμηκῦα in § 7. The χωρίον spoken of in § 8 may be taken to be the atmosphere as a whole.

ἐν ᾧ αὐτὰς διετύπωσεν (διατυποῦται or διατυποῦσαι MSS.) ὁ δημιουργός. This is a reference to some known description of the making of souls, which might be that in the *Timaeus*, or that in *Exc.* XXIII, or possibly some other which is not extant.

οὔτε εἰσὶν ἄρρενες οὔτε θήλειαι. Cf. *Marḥ* 12. 25 (*Luke* 20. 35): ὅταν γὰρ ἐκ νεκρῶν ἀναστῶσιν, οὔτε γαμοῦσιν οὔτε γαμίζονται, ἀλλ' εἰσὶν ὡς ἄγγελοι ἐν τοῖς οὐρανοῖς. But it is not to be supposed that the writer of *Exc.* XXIV derived this statement from a Christian source. See note on ἀρρενόθηλος in *Corp.* I. 15.

§ 9. ἡ δὲ [[]] (αἰτία) τοῦ τὰς μὲν (τῶν ἀρρένων) ὀβριμωτέρας (βριμωδεστέρας MSS.) εἶναι, τὰς δὲ (τῶν θηλειῶν) εὐαφεῖς, (. . .). βριμωδεστέρας ('more grim') cannot be right; what is wanted is an adjective similar in meaning to *τραχεῖαι* and *ἐργατικώτεραι* at the end of the section.

How did *εὐαφής* come to mean 'delicate'? Perhaps the notion is 'needing to be handled carefully'.

Ἦ ἀήρ ἐστι, τέκνον ὦρε, ἐν ᾧ πάντα γίνεταί· ἀήρ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστίν¹ (. . .) αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα δὲ περιβέβληται. It would be possible to make sense of this by cutting out the words *πάντα γίνεταί* and *ἀήρ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστίν*, and writing *ἡ δὲ αἰτία τοῦ . . . εἶναι . . . εὐαφεῖς (οὐχ) ὁ ἀήρ ἐστι, τέκνον ὦρε, ἐν ᾧ [] (οὐπω ἐνσωματισθεῖσα ὧκει ἡ ψυχὴ (?), ἀλλὰ) αὐτὸ τὸ σῶμα δὲ περιβέβληται (sc. ἡ ψυχῆ)*. Assuming that the author wrote something to that effect, we might take *ἀήρ δὲ ψυχῆς ἐστίν* (οὐπω ἐνσωματισθείσης οἰκητήριον?) to be a note appended to the preceding words. But I can make nothing of *πάντα γίνεταί*.

στοιχείων (στοιχείον MSS.) ἐστὶ φύραμα. Cf. *Exc. XXVI. 13.*

τὸ μὲν τῶν θηλειῶν σύγκριμα πλεονάζει μὲν τῷ ὑγρῷ καὶ (τῷ) ψυχρῷ, λείπεται δὲ τῷ ξηρῷ καὶ (τῷ) θερμῷ. As all the four elements have just been mentioned, it is to be presumed that all four of them are here taken into account. If so, the writer must have connected the terms *ὑγρόν*, *ψυχρόν*, *ξηρόν*, and *θερμόν* with the elements as in the Stoic system (according to which τὸ ὑγρόν is water, τὸ ψυχρόν is air, τὸ ξηρόν is earth, and τὸ θερμόν is fire), and not as in the more complicated arrangement of Aristotle (according to which τὸ ὑγρόν καὶ ψυχρόν is water, and τὸ ξηρόν καὶ θερμόν is fire). And if τὸ ὑγρόν is a different thing from τὸ ψυχρόν, and τὸ ξηρόν from τὸ θερμόν, it is better to insert τῷ before *ψυχρῷ* and *θερμῷ*, and τὸ before *ὑγρόν* below, than to bracket τὸ before *θερμόν*, as Wachsmuth does.

According to Aristotle, 'the ultimate distinction between the two sexes is one of greater or less vital heat' (Zeller, *Aristotle*, Eng. tr., vol. ii, p. 55). *Ar. Gen. an. 4. 6, 775 a 14: ἀσθενέστερα γὰρ ἐστὶ καὶ ψυχρότερα τὰ θήλεα τὴν φύσιν.*

δίγυρος γίνεταί καὶ τρυφερά. We are probably meant to understand that the soul of the female becomes *δίγυρος* because of the excess of τὸ ὑγρόν (water) in the composition of the body, and *τρυφερά* because of the excess of τὸ ψυχρόν (air); and similarly, that the soul of the male becomes *τραχεῖα* because of the excess of τὸ ξηρόν (earth), and *ἐργατικώτερα* because of the excess of τὸ θερμόν (fire).

§ 10. ὅταν οὗτοι οἱ χιτῶνες πικνοὶ ὡσι καὶ παχεῖς, ἀμβλυωπεῖ (δξύωπεῖ

MSS.) ὁ ὀφθαλμός. Cf. *Ar. Gen. an.* 5. 1, 780 a 25: οὐ μόνον δὲ τὰ εἰρημένα αἶτια τοῦ ἀμβλῦν ἢ δέξῃ ὄραν, ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡ τοῦ δέρματος φύσις τοῦ ἐπὶ τῇ κόρῃ καλουμένη. δεῖ γὰρ αὐτὸ διαφανὲς εἶναι· τοιοῦτον δ' ἀναγκαῖον εἶναι τὸ λεπτὸν κ.τ.λ.

ἔχει γὰρ καὶ αὕτη (sc. ἡ ψυχὴ) ἴδια περιβόλαια, ἀσώματα, καθὼ καὶ αὕτη ἀσώματος ἔστι. The πνεῦμα spoken of in *Corp. X* is such an 'envelope' of the soul; but it is here implied that there are several of them, one superimposed upon another. Iamblichus (*Stob.* 1. 49. 43, quoted in note on *Corp. X.* 13,) says that some people speak of αἰθέρια καὶ οὐράνια καὶ πνευματικὰ περιβλήματα (τῆς ψυχῆς).

These περιβόλαια cannot be ἀσώματα in the strict sense of the term (i. e. νοητά). In the following sentence we are told (if ἀέρος is the right reading) that they consist of air; and air is a σῶμα. The envelopes at least must be material; and there can be little doubt that the writer of this passage regarded the soul itself as material also. If a man who held the soul to be an immaterial thing were to say, as it is here said, that the soul is enveloped in material wrappings, and that its sight is obstructed by these wrappings, it would be necessary to take his words as spoken metaphorically. But as the word ἀσώματος is here applied to the soul and its envelopes without distinction, it is to be presumed that the writer did not consider the soul itself, any more than its envelopes, to be absolutely incorporeal. His meaning must be merely that neither the soul nor its envelopes consist of *gross* matter. Both alike are invisible and impalpable, and therein differ from the visible and palpable body. If the envelopes consist of air, the soul, perhaps, consists of fire, or of a mixture of fire and air. That is Stoic doctrine, not Platonic.

§ II. Ἡ γῆ μέσον τοῦ παντός ὑπτία κείται, ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος, κ.τ.λ. The earth was personified in the form of a woman by the Greeks, and by many other races; but the notion of picturing the earth as a woman lying on her back *with her head to the South and her feet to the North* could hardly have arisen in any other country than Egypt. It would be natural to speak in this way of the land of Egypt; for Egypt is nothing but the Nile-valley, and the Nile-valley is a long and narrow strip of land stretching from South to North. The fact that the Nile flows northward, and the *caput fluminis* lies to the South, would be a sufficient reason for placing the woman with her head to the South rather than in the reverse position. It is true that the writer of *Exx.* XXIV is speaking, not

of Egypt, but of the surface of the earth as a whole; but the person who first spoke thus of the earth must have been an Egyptian, who thought of the *orbis terrarum* as a larger Egypt, and applied to it what had doubtless been originally said of his own country.

The Egyptians sometimes depicted their earth-god (Seb) in the form of a man lying on the ground, with the sky-goddess (Nut) arching her body above him. (See Maspero, *Dawn of civilization*, Eng. tr. 1894, p. 129, and Wiedemann, *Religion of the ancient Egyptians*, Eng. tr. 1897, p. 231.) Such pictures may perhaps have helped to suggest the description of the earth as a recumbent human figure in *Exc.* XXIV. But Seb was male; and in making the earth female, the writer follows Greek and not Egyptian usage.

All educated Greeks of the period held the earth to be spherical. That view was either unknown to the writer of this passage, or deliberately disregarded by him. He probably had no clear conception of the shape of the earth as a solid body; he was thinking chiefly of its upper surface, which he must have assumed to be approximately level. He did not think of this surface as circular; he imagined its length from North to South to be much greater than its breadth from East to West, and pictured it to himself as more or less resembling in its outline a recumbent human body.

[ἐμβλέπει δ' (βλέπει δ' ἐν MSS.) οὐρανῶ καθάπερ πατρὶ ἰδίῳ, ὅπως ταῖς ἐκείνου μεταβολαῖς καὶ αὐτῇ [τὰ ἴδια] συμμεταβάλλῃ.]
The seasonal variations of temperature, vegetation, &c. on the surface of the earth result from the varying positions of the heavenly bodies.

[τὰ ἴδια] has doubtless arisen out of the preceding ἰδίῳ.

The connexion between the preceding clause (μεμέρισται δὲ καθ' ὅσα μέρη ὁ ἄνθρωπος μερίζεται) and those which follow (καὶ πρὸς μὲν τῷ νότῳ . . . ἔχει τὴν κεφαλὴν, κ.τ.λ.) is broken by the interposition of ἐμβλέπει δ' . . . συμμεταβάλλῃ. If these words are to be retained, they must be transposed, and placed immediately after (πρὸς) οὐρανὸν βλέπουσα. But they are not needed there; the writer's present object is simply to describe the position in which the woman is lying, and for that purpose, the statement that she is 'facing towards the sky' (i. e. lying face upward)¹ is to the point, but an explanation of her reason for choosing that position is

¹ In the Egyptian designs mentioned above, Seb is lying on his back, but turning his head, so that he looks *away from* the sky.

irrelevant. It is therefore most likely that (ἐμ)βλέπει δ' . . . συμ-μεταβάλλη is a marginal note on (πρὸς) οὐρανὸν βλέπουσα.

πρὸς δὲ τῷ ἀπηλιώτῃ (τὸν) δεξιὸν ὤμον, (πρὸς δὲ τῷ λιβί τὸν εὐώνυμον,) ὑπὸ (δὲ) τὴν ἄρκτον (τὰς ἄρκτους MSS.) τοὺς πόδας, [τὸν δὲ εὐώνυμον ὑπὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς ἄρκτου]. As μετὰ τὴν ἄρκτον follows very shortly, it is to be presumed that here also the writer spoke of the Great Bear only, and not of the two Bears. The following τοὺς might easily cause ἄρκτον to be altered into ἄρκτους. The phrase ὑπὸ τὴν ἄρκτον means merely 'in the extreme north'; it does not indicate any more definite position.

Heeren and Wachsmuth retain τὸν δὲ εὐώνυμον ὑπὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς ἄρκτου, and insert (τὸν μὲν δεξιὸν ὑπὸ τὴν οὐράν) before τὸν δὲ εὐώνυμον. But it is better to bracket τὸν δὲ . . . τῆς ἄρκτου. The statement that the woman's right shoulder lies to the East, and her left shoulder to the West, is of some use, because it helps to make the reader clearly understand how she is placed. But when we have once been told this, nothing could possibly be gained by going on to talk about the respective positions of the two feet.

The addition of τὸν δὲ . . . τῆς ἄρκτου may be accounted for by assuming that the words (πρὸς δὲ τῷ λιβί τὸν εὐώνυμον), which must have occurred above, were accidentally transposed, and came to be read, in a mutilated form, after ὑπὸ δὲ τὴν ἄρκτον τοὺς πόδας. We may suppose that a transcriber found a meaningless τὸν εὐώνυμον here, and tried to make sense by expanding it into τὸν μὲν εὐώνυμον ὑπὸ τὴν κεφαλὴν τῆς ἄρκτου.

[For the view that the East was to the right and the West to the left, see Aetius (Diels, *Doxogr.*, p. 339: Τίνα δεξιὰ τοῦ κόσμου καὶ τίνα ἀριστερά. Πυθαγόρας Πλάτων Ἀριστοτέλης δεξιὰ τοῦ κόσμου τὰ ἀνατολικά μέρη, ἀφ' ὧν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κινήσεως, ἀριστερά δὲ τὰ δυτικά. Cf. Pl. *Laus*, 760 D, and Ar. *De Caelo*, 285 b 16: δεξιὸν γὰρ ἐκάστου λέγομεν, ὅθεν ἡ ἀρχὴ τῆς κατὰ τόπον κινήσεως· τοῦ δ' οὐρανοῦ ἀρχὴν τῆς περιφορᾶς, ὅθεν αἱ ἀνατολαὶ τῶν ἀστρων, ὥστε τοῦτ' ἂν εἴη δεξιόν, οὐ δ' αἱ δύσεις, ἀριστερόν. εἰ οὖν ἀρχεται τε ἀπὸ τῶν δεξιῶν καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ δεξιὰ περιφέρεται, ἀνάγκη τὸ ἄνω εἶναι τὸν ἀφανῆ πόλον· εἰ γὰρ ἔσται ὁ φανερός, ἐπ' ἀριστερὰ ἔσται ἡ κίνησις, ὅπερ οὐ φαμεν. δῆλον τοίνυν ὅτι ὁ ἀφανὴς πόλος ἐστὶ τὸ ἄνω. καὶ οἱ μὲν ἐκεῖ οἰκοῦντες ἐν τῷ ἄνω εἰσὶν ἡμισφαιρίῳ καὶ πρὸς τοῖς δεξιοῖς, ἡμεῖς δ' ἐν τῷ κάτω καὶ πρὸς τοῖς ἀριστεροῖς, ἐναντίως ἢ ὡς οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι λέγουσιν]

[τὰ δὲ μέσα ἐν τοῖς μέσοις]. As we already know that the woman is the earth, it is superfluous to tell us that the middle of the woman is

in the middle of the earth. The statement that *Egypt* 'is situated in the middle of the earth', to which all the rest leads up, comes, where it ought to come, in § 13.

§ 12. τὸ τοὺς μὲν νοτιαίους . . . εὐκορύφους (<<εἶναι>>) καὶ καλλίτριχας. The 'men of the South' must be the negroes. κορυφή means, not the whole head, but the top or crown of the head; and the writer was doubtless thinking of the thick and woolly hair of the Soudanese negroes or 'Fuzzy-wuzzies'. [Cf. the Posidonian passage in Strabo, 2. 2. 3: ἔχειν γὰρ τι ἴδιον τὰς ζώνας ταύτας, ἀύχμηράς τε ἰδίως καὶ ἀμμώδεις ὑπαρχούσας . . . ὄρη γὰρ μὴ εἶναι πλησίον ὥστε τὰ νέφη προσπίπτοντα ὄμβρους ποιεῖν . . . διόπερ οὐλότριχας καὶ οὐλόκερως καὶ προχείλους καὶ πλατύρρινας γεννᾶσθαι τὰ γὰρ ἄκρα αὐτῶν συστρέφεσθαι. The attempt to connect climate and character in these passages is Stoic. See Strabo *passim* and Addenda in vol iv.]

τοὺς δὲ ἀπηλιωτικούς πρὸς μάχην προχείρους [[εἶναι]] καὶ τοξικούς (τοξιανούς FP¹),—κρείττων γὰρ τούτοις (αἰτία γὰρ τούτων MSS.) ἢ δεξιὰ χεὶρ ἔστι. The Parthians, for instance, were famous for their archery; and both they and the Persians, who succeeded them, and were the dominant race in the East from A. D. 226, must have been known in Egypt, no less than elsewhere, to be formidable fighters. It is possible that the defeat and capture of the Roman emperor Valerian by the Persians in A. D. 260 was a recent event at the time when this passage was written.

It is here implied that it is the greater strength of their right hands that makes the men of the East good bowmen. The bowstring was commonly drawn back with the right hand, while the left, with which the bow was held in position, remained motionless. When the bow was handled in this way, the chief part of the work was done by the right hand.

τοὺς δ' ἐν τῷ λιβί . . . ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πλεῖστον ἀριστερομάχους. Was this strange notion suggested by some peculiarity in the drill or equipment of the Roman soldiers by whom Alexandria was garrisoned?

[καὶ (ἐν) ὄσοις (καὶ ὄσον MSS.) ἄλλοι τῷ δεξιῷ μέρει ἐνεργοῦσιν, αὐτοὺς τῷ ἐωνύμῳ ἰπροστιθεμένους¹]. This amounts to saying that the men of the West are left-handed in other things as well as in fighting. But the balance of the clauses is improved by omitting these words; and it seems probable that they were added by another hand.

προστι- may have come from πρὸς τινα in the following clause, or *vice versa*. The text is corrupt in both places. It may be worth noting that πρὸς (τινα) occurs again a few lines below.

τοὺς δὲ ὑπὸ τὴν ἄρκτον [πρὸς τίνα] <ταχεῖς?> τοὺς πόδας, καὶ ἄλλως (ἄλλους MSS.) εὐκνήμους. Perhaps the northern barbarians employed in the Roman armies had a reputation for good marching. There may have been a corps of them stationed in Egypt.

οἱ (τοὺς MSS.) δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ μικρῷ πόρρω [τὸ νῦν Ἰταλικὸν κλίμα καὶ τὸ Ἑλλαδικόν], πάντες δὴ (δὲ MSS.) οὗτοι καλλίμηροί εἰσι καὶ εὐπυγότεροι (εὐπωγονότεροι MSS.). 'Those who come after' the Northerners 'and a little further on' (*sc.* as you go from North to South) are, no doubt, those who live in or near the latitude of Italy and Greece. But there are good reasons for bracketing τὸ νῦν . . . Ἑλλαδικόν. As no nations or countries are mentioned by name in the rest of the paragraph, it is unlikely that Italy and Hellas would be mentioned here. The words have no grammatical construction; and νῦν, which is meaningless if spoken by Isis, would have a meaning if we suppose the phrase to have been written by some one who said to himself 'at the time when this dialogue is supposed to have taken place, the names of Italy and Hellas had not come into use'. We may conclude then that τὸ νῦν . . . Ἑλλαδικόν is a marginal note written to explain (and rightly explaining) what is meant by οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους καὶ μικρῷ πόρρω.

If the writer was thinking chiefly of the Greeks, the notion that the people of the region spoken of are καλλίμηροι καὶ εὐπυγότεροι may perhaps have resulted from the Greek practice of stripping for exercise in the gymnasia; for it was only where some such usage existed that these parts of the body would be habitually seen.

The following words ὥστε . . . ὀμιλίαν were probably added by a nasty-minded reader. A piece of confirmatory evidence is no more needed in this case than in that of the feet and legs of the Northerners.

It is possible, however, that the whole passage οἱ δὲ μετὰ τούτους . . . ἀρρένων ὀμιλίαν is a later addition. This passage is connected with the preceding mention of the thighs in § 11 *fin.* (τοὺς δὲ μηροὺς ἐν τοῖς μετὰ τὴν ἄρκτον); but perhaps both might be omitted with advantage. The use of μετὰ to describe the region meant, both there and here, is somewhat awkward; and the mention of an intermediate region, in one direction only, impairs the symmetry of North, South, East, and West.

§ 13. πάντα δὲ ταῦτα τὰ μέρη (μέλη MSS.) <τῆς γῆς> πρὸς <τίνα μὲν ἐνεργὰ ὄντα, πρὸς δὲ> τὰ ἄλλα ἀργά. When applied to land, ἐνεργός means 'productive', and ἀργός 'unproductive'.

ἡ τῶν προγόνων ἡμῶν (ἡμῖν MSS.) ἱερωτάτη χώρα. These words seem to imply that both Isis and Horus, at the time when the dialogue took place, were human beings, descended from human ancestors,—or from ancestors who were formerly human, though they may have become gods after their deaths. See notes on *Exc.* XXIII. 1 and (50).

τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ὀρηγήριόν ἐστι(ν ἢ) καρδία. Cf. *καρδίας ὄγκος* in *Exc.* XXIII. 36. This was the Stoic view. But it was doubtless also the view of native Egyptians who knew nothing of Greek philosophy or science.

(οἱ) ἐνταῦθα ἄνθρωποι . . . τῶν πάντων νοερώτεροί εἰσι. The Egyptian writer takes it for granted, as a thing well known and beyond dispute, that his countrymen are more intelligent than men of other races; for him, the only question is, what is the cause of this superiority.

His assumption, absurd as it may seem to us, would have been admitted by many Greeks. Among the Greeks, from the time of Herodotus and Plato, and perhaps still earlier, the wisdom of the Egyptians was held in high esteem. Centuries before this document was written, it had come to be accepted as an undoubted fact that Pythagoras and Plato were pupils of Egyptian teachers;¹ and in the writer's time, many Pagans believed that Greek philosophy was derived from the teaching of the Egyptian Hermes Trismegistus, just as many Jews and Christians believed that it was derived from the teaching of the Hebrew Moses.

ἐπὶ καρδίας (γῆς) γενόμενοι καὶ τραφέντες. Egypt is the heart of the earth. Cf. *Plut. Is. et Os.* 33: the Egyptians τὴν Αἴγυπτον . . . καρδία παρεικάζουσι' θερμὴ γάρ ἐστι καὶ ὑγρά, καὶ τοῖς νοτίοις μέρεσι τῆς οἰκουμένης, ὥσπερ ἡ καρδία τοῖς εὐωνύμοις τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, μάλιστα ἐγκέκλεισται καὶ προσκεχώρηκεν. In Plutarch's Egyptian source, ἡ οἰκουμένη (i. e. the *orbis terrarum*, the inhabited surface

¹ Cf. *Diod.* 1. 96: βητέον ὅσοι τῶν παρ' Ἑλλήσι δεδοξασμένων ἐπὶ συνέσει καὶ παιδείᾳ παρέβαλον εἰς Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀρχαίοις χρόνοις, ἵνα τῶν ἐνταῦθα νομίμων καὶ τῆς παιδείας μετάρχωσιν. οἱ γὰρ ἱερεῖς τῶν Αἰγυπτίων ἱστοροῦσιν ἐκ τῶν ἀναγραφῶν τῶν ἐν ταῖς ἱεραῖς βίβλοις παραβαλεῖν πρὸς ἑαυτοὺς τὸ παλαιὸν Ὀρφέα τε καὶ Μουσαῖον καὶ Μελάμποδα καὶ Δαίδαλον, πρὸς δὲ τούτοις Ὀμηρὸν τε τὸν ποιητὴν, καὶ Λυκοῦργον τὸν Σπαρτιάτην, ἔτι δὲ Σόλωνα τὸν Ἀθηναῖον, καὶ Πλάτωνα τὸν φιλόσοφον, ἔλθειν δὲ καὶ Πυθαγόραν τὸν Σάμωνα, καὶ τὸν μαθηματικὸν Εὐδόξον, ἔτι δὲ Δημόκριτον τὸν Ἀβδηρίτην, καὶ Οἰνοσίδην τὸν Χίον. πάντων δὲ τούτων σημεῖα δεικνύουσι τῶν μὲν εἰκόνας, τῶν δὲ τόπων ἢ κατασκευασμάτων ὀμνώνυμος προσηγορίας, ἐκ τε τῆς ἐκάστῃ ζηλωθείσης παιδείας ἀποδείξεις φέρουσι, συνίσταντες ἐξ Αἰγύπτου μετενηγέσθαι πάντα δι' ἃν παρὰ τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν ἐθανμάσθησαν. As to Plato and Eudoxus, see *Strabo* 17. 29, p. 806. Compare also *Abdammonis resp.* 1. 1 b (*Testim.*).

of the earth) was doubtless likened to a man or woman lying face upward, as in *Exc.* XXIV; but it must have been assumed that the head lay to the East, and not, as in *Exc.* XXIV, to the South. See also Horapollon 1. 22. Reitzenstein (*Poim.* p. 140) quotes Hephæstion, 'Ἀποτελέσματα, p. 23 Eng.: Χνοῦμιν ὡς κύριον ὄντα τοῦ στήθους τοῦ κόσμου (i. e. lord of Egypt?).

§§ 14, 15. ἄλλως τε, ὁ μὲν νότος . . . ἐπιδίδωσι. This is a second answer to the question asked by Horus in § 11 *init.* The two answers have this much in common, that in both of them the conception of a spherical earth is ignored or tacitly rejected, and Egypt is placed in the middle of the earth's surface. But in all else, there is little connexion between them; and either of the two might very well stand alone. Whether both were written by the same person or not, we have no means of knowing.

§ 14. διὰ τὴν οὕτως αὐτῶν γενομένων ἐκέισε ἀνακομιδὴν (ἐκεῖ κατακομιδὴν MSS.) ἐκεῖθεν ρεῖν λέγουσιν καὶ τὸν ἡμέτερον πο(ταμόν), λυομένης ἐκεῖ τῆς ἰσχυρῆς (αἰ. τέχνης)¹. The flow of the Nile is adduced as evidence in support of the view that the South is a cloudy region. The argument is this: since the Nile flows from the South, there must be a heavy rainfall in the South; and where there is a heavy rainfall, there must be much cloud. The writer's theory appears to be that clouds formed in the more northerly regions are (by some force the nature of which was probably explained in the lost passage which preceded this sentence) driven to the South, and massed together there; that they there discharge themselves in rain; and that this rain supplies the water which flows down the Nile. He seems to have had some knowledge of the tropical rains of central Africa. Cf. Ammianus Marcell. 22. 15. 5: 'Adfirmant aliqui physicorum in subiectis septentrioni spatiis, cum hiemes frigidae cuncta constringunt, magnitudinem nivium congelascere, easque postea vi flagrantis sideris resolutas, fluxis umoribus nubes efficere gravidas, quae in meridianam plagam etesiis flantibus pulsae,¹ expressaeque tepore nimio incrementa ubertim suggerere Nilo creduntur. Ex Aethiopicis imbris, qui abundantes in tractibus illis per aestus torridos cadere memorantur, exundationes eius erigi anni temporibus adserunt alii praestitutis.'

αὐτῶν means τῶν νεφῶν; and οὕτως γενομένων refers back to ἐκ τοῦ περιέχοντος συνισταμένων, or to some fuller explanation of the process by which the clouds which travel to the South have been produced.

¹ In *Exc.* XXIV. 14, it may very likely have been said, in the lacuna after συνισταμένων νεφῶν, that the clouds are driven to the South by the *Etesian winds*.

κατακομιδὴν cannot be right. κατακομίζειν means (1) to bring down to the coast from inland, (2) to bring in to shore from the high sea, (3) to bring to one's own place from elsewhere. But none of those three meanings is here possible. The writer appears to be speaking of the conveyance of clouds from North to South, which, in Egypt, would be conveyance from the coast to the inland parts, and from the mouth of the Nile towards its source; and that could not be called κατακομιδὴ. The word which means 'to convey up stream' or 'up country' is ἀνακομίζειν. It therefore seems best to write τὴν . . . αὐτῶν . . . ἐκεῖσε ἀνακομιδὴν, 'the conveyance of the clouds up country to the South'. There is some awkwardness in the combination ἐκεῖ(σε) . . . ἐκεῖθεν . . . ἐκεῖ; possibly the first ἐκεῖ (or ἐκεῖσε) may have been substituted for some phrase meaning 'to the South'.

[If πάχνη is interpreted as 'snow and ice' on the mountains, the argument is that the precipitation upon the high Ethiopian hills, which causes the Nile floods, gives evidence of the cloudiness of the south. The reading τέχνης is explicable as a corruption of πάχνης, and πάχνη may easily have acquired the same range of meaning as *pruina*; cf. Virgil *Georg.* 3. 368: 'stant circumfusa pruinis | corpora magna boum'. On the connexion of the Etesian winds with the rise of the Nile see Gisinger, *Die Erdbeschreibung des Eudoxus von Knidos*, p. 38 ff. For λυομένης cf. Procl. *In Tim.* 1. 119 Diehl: Πορφύριος μὲν δὴ φησιν, ὅτι δόξα ἦν παλαιὰ Αἰγυπτίων τὸ ὕδωρ κάτωθεν ἀναβλυσθαίνειν ἐν τῇ ἀναβάσει τοῦ Νείλου, . . . οὐχ ὅτι ἡ χιών λυομένη τὸ πλῆθος τῶν ὑδάτων ποιεῖ. See also Strabo, 2. 2-3, and Addenda in vol. iv. for Posidonius.]

τὸν ὑποκείμενον ἤχλυσεν ἀέρα, καὶ τρόπον τινα καπνοῦ κατέπλησε (κατεκόμισε MSS.). καπνός usually means smoke, not mist; and clouds do not fill the air with smoke. But τρόπον τινα is a hint that καπνός is not to be taken literally. Polybius 9. 16. 3 speaks of καπνώδης καὶ συννεφῆς ἀήρ.

The false reading κατεκόμισε must have some connexion with the false reading κατακομιδὴν above. Possibly ἀνακομιδὴν caused κατέπλησε to be altered into κατεκόμισε, and κατεκόμισε caused ἀνακομιδὴν to be altered into κατακομιδὴν.

ἀχλὺς οὐ μόνον ὀμμάτων (ὀνομάτων MSS.) ἐστὶν ἐμπόδιον, ἀλλὰ καὶ νοῦ. The notion is similar to that in § 10, where we were told that the embodied soul is wrapped in layers of air, and that when this internal air is thick and turbid, like the external air in stormy weather, the soul cannot see clearly. In both passages, the writer

speaks as if the sight of 'the eyes of the mind', no less than the sight of the bodily eyes, could be obstructed by material things.

ὁ δὲ ἀπηλιώτης, . . . τῆ συνέγγυς (συνεχῆ or συνεχεῖ MSS.) ἡλίου ἀνατολῇ θορυβούμενος καὶ ἐκθερμαινόμενος, ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ ὁ . . . λιψ μετέχων τῶν αὐτῶν κατὰ δυσμάς. If we read *συνεχεῖ*, we must take it to mean 'contiguous', or 'in close proximity'. *συνεχῆς* sometimes has that meaning; but as the word occurs in a different sense a few lines below, where it means 'continual', it seems better to write *σύνεγγυς* here.

These words imply that the surface of the earth is flat, and has a definite edge; and that the sun is close to that edge on the eastern side when it is rising, and on the western side when it is setting. A similar notion occurs in Hdt. 3. 104, where we are told that in India, 'which is the farthest region of the inhabited world towards the East', it is very hot in the morning, and very cold at sunset. But science had advanced since the age of Herodotus; and a man who speaks in this way in Egypt under Roman rule shows ignorance of things which were known to all educated Greeks of his time.

§ 15. τὸ δὲ μέσον τούτων, [εἰλικρινὲς ἔν καὶ] ἀτάραχον (ἔν). τὸ μέσον τούτων is the land of Egypt. Air may be called *εἰλικρινῆς* literally, and intelligence may be called *εἰλικρινῆς* metaphorically; but a country can

" be called *εἰλικρινῆς* in any sense. It is therefore most . . . *εἰλικρινές* has come from *εἰλικρινῆ τὴν σύνεσιν* (*εἰλικρινῆ ἐπίστα* . . . ὁδ.) above, and has been inserted here by error.

καὶ (αὐτὸ καθ') εἰ . . . τὸ προέχει (καὶ ἑαυτῷ προλέγει MSS.), καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ (γεννωμένοις) [πάσι]. It would be going too far to say that Egypt *προέχει τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ πάσι*, i. e. that *all* things in Egypt are superior to the corresponding things in other lands. The only thing that the writer is here concerned with is the fact that the men born in Egypt (οἱ ἐν αὐτῷ γεννώμενοι) are superior to the men of other lands, and superior in one particular respect, viz. in intelligence.

τῆ γὰρ συνεχεῖ εὐημερίᾳ (ἀμεριμνία MSS.) (συνετοῦς) γεννᾶ. *εὐημερία*, 'fine weather', gives the sense required. In Egypt, rain is rare, and the sky is almost always clear. According to the writer's view, Egypt is exempt from the cloudiness of the South, from the extremes of alternate heat and cold to which the eastern and western regions are daily subjected by the rising and setting of the sun, and from the permanent cold of the North; the weather in Egypt is therefore always mild and serene; and it is the perpetual serenity of the climate that makes Egyptians more intelligent than other men.

καὶ (ἀλλοφύλους δὲ) κοσμεῖ καὶ παιδεύει. From this point to the end of the section there is much corruption; but it is clear that in what follows the writer is speaking of what Egypt does for foreigners, and it seems most likely that κοσμεῖ καὶ παιδεύει (as opposed to γεννα) has to do with that topic.

καὶ (γὰρ) μόνον ὅσοις ἐρίξει, τοσοῦτους καὶ νικᾷ, καὶ νικῆσαν, ὥσπερ σατράπην ἀγαθὸν τοῖς νενικημένοις ἐπιστήμην τὴν ἰδίαν ἐπιδίδωσι.—(καὶ μόνον τοῖς τοσοῦτοις ἐρίξει καὶ νικᾷ καὶ ἐπιστάμενον τὴν ἰδίαν νίκην ὥσπερ σατράπης ἀγαθοῦ τοῖς νενικημένοις καὶ ἐπιδίδωσι MSS.) My reconstruction of the passage gives what the writer probably meant, though it may be doubted in what words he said it. There is a play on the two meanings of νικᾶν, 'to defeat in a competition' and 'to conquer in war'. Egypt defeats all her competitors, i. e. surpasses all other countries, in intelligence; but having won the prize in the competition, she treats her defeated rivals as a wise king treats a country which he has conquered. As such a king benefits his conquered enemies by appointing a good satrap to govern them, so Egypt benefits men of other lands by imparting to them, for the guidance of their lives, the knowledge which she has acquired. That is to say, Egypt has taught the Greeks philosophy, and in so doing, has been the educator of the human race.

The MSS. give σατράπης ἀγαθοῦ; but there can be little doubt that we ought to read σατράπην ἀγαθόν. The conqueror must be a king; a satrap is not a man who makes conquests for himself, but a man who is appointed by his king to rule over a conquered country. In the simile implied, the victorious king corresponds to Egypt, and the satrap, to the wisdom which Egypt teaches to foreign nations.

The occurrence of the word σατράπης in this passage has been used as an argument to prove that *Exc.* XXIV and *Exc.* XXIII were written at a time when Egypt was under Persian dominion, i. e. before 332 B. C., and even that they were written before 405 B. C.¹

¹ Flinders Petrie, *Personal religion in Egypt before Christianity*, 1909, p. 40: 'It would seem impossible for the allusion to the government of a satrap to be preferred by an Egyptian, except under the Persian dominion. And such a reference to wise government could not occur in the very troubled years of plunder and confusion, 342 to 332 B. C. We must go back to the days of wise and righteous rule of Persia, 525-405 B. C., to reach a possible comparison with a wise satrap.' Dr. Petrie thinks that the *Kore Kosmu* (of which he takes *Exc.* XXIV to be a part) was most likely written about 510 B. C.; 'but in any case', he says, 'we must, by this allusion to a satrap, date it to within a century after that.' The date 510 B. C., which he considers to be the most probable, is, at the very least, certainly as much as 460 years too early, and is probably 660 years (if not more) too early.

It may therefore be worth while to mention some of the many instances of the use of the word *satrap* in much later periods. To the references given by Liddell and Scott for *σατράπης* and *σατραπικός* in Plutarch, Pausanias, Lucian, and Alciphro, may be added Philo *De decalogo* 13. 61, Cohn vol. iv, p. 282; Aelius Aristides (Keil) II, p. 343 and p. 99; Celsus, in Orig. *c. Cels.* 8. 35; Philostratus *Vita Apollon.* 1. 27; and the Gnostic Justinus *ap. Hippol. Ref. haer.* 5. 26. In the reign of Diocletian, the governors of certain districts subject to the Roman emperor were entitled satraps.¹

§ 17. Τῶν ζώων (ζώντων MSS.) τὰ μὲν ἔκειώται πρὸς τὸ πῦρ, τὰ δὲ . . . [τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα]. As ζώντων has just been used with reference to men, ζώων is better here.

The point of the passage is that this or that animal has a preference for one or more of the four elements, and is averse to the others. It would be nonsense to speak of a preference for all four elements. If there were any animal that was equally at home in all the four, there would be no reason to mention it; and there could not be an animal that was alien or averse to all four elements, i. e. to the material world as a whole. Both τὰ δὲ καὶ πρὸς τὰ ὅλα here and τὰ δὲ τῶν ὅλων below must therefore be struck out.

§ 18. [οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καὶ τινα τῶν (ἄλλων) ζώων φιλεῖ τὸ πῦρ, οἷον αἱ σαλαμάνδραι, κ.τ.λ.] The original writer mentioned, as an instance of animals which love fire, the high-flying birds. His meaning was that eagles and other such birds show love of fire by flying so high that they get near the sun, or the fiery sphere of heaven. The words οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ κ.τ.λ. are a note added by some one who thought the salamander ought to be mentioned as another instance. According to Aristotle and Aelian, the salamander is a fire-extinguisher; and according to Aelian, it does not love fire, but hates it. *Ar. Hist. an.* 552 b 15: ὅτι δ' ἐνδέχεται μὴ κάεσθαι συστάσεις τινὰς ζώων, ἢ σαλαμάνδρα ποιεῖ φανερόν· αὕτη γάρ, ὡς φασί, διὰ πυρὸς βαδίζουσα κατασβέννυσι τὸ πῦρ. Aelian *De animal.* 2. 31: ἡ σαλαμάνδρα τὸ ζῶον οὐκ ἔστι μὲν τῶν πυρὸς ἐκγόνων, . . . θαρρεῖ δὲ αὐτό, καὶ χωρεῖ τῇ φλογὶ ὁμόσε, καὶ ὡς ἀντίπαλόν τινα σπεύδει καταγωνίσασθαι.

§ 19. (. . .) Ἐκαστον γὰρ τῶν στοιχείων περιβολὴ ἔστι τῶν σωματίων.¹

¹ Schiller, *Gesch. der röm. Kaiserzeit* II, p. 144: in A. D. 298, at the end of Diocletian's Persian war, 'in dem oberen Tigris-Laufe wurden noch fünf Satrapieen des linken Ufers abgetreten (i. e. surrendered to Rome by the Persians) . . ., altarmenische Gebiete, die aber nicht dem Reiche einverleibt, sondern von Satrapen verwaltet wurden.'

πᾶσα οὖν ψυχὴ, ἐν τῷ σώματι οὔσα, βαρεῖται καὶ θλίβεται τοῖς τέτταρσι τοῦτοις. The argument has been obscured by the loss of a passage at this point. What have the likings and dislikes of animals for this or that element to do with the state of the embodied human soul? The connexion of thought was probably as follows. As some of the elements are alien to a fish, and some to a bird, so all the four material elements are alien to the human soul, the true home of which is in an immaterial world; and when the soul is incarnated in a body composed of earth, water, air, and fire, it is, so to speak, 'out of its element', and is like a fish out of water. Consequently, an incarnated soul is never at its ease, and cannot think clearly.

If that is what the writer meant, it seems to be implied in this paragraph that the soul is ἀσώματος in the strict sense, and not merely, as in § 10, that it does not consist of the *grosser* material elements. Supposing that it were made of fire, for instance, a body of fire would suit it perfectly, and even in a body composed of all the four elements it would find something at least that was congenial to it. Possibly, however, the writer of this passage may have held that the soul is composed of the Aristotelian 'fifth substance', and that its true home is heaven, which consists of that substance.

[καὶ γὰρ εἰκός ἐστι καὶ ταύτην τισὶ μὲν τούτων τέρπεσθαι, τισὶ δὲ ἄχθεσθαι.] This must have been added by some one who failed to understand the passage. If the soul 'is weighed down and crushed by (all) the four elements', as we were told in the preceding sentence, it cannot 'find pleasure in some of them'.

ἐὰν μέντοι [καὶ] τοῦτο (ταῦτα MSS.) σάλον λάβῃ καὶ ταραχὴν ἤτοι ἀπὸ νόσου ἢ [φόβου], τότε καὶ αὐτὴ ὡσπερ ἐν βυθῷ (πεσῶν) ἀνθρώπος ἐπικυμᾶται. Incarnation even in a healthy body hinders the soul from thinking clearly; but when the body itself is thrown into confusion by disease, then the soul is as helpless as a man who has fallen overboard in a storm, and it cannot think at all. Bodily disease is likened to a storm at sea; and the sick person's soul is compared to a man who has fallen into the sea, and is tossed about by the waves.

It is only in this last sentence of the answer that the question asked by Horus in § 17 is directly dealt with; down to this point, Isis has been speaking of incarnated souls in general, and not of the state of things ἐν ταῖς μακραῖς νόσοις. Perhaps we are meant to understand that incarnation even in a healthy body is a sort of disease for the soul; but the connexion is not explained, and it may

be suspected that some words which would have made it clearer have been lost before *ἐὰν μέντοι καὶ τοῦτο κ.τ.λ.*

Fear is a state of the soul, and not of the body; *φόβον* must therefore be a wrong reading. One might write in place of it some such word as *μέθης*; but perhaps *ἄλλον τινός* is better.

Wachsmuth follows Meineke in altering *ὡσπερ ἐν βυθῷ ἄνθρωπος* into *ὡσπερ εἰ βυθῷ ἀνθέρικος*. Meineke compares Callimachus *H. in Del.* 193: *παλιρροίη ἐπινήχεται ἀνθέρικος ὡς*. That passage may serve to show that 'to float with the current like an *ἀνθέρικος*' (as we might say 'like a straw') was a phrase in use; but *ἀνθέρικος* suits the context in *Exc.* XXIV no better than *ἄνθρωπος*; and if we insert *πεσών* after *ἐν βυθῷ*, we get a quite satisfactory sense.

EXCERPT XXV

§ I. διηγῆσω . . . ὑπὲρ τῆς θαυμαστῆς ψυχοποιίας τοῦ θεοῦ. The making of souls by God is described in *Exc.* XXIII. 14-16, and is the central incident in the story told in that document. It is therefore probable that these words refer to *Exc.* XXIII. If so, *Exc.* XXV was written as a sequel to *Exc.* XXIII. But it does not necessarily follow that it was written by the same person.

οὗτω δέ μοι ἀπήγγειλας ποῦ τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολυθεῖσαι χωροῦσιν αἱ ψυχαί. ποῦ here means 'whither'. The word is often thus used in late writers; there is therefore no need to alter it into *ποῖ*.

In *Exc.* XXIII. 39, Horus was told that embodied souls, if they behave well during their life on earth, will, when they quit the body, be permitted to return to their home above, but that if they behave ill, they will be reincarnated on earth in the bodies of beasts. That is an answer to the question which is here asked; but it is a short and summary answer only, and the writer of *Exc.* XXV, supposing that he had *Exc.* XXIII in his hands, may have either overlooked it, or considered it inadequate.

τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης μύστης γενόμενος. The doctrine spoken of is a *μυστήριον*, i. e. a holy truth which must be kept secret from all except the few who are worthy to receive it, or which at any rate has been kept secret hitherto.

ἀθάνατε μήτηρ. Here we are plainly told that Isis was a goddess at the time when the dialogue took place. (Cf. *τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως*

καὶτὴ ἴτυγχάνουσα' in § 2.) As far as this passage is concerned, we are free to suppose either that she had been a goddess from the first, or that she had been a mortal woman, and had become a goddess after her death. But on the other hand, the words ἀπὸ σελήνης ἐφ' ἡμᾶς in § 9 seem to imply that both Isis and Horus are human beings living on earth. Perhaps the two passages might be reconciled by assuming that in this dialogue Isis is a goddess, but a goddess incarnate in a human body. See notes on *Exc.* XXIII. 1 and (§50).

§ 2. «[μύστης] (ἐγὼ) δέ, [ὥσπερ] τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως καὶτὴ [τυγχάνουσα] (μετέχουσα), . . . διεξελεύσομαι σοι κ.τ.λ.» In the MSS., this passage stands in § 4, where it is interposed in the middle of an argument on the question whether the soul is dispersed when it quits the body. It is manifestly out of place there. As it contains a promise to give a detailed explanation of things (διεξελεύσομαι σοι τῶν ὄντων τὸ καθ' ἕκαστον), and gives the hearer reasons for accepting as unquestionably true what Isis is about to say concerning them, it must have been intended to stand at the beginning of one of her discourses; and if it occurred anywhere in *Exc.* XXV as originally written, it must have stood at the place where I have put it.

μύστης, if not deleted, should be corrected into μύστις. Isis might call herself μύστις τῆς θείας γνώσεως or something of the sort (cf. τῆς θεωρίας ταύτης μύστης above), but hardly μύστις τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως; and it is most likely that μύστης has been repeated here by error. The meaning probably was 'I am one of the Immortals'; and that may be expressed by writing ἐγὼ δέ, τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως καὶτὴ μετέχουσα. There must be some mistake in ὥσπερ; we might either strike it out, or alter it into ὡς, or transpose it and put it before ὠδευκῖα.

ὠδευκῖα διὰ τοῦ πεδίου τῆς ἀληθείας. This phrase has come directly or indirectly from Pl. *Phaedrus* 248 B, τὸ ἀληθείας ἰδεῖν πεδίον. In Ps.-Pl. *Axiochus* 371 C, the place in which Minos and Rhadamanthus sit as judges of the dead is called πεδίον ἀληθείας. Cf. Plut. *De defectu orac.* 22, 422 B (in an account of a curious cosmologic system attributed to a hermit who lived on the shore of the Red Sea): τὸ δ' ἐντὸς ἐπίπεδον τοῦ τριγώνου κοινὴν ἐστὶαν εἶναι πάντων, καλεῖσθαι δὲ πεδίον ἀληθείας, ἐν ᾧ τοὺς λόγους καὶ τὰ εἶδη καὶ τὰ παραδείγματα τῶν γεγονότων καὶ τῶν γενησομένων ἀκίνητα κείσθαι, καὶ περὶ αὐτὰ τοῦ αἰῶνος ὄντος οἶον ἀπορροῆν ἐπὶ τοὺς

κόσμους φέρεσθαι τὸν χρόνον. (If the hermit said this, he must have read Plato.)

τὸ συνεστὸς καὶ μὴ ἀφανιζόμενον χώρον ἔχει¹. These meaningless words appear to be the remains of an axiom or fundamental proposition which Isis stated at the beginning of her discourse, in order to prepare the way for her teaching about the soul. Its meaning may perhaps be inferred from the words σῶμα . . . ἐκ πολλῶν συγκεκριμένον and τὸ . . . ἐξ ἐνὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν in § 4 (as emended), where this general statement seems to be applied to the case of body (which is ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστὸς) on the one hand, and soul (which is not ἐκ πολλῶν συνεστὸς) on the other hand. Cf. Pl. *Phaedo* 78 C: τῷ μὲν συντεθέντι τε καὶ συνθέτῳ ὄντι φύσει προσήκει τοῦτο πάσχειν, διαιρεθῆναι ταύτη ἥπερ συνετέθη· εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνει ὄν ἀξύνθετον, τοῦτῳ μόνῃ προσήκει μὴ πάσχειν ταῦτα. The author may have written something like τὸ μὲν συνεστὸς καὶ διαλύεται, τὸ δὲ μὴ συνεστὸς, ἀφανιζόμενον, χώρον ἔχει εἰς ὃν ἀπέρχεται (οἷ ἀπέρχηται). The soul is 'visible' to us (in its effects, though not in itself,) as long as it animates a body; when the man dies, it disappears from our view, but, not being composite, it does not perish, but departs to some other place. For ἀφανιζόμενον in this connexion, cf. *Corp.* XI. ii. 15 b: τὸ μὲν σῶμα διαλύεσθαι, τὴν δὲ ζωὴν εἰς τὸ ἀφανὲς χωρεῖν.

§ 3. ἀλλ' ὦδε γὰρ ἐρεῖ (τις, ὡς δὴ) [λόγος ἐμός] κ.τ.λ. The words ὦδε ἐρεῖ λόγος ἐμός could only be translated 'my discourse will speak thus'; but that would be superfluous and pointless. Besides, 'my discourse' would be ὁ ἐμός λόγος rather than λόγος ἐμός. It seems probable that ἐμός is a corruption of some numeral adjective, e. g. τρίτος, πέμπτος,¹ or ἕκτος; that Λόγος (πέμπτος?),—'the (fifth?) discourse of Isis',—together with the following words Ποῦ . . . αἱ ψυχαί, was intended to stand as a superscription at the head of the paragraph; and that this superscription, having been written in the margin, was by mistake inserted into the text after the first words of the paragraph (ἀλλ' ὦδε γὰρ ἐρεῖ) instead of before them.

[οὐ γάρ, ὦ θαυμαστὲ καὶ μεγάλου πατρὸς Ὀσίρειως μέγα τέκνον.] The passage to which these words are prefixed in the MSS. is a statement of a view which Isis rejects; but as her rejection of it is sufficiently expressed by the words ἀλλ' οὐκ ἔχει οὕτως in § 4 *init.*, there is no necessity for an οὐ at the beginning. And the statement of the view rejected (εἰς ἀέρα ἀναχύνονται, . . . εἶτα οὐκέτι δύνασθαι

¹ Possibly ἐός, an abbreviation for πέμπτος.

. . . παλινδρομήσαι, . . . καθάπερ οὐδὲ . . . ὕδωρ . . . ἐστὶ δυνατόν, κ.τ.λ.) is too long and complicated to have been introduced merely by οὐ γάρ ('it is not true that . . .'); it must have been preceded by something like ἐρεῖ τις ὡς. Besides, if we assume that the whole depends on ἐρεῖ or some such verb, the infinitive δύνασθαι can be retained; otherwise, it would be necessary to alter it into δύνανται. And as we find ἀλλ' ὧδε γὰρ ἐρεῖ standing in the text, it is most likely that these are the words by which the statement of the view against which Isis contends was introduced, and that all that separates them from τῶν σωμάτων προελθοῦσαι κ.τ.λ. ought therefore to be cut out.

Moreover, the words ὦ . . . μέγα τέκνον, in which the parentage of Horus is spoken of more fully than elsewhere, would seem more appropriate at the beginning of the dialogue than in the middle of an argument. It is possible that these words originally stood in § 2, where we may suppose the author to have written somewhat as follows: Πρόσεχε, παῖ. . . <<ὦ <μὲν> γάρ, ὦ [θαυμαστὲ καὶ] μεγάλου πατρὸς Ὀσίρειως μέγα τέκνον, . . .>> <<ἐγὼ δέ, τῆς ἀθανάτου φύσεως καυτῇ μετέχουσα, . . . διεξελεύσομαί σοι κ.τ.λ.>>.

[[ἀκρίτως]] [καὶ ὀρμηδόν] τῶν σωμάτων προελθοῦσαι εἰς ἀέρα ἀναχύνονται [τε] <<ἀκρίτως>> κ.τ.λ. The adverb ἀκρίτως, 'indistinguishably', or 'so as not to be distinguishable (from the air)', must have been intended to qualify ἀναχύνονται, and not προελθοῦσαι; it is therefore necessary to transpose it.

ὀρμηδόν is unintelligible. As far as I know, the word does not occur elsewhere. In Liddell and Scott it is translated 'impetuously'; but that meaning would not suit the context.

We are here plunged *in medias res*; and it is to be presumed that a passage, now lost, intervened between the general statement 'τὸ συννεστὸς . . . χῶρον ἔχει', with which Isis began, and the section in which she speaks of a view that she holds to be erroneous. The subject αἱ ψυχαί, which must be understood in this sentence, was doubtless expressed in the lost passage which preceded.

The view here stated and rejected is mentioned in Pl. *Phaedo* 70 A: τὰ δὲ περὶ τῆς ψυχῆς πολλὴν ἀπιστίαν παρέχει τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, μὴ . . . εἰθὺς ἀπαλαττομένη τοῦ σώματος καὶ ἐκβαίνουσα ὡς περ πνεῦμα ἢ καπνὸς διασκεδασθεῖσα οὐχεται διαπτομένη. It was taught by Epicurus; Sext. Emp. *Math.* 9. 72: καὶ καθ' αὐτὰς δὲ διαμένουσι (sc. αἱ ψυχαί), καὶ οὐχ, ὡς ἔλεγεν ὁ Ἐπίκουρος, ἀπολυθεῖσαι τῶν σωμάτων καπνοῦ δίκην σκιδνάνται. Iamblichus *ap.* Stob. 1. 49. 43, vol. i,

p. 384 W.: εἰ δὲ . . . ἔνεστιν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι καθαπερὶ ἀσκῶ πνεῦμα, . . . δηλόν που . . . ὅτι ἔξεισιν μὲν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, ἐν δὲ τῷ ἐκβαίνεῖν διαφορεῖται καὶ διασκεδάννυται, ὡσπερ Δημόκριτος καὶ Ἐπίκουρος ἀποφαίνονται. Lucr. 3. 434 ff.: 'quoniam quassatis undique vasis | diffluere umorem et laticem discedere cernis, | et nebula ac fumus quoniam discedit in auras, | crede animam quoque diffundi multoque perire | ocius . . ., | cum semel ex hominis membris ablata recessit.' *Ib.* 455: 'ergo dissolui quoque convenit omnem animai | naturam, ceu fumus, in altas aeris auras.' Cf. Plut. *De sera nimis vindicta* 17, 560 c: τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν τελευτώντων ἀπολλυμένας ἐπιστάμενος εἰθύς, ὡσπερ ὀμίχλας ἢ καπνοὺς ἀποπνεούσας τῶν σωμάτων.

εἶτα οὐκέτι δύνασθαι . . . παλινδρομήσαι, [[ἀλλὰ]] οὐδὲ (μηδὲ MSS.) εἰς ἐκεῖνον ἔτι τὸν χώρον [εἶναι], ὅθεν ἦλθον τὸ πρότερον, ἀναστρέφειν. The variant ὥστε, given by P² marg. in place of εἶτα, is adopted by Wachsmuth. But after ὥστε, it would be necessary to write *μηκέτι δύνασθαι* in place of οὐκέτι δύνασθαι. On the other hand, if we follow the authority of the MSS. in reading εἶτα οὐκέτι δύνασθαι, we must alter *μηδέ* into οὐδέ.

[εἶναι] may have arisen out of *ιέναι* or *ἀνιέναι*, written as an alternative for ἀναστρέφειν.

καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ λαμβανόμενον ἐκ τῶν κάτω ἀγγείων¹ ὕδωρ εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους ὅθεν ἐλήφθη ἔπέχειν¹ ἐστὶ δυνατόν, [ἀλλ' οὐδ' αὐτὸ παραυτίκα λαμβανόμενον καὶ χεόμενον τὴν ἰδίαν λαμβάνει χώραν¹], πλὴν ἀναμίγνυται τῷ παντὶ τοῦ ὕδατος χύματι. The water corresponds to the soul, and the ἀγγεῖον to the body. (Cf. 'quassatis undique vasis diffluere umorem . . . cernis', in Lucr. 3. 434 ff., quoted above.) We have just been told that the soul, when it quits the body, is dispersed, and that consequently (1) it cannot afterwards enter another body, and (2) it cannot return to the place from which it came when it entered the body. [Since the two clauses εἶτα . . . (l. 9) and [[ἀλλὰ]] οὐδὲ (l. 10) do not correspond to *καθάπερ οὐδὲ* . . . ἀλλ' οὐδὲ here, and since the latter pair appear to repeat one another, the editor suggests that they are doublets and that *καθάπερ* . . . *δυνατόν* represents what the Hermetist wrote. On this assumption he would emend the text in some such way as this: *καθάπερ οὐδὲ τὸ λαμβανόμενον* (ἐκχεόμενον) ἐξ [τῶν κάτω] ἀγγείων ὕδωρ εἰς τοὺς αὐτοὺς τόπους ὅθεν ἐλήφθη ἔτι (ἀνατρ)έχειν ἐστὶ δυνατόν,

[[ἀλλ' οὐδὲ [αὐ]τὸ [[παραυτίκα]] λαμβανόμενον καὶ] (ἐκ)χεόμενον (ὕδωρ) τὴν ἰδίαν (ἀνα)λαμβάνει χώραν,]

πλὴν ((παραυτίκα)) ἀναμίγνυται τῷ παντὶ τοῦ ὕδατος χύματι.

An alternative interpretation may be offered. Both clauses do refer to the second clause above. The question is whether a soul can return to the place whence it came, and it is replied that it cannot, because it will be dispersed in air. This analogy substitutes for the soul and the air a bucket, say, of water drawn from a body of water and then poured back, only to be lost in the whole mass. τὰ κάτω ἀγγεία answers to τὸ ἄπειρον πνεῦμα, and may perhaps be rendered 'the reservoirs below', that is, the masses of water on earth as compared to the air ἀόρα. ἐπέχειν should be emended to ἐπιχεῖν. The second clause simply strengthens the figure: no, no matter how instantaneously it is drawn out and poured back, it itself does not occupy its own place, &c.]

§ 4. ἐκ πολλῶν συγκεκριμένον (συγκριμάτων MSS.) παρατεθλιμμένων (-μένων MSS.) εἰς χύσιν. Water was commonly said to be an element, and not a compound. But water as known to us, the liquid with which we fill our pitchers, is not the pure element, but a mixture, in which the element water predominates, but in which portions of the other elements, or of things made of them, are also present. See *Exc.* II A. 2, where the pure element water is called ὕδωρ αἰτούδωρ.

Our water contains portions of solid substances (e.g. of earth washed away from a river's banks); but they are broken up into minute particles, and thereby made fluid (παρατεθλιμμένα εἰς χύσιν).

ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ . . . ἔργον τῶν τοῦ θεοῦ χειρῶν τε καὶ νοῦ. The writer was probably thinking of the making of souls in *Exc.* XXIII.

τὸ τοῖνον ἐξ ἑνὸς καὶ οὐκ ἐκ πολλῶν (οὐκ ἐξ ἄλλου MSS.). According to *Exc.* XXIII, the soul is composed ἐκ πολλῶν; for it is there said that the souls were made of a mixture of πῦρ, πνεῦμα, and certain 'unknown' materials. But the writer of *Exc.* XXV may have regarded that passage as mythical, and declined to accept it literally.

Cf. *Exc.* II A. 11: τὸ γὰρ ἀληθές ἐστι (τὸ) [καὶ] ἐξ αὐτοῦ μόνου τὴν σύστασιν ἔχον, . . . ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ἐκ πολλῶν συνέστηκε.

ἄτῳ θ' ἑαυτῷ εἰς νοῦν ὀδηγούμενον. This seems to be a passing mention of the end towards which the soul's course ought to be directed. A human soul embodied upon earth is not ἔννοος from the first, but is capable of becoming ἔννοος, or even of becoming νοῦς and nothing else, if rightly guided. (Cf. *Corr.* X. 19a: ψυχὴ δὲ ἀνθρωπίνη, οὐ πᾶσα μὲν, ἡ δὲ εὐσεβής, . . . ὅλη νοῦς γίνεται.)

Sense might be made by writing αὐθίς τε ὑπ' αὐτοῦ (i. e. ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ) εἰς νοῦν ὁδηγούμενον. The soul owes its origin to God's νοῦς, and, if it follows God's guidance, finds its way back to νοῦς.

Such a thought as this, however, is hardly in keeping with the rest of the piece; we should rather have expected to be told that souls find their way back to this or that stratum of the atmosphere. It may therefore be suspected that these words have been added by another hand.

ὅθεν δεῖ (δὴ MSS.) καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα αὐτῆς σύνοδον [ἁρμονίαν θεοῦ] ὑπὸ ἀνάγκης γενομένην εἶναι (perhaps γεγονέναι). Since the soul has no natural affinity to the body, force or compulsion must have been employed to join them together. The reluctance of the unembodied soul to submit to this compulsion is described in *Exc.* XXIII. 33 *sqq.* ἁρμονίαν θεοῦ (a coadjustment—*sc.* of soul and body—effected by God?) may perhaps be a remnant of a marginal note on this sentence.

§ 5. ὅτι δὲ οὔτε εἰς ἓνα καὶ τὸν αὐτὸν τόπον (πάσαι) χυδαίως, οὔτε εἰκῆ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν [[ἀλλὰ]] ἐκάστη, <<ἀλλὰ>> ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν ἀναπέμπεται χώραν. The two things to be proved are (1) that the souls, when they quit the body, do not all go to the same place, and (2) that the particular place to which this or that soul goes is determined by fixed laws, and not by mere chance. (ἐπὶ τὴν ἰδίαν, 'to the place which properly belongs to it', or 'to which it properly belongs', stands in contrast to εἰκῆ καὶ ὡς ἔτυχεν.) Both these things are proved by the similitude which follows in § 6.

φανερὸν καὶ ἐξ ὧν ἔτι ἐν τῷ σώματι οὔσα [καὶ τῷ πλάσματι] πάσχει (καὶ) [γὰρ] παρὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν πεπαχυμμένη (-χυμένη F). πλάσματι is an alternative for σώματι.—γάρ may have arisen out of παρά by duplication; or it may have been shifted to this place from the following sentence, where a γάρ is wanted.

[πεπαχυμμένη is a reminiscence of Pl. *Phaedo* 81 D. Cf. Proclus *In Remp.* I. 119. 10 Kroll: καὶ τὰ περιβλήματα τὰ αἰγιοειδῆ καθαρὰ φέρειν ἀνάγκη, καὶ μὴ ἐπιθολούμενα ὑπὸ τῶν ἐνύλων ἀτμῶν μηδὲ παχυνόμενα ὑπὸ τῆς γῆϊνης φύσεως.] The souls of the men and beasts spoken of in §§ 6-8 are in this condition.

§ 6. πρός(σ)χες . . . τῷ λεγομένῳ ὁμοιώματι. Does τῷ λεγομένῳ mean 'which I am about to tell', or 'which is commonly told'? Neither is quite satisfactory; and perhaps it would be better to strike out λεγομένῳ, and write τῷδε τῷ ὁμοιώματι.

ἀετοῦς καὶ περιστερὰς κ.τ.λ. This list of animals is much longer

than the argument requires; and it is probable that it has been lengthened by transcribers.

If we shift *ῥφεις* in § 6 to the place that corresponds to that in which it stands in § 7, there is a definite plan of arrangement. After men, who are regarded as a class apart, come first animals that fly in air (*τὰ πτηνά*, including flies as well as birds); then, quadrupeds, which walk upon the earth, and snakes, which crawl on it and live in holes below its surface; and lastly, animals that live partly on land and partly in water. The animals are classified according to their relations to the several elements, and the writer names in succession specimens of each of the chief classes, with the exception of the fishes. He could not include fishes in his list, because they would die in any place in which men, birds, flies, quadrupeds, and snakes could live, and for that reason one could not assume them to be shut up along with the rest; he therefore mentioned in place of them amphibious animals, i. e. beasts which live partly in water, though not wholly.

[Was the notion of the *συσχετήριον* suggested by the *περιστερέων* in Pl. *Theaet.* 197 c?]

καὶ κύκνους καὶ ἰέρακας καὶ χελιδόνας καὶ στρουθοῦς. The similitude would serve the writer's purpose better if these words, and the corresponding clauses in § 7 (*οἱ δὲ ἰέρακες . . . αὐτοῖς ἄδειν*), were omitted. In that case, we should have three specimens only of *πτηνά*, viz. (1) eagles, which, when released, fly up into the upper air, (2) doves, which fly up into the lower air, and (3) flies which keep near the ground. That would be an exact parallel to the behaviour of the souls, which, when released from the body, betake themselves to different strata of the atmosphere. It may therefore be suspected that the swans, hawks, swallows, and sparrows have been added by another hand. In § 7 (eagles *εἰς τὸν αἰθέρα*, doves *εἰς τὸν πλησίον ἀέρα*, hawks *ὑπεράνω τούτων*), the mention of the hawks involves a departure from the natural order in respect of the atmospheric strata. The swans, which come first of the four in § 6, come last of the four in § 7; and the description of the place to which the swans go (*ὅπου ἔξιστιν αὐτοῖς ἄδειν*, § 7) is a poor makeshift; one would have supposed that a singing bird could sing in any place in which it could keep alive.

In the case of the quadrupeds, snakes, and amphibious beasts, the similitude is not quite so appropriate, because there is no resemblance between the places to which these animals go and the

places to which the souls go. It is possible that in the earliest form of the document τὰ πτηνά alone were spoken of, and that all the rest of §§ 6 and 7 is a later addition.

καὶ βόας καὶ ποίμνια. ποίμνια, properly 'flocks', here means 'sheep'. This use of the word occurs in Longus, *Daphnis and Chloe* (second century A. D. ?) I. 8: ἡ μὲν ἐς ποίμνιον (sc. the ewe that suckled her) ἀναφέρουσα τῆς σωτηρίας τὴν αἰτίαν, ὁ δὲ μεμνημένος ὡς ἐκκείμενον αὐτὸν αἰξὶ ἀνέθρεψεν.

καὶ τινα τῶν ἴτης κοινότητος ἔχομένων¹ ζώων. Some phrase meaning 'amphibious' is needed; and it seems most likely that τῆς is a corruption of γῆς (τε καὶ ὕδατος).

§ 7. λαγωὶ δὲ (εἰς) δρυμούς, καὶ βόες (εἰς) αὐλιστήρια [πεδία]. These two phrases differ from the context in the omission of the article before the substantives, as well as in the omission of the indispensable εἰς. Perhaps it would be best to bracket them, and to bracket also καὶ λαγῶν καὶ βόας in § 6. We should then have wild animals (lions, leopards, wolves) mentioned first, and domestic animals (dogs and sheep) after them. If we retain the hares, wild and tame animals are intermixed.

ἐκάστου εἰς τὴν οἰκίαν χώραν ὑπὸ τοῦ ἔνδον κριτηρίου ἀνατρεπομένου. The word κριτήριον is used twice by Plato in the sense of κριτήριον ἀληθείας, 'that by which we decide whether something is true or not'. *Rep.* 582 A: τίμη χρῆ κρίνεσθαι τὰ μέλλοντα καλῶς κριθήσεσθαι; ἀρ' οὐκ ἐμπειρία τε καὶ φρονήσει καὶ λόγῳ; ἢ τούτων ἔχοι ἂν τις βέλτιον κριτήριον; *Theaet.* 178 B: πάντων μέτρον ἀνθρωπός ἐστιν . . . ἔχων γὰρ αὐτῶν τὸ κριτήριον ἐν αὐτῷ, οἷα πάσχει τοιαῦτα οἰόμενος, ἀληθῆ τε οἶεται αὐτῷ καὶ ὄντα. (In *Legg.* 767 B, the only other place in Plato where the word occurs, its meaning is different.) It is used once by Aristotle, *Metaph.* K. 1063 a 2: τὸ αἰσθητήριον καὶ κριτήριον τῶν λεχθέντων χυμῶν. But the Stoics were the first to bring κριτήριον into common use as a philosophic term. *Diog. Laert.* 7. 54: κριτήριον δὲ τῆς ἀληθείας φασὶ τυγχάνειν τὴν καταληπτικὴν φαντασίαν, τουτέστι τὴν ἀπὸ ὑπάρχοντος, καθά φησι Χρῦσιππος ἐν τῇ ιβ' τῶν Φυσικῶν, καὶ Ἀντίπατρος καὶ Ἀπολλόδωρος. ὁ μὲν γὰρ Βοηθὸς κριτήρια πλείονα ἀπολείπει, νοῦν καὶ αἴσθησιν καὶ ὄρεξιν καὶ ἐπιστήμην· ὁ δὲ Χρῦσιππος διαφερόμενος πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐν τῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ λόγου κριτήρια φησιν εἶναι αἴσθησιν καὶ πρόληψιν. . . ἄλλοι δὲ τινες τῶν ἀρχαιοτέρων Στωικῶν τὸν ὀρθὸν λόγον κριτήριον ἀπολείπουσιν, ὡς ὁ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ κριτηρίου φησί. *Sextus Empiricus, Math.* 7. 29, distinguishes two different uses of the word: τὸ κριτήριον . . . λέγεται . . . διχῶς.

καθ' ἓνα μὲν τρόπον, ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ποιοῦμεν τὰ δὲ οὐδαμῶς· καθ' ἕτερον δέ, ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ὑπάρχειν φαμὲν τὰ δὲ μὴ ὑπάρχειν, καὶ ταυτὶ μὲν ἀληθῆ καθεστάναι ταυτὶ δὲ ψευδῆ. See also Sext. Emp. *Pyrrh.* 2. 14 (where τὸ κριτήριον in the latter sense is called τὸ κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας); *ib.* 1. 21; and *Malh.* 7. 126-131. The κριτήριον spoken of in *Exc.* XXV is not a κριτήριον τῆς ἀληθείας; but one of the other kind, ᾧ προσέχοντες τὰ μὲν ποιοῦμεν τὰ δὲ οὐδαμῶς; it is something in the animal which determines its movements, and impels it towards a certain place. It is a ὁρμή, or (as Boethus would perhaps have called it) an ὄρεξις. We might call it an instinct; and the writer would probably have said that it was implanted in the animal by φύσις (see *Exc.* IV B).

§ 8. ἐκάστη ψυχῆ, καὶ ἀνθρωπευομένη καὶ ἄλλως ἐπιγεῖζουσα. It is here implied that beasts as well as men are animated by ψυχαί. That is inconsistent with *Exc.* XXIII, according to which men alone are animated by ψυχαί, and a beast has no ψυχῆ, but only a πνεῦμα (except in the case of a beast in which a human ψυχῆ has been reincarnated as a punishment for a bad life on earth).

πλὴν εἰ μὴ τις τῶν Τυφώνιων . . . λέγοι κ.τ.λ. πλὴν εἰ μὴ occurs again in *Exc.* XXVI. 2. It would be more correct to say either πλὴν εἰ or εἰ μὴ. But Lucian (*Pseudosophistes* 7) mentions πλὴν εἰ μὴ as a common solecism: and the incorrect phrase may have been written by the author.

οἱ Τυφώνιοι are the followers of Typhon (Set). According to the Egyptian myth, they fought against Osiris and Horus. Isis would therefore hate and despise them; and the writer makes her name them when she wishes to give an instance of people notorious for perversity. If he had been speaking in his own person, he might perhaps have said, instead of 'some Typhonian', either 'some Epicurean' or 'some Christian'.

ὡς μηδὲν παρὰ τάξιν πράσσειν κἄν κολάζωνται. Those who are undergoing punishment might be expected to feel resentment against their punishers, and obey them only under compulsion, if at all; yet in this matter the embodied souls spontaneously obey the ordinance (τάξις) of God, or of Nature, who is God's vicegerent upon earth.

κόλασις γὰρ αὐταῖς ἢ ἐνσωμάτωσις. Cf. *Exc.* XXIII. 25-41. This notion had come down from the early Pythagoreans. Philolaus *ap.* Clem. Alex. *Strom.* 3. 3. 17: μαρτυροῦνται δὲ καὶ οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες ὡς διὰ τινὰς τιμωρίας ἃ ψυχὰ τῷ σώματι συνέζευκται.

Athenaeus 4. 157 c: Εὐξίθεος ὁ Πυθαγορικός . . ., ὡς φησι Κλέαρχος ὁ Περιπατητικὸς ἐν δευτέρῳ Βίων, ἔλεγεν ἐνδεδέσθαι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῷ δεύρῳ βίῃ τὰς ἀπάντων ψυχὰς τιμωρίας χάριν. Cf. Emped. fr. 115 Diels: ἔστιν ἀνάγκης χρῆμα, θεῶν ψήφισμα παλαιόν, | . . . εὔτε τις ἀμπλακίσει φόνῳ φίλα γυῖα μίγη, | (Νεΐκεί θ'?) ὅς κ' ἐπιόρκον ἀμαρτήσας ἐπομόσση, | δαίμονες οἷτε μακραίωνος λελάχασι βίοιο,—τρίς μιν μυρίας ὄρας ἀπὸ μακάρων ἀλάλησθαι, | φνομένους παντοῖα διὰ χρόνου εἶδεα θνητῶν | ἀργαλέας βίότιοι μεταλλάσσοντα κελεύθους. | . . . τῶν καὶ ἐγὼ νῦν εἰμι, φυγὰς θεόθεν καὶ ἀλήτης, | Νεΐκεί μαινομένῳ πίσυνος.¹ Plotinus 4. 8. 1: Ἐμπεδοκλῆς τε, εἰπὼν ἀμαρτανούσαις νόμον εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς πεσεῖν ἐνταῦθα, καὶ αὐτὸς “φυγὰς θεόθεν” γενόμενος ἤκειν “πίσυνος μαινομένῳ Νεΐκει”, τοσοῦτον παρεγύμνου ὅσον καὶ Πυθαγόρας, οἶμαι, καὶ οἱ ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἠνίττοντο περὶ τε τούτου περὶ τε πολλῶν ἄλλων. τῷ δὲ (sc. Ἐμπεδοκλεῖ) παρῆν καὶ διὰ ποιήσιν οὐ σαφεῖ εἶναι.

§ 9. (. . .) ἔχει δὲ ἡ <τῶν> (<<ἄνω>>) διάταξις [ἡ ἱερωτάτη] οὕτως. [ἦδη ποτέ [[ἄνω]], ὦ μεγαλοφυέστατε παῖ, βλέπε] [ψυχῶν διατάξεις]. The transition to a fresh topic is abrupt; some connecting words or sentences have probably been lost.

βλέπε ψυχῶν διατάξεις is impossible. One might say ἄνω βλέπε, 'look upward'; but the ἄνω in the text is too far separated from βλέπε, and has most likely come from the preceding sentence, where τῶν ἄνω, or something of the sort, is needed to go with διάταξις. More probably, βλέπε was followed by εἰς with a substantive, and the words ἦδη ποτέ . . . βλέπε are the beginning of an unfinished sentence, which is out of place here, but may perhaps have formed part of the lost passage that preceded ἔχει δὲ κ.τ.λ. It may be conjectured that ψυχῶν διατάξεις is a remnant of a superscription (e.g. Περὶ τῆς τῶν ψυχῶν διατάξεως) written at the head of the paragraph; compare the superscription [Ποῦ τῶν σωματῶν ἀπολυθεῖσαι διατρίβουσιν αἱ ψυχαί] at the beginning of § 3.

¹ I.e. men and beasts are 'daemons' (= unembodied souls) that have been sentenced to a series of incarnations as a punishment for some crime. The two crimes mentioned by Empedocles are murder and perjury. But how could an unembodied soul commit murder? The nature of the offence by which the Pythagoreans supposed the soul to have incurred the penalty of incarnation is left unexplained. It may have been explained in some *ἱερὸς λόγος* which has not been transmitted to us; the words *οἱ παλαιοὶ θεολόγοι τε καὶ μάντιες* in Philolaus perhaps refer to something of the sort. (It cannot have had anything to do with the Orphic myth of the rending of Dionysus by the Titans; for the Titans were not unembodied souls, and it was not by incarnation that they were punished for their crime.) The author of the *Kore Kosmu* makes an attempt to answer the question how the souls had offended; see *Exc.* XXIII. 24.

τὸ ἀπ' οὐρανοῦ κορυφῆς μέχρι σελήνης θεοῖς καὶ ἄστροις καὶ τῇ ἄλλῃ προνοίᾳ σχολάζει. τῇ ἄλλῃ προνοίᾳ apparently means 'deity in general'. But what other form than that of gods and stars could deity assume? Was the writer thinking of the fiery element of which the heavens were held to consist, and did he identify the celestial fire as a whole with 'Providence', i. e. with the divine power by which the universe is governed? He could have found Stoic authority for doing so.

σχολάζει means 'is left vacant for', or 'is reserved for'; cf. Plut. *C. Gracch.* 12: τὰ θεωρητήρια καθείλε καὶ τῷ δήμῳ σχολάζοντα . . . ἀπέδειξε τὸν τόπον.

If the words θεοῖς and ἄστροις are to be taken as denoting two different classes of celestial beings, and not merely as two names denoting one and the same class, we must understand that there are 'gods' who are not stars, but live in the same region as the stars, and are closely associated with them. There is no trace here of the peculiar system of *Exc.* XXIV. 1, according to which the 'gods' live in heaven, and the ἀστέρεις (stars in general? or planets?) are situated in another region, called αἰθήρ, which is below heaven. The writer of *Exc.* XXV knows nothing of this latter region; he uses the word αἰθήρ differently, applying it to a part of the αἴθρ, and even to a part of it which is much nearer to the earth than to the lunar sphere; for he says that eagles fly in the αἰθήρ (§ 7), and that no bird can fly above the twelfth of the 60 χῶραι into which the αἴθρ is divided (§ 11). He does not expressly tell us where the lower limit of οὐρανός is situated; but it is to be presumed that he would have placed that limit, as most people did, at the lunar sphere, and would accordingly have said that οὐρανός and αἴθρ are contiguous.

§ 10. ἔχει μέντοι . . . ἐλαίου ὕδωρ. This section breaks the connexion between § 9 and § 11. If we retain it, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦτο in § 11 *ini.* is obscure; if we cut it out, τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦτο refers to the closely preceding words τὸ ἀπὸ σελήνης ἐφ' ἡμῶς in § 9 *fin.* Moreover, these remarks about the movement of the air and the movements of the souls have no connexion with the main topic of §§ 9-13, which is the διάταξις of the atmosphere. What the writer had occasion to say about the wind is sufficiently said in § 11; and in that section there is no indication that the wind has been spoken of shortly before. § 10 appears to be an extract from another mention; and we may suppose that some one was led by the mention of ἀνέμων κινήσεις in § 11 to copy into the margin another

passage about the wind which he had found elsewhere, and that it subsequently got into the text.

ἔχει μέντοι ἐν ἑαυτῷ [ὄδόν] (κίνησιν (ιδίαν?)) ὁ [τοσοῦτος] ἀήρ, ὃν ἄνεμον καλεῖν ἔθος ἐστὶν ἡμῖν, [ἴδιον] [μέγεθος ἐν ᾧ] (ἦν) κινεῖται πρὸς ἀνάψυξιν τῶν ἐπιγείων. ὄδόν is certainly wrong; the wind is not a ὄδος, but a κίνησις ἀέρος, and the substantive wanted is κίνησιν. But it seems probable that the original reading was κίνησιν ιδίαν. The word ιδίαν may have given rise both to ὄδόν by corruption, and to the meaningless ἴδιον below by a misplaced duplication; and it would serve to emphasize the distinction between the movement which belongs to the air itself (cf. πρὸς ἑαυτὸν κινούμενος below) and the movement of the souls in the air. Perhaps in the original context of the passage something had been said about the movements of the unembodied souls in the air, and the writer then went on to say ἔχει μέντοι ἐν ἑαυτῷ κίνησιν ιδίαν ὁ ἀήρ κ.τ.λ.: 'the air has a movement of its own, which we call wind; but that movement does not interfere with those movements of the souls of which I have been speaking.'

τοσοῦτος is unintelligible. It may possibly have been explained by something in the lost context which preceded; but it seems more likely that [τοσοῦτος] and [μέγεθος ἐν ᾧ] are fragments of a marginal note, which may have contained the words ἐπὶ τοσοῦτον μέγεθος.


ὁ (or (περὶ) οὗ?) δὴ καὶ ὕστερον ἐρῶ. If this points forward merely to the passing mention of the wind in § 11, it was not worth while to say it. But it probably refers to something that came later on in the document to which § 10 originally belonged.

§ 11. τὸ δὲ διάστημα τοῦτο . . . μοιρῶν μὲν ἐστὶ γενικῶν τεσσάρων, (εἰδικῶν δὲ χωρῶν ἐξήκοντα). The words γενικός and εἰδικός are not quite accurately used here; for the relation between a μοῖρα and the χώραι contained in it is not the same as that between a genus and its several species. But the meaning is clear enough. The position of a soul might be described 'generally' by saying that it was in the second μοῖρα of the atmosphere, and more 'specially' or 'particularly' by saying that it was in the third χώρα of the second μοῖρα (i. e. the seventh of the sixty χώραι, counting upward from below).

The writer had in his mind, if not before his eyes, a diagram such as is here appended.

In the partly similar system of Posidonius (Plin. *Nat. hist.* 2. 23. 85), clouds and wind extend upwards to a distance of 40 *stadia* (five

miles) from the earth, and the space from the upper limit of the windy region up to the moon is filled with pure bright air, the vertical extent of which is 2,000,000 *stadia* (250,000 miles). Did the writer of *Exc. XXV* mean it to be understood that all the *χωραι* are equal in vertical measurement? It seems most likely that he did; and if so, the vertical extent of the windless region is, in *Exc. XXV*, four times that of the windy region. But according to Posidonius, who knew more about astronomy than the author of *Exc. XXV*, and was nearer to the truth in his estimate of the distance from earth to moon, the vertical extent of the windless region is



50,000 times that of the windy region. Supposing that the writer of *Exc. XXV* agreed with Posidonius in putting the upper limit of the windy region five miles above the surface of the earth, each of his *χωραι* would be five-twelfths of a mile in height, and his estimate of the distance from the earth's surface to the moon would consequently be 25 miles. He would hardly have differed so widely from Posidonius in this respect if he had read what Posidonius had written; we must therefore suppose that a partial and imperfect knowledge of the system of Posidonius had been transmitted to him through ill-instructed intermediaries.

The *διάταξις* of *Exc.* XXV is a fuller and more detailed working out of that in *Exc.* XXIII. 16, where we are told that there are sixty classes or grades of souls, to which habitations are assigned in a corresponding series of divisions of the atmosphere. But in *Exc.* XXIII the divisions of the atmosphere are called, not *χώραι*, but *τμήματα* [καὶ ταμίαια]; and there is no mention there of the four *μοῖραι* spoken of in *Exc.* XXV.

[πρόσχε, παῖ· ἀρρήτων γὰρ ἐπακούεις (ἐπακούσεις?) μυστηρίων γῆς τε καὶ οὐρανοῦ καὶ παντὸς τοῦ μέσου [ἐροῦ] πνεύματος.] Cf. *Exc.* XXIII <<32>: Πρόσχε, τέκνον ὦρε· κρυπτῆς γὰρ ἐπακούεις θεωρίας.

This is obviously out of place in the midst of a description of the second *μοῖρα* of the atmosphere. It ought to stand at the *beginning* of §§ 9–13, or of some similar paragraph. It is very likely that the missing passage which preceded § 9 began with these words; but it is also possible that they have been shifted to this place from the beginning of *Exc.* XXVI.

ἔχει μέντοι παρὰ τῆς φύσεως ταύτην τὴν ἐξουσίαν ὁ ἀήρ οὗτος, ὥστε καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἰδίαις ὀκτὼ χώραις καὶ ἐν ταῖς τῆς γῆς τέτταρσι περιπολεῖ(ν) μεθ' ὧν ἔχει ζῶων. ὁ ἀήρ οὗτος must be taken to mean the air of the second *μοῖρα*, i. e. the windy air. The writer assumes that the second *μοῖρα* is the proper domain of the windy air, and that the first *μοῖρα* belongs to the earth; and he accounts for the fact that there is wind close to the earth by saying that the windy air is allowed to pass the lower boundary of its own region, and descend into the first *μοῖρα*. If the words μεθ' ὧν ἔχει ζῶων are to be retained, he also assumes that the proper home of the birds, or of some birds at least, is the second *μοῖρα*, and that when we see them in the first *μοῖρα* (i. e. near the earth) they have come down from the second *μοῖρα* along with the wind. The latter assumption seems strange; but it is not quite impossible, provided that we take the ζῶα spoken of to be, not birds in general, but high-flying birds, such as eagles. It was said in § 7 that the proper home of eagles is the *αἰθήρ*; and perhaps the word *αἰθήρ* there denotes the region which in § 11 is called the second *μοῖρα*.

§ 12. ἡ δὲ τρίτη . . . ἡ δὲ τετάρτη . . . Of the third and fourth *μοῖραι* we are told only that the third contains 'fine and pure air', and the fourth contains 'very fine and very clear (and transparent?) air'. But there is little point in speaking of them at all, if nothing is to be said about the distinctive qualities of the souls or other beings by whom each of these *μοῖραι* is inhabited; and we must suppose

that something of the kind followed, if not in this document itself, at least in the source from which the writer got these details.

(. . .) διορίζων ἑαυτοῦ¹ τοὺς [ἄνω] οὐρανοὺς. τοὺς οὐρανοὺς means the different spheres or strata of which heaven consists. But there can be no reason here for distinguishing those of them which are above (τοὺς ἄνω) from those of them which are below; we must therefore strike out ἄνω. It may have come from ἄνωθεν in the following sentence.

The boundary of which the writer is speaking must be that between 'the heavens' as a whole and the atmosphere; and as it may be inferred from § 9 that he held heaven to extend downwards 'as far as the moon', there can be little doubt that the missing subject of the sentence is ὁ κύκλος τῆς σελήνης.

§ 13. [ἀκολλητί] has come from ἀκολλητί in § 10 *fin.*

ὡς εἶναι μοίρας [γενικὰς] μὲν τέσσαρας, [διαστηματικὰς δὲ δώδεκα,] χώρας δὲ ἐξήκοντα. What are the διαστηματικὰ μοῖραι? The only διάστημα that has been spoken of is the whole space between the moon and the earth (§ 11 *init.*); and it is impossible to discover any method of dividing that space, or any part of it, into twelve μοῖραι, that could be combined with the writer's division of it into four μοῖραι and sixty χώραι. Perhaps διαστηματικὰς is a corruption of τοῦ διαστήματος (*sc.* τοῦ ἀπὸ γῆς μέχρι σελήνης). When διαστηματικὰς δὲ had got into the text, γενικὰς (suggested by § 11 *init.*) may have been inserted before μὲν to correspond to διαστηματικὰς, and δώδεκα (a number chosen under some misunderstanding, if not merely at random,) may have been added to correspond to τέσσαρας.

§ 14. τίνες μὲν οὖν εἰς ἐκάστην (ἐκάτερα MSS.) τούτων (*sc.* τῶν χωρῶν) ἀναλύουσι ψυχαί, ἐντεῦθεν σοι πάλιν . . . καταλέγειν ἄρξομαι. ἀναλύουσι means 'depart' from earth, or from the body; cf. Kaibel *Epigr. Gr.* 340. 7, ἐς θεοὺς ἀνέλυσα.

If this promise was fulfilled, the writer must have gone on to mention, one by one, sixty distinct classes of souls (beginning, no doubt, with those of kings, and ending with those of reptiles), and must have said that the souls of kings, when they depart from the body, go to the highest of the sixty χώραι, and so on, until he came to the souls of reptiles, which presumably go to the lowest of them. That would be a complete answer to the question asked by Horus in § 1, ποῦ τῶν σωμάτων ἀπολυθεῖσαι χωροῦσιν αἱ ψυχαί. But Stobaeus ended his extract from the *libellus* at this point, and omitted the details given in the remainder of the document.

EXCERPT XXVI

This Excerpt is broken into two pieces by a lacuna between § 2 and § 3. It is possible that §§ 1-2 and §§ 3-30 were originally unconnected, and were taken from two distinct *libelli*; but it is also possible that they were parts of one and the same *libellus*, and were linked together by a passage which has been lost.

In §§ 1-2, the writer speaks of the situation of souls before and after their life on earth, and deals both with the question whence souls come when they enter the body, and with the question whither souls go when they quit the body. (The latter question is that which is asked and answered in *Exc.* XXV.)

In §§ 3-30, the question whither souls go when they quit the body is nowhere spoken of (except that it is briefly and indirectly touched on in § 12); and the question whence they come when they enter the body holds a subordinate position, being dealt with only in §§ 10 and 11. The main subject of §§ 3-30 is the question what is the cause of the differences between one embodied soul and another. The writer's answer is that these differences are caused (1) by the fact that the souls come from different strata of the atmosphere, and bring with them qualities which they already possessed when they resided in those strata (§§ 3-12), and (2) by differences in the composition of the bodies in which the souls are incarnated (§§ 13-30).

In the MSS. of Stobaeus, *Exc.* XXVI has no heading analogous to the *lemma* of *Exc.* XXV ('Ἐρμού λόγος Ἱσιδος πρὸς Ὄρων); the only superscription is Περὶ ἐμφυχώσεως καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως. It is possible that Stobaeus marked *Exc.* XXVI as a separate extract by writing a *lemma* of the usual kind at the head of it, and that his *lemma* has been accidentally lost. But if it was not so, it would seem to follow that he took *Exc.* XXVI to be a continuation of *Exc.* XXV, and regarded XXV. 1-XXVI. 30 as a single document. He may perhaps have done so; but if he did, he was probably mistaken.

Wachsmuth treats *Exc.* XXVI as a continuation of *Exc.* XXV; he brackets the superscription of XXVI (Περὶ ἐμφυχώσεως καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως), and says 'coherent haec (i. e. XXVI) cum priore ecloga (i. e. XXV)'. But it seems to me evident that XXVI does not 'cohere' with XXV. The subject of *Exc.* XXV is the question whither souls go when they quit the body; that is the only question dealt with in XXV, and the extract ends with a promise to answer it

in fuller detail, which promise is not fulfilled in XXVI, and must have been fulfilled in a following part of the *libellus* from which XXV was extracted by Stobaeus. In XXVI. 1-2, the same question is dealt with (together with the different but connected question whence souls come when they enter the body); but it is dealt with in language which could not have been used by a man who had just written XXV. The atmospheric *χωραι*, of which a full and detailed description has been given in XXV, are spoken of *de novo* in XXVI. 1; in the latter passage, the reader is not supposed to have any previous knowledge of them, and is told, as if they were new to him, things which, if *Exc.* XXV had preceded, he would have read just before. (Compare, for instance, *ἐκάστη . . . κατὰ τὴν ἀξίαν καὶ χωρᾶν ἔχει κ.τ.λ.* in XXVI. 1 with *ὅσῳ γὰρ ἐκάστη τῶν χωρῶν . . . , τοσοῦτῳ καὶ (αἱ) ἐν αὐταῖς ψυχαὶ κ.τ.λ.* in XXV. 13.) Moreover, three synonyms for the term *χωραι* are mentioned in XXVI. 1; but if the two extracts had been parts of one *libellus*, the proper place for mentioning these synonyms would have been XXV. 11, where the *χωραι* are first spoken of.

It is clear then that in XXVI. 1-2 we have, not a continuation of XXV, but a separate and independent treatment of the subject dealt with in XXV. And in XXVI. 3-30, the question discussed is a different one from that discussed in XXV. We must therefore conclude that *Exc.* XXV and *Exc.* XXVI are extracts from different *libelli*.

When and by whom the superscription *Περὶ ἐμψυχώσεως καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως* was written, we have no means of knowing. It is possible that it is on a par with certain paragraph-headings which have got into the text elsewhere (see *Exc.* XXV. 3 and 9, and *Exc.* XXIV. 7, 8, and 10), and that, like them, it was not intended to mark the beginning of a fresh document, but merely to describe the contents of the passage which immediately follows it. It is not, however, a correct description of the contents either of *Exc.* XXVI. 1-2 or of *Exc.* XXVI as a whole. *ἐμψύχωσις* (the incarnation of souls) is spoken of both in §§ 1-2 and throughout §§ 3-30; but nowhere in *Exc.* XXVI is anything said about *μετεμψύχωσις*, i. e. the reincarnation of a soul in another body after a previous incarnation. Either the man who wrote the heading blundered in adding *καὶ μετεμψυχώσεως*, or he had before him a document of which our *Exc.* XXVI (*περὶ ἐμψυχώσεως*) was the first part only, and which contained together with it another part, now lost, concerning *μετεμψύχωσις*.

The words most commonly used to signify incarnation and re-incarnation were ἐνσωμάτωση and μετενσωμάτωση; ἐμφύχωσις and μετεμφύχωσις are rarer. ἐμφύχωσις, which properly means 'the process of making (a body) ἐμφυχον', i. e. that of putting soul into a body, occurs in Plotinus 4. 3. 9. μετεμφύχωσις occurs in Diod. Sic. 10, fr. 6 (ὅτι ὁ Πυθαγόρας μετεμφύχων ἐδόξαζε, . . . πάντων τῶν ζῶων τὰς ψυχὰς μετὰ θάνατον εἰς ἕτερα ζῶα λέγων εἰσέρχασθαι);¹ Alexander Aphrod. in Arist. de an. p. 27. 18; Porphyry De abst. 4. 16; Sallustius De diis et mundo 20; Proclus in Pl. Rep. vol. ii, p. 340, l. 23 Kroll; Jerome Epist. ad Avitum p. 764; Theol. arithm. p. 40 Ast (Diels Vorsokr. I, p. 24); Schol. in Iambl. Protrept. 14; Suidas s.v. Φερεκίδης.

§ 1. αἱ δὲ χῶραι αὐταὶ ὑπὸ τῶν προγόνων καλοῦνται ὑφ' ὧν μὲν ζῶναι, ὑφ' ὧν δὲ στερεώματα, ὑπὸ δὲ ἐτέρων πτυχαί. The πρόγονοι of Isis would be Egyptian gods, or early rulers of Egypt who had become gods after death (e. g. Kamephis, who is called ὁ προπάτωρ in Exx. XXIII. <<32>>). But the writer must have been thinking rather of Greek authors who had used the terms of which he speaks; and one of these authors may perhaps have been Posidonius. The use of στερεώματα to denote atmospheric strata had doubtless been suggested by Genesis 1. 6-8. For πτυχαί, which means 'layers' (e. g. the superimposed sheets of leather or metal in a shield), cf. Eur. Or. 1636, ἐν αἰθέρος πτυχαῖς: Eur. Hel. 44, ἐν πτυχαῖσιν αἰθέρος: Eur. Phoen. 84, ὦ φαεινὰς οὐρανοῦ ναίων πτυχὰς | Ζεῦ. For ζῶναι, cf. ταῖς αἰδίους ζῶναις in Exx. XXIII. 8 as emended, and the planetary ζῶναι in Corp. I. 25.

τὰς μὲν θείας καὶ βασιλικὰς (ψυχὰς) ἐν τῇ ὑπεράνω πάντων (χώρῃ) κατοικεῖν. Cf. Exx. XXIV. 4 and 5, where βασιλικαὶ ψυχαί are called θεαί.

§ 2. αἱ μὲν οὖν εἰς τὸ ἄρχειν καταπεμπόμεναι . . . ἐκ τῶν ὑπεράνω ζωνῶν καταπέμπονται. τὸ ἄρχειν presumably means τὸ βασιλεύειν. But if so, τῶν ὑπεράνω ζωνῶν (plural) is inconsistent with τῇ ὑπεράνω πάντων (singular) in § 1.

καὶ λυθεῖσαι εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς ἢ καὶ ἔτι ὑπεράνω ἀνέρχονται. If the souls of kings come from several different χῶραι or ζῶναι of the atmosphere, as is said in § 2 *init.*, a kingly soul which had resided, for instance, in the second χώρα before its incarnation might rise to the first and highest χώρα after its incarnation. But if all kingly souls come

¹ There is no proof that Diodorus used the word himself; this passage is an epitomator's summary of what Diodorus wrote.

from the highest *χώρα* of the atmosphere, as is said in § 1 *fin.*, to rise still higher would mean to rise above the atmosphere, and enter heaven.

Ὅσπερ καὶ τὰς ὑποδεστέρας δυνάμει τε καὶ ἀξίᾳ (. . .) ἐκ [γὰρ] κατωτέρων ἐπὶ [μείζονας καὶ] ὑψηλοτέρας ἀνάγει. A conditional clause ('if they have obeyed God's law', or something to that effect,) must have been lost before ἐκ κατωτέρων . . . ἀνάγει.

§ 3. (. . .) εἰσὶ γὰρ ἄνωθεν οἱ (. . .), δορυφόροι ὄντες τῆς καθόλου προνοίας, ὧν ὁ μὲν ψυχοταμίας, ὁ δὲ ψυχοπομπός. In §§ 3-12, the writer speaks of the descent of souls from their homes in the atmosphere, and their incarnation upon earth. How the paragraph began, we do not know; but in § 3, we find him speaking of two super-human beings¹ in whose charge the unembodied souls are placed. One of these beings who is called the *ψυχοταμίας*, has the souls in his keeping during their residence in the atmosphere; the other, who is called the *ψυχοπομπός*, sends souls down to earth (*ἀποστέλλει, προΐησι*) when they are to be incarnated, and 'puts them in their several places' (*διατάσσει*), i. e. takes care that each soul is placed in the sort of body that is suited to it.

The function of the *ψυχοταμίας* is similar to that which is assigned to the Moon in *Exc.* XXIV. 1; but neither of the two beings spoken of in XXVI. 3 can be identified with *Σελήνη*, as both of them are masculine (ὁ μὲν . . . ὁ δέ). In *Diog. Laert.* 8. 31 *Hermes* is called *ταμίας τῶν φυχῶν καὶ διὰ τοῦτο πομπαῖος*. The word *ψυχοπομπός* is applied to *Charon* by *Euripides*, *Alc.* 361; to *Hermes* by *Diodorus*, 1. 96; and to an unnamed Greek god (*Apollo*?) by *Plutarch*, *Amatorius* 15. 6, 758 v. But the writer of *Exc.* XXVI was probably thinking of two Egyptian gods. *Osiris*, who is *βασιλεὺς ἀπογεγονότων* (§ 9), might very well be called *ψυχοταμίας*; and perhaps *Anubis*, who was worshipped by Egyptians under the name of 'the Opener of the Way' (*Wiedemann, Rel. of Anc. Eg.*, Eng. tr., p. 230), might be called *ψυχοπομπός*.

καὶ ὁ μὲν τηρεῖ, ὁ δὲ προΐησι (πρόεισι MSS.) κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ θεοῦ. The emphasis is on *κατὰ γνώμην τοῦ θεοῦ*; in the discharge of their functions these two beings execute the will of the supreme God. But as we have already been told that the *ψυχοταμίας* and the *ψυχοπομπός* are *δορυφόροι τῆς καθόλου προνοίας*, this further statement contains nothing but superfluous repetition; and perhaps it ought to be bracketed.

§ 4. Ἐπὶ οὖν λόγῳ τούτῳ, ὦ παῖ, καὶ τῆ ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων ἐξαλλαγῇ καὶ ἐπὶ γῆς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις. The meaning must have been that the function of *φύσις* and her two assistants on earth (*viz.* that of

¹ It is possible that *ἀνωθεν οἱ* is a corruption of *ἄνω θεοὶ* (*δύο*).

making the bodies in which the souls are to be incarnated) corresponds to that of *πρόνοια* and its two subordinates in the world above (viz. that of taking care of the unembodied souls and superintending their incarnation); and that, in discharging these functions, *πρόνοια* and *φύσις* do their respective parts in effecting one and the same result (viz. the incarnation of each soul in a body suited to it). This meaning might be expressed by rewriting the sentence as follows. [τῷ] ὁμόλογος (δέ) τούτοις, ὃ παῖ, καὶ τῇ ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων (οἰκονομία κατ') ἐπαλλαγῆν (ἀντίστροφος) [καὶ] ἐπὶ γῆς ἐστὶν ἡ φύσις. The words ἡ ἄνω τῶν πραγμάτων οἰκονομία (or διοίκησις or some other synonym) are equivalent to 'the operation of *πρόνοια*'; and κατ' ἐπαλλαγῆν would mean that the work of *πρόνοια* and that of *φύσις* 'fit in with one another', each of them supplementing what the other does. For the literal sense of ἐπαλλαγῆ, cf. ὀδόντες ἐπαλλάττοντες in Aristotle (*Part. an.* 3. 1, 661 b 18 &c.), meaning rows of teeth which fit into one another.

σκηνοποιὸς οὔσα, καὶ πλάστρια (πλάστρια γὰρ οὔσα καὶ σκηνοποιὸς MSS.) (τῶν) ἀγγείων εἰς (ἀ ἐμ)βάλλονται αἱ ψυχαί. The combination σκηνοποιὸς ἀγγείων is impossible. If we interchange σκηνοποιὸς and πλάστρια, the words πλάστρια (τῶν) ἀγγείων κ.τ.λ. may be taken as an explanation of the meaning of σκηνοποιὸς.

Heeren alters πλάστρια into πλάστειρα. But πλάστρια, though not found elsewhere, is a possible form; cf. ψάλτρια.

ἡ μὲν μνήμη (γνώμη MSS.) ἔργον ἔχει τοῦτο, ὅπως ἡ φύσις [τηρῆ καὶ] περικρατῆ τοῦ [τε ἐκάστου] τύπου (τοῦ) ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβεβλημένου. περικρατεῖν means 'to keep hold of' or 'cling to'; cf. *Exc.* XXIII. 54, (24) and *Exc.* XXIV. 6. τηρῆ, which would require an object in the accusative, has been added to explain περικρατῆ.

The τύπος ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβεβλημένος is the Platonic or Aristotelian εἶδος of the species. The form or type of the horse, for instance, has been determined once for all; and when Nature is constructing the body of an individual horse, she 'remembers' that form or type, and reproduces it in the individual.

καὶ τοῦ παραδείγματος (φυράματος MSS.) τοῦ ἄνω (εἰκῶν) γίγνηται (γίγνεται MSS.) (τὸ πλασσόμενον σῶμα?). With these corrections, we have here a repetition, in other words, of what was said in the preceding clause. τὸ παράδειγμα τὸ ἄνω, 'the pattern laid up in heaven', is a Platonic term equivalent to ὁ τύπος ὁ ἐξ ἀρχῆς καταβεβλημένος. The false reading φυράματος may have been suggested by τοῦ φυράματος in § 13.

ἡ δὲ ἐμπειρία (ἔργον ἔχει τοῦτο), ὅπως [πρὸς ?] ἀνάλογον ἐκάστης τῶν καταβαινουσῶν ψυχῶν . . . καὶ τὸ πλάσμα [] γένηται. Nature's μνήμη

is employed in adhering to the species-type; her *ἐμπειρία* (skilled craftsmanship) is employed in producing individual variations. It results from the working of her *μνήμη* that the body of every horse has those qualities by which horses are distinguished from other animals; it results from the working of her *ἐμπειρία* that the body of this or that individual horse has certain qualities in which it differs from other horses. And the purpose by which Nature's work is guided in these variations is to make each individual body perfectly suitable for the particular soul which is to inhabit it.

καὶ ταῖς μὲν ὀξέσι τῶν ψυχῶν ὀξέα γένηται καὶ τὰ σώματα, ταῖς δὲ βραδέσι βραδέα . . . καὶ ἀπαξαπλῶς ἐκάσταις κατὰ τὸ εἶκος. This is an explanation of ὅπως πρὸς ἀνάλογον ἐκάστης . . . καὶ τὸ πλάσμα γένηται. The meaning of ταῖς μὲν ὀξέσι . . . βραδέα is clear enough; the body of a race-horse, for instance, has been made 'quick', in order that it might be suitable for a 'quick' soul, and the body of a cart-horse has been made 'slow', in order that it might be suitable for a 'slow' soul. But there are difficulties in what follows. ταῖς δὲ ἐνεργέσιν ἐνεργῆ καὶ ταῖς νωθραῖς . . . νωθρά is superfluous repetition; for ἐνεργῆ and νωθρά are hardly distinguishable in meaning from ὀξέα and βραδέα. And what can be meant by δόλια σώματα? Deceitfulness is an attribute of souls alone, and not of bodies. Moreover, we should have expected καὶ ταῖς μὲν ἐνεργέσιν . . . ταῖς δὲ . . . , καὶ ταῖς μὲν δυναταῖς . . . ταῖς δὲ . . . , rather than ταῖς δὲ ἐνεργέσιν . . . καὶ ταῖς . . . , καὶ ταῖς δυναταῖς . . . καὶ ταῖς . . . Also, κατὰ τὸ εἶκος is unsatisfactory; in place of it, something equivalent to ἀνὰ λόγον is wanted. It may be suspected that either the whole passage καὶ ταῖς μὲν ὀξέσι . . . κατὰ τὸ εἶκος, or some part of it at least, is a later addition.

§ 5. (. . .) οὐ γὰρ ἀσκόπως πτηνὰ μὲν ἐπτίλωσε(ν ἢ φύσις), κ.τ.λ. The qualities here spoken of are such as belong to a whole species, not such as belong to some individuals of the species and not to others. (E. g. all birds are feathered.) They are therefore qualities that are produced by Nature's *μνήμη*, and not by her *ἐμπειρία*. That being so, οὐ γὰρ ἀσκόπως κ.τ.λ. cannot have followed immediately on § 4 *fin.*, in which the work of nature's *ἐμπειρία* was spoken of; and a connecting passage must have been lost.

The contents of this section were doubtless derived from a Stoic source. From a similar source, if not from the very same Stoic document, must have come Minucius Felix 17. 10: 'quidve animantium loquar adversus sese tutelam multiforem: alias armatas cornibus, alias dentibus saeptas, et fundatas unguis et spicatas aculeis, aut

pedum celeritate liberas aut elatione pinnarum?' There is a still closer resemblance to *Exc. XXVI. 5* in Lactantius *De opif. dei* 2. 1-4: 'Dedit enim homini artifex ille noster ac parens deus sensum atque rationem . . . Ceteris animantibus, quoniam rationalem istam vim non attribuit, quemadmodum tamen vita eorum tutior esset, ante providit. . . Singulis autem generibus ad propulsandos impetus externos sua propria munimenta constituit, ut aut naturalibus telis repugnent [fortioribus]¹ aut quae sunt inbecilliora subtrahant se periculis pernecitate fugiendi, aut quae simul et viribus et celeritate indigent, astu se protegant aut latibulis saepiant. Itaque alia eorum vel plumis levibus in sublime suspensa sunt vel suffulta unguibus vel instructa cornibus; quibusdam in ore arma sunt dentes, aut in pedibus adunci unguis: nulli munimentum ad tutelam sui deest.' Lactantius is known to have made use of Minucius Felix. He may perhaps have read *Herm. Exc. XXVI* also; but we have no proof that the *Isis to Horus* documents were known to him, and the resemblance may be equally well accounted for by assuming a common Stoic source.

[[λογικά δὲ περισσαῖς καὶ ἀκριβεστέραις αἰσθήσεσιν ἐκόσμησε.]] ζῶα λογικά are men. As men are spoken of in § 6 (*εἰς μὲν ἀνθρώπους . . . εἰς δὲ πτηνὰ κ.τ.λ.*), they were probably spoken of in § 5 also. But the author cannot have placed them between birds and quadrupeds in his list of animals. His mention of men must have stood either at the beginning of the list or at the end; and if δέ is to be retained, these words must be transposed to the end of the section.

For the statement that the senses of men are superior to those of beasts, cf. Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 145 f. (from Posidonius?): 'Omnisque sensus hominum multo antecellit sensibus bestiarum. Primum enim oculi in iis artibus, quarum iudicium est oculorum, in pictis, fictis caelatisque formis, in corporum etiam motione atque gestu, multa cernunt subtilius; colorum enim et figurarum venustatem atque ordinem et, ut ita dicam, decentiam oculi iudicant,' &c. In that passage, it is chiefly aesthetic discrimination that is said to be peculiar to men.

Cicero *ib.*, after speaking of the human senses, goes on to speak of the human intellect ('iam vero animum ipsum mentemque hominis, rationem, consilium, prudentiam', &c.); and we should

¹ I have bracketed *fortioribus*. If any word in the dative stood here, it must have been a word meaning 'their assailants'. But perhaps we ought to read *fortiora* (sc. *genera*), in contrast to *quae sunt inbecilliora*.

have expected the writer of *Exc.* XXVI to do the same. If he did, what he said about it has been lost.

ὦν μὲν τὰ στόματα [καὶ τοῖς] ὀδοῦσιν ἐχαράκωσεν, ὧν δὲ τοὺς ὄγκους αὐξήσασα (ὀξύνας MSS.) δύναμιν περιέθηκεν. These words refer to reptiles, and describe the means of self-defence with which Nature provides them. The reptiles which are equipped with teeth must be the venomous snakes; the description of the other kind of reptiles would apply to boas and pythons, and to the semi-fabulous δράκων. The verb ἐχαράκωσεν is hardly the right word to use in speaking of a pair of poison-fangs; but perhaps the writer had never examined the mouth of a venomous snake, and imagined such snakes to be armed with a 'palisade' of teeth.

§ 6. εἰς μὲν ἀνθρώπους χωρεῖν τὰς κριτικάς. κριτικός is here equivalent to λογικός. The souls of men are distinguished from those of beasts by the fact that they have in them a κριτήριον ἀληθείας. See note on *Exc.* XXV. 7 *fn.*

εἰς δὲ πτηνὰ τὰς ἀπανθρώπους¹. 'The souls that hate or shun men' cannot be right. It is true that wild birds shun men; but so do wild quadrupeds also. ἀπανθρώπους has probably come from εἰς μὲν ἀνθρώπους above,¹ and has driven out the original adjective, which may have been some word meaning 'light-minded', 'flighty', or 'volatile'. κούφας or ἀνεδράστους would serve the purpose; see § 15.

The false reading ἀπανθρώπους has given rise to the interpolation καὶ πτηνὸν τῆς ἀπανθρωπίας ἐκπεσεῖν in § 7.

εἰς δὲ τετράποδα (τὰς) ἀκρίτους¹. Here, again, an inappropriate word has been substituted for the adjective written by the author. ἀκριτος is the opposite of κριτικός (= λογικός), and would be equally applicable to all kinds of animals as opposed to men. Possibly ἀκρατεῖς, in the sense of the Latin *impotens* (*sui*), 'violent'.

νόμος γὰρ ἐκείνοις ἐστὶν ἢ ἰσχύς. Quadrupeds 'know no law but the law of the stronger'. Does this mean that the stronger among them lawlessly prey on the weaker? If so, we might compare Pl. *Gorg.* 484 B, where Callicles quotes Pindar (νόμος ὁ πάντων βασιλεὺς κ.τ.λ.) in support of his thesis that 'might is right'. But the words might also be taken to mean that quadrupeds are subject to the compulsion applied to them by beings stronger than themselves, i. e. by men; (horses and oxen, for instance, are forced to

¹ Or possibly from ἀπανθρωπίζονται, 'become men', which may have occurred in a note on εἰς μὲν ἀνθρώπους χωρεῖν τὰς κριτικάς. Cf. ταῦτα ἀπηνθρώπισται in § 20.

labour;) and perhaps the latter interpretation agrees better with *τετραποῦν δὲ τὴν ἀνάγκην παραλλάξαι* in § 7.

§ 7. *ἄνθρωπον μὲν . . . τὸ κριτικὸν ὑπερβῆναι*. *ὑπερβῆναι* means 'to transgress'. Man is a rational animal; yet men sometimes disobey the dictates of reason.

[[*καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν ἄνω καὶ τῆς καταβάσεως αὐτῶν καὶ τῆς σωματουργίας τοσαῦτα.*]] These words are manifestly out of place. They ought to stand at the *end* of a discussion of the subjects mentioned in them; but the writer continues to speak *περὶ τῆς διαθέσεως τῶν ἄνω καὶ τῆς καταβάσεως αὐτῶν* in §§ 8-12. I have therefore transposed *καὶ τὰ μὲν . . . τοσαῦτα* to the beginning of § 13, where something of the sort is desirable, if not necessary, to mark the transition to a fresh topic. But if we place the sentence there, it seems best to bracket *καὶ τῆς σωματουργίας*; for the making of bodies has been spoken of only in §§ 4 and 5, and there is nothing about it in §§ 6-12.

§ 8. *συμβαίνει δέ, ὡς τέκνον, ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶδει (ἄνθρώπων) εὐρίσκεσθαι [καὶ γένει τῶν προκειμένων] βασιλικὰς τινὰς ψυχὰς*. In §§ 8-11 men alone are dealt with, and not beasts; we must therefore either insert or understand *ἄνθρώπων* after *εἶδει*. Instances of the different *εἶδη* of men (teachers, physicians, &c.) are given in § 9.

Βασιλικαὶ ψυχαί have already been spoken of in §§ 1 and 2. Compare *Exc.* XXIV. 2-6.

[[*καταβαίνειν δὲ καὶ ἄλλας . . . βασιλευούσης ψυχῆς.*]] This passage breaks the connexion between *ἐν ἐκάστῳ εἶδει (ἄνθρώπων) εὐρίσκεσθαι βασιλικὰς τινὰς ψυχὰς* and *πολλὰ γὰρ εἰσι βασιλεῖαι κ.τ.λ.* If we alter *καταβαίνειν δέ* into *συμβαίνει δέ (εὐρίσκεσθαι)*, the passage fits in well at the end of § 10; and when it is placed there, *οἱ (αἱ MSS.) μὲν ἀπὸ βασιλικοῦ διαζώματος* is brought into connexion with *οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐπιστημονικοῦ καὶ τεχνικοῦ* in § 11.

§ 9. *πολλὰ γὰρ εἰσι βασιλεῖαι· αἱ μὲν γὰρ εἰσι (γὰρ εἰς MSS.) ψυχῶν αἱ δὲ σωματῶν, αἱ δὲ τέχνης καὶ (αἱ δὲ τέχνης αἱ δὲ MSS.) ἐπιστήμης*. The meaning must have been 'besides political kingship, there are also kingships of other kinds; for instance, there are kingships of art and science'. *ψυχῶν αἱ δὲ σωματῶν* must therefore be a corruption of some phrase describing kingship in the literal sense, i. e. political supremacy, as opposed to supremacy in other things. In what follows, we are told that Osiris was a king *ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης*, which appears to mean that he was supreme in political power; and the sense required here might be expressed by writing *ἰσχύος καὶ ῥώμης* in place of *εἰς ψυχῶν αἱ δὲ σωματῶν*.

ἀπογεγονότων [ἤδη ψυχῶν] μὲν (βασιλεὺς) Ὁσίρις ὁ πατὴρ σου, ζώντων (σωμάτων MSS.) δὲ ὁ ἐκάστου ἔθνους ἡγεμών. Osiris was commonly described as 'king of the dead'. (Cf. *Exc.* XXIII. 62, where he is called φρικτὸς τῶν ὑπὸ γῆς τύραννος.)

The 'kingships' with which this paragraph (§§ 8-11) is concerned are those held by incarnate souls, i. e. by living men. But the king of the dead cannot be a soul incarnated on earth; the mention of him is therefore irrelevant to the main argument. Perhaps the writer put it in merely because he was unwilling to miss an opportunity for speaking of Osiris.

If my corrections of the text are right, the contrasted terms ἀπογεγονότων and ζώντων have been altered into ἐπιγεγονότων ἤδη ψυχῶν and σωμάτων by a transcriber; and it was probably the same man that wrote ψυχῶν αἱ δὲ σωμάτων above in place of some other phrase.

[βουλῆς δὲ ὁ πατὴρ πάντων]. 'The father of all' must be the supreme God. If the supreme God was to be spoken of at all, he ought to be placed at the head of the list. But a mention of the supreme God is even more inappropriate in this connexion than a mention of the king of the dead.

καθηγητικῆς (καθηγητῆς MSS.) ὁ τρισμέγιστος Ἑρμῆς. Hermes is 'king of the art of teaching'; that is to say, he is the supreme philosopher or teacher of religion. Hermes and Asclepius are here regarded as men, and not as gods; their souls are 'kingly souls' which have been incarnated on earth.

ἰσχύος δὲ καὶ ῥώμης πάλιν Ὁσίρις, μεθ' ὃν, ὦ τέκνον, αὐτὸς σὺ. This must be taken to mean that Osiris, during his life on earth, was king of Egypt, but he has departed from this life, and his son Horus now reigns in his stead.

Osiris then is here spoken of as an instance of an ἔθνους ἡγεμών. But he was mentioned above as 'king of the dead', and as such, was distinguished from ὁ ἐκάστου ἔθνους ἡγεμών. If the two statements are to be taken together, we must understand that Osiris was formerly king of Egypt, but that his soul, having departed from the body, has been transformed into a god, and is now king of the dead. But if that is what the writer meant, it is strange that he has left the relation between his two statements about Osiris unexplained; and if Osiris and Horus are mentioned as instances of ἔθνους ἡγεμόνες, they ought to have been mentioned as such at the point where ὁ ἐκάστου ἔθνους ἡγεμών is first spoken of. There

is therefore strong reason to think that *ισχύος δὲ . . . αὐτὸς σύ* has been added by a later hand.

φιλοσοφίας δὲ Ἀρνεβεσχῆνις. Reitzenstein, *Poim.* p. 135, referring to Spiegelberg, *Demotische Studien*, I, pp. 28* and 41, says that *Ἀρνεβεσχῆνις* means 'Horus, lord of Letopolis' (a town near the apex of the Delta). But the writer of these words in *Exc. XXVI* must have regarded Har-neb-eschenis as a person distinct from Horus the son and pupil of Isis.

As far as I know, there is no other evidence that this obscure local god was believed to have been a teacher of philosophy. Perhaps the man who wrote these words was an inhabitant of Letopolis, and was referring to a local tradition. In the view of the Hellenized Egyptians in general, the supreme philosopher was Hermes Trismegistus; and that is the view implied above, where Hermes is called *βασιλεὺς καθηγητικῆς*. The two statements can hardly be reconciled; it is therefore probable that the mention of *Ἀρνεβεσχῆνις* is a later addition.

ποιητικῆς δὲ πάλιν [ὁ] Ἀσκληπιὸς (ὁ καὶ) Ἴμούθης. As to *Ἀσκληπιὸς (ὁ καὶ) Ἴμούθης*, cf. *Exc. XXIII. 6*. But if his Egyptian name *Ἴμούθης* (Imhotep) was to be given at all, why was it not given when he was mentioned above?

Being well known as a healer of the sick, Asclepius might very well be called *βασιλεὺς ἰατρικῆς*; but it is not clear why he should be called *βασιλεὺς ποιητικῆς*. According to Breasted, *History of Egypt*, 1906, pp. 83, 107, 112 f., 575, Imhotep, who was worshipped as a god from the time of the Saïte dynasty onwards, was vizier or counsellor of Zoser, one of the early kings of Egypt, and was the reputed author of a collection of proverbs well known in later times. Cf. the 'Lay of the Harper' (*ib.* p. 206): 'I have heard the words of Imhotep and Harzozef, whose utterances are of much reputation.' It is possible that the proverbs of Imhotep were composed in poetic form; but even if they were, that is hardly a sufficient reason for calling him 'king of the art of poetry', i. e. supreme above all other poets.

As the second mention of Asclepius, as well as the second mention of Osiris, gives rise to difficulties, it seems best to bracket the whole passage *ισχύος δὲ καὶ ῥώμης . . . Ἴμούθης*.

§ 10. ὁ μὲν πάντων κρατῶν, τέκνον, ἐκ τῆς ὑπεράνω (πάντων?) χώρας ἐστίν, οἱ (ὁ MSS.) δὲ τῶν κατὰ μέρος (ἐκ τόπων κατωτέρων?). For *ὑπεράνω (πάντων)*, cf. § 1 *fn.* ὁ πάντων κρατῶν probably means the

supreme political ruler,—in the time of Isis, for instance, Osiris or Horus, and in the writer's time, the Roman emperor. οἱ τῶν κατὰ μέρος (κρατοῦντες) may be taken to mean those who are supreme in this or that particular department, e. g. Hermes, who is βασιλεὺς καθηγητικῆς, and Asclepius, who is βασιλεὺς ἰατρικῆς. If 'kingly souls' reside in more than one χώρα, as is implied in § 2 *init.*, the souls of the 'kings of art and science' may come from places which are below the highest χώρα of all.

συμβαίνει (καταβαίνειν MSS.) δὲ (εὕρισκεσθαι) καὶ ἄλλας ἀλλοίας (ἀλλοίους codd.), τὰς μὲν διαπύρους κ.τ.λ. ἄλλας means souls which are not 'kingly'. There are differences among souls of other kinds, as well as among kingly souls.

συμβαίνει δὲ (καὶ) τοῦτο παρὰ τὴν τῶν τόπων θέσιν κ.τ.λ. As something very like this was said about kingly souls in the beginning of the section, it seems necessary to insert καὶ before τοῦτο, which means the fact that there are differences among souls which are not kingly.

οἱ (αἱ MSS.) μὲν γὰρ ἀπὸ βασιλικοῦ διαζώματος καταπηδήσαντες (καταπηδῶσι τῆς MSS.) ἴμοιοπάθους βασιλεύουσιν (βασιλευούσης MSS.) [ψυχῆς]. It would be possible to write either αἱ μὲν . . . καταπηδήσανσαι (sc. ψυχαί) or οἱ μὲν . . . καταπηδήσαντες. But as the subjects in the corresponding clauses of § 11 *init.* (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἕγρου . . . οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐπιστημονικοῦ . . . οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἀργου) are masculine, it is most likely that the author wrote οἱ μὲν and not αἱ μὲν here.

ἴμοιοπάθους is probably a corruption of some phrase by which βασιλεύουσιν was qualified.

διάζωμα is here used as a synonym for ζώνη or χώρα. Α βασιλικὸν διάζωμα is a χώρα in which βασιλικαὶ ψυχαί reside. The absence of τοῦ before βασιλικοῦ διαζώματος implies that there are several such χώραι; this agrees with § 2 *init.*

§ 11. (οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ἐνέργους) ((διαζώματος κατεληλυθότες (τετευχότες MSS.) [πυρὸς] ἐργάται γίνονται καὶ τροφεῖς (τροφῆς MSS.)). ἐργάται καὶ τροφεῖς apparently means manual labourers, who maintain the community by their industry. But this notion is not very clearly expressed. Possibly τροφῆς may be a remnant of some such phrase as τροφῆς πορισταί.

πυρὸς ἐργάται is impossible. It is probable that πυρός was inserted by some one who misunderstood the author's meaning, and supposed that the different διαζώματα were distinguished by the presence of different elements in them, and that there was a fiery διάζωμα and

a watery διαζώμα. The same misunderstanding seems to have caused the insertion of [οἱ δὲ ἀπὸ ὑγροῦ ἐν ὑγροῖς διαζώμασιν (διαζώσιν?)] above, and possibly also that of τὰς μὲν διαπύρους τὰς δὲ ψυχράς in § 10.

§ 12. καὶ πάλιν ἀνέρχεται (πάντα ἐκέισε θεῶν) κατέβη (ἵνα καταβῆ MSS.). This applies in the first place to incarnate souls; e. g. a βασιλικὴ ψυχή, when it quits the body, returns to one of the βασιλικά διαζώματα of the atmosphere. (Cf. § 2.) But the return of souls to their home above is only one instance among others of a law which holds good universally; all things on earth come from above, and return to the place from which they came. Compare Heraclitus, fr. 60 Diels, ὁδὸς ἄνω κάτω μία καὶ ὤντη, and the quotations of that saying in later writers. Diog. Laert. 9. 8: καὶ τὴν μεταβολὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω κάτω τὸν τε κόσμον γίνεσθαι κατ' αὐτήν. πυκνούμενοι γὰρ τὸ πῦρ . . . γίνεσθαι ὕδωρ, πηγνύμενοι δὲ τὸ ὕδωρ εἰς γῆν τρέπεσθαι· καὶ ταύτην ὁδὸν ἐπὶ τὸ κάτω εἶναι. πάλιν τε [αὐτήν] τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι, ἐξ ἧς τὸ ὕδωρ γίνεσθαι, ἐκ δὲ τούτου τὰ λοιπὰ . . . αὐτὴ δὲ ἐστὶν ἡ ἐπὶ τὸ ἄνω ὁδός. Cleomedes *De motu circ. corp. cael.* I. II. 61 Ziegler: ἡ γῆ . . . οὐκ ἔστιν ἀδύνατος ἀναπέμπει τροφὴν τῷ οὐρανῷ καὶ τοῖς ἐν αὐτῷ, οὐδ' ἂν ἐξαμβλωθείη (al. ἐξαναλωθείη) τούτου ἕνεκα, ἐν μέρει καὶ αὐτὴ ἀντιλαμβάνουσά τινα ἐκ τε ἀέρος καὶ ἐξ οὐρανοῦ. ὁδὸς γὰρ ἄνω κάτω, φησὶν ὁ Ἡράκλειτος, ἴδι' (τῆς?) ὄλης οὐσίας τρέπεσθαι καὶ μεταβάλλειν πεφυκίας. Philo *De incorr. mundi* 21. 109: περιθέει καὶ τὰ στοιχεῖα τοῦ κόσμου ταῖς εἰς ἄλληλα μεταβολαῖς, (καὶ) . . . θνήσκειν δοκοῦντα, ἀθανατίζεται, . . . τὴν αὐτὴν ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω συνεχῶς ἀμείβοντα. Maximus Tyr. 41. 4: μεταβολὴν ὄρας σωμάτων καὶ γενέσεως ἀλλαγὴν, ὁδὸν ἄνω καὶ κάτω, κατὰ τὸν Ἡράκλειτον. Iamblichus *Περὶ ψυχῆς*, Stob. I. 49. 39, vol. I, p. 378 W.: Ἡράκλειτος μὲν γὰρ ἀμοιβὰς ἀναγκαίας τίθεται ἐκ τῶν ἐναντίων, ὁδὸν τε ἄνω καὶ κάτω διαπορεύεσθαι τὰς ψυχὰς ὑπέειλεψε.

The writer finds an illustration of the law of παλινδρομία in the process of respiration. We draw our breath from the atmosphere, and breathe it out again into the atmosphere.

τότε (αὐτοῖ) ἡμεῖς οὐκέτι ὠδέ ἐσμεν, ἀλλ' ἀναβεβήκαμεν: that is, the man dies. Compare the explanation of the cause of death in *Exc.* XXIII. 68.

ἡμεῖς implies that the writer assumes Isis and Horus to have been human beings, and not gods, at the time when the dialogue took place. Cf. ἡμῖν in § 13.

§ 13. προσεπιγίγνεται δὲ . . . καὶ ἕτερα ἅτινα ἡμῖν ἐκ τῆς (ἐκτὸς MSS.)

τοῦ φυράματος συσταθμίας. In §§ 3-12, the writer has been speaking of qualities which the soul brings with it from its abode in this or that stratum of the atmosphere. In §§ 13-30, he speaks of qualities produced in the soul by the influence of the body in which it resides on earth. The contents of these two parts of the *libellus* were probably derived from different sources; and the connexion between them is not fully worked out. The writer's theory of unembodied souls and atmospheric strata (§§ 3-12) is based on the Platonic doctrine of unembodied souls, as adopted and modified by Posidonius; his theory of the influence of the body on the soul (§§ 13-30) may have been based on some Stoic treatise in which unembodied souls were ignored. According to one school of thought, it might be said that the differences between one man and another were already in existence, as differences between soul and soul, before the souls were incarnated; according to another school of thought, it might be said that these differences are caused by differences in the composition of the body. The writer of *Exc.* XXVI has sought to combine these two views, by saying that some of the differences between soul and soul existed before the incarnation of the souls, and others have resulted from their incarnation in bodies differently composed; but he does not tell us which of the qualities of souls are pre-existent and which of them are produced by the influence of the body, or how the pre-existent qualities are to be distinguished from the others.

The *φύραμα* is the body, regarded as a dough-like mass composed of portions of the four elements 'kneaded' or mingled together. Cf. Philo *De sacr. Abelis et Caini* 33. 107, Cohn I, p. 246: "ὅταν ἐσθίητε ἀπὸ τῶν ἄρτων τῆς γῆς, . . . ἀπαρχὴν φυράματος ὑμῶν ἄρτων . . . ἀφελείτε . . ." (*Num.* 15. 19). τὸ τοίνυν φύραμα κυρίως, εἰ χρὴ τάληθες εἰπεῖν, ἡμεῖς ἐσμεν αὐτοί, συμπεφορημένων καὶ συγκεκριμένων πλείστων οὐσιῶν ἵνα ἀποτελεσθῶμεν' ψυχρὸν γὰρ θερμῷ καὶ ξηρὸν ὑγρῷ, δυνάμεις ἐναντίας, ἀναμίξας καὶ ἀνακερασάμενος ὁ ζωοπλάστης, ἐν ἐκ πασῶν ἕκαστον ἡμῶν ἀπειργάζετο συμφόρημα, ἀφ' οὗ καὶ φύραμα εἴρηται.¹ Marc. Aur. 7. 68: κὰν τὰ θηρία διασπᾶ τὰ μελύδρια τοῦ περιτεθραμμένου τούτου φυράματος (i. e. of the body).

συσταθμία means a coadjustment of weights or quantities; and

¹ Philo *ib.* goes on to say τούτου τοῦ συμφορήματος, ὃ (οὐ?) ψυχὴ καὶ σῶμα δύο τὰ ἀνωτάτω τμήματα κεκλήρωται, τὰς ἀπαρχὰς ἀνιερωτέον: that is, the soul and the body are two of the things which are mixed together in the *φύραμα*. But that is a different application of the term *φύραμα*; in the preceding words, the *φύραμα* is the body, and the ingredients which are mixed together in it are 'hot, cold, moist, and dry', that is to say, the four elements.

ἡ τοῦ φυράματος συσταθμία is the proportion between the quantities of the several elements of which the φύραμα is composed.

ἐξ ἧς [κράσεως καὶ συνόδου] ἀναθυμιάται τις ἀτμός, ὃς περιελεῖται μὲν τῇ ψυχῇ, διατρέχει δὲ ἐν (τῷ) σώματι. The 'vapour' here spoken of is a thing in which the embodied soul is wrapped, and which acts as intermediary between the body and the soul. It is identical with the πνεῦμα spoken of in *Corp.* X. 16 f., where we are told that the πνεῦμα is the περιβολή of the soul. But the writer of *Exc.* XXVI uses the word πνεῦμα only to signify the element air, and employs ἀτμός, instead of πνεῦμα, to describe the 'envelope' in which the soul is wrapped. The ἀτμός is a material thing of gaseous substance; and the writer doubtless regarded the soul also as material, and thought of it as a thing consisting of more highly rarified gas.

The Stoics called the soul itself a πνεῦμα.¹ But many people, while adopting the Stoic conception of the πνεῦμα σύμφυτον ἡμῖν, distinguished the ψυχὴ from it, and interposed the πνεῦμα between the gross body and the ψυχὴ; and the author of this document interposes his ἀτμός in the same way.

Regarding the soul as a πνεῦμα, i. e. a sort of vapour, the Stoics said that it is an ἀναθυμίασις² given off by the watery material contained in the body, or by the blood. Arius Didymus 39. 2, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 470 f.: περὶ δὲ ψυχῆς Κλεάνθης . . . φησὶν ὅτι Ζήνων τὴν ψυχὴν λέγει αἰσθητικὴν³ ἀναθυμίασιν, καθάπερ Ἡράκλειτος.⁴ βουλόμενος

¹ Chrysippus *ap.* Galen *Hipp. et Plat.* 3. 1, Kühn V, p. 287: ἡ ψυχὴ πνευμά ἐστι σύμφυτον ἡμῖν, συνεχές, παντὶ τῷ σώματι¹ (διὰ παντὸς τοῦ σώματος!) διήκον. Diog. Laert. 7. 156: the Stoics say (τὴν ψυχὴν) εἶναι τὸ συμφυὲς ἡμῖν πνεῦμα. (πνεῦμα σύμφυτον or συμφυὲς ἡμῖν is translated *concretus corpori spiritus* by Macrobius, *Somm.* I. 14. 19; less correctly, Tertull. *De an.* 5, *consitus spiritus*; Chalcidius in *Tim.* c. 220, *naturalis spiritus*.) Diog. Laert. 7. 157: Ζήνων δὲ ὁ Κιτιεύς, καὶ Ἀντίπατρος ἐν τοῖς Περὶ ψυχῆς, καὶ Ποσειδώνιος, πνεῦμα ἐνθερμον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν τούτῳ γὰρ ἡμᾶς εἶναι ἐμπνόους. Aetius, Diels *Doxogr.* p. 388: the Stoics (τὴν ψυχὴν λέγουσιν εἶναι) πνεῦμα νοερόν, θερμόν. Nemesius *De nat. hom.* c. 2, p. 38: οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ πνεῦμα λέγουσιν (τὴν ψυχὴν) ἐνθερμον καὶ διάπυρον. Alex. Aphrod. *De an.* 26, 13 Bruns: οἱ τε ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, πνεῦμα (τὴν ψυχὴν) λέγοντες εἶναι συγκείμενον πως ἐκ [τε] πυρὸς καὶ ἀέρος. Plotinus 4. 7. 4: according to the Stoics, the soul is πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον. Porphyry. *ap.* Euseb. *Pr. ev.* 15. 11. 4: πῶς δὲ οὐκ αἰσχύνεις γέμων ὁ πνεῦμα πῶς ἔχον (τὴν ψυχὴν) ἀποδιδούς (λόγος), ἢ πῶρ νοερόν τῇ περιβύξει καὶ ὡν βαφῆ τοῦ ἀέρος ἀναφθὲν ἢ στομαθῆν; Plut. *Sto. rep.* 41. 2, p. 1052 F: Chrysippus considers the ψυχὴ (i. e. the animal soul) to be ἀραιότερον πνεῦμα τῆς φύσεως (i. e. than the vegetable soul) καὶ λεπτομερέστερον.

² The words ἀναθυμίασθαι and ἀναθυμίασις do not occur in Plato, but were frequently used by Aristotle and by the Stoics.

³ αἰσθητικὴν Wellmann: αἰσθησιν ἢ MSS. Cf. Ps.-Plut. *Vit. Hom.* 127: τὴν ψυχὴν οἱ Στωικοὶ ὀρίζονται πνεῦμα συμφυὲς, καὶ ἀναθυμίασιν αἰσθητικὴν ἀναπτομένην (read ἀναδιδομένην?) ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν σώματι ὑγρῶν. Schol. in Hom. *Il.* 2. 85 (Anim. *Sto. vet. fr.* II, § 778): the Stoics define the soul thus, ψυχὴ ἐστὶ πνεῦμα συμφυὲς, καὶ ἀναθυμίασις αἰσθητικὴ ἐκ τῶν τοῦ σώματος ὑγρῶν ἀναδιδομένη.

⁴ Cf. Ar. *De an.* I. 2, 405 a 25: καὶ Ἡράκλειτος δὲ τὴν ἀρχὴν εἶναι φησι ψυχὴν,

γὰρ ἐμφανίσαι ὅτι αἱ ψυχὰι ἀναθυμώμεναι [νοεραὶ]¹ αἰεὶ γίνονται, εἵκασεν αὐτὰς τοῖς ποταμοῖς, λέγων οὕτως· “ποταμοῖσι τοῖσιν αὐτοῖσιν ἔμβαινουσιν¹”.² (τοῖς γὰρ ποταμοῖς) ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ καὶ ψυχὰι δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ὑγρῶν ἀναθυμῶνται. ἀναθυμίαςιν μὲν οὖν ὁμοίως τῷ Ἡρακλείτῳ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀποφαίνει Ζήνων· αἰσθητικὴν δὲ κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* 39. 4: εἶναι δὲ ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ ὄλῳ φασίν, ὃ καλοῦσιν αἰθέρα καὶ ἀέρα, κύκλῳ περιέχουσαν [τὴν] γῆν καὶ θάλασσαν, καὶ ἐκ τούτων ἀναθυμαθεῖσιν³ τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς ψυχὰς προσπεφυκέναι ταύτῃ, ὅσαι τε ἐν ζώοις εἰσὶ καὶ ὅσαι ἐν τῷ περιέχοντι διαμένειν γὰρ ἐκεῖ τὰς τῶν ἀποθανόντων ψυχὰς.⁴ Aetius, Diels *ib.* p. 389: Ἡράκλειτος τὴν μὲν τοῦ κόσμου ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίαςιν ἐκ τῶν ἐν αὐτῷ ὑγρῶν, τὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἄπὸ τῆς ἐκτός καὶ τῆς ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμιάσεως ὁμογενῆ⁵. Diogenes Bab. (Stoic) *ap. Galen Hipp. et Plat.* 2. 8, Kühn V, p. 282: τὸ κινεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον τὰς κατὰ προαίρεσιν κινήσεις ψυχικὴ τίς ἐστιν ἀναθυμίαςις. Longinus *ap. Euseb. Pr. ev.* 15. 21. 3: Ζήνωνι μὲν γὰρ καὶ Κλεάνθει νεμεσήσειε τις ἂν δικαίως, . . . τοῦ στερέου σώματος⁶ εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν ἀναθυμίαςιν φήσασι. τί γὰρ, ὃ πρὸς θεῶν, κοινὸν ὄλως ἀναθυμιάσει καὶ ψυχῇ; Galen *Comm. 5 in Hippocr. Epid.* 6: ὅσοι γὰρ οἴονται τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι πνεῦμα, διασώζεσθαι λέγουσιν αὐτὴν ἐκ τε τῆς ἀναθυμιάσεως τοῦ αἵματος καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν εἰσπνοὴν ἐλκομένου διὰ τῆς τραχείας ἀρτηρίας εἶσω τοῦ σώματος (ἀέρος).⁷

εἴπερ τὴν ἀναθυμίαςιν, ἐξ ἧς τὰλλα συνίστησιν. That sentence is obscure, and probably corrupt. There is no reason to think that the word ἀναθυμίαςις was used by Heraclitus himself; but it occurs repeatedly in reports or interpretations of his doctrine.

¹ Diels says ‘similitudinis gratia ἕτεραι αἰεὶ exspectes’ (in place of νοεραὶ αἰεὶ). But it seems better to bracket νοεραὶ. The point is that souls, like rivers, are not permanently existing things, but ‘are ever coming into existence’ afresh.

² Something equivalent to οὐκ ἔστι δις ἐμβῆναι is wanted. (Cf. Heraclitus *fr.* 49 a Diels: ποταμοῖς τοῖς αὐτοῖς ἔμβαινόμεν τε καὶ οὐκ ἐμβαίνομεν¹. *Ib.* *fr.* 91: ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δις τῷ αὐτῷ καθ’ Ἡρακλείτον. Pl. *Cratyl.* 402 A: Heraclitus λέγει ὡς δις ἐς τὸν αὐτὸν ποταμὸν οὐκ ἂν ἐμβαίης. *At. Metaph.* 3. 5, 1010 a 13: Ἡρακλείτῳ . . . εἰπύντι ὅτι δις τῷ αὐτῷ ποταμῷ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι.) The words ἕτερα καὶ ἕτερα ὕδατα ἐπιρρεῖ are not quoted from Heraclitus; they are a part of the writer’s explanation of Heraclitus’ meaning; and τοῖς γὰρ ποταμοῖς, or something of the sort, must have been lost before them.

³ περιέχουσαν γῆν . . . ἀναθυμαθεῖσιν von Arnim: περὶ τὴν γῆν . . . ἀναθυμιάσεις MSS.: περιέχοντας γῆν . . . ἀναθυμασθέντας (misprint for -αθέντας?) Diels.

⁴ In this last clause the doctrine of disembodied souls resident in the atmosphere presents itself in a simple and undeveloped form. That doctrine was further elaborated by Posidonius, who combined with it the Platonic notion of pre-existing souls; and it was adopted from Posidonius, with some variations, by the authors of *Exc.* XXIII–XXVI.

⁵ Perhaps: τὴν δὲ ἐν τοῖς ζώοις ἀπόσπασμα (?) τῆς ἐκτός (εἶναι δὲ) καὶ ἐν αὐτοῖς ἀναθυμίαςιν ὁμογενῆ.

⁶ It would have been more correct to say τῶν ἐν τῷ σώματι ὑγρῶν, οἱ τοῦ αἵματος. Cf. Galen *Hipp. et Plat.* 2. 8: εἰ δὲ γε ἔπειτο (sc. Διογένους ὁ Βαβ.) Κλεάνθει καὶ Χρυσίππῳ καὶ Ζήνωνι, τρέφεσθαι μὲν ἐξ αἵματος φήσασι τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐσίαν δ’ αὐτῆς εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.

⁷ ἀέρος add. Arnim.

The writer of *Exc.* XXVI has adopted the word *ἀναθυμίασις* from the Stoics, but employs it somewhat differently; instead of speaking of an *ἀναθυμίασις* given off by the watery matter in the body, he speaks of an *ἀναθυμίασις* given off by the 'mixture of the four elements' of which the body consists. As used by the Stoics, *ἀναθυμίασις* meant an exhalation of vapour formed by the transmutation of earth or water into air or fire; and in that sense, an *ἀναθυμίασις* could be given off only by earth or water, not by fire or air.

ἀμφοτέροις μεταδιδούς [τουτέστι τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ] τῆς ἰδίας ποιότητος· καὶ οὕτως αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψυχικῶν καὶ σωματικῶν ἔναλλοιώσεων¹ γίνονται. τουτέστι . . . ψυχῇ is a correct but needless explanation of ἀμφοτέροις.

The writer's object in speaking of the *ἀτμός* is to explain how the body acts on the soul. He says that the body produces an *ἀτμός*, and that this *ἀτμός* derives qualities from the body, and produces corresponding qualities in the soul. But why should he say that the *ἀτμός* imparts qualities to the body also? The statement in the text, as far as it concerns the body, amounts to this: 'if there is an excess of fire, for instance, in the composition of the body, there results thence an excess of heat in the *ἀτμός* produced by the body, and from this again results an excess of heat (or a quality associated with an excess of heat) in the body'. That is a purposeless and unmeaning complication. If qualities of the body are to be spoken of at all in this connexion, it would surely be better to say merely (as is said in §§ 15-17) that they result from an excess or deficiency of this or that element in the composition of the body, and not to attribute them to the influence of the *ἀτμός*. The passage, as it stands in the MSS., shows confusion of thought; and I am inclined to think that the words in which the body is mentioned have been added by a blundering transcriber, and that the text originally ran thus: ἐξ ἧς (i. e. from the mixture of the four elements of which the body consists) ἀναθυμιάται τις ἀτμός, ὃς περιελεῖται τῇ ψυχῇ, μεταδιδούς αὐτῇ τῆς ἰδίας ποιότητος· καὶ οὕτως αἱ διαφοραὶ τῶν ψυχῶν γίνονται. See § 29 *fn.*, where the text has been similarly altered by the addition of ἢ τὴν τοῦ σώματος.

§ 14. εἰ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ τὴν σωματικὴν ἁδιάπηξιν¹ (σύστασιν?) πλεονάσει τὸ πῦρ κ.τ.λ. Cf. *Exc.* XX. 5: ἐὰν γὰρ ὑπερέχη ἐν τῇ σύστασει τὸ θερμόν, κ.τ.λ.

τὸ τῆνικαῦτα ἢ ψυχῇ θερμῇ τὴν φύσιν ὑπάρχουσα καὶ ἕτερον θερμόν προσλαβούσα ἔκπυρωδεστέρα γενομένη¹ ποιεῖ τὸ ἴψον ἐνεργότερον.

There is something wrong here. Perhaps ἐκπυρωδεστέρα¹ γενομένη is an alternative for ἔτερον θερμὸν προσλαβούσα, and ought to be bracketed. Omitting those two words, we might translate 'the fact that the soul is hot by nature and has received an addition of heat makes the animal more energetic'. But that is not satisfactory; and it is most likely that there is some more extensive corruption. The meaning wanted might be better expressed by writing τὸ τηρικαῦτα, τῆς ψυχῆς θερμῆς τὴν φύσιν ὑπαρχούσης καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ ἄτμου, [ἐκ]πυρωδεστέρου ὄντος, ἔτερον θερμὸν προσλαβούσης, ἐνεργότερον γίνεται τὸ ζῶον. But perhaps the best remedy would be to bracket τὸ τηρικαῦτα ἢ ψυχῆ . . . ἐκπυρωδεστέρα γενομένη, and alter ποιεῖ τὸ ζῶον (acc.) into ποιεῖται τὸ ζῶον (nom.).

[τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὀξύ καὶ εὐκίνητον]. If these words are to be retained, τὴν μὲν ψυχὴν or τῇ μὲν ψυχῇ must be inserted before ἐνεργότερον. But it would be impossible to say ἢ ψυχῆ ποιεῖ τὸ σῶμα (or ποιεῖ τὸ ζῶον τῷ σώματι) ὀξύ; for it is not the soul, but the *συσταθμία τῶν στοιχείων* in the composition of the body, that produces bodily qualities. It is probable then that in this section qualities of soul alone were originally spoken of, and that τὸ δὲ σῶμα ὀξύ καὶ εὐκίνητον is a later addition. And that being so, there is some reason to suspect that in the following sections also the words which have to do with qualities of the body (viz. μὲν in § 16 *init.* and τὰ μέντοι σώματα . . . κατ' ὀλίγον ἐκπίπτει in § 16 *fin.*; μὲν in § 17 *init.* and τὸ δὲ σῶμα . . . μετακινούμενον in § 17 *fin.*) have been added by a later hand. See § 29 *fin.*

§ 15. κούφον καὶ πηδητικὸν καὶ ἀνέδραστον γίνεται τὸ ζῶον καὶ ψυχῆ καὶ σώματι. The writer must have been thinking of birds when he selected these three adjectives. Birds (and bird-like men) have an excess of air in the composition of their bodies; and this makes them not only literally 'light' and 'apt to hop about' and 'not apt to settle down' in body, but also metaphorically 'light' &c. in soul. The words καὶ ψυχῆ καὶ σώματι, supposing them to have been written by the original author, may be taken as equivalent to ὡς τῷ σώματι, οὕτω καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ.

§ 16. τὸ ζῶον τῇ [μὲν?] ψυχῇ γίγνεται εὐρουν (εὐχρουν MSS.) [καὶ εὐφυῆς] καὶ εὐπερίχυτον, ἰκανῶς τε τοῖς ἄλλοις [ἐπιπεσεῖν καὶ?] κολληθῆναι δυνάμενον. τὸ ζῶον means the living being, which consists of body and soul in combination. It may be either man or beast; and in this sentence the writer seems to be thinking chiefly of men.

¹ Either πυρωδεστέρα or ἐκπυρωτέρα would be better than ἐκπυρωδεστέρα.

When there is an excess of water in the composition of the body, the result is that the soul, like water, 'flows freely', and 'diffuses itself readily'; and in that case the man is well able to 'cleave to the others', or unite with other men or things, as water unites with things into which it soaks, or dissolves into itself things which are soaked in it. Does this mean that the man is of a social disposition,—that he is ready to make friends with his neighbours, and is able to influence them and apt to be influenced by them? Or does it refer to intellectual qualities, and mean that he readily brings his mind to bear on things and readily receives impressions from them? τοῖς ἄλλοις (sc. ζώοις?) seems to agree better with the former interpretation; if external objects in general were meant, we should have expected rather τοῖς πράγμασιν, or τοῖς ἐκτός. But καὶ εὐφυές was probably added by some one who thought that the sentence had to do with intellectual ability.

διὰ τὸ πρὸς τὰ ἄλλα [ἐνωτικὸν καὶ] κοινωνικὸν τοῦ ὕδατος· [ἐφιζάνει] (ἐνοῦται) γὰρ πᾶσι (sc. τὸ ὕδωρ). There is no sense in saying that water 'sits upon' or 'settles down on' all things; ἐφιζάνει must therefore have been substituted by error for some other verb. If ἐνωτικὸν is retained, it must be taken to mean 'apt to unite itself with things', from ἐνοῦσθαι, and not 'apt to unite things', from ἐνοῦν. But it is probable that the missing verb for which ἐφιζάνει has been substituted is ἐνοῦται, and that ἐνωτικὸν has arisen out of ἐνοῦται misplaced.

καὶ πολὺ μὲν ὄν <<καὶ περιλαβόν>> εἰς ἑαυτὸν ἀναλύει [(καὶ περιλαμβάνει)], ὀλίγον δ' ὑπάρχον καὶ καταδύν (καταδύσαν MSS.) ἐκείνο γίγνεται ᾧ ἐμίγη. καὶ περιλαμβάνει has probably come from πολὺ μὲν ὄν <<καὶ περιλαβόν>>, written in correspondence to ὀλίγον δ' ὑπάρχον καὶ καταδύν. (It is possible, however, that the author wrote merely πολὺ μὲν ὄν εἰς ἑαυτὸ ἀναλύει, ὀλίγον δ' ὑπάρχον ἐκείνο γίγνεται ᾧ ἐμίγη, and that both καὶ περιλαβόν and καὶ καταδύν were added by some one else.) If a large quantity of water is poured on a small quantity of earth, for instance, the water envelopes the earth and dissolves it. If a small quantity of water is poured on a large quantity of earth, the water sinks into the mass of earth, and disappears: and in the latter case it might be thought that the water was transmuted into earth (ἐκείνο γίγνεται ᾧ ἐμίγη).

[καὶ τοῦ ἰδίου συνδέσμου κατ' ὀλίγον ἐκπίπτει]. What is the point of ἰδίου? Possibly the meaning is 'the bond which holds together the parts of the body itself, as opposed to the bond which holds together the body and the soul; but the phrase is obscure. κατ'

δλίγον, 'little by little', is also difficult to explain; we should rather have expected something equivalent to μικρῶ τινι ἀφορμῇ. The words καὶ τοῦ . . . ἐκπίπτει are not needed, and may be omitted with advantage; perhaps they may have come from a marginal note on the preceding clause.

§ 17. ἀμβλεῖα [μέν] τοῦ ζώου ἢ ψυχῆ γίνεται. μέν is out of place. It seems intended to point forward to τὸ δὲ σῶμα κ.τ.λ.; but if that was the writer's intention, he ought to have written ἢ μὲν ψυχῆ τοῦ ζώου ἀμβλεῖα γίνεται. This confirms the suspicion that the mentions of *bodily* qualities in §§ 15-17 are later additions.

οὐκ ἔχουσα τὴν [σωματικὴν] (ἰδίαν) ἀραιότητα εὐλυτον, [οὐδὲ . . . ἀλλ' ἔνδον μένει παρ' ἑαυτῆς,] (ἀλλὰ) ὑπὸ [βάρους καὶ] (τῆς) πυκνότητος (τοῦ ἀτμοῦ?) πεδηθεῖσα. There can be little doubt that the two participle-clauses, οὐκ ἔχουσα τὴν . . . ἀραιότητα εὐλυτον and ὑπὸ . . . πυκνότητος . . . πεδηθεῖσα, were meant to be contiguous, and that the passage οὐδὲ . . . ἑαυτῆς, in which the verbs are in the indicative, has been wrongly interposed between them. If that passage occurred at all in the original text, it must have stood after πεδηθεῖσα; but it seems more probable that it is a note added by a reader.

σωματικὴν ἀραιότητα is impossible. It is not the body, but the soul, that is ἀραιόν; and in the case here spoken of, the body must be πυκνόν or στερεόν even beyond the average of bodies, since it contains an excess of τὸ γεῶδες. If we write τὴν ἰδίαν ἀραιότητα, the words may be taken to mean that the soul, though itself ἀραιόν, cannot easily free itself from the πυκνόν in which it is enveloped or entangled.

βάρους may have come from ἀργὸν καὶ βαρὺ below.

(τῆς) πυκνότητος must have been followed by some substantive in the genitive. As the writer held that it is by means of the ἀτμός that the body acts on the soul, his view would be best expressed by writing ὑπὸ τῆς πυκνότητος (τοῦ ἀτμοῦ) πεδηθεῖσα. But in §§ 15 and 16 he speaks of the influence of the body on the soul without mentioning the ἀτμός by which the influence is conveyed; and supposing that he did so here also, he may have written τοῦ σώματος, or τοῦ φυράματος.

[οὐδὲ τὸ δι' οὐ¹ ἐκ(πηδῆσαι) (δύναται) (πηδῆσεται MSS.) πεπαχυ(ς)-μένων τῶν αἰσθητικῶν (τοῦ σώματος?) μερῶν (μελῶν MSS.), ἀλλ' ἔνδον μένει παρ' ἑαυτῆς.] τοῦ δι' οὐ seems to have taken the place of some phrase by which ἐκπηδῆσαι was qualified. It may have come from τοῦ ἰδίου in § 16 *fin.*; or possibly the original reading may have been οὐδὲ (ἐκ) τοῦ (ἰ)δίου (τόπου? ἐκ)πηδῆσαι (δύναται).

τῶν αἰσθητικῶν μερῶν means the bodily organs of sense; and τοῦ σώματος must be either inserted or understood. The sense-organs (especially, perhaps, the eyes) are here regarded as doorways or passages through which the soul issues forth from its abode (in the heart) to get knowledge of the external world. When there is an excess of earth in the body, these organs are exceptionally thick or dense, and the soul consequently cannot make its way through them; it has to stay within and remain in ignorance.

The writer of this statement ignores the theory of an ἀτμός interposed between body and soul, and assumes that the activity of the soul is directly and immediately affected by the density of certain parts of the body.

A mention of the 'thickening of the bodily sense-organs' would have been more appropriately placed in the following passage, τὸ δὲ σῶμα κ.τ.λ., supposing that passage to have been present in the original text.

§ 18. τότε τὸ ζῶον θερμὸν (μὲν) εἰς πρᾶξιν, κούφον δὲ εἰς κίνησιν, εὔκρατον¹ δὲ εἰς ἀφήν¹, γενναῖον¹ δὲ εἰς πῆξιν κατασκευάζεται. The adjectives are probably intended to apply both to the body and to the soul, as in § 15; we may supply in thought καὶ ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι, or ὡς τῷ σώματι, οὕτω καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ. A satisfactory sense might be got by altering εὔκρατον δὲ εἰς ἀφήν into εὐπερίχυτον (or εὔρυντον) δὲ εἰς συναφήν, 'readily diffusing itself so as to unite with things' (cf. εὔρουν καὶ εὐπερίχυτον κ.τ.λ. in § 16, and εἰς Ἰσμπαγίαν¹ περίχυσιν in § ⟨⟨27⟩⟩). [γενναῖον indicates fixity or firmness: cf. Ar. *H.A.* 488 b 19; *Physiogn.* 809 b 10.]

⟨⟨§ 27. τὸ μὲν γὰρ (αὐτὸ μὲν γὰρ τὸ MSS.) γεῶδες ἐστὶν ἢ τοῦ σώματος πῆξις κ.τ.λ.⟩⟩. This section is out of place where it stands in the MSS. It must have been written to follow § 18; but it may have been added (in that place) by a transcriber. Earth and water are apparently here spoken of as affecting the body alone (ἢ τοῦ σώματος πῆξις, and ἢ ἐν τούτῳ—i. e. τῷ σώματι—περίχυσιν), and air and fire, as affecting the ζῶον as a whole (ἡμῶν), i. e. the body and soul in combination. That is hardly in agreement with the doctrine taught elsewhere in §§ 13–30, that an excess or deficiency of any of the four elements in the composition of the body affects both the qualities of the body (immediately) and those of the soul (through the operation of the intervening ἀτμός).

§§ 19–23. ὅσα οὖν . . . διὰ τὸ συγγενὲς κατοικεῖ. In these sections it is said that, if the quantities of the several elements of which the body is composed are proportioned to one another in a certain way,

the ζῷον produced is a bird; if they are proportioned in another way, the ζῷον produced is a man; and so on. This has little connexion with the preceding sections, and is hardly consistent with them. In §§ 13-18 we have been told that an excess of fire, for instance, in the composition of the body produces certain qualities in the soul (and body) of the ζῷον. That is apparently intended to apply both to men and to beasts, but more especially to men (ἡμῶν, § 13), and to account for the fact that one man differs from another in quality of soul. But in §§ 19-23, we are told that if there is a large proportion of fire in the composition of the body, and also a large proportion of air, the ζῷον is a bird, but if there is a large proportion of fire and only a small proportion of air, the ζῷον is a man. If these statements are to be brought into connexion with one another, we must assume that the soul-qualities which, according to §§ 13-18, are produced by an excess of fire (viz. 'energy and spiritedness') are qualities which all birds and all men possess in common. But nothing of the sort is said in the text; and no attempt is made to show how the contents of §§ 19-23 are to be reconciled with those of §§ 13-18. It is therefore most likely that this paragraph (§§ 19-23) was not written by the author of the document, but was inserted in it by a later hand.

The meaning of the paragraph has been obscured by some corruptions of the phrases in which the proportions of the several elements are stated in each of the five cases dealt with. With the corrections which I propose, we get a scheme which, if we substitute definite numbers for the vague πλεῖον, μέτριον, and ὀλίγον of the text, and assume in each case a total of eight parts, may be represented in tabular form as follows:—

BIRDS	MEN	QUADRUPEDS	REPTILES	FISHES
fire, 3	fire, 3	fire, 1	fire, 0	fire, 0
air, 3	air, 1	air, 1	air, 2	air, 0
water, 1	water, 2	water, 3	water, 3	water, 6
earth, 1	earth, 2	earth, 3	earth, 3	earth, 2

In this table, μέτριον is taken to mean two parts out of eight, πλεῖον three parts, and ὀλίγον one part,² in the case of birds, men, quadrupeds, and reptiles. In the case of fishes, πλεῖον is taken to mean six parts and ὀλίγον two parts, so that the proportion between πλεῖον and ὀλίγον is the same as in the other cases, though the quantities are doubled.

In §§ 13-18, the point insisted on was the connexion between an excess or deficiency of this or that element and the presence of corresponding qualities of soul. In §§ 19-23, a connexion of that kind is mentioned in the case of men (τὸ περισσὸν τοῦ θερμοῦ εἰς σύνεσιν ἐτράπη), quadrupeds (τῇ δὲ τοῦ θερμοῦ παρουσίᾳ ἀλκιμώτερα γέγονε), reptiles (τῇ τοῦ πυρὸς στέρησει ἀτολμα γέγονε), and fishes (τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ἀέρος στέρησει δειλὰ ἐστι), but not in the case of birds. But in constructing his scheme of the proportions of the four elements in the composition of the several kinds of ζῷα, the writer seems (except in the case of men) to have been thinking chiefly of the creature's place of abode. Birds fly aloft; they must therefore have in their composition much of τὰ ἀνωφερῆ στοιχεῖα (fire and air), of which the atmosphere consists, and little of τὰ κατωφερῆ (water and earth). Quadrupeds walk on the ground; they must therefore have in their composition much of τὰ κατωφερῆ, and little of τὰ ἀνωφερῆ. Reptiles, like quadrupeds, live on the surface of the earth, and must therefore, like quadrupeds, consist chiefly of τὰ κατωφερῆ; but as they stand lower than quadrupeds in the scale of existence, the writer assigns to them no fire and two parts of air, as against the one part of fire and one of air assigned to quadrupeds. Fishes live in the water, and die if taken out of it and placed in air; hence it may be inferred that they have in them no ἀνωφερές at all, but consist wholly of τὰ κατωφερῆ,—much water, combined with a little earth to give solidity to their bodies, which would be fluid if composed wholly of water. The case of men is exceptional. Since men, like quadrupeds and reptiles, live on the surface of the earth, they ought, according to the principle which is applied in the other cases, to have in them the same preponderance of τὰ κατωφερῆ; but owing to the Stoic association of fire with intelligence, the writer felt it necessary to assign to men a large proportion of fire, and consequently to cut down their allowance of the other elements. He tells us that the excess of fire in men 'is converted into intelligence'. He assigns an excess of fire to birds also; but it must be supposed that in the case of birds the extra fire is not converted into intelligence, but takes effect in some other way.

It is strange that men are placed between birds and quadrupeds. Possibly the paragraph originally dealt with irrational animals only, and the mention of men was inserted later.

§ 19. ὅσα οὖν (sc. ζῷα) [τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ] κεκοινώηκε πλείονος μὲν πυρὸς καὶ πνεύματος, (ὀλίγου δὲ ὕδατος καὶ γῆς,) ταῦτα ἀπωρνεῖται. Does

τῷδε τῷ λόγῳ mean 'according to this doctrine', i. e. according to the teaching of §§ 13-18? If so, the person who put §§ 19-23 into the document may have inserted this phrase by way of an attempt to connect the paragraph with the preceding passage. But there is no real connexion.

The proportion of each of the four elements ought to be stated in each of the five cases; and the μέν after πλείονος shows that a corresponding statement about water and earth must have followed. The adjective might be either ὀλίγου or ἐλάττωνος; but as ὀλίγου is the word used in §§ 20, 21, and 23, I have written it here also.

§ 20. πλείονος μὲν πυρός, ὀλίγου δὲ πνεύματος, ὕδατος δὲ (μετρίου) καὶ γῆς ἴσης. ὕδατος καὶ γῆς ἴσης is unintelligible. ὕδατος καὶ γῆς ἴσων might mean 'water and air in equal proportions'; but that would be too indefinite. If we insert μετρίου after ὕδατος δέ, and take ἴσης to mean 'likewise μετρίας', we get the proportions which the scheme requires.

ὁ γὰρ ἐν ἡμῖν νοῦς θερμόν τι χρήμά ἐστιν. This is Stoic doctrine. Compare the Stoic speaker's exposition in Cic. *Nat. deor.* 2. 23-32, which is probably based on Posidonius.

διαδύνει δὲ [κατὰ] (διὰ) πάντων [καὶ ἐπίσταται]. ἐπίσταται is probably a misplaced variant for the preceding οἶδε.

§ 21. πλείονος μὲν ὕδατος, πλείονος δὲ γῆς, [μετρίου δέ] ((ὀλίγου δέ)) πνεύματος καὶ [[ὀλίγου δέ]] πυρός. The meaningless δέ before πυρός shows that there is something wrong in the text of the MSS.; and in connexion with πνεύματος, μετρίου (the average amount) cannot be right. If there is more than the average of both water and earth, there ought to be less than the average of both air and fire. μετρίου has doubtless come from § 20, where it is needed; and ὀλίγου δέ, which ought to stand before πνεύματος, has been transposed.

ταῦτα (ἀπο)τεθηρίωται. By θηρία the writer means quadrupeds. He wanted to use a verb, and did not venture to coin such a word as ἀποτετετραπόδωται.

τῇ δὲ τοῦ θερμοῦ παρουσίᾳ (περιουσίᾳ MSS.) ἀλκιμώτερα γέγονε τῶν ἄλλων. τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ περιουσίᾳ is inconsistent with ὀλίγου πυρός. Reading παρουσίᾳ, we may take the meaning to be that quadrupeds, having in them *some* fire (though not much), are thereby made more pugnacious than 'the other animals' (viz. the reptiles and the fishes), which have *no* fire in them.¹ τῶν ἄλλων must be understood to

¹ The writer overlooks the fact that some quadrupeds (e. g. hares) are hardly more pugnacious than snakes and fishes.

mean, not 'all animals other than quadrupeds' (which would include birds and men), but 'animals other than those of which I have already spoken'. Birds and men have *much* fire in them, and therefore, if the writer's theory holds good in their case, ought to be even more *ἄλκιμα* than quadrupeds; but about that he says nothing.

§ 22. ὅσα δὲ γῆς (μὲν) καὶ ὕδατος [ἴσων] (πλείονος) κεκοινώνηκε, (πνεύματος δὲ μετρίου, πυρὸς δὲ οὐδενός,) ταῦτα ἀφηρπύεται (ἀφειρπύθη MSS). The addition of *πυρὸς δὲ οὐδενός* is made necessary by the following words *τῇ τοῦ πυρὸς στερήσει*. But what are the proportions of the other three elements? Reptiles must surely have in them as large a proportion of *τὰ κατωφερῆ* as quadrupeds; and if so, *πλείονος* is the word wanted in connexion with earth and water. It might perhaps be possible to take *ἴσων* as referring to *πλείονος μὲν ὕδατος πλείονος δὲ γῆς* in § 21, and assume that it means 'in the same proportion as in the preceding case'. That would make *ἴσων* equivalent to *πλείονος*; but the meaning would be obscurely expressed, and it seems better to substitute *πλείονος* for *ἴσων*. And if there is *πλείον* of earth, *πλείον* of water, and no fire, the proportion of air required to make up the right total is *μέτριον*. ($3 + 3 + 2 + 0 = 8$.)

τῇ δὲ τοῦ ὕδατος [[*κοινωνία*]] (*περιουσία*) ὑγρά (*ψυχρά* MSS.) ἐγένετο, *τῇ δὲ τῆς γῆς βαρέα καὶ νωθρά*, *τῇ δὲ τοῦ πνεύματος* ((*κοινωνία*)) ἑὺκίνητα εἰ προαιρέσει τὸ κινεῖσθαι. The right word to correspond to *πλείονος* is *περιουσία*, and not *κοινωνία*, which, like *κεκοινώνηκε* above, would be equally applicable whether the quantity of the thing were *πλείον*, *μέτριον*, or *ὀλίγον*. Consequently, if we write *πλείονος* above, we must substitute *περιουσία* for *κοινωνία* in connexion with earth and water, and make *κοινωνία* apply to air alone, the quantity of which is *μέτριον*.

According to the Stoics, air is *τὸ ψυχρόν*, and water *τὸ ὑγρόν*. For this reason, we expect to be told that a surplus of water makes things *ὑγρά*, rather than *ψυχρά*; and it is most likely that *ψυχρά* is a misreading for *ὑγρά*. Cf. *τῇ τοῦ σώματος ὑγρότητι*, said of reptiles, in § 5.

The words *εὺκίνητα εἰ προαιρέσει τὸ κινεῖσθαι*, with some alteration, might be made to mean 'able to move easily or quickly if they choose to move'. *εὺκίνητα* seems hardly consistent with *βαρέα καὶ νωθρά*; but the writer may have meant that a snake usually moves slowly or lies motionless, and yet is capable of making a quick and sudden dart.

§ 23. *πλείονος μὲν ὑγροῦ, ὀλίγου δὲ ξηροῦ*, (*πυρὸς δὲ καὶ πνεύματος οὐδενός*). *πυρὸς δὲ καὶ πνεύματος* (or *θερμοῦ δὲ καὶ ἀέρος*) *οὐδενός* must

be added here, because τῇ τοῦ θερμοῦ καὶ ἀέρος στερήσει follows. Fishes are δειλά because of the absence of τὸ θερμόν in their composition, and καταδντικά (i. e. κατωφερῆ in the extreme) because of the absence of air and fire (τὰ ἀνωφερῆ).

τῆ δὲ τοῦ ὑγροῦ περιουσία καὶ τῇ τοῦ γεώδους παρουσία (περιουσία MSS.) ἐν Ἰλελυμένη γῆ καὶ ὕδατι διὰ τὸ συγγενές κατοικεῖ. Here again, as in § 21, παρουσία has been wrongly altered into περιουσία. The proportion of earth is δλίγον.

λελυμένη γῆ καὶ ὕδατι must be a corruption of some phrase meaning 'water which has a little earth dissolved in it'. Fishes are composed of much water and a little earth; and they live in an environment composed of the same elements. The water of rivers, lakes, and seas is not the pure element water; it always contains some earth.

For the notion that the differences between the several kinds of animals result from the different proportions of the four elements in the composition of their bodies, cf. *Schol. in Hermog. ideas*, Walz *Rhet. Gr.* VII, p. 884 (*Arnim Sto.* II, § 789): οἱ μὲν γὰρ Στωικοὶ λέγουσι μὴ (ἀσώματον?) εἶναι (τὴν) ψυχὴν, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων ἀποτελεῖσθαι τὴν γένεσιν (αὐτῆς): ὅταν μὲν γὰρ πλεονάσῃ τὸ θερμόν, ποιεῖ τὸν λέοντα, ὄθεν, φησί, καὶ θυμικός ἐστω.¹ ὅταν δὲ κατὰ λόγον καὶ σχεδὸν ἐξ ἴσου συνέλθῃ, ποιεῖ τὸν ἀνθρώπων,² ταύτης τῆς δόξης προστάτης ἐγένετο καὶ Γαληνός.

§ 24. Ἰκαὶ πρὸς μὲν . . . στοιχείων οὐσιομετρίας.¹ This passage, as given in the MSS., is meaningless; but it evidently dealt with the proportionate quantities of the several elements in the composition of living bodies. It is to be inferred from the words τὰ λοιπὰ ζῶα that *men* were spoken of in the earlier part of the section; we may therefore insert τῶν ἀνθρώπων in connexion with τὰ σώματα. It seems probable that ὀλιγομετρίαν is a corruption of ὀλιγομοιρίαν (meaning τὴν ὀλιγότητα τῆς μοίρας), which would be a suitable term to stand in contrast to τῆς μοίρας τὴν ὑπεροχὴν (περιοχὴν MSS.); and it is not unlikely that οὐσιομετρίας also is a corruption of ὀλιγομοιρίας (or possibly of ἰσομοιρίας). The text cannot be restored with any certainty; but we can see what the passage was about; and its writer (whether the author of the *libellus* or a transcriber) may have intended it to follow §§ 18 and 27.

¹ Cf. *Exc.* XXVI. 14: εἰ μὲν γὰρ . . . πλεονάσειε τὸ πῦρ, . . . ποιεῖ(ται!) τὸ ζῶον . . . θυμικόν.

² The theory here reported differs in detail from that of *Exc.* XXVI. 19-23, according to which the proportions of the four elements in man are *not* equal; but it is constructed on similar principles.

§ 25. [ἢ κατὰ τὴν πρώτην σύνοδον γενομένη κρᾶσις καὶ ὁ ἐκ ταύτης ἀναθυμῳώμενος ἀτμός.]. This is a misplaced alternative for ὁ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συνόδου καὶ κρᾶσεως τῶν στοιχείων γιγνόμενος ἀτμός in § 28.

ἐφ' ὅσον (μὲν τὸ φύραμα) τὴν ἰδίαν τηρεῖ ποιότητα (τὴν ἰδίαν τηροῦσιν ἰδιότητα MSS.). The missing subject must have been τὸ φύραμα or some term of similar meaning, e. g. τὸ σύγκραμα (§ 29), or ἡ σύστασις τοῦ σώματος. The presence of two nominatives (κρᾶσις and ἀτμός) in the misplaced scrap which precedes has caused τηρεῖ to be altered into τηροῦσιν.

The phrase τῆς ἰδίας ιδιότητος occurs in *Exc.* XVI. 6, and may perhaps be there justified by the context; but τὴν ἰδίαν ιδιότητα is hardly possible here.¹ The word *ιδιότης* is equivalent to *ἰδία ποιότης*; and the sense wanted may be got by writing either τὴν ἰδίαν τηρεῖ ποιότητα or τηρεῖ τὴν ἰδιότητα.

In §§ 13-18, the writer has been speaking of the proportions in which the four elements are present in the body when it is first formed. In §§ 25-29, he goes on to say that these proportions may be altered during the life of the ζῷον, and explains the effect of such alterations. Health consists in the maintenance of the original proportions, whatever they may be in the particular case;² and when the original proportion of any one of the four elements is increased or diminished, disease results. (An increase of τὸ θερμόν, for instance, might produce fever.)

ἐπὰν [γὰρ] (δέ) . . . ἤτοι πλεονάσῃ τούτων τι (πλεονάσῃ ταῦτα MSS.) (ἢ ἐλαττωθῆ), οὐκ ἔνεργεία λέγω (ἐνεργεῖ ἀλλ' ἐγὼ MSS.) τὴν περιοχὴν¹, οὐδὲ τῇ κατ' αὔξῃσιν γινομένη μεταβολῇ [τοῦ γένους καὶ] τῶν σωμάτων, ἀλλὰ τῇ [] συστατικῇ τῶν στοιχείων κρᾶσει, . . . (τὸ) τηρῆκαῦτα [οὕτως] νο(σ)εῖ τὸ ζῷον. Disease is caused by an alteration in the συστατικῇ τῶν στοιχείων κρᾶσις, that is, in the proportions of the several elements which are mixed together in the σύστασις of the body. Cf. Pl. *Tim.* 81 E: τὸ δὲ τῶν νόσων ὄθεν ξυνίσταται, δῆλόν που καὶ παντί. τεττάρων γὰρ ὄντων γενῶν ἐξ ὧν συμπέπηγε τὸ σῶμα, γῆς πυρὸς ὕδατός τε καὶ ἀέρος, τούτων ἢ παρὰ φύσιν πλεονεξία καὶ ἔνδεια . . . στάσεις καὶ νόσους παρέχει. *Ib.* 86 A: τὸ μὲν οὖν ἐκ πυρὸς ὑπερβολῆς μάλιστα νόσησαν σῶμα ξυνεχῆ καίματα καὶ πυρετοὺς ἀπεργάζεται, τὸ δ' ἐξ ἀέρος κ.τ.λ.

¹ In *Sap. Sal.* 2. 23, ὁ θεὸς ἔκτισεν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐπ' ἀφθαρσία, καὶ εἰκόνα τῆς ἰδίας ιδιότητος ἐποίησεν αὐτόν (Swete), it is almost certain that the right reading is τῆς ἰδίας ἀδιότητος. See Goodrick's note *ad loc.*

² It may be inferred from §§ 13-18, if I have understood that passage rightly, that the writer holds not only that the original proportions in the case of a man differ from the original proportions in the case of a bird or a fish, but also that the original proportions in the case of one man differ from the original proportions in the case of another man.

The emendation ΟΥΚΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΙΛΕΓΩ for ΟΥΚΕΝΕΡΓΕΙΑΛΛΕΓΩ may be accepted as certain. The writer guards against misunderstanding by mentioning two other kinds of alterations, and explaining that his statement does not apply to *them*. The second of these is described in the words τῇ κατ' αὔξησιν γινομένη μεταβολῇ τῶν σωμαίων, the meaning of which is clear. As a child grows, the *quantity* of each of the four elements of which its body is composed necessarily increases; but provided that the *proportions* of the four elements to one another are maintained without change, there is no disease, and the healthy child grows into a healthy man. But what is the first of the two kinds of alteration that the writer says he does not mean? His description of it has been corrupted into ἐνεργεῖ ἀλ τὴν περιοχὴν. A satisfactory sense might be got by writing τῇ ἐνεργείᾳ τοῦ περιέχοντος, 'I do not mean (an increase or diminution which is effected) by the operation of the environment'. If a man is exposed to a hot sun, or stands before a fire, his body is heated; that is, the amount of τὸ θερμόν in it is in some sense increased. But that is not the sort of increase that this paragraph is concerned with; you do not fall ill every time you warm yourself. We may suppose that in such cases the θερμόν added from without merely penetrates the body, and is not organically combined with it; the additional 'fire' (or heat, regarded as a material substance,) does not enter into the σύστασις in such a way as to become a constituent part of it. If in some instance the heat of the sun does so enter into the bodily σύστασις as to alter its proportions, we have a case of sunstroke.

[οὕτως] has come from § 26 *init.*

§ 26. [ἐπὶν γὰρ οὕτως διατεθῆ τό τε θερμόν καὶ τὸ ἀερῶδες, ἀ δὴ σύσκηνά ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς, τότε ἐν ἁλλαγόρῳ καὶ ἐκστάσει γίγνεται τὸ ζῶον.] If this is read in connexion with the preceding sentence, οὕτως διατεθῆ must mean 'are increased or diminished'. We should have expected to be told that, when the fire in the body is increased or diminished, the ζῶον falls into certain diseases, and when the air is increased or diminished, the ζῶον falls into certain other diseases. But instead of that, we are here told that when *both* the fire *and* the air are increased or diminished, the ζῶον falls into 'allegories and ecstasies'. ἔκστασις might perhaps mean ἔκστασις μανικῆ, i. e. some form of mental disease (insanity, delirium, or loss of consciousness); but ἀλλαγόρῳ are not diseases.¹

¹ I have thought of proposing ἐρηγορίαις (or γρηγορίαις), in the sense of 'attacks of insomnia'. (In the magic papyri, there are spells which are expected to pro-

We are also told that τὸ θερμόν and τὸ ἀερωδές (the fire and air in the body? or fire and air in general?) are σύσκηνα τῆς ψυχῆς. What does that mean? According to the preceding sections, the four elements are mixed together in the body, and an embodied soul, if it is σύσκηνος with any of them, must be σύσκηνος with all four; though it would be more correct to say that the σκῆνος of the soul (i. e. the body) is composed of the four elements. An *unembodied* soul might be said to be σύσκηνος with fire and air, inasmuch as it resides in the atmosphere, which consists mainly of air, but contains also some fire diffused through the air or intermixed with it; but in this part of the document we are not concerned with unembodied souls.

This sentence then must be a detached fragment inserted here by error. (See § 30.)

[πεπύκνωται γὰρ τὰ στοιχεῖα δι' ὧν διαφθείρεται τὰ σώματα.] This is unintelligible. One might conjecture πεπύκνωται γὰρ (. . .) τὰ (κατωφερῆ) στοιχεῖα (. . . νόσοι?) δι' ὧν διαφθείρεται τὰ σώματα. Thus altered, the words might be a remnant of a statement connected with and parallel to the preceding sentence; and the meaning of the section as a whole might be something of this sort: 'when certain changes take place in the fire and the air, the ζῶον falls into diseases of the soul; when certain changes take place in the water and the earth, the ζῶον falls into diseases of the body.'

§ 28. Ὡσπερ οὖν ὁ ἐκ τῆς πρώτης συνόδου καὶ κράσεως τῶν στοιχείων γιγνόμενος ἀτμός [καὶ ὡσανεὶ ἕξαψις καὶ ἀναθυμίασις], ὁποῖος [εἴ] ἂν ᾖ, κ.τ.λ. In § 25, we were told that an alteration in the proportions of the elements in the body produces (bodily) disease. In § 28, the writer goes on to say that such an alteration produces certain effects in the soul also. But as it is through the medium of the ἀτμός that the influence of the elements contained in the body as originally composed is brought to bear upon the soul (§ 13), so it is through the medium of the ἀτμός that alterations in the composition of the body produce effects in the soul. If, for instance, the proportion of fire in the body is increased, the ἀτμός becomes more fiery, and thence results a corresponding alteration (presumably a morbid alteration) in the soul. Cf. Pl. *Tim.* 86 B-E: καὶ τὰ μὲν περὶ τὸ σῶμα νοσήματα ταύτην ἐμββαίνει γιγνόμενα, τὰ δὲ περὶ ψυχὴν διὰ σώματος ἕξιν, τῆδε. . . ὅτου duce the effect of depriving the victim of sleep; and in one of them, there is given a recipe for a magic operation by which a woman can be kept awake until she dies for want of sleep.) But I have not found any instance of the word ἐγρηγορία or γρηγορία.

γὰρ ἂν ἡ τῶν δξέων καὶ τῶν ἀλυκῶν φλεγμάτων καὶ ὅσοι πικροὶ καὶ χολώδεις χυμοὶ κατὰ τὸ σῶμα πλανηθέντες . . . τὴν ἀφ' αὐτῶν ἀτμίδα τῆ τῆς ψυχῆς φορᾶ ξυμμίξαντες ἀνακερασθῶσι, παντοδαπὰ νοσήματα ψυχῆς ἐμποιοῦσι. (It may possibly have been that passage that suggested to the writer of *Exc.* XXVI the use of ἀτμός instead of the Stoic term πνεῦμα.)

The terms *ἔξαψις* and *ἀναθυμίασις* are here given as equivalents for ἀτμός. We were told in § 13 that the ἀτμός ἀναθυμιᾶται; but *ἔξαψις* ('a kindling' or 'a setting on fire') is not a suitable word to describe this 'vapour'; and as its nature has been sufficiently explained before, the words καὶ . . . ἀναθυμίασις are superfluous.

[ὡς ἂν ἔχη φύσεως, εἴτε σπουδαίως (σπουδαίως MSS.) εἴτε μῆ]. We must understand εἴτε σπουδαίως (ἔχει) εἴτε μῆ. But this phrase is redundant after *ὁποῖος ἂν ἦ*; and the implied statement that the ἀτμός produced by the original *κρᾶσις τῶν στοιχείων* sometimes *οὐ σπουδαίως ἔχει* is inconsistent with § 25, where we were told that, as long as the original proportions are maintained, *τὸ ζῶον ὑγιαίνει*. The phrase *ὁποῖος ἂν ἦ* is not open to this objection; for it implies merely that the ἀτμός (when first formed), like the *φύραμα* which produces it, is differently composed in different cases, and not that it sometimes has *bad* qualities.

§ 29. τῆ (μὲν) γὰρ ἐξ ἀρχῆς (διαθέσει?) [πρὸς αὐτὸν οἰκειότητι καὶ συντροφία] ἐπιμένουσα ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν τάξιν διατηρεῖ. πρὸς αὐτόν (*sc.* τὸν ἀτμόν) οἰκειότητι καὶ συντροφία makes nonsense here; for the οἰκειότης and συντροφία between the soul and the ἀτμός never ceases; if the ἀτμός is altered, the soul is altered correspondingly. The phrase may perhaps have come from the lost passage, beginning with *οὕτω καί*, which followed *ὥσπερ . . . εἰς ἑαυτόν* in § 28.

The sentence ought to end with something equivalent to *τὴν ὑγίειαν διατηρεῖ*. If we retain *τάξιν*, we must take it as meaning *εὐταξίαν*; but perhaps it would be better to write *εὐταξίαν*.

ἦτοι τῷ ὄλῳ συγκράματι ἢ καὶ [μέρεσιν ἢ] μέρει (τινὶ) αὐτοῦ. *μέρεσιν ἢ* may be a corruption of *μέρει τινί*. But why should the writer speak of an addition of fire, for instance, to a *part* of the σίγκραμα? Perhaps his meaning may have been that an increase of fire may take place, not in the body as a whole, but in some one part of it, e. g. in the heart or in the stomach; and that the alteration in the ἀτμός and the soul caused by an increase of fire in the heart would be different from the alteration caused by an increase of fire in the stomach.

[ἤτοι] τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς διάθεσιν [ἢ τὴν τοῦ σώματος]. A mention of changes in the *body* is out of place here. That topic was disposed of in § 25. In §§ 26-28, the writer has gone on to speak of changes in the soul; and he could have no reason for recurring to the subject of *bodily* disease. Besides, it is wrong to say that changes in the *ἀτμός* cause changes in the body; it is the soul, and not the body, that is affected by the *ἀτμός*. See note on § 13.

§ 30. [τὸ (μὲν) γὰρ πῦρ καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα κ.τ.λ.] We are here told that the fire and the air (i. e. the portions of fire and air which have entered into the composition of a given body?) 'run up to' the soul, but the water and the earth 'settle down on' the body. This seems to imply that the soul is in one place and the body in another, that is, that the soul is unembodied. But in the preceding sections, the writer has been speaking only of embodied souls; and an embodied soul is either diffused throughout the body or seated in some central organ of the body. Moreover, as long as the life of the ζῶον continues, the four elements are mixed together in the body, and it could not be said that two of them go to one place and the two others to another place. This section then is inconsistent with the context. It seems to have been written from the same point of view as § 26, which speaks of τό τε θερμὸν καὶ τὸ ἀερῶδες, ἃ δὴ σύσκηνά ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς; and it may very likely have been extracted from the same document, and inserted in *Exc.* XXVI by the same person.

If we read *ὁμοίωρον* and *ὁμοιόδρω*, we are told that the place of the soul is *similar* to the place of the fire and the air, and the abode of the body is *similar* to the abode of the water and the earth. If we read *ὁμόωρον* and *ὁμοέδρω*, we are told that the place of the soul is *the same as* that of the fire and the air, and the abode of the body is *the same as* that of the water and the earth. The latter reading seems the more probable, and agrees better with what is said in § 26; but in either case the statement is obscure.

EXCERPT XXVIII

Exc. XXVIII is not a *Hermeticum* in the same sense as Excerpts I-XXVII; it is an extract from a *gnomologium*, i. e. a collection of apophthegms, each of which was ascribed to some wise man. But it is possible that the compiler of the *gnomologium* found the phrases ὁ τῶν ὄλων δημιουργός and σοφώτατος νοῦς καὶ αἰδῖος in Hermetic

libelli of the same type as those with which we have been dealing. For the former, cf. *ἐκείνος τὸ δλον ἐδημιούργησεν* in *Exc.* XXI. 2.

EXCERPT XXIX

These verses are ascribed to Hermes in the MSS. of Stobaeus. But it is possible that the *lemma* Ἑρμοῦ is wrongly placed, and belonged to an *ecloga* which has been lost; and whether that is so or not, there is no reason to suppose that the verses were attributed to Hermes by the man who composed them. They are given without any author's name in the *Anthologia*,¹ and in three MSS. reported in *Catal. codd. astrol. Graec.* III; and in two other MSS. reported *ibidem*, they are ascribed to Empedocles.²

There is a similar instance of the attribution of hexameters to Hermes in the case of the Περὶ σεισμῶν (Abel, *Orphica*, pp. 141-143, φράζο δὴ καὶ τόνδε λόγον, τέκος, κ.τ.λ.), which in some MSS. is ascribed to Orpheus, but in others (e.g. *Catal. codd. astr. Gr.* Venet. 5, f. 289) to Hermes Trismegistus. In *Catal. codd. astr. Gr.* III. 5, f. 100, *ib.* 24, f. 20, and *ib.* 31, f. 24 v., the title is Ἑρμοῦ τοῦ τρισμαγίστου περὶ σεισμῶν ἐν ἄλλῳ Ὀρφείῳ. And a prose paraphrase of these verses about earthquakes, which is printed in *Catal. codd. astr. Gr.* VII, pp. 167-171, bears the title Ἑρμοῦ τοῦ τρισμαγίστου περὶ σεισμοῦ.

The heading περὶ εἰμαρμένης is inappropriate. It may perhaps be, as Wachsmuth suggests, a misplaced repetition of the superscription (περὶ εἰμαρμένης κ.τ.λ.) which stands at the head of the chapter of Stobaeus in which this *ecloga* is placed.

¹ In *Anthol. Gr.* ed. Jacobs, 1813-1817, vol. ii, p. 768, the superscription τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἢ Ἑρμοῦ is printed at the head of these verses (Append. nr. 40); and τοῦ αὐτοῦ means Θεῶνος Ἀλεξανδρείας, which is there printed at the head of nr. 39 (an encomium on Ptolemy the astronomer). But Jacobs says that nr. 40 'auctoris nomine caret in Append. Plan. p. 494 (i.e., I suppose, in the MS.). Quum in Palat. p. 442, nr. 491 versus septimus Theonis nomine inscriptus sit (see note on Μήνη, Ζεύς, κ.τ.λ. below), totum hoc poemation Theoni tribuendum censebat Br(unckius).'

As to nr. 39, Jacobs writes '*Theonis Alexandrini*. Hoc poemation, quod in Append. Plan. p. 494. St. legitur, Br(unckius) non dubitavit *Theoni* tribuere ei, qui commentarios scripsit in Ptolemaei Magnam Constructionem.' Does this ambiguous note mean that nr. 39 also is anonymous in the MS., and that its ascription to 'Theon of Alexandria' is merely a conjecture? Or, that Θεῶνος is given in the MS., and Brunck added Ἀλεξανδρείας? Or, that Θεῶνος Ἀλεξανδρείας is given in the MS., and Brunck took that to mean the man who wrote the commentary on Ptolemy?

² Perhaps some better readings of the text might be found in the MSS. mentioned in *Catal. codd. astr. Gr.*

κατ' Ὀλύμπιον . . . οὐδὸν εἰλεῦνται. The region of the planet-spheres might perhaps be regarded as the 'threshold' of the heaven of the fixed stars, which is situated beyond it. But that seems a far-fetched interpretation; and it is difficult to picture seven star-gods moving in circles along or upon a threshold. Is it possible that οὐδός is here used as a synonym for ὁδός? In that case, the 'Olympian path' along which the planets move would be the Zodiac. It has been suggested (Autenrieth, *Hom. Wörterb.*) that in the Homeric phrase ἐπὶ γήραος οὐδῶ the word means 'path'. Cf. Apollonius, *Lex. Hom.* 123. 33: οὐδὸς . . . ἀπὸ τοῦ δι' αὐτὸν ὀδεύειν (Ebeling, *Lex. Hom.* s. v.).

μετὰ τοῖσιν ἀεὶ περινίσσεται αἰών.—(μετὰ τοῖσιν ἀεὶ δ' ἐπινήσεται αἰών MSS. Stob.: καὶ τοῖσιν ἀεὶ κανονίζεται αἰών Anth.). κανονίζεται ('is measured'?) is hardly possible; and περινίσσεται (conjectured by Jacobs) is a suitable word to describe the recurrent movement of the seasons and the years. Cf. ἀνίκα Καρνεῖον περινίσσεται ὥρας (Eur. *Alc.* 449), and περιτελλομένων ἐνιαυτῶν. Time is measured by the movements of the heavenly bodies, and was sometimes said by the Greeks to be constituted by those movements.

Ἰαστοφόρος¹ Παφίη. παστός means a bridal chamber. In certain cults, the chamber in which a ἱερός γάμος was supposed to take place was called the παστός, and small models of such a παστός were carried by priests, who were thence called παστοφόροι. It may be that some such usage existed in the cult of Aphrodite at Paphos or elsewhere; and the epithet which properly applied to the priest might possibly be transferred to the deity. But in this verse, an adjective referring to a detail of ritual would be out of place. What is wanted is some word comparable to *στυγνός*, *ἡδύς*, and *θρασύς*, and describing broadly the most prominent characteristic of the goddess; and as we are told that Aphrodite is *ὄρεξις*, we should have expected something like 'bringing desire'. παντοφόρος, *omnium ferax*, would be a possible epithet for *alma Venus*, and would at least be better than παστοφόρος.

εὐπτερος Ἑρμῆς. Hermes is not only the winged messenger of the gods, but also the author or patron of *ἔπεα πτερόεντα*; cf. *λόγος Ἑρμῆς* below. The connexion of Hermes with *λόγος* (speech)¹ was

¹ Cf. Justin *Apol.* 1. 21. 2: πόσους γὰρ υἱὸς φάσκουσι τοῦ Διὸς οἱ παρ' ἡμῖν τιμῆμενοι συγγραφεῖς, ἐπίστασθε Ἑρμῆν μὲν, λόγον τὸν ἑρμηνευτικὸν καὶ πάντων διδάσκαλον, κ.τ.λ. *Ib.* 22. 2: εἰ δὲ καὶ ἰδίως . . . γεγενῆσθαι (τὸν Ἰησοῦν) ἐκ θεοῦ λέγομεν λόγον θεοῦ, . . . κοινὸν τοῦτο ἔστω ἡμῖν τοῖς τὸν Ἑρμῆν λόγον τὸν παρὰ θεοῦ ἀγγελτικὸν λέγουσιν.

felt to be implied in the verb *ἐρμηνεύειν*. A philosopher might identify Hermes with human reason, or with the *λόγος* of God, in the sense in which that term is used by Philo; but such notions would hardly be in keeping with the simple and popular tone of these verses.

Ζεὺς ἀρχιγένεθλος, ἀφ' οὗ φύσις ἐβλάστησεν. This is an expansion of *Ζεὺς γένεσις*. Zeus is *πατὴρ ἀνδρῶν τε θεῶν τε*, and the author of all life.

ἔστι δ' ἐν ἡμῖν Μῆνη κ.τ.λ. The planet-gods are within us; that is, we feel their workings or influences (*ἐνέργειαι* or *ἀπόρροιαί*) within us. Similarly, *δάκρυ μὲν ἐστὶ Κρόνος &c.* means *λύπη ἐστὶ Κρόνου ἐνέργεια* or *ἀπόρροια, &c.*

Μῆνη, Ζεὺς, Ἄρης, Παφίη, Κρόνος, Ἥλιος, Ἑρμῆς. The almost identical verse *Ζεὺς, Ἄρης, Παφίη, Μῆνη, Κρόνος, Ἥλιος, Ἑρμῆς* occurs, with a different context, in Manetho, *Ἀποτελεσματικά*, Koehly (Teubner), 5 [6]. 34. And in *Anthol. Pal.* p. 442 nr. 491 (Jacobs vol. ii, p. 175; Stadtmüller vol. iii. i, p. 488), that same verse (*Ζεὺς, Ἄ., Π., Μῆνη, Κ., Ἥ., Ἑ.*) is given under the superscription *Θέωνος*.¹ *μονόστιχον εἰς τὴν ἑβδομάδα.* The order of the seven names in Manetho and the *μονόστιχον* of *Anthol. Pal.* seems preferable (*ab Iove principium*); and it is very likely that in the *poemation* of Stob. and *Anthol. Append.* the order was originally the same, and *Μῆνη* has been shifted by accident.

There were many Theons; (five Theons of Alexandria, as well as a good many other men named Theon, are mentioned in Smith's *D. B.*;) but the man meant by *Θέωνος* in the superscription of the *μονόστιχον* in *Anthol. Pal.* may perhaps be the Theon of Alexandria (c. A. D. 380) who was the father of Hypatia, and was well known as an astronomer and geometer; and it is not unlikely that he was the writer of this little poem on the planets.²

*ἀπ' αἰθερίου ἡμεμερίσμεθα*¹ πνεύματος ἔλκει δάκρυ, γέλωτα. κ.τ.λ.

¹ Wachsmuth says 'in Palat. p. 442 n. 491 versus septimus (of Stob. 1. 5. 14, i. e. *Μῆνη* . . . Ἑρμῆς) Theoni Alexandrino adscribitur'. But what authority has he for 'Alexandrino'?

² Joh. Malala 343 (Migne, Tom. 97, col. 512) says that in the reign of Gratianus (A. D. 367-383) *Θέων ὁ σοφώτατος φιλόσοφος ἐδίδασκε καὶ ἡρμήνευε (al. -νεύσε) τὰ ἀστρονομικὰ καὶ τὰ Ἑρμοῦ τοῦ τρισμεγίστου συγγράμματα καὶ τὰ Ὀρφείως.* This doubtless refers to Theon, the father of Hypatia. That Theon is known to have written commentaries on the astronomical writings of Ptolemy; and if he was interested in the Orphic poems, that makes it the more likely that he sometimes wrote verses himself. These verses then may possibly have been written by him. But even if they were, they can have had nothing to do with his commentary on the *Hermetica*, and it can hardly be supposed that he ascribed them to Hermes.

In place of μεμερίσμεθα, something equivalent to εἴμαρται ἡμῖν is wanted. Meineke conjectures μεμορήμεθα; if we accept this, we must assume that μεμορήμεθα is here used *metri gratia* for μεμορήμεθα, *sortiti sumus*, from μοιράω. The word μεμόρημαι occurs, with a dative, in *Anth. Pal.* 7. 286 (πολιῶ μεμορημένε (al. μεμοραμμένε) πόντῳ); Manetho *Aprotel.* 6 [3]. 13 συνέσσι τε τοῖσιν ἕκαστος ἀνθρώπων μεμόρηται); and Nicand. *Alexiph.* 229 (πυρὸς μεμορημένος ἀγλαῖς); but in all three passages the meaning is doubtful.¹


ἔλκειν means 'to breathe in'; the ἀπόρροιαί of the planets are spoken of as if they were things that we draw in with our breath, or like our breath. αἰθέριον πνεῦμα is the aether of heaven, from which the planetary influences come down to us. The word πνεῦμα is more usually applied to the atmosphere than to the celestial aether which is situated above it; but the latter also is a gaseous substance, and any gaseous substance might be called πνεῦμα. Perhaps the writer meant to suggest that the celestial aether is the life-breath of the universe, and that the planetary ἀπόρροιαί which we 'breathe in' are, so to speak, detached portions of that universal life-breath.

Ζεὺς Ἰδῆ¹ γένεσις (δὴ *Anth.*: ἢ *MSS. Stob.*: δ' ἢ *Jacobs*). δῆ is meaningless; and ἦ, whether preceded by δ' or not, is intolerable. Sense can be reconciled with metre by writing γένεσις δὲ Ζεὺς.

τούτῳ γὰρ ἅπαντα Ἰδικαίως¹ καὶ θνητῇ διάνοια γελᾷ. 'Every mortal mind laughs *justly* by means of the sun' is nonsense. A phrase meaning 'laughs by reason of the sunlight' would make sense; and that might be expressed by writing τούτου . . . δι' ἀγλαῖς.

¹ In *Clem. Alex. Paed.* 2. 1. 7, οἱ περὶ τὰς λοιπάδας ἀσχολούμενοι καὶ τὰς μεμορημένας τῶν ἡδυσμάτων περιεργίας, it seems certain that μεμορημένας is a misreading.





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